diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 149e338..7f20fba 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ /*.tar.bz2 /*.tar.gz /*.tar.gz.asc -/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg +/*.gpg diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch similarity index 67% rename from openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch rename to 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch index 4c58d71..c08e414 100644 --- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch +++ b/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch @@ -1,72 +1,98 @@ -diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c ---- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth2.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200 -@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; - Authmethod *m = NULL; - char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; +From 95f4e30195382c3df7104c2ad3e5e9953f8ad554 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 01/50] openssh-7.8p1-role-mls + +--- + auth-pam.c | 2 +- + auth-pam.h | 2 +- + auth.h | 3 + + auth2-gss.c | 11 +- + auth2-hostbased.c | 9 + + auth2-pubkey.c | 11 +- + auth2.c | 14 ++ + misc.c | 8 + + monitor.c | 37 ++- + monitor.h | 4 + + monitor_wrap.c | 21 ++ + monitor_wrap.h | 3 + + openbsd-compat/Makefile.in | 3 +- + openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 37 +-- + openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 3 +- + platform.c | 2 +- + sshd-session.c | 3 + + 18 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c + +diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c +index 13c0a792..b4100ea1 100644 +--- a/auth-pam.c ++++ b/auth-pam.c +@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) + * during the ssh authentication process. + */ + int +-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) ++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) + { + int ret = 1; + char *compound; +diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h +index 8d801c68..9dd7ae07 100644 +--- a/auth-pam.h ++++ b/auth-pam.h +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void); + void do_pam_session(struct ssh *); + void do_pam_setcred(void); + void do_pam_chauthtok(void); +-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); ++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); + char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); + char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); + void free_pam_environment(char **); +diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h +index 98bb23d4..83d07ae8 100644 +--- a/auth.h ++++ b/auth.h +@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt { + char *service; + struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ + char *style; +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role = NULL; ++ char *role; +#endif - int authenticated = 0; - double tstart = monotime_double(); -@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); - debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) -+ *role++ = 0; -+#endif -+ - if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) - *style++ = 0; - -@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); - authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); - authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; -- if (use_privsep) -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; -+#endif -+ if (use_privsep) { - mm_inform_authserv(service, style); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ mm_inform_authrole(role); -+#endif -+ } - userauth_banner(); - if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) - packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled"); -diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c 2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200 -@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + /* Method lists for multiple authentication */ + char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ +diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +index 75eb4e3a..f7898ab3 100644 +--- a/auth2-gss.c ++++ b/auth2-gss.c +@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int r, authenticated = 0; + char *micuser; struct sshbuf *b; gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; - const char *displayname; -@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + u_char *p; +@@ -300,7 +301,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); mic.value = p; mic.length = len; - ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0)) ++ if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0) + xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role); + else +#endif + micuser = authctxt->user; + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service, - "gssapi-with-mic"); + "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id); if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) -@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple +@@ -313,6 +320,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); sshbuf_free(b); @@ -74,13 +100,14 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c + free(micuser); free(mic.value); - if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && -diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c ---- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 -@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) + authctxt->postponed = 0; +diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c +index eb21479a..a3be6e49 100644 +--- a/auth2-hostbased.c ++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c +@@ -129,7 +129,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) /* reconstruct packet */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + (authctxt->role @@ -93,12 +120,13 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 || +#endif (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 || -diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c 2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200 -@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index aa24fda0..267a27d2 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -206,9 +206,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) goto done; } /* reconstruct packet */ @@ -117,61 +145,51 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || -diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h ---- openssh/auth.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 -@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt { - char *service; - struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ - char *style; +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index 82f6e621..5ba45c12 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Authmethod *m = NULL; + char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL; +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role; ++ char *role = NULL; +#endif + int r, authenticated = 0; + double tstart = monotime_double(); - /* Method lists for multiple authentication */ - char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ -diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c ---- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth-pam.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200 -@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) - * during the ssh authentication process. - */ - int --do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) -+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) - { - int ret = 1; - #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV -diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h ---- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth-pam.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200 -@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void); - void do_pam_session(struct ssh *); - void do_pam_setcred(int ); - void do_pam_chauthtok(void); --int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); -+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); - char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); - char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); - void free_pam_environment(char **); -diff -up openssh/configure.ac.role-mls openssh/configure.ac ---- openssh/configure.ac.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/configure.ac 2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200 -@@ -4241,10 +4241,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], - LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" - ], - AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library])) -- SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" -- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level]) -- LIBS="$save_LIBS" - fi ] - ) - AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS]) -diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c ---- openssh/misc.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/misc.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200 -@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char * +@@ -284,6 +287,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = 0; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = 0; + +@@ -313,7 +321,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown"); + authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); + authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; ++#endif + mm_inform_authserv(service, style); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ mm_inform_authrole(role); ++#endif + userauth_banner(ssh); + if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed"); +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index dd0bd032..c932f9bb 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -806,6 +806,7 @@ char * colon(char *cp) { int flag = 0; @@ -179,7 +197,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ return NULL; -@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp) +@@ -821,6 +822,13 @@ colon(char *cp) return (cp); if (*cp == '/') return NULL; @@ -193,20 +211,21 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c } return NULL; } -diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c ---- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor.c 2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200 -@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *) - int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_authserv(int, struct sshbuf *); +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 2179553d..02b3eaaa 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+int mm_answer_authrole(int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); +#endif - int mm_answer_authpassword(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, struct sshbuf *); -@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); +@@ -194,6 +197,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, @@ -216,7 +235,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, #ifdef USE_PAM -@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss +@@ -912,6 +918,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); @@ -226,20 +245,20 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); #ifdef USE_PAM -@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb - return (0); +@@ -986,6 +995,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key, + return found; } +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +int -+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int r; + monitor_permit_authentications(1); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role); ++ fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role); + + if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) { + free(authctxt->role); @@ -251,27 +270,27 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c +#endif + int - mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) - { -@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i + mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { +@@ -1358,7 +1387,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL; const u_char *p; - char *userstyle, *cp; + char *userstyle, *s, *cp; size_t len; u_char type; - int r, fail = 0; -@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i + int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0; +@@ -1389,6 +1418,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); + if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL) + *s = '\0'; xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); -@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data +@@ -1439,7 +1470,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, { struct sshbuf *b; const u_char *p; @@ -280,21 +299,22 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c size_t len; int r, fail = 0; u_char type; -@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data +@@ -1460,6 +1491,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen, fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) + fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle"); ++ if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL) + *s = '\0'; xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); -diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h ---- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200 -@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49, +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index 3f8a9bea..9dcd9c29 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50, + MONITOR_REQ_STATE = 51, MONITOR_ANS_STATE = 52, +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, @@ -303,10 +323,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105, -diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c 2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200 -@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char * +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index bd900b2f..ef3ab1b1 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -442,6 +442,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) sshbuf_free(m); } @@ -319,12 +340,12 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c + int r; + struct sshbuf *m; + -+ debug3("%s entering", __func__); ++ debug3_f("entering"); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m); + + sshbuf_free(m); @@ -334,24 +355,26 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c /* Do the password authentication */ int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password) -diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h 2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200 -@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); - int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 7134afee..38a280c8 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int compat); void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +void mm_inform_authrole(char *); +#endif - struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); + struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *); -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 -@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS= port-aix.o \ - port-linux.o \ +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +index 1d549954..78e6fa5b 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in ++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ PORTS= port-aix.o \ + port-prngd.o \ port-solaris.o \ port-net.o \ - port-uw.o @@ -359,80 +382,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make + port-linux-sshd.o .c.o: - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 -@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) - return sc; - } - --/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ --void --ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) --{ -- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; -- -- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) -- return; -- -- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); -- -- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); -- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { -- switch (security_getenforce()) { -- case -1: -- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); -- case 0: -- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " -- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); -- break; -- default: -- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " -- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); -- } -- } -- if (user_ctx != NULL) -- freecon(user_ctx); -- -- debug3("%s: done", __func__); --} -- - /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */ - void - ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty) -@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons - - debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); - -- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); -+ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) { -+ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ - - /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ - -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 -@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX - int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); - void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); --void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); - void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); - void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); -+ -+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); - #endif - - #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@ + $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..b9fbe38b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach @@ -486,7 +442,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa +extern ServerOptions options; +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern int inetd_flag; -+extern int rexeced_flag; + +/* Send audit message */ +static int @@ -544,7 +499,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + access_vector_t bit; + security_class_t class; + -+ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst); ++ debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst); + class = string_to_security_class("context"); + if (!class) { + error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context"); @@ -692,7 +647,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + + if (r == 0) { + /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ -+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ if (inetd_flag) { + security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; + + if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) @@ -706,7 +661,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + /* we actually don't change level */ + reqlvl = ""; + -+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl); ++ debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl); + + } + @@ -734,8 +689,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + } + } + if (r != 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " -+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname); ++ error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security " ++ "context for %s", pwname); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME @@ -760,13 +715,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + char *use_current; + int rv; + -+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); ++ debug3_f("setting execution context"); + + ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); + + rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); + -+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ if (inetd_flag) { + use_current = "1"; + } else { + use_current = ""; @@ -797,32 +752,30 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: -+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed"); + case 0: -+ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", -+ __func__); ++ error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode."); + break; + default: -+ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.", -+ __func__); ++ fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection."); + } + } + return; + } + -+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); ++ debug3_f("setting execution context"); + + r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); + if (r >= 0) { + r = setexeccon(user_ctx); + if (r < 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", -+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", ++ user_ctx, pwname); + } +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON + else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", -+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", ++ user_ctx, pwname); + } +#endif + } @@ -837,14 +790,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + if (r < 0) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: -+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed"); + case 0: -+ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", -+ __func__); ++ error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode."); + break; + default: -+ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.", -+ __func__); ++ fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection."); + } + } + if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx) @@ -852,16 +803,88 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa + if (default_ctx != NULL) + freecon(default_ctx); + -+ debug3("%s: done", __func__); ++ debug3_f("done"); +} + +#endif +#endif + -diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c ---- openssh/platform.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/platform.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200 -@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +index c1d54f38..7426f6f7 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +@@ -109,37 +109,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) + return sc; + } + +-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ +-void +-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +-{ +- char *user_ctx = NULL; +- +- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) +- return; +- +- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); +- +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); +- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { +- switch (security_getenforce()) { +- case -1: +- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); +- case 0: +- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " +- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); +- break; +- default: +- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " +- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); +- } +- } +- if (user_ctx != NULL) +- freecon(user_ctx); +- +- debug3("%s: done", __func__); +-} +- + /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */ + void + ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty) +@@ -152,7 +121,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty) + + debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); + +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); ++ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) { ++ error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + + /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index 959430de..055c825e 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); + void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); +-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); ++ ++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c +index 4c4fe57e..1bfb4bea 100644 +--- a/platform.c ++++ b/platform.c +@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw) } #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX @@ -870,10 +893,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c #endif } -diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c ---- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200 -@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index c64eb29f..74d2cbc7 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -1328,6 +1328,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) restore_uid(); } #endif @@ -882,4 +906,7 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c +#endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { - do_pam_setcred(1); + do_pam_setcred(); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32d3c64 --- /dev/null +++ b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +From 99d8e250514023d3b88a1c9eb724c4898aba9827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 02/50] openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux + +--- + openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 1 + + session.c | 16 +++++++++------- + sshd-auth.c | 4 ++++ + sshd-session.c | 2 +- + 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +index b9fbe38b..dfafc622 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -415,6 +415,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + debug3_f("done"); + } + ++void ++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) ++{ ++ security_context_t *ctx; ++ ++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) ++ return; ++ ++ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { ++ logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno)); ++ return; ++ } ++ if (ctx != NULL) { ++ /* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */ ++ if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0) ++ fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (setcon(ctx) != 0) ++ fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno)); ++ freecon(ctx); ++ } ++} ++ + #endif + #endif + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index 055c825e..498d242a 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + ++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + #endif + +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 6444c77f..e4657cef 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + + platform_setusercontext(pw); + +- if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { ++ if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) { + #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, + (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { +@@ -1382,6 +1382,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); + free(tmp); + free(chroot_path); +@@ -1417,6 +1420,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + #endif ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (in_chroot == 0) ++ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); ++#endif + } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { + fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); +@@ -1434,9 +1442,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s) + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + fprintf(stderr, + "You must change your password now and log in again!\n"); +-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- setexeccon(NULL); +-#endif + #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME + execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, + (char *)NULL); +@@ -1649,9 +1654,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); +-#endif + exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); + } + +diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c +index 30eecd8a..f957dc22 100644 +--- a/sshd-auth.c ++++ b/sshd-auth.c +@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ privsep_child_demote(void) + if ((box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor)) == NULL) + fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed"); + #endif ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); ++#endif ++ + /* Demote the child */ + if (privsep_chroot) { + /* Change our root directory */ +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index 74d2cbc7..4a148db4 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require + * special privileges to begin with. + */ +-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) ++#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX) + skip_privdrop = 1; + #endif + +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch similarity index 70% rename from openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch rename to 0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch index e22a5f3..b46b378 100644 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch +++ b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch @@ -1,24 +1,26 @@ -diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c ---- openssh/auth.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth.c 2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200 -@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw - _exit(1); - } - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { -+ error ("failed to copy environment: %s", -+ strerror(errno)); -+ _exit(127); -+ } -+#endif -+ - execve(av[0], av, child_env); - error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); - _exit(127); -diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat ---- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200 -+++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200 +From 5e35e18a419a5a66b6e1cb2b98beaaf4d9db0dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 03/50] openssh-6.6p1-keycat + +--- + HOWTO.ssh-keycat | 12 ++ + Makefile.in | 8 +- + configure.ac | 6 + + misc.c | 7 + + openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 44 +++++- + openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 2 + + platform.c | 2 +- + ssh-keycat.c | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 8 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 HOWTO.ssh-keycat + create mode 100644 ssh-keycat.c + +diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..630ec628 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with @@ -32,72 +34,116 @@ diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat + PubkeyAuthentication yes + + -diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in ---- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200 -+++ openssh/Makefile.in 2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200 -@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 4617cebc..438efc51 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh + ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass + SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign - SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper - SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat + SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session + SSHD_AUTH=$(libexecdir)/sshd-auth SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ -@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ +@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@ + K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ - SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@ +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@ - AR=@AR@ - AWK=@AWK@ -@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ - MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ - INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ + LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@ + LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@ +@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ --TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) -+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) + .SUFFIXES: .lo + +-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE) ++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE) XMSS_OBJS=\ ssh-xmss.o \ -@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) - ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o - $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) $(LDAPLIBS) +@@ -260,6 +262,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS) + ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS) +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS) + - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) -@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ - $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ - fi +@@ -447,6 +452,7 @@ install-files: + $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200 -@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const - void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); - void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index ee77a048..d546788c 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -3566,6 +3566,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam], + PAM_MSG="yes" -+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); - void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); - void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); -+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); - #endif + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" ++ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam" + AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], + [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) - #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200 -@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +@@ -3576,6 +3577,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam], + ;; + *) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ++ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl" + ;; + esac + fi +@@ -4801,6 +4803,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], + fi ] + ) + AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) ++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS]) + + # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support + KRB5_MSG="no" +@@ -5812,6 +5815,9 @@ fi + if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then + echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" + fi ++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then ++echo " +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}" ++fi + + echo "" + +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index c932f9bb..1e31acc9 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -2897,6 +2897,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command, + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { ++ error ("failed to copy environment: %s", ++ strerror(errno)); ++ _exit(127); ++ } ++#endif + if (env != NULL) + execve(av[0], av, env); + else +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ extern ServerOptions options; + extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; extern int inetd_flag; - extern int rexeced_flag; +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ +int @@ -116,7 +162,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/ /* Send audit message */ static int sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, -@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, +@@ -317,7 +331,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ static int @@ -125,14 +171,14 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/ { const char *reqlvl; char *role; -@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) +@@ -328,16 +342,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); - rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); + rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); - if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { + if (inetd_flag) { use_current = "1"; } else { use_current = ""; @@ -145,7 +191,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/ if (role != NULL) free(role); -@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) +@@ -345,6 +359,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) return rv; } @@ -170,7 +216,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) -@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw +@@ -353,7 +385,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) int r = 0; security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; @@ -179,7 +225,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/ return; if (options.use_pam) { -@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) +@@ -420,7 +452,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) { security_context_t *ctx; @@ -188,10 +234,26 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/ return; if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { -diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c ---- openssh/platform.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200 -+++ openssh/platform.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200 -@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index 498d242a..1b745a76 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); + void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); + void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + ++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); + void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); ++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c +index 1bfb4bea..0d12f311 100644 +--- a/platform.c ++++ b/platform.c +@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX /* Cache selinux status for later use */ @@ -200,9 +262,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c #endif #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS -diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c ---- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200 +diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..5678be07 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh-keycat.c @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +/* + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -445,41 +509,6 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c + } + return ev; +} -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam], - PAM_MSG="yes" - - SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" -+ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam" - AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], - [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) - -@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@ - ;; - *) - SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" -+ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl" - ;; - esac - fi -@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], - ) - AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS]) - AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) -+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS]) - - # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support - KRB5_MSG="no" -@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi - if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then - echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" - fi -+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then -+echo " +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}" -+fi - - echo "" - +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch similarity index 57% rename from openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch rename to 0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch index 953d613..ef15fbf 100644 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch +++ b/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ -diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c ---- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts 2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshd.c 2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200 -@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh) +From 28333f1dfe68b0ffc80c2a4799759587b4c32d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 04/50] openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts + +--- + sshd-session.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index 4a148db4..a365f26f 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -778,12 +778,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh) if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts, &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { @@ -21,11 +31,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c + case 130: + case 133: + case 134: -+ i += opts[i + 1]; -+ break; ++ if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) { ++ i += opts[i + 1]; ++ break; ++ } ++ /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict -+ * source routing options. */ ++ * or incorrect source routing options. */ + text[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) + snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, @@ -35,5 +48,8 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c + } + } while (i < option_size); } - return; #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ + } +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch b/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch similarity index 54% rename from openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch rename to 0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch index ece1a73..909b988 100644 --- a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch +++ b/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch @@ -1,7 +1,18 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 ---- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200 -@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information. +From 388be633842a9f3e4b0a76fe40cf7035912a913a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 05/50] openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man + +--- + ssh.1 | 2 ++ + sshd.8 | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 +index 697f4e42..db92ac9a 100644 +--- a/ssh.1 ++++ b/ssh.1 +@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ manual page for more information. .Nm exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. @@ -10,10 +21,11 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1 .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , -diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 ---- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200 -@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c +diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 +index 08ebf53a..2aa73271 100644 +--- a/sshd.8 ++++ b/sshd.8 +@@ -1018,6 +1018,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El @@ -22,3 +34,6 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8 .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bf31bc --- /dev/null +++ b/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +From 80359feb76fd8061b5ce18f73451d7b9db0c2477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 06/50] openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe + +--- + ssh-keyscan.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c +index 3436c0b5..9f76ad22 100644 +--- a/ssh-keyscan.c ++++ b/ssh-keyscan.c +@@ -798,6 +798,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) + fdlim_set(maxfd); + fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); ++ ++ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); ++ + read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd)); + for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++) + read_wait[j].fd = -1; +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch b/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch similarity index 68% rename from openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch rename to 0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch index 48ce840..2f72f9a 100644 --- a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch +++ b/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch @@ -1,7 +1,17 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c ---- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c 2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200 -@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ +From cf6d48305cf6601448ea7a0d96ae825cbbbf0a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 07/50] openssh-7.2p2-x11 + +--- + channels.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c +index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644 +--- a/channels.c ++++ b/channels.c +@@ -5098,11 +5098,13 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, } static int @@ -14,8 +24,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c + if (len <= 0) + return -1; sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (sock < 0) + if (sock == -1) { error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +@@ -5110,11 +5112,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) + } memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; - strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); @@ -30,7 +42,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c return -1; } -@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int +@@ -5122,8 +5125,18 @@ static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; @@ -51,3 +63,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c } #ifdef __APPLE__ +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch b/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7ca382 --- /dev/null +++ b/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From 6b2a33044583e892badb9ac86cd2c6252b1a532f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 08/50] openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress + +--- + contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +index a62f9815..cb7152dc 100644 +--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c ++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c) + return 1; + } + ++static void ++move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress) ++{ ++ gdouble step; ++ g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); ++ ++ step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1); ++ gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step); ++ gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); ++} ++ + static int + passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type) + { +@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type) + char *passphrase, *local; + int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer; + int buttons, default_response; +- GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry; ++ GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox; + GdkGrabStatus status; + GdkColor fg, bg; + int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0; +@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type) + gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg); + + if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) { ++ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE, ++ FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_widget_show(hbox); ++ + entry = gtk_entry_new(); + if (fg_set) + gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg); + if (bg_set) + gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg); + gtk_box_pack_start( +- GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), +- entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0); ++ GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2); + gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); + gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); + if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) { +@@ -225,6 +242,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type) + g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event", + G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog); + } ++ ++ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), ++ hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8); ++ gtk_widget_show(hbox); ++ ++ progress = gtk_progress_bar_new(); ++ ++ gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), ++ "Passphrase length hidden intentionally"); ++ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE, ++ TRUE, 5); ++ gtk_widget_show(progress); ++ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed", ++ G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress); ++ + } + + /* Grab focus */ +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch b/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a7cf9e --- /dev/null +++ b/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 710ce53fdf1d32a0629fce2e42fb49d407e2b06c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 09/50] openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info + +--- + contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 8 ++++++-- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +index cb7152dc..bbe93d83 100644 +--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c ++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c +@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what) + + err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0, + GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE, +- "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping " +- "on your session.", what); ++ "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n" ++ "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, " ++ "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping " ++ "on your session.\n" ++ "Either close the application which grabs the %s or " ++ "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what); + gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + + gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err)); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch b/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb3d140 --- /dev/null +++ b/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +From 5f21983f6472b26693babea4d6ca6b95a7dc7b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 10/50] openssh-8.7p1-redhat + +--- + ssh_config | 7 +++++++ + ssh_config_redhat | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + sshd_config | 8 ++++++++ + sshd_config.0 | 6 +++--- + sshd_config.5 | 2 +- + sshd_config_redhat | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + sshd_config_redhat_cp | 7 +++++++ + 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 ssh_config_redhat + create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat + create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat_cp + +diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config +index cc566356..18169187 100644 +--- a/ssh_config ++++ b/ssh_config +@@ -44,3 +44,10 @@ + # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com + # RekeyLimit 1G 1h + # UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k ++# ++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. ++# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a *.conf ++# file under /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ which will be automatically ++# included below. For more information, see manual page for ++# update-crypto-policies(8) and ssh_config(5). ++Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf +diff --git a/ssh_config_redhat b/ssh_config_redhat +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..8b1b5902 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh_config_redhat +@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ ++# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last ++# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration ++Match final all ++ # Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined: ++ Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config ++ ++ GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++ ++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access ++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted ++# mode correctly we set this to yes. ++ ForwardX11Trusted yes ++ ++# rhbz#2352653 - export COLORTERM ++ SendEnv COLORTERM ++ ++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain ++# Host *.local +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index 0f4a3a72..608203e4 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@ + # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the + # default value. + ++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a *.conf file under ++# /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ which will be automatically included below ++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf ++ ++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell ++# SELinux about this change. ++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER ++# + #Port 22 + #AddressFamily any + #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0 +index 2f77b4f4..49349bb3 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.0 ++++ b/sshd_config.0 +@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ DESCRIPTION + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, +- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The +- default is AUTH. ++ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, ++ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. ++ The default is AUTH. + + TCPKeepAlive + Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index c0771737..035a50c8 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined. + .It Cm SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + .Xr sshd 8 . +-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, ++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, + LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. + The default is AUTH. + .It Cm TCPKeepAlive +diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat b/sshd_config_redhat +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..993a28d5 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/sshd_config_redhat +@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ ++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV ++ ++KbdInteractiveAuthentication no ++ ++GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no ++ ++UsePAM yes ++ ++X11Forwarding yes ++ ++# rhbz#2352653 - accept COLORTERM ++ AcceptEnv COLORTERM ++ ++# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd, ++# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version. ++PrintMotd no ++ +diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat_cp b/sshd_config_redhat_cp +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..1d592d13 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/sshd_config_redhat_cp +@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ ++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to ++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in ++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option, ++# write it before this block or include it before this file. ++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5). ++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config ++ +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..76ee115 --- /dev/null +++ b/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 56b8d082bc9e25a77b5227d576f27088446c6fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 11/50] openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning + +--- + sshd-session.c | 4 ++++ + sshd_config | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index a365f26f..a70b36c9 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -1127,6 +1127,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + "enabled authentication methods"); + } + ++ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */ ++ if (! options.use_pam) ++ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems."); ++ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (options.moduli_file != NULL) + dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file); +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index 608203e4..48af6321 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without + # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication + # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'. ++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several ++# problems. + #UsePAM no + + #AllowAgentForwarding yes +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5f54f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,4310 @@ +From 754b023b92aa68742258c55243a6ae8f30ed5a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 12/50] openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex + +--- + Makefile.in | 7 +- + auth.c | 3 +- + auth2-gss.c | 52 +++- + auth2-methods.c | 6 + + auth2.c | 2 + + canohost.c | 93 +++++++ + canohost.h | 3 + + clientloop.c | 12 + + configure.ac | 24 ++ + gss-genr.c | 302 ++++++++++++++++++++- + gss-serv-krb5.c | 97 ++++++- + gss-serv.c | 200 ++++++++++++-- + kex-names.c | 62 ++++- + kex.c | 35 ++- + kex.h | 34 +++ + kexdh.c | 10 + + kexgen.c | 2 +- + kexgssc.c | 706 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + kexgsss.c | 601 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + monitor.c | 147 +++++++++- + monitor.h | 2 + + monitor_wrap.c | 57 +++- + monitor_wrap.h | 4 +- + readconf.c | 70 +++++ + readconf.h | 6 + + servconf.c | 47 ++++ + servconf.h | 3 + + session.c | 10 +- + ssh-gss.h | 64 ++++- + ssh.1 | 8 + + ssh.c | 6 +- + ssh_config | 2 + + ssh_config.5 | 58 ++++ + sshconnect2.c | 154 ++++++++++- + sshd-auth.c | 53 ++++ + sshd-session.c | 9 +- + sshd.c | 3 +- + sshd_config | 2 + + sshd_config.5 | 31 +++ + sshkey.c | 72 ++++- + sshkey.h | 1 + + 41 files changed, 2984 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 kexgssc.c + create mode 100644 kexgsss.c + +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 438efc51..78f65948 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ + kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \ + kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ ++ kexgssc.o \ + sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ + sshbuf-io.o + +@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ SSHD_SESSION_OBJS=sshd-session.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ + auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ + auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \ +- monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ ++ monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ + auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ +@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ SSHD_AUTH_OBJS=sshd-auth.o \ + serverloop.o auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o auth2-chall.o \ + groupaccess.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ + monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ + audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ +@@ -563,7 +564,7 @@ regress-prep: + ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile + + REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) +-TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) ++TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS) + + regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \ +diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c +index 9a6e5a31..e4578169 100644 +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) + case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: + if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || +- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) ++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 || ++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) + return 1; + break; + case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: +diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +index f7898ab3..5b1b9cde 100644 +--- a/auth2-gss.c ++++ b/auth2-gss.c +@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ + #define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS 2048 + + extern ServerOptions options; ++extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex; + extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi; + + static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +@@ -58,6 +59,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); + static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); + static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + ++/* ++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. ++ */ ++static int ++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) ++{ ++ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; ++ int r, authenticated = 0; ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; ++ u_char *p; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "parsing"); ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ mic.value = p; ++ mic.length = len; ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id); ++ ++ if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); ++ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); ++ ++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf, &mic))) ++ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw, 1); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ free(mic.value); ++ ++ return (authenticated); ++} ++ + /* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) +@@ -267,7 +310,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); + +- authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -315,7 +358,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))) +- authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + +@@ -333,6 +376,11 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + return 0; + } + ++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { ++ &methodcfg_gsskeyex, ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++}; ++ + Authmethod method_gssapi = { + &methodcfg_gssapi, + userauth_gssapi, +diff --git a/auth2-methods.c b/auth2-methods.c +index 99637a89..a05908cf 100644 +--- a/auth2-methods.c ++++ b/auth2-methods.c +@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey = { + &options.pubkey_authentication + }; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; + struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + NULL, +@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ static struct authmethod_cfg *authmethod_cfgs[] = { + &methodcfg_none, + &methodcfg_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &methodcfg_gsskeyex, + &methodcfg_gssapi, + #endif + &methodcfg_passwd, +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index 5ba45c12..8ec41de2 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + +@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + &method_passwd, +diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c +index 28f086e5..875805c9 100644 +--- a/canohost.c ++++ b/canohost.c +@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@ + #include "canohost.h" + #include "misc.h" + ++/* ++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not ++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is ++ * called. ++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some ++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. ++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? ++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) ++ */ ++ ++char * ++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct sockaddr_storage from; ++ socklen_t fromlen; ++ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; ++ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; ++ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ ++ /* Get IP address of client. */ ++ fromlen = sizeof(from); ++ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); ++ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), ++ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { ++ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); ++ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) ++ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++ ++ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); ++ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ ++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), ++ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { ++ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, ++ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: ++ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { ++ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", ++ name, ntop); ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ ++ lowercase(name); ++ ++ /* ++ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given ++ * address actually is an address of this host. This is ++ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can ++ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from ++ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be ++ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of ++ * the domain). ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { ++ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " ++ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ ++ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { ++ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, ++ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && ++ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) ++ break; ++ } ++ freeaddrinfo(aitop); ++ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ ++ if (ai == NULL) { ++ /* Address not found for the host name. */ ++ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " ++ "map back to the address.", ntop, name); ++ return xstrdup(ntop); ++ } ++ return xstrdup(name); ++} ++ + void + ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) + { +diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h +index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644 +--- a/canohost.h ++++ b/canohost.h +@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ + #ifndef _CANOHOST_H + #define _CANOHOST_H + ++struct ssh; ++ ++char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *); + char *get_peer_ipaddr(int); + int get_peer_port(int); + char *get_local_ipaddr(int); +diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c +index 916fc077..4655f91f 100644 +--- a/clientloop.c ++++ b/clientloop.c +@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */ + #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256" + +@@ -1591,6 +1595,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, + /* Do channel operations. */ + channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) { ++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); ++ need_rekeying = 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* Buffer input from the connection. */ + if (conn_in_ready) + client_process_net_input(ssh); +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index d546788c..13c70a98 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -786,6 +786,30 @@ int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], ++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" ++ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1], ++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ], ++ [cc_context_t c; ++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], ++ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1], ++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***]) ++ fi], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])] ++ ) + m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], + AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) +diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c +index aa34b71c..3034370c 100644 +--- a/gss-genr.c ++++ b/gss-genr.c +@@ -42,9 +42,33 @@ + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "ssh2.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "digest.h" ++#include "packet.