fix arbitrary code execution via crafted URLs

Resolves: #1269797

0001-git-subtree-Use-gitexecdir-instead-of-libexecdir.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From a906459c2a89938e911f1650e6ce22315a1ec84d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Todd Zullinger <tmz@pobox.com>
-Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2013 11:54:21 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] git-subtree: Use gitexecdir instead of libexecdir
-
-When the git subtree Makefile includes config.mak from the toplevel,
-it's useful to have the same variables set globally applied.  Using
-gitexecdir instead of libexecdir respects the global settings more
-consistently.
-
-Remove the unused gitdir variable as well.
----
- contrib/subtree/Makefile | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/subtree/Makefile b/contrib/subtree/Makefile
-index 435b2de..dc8da19 100644
---- a/contrib/subtree/Makefile
-+++ b/contrib/subtree/Makefile
-@@ -2,9 +2,8 @@
- -include ../../config.mak
- 
- prefix ?= /usr/local
-+gitexecdir ?= $(prefix)/libexec/git-core
- mandir ?= $(prefix)/share/man
--libexecdir ?= $(prefix)/libexec/git-core
--gitdir ?= $(shell git --exec-path)
- man1dir ?= $(mandir)/man1
- 
- gitver ?= $(word 3,$(shell git --version))
-@@ -30,8 +29,8 @@ $(GIT_SUBTREE): $(GIT_SUBTREE_SH)
- doc: $(GIT_SUBTREE_DOC) $(GIT_SUBTREE_HTML)
- 
- install: $(GIT_SUBTREE)
--	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
--	$(INSTALL) -m 755 $(GIT_SUBTREE) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
-+	$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(gitexecdir)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 755 $(GIT_SUBTREE) $(DESTDIR)$(gitexecdir)
- 
- install-doc: install-man
- 
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