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + ++typedef struct { ++ char *encoded; ++ gss_OID oid; ++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; ++ ++/* ++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the ++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines ++ */ ++ ++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; ++ ++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) { ++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); ++} ++ + /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */ + int + ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) +@@ -60,6 +84,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) + return 0; + } + ++/* sshpkt_get of gss_buffer_desc */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_desc *g) ++{ ++ int r; ++ u_char *p; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0) ++ return r; ++ g->value = p; ++ g->length = len; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program ++ * ++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting ++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism ++ */ ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client, ++ const char *kex) { ++ gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; ++ OM_uint32 min_status; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, ++ host, client, kex); ++} ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, ++ const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) { ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ size_t i; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ int oidpos, enclen; ++ char *mechs, *encoded; ++ u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ char deroid[2]; ++ struct ssh_digest_ctx *md = NULL; ++ char *s, *cp, *p; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) ++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); ++ free(gss_enc2oid); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * ++ (gss_supported->count + 1)); ++ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ oidpos = 0; ++ s = cp = xstrdup(kex); ++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { ++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && ++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { ++ ++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; ++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; ++ ++ if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ++ (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_digest_update(md, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "digest failed"); ++ ssh_digest_free(md); ++ md = NULL; ++ ++ encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) ++ * 2); ++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, ++ ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded, ++ ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2); ++ ++ cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex)); ++ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; ++ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { ++ if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 && ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 error"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put error"); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; ++ oidpos++; ++ } ++ } ++ free(s); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; ++ ++ if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ ++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { ++ free(mechs); ++ mechs = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (mechs); ++} ++ ++gss_OID ++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++#define SKIP_KEX_NAME(type) \ ++ case type: \ ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(type##_ID)) \ ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; \ ++ name += sizeof(type##_ID) - 1; \ ++ break; ++ ++ switch (kex_type) { ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256) ++ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256) ++ default: ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ } ++ ++#undef SKIP_KEX_NAME ++ ++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && ++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) ++ i++; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); ++ ++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; ++} ++ + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ + int + ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +@@ -168,6 +345,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) + (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ (*ctx)->first = 1; + } + + /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */ +@@ -193,6 +371,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) + gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client); + if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->shared_secret); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_pubkey); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_host_key_blob); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_blob); ++ explicit_bzero((*ctx)->hash, sizeof((*ctx)->hash)); ++ BN_clear_free((*ctx)->dh_client_pub); + + free(*ctx); + *ctx = NULL; +@@ -216,7 +400,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, ++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + +@@ -245,9 +429,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_name_t gssname; ++ OM_uint32 status; ++ gss_OID_set oidset; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; ++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); ++ ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, ++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); ++ ++ if (!ctx->major) ++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, ++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ ++ if (ctx->major) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ ++ return(ctx->major); ++} ++ + OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + { ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -255,6 +473,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++/* Priviledged when used by server */ ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++{ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, ++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ + void + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id) +@@ -271,11 +502,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, + } + + int +-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, ++ const char *client) + { + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; ++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ ctx = &intctx; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && +@@ -285,6 +521,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) ++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); ++ + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); +@@ -294,10 +534,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + +- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; ++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ static gss_name_t name; ++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; ++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; ++ int equal; ++ ++ now = time(NULL); ++ ++ if (ctxt) { ++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); ++ ++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { ++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; ++ saved_lifetime+= now; ++ } else { ++ /* Handle the error */ ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (now - last_call < 10) ++ return 0; ++ ++ last_call = now; ++ ++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) ++ return 0; ++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; +- int len; ++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; + const char *errmsg; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { +@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') ++ new_ccname++; ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); ++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { ++ char *p; ++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); ++ if (p) ++ *p = '\0'; ++ } ++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) + + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + ++ client->store.data = krb_context; ++ + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -203,7 +285,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c +index 025a118f..a5cca797 100644 +--- a/gss-serv.c ++++ b/gss-serv.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -45,17 +45,19 @@ + #include "session.h" + #include "misc.h" + #include "servconf.h" ++#include "uidswap.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" + + extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = +- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ++ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = +- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; ++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + + #ifdef KRB5 + extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +@@ -141,6 +143,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) + return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); + } + ++/* Unprivileged */ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) { ++ if (supported_oids == NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); ++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids, ++ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL, ++ options.gss_kex_algorithms)); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, ++ const char *dummy) { ++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); ++ ++ return (res); ++} ++ + /* Unprivileged */ + void + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) +@@ -151,7 +176,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) ++ return; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, +@@ -277,8 +304,48 @@ OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + int i = 0; ++ int equal = 0; ++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { ++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || ++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, ++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, ++ new_name, &equal); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (!equal) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); ++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); ++ client->name = new_name; ++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ client->updated = 1; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + + client->mech = NULL; + +@@ -293,6 +360,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ++ if (ctx->client_creds && ++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -310,6 +384,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + return (ctx->major); + } + ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +@@ -320,11 +396,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + void + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) + { +- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { +- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ +- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", +- gssapi_client.store.filename); +- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) { ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) { ++ debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) { ++ debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); ++ } else { ++ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data); ++ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -357,19 +442,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) + + /* Privileged */ + int +-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; + ++ (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */ ++ + if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || + gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { + debug("No suitable client data"); + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) +- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) ++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { ++ gssapi_client.used = 1; ++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; + return 1; +- else { ++ } else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); +@@ -383,14 +472,85 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return (0); + } + +-/* Privileged */ +-OM_uint32 +-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running ++ * as the user, the monitor is root. ++ * ++ * In the child, we want to : ++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify ++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update ++ */ ++ ++/* Stuff for PAM */ ++ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, ++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) + { +- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, +- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); ++} ++#endif + +- return (ctx->major); ++void ++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) { ++ int ok; ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ int ret; ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; ++ char *envstr; ++#endif ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return; ++ ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); ++ ++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will ++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options ++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) ++ */ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, ++ &pamconv, &pamh); ++ if (ret) ++ return; ++ ++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, ++ gssapi_client.store.envval); ++ ++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); ++ if (!ret) ++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); ++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { ++ int ok = 0; ++ ++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ ++ if (!gssapi_client.updated) ++ return 0; ++ ++ gssapi_client.updated = 0; ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); ++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) ++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); ++ else ++ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ ++ return ok; + } + + /* Privileged */ +diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c +index ec840c1f..6c0b7c2b 100644 +--- a/kex-names.c ++++ b/kex-names.c +@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + struct kexalg { + char *name; + u_int type; +@@ -89,15 +93,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { + #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, + }; ++static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, ++ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++#endif ++ { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, ++}; + +-char * +-kex_alg_list(char sep) ++static char * ++kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs) + { + char *ret = NULL, *tmp; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct kexalg *k; + +- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(k->name); +@@ -112,6 +129,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep) + return ret; + } + ++char * ++kex_alg_list(char sep) ++{ ++ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs); ++} ++ ++char * ++kex_gss_alg_list(char sep) ++{ ++ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs); ++} ++ + static const struct kexalg * + kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + { +@@ -121,6 +150,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; + } ++ for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) ++ return k; ++ } + return NULL; + } + +@@ -334,3 +367,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) + free(ret); + return r; + } ++ ++/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */ ++int ++kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names) ++{ ++ char *s, *cp, *p; ++ ++ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0') ++ return 0; ++ s = cp = xstrdup(names); ++ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; ++ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { ++ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0 ++ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { ++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); ++ free(s); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names); ++ free(s); ++ return 1; ++} +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index 6b957e5e..19a56e8e 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -297,17 +297,37 @@ static int + kex_compose_ext_info_server(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) + { + int r; ++ int have_key = 0; ++ int ext_count = 2; ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* ++ * Currently GSS KEX don't provide host keys as optional message, so ++ * no reasons to announce the publickey-hostbound extension ++ */ ++ if (ssh->kex->gss == NULL) ++ have_key = 1; ++#endif ++ ext_count += have_key; ++ + + if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL && + (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 3)) != 0 || ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ext_count)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, +- "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0) { ++ error_fr(r, "compose"); ++ return r; ++ } ++ if (have_key) { ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) { ++ error_fr(r, "compose"); ++ return r; ++ } ++ } ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "compose"); + return r; +@@ -737,6 +757,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex) + sshbuf_free(kex->server_version); + sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); + sshbuf_free(kex->session_id); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ free(kex->gss_host); ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ + sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig); + sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey); + free(kex->failed_choice); +diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h +index d08988b3..0e080ea3 100644 +--- a/kex.h ++++ b/kex.h +@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ + #include "mac.h" + #include "crypto_api.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++# include "ssh-gss.h" /* Gssctxt */ ++#endif ++ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + # include + # include +@@ -103,6 +107,15 @@ enum kex_exchange { + KEX_C25519_SHA256, + KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, + KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256, ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, ++#endif + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -165,6 +178,13 @@ struct kex { + u_int flags; + int hash_alg; + int ec_nid; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ Gssctxt *gss; ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *failed_choice; + int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); + struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); +@@ -191,8 +211,10 @@ int kex_hash_from_name(const char *); + int kex_nid_from_name(const char *); + int kex_names_valid(const char *); + char *kex_alg_list(char); ++char *kex_gss_alg_list(char); + char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); + int kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *); ++int kex_gss_names_valid(const char *); + int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); + void kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], + const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +@@ -226,6 +248,12 @@ int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); + int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); + int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *); + int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *); ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++int kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *); ++int kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *); ++int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); ++int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); ++#endif + + int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); + int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, +@@ -264,6 +292,12 @@ int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, + const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t, + u_char *, size_t *); + ++int kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, ++ const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit, ++ const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob, ++ const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub, ++ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen); ++ + void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); +diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c +index c1084f21..0faab21b 100644 +--- a/kexdh.c ++++ b/kexdh.c +@@ -49,13 +49,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex) + { + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++#endif + kex->dh = dh_new_group1(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++#endif + kex->dh = dh_new_group14(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++#endif + kex->dh = dh_new_group16(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: +diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c +index 40d688d6..15df591c 100644 +--- a/kexgen.c ++++ b/kexgen.c +@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ + static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh); + +-static int ++int + kex_gen_hash( + int hash_alg, + const struct sshbuf *client_version, +diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..96f7b6f5 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kexgssc.c +@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "digest.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++ ++static int input_kexgss_hostkey(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++ ++static int ++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ /* compute shared secret */ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)] & 0x80) ++ fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); ++ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ if (sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob) != 65) ++ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match " ++ "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", ++ sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)); ++ ++ if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) ++ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); ++ ++ r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ default: ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ break; ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, ++ (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty), ++ kex->client_pub, gss->server_blob, shared_secret, ++ hash, &hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ if (r != 0) ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ ++ gss->buf.value = hash; ++ gss->buf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok))) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = gss; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob); ++ gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob); ++ gss->server_blob = NULL; ++ } ++out: ++ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); ++ kex->client_pub = NULL; ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static int ++kexgss_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds, ++ token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ /* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr); ++ ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (gss->first) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss->first = 0; ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgss_complete); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr); ++ ++ return kexgss_final(ssh); ++} ++ ++int ++kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ /* Step 1 */ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_keypair(kex); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ return r; ++ } ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgss_hostkey(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ u_char *tmp = NULL; ++ size_t tmp_len = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (gss->server_host_key_blob) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if ((gss->server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) ++ fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgss_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ int r; ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); ++ ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgss_complete(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ u_char c; ++ int r; ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); ++ ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL) ++ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (c) { ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ return kexgss_final(ssh); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgss_error(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ u_char *msg; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->major)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->minor)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/*******************************************************/ ++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/ ++/*******************************************************/ ++ ++int ++kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; ++ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ kex->nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, &input_kexgssgex_group); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */ ++ /* 8. C computes shared secret */ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, gss->server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ buf = NULL; ++ ++ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, ++ (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty), ++ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), ++ hash, &hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ if (r != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss->buf.value = hash; ++ gss->buf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok))) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = gss; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ ++ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob); ++ gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob); ++ gss->server_blob = NULL; ++ } ++out: ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static int ++kexgssgex_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds, ++ token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ /* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr); ++ ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (gss->first) { ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss->first = 0; ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgssgex_complete); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr); ++ ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_group(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("Received SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, NULL); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < kex->min || BN_num_bits(p) > kex->max) ++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ kex->min, BN_num_bits(p), kex->max); ++ ++ if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) ++ fatal("dn_new_group() failed"); ++ p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ ++ ++ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ int r; ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); ++ ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_complete(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ u_char c; ++ int r; ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); ++ ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL) ++ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (c) { ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh); ++} ++ ++#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ +diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..8362081e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/kexgsss.c +@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "digest.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++ ++static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++ ++int ++kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) { ++ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ free(mechs); ++ } ++ ++ debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (kex->gss == NULL) ++ fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context"); ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgss_init); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue); ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static inline void ++kexgss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ int r; ++ ++ gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok); ++ ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (gss->buf.value == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ } ++} ++ ++static inline int ++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ if (send_tok->length > 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, gss->server_pubkey)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if (send_tok->length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok); ++ ++ hashlen = gss->hashlen; ++ memcpy(hash, gss->hash, hashlen); ++ explicit_bzero(gss->hash, sizeof(gss->hash)); ++ shared_secret = gss->shared_secret; ++ gss->shared_secret = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = gss; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++ ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_pubkey); ++ gss->server_pubkey = NULL; ++ } ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgss_init(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ struct sshbuf *empty; ++ struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ } ++ ++ /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the ++ * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent ++ * buffer state->incoming_packet ++ */ ++ gss->hashlen = sizeof(gss->hash); ++ r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, ++ kex->peer, kex->my, empty, client_pubkey, gss->server_pubkey, ++ gss->shared_secret, gss->hash, &gss->hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ if (r != 0) { ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ gss->buf.value = gss->hash; ++ gss->buf.length = gss->hashlen; ++ ++ kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgss_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ ++/*******************************************************/ ++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/ ++/*******************************************************/ ++ ++int ++kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) { ++ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ free(mechs); ++ } ++ ++ debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (kex->gss == NULL) ++ fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context"); ++ ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, &input_kexgssgex_groupreq); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static inline void ++kexgssgex_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ int r; ++ ++ gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok); ++ ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (gss->dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ } ++} ++ ++static inline int ++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ if (send_tok->length > 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ /* calculate shared secret */ ++ shared_secret = sshbuf_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, gss->dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, ++ kex->peer, kex->my, empty, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, ++ gss->dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), ++ sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ if (r != 0) ++ fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss->buf.value = hash; ++ gss->buf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if (send_tok->length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = gss; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ ++ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++ ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) ++ BN_clear_free(gss->dh_client_pub); ++ ++out: ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ ++ int r; ++ ++ /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ ++ ++ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ received"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, NULL); ++ ++ /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ kex->nbits = nbits; ++ kex->min = cmin; ++ kex->max = cmax; ++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin); ++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax); ++ nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); ++ nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); ++ ++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", min, nbits, max); ++ ++ kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max); ++ if (kex->dh == NULL) { ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ ++ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgssgex_init); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue); ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_init(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &gss->dh_client_pub)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ ++ kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ ++#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 02b3eaaa..2ef16cc8 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + #endif + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +@@ -224,11 +226,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + #endif + {0, 0, NULL} + }; + + struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_STATE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_state}, + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, +@@ -299,6 +308,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_STATE, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + + /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ + while (!authenticated) { +@@ -351,8 +364,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { + auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, + auth_method, auth_submethod); +- if (!partial && !authenticated) ++ if (!partial && !authenticated) { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled. ++ * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */ ++ if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex) ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++#endif + authctxt->failures++; ++ } + if (authenticated || partial) { + auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, + auth_method, auth_submethod); +@@ -421,6 +441,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + + if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); +@@ -1890,6 +1914,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; + # endif ++# ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++# endif + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; +@@ -1981,8 +2016,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + u_char *p; + int r; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); +@@ -2014,8 +2049,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + int r; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); + + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc"); +@@ -2035,6 +2070,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); + } + return (0); + } +@@ -2046,8 +2082,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + OM_uint32 ret; + int r; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); + + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) +@@ -2073,13 +2109,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + int + mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + { +- int r, authenticated; ++ int r, authenticated, kex; + const char *displayname; + +- if (!options.gss_authentication) +- fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled"); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + +- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) +@@ -2088,7 +2128,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); + +- auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; ++ if (kex) { ++ auth_method = "gssapi-keyex"; ++ } else { ++ auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; ++ } + + if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); +@@ -2096,5 +2140,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc data; ++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 major, minor; ++ size_t len; ++ u_char *p = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ data.value = p; ++ data.length = len; ++ /* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */ ++ if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64) ++ fatal_f("data length incorrect: %d", (int) data.length); ++ ++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ ++ if (session_id2_len == 0) { ++ session_id2_len = data.length; ++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); ++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); ++ } ++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); ++ ++ free(data.value); ++ ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); ++ ++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); ++ ++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { ++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int r, ok; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); ++ ++ free(store.filename); ++ free(store.envvar); ++ free(store.envval); ++ ++ sshbuf_reset(m); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ return(0); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index 9dcd9c29..dbc7e003 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, + ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153, + }; + + struct ssh; +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index ef3ab1b1..b6e3b3f3 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -1131,13 +1131,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) + } + + int +-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) + { + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, authenticated = 0; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, +@@ -1150,6 +1152,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++OM_uint32 ++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ OM_uint32 major; ++ int r; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++ ++ return (major); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *m; ++ int r, ok; ++ ++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ++ store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ++ store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ++ store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(m); ++ ++ return (ok); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + /* +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 38a280c8..672dce52 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index 7cbe7d2c..6c04ed43 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ + #include "myproposal.h" + #include "digest.h" + #include "version.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" + + /* Format of the configuration file: + +@@ -165,6 +166,8 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, ++ oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -212,10 +215,22 @@ static struct { + /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, ++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms }, + # else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported }, + #endif + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, +@@ -1320,10 +1335,42 @@ parse_time: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssClientIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssServerIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssRenewalRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssKexAlgorithms: ++ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg)) ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", ++ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); ++ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -2662,7 +2709,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; ++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -2826,8 +2879,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; ++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); ++#endif + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -3656,7 +3719,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssTrustDns, o->gss_trust_dns); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssRenewalRekey, o->gss_renewal_rekey); ++ dump_cfg_string(oGssClientIdentity, o->gss_client_identity); ++ dump_cfg_string(oGssServerIdentity, o->gss_server_identity); ++ dump_cfg_string(oGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms ? ++ o->gss_kex_algorithms : GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); +diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h +index cd49139b..368523dd 100644 +--- a/readconf.h ++++ b/readconf.h +@@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ typedef struct { + int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ + int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ ++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ ++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ ++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ ++ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index f7bc9237..d4f7fd66 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ + #include "myproposal.h" + #include "digest.h" + #include "version.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" + + #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) + # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE "sshd" +@@ -138,8 +139,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; +@@ -380,10 +384,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; + if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) + options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; ++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); ++#endif + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -568,6 +580,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, + sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, + sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, +@@ -653,12 +666,22 @@ static struct { + #ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */ +@@ -1649,6 +1672,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1657,6 +1684,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssStoreRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sGssKexAlgorithms: ++ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", ++ filename, linenum); ++ if (!kex_gss_names_valid(arg)) ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", ++ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); ++ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) ++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -3254,6 +3297,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); ++ dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms); + #endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index 9beb90fa..c3f50140 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -150,8 +150,11 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ + int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ ++ int gss_store_rekey; ++ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index e4657cef..cbfbcee8 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -2670,13 +2670,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + + #ifdef KRB5 + if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && +- authctxt->krb5_ctx) ++ authctxt->krb5_ctx) { ++ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); ++ restore_uid(); ++ } + #endif + + #ifdef GSSAPI +- if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) ++ if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) { ++ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); ++ restore_uid(); ++ } + #endif + + /* remove agent socket */ +diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +index 7b14e74a..8ec45192 100644 +--- a/ssh-gss.h ++++ b/ssh-gss.h +@@ -61,10 +61,36 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "gss-nistp256-sha256-" ++#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "gss-curve25519-sha256-" ++ ++#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID ++ ++#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */ ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -72,8 +98,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -84,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -94,10 +124,21 @@ typedef struct { + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret; /* both */ ++ struct sshbuf *server_pubkey; /* server */ ++ struct sshbuf *server_blob; /* client */ ++ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob; /* client */ ++ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; /* client */ ++ gss_buffer_desc buf; /* both */ ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; /* both */ ++ size_t hashlen; /* both */ ++ int first; /* client */ ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub; /* server (gex) */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -108,6 +149,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *); + + struct sshbuf; + int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *); ++int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *); + + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int, +@@ -122,17 +164,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, + const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *, const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); ++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void); ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ +diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 +index db92ac9a..6a9fbdc5 100644 +--- a/ssh.1 ++++ b/ssh.1 +@@ -539,9 +539,15 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + .It ForwardX11Timeout + .It ForwardX11Trusted + .It GSSAPIAuthentication ++.It GSSAPIKeyExchange ++.It GSSAPIClientIdentity + .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + .It GatewayPorts + .It GlobalKnownHostsFile ++.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++.It GSSAPIServerIdentity ++.It GSSAPITrustDns + .It HashKnownHosts + .It Host + .It HostKeyAlgorithms +@@ -636,6 +642,8 @@ flag), + (supported message integrity codes), + .Ar kex + (key exchange algorithms), ++.Ar kex-gss ++(GSSAPI key exchange algorithms), + .Ar key + (key types), + .Ar key-ca-sign +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index dc4886d0..c23d3b9e 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -835,6 +835,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 || + strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0) + cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); ++ else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex-gss") == 0) ++ cp = kex_gss_alg_list('\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) + cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) +@@ -865,8 +867,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { + cp = xstrdup( + "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n" +- "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n" +- "protocol-version\nsig"); ++ "kex-gss\nkey\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\n" ++ "key-sig\nmac\nprotocol-version\nsig"); + } + if (cp == NULL) + fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); +diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config +index 18169187..209248d6 100644 +--- a/ssh_config ++++ b/ssh_config +@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ + # HostbasedAuthentication no + # GSSAPIAuthentication no + # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no ++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++# GSSAPITrustDNS no + # BatchMode no + # CheckHostIP no + # AddressFamily any +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index 894d7383..3a8e246c 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -976,10 +976,68 @@ The default is + Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. + The default is + .Cm no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default ++identity will be used. + .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Cm no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using ++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++If set to ++.Dq yes ++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the ++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this will delegate the renewed ++credentials to a session on the server. ++.Pp ++Checks are made to ensure that credentials are only propagated when the new ++credentials match the old ones on the originating client and where the ++receiving server still has the old set in its cache. ++.Pp ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.Pp ++For this to work ++.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. ++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the ++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target ++hostname. ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes ++to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no , ++the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI ++key exchange. Possible values are ++.Bd -literal -offset 3n ++gss-gex-sha1-, ++gss-group1-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha256-, ++gss-group16-sha512-, ++gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256- ++.Ed ++.Pp ++The default is ++.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . ++This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 1ee6000a..0af15bcc 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL; + int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++#endif ++ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + xxx_conn_info = cinfo; +@@ -255,6 +260,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + compression_alg_list(options.compression), + hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms); + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); ++ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command ++ * and can not use DNS on that socket */ ++ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) { ++ free(gss_host); ++ gss_host = xstrdup(host); ++ } ++ } else { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(host); ++ } ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + free(hkalgs); + + /* start key exchange */ +@@ -271,15 +312,45 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; + # endif +-#endif ++# ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_client; ++ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_client; ++ } ++# endif ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; ++ ssh->kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; ++ ssh->kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; ++ ssh->kex->gss_host = gss_host; ++ } ++#endif ++ + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done); + kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal); + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */ ++ /* ext-info removal above */ ++ if (gss) { ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ free(gss); ++ } ++#endif + #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || +@@ -369,6 +440,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *); + #endif + + void userauth(struct ssh *, char *); +@@ -385,6 +457,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); + + Authmethod authmethods[] = { + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ {"gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_keyex, ++ NULL}, + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + userauth_gssapi_cleanup, +@@ -759,12 +836,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + OM_uint32 min; + int r, ok = 0; + gss_OID mech = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); ++ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command ++ * and can not use DNS on that socket */ ++ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) { ++ free(gss_host); ++ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host); ++ } ++ } else { ++ gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host); ++ } + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL) +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, ++ &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs))) { ++ authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL; ++ free(gss_host); ++ return 0; ++ } + + /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count && +@@ -773,13 +870,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- mech, authctxt->host)) { ++ mech, gss_host, options.gss_client_identity)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + authctxt->mech_tried++; + } + } + ++ free(gss_host); ++ + if (!ok || mech == NULL) + return 0; + +@@ -1013,6 +1112,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + free(lang); + return r; + } ++ ++int ++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; ++ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ms; ++ int r; ++ ++ static int attempt = 0; ++ if (attempt++ >= 1) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { ++ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id); ++ ++ if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); ++ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "parsing"); ++ ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); ++ ++ return (1); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + static int +diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c +index f957dc22..d51e4636 100644 +--- a/sshd-auth.c ++++ b/sshd-auth.c +@@ -844,6 +844,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + + free(hkalgs); + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"); ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = xstrdup("null"); ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "kex_setup"); +@@ -861,6 +903,17 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; + # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ ++# ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++# endif + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index a70b36c9..f8c8a797 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -616,8 +616,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) + } + debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys); + if (nkeys == 0) +- fatal_f("no hostkeys"); +- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ debug3_f("no hostkeys"); ++ else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); + sshbuf_free(buf); + } +@@ -1159,8 +1159,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + break; + } + } +- if (!have_key) +- fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys"); ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ ++ if (!have_key && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys and GSS KEX is not configured"); + + /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ + new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 4a93e29e..c9ea8e38 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -1676,7 +1676,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + free(fp); + } + accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); +- if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ ++ if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); + } +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index 48af6321..8db9f0fb 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes ++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 035a50c8..8bc6586e 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -739,6 +739,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache + on logout. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange ++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. ++The default is ++.Cm no . + .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck + Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor + a client authenticates against. +@@ -753,6 +758,32 @@ machine's default store. + This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey ++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a ++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed ++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is ++.Dq no . ++.Pp ++For this to work ++.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI ++key exchange. Possible values are ++.Bd -literal -offset 3n ++gss-gex-sha1-, ++gss-group1-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha1-, ++gss-group14-sha256-, ++gss-group16-sha512-, ++gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256- ++.Ed ++.Pp ++The default is ++.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . ++This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. +diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c +index ab80752b..4e41a78c 100644 +--- a/sshkey.c ++++ b/sshkey.c +@@ -129,6 +129,75 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl; + extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl; + #endif + ++static int ssh_gss_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) ++{ ++ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++static int ssh_gss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, ++ enum sshkey_serialize_rep) ++{ ++ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_public(const char *, struct sshbuf *, ++ struct sshkey *) ++{ ++ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++static int ssh_gss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, ++ enum sshkey_serialize_rep) ++{ ++ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_private(const char *, struct sshbuf *, ++ struct sshkey *) ++{ ++ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++static int ssh_gss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *) ++{ ++ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++static int ssh_gss_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **) ++{ ++ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; ++} ++ ++static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_gss_funcs = { ++ /* .size = */ NULL, ++ /* .alloc = */ NULL, ++ /* .cleanup = */ NULL, ++ /* .equal = */ ssh_gss_equal, ++ /* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_gss_serialize_public, ++ /* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_public, ++ /* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_gss_serialize_private, ++ /* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_private, ++ /* .generate = */ NULL, ++ /* .copy_public = */ ssh_gss_copy_public, ++ /* .sign = */ NULL, ++ /* .verify = */ ssh_gss_verify, ++}; ++ ++/* The struct is intentionally dummy and has no gss calls */ ++static const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_gss_kex_impl = { ++ /* .name = */ "null", ++ /* .shortname = */ "null", ++ /* .sigalg = */ NULL, ++ /* .type = */ KEY_NULL, ++ /* .nid = */ 0, ++ /* .cert = */ 0, ++ /* .sigonly = */ 0, ++ /* .keybits = */ 0, /* FIXME */ ++ /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_gss_funcs, ++}; ++ + const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = { + &sshkey_ed25519_impl, + &sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl, +@@ -167,6 +236,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = { + &sshkey_xmss_impl, + &sshkey_xmss_cert_impl, + #endif ++ &sshkey_gss_kex_impl, + NULL + }; + +@@ -336,7 +406,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep) + + for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) { + impl = keyimpls[i]; +- if (impl->name == NULL) ++ if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL) + continue; + if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly) + continue; +diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h +index 19bbbac7..4a318d05 100644 +--- a/sshkey.h ++++ b/sshkey.h +@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ enum sshkey_types { + KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, + KEY_ED25519_SK, + KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, ++ KEY_NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch b/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch similarity index 88% rename from openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch rename to 0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch index aeee77f..74643b5 100644 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch +++ b/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch @@ -1,5 +1,17 @@ +From f5e5ee321def2a3674600714ad98fd1ca9b2cff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 13/50] openssh-6.6p1-force_krb + +--- + gss-serv-krb5.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + session.c | 23 +++++++ + ssh-gss.h | 4 ++ + sshd.8 | 7 +++ + 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c -index 413b845..54dd383 100644 +index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ @@ -12,7 +24,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644 #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" -@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ +@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@ #include "ssh-gss.h" @@ -20,7 +32,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644 extern ServerOptions options; #ifdef HEIMDAL -@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options; +@@ -55,6 +58,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options; # include #endif @@ -34,7 +46,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644 static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ -@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) +@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) krb5_principal princ; int retval; const char *errmsg; @@ -42,7 +54,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644 if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) return 0; -@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) +@@ -98,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return 0; } @@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644 } else retval = 0; -@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) +@@ -109,6 +132,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) return retval; } @@ -205,10 +217,10 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644 /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ diff --git a/session.c b/session.c -index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644 +index cbfbcee8..89b3a9cf 100644 --- a/session.c +++ b/session.c -@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) +@@ -680,6 +680,29 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) command = auth_opts->force_command; forced = "(key-option)"; } @@ -235,11 +247,11 @@ index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644 +#endif +#endif + + s->forced = 0; if (forced != NULL) { - if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { - s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? + s->forced = 1; diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h -index 0374c88..509109a 100644 +index 8ec45192..db34d77f 100644 --- a/ssh-gss.h +++ b/ssh-gss.h @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ @@ -254,10 +266,10 @@ index 0374c88..509109a 100644 /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */ diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 -index adcaaf9..824163b 100644 +index 2aa73271..049d0a94 100644 --- a/sshd.8 +++ b/sshd.8 -@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. +@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, @@ -265,7 +277,7 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644 challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. .Pp -@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as +@@ -874,6 +875,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp @@ -278,3 +290,6 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644 .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch b/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch similarity index 72% rename from openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch rename to 0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch index 7acc58a..1d21839 100644 --- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch +++ b/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch @@ -1,5 +1,23 @@ +From 5fca5946aa97dce23c6824c52b070a92532752a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 14/50] openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique + +--- + auth-krb5.c | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + auth.h | 3 +- + gss-serv-krb5.c | 42 +++----- + gss-serv.c | 10 +- + servconf.c | 12 ++- + servconf.h | 2 + + session.c | 5 +- + ssh-gss.h | 4 +- + sshd-session.c | 2 +- + sshd_config.5 | 8 ++ + 10 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) + diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c -index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 +index c99e4e43..77714e3d 100644 --- a/auth-krb5.c +++ b/auth-krb5.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ @@ -19,24 +37,18 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 char *client, *platform_client; const char *errmsg; -@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) +@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) goto out; } -- problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); +- problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, +- &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env); if (problem) goto out; -@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) - if (problem) - goto out; - -- problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, -+ problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, - &creds); - if (problem) +@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) goto out; #endif @@ -57,7 +69,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif -@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) +@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) { @@ -84,7 +96,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 + /* There is at least one other ccache in collection + * we can switch to */ + krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache); -+ } else { ++ } else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) { + /* Clean up the collection too */ + strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10); + krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1; @@ -113,7 +125,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 if (authctxt->krb5_user) { krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); authctxt->krb5_user = NULL; -@@ -237,36 +287,186 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) +@@ -238,36 +281,189 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) } } @@ -153,7 +165,8 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 + old = *dsc; + + i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src); -+ if (i == -1 || src == NULL) { ++ if (i == -1) { ++ *dsc = old; + free(src); + return -1; + } @@ -168,7 +181,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 +ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) { + char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template; + -+ debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template); ++ debug3_f("called, template = %s", template); + if (template == NULL) + return -1; + @@ -195,8 +208,8 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 + continue; + } else { + p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1; -+ p_o = '\0'; -+ debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template); ++ *p_o = '\0'; ++ debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template); + /* unknown token, fallback to the default */ + goto cleanup; + } @@ -222,7 +235,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 + int ret = 0; + char *value = NULL; + -+ debug3("%s: called", __func__); ++ debug3_f("called"); + ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p); + if (ret) + return ret; @@ -233,7 +246,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 + + ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value); + -+ debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname); ++ debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname); + return ret; +} + @@ -244,11 +257,11 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 + mode_t old_umask; + char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL; + -+ debug3("%s: called", __func__); ++ debug3_f("called"); + if (need_environment) + *need_environment = 0; + ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname); -+ if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ticket) { ++ if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) { + /* Otherwise, go with the old method */ + if (ccname) + free(ccname); @@ -284,7 +297,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 - close(tmpfd); - return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); -+ debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname); ++ debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname); + /* set the default with already expanded user IDs */ + ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname); + if (ret) @@ -305,29 +318,31 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644 + * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE) + */ + if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) { -+ debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname); ++ debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname); + ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache); ++ free(type); + if (ret) + return ret; + -+ debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__); ++ debug3_f("calling cc_switch()"); + return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache); + } else { + /* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either + * it is already unique from above or the type does not support + * collections + */ -+ debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname); ++ free(type); ++ debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname); + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); + } } #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ #endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h -index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644 +index 83d07ae8..10e88e11 100644 --- a/auth.h +++ b/auth.h -@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt { +@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct Authctxt { krb5_principal krb5_user; char *krb5_ticket_file; char *krb5_ccname; @@ -335,19 +350,20 @@ index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644 #endif struct sshbuf *loginmsg; -@@ -243,6 +244,6 @@ int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *); +@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); + int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *); #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) - #include -krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *); #endif - #endif + + #endif /* AUTH_H */ diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c -index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 +index 14502c5a..df55512d 100644 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c -@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ @@ -356,12 +372,9 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) { krb5_ccache ccache; -@@ -121,16 +121,17 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) - krb5_error_code problem; - krb5_principal princ; +@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -- const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; -+ int len; + const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; const char *errmsg; + int set_env = 0; @@ -377,7 +390,7 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 #ifdef HEIMDAL # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE -@@ -144,14 +145,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); # endif krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); @@ -396,7 +409,7 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 } #endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */ -@@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); @@ -405,7 +418,7 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 } if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) { -@@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); @@ -414,7 +427,7 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 } krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); -@@ -178,37 +179,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) client->creds, ccache))) { logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed"); krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); @@ -422,30 +435,29 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 + return 0; } -- new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); -- new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); + new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); + new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); - - client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; -#ifdef USE_CCAPI - xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); +- client->store.filename = NULL; -#else - if (new_ccname[0] == ':') - new_ccname++; -- xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); + xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); - if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { - char *p; - p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); - if (p) - *p = '\0'; -- } --#endif ++ + if (set_env) { -+ const char *filename = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; -+ len = strlen(filename) + 6; -+ client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); -+ snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", filename); -+ } + } + if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) + client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); +-#endif #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) @@ -453,7 +465,7 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval); #endif - krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); +@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) client->store.data = krb_context; @@ -463,10 +475,10 @@ index 795992d9..0623a107 100644 int diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c -index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644 +index a5cca797..9d5435ed 100644 --- a/gss-serv.c +++ b/gss-serv.c -@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -414,13 +414,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) } /* As user */ @@ -483,91 +495,101 @@ index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644 + return 0; } - /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based + /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based +@@ -500,9 +502,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) { + char *envstr; + #endif + +- if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && +- gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && +- gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL) + return; + + ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store); diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c -index cb578658..a6e01df2 100644 +index d4f7fd66..55aa5bf0 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c -@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; -+ options->kerberos_unique_ticket = -1; ++ options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_keyex = -1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; -@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +@@ -382,6 +383,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; -+ if (options->kerberos_unique_ticket == -1) -+ options->kerberos_unique_ticket = 0; ++ if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1) ++ options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum { - sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, - sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, +@@ -564,7 +567,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, -- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, -+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueTicket, -+ sChallengeResponseAuthentication, - sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, - sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, +- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication, ++ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication, + sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, -@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct { + sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, +@@ -655,11 +658,13 @@ static struct { #else { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif -+ { "kerberosuniqueticket", sKerberosUniqueTicket, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "kerberosuniqueticket", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, +@@ -1668,6 +1673,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; -+ case sKerberosUniqueTicket: -+ intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ticket; ++ case sKerberosUniqueCCache: ++ intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache; + goto parse_flag; + case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; -@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) +@@ -3293,6 +3302,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueTicket, o->kerberos_unique_ticket); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h -index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644 +index c3f50140..a4a38d6d 100644 --- a/servconf.h +++ b/servconf.h -@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct { +@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ typedef struct { * file on logout. */ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if * authenticated with Kerberos. */ -+ int kerberos_unique_ticket; /* If true, the aquired ticket will ++ int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will + * be stored in per-session ccache */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ diff --git a/session.c b/session.c -index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644 +index 89b3a9cf..2620dd11 100644 --- a/session.c +++ b/session.c -@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) +@@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter - * the childs environment as they see fit + * the child's environment as they see fit */ - ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); + if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env) @@ -575,7 +597,7 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644 #endif /* Set basic environment. */ -@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) +@@ -1101,7 +1102,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) } #endif #ifdef KRB5 @@ -585,18 +607,10 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644 s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h -index 6593e422..245178af 100644 +index db34d77f..a894e23c 100644 --- a/ssh-gss.h +++ b/ssh-gss.h -@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ - #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" - - typedef struct { -- char *filename; - char *envvar; - char *envval; - struct passwd *owner; -@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *); int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); @@ -605,7 +619,7 @@ index 6593e422..245178af 100644 int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); } ssh_gssapi_mech; -@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); +@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex); OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); @@ -614,11 +628,11 @@ index 6593e422..245178af 100644 const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c -index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644 ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index f8c8a797..478381db 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_authentication) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); @@ -628,19 +642,24 @@ index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644 } #endif diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 -index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644 +index 8bc6586e..1251d4d5 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 -@@ -860,6 +860,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache +@@ -1033,6 +1033,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is .Cm yes . -+.It Cm KerberosUniqueTicket -+Specifies whether to store the aquired tickets in the per-session credential -+cache or whether to use per-user credential cache, which might overwrite -+tickets aquired in different sessions of the same user. -+The default is -+.Cm no . ++.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache ++Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential ++cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in ++.Pa /etc/krb5.conf . ++The default value ++.Cm no ++can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same ++user account. .It Cm KexAlgorithms - Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. - Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will + offer to clients. +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch b/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch similarity index 66% rename from openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch rename to 0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch index 09369aa..5e980c8 100644 --- a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch +++ b/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch @@ -1,11 +1,24 @@ +From 25540939422660b024b8832f67eab82267aa8df6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 15/50] openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory + +--- + auth-krb5.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + auth.h | 2 ++ + gss-serv-krb5.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- + sshd.8 | 4 ++++ + 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c -index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644 +index 77714e3d..74f56d47 100644 --- a/auth-krb5.c +++ b/auth-krb5.c -@@ -375,6 +375,22 @@ cleanup: - return -1; +@@ -465,5 +465,21 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); + } } - ++ +/* + * Reads k5login_directory option from the krb5.conf + */ @@ -21,27 +34,26 @@ index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644 + return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL, + k5login_directory); +} -+ - krb5_error_code - ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) { - profile_t p; + #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ + #endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h -index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644 +index 10e88e11..39163035 100644 --- a/auth.h +++ b/auth.h -@@ -222,5 +222,7 @@ int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *); +@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *); + #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) - #include krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *); +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, + char **k5login_directory); #endif - #endif + + #endif /* AUTH_H */ diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c -index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644 +index df55512d..820f794c 100644 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c -@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists() +@@ -144,8 +144,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists() { char file[MAXPATHLEN]; struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; @@ -49,7 +61,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644 + int ret = 0; + + ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory); -+ debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret); ++ debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret); + if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) { + /* If not set, the library will look for k5login + * files in the user's home directory, with the filename .k5login. @@ -64,17 +76,17 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644 + k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "", + pw->pw_name); + } -+ debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file); ++ debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file); - snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir); return access(file, F_OK) == 0; } diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 -index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644 +index 049d0a94..6784286d 100644 --- a/sshd.8 +++ b/sshd.8 -@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh. +@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ rlogin/rsh. These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control. Further details are described in .Xr ksu 1 . @@ -85,3 +97,6 @@ index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644 .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch similarity index 74% rename from openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch rename to 0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch index 81ec2a4..3724b8d 100644 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch +++ b/0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch @@ -1,7 +1,22 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c 2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100 -@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@ +From bac7a9d1a654c8c2e0c71f979195e300b25d6232 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 16/50] openssh-6.6p1-kuserok + +--- + auth-krb5.c | 20 ++++++++- + gss-serv-krb5.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + servconf.c | 13 +++++- + servconf.h | 1 + + sshd_config | 1 + + sshd_config.5 | 5 +++ + 6 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c +index 74f56d47..bae153c9 100644 +--- a/auth-krb5.c ++++ b/auth-krb5.c +@@ -55,6 +55,21 @@ extern ServerOptions options; @@ -23,7 +38,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c static int krb5_init(void *context) { -@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c +@@ -158,8 +173,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) if (problem) goto out; @@ -35,10 +50,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c problem = -1; goto out; } -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100 -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 820f794c..187faf92 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *, int); static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; @@ -46,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ -@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) +@@ -91,6 +92,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 */ @@ -150,17 +166,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) { -@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client +@@ -115,7 +213,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user, * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials * to access these files aren't available yet. */ - if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) { -+ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists) -+ && k5login_exists) { ++ if (k5login_exists && ++ ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) { retval = 1; logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", name, (char *)client->displayname.value); -@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri +@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) { @@ -172,62 +188,63 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c } if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) { int saved_errno = errno; -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100 -@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 55aa5bf0..5dd5ca21 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->use_kuserok = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; -@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; - if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) - options->gss_store_rekey = 0; + options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; +@@ -399,6 +400,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); + #endif + if (options->use_kuserok == -1) + options->use_kuserok = 1; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum { - sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, - sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, +@@ -567,7 +570,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, -- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueTicket, -+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueTicket, sKerberosUseKuserok, - sChallengeResponseAuthentication, - sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, - sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, -@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct { +- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication, ++ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication, + sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, + sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, + sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, +@@ -659,12 +662,14 @@ static struct { { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif - { "kerberosuniqueticket", sKerberosUniqueTicket, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL }, #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "kerberosuniqueticket", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - *activep = value; +@@ -2441,6 +2446,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + } break; + case sKerberosUseKuserok: + intptr = &options->use_kuserok; + goto parse_flag; + - case sPermitListen: - case sPermitOpen: - if (opcode == sPermitListen) { -@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d + case sMatch: + if (cmdline) + fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " +@@ -2995,6 +3004,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); @@ -235,40 +252,54 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); -@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) +@@ -3303,6 +3313,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif - dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueTicket, o->kerberos_unique_ticket); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100 -@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct { + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index a4a38d6d..11de36a2 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ typedef struct { * authenticated with Kerberos. */ - int kerberos_unique_ticket; /* If true, the aquired ticket will + int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will * be stored in per-session ccache */ + int use_kuserok; int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100 -@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr - tickets aquired in different sessions of the same user. - The default is - .Cm no . +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index 8db9f0fb..ea5a878e 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes + #KerberosTicketCleanup yes + #KerberosGetAFSToken no ++#KerberosUseKuserok yes + + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 1251d4d5..0fcb409a 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -1041,6 +1041,10 @@ The default value + .Cm no + can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same + user account. +.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok +Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases. +The default is +.Cm yes . .It Cm KexAlgorithms - Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. - Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. -@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are + Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will + offer to clients. +@@ -1355,6 +1359,7 @@ Available keywords are .Cm IPQoS , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , @@ -276,14 +307,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 .Cm LogLevel , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok 2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100 -@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes - #KerberosTicketCleanup yes - #KerberosGetAFSToken no -+#KerberosUseKuserok yes - - # GSSAPI options - GSSAPIAuthentication yes +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch b/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e8309d --- /dev/null +++ b/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 20aabb2c445e29d211266ce7434bb0273edf88b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 17/50] openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote + +--- + scp.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 57c242ff..716ae386 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -1162,7 +1162,10 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct) + addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); + addargs(&alist, "-x"); + addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); +- addargs(&alist, "-n"); ++ if (isatty(fileno(stdin))) ++ addargs(&alist, "-t"); ++ else ++ addargs(&alist, "-n"); + for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { + addargs(&alist, "%s", + remote_remote_args.list[j]); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49f2119 --- /dev/null +++ b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +From 6481ac7fbd0027a7038560e0f51dd0af056cc229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 18/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts + +--- + openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 2 +- + openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 1 + + sshd-auth.c | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +index 8c5fc1fe..646f0887 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ + #include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ + #include "servconf.h" + #include "port-linux.h" ++#include "misc.h" + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" +@@ -450,7 +451,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + void + sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) + { +- security_context_t *ctx; ++ char *ctx; + + if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; +@@ -469,6 +470,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) + } + } + ++void ++sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void) ++{ ++ int len; ++ char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg; ++ const char *contexts_path; ++ FILE *contexts_file; ++ struct stat sb; ++ ++ contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path(); ++ if (contexts_path == NULL) { ++ debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) { ++ debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 || ++ sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) { ++ logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root" ++ " and not writable by anyone else"); ++ fclose(contexts_file); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) { ++ /* Strip trailing whitespace */ ++ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { ++ if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL) ++ break; ++ line[len] = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ if (line[0] == '\0') ++ continue; ++ ++ cp = line; ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ if (arg && *arg == '\0') ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ ++ if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) { ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { ++ debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty"); ++ fclose(contexts_file); ++ return; ++ } ++ preauth_context = xstrdup(arg); ++ } ++ } ++ fclose(contexts_file); ++ ++ if (preauth_context == NULL) { ++ debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in" ++ " SELinux context file"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context); ++ free(preauth_context); ++} ++ + #endif + #endif + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +index 7426f6f7..9a6b1d6e 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname) + xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx, + newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2); + +- debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx); ++ debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx); + if (setcon(newctx) < 0) + do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s", + newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno)); +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index 1b745a76..7f8ba200 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); + void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); + void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); + int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); ++void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void); + #endif + + #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c +index d51e4636..e4a8edfd 100644 +--- a/sshd-auth.c ++++ b/sshd-auth.c +@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ privsep_child_demote(void) + fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed"); + #endif + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); ++ sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(); + #endif + + /* Demote the child */ +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b30f98 --- /dev/null +++ b/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +From 825018f5f2d892655f3d63167a0d1f3391cec678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 19/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot + +--- + log.c | 11 +++++++++-- + log.h | 1 + + monitor.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + monitor.h | 2 +- + session.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- + sftp-server-main.c | 2 +- + sftp-server.c | 6 +++--- + sftp.h | 2 +- + sshd-session.c | 7 ++++++- + 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/log.c b/log.c +index 6617f267..9782cfb0 100644 +--- a/log.c ++++ b/log.c +@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ void + log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, + int on_stderr) + { ++ log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1); ++} ++ ++void ++log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) { + #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) + struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; + #endif +@@ -208,8 +213,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, + exit(1); + } + +- log_handler = NULL; +- log_handler_ctx = NULL; ++ if (reset_handler) { ++ log_handler = NULL; ++ log_handler_ctx = NULL; ++ } + + log_on_stderr = on_stderr; + if (on_stderr) +diff --git a/log.h b/log.h +index 8e8dfc23..70048a8a 100644 +--- a/log.h ++++ b/log.h +@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum { + typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *); + + void log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); ++void log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int); + LogLevel log_level_get(void); + int log_change_level(LogLevel); + int log_is_on_stderr(void); +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 2ef16cc8..43c10a4e 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -2001,9 +2001,22 @@ monitor_init(void) + } + + void +-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) ++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir) + { +- monitor_openfds(mon, 0); ++ struct stat dev_log_stat; ++ char *dev_log_path; ++ int do_logfds = 0; ++ ++ if (chroot_dir != NULL) { ++ xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir); ++ ++ if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) { ++ debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir); ++ do_logfds = 1; ++ } ++ free(dev_log_path); ++ } ++ monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds); + } + + #ifdef GSSAPI +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index dbc7e003..d4d631dd 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct monitor { + }; + + struct monitor *monitor_init(void); +-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *); ++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *); + + struct Authctxt; + void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *); +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 2620dd11..54da09d5 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc; + + static int is_child = 0; + static int in_chroot = 0; ++static int have_dev_log = 1; + + /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */ + static char *auth_info_file = NULL; +@@ -670,6 +671,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) + int ret; + const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; + char session_type[1024]; ++ struct stat dev_log_stat; + + if (options.adm_forced_command) { + original_command = command; +@@ -729,6 +731,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) + tty += 5; + } + ++ if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) { ++ have_dev_log = 0; ++ } ++ + verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d", + session_type, + tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", +@@ -1512,14 +1518,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh) + + /* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */ + log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL); +- +- /* +- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them +- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after +- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file +- * descriptors open. +- */ +- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + } + + /* +@@ -1652,8 +1650,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) + exit(1); + } + +- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); +- + do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell); + + /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ +@@ -1678,9 +1674,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); ++ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log)); + } + ++ /* ++ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them ++ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after ++ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file ++ * descriptors open. ++ */ ++ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); ++ + fflush(NULL); + + /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ +diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c +index 2c70f89b..bbb79f27 100644 +--- a/sftp-server-main.c ++++ b/sftp-server-main.c +@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + return 1; + } + +- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw)); ++ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0)); + } +diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c +index a4abb9f7..4985da38 100644 +--- a/sftp-server.c ++++ b/sftp-server.c +@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void) + } + + int +-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) ++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler) + { + int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; + ssize_t len, olen; +@@ -1913,7 +1913,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) + extern char *__progname; + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); +- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); + + pw = pwcopy(user_pw); + +@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) + } + } + +- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); ++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); + + /* + * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} +diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h +index 2bde8bb7..ddf1a396 100644 +--- a/sftp.h ++++ b/sftp.h +@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@ + + struct passwd; + +-int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *); ++int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int); + void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index 478381db..9342e416 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + #endif + + /* New socket pair */ +- monitor_reinit(pmonitor); ++ monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory); + + pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); + if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) +@@ -456,6 +456,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; ++ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); ++ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; ++ ++ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1) ++ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch b/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94c43ef --- /dev/null +++ b/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 007ee98fa9100f7241985ac2a7eed71e17d89a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 20/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory + +--- + scp.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 716ae386..9554b188 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -1876,6 +1876,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) + free(vect[0]); + continue; + } ++ if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') { ++ errno = ENOTDIR; ++ goto bad; ++ } + omode = mode; + mode |= S_IWUSR; + if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) { +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch similarity index 56% rename from openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch rename to 0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch index 37e010d..eeff02a 100644 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch +++ b/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch @@ -1,7 +1,21 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100 -@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri +From 9c75c175e3555377328fc5fc9b06e94f129b7cd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 21/50] openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users + +--- + gss-serv-krb5.c | 3 +-- + servconf.c | 13 ++++++++++++- + servconf.h | 1 + + sshd_config | 1 + + sshd_config.5 | 6 ++++++ + 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 187faf92..03188d9b 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, FILE *fp; char file[MAXPATHLEN]; char *line = NULL; @@ -9,7 +23,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser struct stat st; struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; int found_principal = 0; -@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri +@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name, snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir); /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */ @@ -18,19 +32,20 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser, k5login_exists); } -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100 -@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 5dd5ca21..c0de7110 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; options->use_kuserok = -1; + options->enable_k5users = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; -@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->gss_store_rekey = 0; + options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; +@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + #endif if (options->use_kuserok == -1) options->use_kuserok = 1; + if (options->enable_k5users == -1) @@ -38,31 +53,32 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum { - sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, - sHostKeyAlgorithms, +@@ -585,7 +588,7 @@ typedef enum { + sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize, + sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, - sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor, - sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, + sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, -@@ -497,12 +500,14 @@ static struct { - { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -681,6 +684,7 @@ static struct { { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -689,6 +693,7 @@ static struct { { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, #endif { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions +@@ -2450,6 +2455,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, intptr = &options->use_kuserok; goto parse_flag; @@ -70,10 +86,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c + intptr = &options->enable_k5users; + goto parse_flag; + - case sPermitListen: - case sPermitOpen: - if (opcode == sPermitListen) { -@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d + case sMatch: + if (cmdline) + fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " +@@ -3005,6 +3014,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok); @@ -81,29 +97,43 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); -@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) +@@ -3314,6 +3324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) # endif - dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueTicket, o->kerberos_unique_ticket); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100 -@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct { - int kerberos_unique_ticket; /* If true, the aquired ticket will - * be stored in per-session ccache */ +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index 11de36a2..c08cf6a7 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_unique_ccache; /* If true, the acquired ticket will + * be stored in per-session ccache */ int use_kuserok; + int enable_k5users; int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100 -@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr +diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +index ea5a878e..33713c88 100644 +--- a/sshd_config ++++ b/sshd_config +@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes + #GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 0fcb409a..fe246fc2 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -739,6 +739,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Cm yes . @@ -116,14 +146,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_conf .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100 -@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes - GSSAPICleanupCredentials no - #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes - #GSSAPIKeyExchange no -+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch b/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e4766e --- /dev/null +++ b/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From 05b09904f431333e19cd24528ef66d1fd15e9efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 22/50] openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output + +--- + servconf.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index c0de7110..105e301d 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -3366,7 +3366,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); + dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers); + dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs); +- dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); ++ dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none"); + dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); + dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); + dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch b/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch similarity index 60% rename from openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch rename to 0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch index 2d6e730..1cdc0df 100644 --- a/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch +++ b/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch @@ -1,29 +1,43 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 ---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode 2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8 2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200 +From 34b196198018059bed294fa7a08e70606b4cbc36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 23/50] openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission + +--- + sftp-server.8 | 7 +++++++ + sftp-server.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8 +index 5311bf92..5e6e3aa4 100644 +--- a/sftp-server.8 ++++ b/sftp-server.8 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ - .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests - .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests + .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests + .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests .Op Fl u Ar umask +.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms .Ek .Nm .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature -@@ -138,6 +139,10 @@ Sets an explicit +@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit .Xr umask 2 to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the user's default mask. +.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms +Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead +of the default or client requested mode. Numeric values include: -+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Option -u is ineffective if -m is set. ++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Using both -m and -u switches makes the ++umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m) ++for newly created files. .El .Pp On some systems, -diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c ---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode 2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c 2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200 -@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue; +diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c +index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644 +--- a/sftp-server.c ++++ b/sftp-server.c +@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue; /* Version of client */ static u_int version; @@ -34,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ static int init_done; -@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) +@@ -745,6 +749,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) Attrib a; char *name; int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; @@ -42,7 +56,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ -@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) +@@ -754,6 +759,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; @@ -53,7 +67,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && -@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) +@@ -775,6 +784,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) } } } @@ -62,16 +76,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); -@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void) +@@ -1894,7 +1905,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " - "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] " -- "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n" -+ "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n" + "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] " +- "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n" ++ "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n" " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", __progname, __progname); exit(1); -@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, +@@ -1918,7 +1929,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle pw = pwcopy(user_pw); while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, @@ -80,7 +94,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c switch (ch) { case 'Q': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { -@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, +@@ -1980,6 +1991,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); (void)umask((mode_t)mask); break; @@ -96,3 +110,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c case 'h': default: sftp_server_usage(); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch b/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch similarity index 65% rename from openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch rename to 0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch index 301a523..0214781 100644 --- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch +++ b/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch @@ -1,21 +1,17 @@ -Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open. - -All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new -sshd process to handle a new client connection is -spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem -without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the -files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the -closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop. - -Author: Harald Freudenberger +From 9bb31b63142adaaf949e20c2d86c97f9b787217b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 24/50] openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom --- - openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c +index 49a4f35f..f6112458 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c -@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd) +@@ -140,7 +140,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd) fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10); if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' && fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp)) @@ -48,5 +44,7 @@ Author: Harald Freudenberger +#endif } (void) closedir(dirp); - } else + return; +-- +2.49.0 diff --git a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch b/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch similarity index 53% rename from openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch rename to 0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch index 94dac8f..68d679c 100644 --- a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch +++ b/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch @@ -1,18 +1,22 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100 -@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0; - #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" - - /* -- X11 forwarding */ --/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ --#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 -+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */ -+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000 - - /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */ - typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c, -@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void) +From 36e3430d1f81397d5f40600e075272a81f7effce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 25/50] openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays + +--- + channels.c | 9 ++++++--- + channels.h | 2 +- + servconf.c | 12 +++++++++++- + servconf.h | 2 ++ + session.c | 5 +++-- + sshd_config.5 | 7 +++++++ + 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c +index d46531ce..7438c1a5 100644 +--- a/channels.c ++++ b/channels.c +@@ -4996,7 +4996,7 @@ rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) */ int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, @@ -21,8 +25,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; -@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ - if (chanids == NULL) +@@ -5009,8 +5009,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, + x11_display_offset > UINT16_MAX - X11_BASE_PORT - MAX_DISPLAYS) return -1; + /* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */ @@ -32,67 +36,35 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c - display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; + display_number < x11_max_displays; display_number++) { -- port = 6000 + display_number; -+ port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number; -+ if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */ -+ break; + port = X11_BASE_PORT + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; - hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; -@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ +@@ -5065,7 +5068,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, if (num_socks > 0) break; } - if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { -+ if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) { ++ if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_BASE_PORT ) { error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); return -1; } -@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void) - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; -- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); -+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number); - if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { - error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, - ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); -@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void) - /* Connect it to the display. */ - if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { - debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, -- 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); -+ X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno)); - close(sock); - continue; - } -@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void) - } - freeaddrinfo(aitop); - if (!ai) { -- error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, -- 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); -+ error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, -+ X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno)); - return -1; - } - set_nodelay(sock); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100 -@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *); +diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h +index 134528d5..8a09a820 100644 +--- a/channels.h ++++ b/channels.h +@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *); - void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int); + void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t); int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *); -int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); +int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *, const char *, int); - -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100 -@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + int x11_channel_used_recently(struct ssh *ssh); +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 105e301d..15c99b30 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->print_lastlog = -1; options->x11_forwarding = -1; options->x11_display_offset = -1; @@ -100,7 +72,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c options->x11_use_localhost = -1; options->permit_tty = -1; options->permit_user_rc = -1; -@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption +@@ -353,6 +354,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->x11_forwarding = 0; if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) options->x11_display_offset = 10; @@ -109,16 +81,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) options->x11_use_localhost = 1; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) -@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum { - sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, - sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, +@@ -576,7 +579,7 @@ typedef enum { + sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication, + sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, - sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, + sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost, sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, -@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct { +@@ -714,6 +717,7 @@ static struct { { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -126,7 +98,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions +@@ -1750,6 +1754,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, *intptr = value; break; @@ -137,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c case sX11UseLocalhost: intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; goto parse_flag; -@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d +@@ -3004,6 +3012,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); @@ -145,7 +117,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); -@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) +@@ -3299,6 +3308,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) #endif dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); @@ -153,10 +125,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100 -@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index c08cf6a7..7c7e5d43 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ @@ -164,7 +137,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp" -@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct { +@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ typedef struct { int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */ int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start * searching at */ @@ -172,13 +145,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */ char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */ int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100 -@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 54da09d5..28bbb8a7 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -2611,8 +2611,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) return 0; } - if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset, + if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset, - options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, - &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { + options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays, @@ -187,18 +161,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); return 0; } -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100 -@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are - .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index fe246fc2..26fcdc84 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -1391,6 +1391,7 @@ Available keywords are .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , + .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout , .Cm X11DisplayOffset , +.Cm X11MaxDisplays , .Cm X11Forwarding and - .Cm X11UseLocalHost . -@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail + .Cm X11UseLocalhost . +@@ -2111,6 +2112,12 @@ Specifies the first display number available for X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. @@ -211,3 +186,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4f2d15 --- /dev/null +++ b/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ +From 43320351b6f150167190aacc84f2f87030fef3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 26/50] openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux + +--- + auth2-pubkey.c | 8 ++++-- + misc.c | 5 ++-- + misc.h | 2 +- + openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++--------------- + openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 4 +-- + platform.c | 6 ++++- + sshconnect.c | 2 +- + sshd-auth.c | 2 +- + sshd-session.c | 6 +++-- + 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index 267a27d2..0d5ae0df 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ + + /* import */ + extern ServerOptions options; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey; + + static char * +@@ -485,7 +487,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key, + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, +- runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0) ++ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid, ++ inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; +@@ -755,7 +758,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key, + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, +- runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0) ++ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid, ++ inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index 1e31acc9..09722962 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -2764,7 +2764,8 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr) + pid_t + subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command, + int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, +- struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs) ++ struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, ++ privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt) + { + FILE *f = NULL; + struct stat st; +@@ -2898,7 +2899,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command, + _exit(1); + } + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) { + error ("failed to copy environment: %s", + strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); +diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h +index efecdf1a..9efa9cf4 100644 +--- a/misc.h ++++ b/misc.h +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ typedef void privrestore_fn(void); + #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH (1<<3) /* Don't check for safe cmd */ + #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV (1<<4) /* Keep parent environment */ + pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int, +- struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *); ++ struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *); + + typedef struct arglist arglist; + struct arglist { +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +index 646f0887..291b569a 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c +@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@ + #include + #endif + +-extern ServerOptions options; +-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +-extern int inetd_flag; +- + /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ + int + sshd_selinux_enabled(void) +@@ -222,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl, + } + + static void +-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) ++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level, ++ Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { + *role = NULL; + *level = NULL; +@@ -240,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) + + /* Return the default security context for the given username */ + static int +-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, +- security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) ++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc, ++ security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { + char *sename, *lvl; + char *role; +@@ -249,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + int r = 0; + context_t con = NULL; + +- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt); + + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { +@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + + if (r == 0) { + /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ +- if (inetd_flag) { ++ if (inetd) { + security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; + + if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) +@@ -332,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + + /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ + static int +-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *)) ++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd, ++ Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { + const char *reqlvl; + char *role; +@@ -341,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *)) + + debug3_f("setting execution context"); + +- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt); + + rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); + +- if (inetd_flag) { ++ if (inetd) { + use_current = "1"; + } else { + use_current = ""; +@@ -361,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *)) + } + + static int +-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd, ++ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt) + { +- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv); ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt); + } + + static int +@@ -373,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value) + } + + int +-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void) ++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt) + { +- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv); ++ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt; ++ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt); + } + + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ + void +-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) ++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd, ++ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam) + { + security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; + int r = 0; + security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; ++ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt; + + if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) + return; + +- if (options.use_pam) { ++ if (use_pam) { + /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ +- if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { ++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: + fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed"); +@@ -407,7 +409,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + + debug3_f("setting execution context"); + +- r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); ++ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt); + if (r >= 0) { + r = setexeccon(user_ctx); + if (r < 0) { +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +index 7f8ba200..3cd7da6a 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); + + int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); + void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); +-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); +-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); ++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int); ++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *); + void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void); + #endif + +diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c +index 0d12f311..f0800b1f 100644 +--- a/platform.c ++++ b/platform.c +@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ + #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" + + extern ServerOptions options; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + + /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */ + int +@@ -140,7 +142,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw) + } + #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, ++ inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt, ++ options.use_pam); + #endif + } + +diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c +index c86182d1..04084810 100644 +--- a/sshconnect.c ++++ b/sshconnect.c +@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template, + + if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH| +- SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0) ++ SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0) + goto out; + + load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1); +diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c +index e4a8edfd..897db9b4 100644 +--- a/sshd-auth.c ++++ b/sshd-auth.c +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; + int debug_flag = 0; + + /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ +-static int inetd_flag = 0; ++int inetd_flag = 0; + + /* Saved arguments to main(). */ + static char **saved_argv; +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index 9342e416..81d30152 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; + int debug_flag = 0; + + /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ +-static int inetd_flag = 0; ++int inetd_flag = 0; + + /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ + static int log_stderr = 0; +@@ -1359,7 +1359,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + } + #endif + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); ++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name, ++ inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt, ++ options.use_pam); + #endif + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..435d029 --- /dev/null +++ b/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 35205319dd71d8e61c1596b8f9479df91aff7756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 27/50] openssh-7.5p1-sandbox + +--- + sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +index b31062c2..1fabf99d 100644 +--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +@@ -277,6 +277,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_exit_group + SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), + #endif ++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__) ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_futex + SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex), + #endif +@@ -295,6 +298,21 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_getpid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_getuid ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_getuid32 ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_geteuid ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32 ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_gettid ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_getrandom + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), + #endif +@@ -304,6 +322,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday + SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), + #endif ++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__) ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_getuid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), + #endif +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73e890b --- /dev/null +++ b/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch @@ -0,0 +1,3182 @@ +From 5d6ec35c1a0e06452a2c087decb0baf6e8063e21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 28/50] openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri + +--- + Makefile.in | 20 +- + configure.ac | 37 ++ + regress/Makefile | 8 +- + regress/pkcs11.sh | 349 +++++++++++++++ + regress/unittests/Makefile | 2 +- + regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c | 346 ++++++++++++++ + ssh-add.c | 48 +- + ssh-agent.c | 103 ++++- + ssh-keygen.c | 7 +- + ssh-pkcs11-client.c | 3 + + ssh-pkcs11-uri.c | 437 ++++++++++++++++++ + ssh-pkcs11-uri.h | 43 ++ + ssh-pkcs11.c | 745 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + ssh-pkcs11.h | 4 + + ssh.c | 104 ++++- + ssh_config.5 | 15 + + 16 files changed, 2024 insertions(+), 247 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 regress/pkcs11.sh + create mode 100644 regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c + create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-uri.c + create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-uri.h + +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 78f65948..6c417ef7 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \ + ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ +- ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ ++ ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ + poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \ + ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \ + hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \ +@@ -339,6 +339,8 @@ clean: regressclean + rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo + rm -f regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation/ssh-verify-attestation$(EXEEXT) +@@ -377,6 +379,8 @@ distclean: regressclean + rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o ++ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo + rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so +@@ -558,6 +562,7 @@ regress-prep: + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8 ++ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11 + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation + [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ +@@ -731,6 +736,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS) + ++UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\ ++ regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o ++ ++regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT): \ ++ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS} \ ++ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \ ++ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ ++ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS) ++ + # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently. + SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\ + regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \ +@@ -776,7 +791,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \ +- regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) ++ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \ ++ regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \ + + tests: file-tests t-exec interop-tests extra-tests unit + echo all tests passed +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 13c70a98..d9bd2f51 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -2172,12 +2172,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) + ]) + ++SCARD_MSG="yes" + disable_pkcs11= + AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11], + [ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + disable_pkcs11=1 ++ SCARD_MSG="no" + fi + ] + ) +@@ -2207,6 +2209,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include ]) + ++# Check whether we have a p11-kit, we got default provider on command line ++DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG="no" ++AC_ARG_WITH([default-pkcs11-provider], ++ [ --with-default-pkcs11-provider[[=PATH]] Use default pkcs11 provider (p11-kit detected by default)], ++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then ++ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then ++ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) ++ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about p11-kit]) ++ if "$PKGCONFIG" "p11-kit-1"; then ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ++ use_pkgconfig_for_p11kit=yes ++ else ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ++ fi ++ fi ++ else ++ PKCS11_PATH="${withval}" ++ fi ++ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_p11kit" = "xyes"; then ++ PKCS11_PATH=`$PKGCONFIG --variable=proxy_module p11-kit-1` ++ fi ++ AC_CHECK_FILE("$PKCS11_PATH", ++ [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER], ["$PKCS11_PATH"], [Path to default PKCS#11 provider (p11-kit proxy)]) ++ DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG="$PKCS11_PATH" ++ ], ++ [ AC_MSG_ERROR([Requested PKCS11 provided not found]) ] ++ ) ++ else ++ AC_MSG_WARN([Needs PKCS11 support to enable default pkcs11 provider]) ++ fi ] ++) ++ ++ + # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) +@@ -5820,6 +5856,7 @@ echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" + echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" + echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" + echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11" ++echo " Default PKCS#11 provider: $DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG" + echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk" + + echo "" +diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile +index 7e7f95b5..f36de51e 100644 +--- a/regress/Makefile ++++ b/regress/Makefile +@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \ + known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ + modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ + pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \ +- revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ ++ revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa-agent-cert.pub \ ++ rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv pkcs11*.crt pkcs11*.key pkcs11.info \ + rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ + scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ + sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ +@@ -297,8 +298,9 @@ unit: + V="" ; \ + test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ + V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ +- $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ +- $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ ++ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 ; \ ++ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ ++ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ + -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \ + -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \ +diff --git a/regress/pkcs11.sh b/regress/pkcs11.sh +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..a91aee94 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/regress/pkcs11.sh +@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ ++# ++# Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++# ++# Authors: Jakub Jelen ++# ++# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++# ++# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ ++tid="pkcs11 tests with soft token" ++ ++try_token_libs() { ++ for _lib in "$@" ; do ++ if test -f "$_lib" ; then ++ verbose "Using token library $_lib" ++ TEST_SSH_PKCS11="$_lib" ++ return ++ fi ++ done ++ echo "skipped: Unable to find PKCS#11 token library" ++ exit 0 ++} ++ ++try_token_libs \ ++ /usr/local/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \ ++ /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so \ ++ /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so ++ ++TEST_SSH_PIN=1234 ++TEST_SSH_SOPIN=12345678 ++if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" != "x" ]; then ++ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" ++ export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER ++fi ++ ++test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist" ++ ++# setup environment for softhsm token ++DIR=$OBJ/SOFTHSM ++rm -rf $DIR ++TOKEN=$DIR/tokendir ++mkdir -p $TOKEN ++SOFTHSM2_CONF=$DIR/softhsm2.conf ++export SOFTHSM2_CONF ++cat > $SOFTHSM2_CONF << EOF ++# SoftHSM v2 configuration file ++directories.tokendir = ${TOKEN} ++objectstore.backend = file ++# ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG ++log.level = DEBUG ++# If CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE flag should be set ++slots.removable = false ++EOF ++out=$(softhsm2-util --init-token --free --label token-slot-0 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --so-pin "$TEST_SSH_SOPIN") ++slot=$(echo -- $out | sed 's/.