0001-transport-add-a-protocol-whitelist-environment-varia.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+From 91233ae25ec604bfbe5f624ebc3e1c45a3d3a36d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2015 18:03:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
+
+If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
+sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
+order to get the complete view as intended by the other
+side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
+user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
+have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
+but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
+exposes them to the attacker).
+
+Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
+high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
+to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
+protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
+
+We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
+particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
+This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
+defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
+grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
+to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
+since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
+effect, it is the only sensible one).
+
+A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
+test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
+is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
+prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
+unable to test the file-local code on machines without
+apache.
+---
+ Documentation/git.txt | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ connect.c             |  5 +++++
+ transport-helper.c    |  2 ++
+ transport.c           | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ transport.h           |  7 +++++++
+ 5 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/git.txt b/Documentation/git.txt
+index de7b870..b87bf7f 100644
+--- a/Documentation/git.txt
++++ b/Documentation/git.txt
+@@ -993,6 +993,37 @@ GIT_ICASE_PATHSPECS::
+ 	variable when it is invoked as the top level command by the
+ 	end user, to be recorded in the body of the reflog.
+ 
++`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`::
++	If set, provide a colon-separated list of protocols which are
++	allowed to be used with fetch/push/clone. This is useful to
++	restrict recursive submodule initialization from an untrusted
++	repository. Any protocol not mentioned will be disallowed (i.e.,
++	this is a whitelist, not a blacklist). If the variable is not
++	set at all, all protocols are enabled.  The protocol names
++	currently used by git are:
++
++	  - `file`: any local file-based path (including `file://` URLs,
++	    or local paths)
++
++	  - `git`: the anonymous git protocol over a direct TCP
++	    connection (or proxy, if configured)
++
++	  - `ssh`: git over ssh (including `host:path` syntax,
++	    `git+ssh://`, etc).
++
++	  - `rsync`: git over rsync
++
++	  - `http`: git over http, both "smart http" and "dumb http".
++	    Note that this does _not_ include `https`; if you want both,
++	    you should specify both as `http:https`.
++
++	  - any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
++	    `hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
+++
++Note that this controls only git's internal protocol selection.
++If libcurl is used (e.g., by the `http` transport), it may
++redirect to other protocols. There is not currently any way to
++restrict this.
+ 
+ Discussion[[Discussion]]
+ ------------------------
+diff --git a/connect.c b/connect.c
+index 5047402..6b679be 100644
+--- a/connect.c
++++ b/connect.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include "url.h"
+ #include "string-list.h"
+ #include "sha1-array.h"
++#include "transport.h"
+ 
+ static char *server_capabilities;
+ static const char *parse_feature_value(const char *, const char *, int *);
+@@ -677,6 +678,8 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
+ 		 * cannot connect.
+ 		 */
+ 		char *target_host = xstrdup(hostandport);
++		transport_check_allowed("git");
++
+ 		if (git_use_proxy(hostandport))
+ 			conn = git_proxy_connect(fd, hostandport);
+ 		else
+@@ -706,6 +709,7 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
+ 			int putty = ssh && strcasestr(ssh, "plink");
+ 			char *ssh_host = hostandport;
+ 			const char *port = NULL;
++			transport_check_allowed("ssh");
+ 			get_host_and_port(&ssh_host, &port);
+ 			port = get_port_numeric(port);
+ 
+@@ -724,6 +728,7 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
+ 			/* remove repo-local variables from the environment */
+ 			conn->env = local_repo_env;
+ 			conn->use_shell = 1;
++			transport_check_allowed("file");
+ 		}
+ 		argv_array_push(&conn->args, cmd.buf);
+ 
+diff --git a/transport-helper.c b/transport-helper.c
+index 3d8fe7d..fb4bd44 100644
+--- a/transport-helper.c
++++ b/transport-helper.c
+@@ -1031,6 +1031,8 @@ int transport_helper_init(struct transport *transport, const char *name)
+ 	struct helper_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
+ 	data->name = name;
+ 
++	transport_check_allowed(name);
++
+ 	if (getenv("GIT_TRANSPORT_HELPER_DEBUG"))
+ 		debug = 1;
+ 
+diff --git a/transport.c b/transport.c
+index 662421b..1f80cef 100644
+--- a/transport.c
++++ b/transport.c
+@@ -903,6 +903,20 @@ static int external_specification_len(const char *url)
+ 	return strchr(url, ':') - url;
+ }
+ 
++void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
++{
++	struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
++	const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
++
++	if (!v)
++		return;
++
++	string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
++	if (!unsorted_string_list_has_string(&allowed, type))
++		die("transport '%s' not allowed", type);
++	string_list_clear(&allowed, 0);
++}
++
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+ {
+ 	const char *helper;
+@@ -934,12 +948,14 @@ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+ 	if (helper) {
+ 		transport_helper_init(ret, helper);
+ 	} else if (starts_with(url, "rsync:")) {
++		transport_check_allowed("rsync");
+ 		ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_via_rsync;
+ 		ret->fetch = fetch_objs_via_rsync;
+ 		ret->push = rsync_transport_push;
+ 		ret->smart_options = NULL;
+ 	} else if (url_is_local_not_ssh(url) && is_file(url) && is_bundle(url, 1)) {
+ 		struct bundle_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
++		transport_check_allowed("file");
+ 		ret->data = data;
+ 		ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_from_bundle;
+ 		ret->fetch = fetch_refs_from_bundle;
+@@ -951,7 +967,10 @@ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+ 		|| starts_with(url, "ssh://")
+ 		|| starts_with(url, "git+ssh://")
+ 		|| starts_with(url, "ssh+git://")) {
+-		/* These are builtin smart transports. */
++		/*
++		 * These are builtin smart transports; "allowed" transports
++		 * will be checked individually in git_connect.
++		 */
+ 		struct git_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
+ 		ret->data = data;
+ 		ret->set_option = NULL;
+diff --git a/transport.h b/transport.h
+index 02ea248..c1447f1 100644
+--- a/transport.h
++++ b/transport.h
+@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ struct transport {
+ /* Returns a transport suitable for the url */
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *, const char *);
+ 
++/*
++ * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment,
++ * and die otherwise. type should generally be the URL scheme,
++ * as described in Documentation/git.txt
++ */
++void transport_check_allowed(const char *type);
++
+ /* Transport options which apply to git:// and scp-style URLs */
+ 
+ /* The program to use on the remote side to send a pack */
+-- 
+2.1.0
+

0002-submodule-allow-only-certain-protocols-for-submodule.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From 8c0d436912443147e691e4820c706d1c5014c1eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:13:12 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] submodule: allow only certain protocols for submodule
+ fetches
+
+Some protocols (like git-remote-ext) can execute arbitrary
+code found in the URL. The URLs that submodules use may come
+from arbitrary sources (e.g., .gitmodules files in a remote
+repository). Let's restrict submodules to fetching from a
+known-good subset of protocols.
+
+Note that we apply this restriction to all submodule
+commands, whether the URL comes from .gitmodules or not.
+This is more restrictive than we need to be; for example, in
+the tests we run:
+
+  git submodule add ext::...
+
+which should be trusted, as the URL comes directly from the
+command line provided by the user. But doing it this way is
+simpler, and makes it much less likely that we would miss a
+case. And since such protocols should be an exception
+(especially because nobody who clones from them will be able
+to update the submodules!), it's not likely to inconvenience
+anyone in practice.
+
+Reported-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+---
+ git-submodule.sh            |  9 +++++++++
+ t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100755 t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+
+diff --git a/git-submodule.sh b/git-submodule.sh
+index 9245abf..5aa3ce5 100755
+--- a/git-submodule.sh
++++ b/git-submodule.sh
+@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ require_work_tree
+ wt_prefix=$(git rev-parse --show-prefix)
+ cd_to_toplevel
+ 
++# Restrict ourselves to a vanilla subset of protocols; the URLs
++# we get are under control of a remote repository, and we do not
++# want them kicking off arbitrary git-remote-* programs.
++#
++# If the user has already specified a set of allowed protocols,
++# we assume they know what they're doing and use that instead.
++: ${GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=file:git:http:https:ssh}
++export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
++
+ command=
+ branch=
+ force=
+diff --git a/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..06f55a1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test protocol whitelisting with submodules'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-proto-disable.sh
++
++setup_ext_wrapper
++setup_ssh_wrapper
++
++test_expect_success 'setup repository with submodules' '
++	mkdir remote &&
++	git init remote/repo.git &&
++	(cd remote/repo.git && test_commit one) &&
++	# submodule-add should probably trust what we feed it on the cmdline,
++	# but its implementation is overly conservative.
++	GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ssh git submodule add remote:repo.git ssh-module &&
++	GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git submodule add "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git" ext-module &&
++	git commit -m "add submodules"
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'clone with recurse-submodules fails' '
++	test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules . dst
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'setup individual updates' '
++	rm -rf dst &&
++	git clone . dst &&
++	git -C dst submodule init
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'update of ssh allowed' '
++	git -C dst submodule update ssh-module
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'update of ext not allowed' '
++	test_must_fail git -C dst submodule update ext-module
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'user can override whitelist' '
++	GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git -C dst submodule update ext-module
++'
++
++test_done
+-- 
+2.1.0
+