* //') ++ ++# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass ++SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true ++export SSH_ASKPASS ++unset DISPLAY ++# We need interactive access to test PKCS# since it prompts for PIN ++sed -i 's/.*BatchMode.*//g' $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++ ++# start command w/o tty, so ssh accepts pin from stdin (from agent-pkcs11.sh) ++notty() { ++ perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid(); ++ if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@" ++} ++ ++trace "generating keys" ++ID1="02" ++ID2="04" ++RSA=${DIR}/RSA ++EC=${DIR}/EC ++openssl genpkey -algorithm rsa > $RSA ++openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $RSA |\ ++ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label "SSH RSA Key $ID1" --id $ID1 \ ++ --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin ++openssl genpkey \ ++ -genparam \ ++ -algorithm ec \ ++ -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 |\ ++ openssl genpkey \ ++ -paramfile /dev/stdin > $EC ++openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $EC |\ ++ softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label "SSH ECDSA Key $ID2" --id $ID2 \ ++ --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin ++ ++trace "List the keys in the ssh-keygen with PKCS#11 URIs" ++${SSHKEYGEN} -D ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > $OBJ/token_keys ++if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: keygen fails to enumerate keys on PKCS#11 token" ++fi ++grep "pkcs11:" $OBJ/token_keys > /dev/null ++if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: The keys from ssh-keygen do not contain PKCS#11 URI as a comment" ++fi ++ ++# Set the ECDSA key to authorized keys ++grep "ECDSA" $OBJ/token_keys > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ++ ++trace "Simple connect with ssh (without PKCS#11 URI)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -I ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} \ ++ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with pkcs11 failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Connect with PKCS#11 URI" ++trace " (ECDSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (RSA key should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Connect with PKCS#11 URI including PIN should not prompt" ++trace " (ECDSA key should succeed)" ++${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}&pin-value=${TEST_SSH_PIN}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (RSA key should fail)" ++${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}&pin-value=${TEST_SSH_PIN}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Connect with various filtering options in PKCS#11 URI" ++trace " (by object label, ECDSA should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:object=SSH%20ECDSA%20Key%2004?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (by object label, RSA key should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:object=SSH%20RSA%20Key%2002?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (by token label, ECDSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID2};token=token-slot-0?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace " (by wrong token label, should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:token=token-slot-99?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++ ++ ++ ++ ++trace "Test PKCS#11 URI specification in configuration files" ++echo "IdentityFile \"pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}\"" \ ++ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++trace " (ECDSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI in config failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++# Set the RSA key as authorized ++grep "RSA" $OBJ/token_keys > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER ++ ++trace " (RSA key should fail)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI in config succeeded (should fail)" ++fi ++sed -i -e "/IdentityFile/d" $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++ ++trace "Test PKCS#11 URI specification in configuration files with bogus spaces" ++echo "IdentityFile \" pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} \"" \ ++ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI with bogus spaces in config failed" \ ++ "(exit code $r)" ++fi ++sed -i -e "/IdentityFile/d" $OBJ/ssh_proxy ++ ++ ++trace "Combination of PKCS11Provider and PKCS11URI on commandline" ++trace " (RSA key should succeed)" ++echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -i "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}" -I ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI and provider combination" \ ++ "failed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++trace "Regress: Missing provider in PKCS11URI option" ++${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ ++ -o IdentityFile=\"pkcs11:token=segfault\" somehost exit 5 ++r=$? ++if [ $r -eq 139 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect with missing provider_id from configuration option" \ ++ "crashed (exit code $r)" ++fi ++ ++ ++trace "SSH Agent can work with PKCS#11 URI" ++trace "start the agent" ++eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null ++ ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" ++else ++ trace "add whole provider to agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" #> /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add failed with whole provider: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 list via agent (all keys)" ++ ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -l failed with whole provider: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (all keys)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect failed with whole provider (exit code $r)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove pkcs11 keys (all keys)" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -d failed with whole provider: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "add only RSA key to the agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL ssh-add failed with RSA key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (RSA key)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect failed with RSA key (exit code $r)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove RSA pkcs11 key" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ ++ > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -d failed with RSA key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "add only ECDSA key to the agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add failed with second key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (ECDSA key should fail)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh connect passed with ECDSA key (should fail)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "add also the RSA key to the agent" ++ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ ++ "pkcs11:id=%${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add failed with first key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove ECDSA pkcs11 key" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ ++ > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "ssh-add -d failed with ECDSA key: exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " remove already-removed pkcs11 key should fail" ++ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=%${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ ++ > /dev/null 2>&1 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -eq 0 ]; then ++ fail "FAIL: ssh-add -d passed with non-existing key (should fail)" ++ fi ++ ++ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (the RSA key should be still usable)" ++ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 ++ r=$? ++ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then ++ fail "ssh connect failed with RSA key (after removing ECDSA): exit code $r" ++ fi ++ ++ trace "kill agent" ++ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null ++fi +diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile b/regress/unittests/Makefile +index e370900e..d6c89c12 100644 +--- a/regress/unittests/Makefile ++++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + # $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.13 2023/09/24 08:14:13 claudio Exp $ + + SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion +-SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig ++SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig pkcs11 + + .include +diff --git a/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..7d4fa499 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c +@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++ * ++ * Authors: Jakub Jelen ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" ++ ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" ++ ++#define EMPTY_URI compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) ++ ++/* prototypes are not public -- specify them here internally for tests */ ++struct sshbuf *percent_encode(const char *, size_t, char *); ++int percent_decode(char *, char **); ++ ++void ++compare_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *a, struct pkcs11_uri *b) ++{ ++ ASSERT_PTR_NE(a, NULL); ++ ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); ++ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a->id_len, b->id_len); ++ ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a->id, b->id, a->id_len); ++ if (b->object != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->object, b->object); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->object, b->object); ++ if (b->module_path != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->module_path, b->module_path); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->module_path, b->module_path); ++ if (b->token != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->token, b->token); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->token, b->token); ++ if (b->manuf != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->manuf, b->manuf); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->manuf, b->manuf); ++ if (b->lib_manuf != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf); ++ if (b->serial != NULL) ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->serial, b->serial); ++ else /* both should be null */ ++ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->serial, b->serial); ++} ++ ++void ++check_parse_rv(char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *expect, int expect_rv) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL, *str; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11uri = NULL; ++ int rv; ++ ++ if (expect_rv == 0) ++ str = "Valid"; ++ else ++ str = "Invalid"; ++ asprintf(&buf, "%s PKCS#11 URI parsing: %s", str, uri); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ pkcs11uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ rv = pkcs11_uri_parse(uri, pkcs11uri); ++ ASSERT_INT_EQ(rv, expect_rv); ++ if (rv == 0) /* in case of failure result is undefined */ ++ compare_uri(pkcs11uri, expect); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(pkcs11uri); ++ free(expect); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++void ++check_parse(char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *expect) ++{ ++ check_parse_rv(uri, expect, 0); ++} ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri * ++compose_uri(unsigned char *id, size_t id_len, char *token, char *lib_manuf, ++ char *manuf, char *serial, char *module_path, char *object, char *pin) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (id_len > 0) { ++ uri->id_len = id_len; ++ uri->id = id; ++ } ++ uri->module_path = module_path; ++ uri->token = token; ++ uri->lib_manuf = lib_manuf; ++ uri->manuf = manuf; ++ uri->serial = serial; ++ uri->object = object; ++ uri->pin = pin; ++ return uri; ++} ++ ++static void ++test_parse_valid(void) ++{ ++ /* path arguments */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:id=%01", ++ compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:id=%00%01", ++ compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:serial=IamSerial", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "IamSerial", NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:object=SIGN%20Key", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "SIGN Key", NULL)); ++ /* query arguments */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?pin-value=123456", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "123456")); ++ ++ /* combinations */ ++ /* ID SHOULD be percent encoded */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Key;id=0", ++ compose_uri("0", 1, "SSH Key", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse( ++ "pkcs11:manufacturer=CAC?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "CAC", NULL, ++ "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ check_parse( ++ "pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key?module-path=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ++ "/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", "RSA Key", NULL)); ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so&pin-value=123456", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, "123456")); ++ ++ /* empty path component matches everything */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI); ++ ++ /* empty string is a valid to match against (and different from NULL) */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ /* Percent character needs to be percent-encoded */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=%25", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "%", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_parse_invalid(void) ++{ ++ /* Invalid percent encoding */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%0", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* Invalid percent encoding */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%ZZ", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* Space MUST be percent encoded -- XXX not enforced yet */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH Keys", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ /* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%01;id=%02", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */ ++ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:?pin-value=111111&pin-value=123456", EMPTY_URI, -1); ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in path are ignored with log message */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:key_name=SSH", EMPTY_URI); ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in query SHOULD be ignored */ ++ check_parse("pkcs11:?key_name=SSH", EMPTY_URI); ++} ++ ++void ++check_gen(char *expect, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL, *uri_str; ++ ++ asprintf(&buf, "Valid PKCS#11 URI generation: %s", expect); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ uri_str = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ ASSERT_PTR_NE(uri_str, NULL); ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(uri_str, expect); ++ free(uri_str); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_generate_valid(void) ++{ ++ /* path arguments */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%01", ++ compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%00%01", ++ compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", /* space must be percent encoded */ ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ /* library-manufacturer is not implmented now */ ++ /*check_gen("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));*/ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:serial=IamSerial", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "IamSerial", NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "RSA Key", NULL)); ++ /* query arguments */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ ++ /* combinations */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%02;token=SSH%20Keys", ++ compose_uri("\x02", 1, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%EE%02?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", ++ compose_uri("\xEE\x02", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL)); ++ check_gen("pkcs11:object=Encryption%20Key;manufacturer=piv_II", ++ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, "Encryption Key", NULL)); ++ ++ /* empty path component matches everything */ ++ check_gen("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI); ++ ++} ++ ++void ++check_encode(char *source, size_t len, char *allow_list, char *expect) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *b; ++ ++ asprintf(&buf, "percent_encode: expected %s", expect); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ ++ b = percent_encode(source, len, allow_list); ++ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(b), expect); ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_percent_encode_multibyte(void) ++{ ++ /* SHOULD be encoded as octets according to the UTF-8 character encoding */ ++ ++ /* multi-byte characters are "for free" */ ++ check_encode("$", 1, "", "%24"); ++ check_encode("¢", 2, "", "%C2%A2"); ++ check_encode("€", 3, "", "%E2%82%AC"); ++ check_encode("𐍈", 4, "", "%F0%90%8D%88"); ++ ++ /* CK_UTF8CHAR is unsigned char (1 byte) */ ++ /* labels SHOULD be normalized to NFC [UAX15] */ ++ ++} ++ ++static void ++test_percent_encode(void) ++{ ++ /* Without allow list encodes everything (for CKA_ID) */ ++ check_encode("A*", 2, "", "%41%2A"); ++ check_encode("\x00", 1, "", "%00"); ++ check_encode("\x7F", 1, "", "%7F"); ++ check_encode("\x80", 1, "", "%80"); ++ check_encode("\xff", 1, "", "%FF"); ++ ++ /* Default allow list encodes anything but safe letters */ ++ check_encode("test" "\x00" "0alpha", 11, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "test%000alpha"); ++ check_encode(" ", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%20"); /* Space MUST be percent encoded */ ++ check_encode("/", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%2F"); /* '/' delimiter MUST be percent encoded (in the path) */ ++ check_encode("?", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%3F"); /* delimiter '?' MUST be percent encoded (in the path) */ ++ check_encode("#", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "%23"); /* '#' MUST be always percent encoded */ ++ check_encode("key=value;separator?query&#anch", 35, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, ++ "key%3Dvalue%3Bseparator%3Fquery%26amp%3B%23anch"); ++ ++ /* Components in query can have '/' unencoded (useful for paths) */ ++ check_encode("/path/to.file", 13, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "/", ++ "/path/to.file"); ++} ++ ++void ++check_decode(char *source, char *expect, int expect_len) ++{ ++ char *buf = NULL, *out = NULL; ++ int rv; ++ ++ asprintf(&buf, "percent_decode: %s", source); ++ TEST_START(buf); ++ free(buf); ++ ++ rv = percent_decode(source, &out); ++ ASSERT_INT_EQ(rv, expect_len); ++ if (rv >= 0) ++ ASSERT_MEM_EQ(out, expect, expect_len); ++ free(out); ++ TEST_DONE(); ++} ++ ++static void ++test_percent_decode(void) ++{ ++ /* simple valid cases */ ++ check_decode("%00", "\x00", 1); ++ check_decode("%FF", "\xFF", 1); ++ ++ /* normal strings shold be kept intact */ ++ check_decode("strings are left", "strings are left", 16); ++ check_decode("10%25 of trees", "10% of trees", 12); ++ ++ /* make sure no more than 2 bytes are parsed */ ++ check_decode("%222", "\x22" "2", 2); ++ ++ /* invalid expects failure */ ++ check_decode("%0", "", -1); ++ check_decode("%Z", "", -1); ++ check_decode("%FG", "", -1); ++} ++ ++void ++tests(void) ++{ ++ test_percent_encode(); ++ test_percent_encode_multibyte(); ++ test_percent_decode(); ++ test_parse_valid(); ++ test_parse_invalid(); ++ test_generate_valid(); ++} +diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c +index 0035cb84..b0f47f4d 100644 +--- a/ssh-add.c ++++ b/ssh-add.c +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ + #include "ssh-sk.h" + #include "sk-api.h" + #include "hostfile.h" ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" + + /* argv0 */ + extern char *__progname; +@@ -242,6 +243,38 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag) + return ret; + } + ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++static int ++update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag, ++ int key_only, int cert_only, ++ struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints, ++ struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin); ++ ++int ++update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri, int qflag, ++ struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) ++{ ++ char *pin = NULL; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ /* dry-run parse to make sure the URI is valid and to report errors */ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse((char *) pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ if (uri->pin != NULL) { ++ pin = strdup(uri->pin); ++ if (pin == NULL) { ++ fatal("Failed to dupplicate string"); ++ } ++ /* pin is freed in the update_card() */ ++ } ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ ++ return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, 1, 0, ++ dest_constraints, ndest_constraints, NULL, 0, pin); ++} ++#endif ++ + static int + add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int cert_only, + int qflag, const char *skprovider, +@@ -462,15 +495,14 @@ static int + update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag, + int key_only, int cert_only, + struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints, +- struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts) ++ struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin) + { +- char *pin = NULL; + int r, ret = -1; + + if (key_only) + ncerts = 0; + +- if (add) { ++ if (add && pin == NULL) { + if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) + return -1; +@@ -658,6 +690,14 @@ do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, int cert_only, + char *file, int qflag, const char *skprovider, + struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) + { ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ if (strlen(file) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(file, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ return update_pkcs11_uri(agent_fd, !deleting, file, qflag, ++ dest_constraints, ndest_constraints); ++ } ++#endif + if (deleting) { + if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, + cert_only, qflag) == -1) +@@ -1001,7 +1041,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider, + qflag, key_only, cert_only, + dest_constraints, ndest_constraints, +- certs, ncerts) == -1) ++ certs, ncerts, NULL) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index c27c5a95..798bf9b6 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1569,10 +1569,74 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, char *comment, const char *provider, + idtab->nentries++; + } + ++static char * ++sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL; ++ char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */ ++ char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; ++ ++ if (provider == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ memset(canonical_provider, 0, sizeof(canonical_provider)); ++ ++ if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ /* PKCS#11 URI */ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) { ++ error("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) { ++ error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ /* validate also provider from URI */ ++ if (uri->module_path) ++ module_path = strdup(uri->module_path); ++ } else ++ module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */ ++ ++ if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */ ++ if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) { ++ verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", ++ module_path, strerror(errno)); ++ free(module_path); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ free(module_path); ++ if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) { ++ verbose("refusing PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": " ++ "not allowed", canonical_provider); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* copy verified and sanitized provider path back to the uri */ ++ if (uri) { ++ free(uri->module_path); ++ uri->module_path = xstrdup(canonical_provider); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (uri) { ++ sane_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return sane_uri; ++ } else { ++ return xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* simple path */ ++ } ++} ++ + static void + process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + { +- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; ++ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, *sane_uri = NULL; + char **comments = NULL; + int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; + u_int seconds = 0; +@@ -1601,25 +1665,18 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + "providers is disabled", provider); + goto send; + } +- if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { +- verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", +- provider, strerror(errno)); +- goto send; +- } +- if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) { +- verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": " +- "provider not allowed", canonical_provider); ++ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); ++ if (sane_uri == NULL) + goto send; +- } +- debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider); + if (lifetime && !death) + death = monotime() + lifetime; + +- count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments); ++ debug_f("add %.100s", sane_uri); ++ count = pkcs11_add_provider(sane_uri, pin, &keys, &comments); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + if (comments[i] == NULL || comments[i][0] == '\0') { + free(comments[i]); +- comments[i] = xstrdup(canonical_provider); ++ comments[i] = xstrdup(sane_uri); + } + for (j = 0; j < ncerts; j++) { + if (!sshkey_is_cert(certs[j])) +@@ -1629,13 +1686,13 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + if (pkcs11_make_cert(keys[i], certs[j], &k) != 0) + continue; + add_p11_identity(k, xstrdup(comments[i]), +- canonical_provider, death, confirm, ++ sane_uri, death, confirm, + dest_constraints, ndest_constraints); + success = 1; + } + if (!cert_only && lookup_identity(keys[i]) == NULL) { + add_p11_identity(keys[i], comments[i], +- canonical_provider, death, confirm, ++ sane_uri, death, confirm, + dest_constraints, ndest_constraints); + keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ + comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */ +@@ -1648,6 +1705,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + send: + free(pin); + free(provider); ++ free(sane_uri); + free(keys); + free(comments); + free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints); +@@ -1660,7 +1718,7 @@ send: + static void + process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + { +- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; ++ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, *sane_uri = NULL; + int r, success = 0; + Identity *id, *nxt; + +@@ -1672,30 +1730,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) + } + free(pin); + +- if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { +- verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", +- provider, strerror(errno)); ++ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); ++ if (sane_uri == NULL) + goto send; +- } + +- debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider); ++ debug_f("remove %.100s", sane_uri); + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); + /* Skip file--based keys */ + if (id->provider == NULL) + continue; +- if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { ++ if (!strcmp(sane_uri, id->provider)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; + } + } +- if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0) ++ if (pkcs11_del_provider(sane_uri) == 0) + success = 1; + else + error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed"); + send: + free(provider); ++ free(sane_uri); + send_status(e, success); + } + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c +index 89c3ed28..16cff947 100644 +--- a/ssh-keygen.c ++++ b/ssh-keygen.c +@@ -906,8 +906,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) + free(fp); + } else { + (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ +- fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n", +- *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]); ++ if (*(comments[i]) != '\0') { ++ fprintf(stdout, " %s", comments[i]); ++ } ++ (void) pkcs11_uri_write(keys[i], stdout); ++ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + } + free(comments[i]); + sshkey_free(keys[i]); +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +index b8d1700f..64df695e 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +@@ -635,6 +635,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, + struct sshbuf *msg; + struct helper *helper; + ++ debug_f("called, name = %s", name); ++ + if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) == NULL && + (helper = pkcs11_start_helper(name)) == NULL) + return -1; +@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, + *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + if (labelsp) + *labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *)); ++ debug_f("nkeys = %u", nkeys); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + /* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..8bd97e9e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c +@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++ * ++ * Authors: Jakub Jelen ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "sshkey.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "log.h" ++ ++#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" ++ ++#define PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR ";" ++#define PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR "&" ++#define PKCS11_URI_VALUE_SEPARATOR "=" ++#define PKCS11_URI_ID "id" ++#define PKCS11_URI_TOKEN "token" ++#define PKCS11_URI_OBJECT "object" ++#define PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF "library-manufacturer" ++#define PKCS11_URI_MANUF "manufacturer" ++#define PKCS11_URI_SERIAL "serial" ++#define PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH "module-path" ++#define PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE "pin-value" ++ ++/* Keyword tokens. */ ++typedef enum { ++ pId, pToken, pObject, pLibraryManufacturer, pManufacturer, pSerial, ++ pModulePath, pPinValue, pBadOption ++} pkcs11uriOpCodes; ++ ++/* Textual representation of the tokens. */ ++static struct { ++ const char *name; ++ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; ++} keywords[] = { ++ { PKCS11_URI_ID, pId }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_TOKEN, pToken }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, pObject }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF, pLibraryManufacturer }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_MANUF, pManufacturer }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_SERIAL, pSerial }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, pModulePath }, ++ { PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE, pPinValue }, ++ { NULL, pBadOption } ++}; ++ ++static pkcs11uriOpCodes ++parse_token(const char *cp) ++{ ++ u_int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) ++ if (strncasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name, ++ strlen(keywords[i].name)) == 0) ++ return keywords[i].opcode; ++ ++ return pBadOption; ++} ++ ++int ++percent_decode(char *data, char **outp) ++{ ++ char tmp[3]; ++ char *out, *tmp_end; ++ char *p = data; ++ long value; ++ size_t outlen = 0; ++ ++ out = malloc(strlen(data)+1); /* upper bound */ ++ if (out == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ while (*p != '\0') { ++ switch (*p) { ++ case '%': ++ p++; ++ if (*p == '\0') ++ goto fail; ++ tmp[0] = *p++; ++ if (*p == '\0') ++ goto fail; ++ tmp[1] = *p++; ++ tmp[2] = '\0'; ++ tmp_end = NULL; ++ value = strtol(tmp, &tmp_end, 16); ++ if (tmp_end != tmp+2) ++ goto fail; ++ else ++ out[outlen++] = (char) value; ++ break; ++ default: ++ out[outlen++] = *p++; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* zero terminate */ ++ out[outlen] = '\0'; ++ *outp = out; ++ return outlen; ++fail: ++ free(out); ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++struct sshbuf * ++percent_encode(const char *data, size_t length, const char *allow_list) ++{ ++ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; ++ char tmp[4], *cp; ++ size_t i; ++ ++ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { ++ cp = strchr(allow_list, data[i]); ++ /* if c is specified as '\0' pointer to terminator is returned !! */ ++ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { ++ if (sshbuf_put(b, &data[i], 1) != 0) ++ goto err; ++ } else ++ if (snprintf(tmp, 4, "%%%02X", (unsigned char) data[i]) < 3 ++ || sshbuf_put(b, tmp, 3) != 0) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (sshbuf_put(b, "\0", 1) == 0) ++ return b; ++err: ++ sshbuf_free(b); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++char * ++pkcs11_uri_append(char *part, const char *separator, const char *key, ++ struct sshbuf *value) ++{ ++ char *new_part; ++ size_t size = 0; ++ ++ if (value == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ size = asprintf(&new_part, ++ "%s%s%s" PKCS11_URI_VALUE_SEPARATOR "%s", ++ (part != NULL ? part : ""), ++ (part != NULL ? separator : ""), ++ key, sshbuf_ptr(value)); ++ sshbuf_free(value); ++ free(part); ++ ++ if (size <= 0) ++ return NULL; ++ return new_part; ++} ++ ++char * ++pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri) ++{ ++ size_t size = 0; ++ char *p = NULL, *path = NULL, *query = NULL; ++ ++ /* compose a percent-encoded ID */ ++ if (uri->id_len > 0) { ++ struct sshbuf *key_id = percent_encode(uri->id, uri->id_len, ""); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_ID, key_id); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write object label */ ++ if (uri->object) { ++ struct sshbuf *label = percent_encode(uri->object, strlen(uri->object), ++ PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, label); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write token label */ ++ if (uri->token) { ++ struct sshbuf *label = percent_encode(uri->token, strlen(uri->token), ++ PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_TOKEN, label); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write manufacturer */ ++ if (uri->manuf) { ++ struct sshbuf *manuf = percent_encode(uri->manuf, ++ strlen(uri->manuf), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_MANUF, manuf); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write serial */ ++ if (uri->serial) { ++ struct sshbuf *serial = percent_encode(uri->serial, ++ strlen(uri->serial), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); ++ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_SERIAL, serial); ++ if (path == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Write module_path */ ++ if (uri->module_path) { ++ struct sshbuf *module = percent_encode(uri->module_path, ++ strlen(uri->module_path), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "/"); ++ query = pkcs11_uri_append(query, PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR, ++ PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, module); ++ if (query == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ size = asprintf(&p, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME "%s%s%s", ++ path != NULL ? path : "", ++ query != NULL ? "?" : "", ++ query != NULL ? query : ""); ++err: ++ free(query); ++ free(path); ++ if (size <= 0) ++ return NULL; ++ return p; ++} ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri * ++pkcs11_uri_init() ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *d = calloc(1, sizeof(struct pkcs11_uri)); ++ return d; ++} ++ ++void ++pkcs11_uri_cleanup(struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11) ++{ ++ if (pkcs11 == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ free(pkcs11->id); ++ free(pkcs11->module_path); ++ free(pkcs11->token); ++ free(pkcs11->object); ++ free(pkcs11->lib_manuf); ++ free(pkcs11->manuf); ++ free(pkcs11->serial); ++ if (pkcs11->pin) ++ freezero(pkcs11->pin, strlen(pkcs11->pin)); ++ free(pkcs11); ++} ++ ++int ++pkcs11_uri_parse(const char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11) ++{ ++ char *saveptr1, *saveptr2, *str1, *str2, *tok; ++ int rv = 0, len; ++ char *p = NULL; ++ ++ size_t scheme_len = strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME); ++ if (strlen(uri) < scheme_len || /* empty URI matches everything */ ++ strncmp(uri, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, scheme_len) != 0) { ++ error_f("The '%s' does not look like PKCS#11 URI", uri); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (pkcs11 == NULL) { ++ error_f("Bad arguments. The pkcs11 can't be null"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ /* skip URI schema name */ ++ p = strdup(uri); ++ str1 = p; ++ ++ /* everything before ? */ ++ tok = strtok_r(str1, "?", &saveptr1); ++ if (tok == NULL) { ++ error_f("pk11-path expected, got EOF"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* skip URI schema name: ++ * the scheme ensures that there is at least something before "?" ++ * allowing empty pk11-path. Resulting token at worst pointing to ++ * \0 byte */ ++ tok = tok + scheme_len; ++ ++ /* parse pk11-path */ ++ for (str2 = tok; ; str2 = NULL) { ++ char **charptr, *arg = NULL; ++ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; ++ tok = strtok_r(str2, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, &saveptr2); ++ if (tok == NULL) ++ break; ++ opcode = parse_token(tok); ++ if (opcode != pBadOption) ++ arg = tok + strlen(keywords[opcode].name) + 1; /* separator "=" */ ++ ++ switch (opcode) { ++ case pId: ++ /* CKA_ID */ ++ if (pkcs11->id != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("The id already set in the PKCS#11 URI"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ len = percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->id); ++ if (len <= 0) { ++ verbose_f("Failed to percent-decode CKA_ID: %s", arg); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } else ++ pkcs11->id_len = len; ++ debug3_f("Setting CKA_ID = %s from PKCS#11 URI", arg); ++ break; ++ case pToken: ++ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> label */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->token; ++ parse_string: ++ if (*charptr != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("The %s already set in the PKCS#11 URI", ++ keywords[opcode].name); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ percent_decode(arg, charptr); ++ debug3_f("Setting %s = %s from PKCS#11 URI", ++ keywords[opcode].name, *charptr); ++ break; ++ ++ case pObject: ++ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> manufacturerID */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->object; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case pManufacturer: ++ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> manufacturerID */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->manuf; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case pSerial: ++ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> serialNumber */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->serial; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case pLibraryManufacturer: ++ /* CK_INFO -> manufacturerID */ ++ charptr = &pkcs11->lib_manuf; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ default: ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in the URI path SHOULD be error */ ++ verbose_f("Unknown part of path in PKCS#11 URI: %s", tok); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ tok = strtok_r(NULL, "?", &saveptr1); ++ if (tok == NULL) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* parse pk11-query (optional) */ ++ for (str2 = tok; ; str2 = NULL) { ++ char *arg; ++ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; ++ tok = strtok_r(str2, PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR, &saveptr2); ++ if (tok == NULL) ++ break; ++ opcode = parse_token(tok); ++ if (opcode != pBadOption) ++ arg = tok + strlen(keywords[opcode].name) + 1; /* separator "=" */ ++ ++ switch (opcode) { ++ case pModulePath: ++ /* module-path is PKCS11Provider */ ++ if (pkcs11->module_path != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("Multiple module-path attributes are" ++ "not supported the PKCS#11 URI"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->module_path); ++ debug3_f("Setting PKCS11Provider = %s from PKCS#11 URI", ++ pkcs11->module_path); ++ break; ++ ++ case pPinValue: ++ /* pin-value */ ++ if (pkcs11->pin != NULL) { ++ verbose_f("Multiple pin-value attributes are" ++ "not supported the PKCS#11 URI"); ++ rv = -1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->pin); ++ debug3_f("Setting PIN from PKCS#11 URI"); ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ /* Unrecognized attribute in the URI query SHOULD be ignored */ ++ verbose_f("Unknown part of query in PKCS#11 URI: %s", tok); ++ } ++ } ++out: ++ free(p); ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..29e9f732 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h +@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat ++ * ++ * Authors: Jakub Jelen ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#define PKCS11_URI_SCHEME "pkcs11:" ++#define PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" \ ++ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" \ ++ "0123456789_-.()" ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri { ++ /* path */ ++ char *id; ++ size_t id_len; ++ char *token; ++ char *object; ++ char *lib_manuf; ++ char *manuf; ++ char *serial; ++ /* query */ ++ char *module_path; ++ char *pin; /* Only parsed, but not printed */ ++}; ++ ++struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init(); ++void pkcs11_uri_cleanup(struct pkcs11_uri *); ++int pkcs11_uri_parse(const char *, struct pkcs11_uri *); ++struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init(); ++char *pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri); ++ +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c +index 31b9360f..b96f5b89 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT + #include "pkcs11.h" +@@ -55,8 +56,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo { + int logged_in; + }; + +-struct pkcs11_provider { +- char *name; ++struct pkcs11_module { ++ char *module_path; + void *handle; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; + CK_INFO info; +@@ -65,6 +66,13 @@ struct pkcs11_provider { + struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; + int valid; + int refcount; ++}; ++ ++struct pkcs11_provider { ++ char *name; ++ struct pkcs11_module *module; /* can be shared between various providers */ ++ int refcount; ++ int valid; + TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; + }; + +@@ -75,6 +83,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key { + CK_ULONG slotidx; + char *keyid; + int keyid_len; ++ char *label; + }; + + int pkcs11_interactive = 0; +@@ -106,26 +115,61 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive) + * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. + */ + static void +-pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) ++pkcs11_module_finalize(struct pkcs11_module *m) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG i; + +- debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d", +- p->name, p->refcount, p->valid); +- if (!p->valid) ++ debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid); ++ if (!m->valid) + return; +- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { +- if (p->slotinfo[i].session && +- (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( +- p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) ++ for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) { ++ if (m->slotinfo[i].session && ++ (rv = m->function_list->C_CloseSession( ++ m->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); + } +- if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) ++ if ((rv = m->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); ++ m->valid = 0; ++ m->function_list = NULL; ++ dlclose(m->handle); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * remove a reference to the pkcs11 module. ++ * called when a provider is unregistered. ++ */ ++static void ++pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m) ++{ ++ debug_f("%p refcount %d", m, m->refcount); ++ if (--m->refcount <= 0) { ++ pkcs11_module_finalize(m); ++ if (m->valid) ++ error_f("%p still valid", m); ++ free(m->slotlist); ++ free(m->slotinfo); ++ free(m->module_path); ++ free(m); ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable. ++ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, ++ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). ++ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. ++ */ ++static void ++pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) ++{ ++ debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid); ++ if (!p->valid) ++ return; ++ pkcs11_module_unref(p->module); ++ p->module = NULL; + p->valid = 0; +- p->function_list = NULL; +- dlclose(p->handle); + } + + /* +@@ -137,11 +181,9 @@ pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) + { + debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount); + if (--p->refcount <= 0) { +- if (p->valid) +- error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name); + free(p->name); +- free(p->slotlist); +- free(p->slotinfo); ++ if (p->module) ++ pkcs11_module_unref(p->module); + free(p); + } + } +@@ -159,6 +201,20 @@ pkcs11_terminate(void) + } + } + ++/* lookup provider by module path */ ++static struct pkcs11_module * ++pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(char *module_path) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_provider *p; ++ ++ TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { ++ debug("check %p %s (%s)", p, p->name, p->module->module_path); ++ if (!strcmp(module_path, p->module->module_path)) ++ return (p->module); ++ } ++ return (NULL); ++} ++ + /* lookup provider by name */ + static struct pkcs11_provider * + pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) +@@ -173,19 +229,55 @@ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) + return (NULL); + } + ++int pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *); ++ + /* unregister provider by name */ + int + pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) ++{ ++ int rv; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id); ++ ++ if (provider_id == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ } else { ++ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(uri); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ return rv; ++} ++ ++/* unregister provider by PKCS#11 URI */ ++int ++pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri) + { + struct pkcs11_provider *p; ++ int rv = -1; ++ char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); + +- if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { ++ debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri); ++ ++ if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); +- return (0); ++ rv = 0; + } +- return (-1); ++ free(provider_uri); ++ return rv; + } + + static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; +@@ -195,6 +287,60 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method; + static int ec_key_idx = 0; + #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + ++/* ++ * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on ++ * PKCS#11 structures in ssh-agent (using client-helper communication) ++ */ ++int ++pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) ++{ ++ char *p = NULL; ++ struct pkcs11_uri uri; ++ struct pkcs11_key *k11; ++ ++ /* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */ ++ switch (key->type) { ++ case KEY_RSA: { ++ const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key->pkey); ++ k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx); ++ break; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW ++ case KEY_ECDSA: { ++ const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key->pkey); ++ k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx); ++ break; ++ } ++#endif ++ default: ++ error("Unknown key type %d", key->type); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (k11 == NULL) { ++ error("Failed to get ex_data for key type %d", key->type); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ /* omit type -- we are looking for private-public or private-certificate pairs */ ++ uri.id = k11->keyid; ++ uri.id_len = k11->keyid_len; ++ uri.token = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.label; ++ uri.object = k11->label; ++ uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path; ++ uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID; ++ uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID; ++ uri.serial = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.serialNumber; ++ ++ p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri); ++ /* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */ ++ if (p == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ fprintf(f, " %s", p); ++ free(p); ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* release a wrapped object */ + static void + pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, +@@ -208,6 +354,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, + if (k11->provider) + pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); + free(k11->keyid); ++ free(k11->label); + free(k11); + } + +@@ -222,8 +369,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, + CK_RV rv; + int ret = -1; + +- f = p->function_list; +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); + return (-1); +@@ -260,14 +407,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si, + if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) + verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); + else { +- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", ++ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%.32s': ", + si->token.label); +- if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) { ++ if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) { + debug_f("no pin specified"); + return (-1); /* bail out */ + } + } +- rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin, ++ rv = provider->module->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin, + (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); + if (pin != NULL) + freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); +@@ -297,13 +444,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si, + static int + pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type) + { +- if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) { ++ if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid || ++ k11->provider->module == NULL || !k11->provider->module->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); + return (-1); + } + + return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider, +- &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type); ++ &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type); + } + + +@@ -319,13 +467,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj, + + *val = 0; + +- if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { ++ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid || ++ !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); + return (-1); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + + attr.type = type; + attr.pValue = &flag; +@@ -356,13 +505,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type) + int always_auth = 0; + int did_login = 0; + +- if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { ++ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid || ++ !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found"); + return (-1); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + + if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { + if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) { +@@ -439,8 +589,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, + return (-1); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + tlen = RSA_size(rsa); + + /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ +@@ -484,7 +634,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void) + /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ + static int + pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, RSA *rsa) + { + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + +@@ -502,6 +652,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, + memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + } + ++ if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) { ++ k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1); ++ memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen); ++ k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; ++ } ++ + if (RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method) != 1) + fatal_f("RSA_set_method failed"); + if (RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11) != 1) +@@ -534,8 +690,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv, + return (NULL); + } + +- f = k11->provider->function_list; +- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; ++ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; ++ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + + siglen = ECDSA_size(ec); + sig = xmalloc(siglen); +@@ -600,7 +756,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void) + + static int + pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec) ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, EC_KEY *ec) + { + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + +@@ -617,6 +773,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, + k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); + memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + } ++ if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) { ++ k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1); ++ memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen); ++ k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; ++ } ++ + if (EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method) != 1) + fatal_f("EC_KEY_set_method failed"); + if (EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11) != 1) +@@ -626,7 +788,8 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, + } + #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ + +-/* remove trailing spaces */ ++/* remove trailing spaces. Note, that this does NOT guarantee the buffer ++ * will be null terminated if there are no trailing spaces! */ + static char * + rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) + { +@@ -658,8 +821,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin, + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + int login_required, ret; + +- f = p->function_list; +- si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx]; ++ f = p->module->function_list; ++ si = &p->module->slotinfo[slotidx]; + + login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; + +@@ -669,9 +832,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin, + error("pin required"); + return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED); + } +- if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| ++ if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->module->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| + CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) { +- error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); ++ error("C_OpenSession failed for slot %lu: %lu", slotidx, rv); + return (-1); + } + if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) { +@@ -707,7 +870,8 @@ static struct sshkey * + pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) + { +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[4]; ++ int nattr = 4; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -721,14 +885,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + + memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); + key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; +- key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT; +- key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; ++ key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_POINT; ++ key_attr[3].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS; + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + + /* figure out size of the attributes */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + return (NULL); +@@ -739,19 +904,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + * ensure that none of the others are zero length. + * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. + */ +- if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || +- key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { ++ if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 || ++ key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) { + error("invalid attribute length"); + return (NULL); + } + + /* allocate buffers for attributes */ +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) + key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); + + /* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -763,8 +928,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + goto fail; + } + +- attrp = key_attr[2].pValue; +- group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen); ++ attrp = key_attr[3].pValue; ++ group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[3].ulValueLen); + if (group == NULL) { + ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed"); + goto fail; +@@ -775,13 +940,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + goto fail; + } + +- if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) { ++ if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen <= 2) { + error("CKA_EC_POINT too small"); + goto fail; + } + +- attrp = key_attr[1].pValue; +- octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen); ++ attrp = key_attr[2].pValue; ++ octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen); + if (octet == NULL) { + ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed"); + goto fail; +@@ -798,7 +963,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + goto fail; + } + +- if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec)) ++ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], ec)) + goto fail; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -817,7 +982,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + + fail: +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + free(key_attr[i].pValue); + if (ec) + EC_KEY_free(ec); +@@ -834,7 +999,8 @@ static struct sshkey * + pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) + { +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[4]; ++ int nattr = 4; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -845,14 +1011,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + + memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr)); + key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; +- key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS; +- key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; ++ key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[2].type = CKA_MODULUS; ++ key_attr[3].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT; + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + + /* figure out size of the attributes */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + return (NULL); +@@ -863,19 +1030,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + * ensure that none of the others are zero length. + * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. + */ +- if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || +- key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { ++ if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 || ++ key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) { + error("invalid attribute length"); + return (NULL); + } + + /* allocate buffers for attributes */ +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) + key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen); + + /* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -887,8 +1054,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + goto fail; + } + +- rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL); +- rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL); ++ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL); ++ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[3].pValue, key_attr[3].ulValueLen, NULL); + if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) { + error("BN_bin2bn failed"); + goto fail; +@@ -897,7 +1064,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + fatal_f("set key"); + rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ + +- if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa)) ++ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], rsa)) + goto fail; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -915,7 +1082,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + + fail: +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + free(key_attr[i].pValue); + RSA_free(rsa); + +@@ -926,7 +1093,8 @@ static int + pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp) + { +- CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[3]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[4]; ++ int nattr = 4; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -950,14 +1118,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + + memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr)); + cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID; +- cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT; +- cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE; ++ cert_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ cert_attr[2].type = CKA_SUBJECT; ++ cert_attr[3].type = CKA_VALUE; + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + + /* figure out size of the attributes */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + return -1; +@@ -969,18 +1138,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. + */ + if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 || +- cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) { ++ cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 || ++ cert_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) { + error("invalid attribute length"); + return -1; + } + + /* allocate buffers for attributes */ +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0) + cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen); + + /* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */ +- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3); ++ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + goto out; +@@ -994,8 +1164,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + subject = xstrdup("invalid subject"); + X509_NAME_free(x509_name); + +- cp = cert_attr[2].pValue; +- if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) { ++ cp = cert_attr[3].pValue; ++ if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[3].ulValueLen)) == NULL) { + error("d2i_x509 failed"); + goto out; + } +@@ -1015,7 +1185,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + goto out; + } + +- if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa)) ++ if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], rsa)) + goto out; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -1048,7 +1218,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + goto out; + } + +- if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec)) ++ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], ec)) + goto out; + + key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); +@@ -1071,7 +1241,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + goto out; + } + out: +- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) + free(cert_attr[i].pValue); + X509_free(x509); + RSA_free(rsa); +@@ -1122,11 +1292,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, const char *context, + */ + static int + pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) ++ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) + { + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ int nattr = 1; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -1143,10 +1314,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; + key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ if (uri->id != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ if (uri->object != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + +- rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); ++ rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -1227,11 +1411,12 @@ fail: + */ + static int + pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, +- struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys) ++ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) + { + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class; +- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[2]; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3]; ++ int nattr = 1; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_RV rv; +@@ -1247,10 +1432,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class; + key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class); + +- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; +- f = p->function_list; ++ if (uri->id != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ if (uri->object != NULL) { ++ key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL; ++ key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object; ++ key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); ++ nattr++; ++ } ++ ++ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; ++ f = p->module->function_list; + +- rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1); ++ rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr); + if (rv != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; +@@ -1532,16 +1730,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + } + #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */ + +-/* +- * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if +- * keyp is provided, fetch keys. +- */ + static int +-pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, +- struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, +- struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user) ++pkcs11_initialize_provider(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp) + { +- int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; ++ int need_finalize = 0; + int ret = -1; + struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; + void *handle = NULL; +@@ -1550,162 +1742,309 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; + CK_ULONG i; ++ char *provider_module = NULL; ++ struct pkcs11_module *m = NULL; ++ ++ /* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */ ++ if (uri->module_path == NULL) { ++#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER ++ provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER); ++#else ++ error_f("No module path provided"); ++ goto fail; ++#endif ++ } else { ++ provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path); ++ } ++ p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); ++ p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); + +- if (providerp == NULL) +- goto fail; +- *providerp = NULL; +- +- if (keyp != NULL) +- *keyp = NULL; +- if (labelsp != NULL) +- *labelsp = NULL; +- +- if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { +- debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id); ++ if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_module, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) { ++ error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_module); + goto fail; + } +- if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_id, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) { +- error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_id); +- goto fail; ++ if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL ++ && m->valid) { ++ debug_f("provider module already initialized: %s", provider_module); ++ free(provider_module); ++ /* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */ ++ m->refcount++; ++ p->module = m; ++ p->valid = 1; ++ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); ++ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ ++ *providerp = p; ++ return 0; ++ } else { ++ m = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*m)); ++ p->module = m; ++ m->refcount++; + } ++ + /* open shared pkcs11-library */ +- if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { +- error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); ++ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_module, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { ++ error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror()); + goto fail; + } + if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) + fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); +- p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); +- p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); +- p->handle = handle; ++ p->module->handle = handle; + /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ + if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); + goto fail; + } +- p->function_list = f; ++ m->function_list = f; + if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); + goto fail; + } + need_finalize = 1; +- if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&m->info)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID)); ++ if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL && ++ strncmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID, 32)) { ++ debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer", ++ m->info.manufacturerID); + goto fail; + } +- debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.*s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" +- " libraryDescription <%.*s> libraryVersion %d.%d", +- provider_id, +- RMSPACE(p->info.manufacturerID), +- p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, +- p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, +- RMSPACE(p->info.libraryDescription), +- p->info.libraryVersion.major, +- p->info.libraryVersion.minor); +- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { ++ rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription)); ++ debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.32s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" ++ " libraryDescription <%.32s> libraryVersion %d.%d", ++ provider_module, ++ m->info.manufacturerID, ++ m->info.cryptokiVersion.major, ++ m->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, ++ m->info.libraryDescription, ++ m->info.libraryVersion.major, ++ m->info.libraryVersion.minor); ++ ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &m->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } +- if (p->nslots == 0) { +- debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id); ++ if (m->nslots == 0) { ++ debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_module); + ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS; + goto fail; + } +- p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); +- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) ++ m->slotlist = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, m->slotlist, &m->nslots)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); ++ provider_module, rv); + goto fail; + } +- p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); ++ m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); + p->valid = 1; +- nkeys = 0; +- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { +- token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; +- if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) ++ m->valid = 1; ++ for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) { ++ token = &m->slotinfo[i].token; ++ if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu " +- "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv); +- continue; +- } +- if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { +- debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in " +- "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i); ++ "failed: %lu", provider_module, (u_long)i, rv); ++ token->flags = 0; + continue; + } + debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.*s> " + "manufacturerID <%.*s> model <%.*s> serial <%.*s> " + "flags 0x%lx", +- provider_id, (unsigned long)i, ++ provider_module, (unsigned long)i, + RMSPACE(token->label), RMSPACE(token->manufacturerID), + RMSPACE(token->model), RMSPACE(token->serialNumber), + token->flags); ++ } ++ m->module_path = provider_module; ++ provider_module = NULL; ++ ++ /* now owned by caller */ ++ *providerp = p; ++ ++ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); ++ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ ++ ++ return 0; ++fail: ++ if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) ++ error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", ++ provider_module, rv); ++ free(provider_module); ++ if (m) { ++ free(m->slotlist); ++ free(m); ++ } ++ if (p) { ++ free(p->name); ++ free(p); ++ } ++ if (handle) ++ dlclose(handle); ++ return (ret); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if ++ * keyp is provided, fetch keys. ++ */ ++static int ++pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin, ++ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, ++ CK_ULONG user) ++{ ++ int nkeys; ++ int ret = -1; ++ struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; ++ CK_ULONG i; ++ CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; ++ char *provider_uri = NULL; ++ ++ if (providerp == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ *providerp = NULL; ++ ++ if (keyp != NULL) ++ *keyp = NULL; ++ ++ if ((ret = pkcs11_initialize_provider(uri, &p)) != 0) { ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ if (pin == NULL && uri->pin != NULL) { ++ pin = uri->pin; ++ } ++ nkeys = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) { ++ token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token; ++ if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { ++ debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in " ++ "provider %s slot %lu", provider_uri, (u_long)i); ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (uri->token != NULL && ++ strncmp(token->label, uri->token, 32) != 0) { ++ debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%.32s) " ++ "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu", ++ token->label, (unsigned long)i); ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (uri->manuf != NULL && ++ strncmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf, 32) != 0) { ++ debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested " ++ "manufacturerID (%.32s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in " ++ "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i); ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (uri->serial != NULL && ++ strncmp(token->serialNumber, uri->serial, 16) != 0) { ++ debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested " ++ "serialNumber (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in " ++ "slot %lu", token->serialNumber, (unsigned long)i); ++ continue; ++ } ++ debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.32s> manufacturerID <%.32s> " ++ "model <%.16s> serial <%.16s> flags 0x%lx", ++ provider_uri, (unsigned long)i, ++ token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, ++ token->serialNumber, token->flags); + /* +- * open session, login with pin and retrieve public +- * keys (if keyp is provided) ++ * open session if not yet opened, login with pin and ++ * retrieve public keys (if keyp is provided) + */ +- if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 || ++ if ((p->module->slotinfo[i].session != 0 || ++ (ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0) && /* ??? */ + keyp == NULL) + continue; +- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); +- pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); +- if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in && ++ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ if (nkeys == 0 && !p->module->slotinfo[i].logged_in && + pkcs11_interactive) { + /* + * Some tokens require login before they will + * expose keys. + */ +- if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i], ++ debug3_f("Trying to login as there were no keys found"); ++ if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->module->slotinfo[i], + CKU_USER) < 0) { + error("login failed"); + continue; + } +- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); +- pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys); ++ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ } ++ if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) { ++ debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%.32s) ", ++ uri->object); ++ /* Try once more without the label filter */ ++ char *label = uri->object; ++ uri->object = NULL; /* XXX clone uri? */ ++ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri); ++ uri->object = label; + } + } ++ pin = NULL; /* Will be cleaned up with URI */ + + /* now owned by caller */ + *providerp = p; + +- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); +- p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ +- ++ free(provider_uri); + return (nkeys); + fail: +- if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) +- error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", +- provider_id, rv); + if (p) { +- free(p->name); +- free(p->slotlist); +- free(p->slotinfo); +- free(p); ++ TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); ++ pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + } +- if (handle) +- dlclose(handle); + if (ret > 0) + ret = -1; + return (ret); + } + +-/* +- * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token, +- * fails if provider already exists +- */ ++static int ++pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, ++ char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id); ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ } else { ++ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); ++ } ++ ++ r = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, providerp, user); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++ ++ return r; ++} ++ + int +-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, +- char ***labelsp) ++pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin, ++ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp) + { + struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; + int nkeys; ++ char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ ++ debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri); + +- nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp, +- &p, CKU_USER); ++ nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER); + + /* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */ + if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) { +@@ -1714,7 +2053,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + } + if (nkeys == 0) +- debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id); ++ debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_uri); ++ ++ free(provider_uri); ++ return nkeys; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token, ++ * fails if provider already exists ++ */ ++int ++pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, ++ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp) ++{ ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ int nkeys; ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ } else { ++ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); ++ } ++ ++ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); + + return (nkeys); + } +diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h +index 52602231..9ce20c1f 100644 +--- a/ssh-pkcs11.h ++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h +@@ -22,10 +22,14 @@ + #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED 4 + #define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED 5 + ++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" ++ + int pkcs11_init(int); + void pkcs11_terminate(void); + int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***); ++int pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***); + int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); ++int pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); + #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN + struct sshkey * + pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int, +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index c23d3b9e..98b103c9 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -890,6 +890,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; + break; + case 'i': ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ if (strlen(optarg) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(optarg, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1); ++ break; ++ } ++#endif + p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid()); + if (stat(p, &st) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " +@@ -1847,6 +1855,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + (void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider); + #endif ++ pkcs11_terminate(); + + skip_connect: + exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo); +@@ -2370,6 +2379,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); + } + ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++static void ++load_pkcs11_identity(char *pkcs11_uri, char *identity_files[], ++ struct sshkey *identity_keys[], int *n_ids) ++{ ++ int nkeys, i; ++ struct sshkey **keys; ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ debug("identity file '%s' from pkcs#11", pkcs11_uri); ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI %s", pkcs11_uri); ++ ++ /* we need to merge URI and provider together */ ++ if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && uri->module_path == NULL) ++ uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider); ++ ++ if (options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && ++ (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, NULL, &keys, NULL)) > 0) { ++ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { ++ if (*n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { ++ sshkey_free(keys[i]); ++ continue; ++ } ++ identity_keys[*n_ids] = keys[i]; ++ identity_files[*n_ids] = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ (*n_ids)++; ++ } ++ free(keys); ++ } ++ ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); ++} ++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ ++ + /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ + static void + load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) +@@ -2384,11 +2432,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; +-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +- struct sshkey **keys = NULL; +- char **comments = NULL; +- int nkeys; +-#endif /* PKCS11 */ + + n_ids = n_certs = 0; + memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); +@@ -2401,33 +2444,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); + + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +- if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && +- options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && +- (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && +- (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, +- &keys, &comments)) > 0) { +- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { +- if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { +- sshkey_free(keys[i]); +- free(comments[i]); +- continue; +- } +- identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; +- identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */ +- n_ids++; +- } +- free(keys); +- free(comments); ++ /* handle fallback from PKCS11Provider option */ ++ pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode); ++ ++ if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL) { ++ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; ++ ++ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); ++ if (uri == NULL) ++ fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI"); ++ ++ /* Construct simple PKCS#11 URI to simplify access */ ++ uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider); ++ ++ /* Add it as any other IdentityFile */ ++ cp = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); ++ add_identity_file(&options, NULL, cp, 1); ++ free(cp); ++ ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); + } + #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { ++ char *name = options.identity_files[i]; + if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || +- strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { ++ strcasecmp(name, "none") == 0) { + free(options.identity_files[i]); + options.identity_files[i] = NULL; + continue; + } +- cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid()); ++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 ++ if (strlen(name) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && ++ strncmp(name, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, ++ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { ++ load_pkcs11_identity(name, identity_files, ++ identity_keys, &n_ids); ++ free(options.identity_files[i]); ++ continue; ++ } ++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ ++ cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid()); + filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo); + free(cp); + check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index 3a8e246c..8d5d0722 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -1263,6 +1263,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with + .Cm CertificateFile + in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with + the identity. ++.Pp ++The authentication identity can be also specified in a form of PKCS#11 URI ++starting with a string ++.Cm pkcs11: . ++There is supported a subset of the PKCS#11 URI as defined ++in RFC 7512 (implemented path arguments ++.Cm id , ++.Cm manufacturer , ++.Cm object , ++.Cm token ++and query arguments ++.Cm module-path ++and ++.Cm pin-value ++). The URI can not be in quotes. + .It Cm IgnoreUnknown + Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are + encountered in configuration parsing. +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch b/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch similarity index 51% rename from openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch rename to 0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch index 8ae0948..dbd69aa 100644 --- a/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch +++ b/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch @@ -1,8 +1,17 @@ +From 507e6f245557ae7261806f7ecbd40697cb0dd389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 29/50] openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6 + +--- + scp.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c -index 60682c68..9344806e 100644 +index 9554b188..7f9795a5 100644 --- a/scp.c +++ b/scp.c -@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv) +@@ -1183,7 +1183,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct) addargs(&alist, "%s", host); addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); addargs(&alist, "%s", src); @@ -13,4 +22,6 @@ index 60682c68..9344806e 100644 tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", thost, targ); if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) +-- +2.49.0 diff --git a/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..498e3f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch @@ -0,0 +1,654 @@ +From b436140fe3abd9f97f01f9af9f5da5cf6c5d7725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 30/50] openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies + +--- + ssh_config.5 | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- + sshd_config.5 | 179 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------------- + 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index 8d5d0722..a43b2a27 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -438,17 +438,13 @@ A single argument of + causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization. + This is the default behaviour. + .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates + by certificate authorities (CAs). +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed +-.Pp + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +@@ -587,20 +583,25 @@ If the option is set to + (the default), + the check will not be executed. + .It Cm Ciphers ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. + Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The supported ciphers are: + .Bd -literal -offset indent +@@ -616,13 +617,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com + .Ed + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, +-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, +-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q cipher . + .It Cm ClearAllForwardings +@@ -1022,6 +1016,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. + The default is + .Dq no . + .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI + key exchange. Possible values are + .Bd -literal -offset 3n +@@ -1034,10 +1033,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-, + gss-curve25519-sha256- + .Ed + .Pp +-The default is +-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, +-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . + This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. ++.Pp + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +@@ -1056,36 +1053,25 @@ will not be converted automatically, + but may be manually hashed using + .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . + .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased + authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. + Alternately if the specified list begins with a + .Sq + + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended +-to the default set instead of replacing them. ++to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) +-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. ++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed +-at the head of the default set. +-The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed ++at the head of the built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The + .Fl Q +@@ -1138,6 +1124,17 @@ to prefer their algorithms. + .Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . ++.Pp ++The proposed ++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms ++during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in ++.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ++and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide ++.Xr crypto_policies 7 . ++.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so ++would break the order given by the ++.Pa known_hosts ++file. + .It Cm HostKeyAlias + Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the + real host name when looking up or saving the host key +@@ -1376,6 +1373,11 @@ it may be zero or more of: + and + .Cm pam . + .It Cm KexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and + their preference order. + The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that +@@ -1384,29 +1386,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + .Pp + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. +-.Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-mlkem768x25519-sha256, +-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, +-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, +-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, +-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, +-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, +-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, +-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 +-.Ed + .Pp ++built-in openssh default set. + The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q kex . + .It Cm KnownHostsCommand +@@ -1522,37 +1512,33 @@ function, and all code in the + file. + This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. + .It Cm MACs ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms + in order of preference. + The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The algorithms that contain + .Qq -etm + calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). + These are considered safer and their use recommended. + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, +-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q mac . + .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +@@ -1741,39 +1727,31 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pass data. + The default is + .Cm no . + .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key + authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default +-instead of replacing it. ++character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default instead of replacing it. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. +-The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . ++.Pp ++This option affects also ++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms + .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication + Specifies whether to try public key authentication. + The argument to this keyword must be +@@ -2497,7 +2475,9 @@ for those users who do not have a configuration file. + This file must be world-readable. + .El + .Sh SEE ALSO +-.Xr ssh 1 ++.Xr ssh 1 , ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 , ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 + .Sh AUTHORS + .An -nosplit + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 26fcdc84..583a01cd 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@ If the argument is + then no banner is displayed. + By default, no banner is displayed. + .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates + by certificate authorities (CAs). +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed +-.Pp + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +@@ -533,20 +529,25 @@ The default is + indicating not to + .Xr chroot 2 . + .It Cm Ciphers ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the ciphers allowed. + Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The supported ciphers are: + .Pp +@@ -573,13 +574,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com + .El + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, +-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, +-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q cipher . + .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax +@@ -774,53 +768,43 @@ For this to work + .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange + needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. + .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI + key exchange. Possible values are + .Bd -literal -offset 3n +-gss-gex-sha1-, +-gss-group1-sha1-, +-gss-group14-sha1-, +-gss-group14-sha256-, +-gss-group16-sha512-, +-gss-nistp256-sha256-, ++gss-gex-sha1- ++gss-group1-sha1- ++gss-group14-sha1- ++gss-group14-sha256- ++gss-group16-sha512- ++gss-nistp256-sha256- + gss-curve25519-sha256- + .Ed +-.Pp +-The default is +-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-, +-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- . + This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. + Alternately if the specified list begins with a + .Sq + + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to +-the default set instead of replacing them. ++the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards) +-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. ++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at +-the head of the default set. +-The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed ++the head of the built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms . +@@ -887,25 +871,14 @@ is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the + .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK + environment variable. + .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the host key signature algorithms + that the server offers. + The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . + .It Cm IgnoreRhosts +@@ -1052,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases. + The default is + .Cm yes . + .It Cm KexAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will + offer to clients. + The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the +@@ -1060,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + .Pp + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The supported algorithms are: + .Pp +@@ -1106,14 +1084,6 @@ sntrup761x25519-sha512 + sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com + .El + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-mlkem768x25519-sha256, +-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, +-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, +-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521 +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms . + .It Cm ListenAddress +@@ -1200,21 +1170,26 @@ function, and all code in the + file. + This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default. + .It Cm MACs ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. + The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. + Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The algorithms that contain + .Qq -etm +@@ -1257,15 +1232,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com + umac-128-etm@openssh.com + .El + .Pp +-The default is: +-.Bd -literal -offset indent +-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, +-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 +-.Ed +-.Pp + The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q mac . + .It Cm Match +@@ -1753,36 +1719,25 @@ or equivalent.) + The default is + .Cm yes . + .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ++The default is handled system-wide by ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 . ++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 . ++.Pp + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. + Alternately if the specified list begins with a + .Sq + +-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +-instead of replacing them. ++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in ++openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq - + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +-from the default set instead of replacing them. ++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified list begins with a + .Sq ^ + character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the +-default set. +-The default for this option is: +-.Bd -literal -offset 3n +-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +-ssh-ed25519, +-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com, +-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, +-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 +-.Ed ++built-in openssh default set. + .Pp + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms . +@@ -2289,7 +2244,9 @@ This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended + .El + .Sh SEE ALSO + .Xr sftp-server 8 , +-.Xr sshd 8 ++.Xr sshd 8 , ++.Xr crypto-policies 7 , ++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 + .Sh AUTHORS + .An -nosplit + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch b/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..529940f --- /dev/null +++ b/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +From 430bd33963725beb8ec01a1e581529ae6bf6bec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 31/50] openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf + +--- + configure.ac | 1 + + kex.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index d9bd2f51..d92a8580 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -3137,6 +3137,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + HMAC_CTX_init \ + RSA_generate_key_ex \ + RSA_get_default_method \ ++ EVP_KDF_CTX_new \ + ]) + + # OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro. +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index 19a56e8e..8b200ff4 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #include + #include ++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW ++# include ++# include ++# include ++# endif + #endif + + #include "ssh.h" +@@ -1078,6 +1083,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) + return r; + } + ++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW ++static const char * ++digest_to_md(int digest_type) ++{ ++ switch (digest_type) { ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: ++ return SN_sha1; ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: ++ return SN_sha256; ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384: ++ return SN_sha384; ++ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: ++ return SN_sha512; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static int ++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, ++ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ u_char *key = NULL; ++ int r, key_len; ++ ++ EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL); ++ EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new(); ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg); ++ char keytype = (char)id; ++ ++ EVP_KDF_free(kdf); ++ if (!ctx) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (md == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (param_bld == NULL) { ++ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len); ++ if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ r = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, ++ md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */ ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, ++ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) && ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, ++ hash, hashlen) && ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, ++ sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) && ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE, ++ &keytype, 1); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld); ++ if (params == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params); ++ if (r != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX ++ fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id); ++ dump_digest("key", key, key_len); ++#endif ++ *keyp = key; ++ key = NULL; ++ r = 0; ++ ++out: ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); ++ free (key); ++ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx); ++ if (r < 0) { ++ return r; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++#else + static int + derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) +@@ -1141,6 +1247,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + ssh_digest_free(hashctx); + return r; + } ++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */ + + #define NKEYS 6 + int +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch b/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c67373c --- /dev/null +++ b/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 6aa231d9acfeca870ee87e3bf9c4a1239518706d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 32/50] openssh-8.2p1-visibility + +--- + regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c +index 347b2122..344f8a8a 100644 +--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c ++++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c +@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...) + #endif + } + +-uint32_t ++uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_api_version(void) + { + return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR; +@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options) + return 0; + } + +-int ++int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len, + const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin, + struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response) +@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len, + return ret; + } + +-int ++int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len, + uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, +@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + return ret; + } + +-int ++int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options, + struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks) + { +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch b/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32a9056 --- /dev/null +++ b/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From cfe5a99d335eb57b8c08b4eb6b4535dd042d96e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 33/50] openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6 + +--- + channels.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c +index 7438c1a5..95836d50 100644 +--- a/channels.c ++++ b/channels.c +@@ -5055,6 +5055,16 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, + debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port, + strerror(errno)); + close(sock); ++ ++ /* do not remove successfully opened ++ * sockets if the request failed because ++ * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available ++ * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being ++ * supported) ++ */ ++ if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno) ++ continue; ++ + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) + close(socks[n]); + num_socks = 0; +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch b/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15e59c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 8de0391e3b3eb75e23ee9f173f04a9c78f2b96c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 34/50] openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors + +--- + auth-pam.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c +index b4100ea1..a042c3c8 100644 +--- a/auth-pam.c ++++ b/auth-pam.c +@@ -523,7 +523,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) + goto auth_fail; + + if (!do_pam_account()) { +- sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; ++ /* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN. ++ * Backward compatibility for other errors. */ ++ if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED ++ && sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) ++ sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; + goto auth_fail; + } + if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { +@@ -580,8 +584,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ +- if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) +- ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer); ++ if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED ++ || sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN ++ || sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) ++ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer); + else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached) + ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer); + else +@@ -890,9 +896,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, + free(msg); + break; + case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: ++ sshpam_account_status = 0; ++ /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case PAM_MAXTRIES: +- if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) +- sshpam_account_status = 0; ++ case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN: ++ case PAM_PERM_DENIED: + if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES) + sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch b/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..58a5036 --- /dev/null +++ b/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From a68f3741fdc01bf6823a69d2442caba7de9835f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 35/50] openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch + +--- + pathnames.h | 1 + + scp.1 | 7 +++++++ + scp.c | 8 ++++++++ + 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h +index 1158bec9..43f0c570 100644 +--- a/pathnames.h ++++ b/pathnames.h +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ + #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key" + #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key" + #define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli" ++#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH SSHDIR "/disable_scp" + + #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM + #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh" +diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1 +index aa2e2d8b..373d7237 100644 +--- a/scp.1 ++++ b/scp.1 +@@ -331,6 +331,13 @@ during download or upload. + By default a 32KB buffer is used. + .El + .El ++.Pp ++Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable ++.Ar /etc/ssh/disable_scp ++file. If this file exists, when SCP protocol is in use (either remotely or ++via the ++.Fl O ++option), the program will exit. + .Sh EXIT STATUS + .Ex -std scp + .Sh SEE ALSO +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 7f9795a5..7ed1a54c 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -649,6 +649,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + if (iamremote) + mode = MODE_SCP; + ++ if (mode == MODE_SCP) { ++ FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r"); ++ if (f != NULL) { ++ fclose(f); ++ fatal("SCP protocol is forbidden via %s", _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH); ++ } ++ } ++ + if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) + fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); + +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch b/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..929b408 --- /dev/null +++ b/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +From 99e1e3af524376788e591ca73387f1ca37e6f5ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 36/50] openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp + +--- + scp.c | 2 +- + sftp-client.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ + sftp-client.h | 4 ++-- + sftp.c | 6 +++--- + 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 7ed1a54c..0c87dd0e 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn) + + if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) { + if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, +- SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) { ++ SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) { + error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ); + errs = 1; + } +diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c +index 9f8ab4af..873dec04 100644 +--- a/sftp-client.c ++++ b/sftp-client.c +@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, + + /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */ + static char * +-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand) ++sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir) + { + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int expected_id, count, id; +@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand) + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); +- error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath", +- path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg); +- free(errmsg); +- sshbuf_free(msg); +- return NULL; ++ if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir) { ++ memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a)); ++ if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) { ++ sshbuf_free(msg); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path); ++ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, ++ path, strlen(path)); ++ ++ get_msg(conn, msg); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "parse"); ++ ++ if (id != expected_id) ++ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); ++ ++ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { ++ free(errmsg); ++ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "parse status"); ++ error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath", ++ path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg); ++ free(errmsg); ++ sshbuf_free(msg); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ } else { ++ error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath", ++ path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg); ++ free(errmsg); ++ sshbuf_free(msg); ++ return NULL; ++ } + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); +@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand) + } + + char * +-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) ++sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir) + { +- return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0); ++ return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir); + } + + int +@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@ sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) + { + if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) { + debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath"); +- return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0); ++ return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0); + } +- return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1); ++ return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0); + } + + int +@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@ sftp_download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + char *src_canon; + int ret; + +- if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { ++ if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) { + error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src); + return -1; + } +@@ -2366,12 +2398,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + int + sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag, +- int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag) ++ int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir) + { + char *dst_canon; + int ret; + +- if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { ++ if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) { + error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst); + return -1; + } +@@ -2826,7 +2858,7 @@ sftp_crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, + char *from_path_canon; + int ret; + +- if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) { ++ if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) { + error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", + from_path); + return -1; +diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h +index 74cdae7d..00ed6630 100644 +--- a/sftp-client.h ++++ b/sftp-client.h +@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *); + int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a); + + /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ +-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); ++char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); + + /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */ + char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); +@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int sftp_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, + * times if 'pflag' is set + */ + int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, +- int, int, int, int, int, int); ++ int, int, int, int, int, int, int); + + /* + * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to +diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c +index bdedd141..322e6d1f 100644 +--- a/sftp.c ++++ b/sftp.c +@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + (rflag || global_rflag)) { + if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, + pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, +- fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1) ++ fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1) + err = -1; + } else { + if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, +@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd, + if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') + path1 = xstrdup(startdir); + path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd); +- if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) { ++ if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) { + err = 1; + break; + } +@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) + } + #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ + +- if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL) ++ if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL) + fatal("Need cwd"); + startdir = xstrdup(remote_path); + +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch b/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59e530b --- /dev/null +++ b/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 286bc4a302b5130f732c857095ae665f7bea01dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 37/50] openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits + +--- + readconf.c | 1 + + servconf.c | 1 + + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index 6c04ed43..f340bf50 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static struct { + { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider }, + { "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand }, + { "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize }, ++ { "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */ + { "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline }, + { "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming }, + { "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout }, +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 15c99b30..84891544 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ static struct { + { "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */ + { "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch b/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74dd5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From 26af04432f6404eb03780265a5cce948ecfec8dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 38/50] openssh-8.7p1-ibmca + +--- + openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c +index f6112458..417c2048 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c +@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ + + #include "includes.h" + +-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) ++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__) + + #include + #include +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch similarity index 57% rename from openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch rename to 0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch index e184894..e4f89c7 100644 --- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch +++ b/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch @@ -1,306 +1,129 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-bsm.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/audit-bsm.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.834505048 +0200 -@@ -373,10 +373,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, +From b0505837bfa2dcdf07800634fa80c5cdb78799dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 39/50] openssh-7.6p1-audit + +--- + Makefile.in | 2 +- + audit-bsm.c | 45 ++++++- + audit-linux.c | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + audit.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++-- + audit.h | 22 +++- + auditstub.c | 52 ++++++++ + auth.c | 3 - + auth.h | 4 + + auth2-hostbased.c | 16 ++- + auth2-pubkey.c | 16 ++- + auth2.c | 3 - + cipher.c | 21 +--- + cipher.h | 20 ++- + kex.c | 61 ++++++++-- + kex.h | 2 + + mac.c | 14 +++ + mac.h | 1 + + monitor.c | 194 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + monitor.h | 8 +- + monitor_wrap.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++- + monitor_wrap.h | 11 +- + packet.c | 98 +++++++++++++-- + packet.h | 1 + + session.c | 83 ++++++++++++- + session.h | 10 +- + sshd-session.c | 104 ++++++++++++++-- + sshd.c | 10 ++ + 27 files changed, 1258 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 auditstub.c + +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index 6c417ef7..a2942392 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ + kexgssc.o \ + sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ +- sshbuf-io.o ++ sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o + + SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o + +diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c +index ccfcf6f7..a49abb92 100644 +--- a/audit-bsm.c ++++ b/audit-bsm.c +@@ -373,12 +373,25 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) #endif } --void +int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - /* not implemented */ ++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) ++{ ++ /* not implemented */ + return 0; +} + -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ + void +-audit_run_command(const char *command) ++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) + { + /* not implemented */ + } + +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + /* not necessary */ - } - ++} ++ void -@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li + audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) + { +@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) /* not implemented */ } +int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + void - audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) + audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) { -@@ -452,4 +471,34 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) +@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); } } + +void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh * ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} #endif /* BSM */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/audit.c.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/audit.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.834505048 +0200 -@@ -34,6 +35,12 @@ - #include "log.h" - #include "hostfile.h" - #include "auth.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+#include "ssherr.h" - - /* - * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when -@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ - * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. - */ - extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; -+extern ServerOptions options; - - /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ - ssh_audit_event_t -@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) - const char * - audit_username(void) - { -- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; -- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; -+ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; - -- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) -+ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) - return (unknownuser); -- if (!the_authctxt->valid) -- return (invaliduser); - return (the_authctxt->user); - } - -@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) - return(event_lookup[i].name); - } - -+void -+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key) -+{ -+ char *fp; -+ -+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0) -+ *rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -+ free(fp); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_unsupported(int what) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free(int ctos) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); -+} -+ - # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - /* - * Null implementations of audit functions. -@@ -138,6 +173,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - } - - /* -+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, -+ * audit_session_open. -+ */ -+void -+audit_count_session_open(void) -+{ -+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), -+ audit_username()); -+} -+ -+/* - * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to - * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. - * -@@ -172,13 +218,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li - /* - * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that - * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows -- * multiple sessions within a single connection. -+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for -+ * audit_end_command. - */ --void -+int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), - audit_username(), command); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that -+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows -+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from -+ * the corresponding audit_run_command. -+ */ -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), -+ audit_username(), command); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. -+ * -+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. -+ */ -+int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, char *fp, int rv) -+{ -+ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d", -+ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), -+ fp, rv); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. -+ */ -+void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. -+ */ -+void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, -+ uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", -+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, -+ (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard -+ */ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", -+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key -+ */ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", -+ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); - } - # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ - #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/audit.h.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/audit.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.834505048 +0200 -@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ - # define _SSH_AUDIT_H - - #include "loginrec.h" -+#include "sshkey.h" - - enum ssh_audit_event_type { - SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, -@@ -43,13 +44,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { - SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */ - SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN - }; -+ -+enum ssh_audit_kex { -+ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER, -+ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC, -+ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION -+}; - typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; - -+int listening_for_clients(void); -+ - void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); - void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); -+void audit_count_session_open(void); - void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); - void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); --void audit_run_command(const char *); -+int audit_run_command(const char *); -+void audit_end_command(int, const char *); - ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); -+int audit_keyusage(int, char *, int); -+void audit_key(int, int *, const struct sshkey *); -+void audit_unsupported(int); -+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *); -+void audit_unsupported_body(int); -+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); -+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); - - #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.835505053 +0200 +diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c +index 3fcbe5c5..d484b82b 100644 +--- a/audit-linux.c ++++ b/audit-linux.c @@ -33,27 +33,40 @@ #include "log.h" @@ -312,11 +135,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c +#include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" -- +#include "cipher.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "session.h" -+ + +#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 + +extern ServerOptions options; @@ -350,7 +172,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c saved_errno = errno; close(audit_fd); -@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const +@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, rc = 0; errno = saved_errno; @@ -414,7 +236,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c +} + +int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; @@ -429,12 +251,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased"); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, -+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, rv); ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); + if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + goto out; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp); + rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL, -+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, rv); ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); +out: + saved_errno = errno; + audit_close(audit_fd); @@ -448,34 +270,34 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ void -@@ -76,24 +177,55 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, +@@ -76,49 +176,211 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) /* not implemented */ } --void +int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { -- /* not implemented */ ++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) ++{ + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + return 0; +} + -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ + void +-audit_run_command(const char *command) ++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) + { +- /* not implemented */ + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); +} + @@ -510,9 +332,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c } void -@@ -102,25 +231,155 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ - + audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + { switch(event) { - case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: - case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: @@ -528,6 +349,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: + if (options.use_pam) + break; ++ /* Fallthrough */ + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: @@ -563,32 +385,32 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c } + +void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; ++ static const char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; + char *s; + int audit_fd; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", -+ name[what], ssh_remote_port(active_state), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), -+ ssh_local_port(active_state)); ++ name[what], ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ++ ssh_local_port(ssh)); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) + /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ + return; + audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, -+ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, 0); ++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 0); + audit_close(audit_fd); +#endif +} + -+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; ++static const char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; + +void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, ++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, + char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION @@ -600,7 +422,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, + (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, -+ ssh_remote_port(active_state), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), ssh_local_port(active_state)); ++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ssh_local_port(ssh)); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { @@ -611,7 +433,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c + fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, -+ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, 1); ++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) @@ -620,7 +442,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c +} + +void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; @@ -628,9 +450,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, -+ ssh_remote_port(active_state), -+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), -+ ssh_local_port(active_state)); ++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), ++ (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ++ ssh_local_port(ssh)); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { @@ -640,7 +462,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, -+ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, 1); ++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) @@ -648,7 +470,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c +} + +void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; @@ -664,7 +486,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, -+ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), /*FIXME listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh) */ + NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ @@ -672,10 +494,239 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/audit-linux.c + error("cannot write into audit"); +} #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/auditstub.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/auditstub.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.835505053 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/auditstub.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.835505053 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c +index dd2f0355..d0433c3a 100644 +--- a/audit.c ++++ b/audit.c +@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ + #include "log.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" + + /* + * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when +@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ + * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. + */ + extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern ServerOptions options; + + /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ + ssh_audit_event_t +@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) + const char * + audit_username(void) + { +- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; +- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; ++ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; + +- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) ++ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) + return (unknownuser); +- if (!the_authctxt->valid) +- return (invaliduser); + return (the_authctxt->user); + } + +@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) + return(event_lookup[i].name); + } + ++void ++audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key) ++{ ++ char *fp; ++ ++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0) ++ *rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ free(fp); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what) ++{ ++ mm_audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) ++{ ++ mm_audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()); ++} ++ ++void ++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos) ++{ ++ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()); ++} ++ + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* + * Null implementations of audit functions. +@@ -137,6 +170,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event)); + } + ++/* ++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, ++ * audit_session_open. ++ */ ++void ++audit_count_session_open(void) ++{ ++ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), ++ audit_username()); ++} ++ + /* + * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to + * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. +@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + /* + * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows +- * multiple sessions within a single connection. ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for ++ * audit_end_command. + */ +-void +-audit_run_command(const char *command) ++int ++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) + { + debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that ++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows ++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from ++ * the corresponding audit_run_command. ++ */ ++void ++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) ++{ ++ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), ++ audit_username(), command); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. ++ * ++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. ++ */ ++int ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++{ ++ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d", ++ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), ++ fp, rv); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. ++ */ ++void ++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) ++{ ++ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. ++ */ ++void ++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, ++ uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, ++ (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard ++ */ ++void ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", ++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key ++ */ ++void ++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++{ ++ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", ++ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); + } + # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h +index 38cb5ad3..45d66ccf 100644 +--- a/audit.h ++++ b/audit.h +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + # define _SSH_AUDIT_H + + #include "loginrec.h" ++#include "sshkey.h" + + struct ssh; + +@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { + SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */ + SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN + }; ++ ++enum ssh_audit_kex { ++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER, ++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC, ++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION ++}; + typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; + ++int listening_for_clients(void); ++ + void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); + void audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); ++void audit_count_session_open(void); + void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); + void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); +-void audit_run_command(const char *); ++int audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *); ++void audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *); + ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); ++int audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); ++void audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *); ++void audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int); ++void audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *); ++void audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int); ++void audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos); ++void audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); ++void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); + + #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ +diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..639a798d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/auditstub.c +@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ + +/* @@ -707,149 +758,150 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/auditstub.c + +#include + ++struct ssh; ++ +void -+audit_unsupported(int n) ++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int n) +{ +} + +void -+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) ++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) +{ +} + +void -+audit_session_key_free(int ctos) ++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos) +{ +} + +void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ +} -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/auth2.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.746504598 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/auth2.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.835505053 +0200 -@@ -255,9 +255,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - } else { - /* Invalid user, fake password information */ - authctxt->pw = fakepw(); +diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c +index e4578169..e10e804f 100644 +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -501,9 +501,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user) + record_failed_login(ssh, user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); + #endif -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); --#endif - } - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.683504276 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.835505053 +0200 -@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) - /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ +- audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER); +-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + return (NULL); + } + if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw)) +diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h +index 39163035..6be52d70 100644 +--- a/auth.h ++++ b/auth.h +@@ -215,6 +215,8 @@ struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); + int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); + int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, + u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *); ++int hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); + + /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */ + int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *); +@@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ int auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, + char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **); + int auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *, + struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **); ++int user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); + FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); + FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); + +diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c +index a3be6e49..8cebaffd 100644 +--- a/auth2-hostbased.c ++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c +@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && -- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, -+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, - sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0) + if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser, + chost, key) && +- mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, ++ mm_hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0) authenticated = 1; -@@ -169,6 +169,19 @@ done: +@@ -174,6 +174,20 @@ done: return authenticated; } +int -+hostbased_key_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t slen, -+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat) ++hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, ++ size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) +{ + int rv; + -+ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat); ++ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_key(0, &rv, key); ++ audit_key(ssh, 0, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int - hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.828505018 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.835505053 +0200 -@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) + hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index 0d5ae0df..99cb810f 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) && -- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, -+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, + if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) && +- mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, ++ mm_user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL, - ssh->compat)) == 0) { -@@ -250,6 +250,19 @@ done: + ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) { +@@ -328,6 +328,20 @@ done: return authenticated; } +int -+user_key_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t slen, -+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat) ++user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, ++ size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) +{ + int rv; + -+ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat); ++ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_key(1, &rv, key); ++ audit_key(ssh, 1, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + static int - match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) - { -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/auth.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/auth.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.746504598 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/auth.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.835505053 +0200 -@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authent - # endif - #endif - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -- if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) -+ if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && !partial) - audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); - #endif - } -@@ -599,9 +599,6 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) - record_failed_login(user, - auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); - #endif + match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file, + struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index 8ec41de2..4a8515ea 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -310,9 +310,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + authctxt->valid = 0; + /* Invalid user, fake password information */ + authctxt->pw = fakepw(); -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -- audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); --#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ - return (NULL); - } - if (!allowed_user(pw)) -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/auth.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/auth.h.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.768504711 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/auth.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.836505059 +0200 -@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char - - char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); - char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); -+int user_key_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, -+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); - - FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); - FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); -@@ -217,6 +218,8 @@ struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_ty - int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); - int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, - size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); -+int hostbased_key_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, -+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); - - /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */ - const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *); -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/cipher.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/cipher.c.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/cipher.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.836505059 +0200 -@@ -61,25 +61,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx { +- mm_audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER); +-#endif + } + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c +index 8a18da2d..57d55325 100644 +--- a/cipher.c ++++ b/cipher.c +@@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx { const struct sshcipher *cipher; }; @@ -875,19 +927,20 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/cipher.c static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES -@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx * +@@ -420,7 +401,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { - if (cc == NULL) + if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) return; - if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) - explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx)); -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/cipher.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/cipher.h.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/cipher.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.836505059 +0200 -@@ -45,7 +45,25 @@ + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { + chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx); +diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h +index 6533ff2b..2e05a021 100644 +--- a/cipher.h ++++ b/cipher.h +@@ -47,7 +47,25 @@ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 @@ -914,75 +967,103 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/cipher.h struct sshcipher_ctx; const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/kex.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/kex.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.822504987 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/kex.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.836505059 +0200 -@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ - #include "ssherr.h" +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index 8b200ff4..62f607d6 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" +#include "audit.h" - #ifdef GSSAPI - #include "ssh-gss.h" -@@ -692,8 +693,12 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *cli + /* prototype */ + static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq); +@@ -821,12 +822,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) + } + + static int +-choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) ++choose_enc(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); ++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; + } if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) { + error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name); free(name); - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -@@ -713,8 +718,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma +@@ -847,8 +852,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC); ++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; + } if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) { + error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name); free(name); - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -@@ -733,8 +742,12 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char * +@@ -861,12 +870,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) + } + + static int +-choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) ++choose_comp(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION); ++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION); +#endif return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; + } + #ifdef WITH_ZLIB if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; - } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { -@@ -904,6 +917,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -1030,7 +1043,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) + nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; + nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; + ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; +- if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], ++ if ((r = choose_enc(ssh, &newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], + sprop[nenc])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; + peer[nenc] = NULL; +@@ -1045,7 +1058,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) + peer[nmac] = NULL; + goto out; + } +- if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], ++ if ((r = choose_comp(ssh, &newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], + sprop[ncomp])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp]; + peer[ncomp] = NULL; +@@ -1068,6 +1081,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); + debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); ++ audit_kex(ssh, mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); +#endif } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; -@@ -1037,3 +1054,33 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i - sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); +@@ -1337,6 +1354,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len) } #endif -+ + +static void +enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc) +{ @@ -1012,22 +1093,28 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/kex.c + mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); + memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); +} -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/kex.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/kex.h.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.822504987 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/kex.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.836505059 +0200 -@@ -219,6 +219,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); ++ + /* + * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n. + * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server. +diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h +index 0e080ea3..6a55aadf 100644 +--- a/kex.h ++++ b/kex.h +@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); #endif +void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys); + - int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *, - const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, - const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/mac.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/mac.c.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/mac.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.836505059 +0200 -@@ -242,6 +242,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) + int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); + int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, + struct sshbuf **); +diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c +index f3dda669..bf051baa 100644 +--- a/mac.c ++++ b/mac.c +@@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } @@ -1048,62 +1135,51 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/mac.c /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ #define MAC_SEP "," int -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/mac.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/mac.h.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/mac.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.837505064 +0200 -@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3 +diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h +index 0b119d7a..5fb593b9 100644 +--- a/mac.h ++++ b/mac.h +@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int, int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t); void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); +void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *); #endif /* SSHMAC_H */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.749504614 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/Makefile.in 2017-10-04 17:18:32.837505064 +0200 -@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ - kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ - kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ - kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \ -- platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o -+ platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ -+ auditstub.o - - SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.824504997 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.837505064 +0200 -@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 43c10a4e..fbc35782 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "authfd.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" - -@@ -117,6 +118,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug; - extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + #include "sk-api.h" +@@ -110,6 +111,8 @@ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + extern struct include_list includes; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ -+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *); + /* State exported from the child */ static struct sshbuf *child_state; -@@ -167,6 +170,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffe +@@ -154,6 +157,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - int mm_answer_audit_event(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_audit_command(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif - static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); -@@ -222,6 +230,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + static Authctxt *authctxt; +@@ -214,6 +222,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, @@ -1114,7 +1190,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, -@@ -260,6 +272,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 +@@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, @@ -1126,40 +1202,40 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; -@@ -1396,8 +1413,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct ssh - char *sigalg; - size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; - int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret; +@@ -1569,8 +1586,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0; + int encoded_ret; + struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; + int type = 0; -- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || +- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0) -@@ -1405,6 +1424,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct ssh +@@ -1579,6 +1598,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) - fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); + fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed"); + if (type != key_blobtype) -+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); ++ fatal_f("bad key type"); /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */ if (*sigalg == '\0') { -@@ -1414,21 +1435,24 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct ssh +@@ -1594,14 +1615,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) case MM_USERKEY: - valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); + valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen); auth_method = "publickey"; -+ ret = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, -+ datalen, sigalg, active_state->compat); ++ ret = user_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data, ++ datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); -+ ret = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, -+ datalen, sigalg, active_state->compat); auth_method = "hostbased"; ++ ret = hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data, ++ datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); break; default: valid_data = 0; @@ -1167,36 +1243,64 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c break; } if (!valid_data) - fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); +@@ -1613,8 +1639,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); - ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, -- sigalg, active_state->compat); - debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s", __func__, auth_method, key, - (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified"); - auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key); -@@ -1485,6 +1509,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) - debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); +- sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details); + debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method, + sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg, + (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified", +@@ -1702,13 +1726,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw) + } + + static void +-mm_session_close(Session *s) ++mm_session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) + { + debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL) { -+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); -+ session_end_command2(s); ++ debug3_f("command %d", s->command_handle); ++ session_end_command2(ssh, s); + } +#endif session_unused(s->self); } -@@ -1588,6 +1618,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) +@@ -1775,7 +1805,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + + error: + if (s != NULL) +- mm_session_close(s); ++ mm_session_close(ssh, s); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0"); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); +@@ -1794,7 +1824,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse tty"); + if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) +- mm_session_close(s); ++ mm_session_close(ssh, s); + sshbuf_reset(m); + free(tty); + return (0); +@@ -1816,6 +1846,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); -@@ -1630,12 +1662,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff +@@ -1862,12 +1894,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { char *cmd; int r; @@ -1210,10 +1314,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c - audit_run_command(cmd); + s = session_new(); + if (s == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); ++ fatal_f("error allocating a session"); + s->command = cmd; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); ++ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(ssh, cmd); +#endif + + sshbuf_reset(m); @@ -1225,44 +1329,44 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c +} + +int -+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int handle, r; + size_t len; + u_char *cmd = NULL; + Session *s; + -+ debug3("%s entering", __func__); ++ debug3_f("entering"); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cmd, &len)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + s = session_by_id(handle); + if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || + strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); -+ mm_session_close(s); ++ fatal_f("invalid handle"); ++ mm_session_close(ssh, s); free(cmd); return (0); } -@@ -1702,6 +1768,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p +@@ -1940,6 +2007,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) void - mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) + mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) { + struct sshbuf *m; - debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); + debug3_f("Waiting for new keys"); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -@@ -1709,6 +1776,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor +@@ -1947,6 +2015,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); - debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); + debug3_f("GOT new keys"); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + m = sshbuf_new(); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); -+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); ++ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); + sshbuf_free(m); +#endif + @@ -1273,20 +1377,20 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c } -@@ -1976,3 +2056,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Bu +@@ -2234,3 +2315,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { #endif /* GSSAPI */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +int -+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int what, r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &what)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + -+ audit_unsupported_body(what); ++ audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + @@ -1295,7 +1399,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c +} + +int -+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int ctos, r; + char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; @@ -1309,13 +1413,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &compress, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pfs, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + pid = (pid_t) tmp; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + uid = (pid_t) tmp; + -+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); ++ audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); + + free(cipher); + free(mac); @@ -1328,7 +1432,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c +} + +int -+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int ctos, r; + u_int64_t tmp; @@ -1337,13 +1441,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + pid = (pid_t) tmp; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + uid = (uid_t) tmp; + -+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); ++ audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, pid, uid); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + @@ -1352,7 +1456,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c +} + +int -+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + size_t len, r; + char *fp; @@ -1362,13 +1466,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &fp, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + pid = (pid_t) tmp; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + uid = (uid_t) tmp; + -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid); + + free(fp); + sshbuf_reset(m); @@ -1376,10 +1480,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.c + return 0; +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/monitor.h.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.781504777 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/monitor.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.837505064 +0200 -@@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { +diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +index d4d631dd..2c64f07d 100644 +--- a/monitor.h ++++ b/monitor.h +@@ -66,7 +66,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, @@ -1390,60 +1495,64 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor.h + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124 ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, - }; - -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.750504619 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.838505069 +0200 -@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153, +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index b6e3b3f3..1a079c15 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host, */ int -mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, +mm_sshkey_verify(enum mm_keytype type, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat) + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat, + struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp) { - struct sshbuf *m; -@@ -478,7 +478,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke - +@@ -583,7 +583,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, + *sig_detailsp = NULL; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); - if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0) -@@ -497,6 +498,20 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke +@@ -616,6 +617,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, return 0; } +int -+mm_hostbased_key_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, -+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat) ++mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, ++ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) +{ -+ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat); ++ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); +} + +int -+mm_user_key_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, -+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat) ++mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, ++ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat, ++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) +{ -+ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat); ++ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp); +} + void - mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) + mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor) { -@@ -874,11 +889,12 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) +@@ -1032,11 +1049,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) sshbuf_free(m); } -void +-mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) +int - mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) ++mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) { struct sshbuf *m; int r; @@ -1451,52 +1560,52 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); -@@ -885,6 +901,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command +@@ -1046,6 +1064,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + sshbuf_free(m); + + return (handle); +} + +void -+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) ++mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) +{ + int r; + struct sshbuf *m; + -+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); ++ debug3_f("entering command %s", command); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, handle)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, m); sshbuf_free(m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -@@ -1020,3 +1056,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc - return (ok); +@@ -1294,3 +1336,83 @@ server_get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns) + return &ci; } - #endif /* GSSAPI */ + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void -+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) ++mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what) +{ + int r; + struct sshbuf *m; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, what)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, @@ -1506,14 +1615,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c +} + +void -+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, ++mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ + int r; + struct sshbuf *m; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, cipher)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, (mac ? mac : ""))) != 0 || @@ -1521,7 +1630,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fps)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, @@ -1531,17 +1640,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c +} + +void -+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + int r; + struct sshbuf *m; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, @@ -1550,62 +1659,64 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.c +} + +void -+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) ++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + int r; + struct sshbuf *m; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); + sshbuf_free(m); +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.750504619 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/monitor_wrap.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.838505069 +0200 -@@ -53,7 +53,9 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, cons +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 672dce52..661ed63b 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int, struct sshauthopt **); - int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, + int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *); -int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, -+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, -+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); -+int mm_user_key_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, - const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); ++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, ++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); ++int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **); - #ifdef GSSAPI -@@ -78,7 +80,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); + void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m); +@@ -85,7 +87,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" - void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); + void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t); -void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); -+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); -+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); -+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); -+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); -+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++int mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *); ++void mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int, const char *); ++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int); ++void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t); ++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); #endif struct Session; -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.672504220 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/packet.c 2017-10-04 17:25:48.141741390 +0200 -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ - #include +diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c +index 9dea2cfc..344b5f54 100644 +--- a/packet.c ++++ b/packet.c +@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ + #endif #include "xmalloc.h" +#include "audit.h" - #include "crc32.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" -@@ -502,6 +503,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh + #include "cipher.h" +@@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh) return ssh->state->connection_out; } @@ -1619,7 +1730,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.c /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. -@@ -566,22 +574,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss +@@ -675,22 +683,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int mode; @@ -1642,18 +1753,18 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.c + state->output = NULL; sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); + state->outgoing_packet = NULL; - sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); + sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); + state->incoming_packet = NULL; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */ state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; -@@ -615,8 +616,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss - } +@@ -726,8 +731,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close) + #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */ cipher_free(state->send_context); cipher_free(state->receive_context); + if (had_keys && state->server_side) { + /* Assuming this is called only from privsep child */ -+ audit_session_key_free(MODE_MAX); ++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX); + } state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; if (do_close) { @@ -1666,15 +1777,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.c free(ssh->local_ipaddr); ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL; free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); -@@ -854,6 +863,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod - (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks, - (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, - (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); -+ audit_session_key_free(mode); - cipher_free(*ccp); - *ccp = NULL; +@@ -984,6 +999,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); -@@ -2135,6 +2145,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) ++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, mode); + state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + } + /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */ +@@ -2325,6 +2341,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) return (void *)ssh->state->output; } @@ -1705,6 +1816,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.c + + cipher_free(state->receive_context); + cipher_free(state->send_context); ++ state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; + + sshbuf_free(state->input); + state->input = NULL; @@ -1728,18 +1840,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.c +} + +void -+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) ++packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, int audit_it, int privsep) +{ + if (audit_it) -+ audit_it = (active_state != NULL && packet_state_has_keys(active_state->state)); -+ if (active_state != NULL) -+ packet_destroy_state(active_state->state); ++ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys(ssh->state); ++ packet_destroy_state(ssh->state); + if (audit_it) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (privsep) -+ audit_session_key_free(MODE_MAX); ++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX); + else -+ audit_session_key_free_body(MODE_MAX, getpid(), getuid()); ++ audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, MODE_MAX, getpid(), getuid()); +#endif + } +} @@ -1747,28 +1858,30 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.c /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/packet.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/packet.h.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/packet.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.838505069 +0200 -@@ -217,4 +217,5 @@ extern struct ssh *active_state; +diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h +index 49bb87f0..44a39a9e 100644 +--- a/packet.h ++++ b/packet.h +@@ -223,4 +223,5 @@ const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); # undef EC_POINT #endif -+void packet_destroy_all(int, int); ++void packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int); #endif /* PACKET_H */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/session.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.812504936 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/session.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.839505074 +0200 -@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ extern char *__progname; +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 28bbb8a7..83fc9418 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ extern char *__progname; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); -+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); ++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *); extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; - char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */ -@@ -605,6 +605,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, + extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */ +@@ -653,6 +653,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); @@ -1782,43 +1895,42 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.c + /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; - packet_set_interactive(1, -@@ -724,15 +732,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con + ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1, +@@ -745,15 +753,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) s->self); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) + fatal("do_exec: command already set"); if (command != NULL) -- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); +- mm_audit_run_command(command); + s->command = xstrdup(command); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; -- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); +- mm_audit_run_command(shell); + s->command = xstrdup(shell); } + if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) -+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); ++ s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command); #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); -@@ -1499,8 +1511,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co - int r = 0; +@@ -1538,7 +1550,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) + sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); - /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ -- destroy_sensitive_data(); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(1); - packet_clear_keys(); + /* remove keys from memory */ ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the + monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ -+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1); ++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { -@@ -1714,6 +1729,9 @@ session_unused(int id) +@@ -1750,6 +1766,9 @@ session_unused(int id) sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; @@ -1828,10 +1940,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.c sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } -@@ -1796,6 +1814,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha +@@ -1828,6 +1847,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) + return 1; } - Session * ++Session * +session_by_id(int id) +{ + if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { @@ -1839,26 +1952,25 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.c + if (s->used) + return s; + } -+ debug("%s: unknown id %d", __func__, id); ++ debug_f("unknown id %d", id); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + -+Session * + Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { - int i; -@@ -2307,6 +2338,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se +@@ -2445,6 +2477,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status) chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void -+session_end_command2(Session *s) ++session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL) { + if (s->command_handle != -1) -+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); ++ audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; @@ -1866,11 +1978,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.c +} + +static void -+session_end_command(Session *s) ++session_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL) { + if (s->command_handle != -1) -+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); ++ mm_audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; @@ -1881,46 +1993,64 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.c void session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { -@@ -2320,6 +2377,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session * +@@ -2458,6 +2516,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command) -+ session_end_command(s); ++ session_end_command(ssh, s); +#endif free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); -@@ -2528,6 +2589,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc +@@ -2534,14 +2596,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg) + } + + void +-session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *)) ++session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(struct ssh *ssh, Session *)) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used) { + if (closefunc != NULL) +- closefunc(s); ++ closefunc(ssh, s); + else + session_close(ssh, s); + } +@@ -2668,6 +2730,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) server_loop2(ssh, authctxt); } +static void -+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) ++do_cleanup_one_session(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + session_pty_cleanup2(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ session_end_command2(s); ++ session_end_command2(ssh, s); +#endif +} + void do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { -@@ -2585,7 +2655,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au +@@ -2731,7 +2802,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) * or if running in monitor. */ - if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) + if (mm_is_monitor()) - session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2); + session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session); } /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/session.h.audit 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/session.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.839505074 +0200 -@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session { +diff --git a/session.h b/session.h +index 344a1ddf..a41c6efc 100644 +--- a/session.h ++++ b/session.h +@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session { char *name; char *val; } *env; @@ -1933,55 +2063,79 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/session.h }; void do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); -@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *s - void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *); - void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *)); +@@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void session_unused(int); + int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *); + void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int); + void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); +-void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *)); ++void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *)); void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); -+void session_end_command2(Session *); ++void session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *); Session *session_new(void); +Session *session_by_id(int); Session *session_by_tty(char *); void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *); void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.830505028 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.839505074 +0200 -@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ - #include "ssh-gss.h" - #endif - #include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "audit.h" - #include "ssh-sandbox.h" - #include "auth-options.h" - #include "version.h" -@@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg; - struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index 81d30152..a808ac9a 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes); + struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ -void destroy_sensitive_data(void); -+void destroy_sensitive_data(int); - void demote_sensitive_data(void); - static void do_ssh2_kex(void); +-void demote_sensitive_data(void); ++void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh); ++void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh); -@@ -265,6 +266,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) - num_listen_socks = -1; + /* XXX reduce to stub once postauth split */ + int +@@ -208,6 +208,41 @@ mm_is_monitor(void) + return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0); } -+/* -+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific -+ * client connection?) -+ */ -+int listening_for_clients(void) ++static int ++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) +{ -+ return num_listen_socks >= 0; ++ switch (k->type) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ case KEY_RSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_RSA: { ++ const BIGNUM *d; ++ const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey); ++ RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); ++ return d != NULL; ++ } ++ case KEY_DSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_DSA: { ++ const BIGNUM *priv_key; ++ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); ++ return priv_key != NULL; ++ } ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ++ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_ECDSA: { ++ const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(k->pkey); ++ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdsa) != NULL; ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: ++ case KEY_ED25519: ++ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); ++ default: ++ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ ++ return 0; ++ } +} + - static void - close_startup_pipes(void) - { -@@ -475,18 +485,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh - } + /* + * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. + * As usual, this may only take signal-safe actions, even though it is +@@ -236,18 +271,40 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) + _exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE); } -/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ @@ -1991,7 +2145,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c + */ void -destroy_sensitive_data(void) -+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) ++destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS @@ -2013,12 +2167,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + if (fp != NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (privsep) -+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, -+ pid, uid)); -+ else -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, -+ pid, uid); ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid); +#endif + free(fp); + } @@ -2029,7 +2178,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } -@@ -499,16 +536,34 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) +@@ -256,20 +313,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void) + + /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ + void +-demote_sensitive_data(void) ++demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh) + { struct sshkey *tmp; u_int i; int r; @@ -2048,55 +2203,45 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + else + fp = NULL; - if ((r = sshkey_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], - &tmp)) != 0) - fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s", - sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]), - ssh_err(r)); - sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private( + sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key", + sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])); + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; + if (fp != NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); ++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid); +#endif + free(fp); + } } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } -@@ -587,7 +642,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) +@@ -463,7 +538,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); - if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) - box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); -- pid = fork(); -+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); - if (pid == -1) { - fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); - } else if (pid != 0) { -@@ -1162,6 +1217,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so - if (received_sigterm) { - logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", - (int) received_sigterm); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); - close_listen_socks(); - if (options.pid_file != NULL) - unlink(options.pid_file); -@@ -2165,6 +2221,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ +- demote_sensitive_data(); ++ demote_sensitive_data(ssh); + + reseed_prngs(); + +@@ -1387,6 +1462,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ -+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(1); ++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1); ++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); + - packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); + ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); -@@ -2344,6 +2403,15 @@ void +@@ -1432,6 +1510,14 @@ sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey, + void cleanup_exit(int i) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + static int in_cleanup = 0; -+ int is_privsep_child; + + /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep + wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse @@ -2104,69 +2249,48 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshd.c + if (in_cleanup) + _exit(i); + in_cleanup = 1; + extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */ - if (the_authctxt) { - do_cleanup(ssh, the_authctxt); -@@ -2356,9 +2424,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) - pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); - } + if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { +@@ -1448,7 +1534,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) } -+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; -+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) -+ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); -+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ -- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) -+ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && -+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) - audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); +- if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor()) ++ if (the_active_state != NULL && ++ (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && ++ mm_is_monitor()) + audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif - _exit(i); -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.c.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.758504660 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.c 2017-10-04 17:18:32.839505074 +0200 -@@ -295,6 +295,32 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) + /* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */ +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index c9ea8e38..8a99f0b2 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -217,6 +217,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) + num_listen_socks = 0; } - int -+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) ++/* ++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific ++ * client connection?) ++ */ ++int listening_for_clients(void) +{ -+ switch (k->type) { -+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_RSA: -+ return k->rsa->d != NULL; -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_DSA: -+ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_ECDSA: -+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: -+ case KEY_ED25519: -+ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); -+ default: -+ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ -+ return 0; -+ } ++ return num_listen_socks > 0; +} + -+int - sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) - { - if (k == NULL) -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.h.audit 2017-10-04 17:18:32.758504660 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/sshkey.h 2017-10-04 17:18:32.840505079 +0200 -@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey - int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); - int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); - int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); -+int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); - int sshkey_type_plain(int); + /* Allocate and initialise the children array */ + static void + child_alloc(void) +@@ -959,6 +968,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s, + if (received_sigterm) { + logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", + (int) received_sigterm); ++ /* destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); FIXME */ + close_listen_socks(); + if (options.pid_file != NULL) + unlink(options.pid_file); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch b/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch similarity index 55% rename from openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch rename to 0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch index 9a0d917..fe732a6 100644 --- a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch +++ b/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch @@ -1,7 +1,19 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100 -@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch +From c288d4a26ad44dc481c9d18d2920c9d70474833c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 40/50] openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition + +--- + monitor_wrap.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + monitor_wrap.h | 2 ++ + session.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +index 1a079c15..768a59f9 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.c ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c +@@ -1415,4 +1415,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); sshbuf_free(m); } @@ -13,33 +25,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, ret = 0; + -+ debug3("%s: entering", __func__); ++ debug3_f("entering"); + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + do { + blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */ + break; + if (blen != sizeof(buf)) { -+ error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__); ++ error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child"); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + msg_len = get_u32(buf); + if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) -+ fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); ++ fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len); + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) { -+ error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__); ++ error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child"); + ret = -1; + break; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || + atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) { -+ error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__); ++ error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor"); + ret = -1; + break; + } @@ -52,22 +64,24 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c + pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd; +} #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100 -@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); - void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); - void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); - void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); +diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +index 661ed63b..e957ba6e 100644 +--- a/monitor_wrap.h ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h +@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int); + void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); + void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t); + void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t); +int mm_forward_audit_messages(int); +void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int); #endif struct Session; -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race 2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100 -@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL; +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 83fc9418..b4753d93 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL; login_cap_t *lc; #endif @@ -78,50 +92,50 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c static int is_child = 0; static int in_chroot = 0; static int have_dev_log = 1; -@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s) +@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s) return 1; } -+void child_destory_sensitive_data(); ++void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh); + #define USE_PIPES 1 /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This -@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c +@@ -513,6 +519,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) close(err[0]); #endif -+ child_destory_sensitive_data(); ++ child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh); + /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ do_child(ssh, s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ -@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm +@@ -630,6 +638,9 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); + /* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */ -+ child_destory_sensitive_data(); ++ child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh); + /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA do_login(ssh, s, command); -@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) +@@ -766,6 +777,8 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) } if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) - s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); + s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command); + if (pipe(paudit) < 0) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); -@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) +@@ -781,6 +794,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) */ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + close(paudit[1]); -+ if (use_privsep && ret == 0) { ++ if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them + * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly, @@ -136,31 +150,30 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c return ret; } -@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void) - endpwent(); +@@ -1532,6 +1559,33 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh) + log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL); } +void -+child_destory_sensitive_data() ++child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh) +{ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int pparent = paudit[1]; + close(paudit[0]); + /* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */ -+ if (use_privsep) -+ mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent); ++ mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent); +#endif + + /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ -+ destroy_sensitive_data(use_privsep); ++ /* FIXME beldmit destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); */ + /* + * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the + * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer + * which we can't do using one-way pipe. + */ -+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1); ++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1); + /* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */ -+ /* packet_clear_keys(); */ ++ /* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */ + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* Notify parent that we are done */ @@ -171,17 +184,20 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c /* * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group -@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - struct passwd *pw = s->pw; - int r = 0; +@@ -1549,13 +1603,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) -- /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ -- destroy_sensitive_data(1); -- packet_clear_keys(); + sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); + +- /* remove keys from memory */ +- destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); +- ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); - /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the - monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ -- packet_destroy_all(0, 1); +- packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1); - /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e04f31b --- /dev/null +++ b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +From 80d967a18261156573e7385f8e534a89d2767d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 41/50] openssh-9.0p1-audit-log + +--- + audit-bsm.c | 2 +- + audit-linux.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + audit.c | 18 +++++++++--- + audit.h | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c +index a49abb92..c6f56553 100644 +--- a/audit-bsm.c ++++ b/audit-bsm.c +@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + } + + int +-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv) + { + /* not implemented */ + } +diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c +index d484b82b..dcfde3a9 100644 +--- a/audit-linux.c ++++ b/audit-linux.c +@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; + const char *audit_username(void); + + static void +-linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, ++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, + const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) + { + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; +@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, + } + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, + NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", +- username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success); ++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; + close(audit_fd); + +@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report: + } + + int +-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) ++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv) + { + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; ++ const char *rip; ++ u_int i; + + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { +@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv) + else + return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + } ++ rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased"); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, +- buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv); + if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + goto out; +- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp); ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp); + rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL, +- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv); ++ rip, NULL, rv); ++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ if (cert) { ++ char *pbuf; ++ ++ pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0); ++ if (pbuf == NULL) ++ goto out; ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"", ++ pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp); ++ free(pbuf); ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv); ++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { ++ pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0); ++ if (pbuf == NULL) ++ goto out; ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf); ++ free(pbuf); ++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, ++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv); ++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } + out: + saved_errno = errno; + audit_close(audit_fd); +@@ -179,26 +211,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) + int + audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) + { ++ char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL; + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); ++ free(audit_hostname); + return 0; + } + + void + audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) + { ++ char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL; + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++ free(audit_hostname); + } + + void +@@ -211,31 +251,41 @@ void + audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) + { + if (!user_login_count++) +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + } + + void + audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + { +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + + void + audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + { ++ char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL; ++ + switch(event) { + case SSH_NOLOGIN: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event); +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: +@@ -255,9 +305,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + if (user_login_count) { + while (user_login_count--) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } +@@ -266,12 +318,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: + case SSH_INVALID_USER: + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + default: + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + break; + } ++ free(audit_hostname); + } + + void +diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c +index d0433c3a..28d51a14 100644 +--- a/audit.c ++++ b/audit.c +@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) + void + audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key) + { +- char *fp; ++ char *key_fp = NULL; ++ char *issuer_fp = NULL; ++ struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL; + +- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); +- if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0) ++ key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) { ++ cert = key->cert; ++ issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key, ++ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ++ } ++ if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0) + *rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- free(fp); ++ if (key_fp) ++ free(key_fp); ++ if (issuer_fp) ++ free(issuer_fp); + } + + void +diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h +index 45d66ccf..05ac132c 100644 +--- a/audit.h ++++ b/audit.h +@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); + int audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *); + void audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *); + ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); +-int audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); ++int audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int); + void audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *); + void audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int); + void audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a81cc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch @@ -0,0 +1,763 @@ +From 79f9b2763d85ec592cb7e54dcf1c695d8dd138b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 14:01:38 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 42/54] openssh-7.7p1-fips + +--- + dh.