0003-transport-refactor-protocol-whitelist-code.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+From 2177303c6bff4d91b80cfb7cd95fac211771205a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:03:49 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] transport: refactor protocol whitelist code
+
+The current callers only want to die when their transport is
+prohibited. But future callers want to query the mechanism
+without dying.
+
+Let's break out a few query functions, and also save the
+results in a static list so we don't have to re-parse for
+each query.
+
+Based-on-a-patch-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+---
+ transport.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ transport.h | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/transport.c b/transport.c
+index 1f80cef..6eeb0e3 100644
+--- a/transport.c
++++ b/transport.c
+@@ -903,18 +903,40 @@ static int external_specification_len(const char *url)
+ 	return strchr(url, ':') - url;
+ }
+ 
+-void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
++static const struct string_list *protocol_whitelist(void)
+ {
+-	struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
+-	const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
++	static int enabled = -1;
++	static struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
++
++	if (enabled < 0) {
++		const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
++		if (v) {
++			string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
++			sort_string_list(&allowed);
++			enabled = 1;
++		} else {
++			enabled = 0;
++		}
++	}
+ 
+-	if (!v)
+-		return;
++	return enabled ? &allowed : NULL;
++}
++
++int is_transport_allowed(const char *type)
++{
++	const struct string_list *allowed = protocol_whitelist();
++	return !allowed || string_list_has_string(allowed, type);
++}
+ 
+-	string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
+-	if (!unsorted_string_list_has_string(&allowed, type))
++void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
++{
++	if (!is_transport_allowed(type))
+ 		die("transport '%s' not allowed", type);
+-	string_list_clear(&allowed, 0);
++}
++
++int transport_restrict_protocols(void)
++{
++	return !!protocol_whitelist();
+ }
+ 
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+diff --git a/transport.h b/transport.h
+index c1447f1..0a7f3f2 100644
+--- a/transport.h
++++ b/transport.h
+@@ -131,12 +131,23 @@ struct transport {
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *, const char *);
+ 
+ /*
++ * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment. Type should
++ * generally be the URL scheme, as described in Documentation/git.txt
++ */
++int is_transport_allowed(const char *type);
++
++/*
+  * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment,
+- * and die otherwise. type should generally be the URL scheme,
+- * as described in Documentation/git.txt
++ * and die otherwise.
+  */
+ void transport_check_allowed(const char *type);
+ 
++/*
++ * Returns true if the user has attempted to turn on protocol
++ * restrictions at all.
++ */
++int transport_restrict_protocols(void);
++
+ /* Transport options which apply to git:// and scp-style URLs */
+ 
+ /* The program to use on the remote side to send a pack */
+-- 
+2.1.0
+

0004-http-limit-redirection-to-protocol-whitelist.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+From 0521da24ebb5a81616f4bca6507d7bcbebc76cea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2015 18:08:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] http: limit redirection to protocol-whitelist
+
+Previously, libcurl would follow redirection to any protocol
+it was compiled for support with. This is desirable to allow
+redirection from HTTP to HTTPS. However, it would even
+successfully allow redirection from HTTP to SFTP, a protocol
+that git does not otherwise support at all. Furthermore
+git's new protocol-whitelisting could be bypassed by
+following a redirect within the remote helper, as it was
+only enforced at transport selection time.
+
+This patch limits redirects within libcurl to HTTP, HTTPS,
+FTP and FTPS. If there is a protocol-whitelist present, this
+list is limited to those also allowed by the whitelist. As
+redirection happens from within libcurl, it is impossible
+for an HTTP redirect to a protocol implemented within
+another remote helper.
+
+When the curl version git was compiled with is too old to
+support restrictions on protocol redirection, we warn the
+user if GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL restrictions were requested. This
+is a little inaccurate, as even without that variable in the
+environment, we would still restrict SFTP, etc, and we do
+not warn in that case. But anything else means we would
+literally warn every time git accesses an http remote.
+
+This commit includes a test, but it is not as robust as we
+would hope. It redirects an http request to ftp, and checks
+that curl complained about the protocol, which means that we
+are relying on curl's specific error message to know what
+happened. Ideally we would redirect to a working ftp server
+and confirm that we can clone without protocol restrictions,
+and not with them. But we do not have a portable way of
+providing an ftp server, nor any other protocol that curl
+supports (https is the closest, but we would have to deal
+with certificates).
+---
+ Documentation/git.txt |  5 -----
+ http.c                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/git.txt b/Documentation/git.txt
+index b87bf7f..406a179 100644
+--- a/Documentation/git.txt
++++ b/Documentation/git.txt
+@@ -1019,11 +1019,6 @@ GIT_ICASE_PATHSPECS::
+ 
+ 	  - any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
+ 	    `hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
+-+
+-Note that this controls only git's internal protocol selection.
+-If libcurl is used (e.g., by the `http` transport), it may
+-redirect to other protocols. There is not currently any way to
+-restrict this.
+ 
+ Discussion[[Discussion]]
+ ------------------------
+diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
+index c8cd50d..e153678 100644
+--- a/http.c
++++ b/http.c
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
+ #include "credential.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "pkt-line.h"
++#include "transport.h"
+ 
+ int active_requests;
+ int http_is_verbose;
+@@ -299,6 +300,7 @@ static void set_curl_keepalive(CURL *c)
+ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
+ {
+ 	CURL *result = curl_easy_init();
++	long allowed_protocols = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!curl_ssl_verify) {
+ 		curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0);
+@@ -348,6 +350,21 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
+ #elif LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071101
+ 	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_POST301, 1);
+ #endif
++#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071304
++	if (is_transport_allowed("http"))
++		allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_HTTP;
++	if (is_transport_allowed("https"))
++		allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_HTTPS;
++	if (is_transport_allowed("ftp"))
++		allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_FTP;
++	if (is_transport_allowed("ftps"))
++		allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_FTPS;
++	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, allowed_protocols);
++#else
++	if (transport_restrict_protocols())
++		warning("protocol restrictions not applied to curl redirects because\n"
++			"your curl version is too old (>= 7.19.4)");
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (getenv("GIT_CURL_VERBOSE"))
+ 		curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1);
+-- 
+2.1.0
+

0005-http-limit-redirection-depth.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 651648cf0ac04f9673bca45641e848771a4c64e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2015 17:30:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] http: limit redirection depth
+
+By default, libcurl will follow circular http redirects
+forever. Let's put a cap on this so that somebody who can
+trigger an automated fetch of an arbitrary repository (e.g.,
+for CI) cannot convince git to loop infinitely.
+
+The value chosen is 20, which is the same default that
+Firefox uses.
+---
+ http.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
+index e153678..0bfddb4 100644
+--- a/http.c
++++ b/http.c
+@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);
++	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS, 20);
+ #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301
+ 	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_POSTREDIR, CURL_REDIR_POST_ALL);
+ #elif LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071101
+-- 
+2.1.0
+

git-infinite-loop.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+diff --git a/refs.c b/refs.c
+index 67d6745..ddb9a77 100644
+--- a/refs.c
++++ b/refs.c
+@@ -1422,6 +1422,7 @@ static struct ref_dir *get_loose_refs(struct ref_cache *refs)
+ /* We allow "recursive" symbolic refs. Only within reason, though */
+ #define MAXDEPTH 5
+ #define MAXREFLEN (1024)
++#define MAXRETRIES 5
+ 
+ /*
+  * Called by resolve_gitlink_ref_recursive() after it failed to read
+@@ -1576,6 +1577,7 @@ const char *resolve_ref_unsafe(const char *refname, int resolve_flags, unsigned
+ 		struct stat st;
+ 		char *buf;
+ 		int fd;
++		int retries = 0;
+ 
+ 		if (--depth < 0) {
+ 			errno = ELOOP;
+@@ -1612,7 +1614,8 @@ const char *resolve_ref_unsafe(const char *refname, int resolve_flags, unsigned
+ 		if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
+ 			len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
+ 			if (len < 0) {
+-				if (errno == ENOENT || errno == EINVAL)
++				if ((errno == ENOENT || errno == EINVAL) &&
++					retries++ < MAXRETRIES)
+ 					/* inconsistent with lstat; retry */
+ 					goto stat_ref;
+ 				else
+@@ -1645,7 +1648,7 @@ const char *resolve_ref_unsafe(const char *refname, int resolve_flags, unsigned
+ 		 */
+ 		fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ 		if (fd < 0) {
+-			if (errno == ENOENT)
++			if (errno == ENOENT && retries++ < MAXRETRIES)
+ 				/* inconsistent with lstat; retry */
+ 				goto stat_ref;
+ 			else