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + dh.h | 1 + + kex-names.c | 6 +++- + kex.c | 3 +- + kexgen.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + kexgexc.c | 5 +++ + myproposal.h | 33 ++++++++++++++++++ + readconf.c | 16 ++++++--- + sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 3 ++ + servconf.c | 16 ++++++--- + ssh-ed25519.c | 9 +++++ + ssh-gss.h | 5 +++ + ssh-keygen.c | 22 ++++++++++-- + ssh-rsa.c | 3 ++ + ssh.c | 5 +++ + sshconnect2.c | 9 ++++- + sshd-session.c | 1 + + sshd.c | 13 +++++++ + sshkey.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 19 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c +index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644 +--- a/dh.c ++++ b/dh.c +@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "dh.h" + #include "pathnames.h" +@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) + int best, bestcount, which, linenum; + struct dhgroup dhg; + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode." ++ " Falling back to known groups."); ++ return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); ++ } ++ + if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) { + logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus", + get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno)); +@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits) + return 8192; + } + ++/* ++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups, ++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18. ++ */ ++int ++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh) ++{ ++ const BIGNUM *p, *g; ++ const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g; ++ DH *known = NULL; ++ int bits = 0, rv = 0; ++ ++ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g); ++ bits = BN_num_bits(p); ++ ++ if (bits <= 3072) { ++ known = dh_new_group14(); ++ } else if (bits <= 6144) { ++ known = dh_new_group16(); ++ } else { ++ known = dh_new_group18(); ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g); ++ ++ if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 && ++ BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) { ++ rv = 1; ++ } ++ ++ DH_free(known); ++ return rv; ++} ++ + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h +index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644 +--- a/dh.h ++++ b/dh.h +@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); + + int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); + int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *); ++int dh_is_known_group(const DH *); + + u_int dh_estimate(int); + void dh_set_moduli_file(const char *); +diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c +index 6c0b7c2b3..cd3902ad2 100644 +--- a/kex-names.c ++++ b/kex-names.c +@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ + + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #include ++#include + #include + #endif + +@@ -206,7 +207,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { +- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p); ++ else ++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); + free(s); + return 0; + } +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index 62f607d6f..71fbe5cbe 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #include + #include ++#include + # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW + # include + # include +@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], + + /* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */ + if (kexalgos == NULL) +- kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ? + "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" : + "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) +diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c +index 15df591ca..eecdceba2 100644 +--- a/kexgen.c ++++ b/kexgen.c +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "kex.h" +@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh) + break; + #endif + case KEX_C25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512: +- r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex); ++ } + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + break; + #endif + case KEX_C25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512: +- r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, +- &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, ++ &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, +- &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, ++ &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + break; + #endif + case KEX_C25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, +- &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, ++ &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512: +- r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, +- &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, ++ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, +- &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, ++ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c +index e99e0cf21..4c3feae09 100644 +--- a/kexgexc.c ++++ b/kexgexc.c +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + ++#include + #include + + #include +@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } ++ if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ goto out; ++ } + p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ + + /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ +diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h +index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644 +--- a/myproposal.h ++++ b/myproposal.h +@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@ + "rsa-sha2-512," \ + "rsa-sha2-256" + ++#define KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ ++ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-512," \ ++ "rsa-sha2-256" ++ + #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \ +@@ -79,6 +91,27 @@ + + #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC + ++#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ ++ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ ++ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ ++ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \ ++ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" ++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ ++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ ++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ ++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \ ++ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" ++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ ++ "hmac-sha1," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-256," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-512," \ ++ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ ++ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" ++ + /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */ + #define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \ + "ssh-ed25519," \ +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index f340bf501..ea9d293c3 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB + # include + #else +@@ -3043,11 +3044,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); + /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ +- def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); +- def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac); +- def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex); +- def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); +- def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); ++ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher); ++ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac); ++ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex); ++ def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key); ++ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig); + #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ + do { \ + if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \ +diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +index 1fabf99d0..ccb61586e 100644 +--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_open + SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_socket ++ SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_openat + SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES), + #endif +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 84891544b..8b708cbf4 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H + #include + #endif +@@ -247,11 +248,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); + /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */ +- def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); +- def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); +- def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); +- def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); +- def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); ++ def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher); ++ def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac); ++ def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex); ++ def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key); ++ def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ? ++ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig); + #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ + do { \ + if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \ +diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c +index 22d8db026..41942f4e5 100644 +--- a/ssh-ed25519.c ++++ b/ssh-ed25519.c +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "log.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" +@@ -164,6 +165,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key, + key->ed25519_sk == NULL || + datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } + smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES; + if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +@@ -221,6 +226,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES || + sig == NULL || siglen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +index a894e23c9..329dc9da0 100644 +--- a/ssh-gss.h ++++ b/ssh-gss.h +@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds; + KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \ + KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID + ++#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID ++ + #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */ + + typedef struct { +diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c +index 16cff9473..792aafde0 100644 +--- a/ssh-keygen.c ++++ b/ssh-keygen.c +@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ + + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #include ++#include + #include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #endif +@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ + #include "cipher.h" + + #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" ++#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" + + /* + * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be +@@ -202,6 +204,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) + #endif + } + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ if (type == KEY_DSA) ++ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK) ++ fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ } + switch (type) { + case KEY_DSA: + if (*bitsp != 1024) +@@ -259,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) + char *name = NULL; + + if (key_type_name == NULL) +- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; ++ name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; + else { + switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) { + #ifdef WITH_DSA +@@ -1144,9 +1152,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) + first = 1; + printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); + } ++ type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type); ++ ++ /* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */ ++ if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) { ++ logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode", ++ key_types[i].key_type_display); ++ goto next; ++ } ++ + printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); + fflush(stdout); +- type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type); + if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s", + prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); +@@ -3849,7 +3865,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + } + + if (key_type_name == NULL) +- key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; ++ key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; + + type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name); + type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); +diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c +index 3ad1fddc4..6c2f771a3 100644 +--- a/ssh-rsa.c ++++ b/ssh-rsa.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + + #include + #include +@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits) + goto out; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) { ++ if (FIPS_mode()) ++ logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method"); + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 98b103c9e..abc8b8439 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ + #include + #include + #endif ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +@@ -1642,6 +1643,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + exit(0); + } + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ debug("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + /* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */ + if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' && + strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) { +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 0af15bcc1..3e02f485d 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#include ++ + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + + #include "xmalloc.h" +@@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + + #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ? ++ match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms); ++ + /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this + * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ + orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; +@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + } + + gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, +- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); ++ options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered); ++ free(gss_kex_filtered); ++ + if (gss) { + debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); + xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index a808ac9a6..a67a78391 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #endif + +diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +index 8a99f0b29..5ff0b5ff0 100644 +--- a/sshd.c ++++ b/sshd.c +@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ + #endif + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #include + #include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #endif + +@@ -1611,6 +1613,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"", + options.host_key_files[i]); ++ if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK ++ || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) { ++ logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]); ++ sshkey_free(key); ++ key = NULL; ++ continue; ++ } + if (sshkey_is_sk(key) && + key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) { + debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring", +@@ -1830,6 +1839,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ debug("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + /* + * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + * unmounted if desired. +diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c +index 4e41a78c7..ca1cdb642 100644 +--- a/sshkey.c ++++ b/sshkey.c +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #endif + + #include "crypto_api.h" +@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ + #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "match.h" ++#include "log.h" + #include "ssh-sk.h" + + #ifdef WITH_XMSS +@@ -408,6 +410,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep) + impl = keyimpls[i]; + if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL) + continue; ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ switch (impl->type) { ++ case KEY_ED25519: ++ case KEY_ED25519_SK: ++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: ++ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: ++ continue; ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ } + if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly) + continue; + if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert)) +@@ -1441,6 +1455,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) + return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; + } + ++ switch (type) { ++ case KEY_ED25519: ++ case KEY_ED25519_SK: ++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: ++ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ sshkey_free(k); ++ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } + /* Fill in ret from parsed key */ + sshkey_free_contents(ret); + *ret = *k; +@@ -2275,6 +2303,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, + *lenp = 0; + if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) { ++ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } ++ /* Fallthrough */ + if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0) +@@ -2311,6 +2344,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + *detailsp = NULL; + if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) { ++ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } + if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, +-- +2.51.0 + diff --git a/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch b/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89c6ea1 --- /dev/null +++ b/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 299a602802d7c7d121306eb2aeae1502871a35cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 43/50] openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage + +--- + ssh.1 | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 +index 6a9fbdc5..755cdef2 100644 +--- a/ssh.1 ++++ b/ssh.1 +@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + .It BatchMode + .It BindAddress + .It BindInterface +-.It CASignatureAlgorithms + .It CanonicalDomains + .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal + .It CanonicalizeHostname + .It CanonicalizeMaxDots + .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs ++.It CASignatureAlgorithms + .It CertificateFile + .It ChannelTimeout + .It CheckHostIP +@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + .It ControlPath + .It ControlPersist + .It DynamicForward ++.It EnableSSHKeysign + .It EnableEscapeCommandline + .It EnableSSHKeysign + .It EscapeChar +@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + .It RemoteCommand + .It RemoteForward + .It RequestTTY ++.It RevokedHostKeys ++.It SecurityKeyProvider + .It RequiredRSASize + .It RevokedHostKeys + .It SecurityKeyProvider +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch b/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4c3b8a --- /dev/null +++ b/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +From 5c92430c08ac392b5b2ace899cc043247c923734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 44/50] openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs + +--- + regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + sshconnect2.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh +index 28dcfe17..b9e716dc 100644 +--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh ++++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh +@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key" + + ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA" + ++PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \ ++ grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"` ++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"` ++echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa" ++r=$? ++if [ $r == 0 ]; then ++echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa" ++r=$? ++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then ++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa" ++fi ++fi ++ + trace "load hostkeys" +-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do ++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do + ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \ + -I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \ +@@ -32,12 +45,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either + + unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK + +-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do ++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do + verbose "key type $k" ++ hka=$k ++ if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then ++ hka="rsa-sha2-512" ++ fi + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy +- echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy ++ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy +- opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" ++ opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" + ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ; + cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts + SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` +@@ -50,15 +67,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do + done + + SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com' | maybe_filter_sk` ++SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"` + + # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates. + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy + HOSTKEYALGS="" +-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do ++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do + test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}," + HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}" + done +-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do ++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do + echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key" +@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ; + cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts + +-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do ++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do + verbose "cert type $k" + opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" + SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 14f7671a..ad3f560f 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + { + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; +- char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL; ++ char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL; + int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; + + #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) +@@ -257,10 +257,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + if (use_known_hosts_order) + hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo); + ++ filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos) ++ : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms, ++ options.pubkey_accepted_algos); ++ if (filtered_algs == NULL) { ++ if (hkalgs) ++ fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s", ++ hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos); ++ else ++ fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s", ++ options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos); ++ } ++ + kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, + options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs, + compression_alg_list(options.compression), +- hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ filtered_algs); + + #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + if (options.gss_keyex) { +@@ -304,6 +316,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + #endif + + free(hkalgs); ++ free(filtered_algs); + + /* start key exchange */ + if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch b/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..610cea0 --- /dev/null +++ b/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,616 @@ +From be23afbab800c9b5ffea56b3f410a04156c08df2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 45/50] openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex + +--- + dh.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + kex.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + kex.h | 6 +++ + kexdh.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++-- + kexecdh.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- + 5 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c +index 8c9a29fa..ea0a0b09 100644 +--- a/dh.c ++++ b/dh.c +@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include ++#include + + #include "dh.h" + #include "pathnames.h" +@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub) + int + dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) + { +- int pbits; +- const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key; ++ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ int pbits, r = 0; + +- DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL); ++ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + + if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL || + (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 || +@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (need < 256) + need = 256; ++ ++ if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL || ++ (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) { ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ } ++ ++ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) { ++ error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } + /* + * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)), + * so double requested need here. + */ +- if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1))) +- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +- +- if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) +- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +- DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); +- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) +- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; +- return 0; ++ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN, ++ MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 || ++ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey, ++ EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) { ++ error_f("Failed key generation"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* reuse context for key generation */ ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ ctx = NULL; ++ ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) { ++ error_f("Could not create or init context"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) { ++ error_f("Could not generate keys"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) { ++ error_f("The public key is incorrect"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ++ &pub_key) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ++ &priv_key) != 1 || ++ DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) { ++ error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* transferred */ ++ pub_key = NULL; ++ priv_key = NULL; ++out: ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ BN_clear_free(pub_key); ++ BN_clear_free(priv_key); ++ return r; + } + + DH * +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index 71fbe5cb..ce6a7b81 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -1614,3 +1614,142 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms, + return r; + } + ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++/* ++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys. ++ * The private key can be omitted. ++ */ ++EVP_PKEY * ++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) ++{ ++ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) { ++ debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { ++ debug2_f("Could not build param list"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) { ++ debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed"); ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++int ++kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey) ++{ ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; ++ uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL; ++ const char *group_name; ++ const EC_POINT *pub = NULL; ++ const BIGNUM *priv = NULL; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (k == NULL) ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL || ++ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL || ++ (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ++ group_name, ++ strlen(group_name)) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) { ++ const EC_GROUP *group; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); ++ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub, ++ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); ++ if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ EC_POINT_point2oct(group, ++ pub, ++ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, ++ pub_ser, ++ len, ++ bn_ctx); ++ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ++ pub_ser, ++ len) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } ++ if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL && ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++out: ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); ++ free(pub_ser); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++int ++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, ++ const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv) ++{ ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ int r = 0; ++ ++ /* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */ ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL || ++ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) { ++ error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) { ++ error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (priv != NULL && ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) { ++ error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++out: ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ return r; ++} ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h +index 6a55aadf..48f3bb87 100644 +--- a/kex.h ++++ b/kex.h +@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ + # include + # include + # include ++# include ++# include ++# include + # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + # include + # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +@@ -311,6 +314,9 @@ int kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], + const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); ++int kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, ++ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *); ++int kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey); + + #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) + void dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int); +diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c +index 0faab21b..32e1de51 100644 +--- a/kexdh.c ++++ b/kexdh.c +@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ + + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include + + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "kex.h" +@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@ int + kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out) + { + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; + u_char *kbuf = NULL; + size_t klen = 0; +- int kout, r; ++ int r = 0; + + #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= "); +@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out) + r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + goto out; + } +- klen = DH_size(kex->dh); ++ ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv); ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g); ++ /* import key */ ++ r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv); ++ if (r != 0) { ++ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh"); ++ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* import peer key ++ * the parameters should be the same as with pkey ++ */ ++ r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL); ++ if (r != 0) { ++ error_f("Could not import peer key for dh"); ++ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) { ++ error_f("Could not get key size"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } + if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || + (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || +- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { ++ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 || ++ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Could not derive key"); + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH +- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); ++ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); + #endif + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret); + out: + freezero(kbuf, klen); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + return r; + } + +diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c +index efb2e55a..d92ba54f 100644 +--- a/kexecdh.c ++++ b/kexecdh.c +@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include + + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "kex.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "digest.h" + #include "ssherr.h" ++#include "log.h" + + static int + kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key, + const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **); + ++static EC_KEY * ++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid) ++{ ++ EC_KEY *client_key = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ const char *group_name; ++ ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL || ++ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) ++ goto out; ++ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 || ++ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 || ++ (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Could not generate ec keys"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++out: ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); ++ return client_key; ++} ++ + int + kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex) + { +@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex) + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + int r; + +- if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { +- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +- goto out; +- } +- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) { ++ if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@ kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob, + *server_blobp = NULL; + *shared_secretp = NULL; + +- if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { +- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +- goto out; +- } +- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) { ++ if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob, + { + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; +- EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL; +- u_char *kbuf = NULL; +- size_t klen = 0; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL; ++ size_t klen = 0, publen; ++ const char *group_name; + int r; + ++ /* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */ ++ if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) { ++ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + *shared_secretp = NULL; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { +@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob, + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0) + goto out; +- if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ++ ++ /* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED ++ * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ sshbuf_reset(buf); ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL || ++ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +- if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) { ++ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 || ++ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey, ++ EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) { ++ error_f("Peer public key import failed"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +- sshbuf_reset(buf); + + #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + fputs("public key:\n", stderr); +- sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub); ++ EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL); + #endif +- if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) { +- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ ctx = NULL; ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) { ++ error_f("Failed to get derive information"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; +- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || +- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { ++ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen || +- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { ++ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); + #endif ++ if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL || ++ (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0) + goto out; + *shared_secretp = buf; + buf = NULL; + out: +- EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey); ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + freezero(kbuf, klen); ++ freezero(pub, publen); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return r; + } +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch b/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e75c8a --- /dev/null +++ b/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +From e4ca3b9dba1cc832a9974493c91207d42e218a68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 46/50] openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof + +--- + compat.c | 6 +++++ + compat.h | 2 +- + monitor.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++------ + regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c | 3 ++- + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c | 3 ++- + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c | 3 ++- + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++--------- + serverloop.c | 6 ++++- + ssh-rsa.c | 3 ++- + sshconnect2.c | 8 +++++++ + sshd-session.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++ + 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c +index b59f0bfc..4e611dc3 100644 +--- a/compat.c ++++ b/compat.c +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ void + compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version) + { + int i; ++ int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0; + static struct { + char *pat; + int bugs; +@@ -125,16 +126,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version) + }; + + /* process table, return first match */ ++ forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA); + ssh->compat = 0; + for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { + if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) { + debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", + version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); + ssh->compat = check[i].bugs; ++ if (forbid_ssh_rsa) ++ ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA; + return; + } + } + debug_f("no match: %s", version); ++ if (forbid_ssh_rsa) ++ ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA; + } + + /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */ +diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h +index 1a19060f..2e6db5bf 100644 +--- a/compat.h ++++ b/compat.h +@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ + #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001 + #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002 + #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74 0x00000004 +-/* #define unused 0x00000008 */ ++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA 0x00000008 + #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 + /* #define unused 0x00000020 */ + #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040 +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index fbc35782..19cb058e 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -747,11 +747,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + struct sshkey *pubkey, *key; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; + u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL; +- char *alg = NULL; +- size_t datlen, siglen; +- int r, is_proof = 0, keyid; +- u_int compat; ++ char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg; ++ size_t datlen, siglen, alglen; ++ int r, is_proof = 0; ++ u_int keyid, compat; + const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"; ++ const char safe_rsa[] = "rsa-sha2-256"; + + debug3_f("entering"); + +@@ -809,18 +810,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + } + + if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { +- if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, ++ if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0 ++ && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) { ++ effective_alg = safe_rsa; ++ } else { ++ effective_alg = alg; ++ } ++ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg, + options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "sign"); + } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && + auth_sock > 0) { ++ if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0 ++ && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) { ++ effective_alg = safe_rsa; ++ } else { ++ effective_alg = alg; ++ } + if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, +- p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) ++ p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "agent sign"); + } else + fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid); + +- debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg, ++ debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg, + is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen); + + sshbuf_reset(m); +diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c +index caf8f57f..09016aea 100644 +--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c ++++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c +@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits) + memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal)); + if (kex != NULL) + kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex; +- keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)); ++ keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ? ++ strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL); + kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname; + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0); +diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c +index 3babe604..cc80fe97 100644 +--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c ++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c +@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void) + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + ++ /* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported + TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); +@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void) + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa"); + sshkey_free(k2); +- TEST_DONE(); ++ TEST_DONE(); */ + + TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0); +diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c +index 0aff7c9b..951122e1 100644 +--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c ++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c +@@ -338,13 +338,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void) + TEST_DONE(); + + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ /* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported + TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa"); + sshkey_free(k1); +- TEST_DONE(); ++ TEST_DONE();*/ + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); +diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c +index 5bf4b65c..6d0a35bb 100644 +--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c ++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c +@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type, + u_char *sigblob; + size_t siglen; + ++ /* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */ ++ int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0; ++ + ca_buf = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0); +@@ -102,8 +105,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type, + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen, +- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0); +- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */ ++ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected); ++ if (expected == 0) ++ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */ + + free(sigblob); + sshbuf_free(ca_buf); +@@ -120,16 +124,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg, + { + size_t len; + u_char *sig; ++ /* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */ ++ int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0; ++ if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) ++ expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0); + + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, +- NULL, NULL, 0), 0); +- ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8); +- ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL); +- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); +- ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); +- /* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */ +- sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10; +- ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); ++ NULL, NULL, 0), expected); ++ if (expected == 0) { ++ ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8); ++ ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL); ++ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); ++ ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); ++ /* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */ ++ sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10; ++ ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0); ++ } + free(sig); + } + +@@ -526,7 +536,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void) + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + k3 = get_private("rsa_1"); +- build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL); ++ build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4), + SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL); +diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c +index 40ddfb04..9c5b1567 100644 +--- a/serverloop.c ++++ b/serverloop.c +@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ + #include "auth-options.h" + #include "serverloop.h" + #include "ssherr.h" ++#include "compat.h" + + extern ServerOptions options; + +@@ -699,7 +700,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp) + else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED) + sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256"; + } +- ++ if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) { ++ sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512"; ++ debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg); ++ } + debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", + sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, +diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c +index 6c2f771a..8dd4ab01 100644 +--- a/ssh-rsa.c ++++ b/ssh-rsa.c +@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } +- if (hash_alg != want_alg) { ++ if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) { ++ debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg); + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index ad3f560f..3941e089 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -1434,6 +1434,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + retried = 1; + goto retry_pin; + } ++ if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) { ++ char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512"; ++ debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg); ++ ++ if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, ++ rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) ++ debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback"); ++ } + goto out; + } + +diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +index a808ac9a..c3349a8a 100644 +--- a/sshd-session.c ++++ b/sshd-session.c +@@ -1316,6 +1316,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + check_ip_options(ssh); + ++ { ++ struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL; ++ rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh); ++ if (rsakey == NULL) ++ rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh); ++ ++ if (rsakey != NULL) { ++ size_t sign_size = 0; ++ u_char *tmp = NULL; ++ u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector"; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); ++ free(tmp); ++ if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) { ++ verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys"); ++ ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ + /* Prepare the channels layer */ + channel_init_channels(ssh); + channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch b/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..968e60a --- /dev/null +++ b/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From 497de886faaddec60b7ad1013396c7d4f3145968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 47/50] openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost + +--- + auth-pam.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c +index a042c3c8..a321e0d3 100644 +--- a/auth-pam.c ++++ b/auth-pam.c +@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) + sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr( + ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); + } +- if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) { ++ if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) { + debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost); + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, + sshpam_rhost); +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch b/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d0f691 --- /dev/null +++ b/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From b97b1040bc0918fe9be89cdb482d046270e92d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 48/50] openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign + +--- + ssh_config.5 | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index a43b2a27..9d5da2a6 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ or + This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. + See + .Xr ssh-keysign 8 +-for more information. ++for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly. + .It Cm EscapeChar + Sets the escape character (default: + .Ql ~ ) . +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch b/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e04d194 --- /dev/null +++ b/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +From 0a621a2ccb8444e4c6da906b0e112e0522658122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 49/50] openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem + +--- + kex-names.c | 20 +++ + kexmlkem768x25519.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 311 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c +index cd3902ad..36a953ab 100644 +--- a/kex-names.c ++++ b/kex-names.c +@@ -108,6 +108,19 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = { + { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, + }; + ++static int is_mlkem768_available() ++{ ++ static int is_fetched = -1; ++ ++ if (is_fetched == -1) { ++ EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL); ++ is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0; ++ EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768); ++ } ++ ++ return is_fetched; ++} ++ + static char * + kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs) + { +@@ -116,6 +129,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs) + const struct kexalg *k; + + for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0 ++ && !is_mlkem768_available()) ++ continue; + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(k->name); +@@ -147,6 +163,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + { + const struct kexalg *k; + ++ if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0 ++ && !is_mlkem768_available()) ++ return NULL; ++ + for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; +diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c +index 2b5d3960..670049dc 100644 +--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c ++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c +@@ -48,10 +48,127 @@ + #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519 + + #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static int ++mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf) ++{ ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES; ++ ++ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL); ++ if (ctx == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 ++ || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0 ++ || EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES ++ || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ret = 0; ++ ++ err: ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) ++ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++static int ++mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out) ++{ ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES, ++ secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES; ++ ++ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL, ++ pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES); ++ if (pkey == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL); ++ if (ctx == NULL ++ || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0 ++ || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0 ++ || secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES ++ || outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ r = 0; ++ ++ err: ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) ++ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ++ ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static int ++mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret) ++{ ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES, ++ secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES; ++ ++ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL, ++ privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES); ++ if (pkey == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL); ++ if (ctx == NULL ++ || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0 ++ || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0 ++ || secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ r = 0; ++ ++ err: ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ ++ if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) ++ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ++ ++ return r; ++} + + int + kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex) + { ++#if 0 + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL; + size_t need; +@@ -86,6 +203,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex) + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return r; ++#else ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ u_char *cp = NULL; ++ size_t need; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE; ++ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp, ++ crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES); ++#endif ++ cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES; ++ kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp); ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE); ++#endif ++ /* success */ ++ r = 0; ++ kex->client_pub = buf; ++ buf = NULL; ++ out: ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ return r; ++#endif + } + + int +@@ -93,6 +240,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex, + const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp, + struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) + { ++#if 0 + struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + const u_char *client_pub; +@@ -185,12 +333,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex, + sshbuf_free(server_blob); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return r; ++#else ++ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ const u_char *client_pub; ++ u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t need; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */ ++ ++ *server_blobp = NULL; ++ *shared_secretp = NULL; ++ ++ /* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */ ++ need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE; ++ if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob); ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub, ++ crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES); ++ dump_digest("client public key 25519:", ++ client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, ++ CURVE25519_SIZE); ++#endif ++ ++ /* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */ ++ /* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */ ++ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */ ++ kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ /* append ECDH shared key */ ++ client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES; ++ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0) ++ goto out; ++ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) ++ goto out; ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); ++ dump_digest("server cipher text:", ++ enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value)); ++ dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd)); ++ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:", ++ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ++#endif ++ /* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */ ++ sshbuf_reset(buf); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash, ++ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0) ++ goto out; ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ++#endif ++ /* success */ ++ r = 0; ++ *server_blobp = server_blob; ++ *shared_secretp = buf; ++ server_blob = NULL; ++ buf = NULL; ++ out: ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key)); ++ explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc)); ++ sshbuf_free(server_blob); ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ return r; ++#endif + } + + int + kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex, + const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp) + { ++#if 0 + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES]; + const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub; +@@ -258,6 +491,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex, + explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return r; ++#else ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES]; ++ size_t need; ++ int r; ++ ++ *shared_secretp = NULL; ++ ++ need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE; ++ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob); ++ server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES; ++ /* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES); ++ dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); ++#endif ++ if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub, ++ buf, 1)) < 0) ++ goto out; ++ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, ++ hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) ++ goto out; ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap)); ++ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:", ++ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ++#endif ++ sshbuf_reset(buf); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash, ++ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0) ++ goto out; ++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH ++ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); ++#endif ++ /* success */ ++ r = 0; ++ *shared_secretp = buf; ++ buf = NULL; ++ out: ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap)); ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ return r; ++#endif + } + #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */ + int +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch b/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aed1c30 --- /dev/null +++ b/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From fd32e753ae7f3b314712e6aa8b2bed3c1fca1ef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 14:53:54 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 50/51] openssh-9.9p2-error_processing + +--- + ssh-agent.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 798bf9b6..dfb6ac72 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1377,6 +1377,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) + if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 || + k == NULL || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { ++ if (!r) /* k == NULL */ ++ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + error_fr(r, "parse"); + goto out; + } +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch b/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c1aa4d --- /dev/null +++ b/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 4965cdbc1ee1e6a0c665797bb8b944d96d3d411f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zoltan Fridrich +Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 15:11:59 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 51/53] Provide better error for non-supported private keys + +Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich +--- + sshkey.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c +index ca1cdb642..aada474e0 100644 +--- a/sshkey.c ++++ b/sshkey.c +@@ -3582,6 +3582,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + case ERR_LIB_ASN1: ++#ifdef ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER ++ case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER: ++#endif + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch b/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f071225 --- /dev/null +++ b/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 9ed09ef158a113e21be7b3fefa7c5f932632749b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zoltan Fridrich +Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:52:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 52/53] Ignore bad hostkeys in known_hosts file + +Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich +--- + hostfile.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + hostfile.h | 1 + + ssh.c | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c +index c5669c703..5c402f501 100644 +--- a/hostfile.c ++++ b/hostfile.c +@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@ + #include "hmac.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" + ++static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE; ++ ++void ++hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size) ++{ ++ required_rsa_size = size; ++} ++ + /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */ + + static int +@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) + struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx; + struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys; + struct hostkey_entry *tmp; ++ int r = 0; + + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { + /* XXX make this verbose() in the future */ +@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) + return 0; + } + ++ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) { ++ debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s", ++ l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", + l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" : + (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "), +diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h +index a24a4e329..0e9b1a19a 100644 +--- a/hostfile.h ++++ b/hostfile.h +@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f, + const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note); + + void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int); ++void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int); + + #endif +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index abc8b8439..33787a8d4 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "myproposal.h" + #include "utf8.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" + + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + options.update_hostkeys = 0; + } + } ++ hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size); + if (options.connection_attempts <= 0) + fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts"); + +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch b/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..237e45d --- /dev/null +++ b/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch @@ -0,0 +1,450 @@ +From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Bokovoy +Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI + +RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes +associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use +name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used +to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators' +may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket +issuance process. + +Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server. +GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators +that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details +on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page. + +Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696 + +Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy +--- + configure.ac | 1 + + gss-serv-krb5.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + gss-serv.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + servconf.c | 15 ++++++- + servconf.h | 2 + + ssh-gss.h | 7 ++++ + sshd_config.5 | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], + [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) +diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644 +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c +@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ + #include "log.h" + #include "misc.h" + #include "servconf.h" ++#include "match.