git.service

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=Git Repositories Server Daemon
-Documentation=man:git-daemon(1)
-Wants=git.socket
-
-[Service]
-User=nobody
-ExecStart=/usr/libexec/git-core/git-daemon --base-path=/var/lib/git --export-all --user-path=public_git --syslog --inetd --verbose
-StandardInput=socket

git.spec

@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@
 %endif
 
 Name:           git
-Version:        2.0.0
+Version:        2.1.0
-Release:        4%{?dist}
+Release:        6%{?dist}
 Summary:        Fast Version Control System
 License:        GPLv2
 Group:          Development/Tools
@@ -57,14 +57,21 @@ Source5:        git-gui.desktop
 Source6:        gitweb.conf.in
 Source10:       http://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/%{name}-manpages-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source11:       http://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/%{name}-htmldocs-%{version}.tar.gz
-Source12:       git.service
+Source12:       git@.service
 Source13:       git.socket
 Patch0:         git-1.8-gitweb-home-link.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/490602
 Patch1:         git-cvsimport-Ignore-cvsps-2.2b1-Branches-output.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/600411
 Patch3:         git-1.7-el5-emacs-support.patch
-Patch5:         0001-git-subtree-Use-gitexecdir-instead-of-libexecdir.patch
+Patch4:         git-infinite-loop.patch
+
+# set of patches for security bug (solved since 2.6.1)
+Patch6:         0001-transport-add-a-protocol-whitelist-environment-varia.patch
+Patch7:         0002-submodule-allow-only-certain-protocols-for-submodule.patch
+Patch8:         0003-transport-refactor-protocol-whitelist-code.patch
+Patch9:         0004-http-limit-redirection-to-protocol-whitelist.patch
+Patch10:        0005-http-limit-redirection-depth.patch
 
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
 
@@ -175,18 +182,6 @@ Requires:       git = %{version}-%{release}
 %description -n gitweb
 Simple web interface to track changes in git repositories
 
-%package hg
-Summary:        Git tools for working with mercurial repositories
-Group:          Development/Tools
-%if %{noarch_sub}
-BuildArch:      noarch
-%endif
-Requires:       git = %{version}-%{release}
-Requires:       mercurial >= 1.8
-
-%description hg
-%{summary}.
-
 %package p4
 Summary:        Git tools for working with Perforce depots
 Group:          Development/Tools
@@ -308,7 +303,12 @@ Requires:       emacs-git = %{version}-%{release}
 %if %{emacs_old}
 %patch3 -p1
 %endif
-%patch5 -p1
+%patch4 -p1
+%patch6 -p1
+%patch7 -p1
+%patch8 -p1
+%patch9 -p1
+%patch10 -p1
 
 %if %{use_prebuilt_docs}
 mkdir -p prebuilt_docs/{html,man}
@@ -464,9 +464,6 @@ perl -p \
     %{SOURCE3} > %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/xinetd.d/git
 %endif
 
-# Install bzr and hg remote helpers from contrib
-install -pm 755 contrib/remote-helpers/git-remote-{bzr,hg} %{buildroot}%{gitcoredir}
-
 # Setup bash completion
 mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/bash_completion.d
 install -pm 644 contrib/completion/git-completion.bash %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/bash_completion.d/git
@@ -513,13 +510,13 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
 
 %if %{use_systemd}
 %post daemon
-%systemd_post git.service
+%systemd_post git@.service
 
 %preun daemon
-%systemd_preun git.service
+%systemd_preun git@.service
 
 %postun daemon
-%systemd_postun_with_restart git.service
+%systemd_postun_with_restart git@.service
 %endif
 
 %files -f bin-man-doc-files
@@ -530,13 +527,10 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
 %{!?_without_docs: %doc Documentation/howto Documentation/technical}
 %{_sysconfdir}/bash_completion.d
 
-%files bzr
+#git-bzr removed from this package and replaced by git-remote-bzr
-%defattr(-,root,root)
+#%files bzr
-%{gitcoredir}/git-remote-bzr
+#%defattr(-,root,root)
-
+#%{gitcoredir}/git-remote-bzr
-%files hg
-%defattr(-,root,root)
-%{gitcoredir}/git-remote-hg
 
 %files p4
 %defattr(-,root,root)
@@ -612,7 +606,7 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
 %doc Documentation/*daemon*.txt
 %if %{use_systemd}
 %{_unitdir}/git.socket
-%{_unitdir}/git.service
+%{_unitdir}/git@.service
 %else
 %config(noreplace)%{_sysconfdir}/xinetd.d/git
 %endif
@@ -633,6 +627,45 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
 # No files for you!
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Oct 28 2015 Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-6
+- fix arbitrary code execution via crafted URLs
+  Resolves: #1269797
+
+* Mon Jun 22 2015  Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-5
+- git-svn - added requires for perl-Digest-MD5 (#1218176) - it doesn't
+  seem that's really problem on F21 - found dependency by rpm from git-svn
+  package when I try remove it, but it's not bad have it inside spec file
+- solve troubles with infinite loop due to broken symlink (probably
+  shouldn't be problem here, but it's reproducible manually)
+  (#1204193)
+
+* Thu Dec 11 2014  Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-4
+- removed subpackage git-hg (not functional already)  -> replaced by separated
+  package git-remote-hg
+
+* Thu Nov 27 2014  Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com> - 2.1.0-3
+- removed subpackage git-bzr (not functional already)  -> replaced by separated
+  package git-remote-bzr
+
+* Sat Oct 25 2014 Pierre-Yves Chibon <pingou@pingoured.fr> - 2.1.0-2 
+- Rename the git.service into git@.service fixing
+  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/980574
+
+* Mon Aug 18 2014 Ondrej Oprala <ooprala@redhat.com - 2.1.0-1
+- 2.1.0
+
+* Sat Aug 16 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2.0.4-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jul 31 2014 Ondrej Oprala <ooprala@redhat.com - 2.0.4-1
+- 2.0.4
+
+* Mon Jul 28 2014 Ondrej Oprala <ooprala@redhat.com - 2.0.3-1
+- 2.0.3
+
+* Fri Jul 11 2014 Ondrej Oprala <ooprala@redhat.com - 2.0.1-1
+- 2.0.1
+
 * Tue Jun 10 2014 Ondrej Oprala <ooprala@redhat.com> - 2.0.0-4
 - Change source URLs, as googlecode doesn't have up-to-date tarballs
 

git@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Git Repositories Server Daemon
+Documentation=man:git-daemon(1)
+
+[Service]
+User=nobody
+ExecStart=-/usr/libexec/git-core/git-daemon --base-path=/var/lib/git --export-all --user-path=public_git --syslog --inetd --verbose
+StandardInput=socket

sources

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-a461ea86f5d655e449a3356ac7eb71ec  git-2.0.0.tar.gz
+40f059350019ff1f0763b315d0ca5c2e  git-2.1.0.tar.gz
-da88525f56a76b2e5b7249361eaf7073  git-htmldocs-2.0.0.tar.gz
+920860531676844a232589b21c1fba35  git-htmldocs-2.1.0.tar.gz
-0285283ceff06249c249fad8e77860d4  git-manpages-2.0.0.tar.gz
+3a0745e8302a904c8359e8a5da594cc9  git-manpages-2.1.0.tar.gz