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + +@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) + return 1; + } + ++/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match ++ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules. ++ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule. ++ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny ++ */ ++ ++static int ++ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ u_int i; ++ ++ /* Check indicators */ ++ for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) { ++ ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i], ++ options.gss_indicators, 1); ++ /* negative or positive match */ ++ if (ret != 0) { ++ *matched = i; ++ return ret; ++ } ++ } ++ /* No rule matched */ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other + * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own. + * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 +@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int + ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + { + krb5_principal princ; +- int retval; ++ int retval, matched; + const char *errmsg; + int k5login_exists; + +@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) + if (k5login_exists && + ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) { + retval = 1; +- logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", +- name, (char *)client->displayname.value); ++ errmsg = "krb5_kuserok"; + } else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value, + name, k5login_exists)) { + retval = 1; +- logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s " +- "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)", +- name, (char *)client->displayname.value); ++ errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok"; + } else + retval = 0; + ++ if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) { ++ /* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators ++ * so we drop the authorization result again */ ++ retval = 0; ++ if (client->indicators) { ++ matched = -1; ++ retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched); ++ if (retval != 0) { ++ retval = (retval == 1); ++ logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, " ++ "krb5 principal %s is %s", ++ client->indicators[matched], ++ (char *)client->displayname.value, ++ retval ? "allowed" : "denied"); ++ goto cont; ++ } ++ } ++ if (retval == 0) { ++ logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced " ++ "but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied", ++ (char *)client->displayname.value); ++ } ++ } ++cont: ++ if (retval == 1) { ++ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)", ++ name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg); ++ } + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); + return retval; + } +diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c +index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644 +--- a/gss-serv.c ++++ b/gss-serv.c +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, +- GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; ++ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = + { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; +@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name) + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + ++ ++/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication ++ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators". ++ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket. ++ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */ ++ ++#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators" ++ ++/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ ++static OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET; ++ gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more; ++ size_t count, i; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name, ++ &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs); ++ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) { ++ /* No indicators in the ticket */ ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ count = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) { ++ /* skip anything but auth-indicators */ ++ if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) || ++ strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG, ++ attrs->elements[i].value, ++ sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0) ++ continue; ++ count++; ++ } ++ ++ if (count == 0) { ++ /* No auth-indicators in the ticket */ ++ (void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*)); ++ count = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) { ++ authenticated = 0; ++ complete = 0; ++ more = -1; ++ /* skip anything but auth-indicators */ ++ if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) || ++ strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG, ++ attrs->elements[i].value, ++ sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0) ++ continue; ++ /* retrieve all indicators */ ++ while (more != 0) { ++ value.value = NULL; ++ display_value.value = NULL; ++ ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name, ++ &attrs->elements[i], &authenticated, ++ &complete, &value, &display_value, &more); ++ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) { ++ client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1); ++ memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length); ++ client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0'; ++ count++; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++out: ++ (void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value); ++ (void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value); ++ (void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs); ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ ++ + /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably + * be called once for a context */ + +@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + } + + gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ /* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */ ++ if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx, ++ ctx->client, client))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } + + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; +@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int + ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; ++ size_t i; + + (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */ + +@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex) + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); + gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) { ++ for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) { ++ free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]); ++ } ++ free(gssapi_client.indicators); ++ } ++ + explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, + sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); + return 0; +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; + options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; ++ options->gss_indicators = NULL; + options->use_kuserok = -1; + options->enable_k5users = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; +@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum { + sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, + sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor, +- sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, + sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, +@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct { + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct { + { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + #endif + { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); + break; + ++ case sGssIndicators: ++ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.", ++ filename, linenum, keyword); ++ if (options->gss_indicators == NULL) ++ options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); + dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms); ++ dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators); + #endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, +diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644 +--- a/servconf.h ++++ b/servconf.h +@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct { + char **allow_groups; + u_int num_deny_groups; + char **deny_groups; ++ char *gss_indicators; + + u_int num_subsystems; + char **subsystem_name; +@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item); + M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \ + M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \ + M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \ ++ M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \ +diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644 +--- a/ssh-gss.h ++++ b/ssh-gss.h +@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H ++#include ++#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H) ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifdef KRB5 + # ifndef HEIMDAL + # ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H +@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct { + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; + int used; + int updated; ++ char **indicators; /* auth indicators */ + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256- + gss-curve25519-sha256- + .Ed + This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators ++Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos ++mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of ++authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list ++.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... . ++When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name' ++will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication ++indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If ++.Cm GSSAPIIndicators ++is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the ++policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for ++access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly ++rejected. ++.Pp ++By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any ++indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators ++to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is ++preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to ++authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos ++(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication ++indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to ++inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence. ++.Pp ++Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a ++particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and ++FreeIPA environments: ++.Pp ++.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact ++.It Cm hardened ++SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA ++.It Cm pkinit ++smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA ++.It Cm radius ++pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA ++.It Cm otp ++TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA ++.It Cm idp ++OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider ++and device authorization grant flow ++.It Cm passkey ++FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens ++.El ++.Pp ++The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions. + .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms + The default is handled system-wide by + .Xr crypto-policies 7 . +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/1000-openssh-coverity.patch b/1000-openssh-coverity.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88362eb --- /dev/null +++ b/1000-openssh-coverity.patch @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +From 24c411970682dc67873c36bac05b4b460d68a628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dmitry Belyavskiy +Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 50/50] openssh-6.7p1-coverity + +--- + auth-krb5.c | 2 ++ + gss-genr.c | 3 ++- + krl.c | 3 +++ + loginrec.c | 2 ++ + misc.c | 3 +++ + monitor.c | 4 ++-- + openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 2 +- + openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c | 8 ++++---- + readconf.c | 1 + + servconf.c | 5 +++-- + serverloop.c | 2 +- + ssh-agent.c | 1 + + ssh-keygen.c | 3 +++ + 13 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c +index bae153c9..209a3265 100644 +--- a/auth-krb5.c ++++ b/auth-krb5.c +@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm + umask(old_umask); + if (tmpfd == -1) { + logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); ++ free(ccname); + return oerrno; + } + +@@ -434,6 +435,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm + oerrno = errno; + logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); + close(tmpfd); ++ free(ccname); + return oerrno; + } + /* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */ +diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c +index 3034370c..c357e973 100644 +--- a/gss-genr.c ++++ b/gss-genr.c +@@ -168,8 +168,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, + enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, + ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded, + ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2); +- ++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow" + cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex)); ++#pragma GCC diagnostic pop + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 && +diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c +index 0d0f6953..d8517f12 100644 +--- a/krl.c ++++ b/krl.c +@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); ++ rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */ + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; +@@ -1212,6 +1213,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); ++ rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */ + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; +@@ -1223,6 +1225,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); + free(rb.blob); ++ rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */ + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; +diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c +index c4a9bd48..2583612c 100644 +--- a/loginrec.c ++++ b/loginrec.c +@@ -683,9 +683,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, + */ + + /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */ ++ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ + strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username, + MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username)); + # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP ++ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ + strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, + MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname)); + # endif +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index 09722962..cd71c1b2 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -1556,6 +1556,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void) + } + if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO) + close(nullfd); ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/ ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/ + } + + char * +@@ -2749,6 +2751,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr) + } + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/ + return ret; + } + +diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +index 19cb058e..58fbac9d 100644 +--- a/monitor.c ++++ b/monitor.c +@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) + mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ +- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + + if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) +@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) + s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; + + debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd); +- ++ /* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */ + return (0); + + error: +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c +index 346c7fe5..f42792fd 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c +@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa) + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; + u_int16_t *portp; + u_int16_t port; +- socklen_t salen; ++ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + int i; + + if (sa == NULL) { +diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c +index 26bdc3e0..8e2939b9 100644 +--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c +@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void) + static void + pselect_notify_parent(void) + { +- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0) + (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); + } + static void + pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) + { +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0) + FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); + } + static void +@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset) + { + char c; + +- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) { +- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) ++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) { ++ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0) + debug2_f("reading"); + FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset); + } +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index ea9d293c..9680c38c 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -2164,6 +2164,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos: + } else if (r != 0) { + error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.", + filename, linenum, arg2); ++ free(arg2); + goto out; + } + free(arg2); +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 8b708cbf..e7e4ad04 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -2293,8 +2293,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { + *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); + /* increase optional counter */ +- if (intptr != NULL) +- *intptr = *intptr + 1; ++ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;) ++ if (intptr != NULL) ++ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */ + } + break; + +diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c +index 9c5b1567..768ee9fa 100644 +--- a/serverloop.c ++++ b/serverloop.c +@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh) + debug_f("invalid tun"); + goto done; + } +- if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) { ++ if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) { + if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && + auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun) + goto done; +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 798bf9b6..0e39dff7 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1593,6 +1593,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider) + + if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) { + error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); ++ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); + return NULL; + } + /* validate also provider from URI */ +diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c +index 792aafde..96b3474d 100644 +--- a/ssh-keygen.c ++++ b/ssh-keygen.c +@@ -2424,6 +2424,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); + if (r != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); ++ freezero(blob, blen); ++ blob = NULL; ++ blen = 0; + } else { + if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { + cp += 4; +-- +2.49.0 + diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-gsissh.patch b/2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch similarity index 53% rename from openssh-7.8p1-gsissh.patch rename to 2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch index 7e0d6dc..4a1a329 100644 --- a/openssh-7.8p1-gsissh.patch +++ b/2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.619775688 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/auth2.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.219377927 +0200 -@@ -270,7 +270,27 @@ - user = packet_get_cstring(NULL); - service = packet_get_cstring(NULL); - method = packet_get_cstring(NULL); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.444264765 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.314922659 +0200 +@@ -286,7 +286,28 @@ + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; - debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + +#ifdef GSSAPI @@ -12,14 +12,15 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2.c + debug("received empty username for %s", method); + if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) { + char *lname = NULL; -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname)); ++ mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname); + if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') { + free(user); + user = lname; + debug("set username to %s from gssapi context", user); + } else { + debug("failed to set username from gssapi context"); -+ packet_send_debug("failed to set username from gssapi context"); ++ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, ++ "failed to set username from gssapi context"); + } + } + } @@ -30,13 +31,13 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2.c debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX -@@ -281,11 +301,32 @@ - if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) - *style++ = 0; +@@ -299,11 +320,33 @@ + if (authctxt->attempt >= 1024) + auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh); - if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) { - /* setup auth context */ -- authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user)); +- authctxt->pw = mm_getpwnamallow(ssh, user); + /* If first time or username changed or empty username, + setup/reset authentication context. */ + if ((authctxt->attempt++ == 0) || @@ -50,7 +51,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2.c authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); - if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { + if (strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0) { -+ packet_disconnect("Unsupported service %s", service); ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Unsupported service %s", ++ service); + } +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* If we're going to set the username based on the @@ -62,12 +64,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2.c + authctxt->pw = fakepw(); + } else { +#endif -+ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user)); ++ authctxt->pw = mm_getpwnamallow(ssh, user); + if (authctxt->pw) { authctxt->valid = 1; - debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s", - __func__, user); -@@ -293,6 +334,9 @@ + debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user); + } else { +@@ -311,6 +354,9 @@ /* Invalid user, fake password information */ authctxt->pw = fakepw(); } @@ -76,83 +78,94 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2.c +#endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) - PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt)); -@@ -301,6 +345,7 @@ + mm_start_pam(ssh); +@@ -318,6 +364,7 @@ + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user); - setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", - use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); + setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown"); + if (authctxt->attempt == 1) { authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; #ifdef WITH_SELINUX -@@ -315,9 +360,10 @@ - userauth_banner(); +@@ -333,9 +380,10 @@ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) - packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled"); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, + "no authentication methods enabled"); - } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || - strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { -- packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: " +- ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service " + } + } + if (strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { -+ packet_disconnect("Change of service not allowed: " - "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)", ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of service " + "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)", authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service); } -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2-gss.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.410777899 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/auth2-gss.c 2018-10-24 17:39:13.477216029 +0200 -@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-10.0p1/auth2-gss.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2-gss.c 2025-06-14 08:24:54.946580198 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth2-gss.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.315696363 +0200 +@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ + extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex; + extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi; - extern ServerOptions options; - -+static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt); ++static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); -@@ -63,8 +64,8 @@ +@@ -67,8 +68,8 @@ { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; - int authenticated = 0; + int r, authenticated = 0; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *b2 = NULL; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf, gssbuf2; - u_int len; + u_char *p; + size_t len; - mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); -@@ -81,13 +82,27 @@ - gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); +@@ -79,6 +80,9 @@ + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + ++ if ((b2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ + mic.value = p; + mic.length = len; + +@@ -89,13 +93,28 @@ + fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); + /* client may have used empty username to determine target + name from GSSAPI context */ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b2, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b2, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex", ++ ssh->kex->session_id); + -+ gssbuf2.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b2); ++ if ((gssbuf2.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b2)) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); + gssbuf2.length = sshbuf_len(b2); + /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ - if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, -- &gssbuf, &mic)))) -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -- authctxt->pw)); -+ &gssbuf, &mic))) || -+ !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, -+ &gssbuf2, &mic)))) { + if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, +- &gssbuf, &mic))) +- authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, +- authctxt->pw, 1); ++ &gssbuf, &mic)) || ++ !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf2, &mic))) { + if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) { -+ authenticated = -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw, 1 /* gssapi-keyex */)); ++ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw, 1); + } + } - + sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(b2); free(mic.value); return (authenticated); -@@ -142,7 +157,9 @@ +@@ -154,7 +173,9 @@ return (0); } @@ -160,10 +173,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2-gss.c + /* authctxt->valid may be 0 if we haven't yet determined + username from gssapi context. */ + if (authctxt->user == NULL) { - debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); + debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user"); free(doid); return (0); -@@ -180,7 +197,7 @@ +@@ -192,7 +213,7 @@ Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; @@ -172,40 +185,42 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2-gss.c u_char *p; size_t len; int r; -@@ -201,6 +218,7 @@ +@@ -213,6 +234,7 @@ free(p); if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(gssctxt); ++ ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(gssctxt, ssh); if (send_tok.length != 0) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 || -@@ -275,6 +293,32 @@ +@@ -287,6 +309,34 @@ return 0; } +static void -+gssapi_set_username(Authctxt *authctxt) ++gssapi_set_username(struct ssh *ssh) +{ ++ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *lname = NULL; + + if ((authctxt->user == NULL) || (authctxt->user[0] == '\0')) { -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname)); ++ mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname); + if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') { + if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user); + authctxt->user = lname; + debug("set username to %s from gssapi context", lname); -+ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(authctxt->user)); ++ authctxt->pw = mm_getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user); + if (authctxt->pw) { + authctxt->valid = 1; +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) -+ PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt)); ++ mm_start_pam(ssh); +#endif + } + } else { + debug("failed to set username from gssapi context"); -+ packet_send_debug("failed to set username from gssapi context"); ++ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, ++ "failed to set username from gssapi context"); + } + } +} @@ -213,51 +228,47 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2-gss.c /* * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication. * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above, -@@ -285,12 +329,14 @@ +@@ -297,11 +347,13 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; - int r, authenticated; + int r, authenticated = 0; - const char *displayname; - if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) + if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); -+ gssapi_set_username(authctxt); ++ gssapi_set_username(ssh); + /* * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete -@@ -299,8 +345,11 @@ +@@ -310,7 +362,11 @@ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -- authctxt->pw)); +- authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1); + /* user should be set if valid but we double-check here */ + if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) { -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw, 1 /* gssapi-keyex */)); ++ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw, 1); + } - if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && - (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) -@@ -352,11 +401,17 @@ - fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -357,10 +413,16 @@ + fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed"); gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); -- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) -- authenticated = -- PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); +- if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))) +- authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0); - else -+ gssapi_set_username(authctxt); ++ gssapi_set_username(ssh); + -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) { ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))) { + if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) { -+ authenticated = -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw, 0 /* !gssapi-keyex */)); ++ authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw, 0); + } + } else { logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); @@ -265,44 +276,37 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-7.8p1/auth2-gss.c sshbuf_free(b); if (micuser != authctxt->user) -@@ -376,6 +431,23 @@ +@@ -376,6 +438,26 @@ return 0; } -+static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh) { + char *errstr; -+ OM_uint32 maj,min; ++ OM_uint32 maj, min; ++ int r; + -+ errstr=PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt,&maj,&min)); ++ errstr = mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min); + if (errstr) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR); -+ packet_put_int(maj); -+ packet_put_int(min); -+ packet_put_cstring(errstr); -+ packet_put_cstring(""); -+ packet_send(); -+ packet_write_wait(); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, ++ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, maj)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errstr)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, ""); + free(errstr); + } +} + Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { - "gssapi-keyex", + &methodcfg_gsskeyex, userauth_gsskeyex, -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.c openssh-7.8p1/auth.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.621775667 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/auth.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.220377916 +0200 -@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ - #include "compat.h" - #include "channels.h" - -+#include "version.h" -+#include "ssh-globus-usage.h" -+ - /* import */ - extern ServerOptions options; - extern int use_privsep; -@@ -339,7 +342,8 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.c openssh-10.0p1/auth.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.443524655 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.316281495 +0200 +@@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ method, submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", @@ -312,31 +316,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.c openssh-7.8p1/auth.c ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), extra != NULL ? ": " : "", -@@ -365,6 +369,23 @@ - if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && !partial) - audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); - #endif -+ if (authenticated) { -+ char *userdn = NULL; -+ char *mech_name = NULL; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ ssh_gssapi_get_client_info(&userdn, &mech_name); -+#endif -+ debug("REPORTING (%s) (%s) (%s) (%s) (%s) (%s) (%s)", -+ SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), -+ method, mech_name?mech_name:"NULL", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), -+ (authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0])? -+ authctxt->user : "unknown", -+ userdn?userdn:"NULL"); -+ ssh_globus_send_usage_metrics(SSH_RELEASE, -+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), -+ method, mech_name, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), -+ authctxt->user, userdn); -+ } - } - - -@@ -577,6 +598,10 @@ +@@ -490,13 +491,18 @@ #endif pw = getpwnam(user); @@ -347,7 +327,6 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.c openssh-7.8p1/auth.c #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_restoreauthdb(); -@@ -596,7 +621,8 @@ #endif if (pw == NULL) { logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d", @@ -355,11 +334,11 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.c openssh-7.8p1/auth.c + (user && user[0]) ? user : "unknown", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN - record_failed_login(user, + record_failed_login(ssh, user, auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.h openssh-7.8p1/auth.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.622775656 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/auth.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.220377916 +0200 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.h openssh-10.0p1/auth.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.h 2025-06-14 08:24:55.443709595 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.316833592 +0200 @@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ krb5_principal krb5_user; char *krb5_ticket_file; @@ -369,10 +348,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.h openssh-7.8p1/auth.h int krb5_set_env; #endif struct sshbuf *loginmsg; -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.677775074 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.221377906 +0200 -@@ -288,6 +288,55 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.609208310 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.317378775 +0200 +@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ + static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; + static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL; + static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL; ++static struct ssh *sshpam_ssh = NULL; + + /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ + #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST +@@ -296,6 +297,56 @@ # define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b))) #endif @@ -396,6 +383,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c +void +sshpam_check_userchanged(void) +{ ++ int sshpam_err; + struct passwd *pw; + const char *user; + @@ -415,7 +403,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c + "'%.100s' provided by PAM_USER", user); + pwfree(sshpam_authctxt->pw); + sshpam_authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pw); -+ sshpam_authctxt->valid = allowed_user(pw); ++ sshpam_authctxt->valid = allowed_user(sshpam_ssh, pw); + free(sshpam_authctxt->user); + sshpam_authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); + debug("PAM: user '%.100s' now %svalid", user, @@ -425,10 +413,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c + sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name); +} + - void + static void sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd) { -@@ -319,7 +368,7 @@ +@@ -327,7 +378,7 @@ static void import_environments(struct sshbuf *b) { @@ -437,7 +425,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c u_int n, i, num_env; int r; -@@ -335,6 +384,19 @@ +@@ -343,6 +394,19 @@ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0); @@ -457,7 +445,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c /* Import environment from subprocess */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) -@@ -507,6 +569,13 @@ +@@ -522,6 +586,13 @@ if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; @@ -469,9 +457,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c + sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_name); + } if (!do_pam_account()) { - sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; - goto auth_fail; -@@ -527,6 +596,13 @@ + /* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN. + * Backward compatibility for other errors. */ +@@ -546,6 +617,13 @@ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); @@ -485,7 +473,16 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c /* Export any environment strings set in child */ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { -@@ -1024,6 +1100,18 @@ +@@ -740,6 +818,8 @@ + options.use_dns)); + sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr( + ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); ++ /* Save so allowed_user can be called later */ ++ sshpam_ssh = ssh; + } + if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) { + debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost); +@@ -1096,6 +1176,18 @@ debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); @@ -504,8 +501,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { sshpam_account_status = 0; return (sshpam_account_status); -@@ -1314,6 +1402,9 @@ - pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); +@@ -1384,6 +1476,9 @@ + expose_authinfo(__func__); sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); + if (options.permit_pam_user_change) { @@ -514,9 +511,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.c sshpam_password = NULL; free(fake); if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.320778851 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.221377906 +0200 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.h 2025-06-14 08:24:54.755199761 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.318085082 +0200 @@ -43,5 +43,6 @@ int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void); void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int); @@ -524,9 +521,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-7.8p1/auth-pam.h +struct passwd *sshpam_getpw(const char *); #endif /* USE_PAM */ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-7.8p1/canohost.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/canohost.c 2018-08-23 07:41:42.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/canohost.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.221377906 +0200 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-10.0p1/canohost.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.c 2025-06-14 08:24:54.947106244 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/canohost.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.318537655 +0200 @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include @@ -535,7 +532,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-7.8p1/canohost.c #include #include -@@ -202,3 +203,33 @@ +@@ -300,3 +301,33 @@ { return get_sock_port(sock, 1); } @@ -569,37 +566,37 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-7.8p1/canohost.c + } + } +} -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/canohost.h openssh-7.8p1/canohost.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/canohost.h 2018-08-23 07:41:42.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/canohost.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.221377906 +0200 -@@ -23,4 +23,6 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.h openssh-10.0p1/canohost.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.h 2025-06-14 08:24:54.947234403 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/canohost.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.318980799 +0200 +@@ -26,4 +26,6 @@ #endif /* _CANOHOST_H */ +void resolve_localhost(char **host); + void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *); -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-7.8p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/configure.ac 2018-10-24 14:09:16.709774736 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/configure.ac 2018-10-24 14:09:54.223377885 +0200 -@@ -4504,6 +4504,14 @@ - AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , - [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac 2025-06-14 08:24:55.711190794 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac 2025-06-14 08:25:50.319884827 +0200 +@@ -4992,6 +4992,14 @@ + AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , + [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) -+ # If we're using some other GSSAPI -+ if test -n "$GSSAPI" ; then -+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Previously configured GSSAPI library conflicts with Kerberos GSI.]) -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$GSSAPI"; then -+ GSSAPI="KRB5"; -+ fi ++ # If we're using some other GSSAPI ++ if test -n "$GSSAPI" ; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR([Previously configured GSSAPI library conflicts with Kerberos GSI.]) ++ fi ++ ++ if test -z "$GSSAPI"; then ++ GSSAPI="KRB5"; ++ fi + fi fi - if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then - LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib" -@@ -4543,6 +4551,50 @@ - AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) + if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then +@@ -5034,6 +5042,40 @@ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) + AC_SUBST([CHANNELLIBS]) +# Check whether the user wants GSI (Globus) support +gsi="no" @@ -623,34 +620,24 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-7.8p1/configure.ac + GSSAPI="GSI" + fi + -+ LIBS="$LIBS `pkg-config --libs globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`" -+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `pkg-config --cflags globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`" ++ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) ++ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then ++ LIBS="$LIBS `$PKGCONFIG --libs globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`" ++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags globus-gss-assist globus-gssapi-gsi globus-common`" ++ fi + + AC_DEFINE(GSSAPI) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GSSAPI_H) + + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize) -+ -+ dnl -+ dnl Check for globus_usage_stats_send -+ dnl -+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS(globus_usage_stats_send, -+ globus_usage, -+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE], 1, [Have Globus Usage])) -+ dnl -+ dnl Check for globus_usage_stats_send_array -+ dnl -+ AC_SEARCH_LIBS(globus_usage_stats_send_array, -+ globus_usage, -+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE_SEND_ARRAY], 1, [Have Globus Usage send_array])) +fi + - # Check whether user wants systemd support - SYSTEMD_MSG="no" - AC_ARG_WITH(systemd, -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-genr.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-genr.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.682775021 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/gss-genr.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.223377885 +0200 + # Looking for programs, paths and files + + PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-genr.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-genr.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.730946369 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-genr.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.321274952 +0200 @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" @@ -659,7 +646,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-genr.c #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" -@@ -396,9 +397,18 @@ +@@ -416,9 +417,18 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; @@ -679,7 +666,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-genr.c gssbuf.value = val; gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); -@@ -406,6 +416,7 @@ +@@ -426,6 +436,7 @@ &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); @@ -687,10 +674,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-genr.c free(gssbuf.value); return (ctx->major); } -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.511776830 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.224377874 +0200 -@@ -50,10 +50,12 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.712377680 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv.c 2025-06-14 14:29:38.679799497 +0200 +@@ -51,10 +51,12 @@ #include "monitor_wrap.h" extern ServerOptions options; @@ -698,14 +685,14 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = - { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -- GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; +- GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL}; + { {0, NULL}, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, -+ GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, 0, 0}; ++ GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, 0, 0, NULL}; ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; -@@ -61,14 +63,26 @@ +@@ -62,14 +64,26 @@ #ifdef KRB5 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; #endif @@ -732,7 +719,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c /* * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up. -@@ -229,6 +243,10 @@ +@@ -230,6 +244,10 @@ (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) { if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client)) fatal("Couldn't convert client name"); @@ -743,7 +730,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c } return (status); -@@ -248,6 +266,20 @@ +@@ -249,6 +267,20 @@ tok = ename->value; @@ -764,7 +751,23 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c /* * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct -@@ -308,21 +340,24 @@ +@@ -297,6 +329,7 @@ + } + + ++#ifdef KRB5 + /* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication + * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators". + * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket. +@@ -380,6 +413,7 @@ + (void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs); + return (ctx->major); + } ++#endif + + + /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably +@@ -395,21 +429,24 @@ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { @@ -777,8 +780,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } -- if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -- ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, +- if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, +- ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, + /* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech + because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */ + @@ -789,12 +792,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c return (ctx->major); } -- ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, +- ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, + ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->cred_name, new_name, &equal); if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { -@@ -337,9 +372,9 @@ +@@ -424,9 +461,9 @@ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); @@ -804,9 +807,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c - client->name = new_name; + client->cred_name = new_name; client->creds = ctx->client_creds; - ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; client->updated = 1; -@@ -356,12 +391,17 @@ +@@ -443,12 +480,17 @@ i++; } @@ -826,7 +829,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } -@@ -378,16 +418,25 @@ +@@ -465,22 +507,33 @@ return (ctx->major); } @@ -842,6 +845,14 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c + return ctx->major; + gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++#ifdef KRB5 + /* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */ + if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx, + ctx->client, client))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } ++#endif /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; @@ -853,7 +864,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c return (ctx->major); } -@@ -395,6 +444,7 @@ +@@ -488,6 +541,7 @@ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) { @@ -861,7 +872,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; krb5_error_code problem; -@@ -410,6 +460,14 @@ +@@ -503,6 +557,14 @@ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL; } } @@ -876,7 +887,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c } /* As user */ -@@ -417,6 +475,11 @@ +@@ -510,6 +572,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void) { if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) { @@ -888,16 +899,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client); } else debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism"); -@@ -442,16 +505,19 @@ - } +@@ -543,11 +610,13 @@ - /* Privileged */ -+/* gssapi_keyex arg added for Globus usage */ - int --ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) -+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int gssapi_keyex) - { - OM_uint32 lmin; + (void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */ - if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || - gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { @@ -912,15 +916,15 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { gssapi_client.used = 1; -@@ -462,6 +528,7 @@ +@@ -558,6 +627,7 @@ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); + gss_release_name(&lmin, &gssapi_client.ctx_name); - explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, - sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); - return 0; -@@ -471,6 +538,24 @@ + + if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) { + for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) { +@@ -575,6 +645,24 @@ return (0); } @@ -942,23 +946,23 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c + return (0); +} + - /* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running + /* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running * as the user, the monitor is root. * -@@ -497,9 +582,11 @@ +@@ -601,9 +689,11 @@ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; char *envstr; + char **p; char **pw; #endif -- if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && -+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && - gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) +- if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL) ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL) return; - -@@ -525,6 +612,18 @@ + + ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store); +@@ -623,6 +713,18 @@ if (ret) return; @@ -974,26 +978,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv.c + } + free_pam_environment(p); + - xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, + xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); -@@ -565,4 +664,13 @@ - return (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value; - } - -+/* added for Globus usage */ -+void -+ssh_gssapi_get_client_info(char **userdn, char **mech) { -+ *userdn = gssapi_client.displayname.value; -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.mech) -+ *mech = gssapi_client.mech->name; -+} -+ - #endif -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv-gsi.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv-gsi.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.224377874 +0200 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-gsi.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-gsi.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.323228698 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,328 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. @@ -1323,10 +1313,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv-gsi.c + +#endif /* GSI */ +#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.497776978 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.224377874 +0200 -@@ -379,6 +379,34 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.712149299 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.323586985 +0200 +@@ -431,6 +431,34 @@ return found_principal; } @@ -1361,16 +1351,16 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ -@@ -471,7 +499,7 @@ +@@ -525,7 +553,7 @@ return set_env; } -int +static int - ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, + ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ssh_gssapi_client *client) { -@@ -542,7 +570,7 @@ +@@ -596,7 +624,7 @@ {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}, NULL, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, @@ -1379,108 +1369,97 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-7.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds }; -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-7.8p1/kexgsss.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/kexgsss.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.685774989 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/kexgsss.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.225377863 +0200 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-10.0p1/kexgsss.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/kexgsss.c 2025-06-14 08:24:54.950961355 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/kexgsss.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.324355451 +0200 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" -+static void kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt); ++static void kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh); extern ServerOptions options; - int -@@ -97,8 +98,10 @@ + static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +@@ -81,8 +82,10 @@ - debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); + debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); -- if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) { -+ kex_gss_send_error(ctxt); +- if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) { ++ kex_gss_send_error(kex->gss, ssh); fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); + } - switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { - case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -@@ -190,12 +193,13 @@ - } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); + if (kex->gss == NULL) +@@ -139,13 +142,14 @@ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); - if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ kex_gss_send_error(ctxt); - if (send_tok.length > 0) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); - packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); - packet_send(); + if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ kex_gss_send_error(kex->gss, ssh); + if (send_tok->length > 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); } - fatal("accept_ctx died"); -+ packet_disconnect("GSSAPI Key Exchange handshake failed"); ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "GSSAPI Key Exchange handshake failed"); } - if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -@@ -638,4 +642,23 @@ - } - return r; + if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) +@@ -598,4 +602,26 @@ + return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); } -+ + +static void -+kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh) { + char *errstr; + OM_uint32 maj, min; ++ int r; + -+ errstr = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min)); ++ errstr = mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min); + if (errstr) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR); -+ packet_put_int(maj); -+ packet_put_int(min); -+ packet_put_cstring(errstr); -+ packet_put_cstring(""); -+ packet_send(); -+ packet_write_wait(); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, maj)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errstr)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r)); + /* XXX - We should probably log the error locally here */ + free(errstr); + } +} - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/LICENSE.globus_usage openssh-7.8p1/LICENSE.globus_usage ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/LICENSE.globus_usage 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/LICENSE.globus_usage 2018-10-24 14:09:54.225377863 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ -+/* -+ * Portions of the Usage Metrics suport code are derived from the -+ * Globus project's GridFTP subject to the following license. -+ * -+ * Copyright 2010 University of Chicago -+ * -+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at -+ * -+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -+ * -+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -+ * limitations under the License. -+ */ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-7.8p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/Makefile.in 2018-10-24 14:09:16.688774958 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/Makefile.in 2018-10-24 14:09:54.225377863 +0200 -@@ -124,8 +124,10 @@ - auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ - monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ - auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ -+ gss-serv-gsi.o \ - loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ ++ + #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in 2025-06-14 08:24:55.442297261 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in 2025-06-14 14:49:48.752490751 +0200 +@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ + auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \ + monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-gsi.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ -+ ssh-globus-usage.o \ - sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ - sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \ - sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/misc.c openssh-7.8p1/misc.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/misc.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.494777010 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/misc.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.226377853 +0200 -@@ -237,11 +237,14 @@ + uidswap.o platform-listen.o $(SKOBJS) +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ + serverloop.o auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o auth2-chall.o \ + groupaccess.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-gsi.o kexgsss.o \ + monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ + audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c openssh-10.0p1/misc.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.731834474 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.325895875 +0200 +@@ -440,11 +440,14 @@ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" #define QUOTE "\"" @@ -1496,7 +1475,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/misc.c openssh-7.8p1/misc.c int wspace = 0; if (*s == NULL) -@@ -249,6 +252,21 @@ +@@ -452,6 +455,21 @@ old = *s; @@ -1518,7 +1497,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/misc.c openssh-7.8p1/misc.c *s = strpbrk(*s, split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE); if (*s == NULL) -@@ -324,6 +342,20 @@ +@@ -527,6 +545,20 @@ return copy; } @@ -1539,31 +1518,31 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/misc.c openssh-7.8p1/misc.c /* * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. * Port must be >=0 and <=65535. -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/misc.h openssh-7.8p1/misc.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/misc.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.494777010 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/misc.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.226377853 +0200 -@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h openssh-10.0p1/misc.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h 2025-06-14 08:24:55.216960866 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.326898660 +0200 +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ void sock_set_v6only(int); struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *); +void pwfree(struct passwd *); const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int); - typedef struct arglist arglist; -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.689774947 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.226377853 +0200 -@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ - int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_gss_error(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_gss_localname(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, struct sshbuf *); + typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-10.0p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.732232011 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.327682491 +0200 +@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ + int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_gss_error(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); ++int mm_answer_gss_localname(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); + int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); #endif -@@ -200,7 +203,7 @@ +@@ -205,7 +208,7 @@ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, @@ -1572,7 +1551,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, #ifdef WITH_SELINUX {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole}, -@@ -208,7 +211,7 @@ +@@ -213,7 +216,7 @@ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, #ifdef USE_PAM @@ -1581,7 +1560,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query}, -@@ -232,8 +235,11 @@ +@@ -237,8 +240,11 @@ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, @@ -1594,7 +1573,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; -@@ -243,6 +249,8 @@ +@@ -248,6 +254,8 @@ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, @@ -1602,8 +1581,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 0, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, #endif - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -@@ -324,6 +332,8 @@ + {MONITOR_REQ_STATE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_state}, +@@ -328,6 +336,8 @@ #ifdef GSSAPI /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); @@ -1612,74 +1591,41 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c #endif /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ -@@ -442,6 +452,8 @@ +@@ -461,6 +471,8 @@ #ifdef GSSAPI /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 1); - #endif + #endif if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { -@@ -763,15 +775,18 @@ +@@ -895,14 +907,17 @@ - debug3("%s", __func__); + debug3_f("entering"); - if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) -- fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); +- fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam"); - - if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - - pwent = getpwnamallow(username); - + if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user); - authctxt->user = xstrdup(username); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->user, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); + + pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.permit_pam_user_change) + setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? "[pam]" : "unknown"); + else +#endif - setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown"); - free(username); - -@@ -2010,13 +2025,17 @@ - mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) - { - int r, authenticated; -+ int gssapi_keyex; - const char *displayname; - - if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); - -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &gssapi_keyex)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ - authenticated = authctxt->valid && -- ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); -+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, gssapi_keyex); + setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? authctxt->user : "unknown"); sshbuf_reset(m); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) -@@ -2025,7 +2044,10 @@ - debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); - mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); - -- auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; -+ if (gssapi_keyex) -+ auth_method = "gssapi-keyex"; -+ else -+ auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; - - if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) - auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); -@@ -2034,6 +2056,79 @@ - return (authenticated); +@@ -2249,6 +2264,79 @@ } -+int -+mm_answer_gss_error(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) + int ++mm_answer_gss_error(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + OM_uint32 major, minor; + char *msg; @@ -1690,7 +1636,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, minor)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, msg)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR, m); + @@ -1700,7 +1646,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c +} + +int -+mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_set mech_set; @@ -1712,11 +1658,11 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, mech_set->count)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + for (i = 0; i < mech_set->count; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, mech_set->elements[i].elements, + mech_set->elements[i].length)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + } + + gss_release_oid_set(&minor, &mech_set); @@ -1727,7 +1673,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c +} + +int -+mm_answer_gss_localname(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) ++mm_answer_gss_localname(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + char *name; + int r; @@ -1737,13 +1683,13 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c + sshbuf_reset(m); + if (name) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ debug3("%s: sending result %s", __func__, name); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ debug3_f("sending result %s", name); + free(name); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "")) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ debug3("%s: sending result \"\"", __func__); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); ++ debug3_f("sending result \"\""); + } + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME, m); @@ -1751,62 +1697,28 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor.c + return(0); +} + - int - mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) ++int + mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { -@@ -2085,12 +2180,14 @@ - ssh_gssapi_ccache store; - int ok, r; + gss_buffer_desc data; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-10.0p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.h 2025-06-14 08:24:55.446043209 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.328788501 +0200 +@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ -- if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 || -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.filename, NULL)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.envval, NULL)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - - ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); - -+ free(store.filename); - free(store.envvar); - free(store.envval); - -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-7.8p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.630775571 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/monitor.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.227377842 +0200 -@@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ - MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, - MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, - MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, -- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124 -- -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153, ++ + MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS = 200, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS = 201, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME = 202, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME = 203, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR = 204, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR = 205 }; - struct monitor { -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.665775201 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2018-10-24 14:33:40.976350751 +0200 -@@ -1045,13 +1045,15 @@ - } - - int --mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) -+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int gssapi_keyex) - { - struct sshbuf *m; - int r, authenticated = 0; - - if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, gssapi_keyex)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - - mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m); - mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, -@@ -1065,6 +1067,94 @@ + struct ssh; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.468434323 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.329256997 +0200 +@@ -1195,6 +1195,94 @@ return (authenticated); } @@ -1819,20 +1731,20 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.c + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maj)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + if (major) *major=maj; + if (minor) *minor=min; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &errstr, NULL)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + sshbuf_free(m); + @@ -1850,18 +1762,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.c + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &count)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&minor, mech_set); + while(count-->0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&oid.elements, &length)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + oid.length = length; + gss_add_oid_set_member(&minor, &oid, mech_set); + } @@ -1878,21 +1790,21 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.c + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME, m); + -+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME", __func__); ++ debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME"); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME, + m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, lname, NULL)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error"); + + sshbuf_free(m); + if ((*lname == NULL) || (*lname[0] == '\0')) { -+ debug3("%s: gssapi identity mapping failed", __func__); ++ debug3_f("gssapi identity mapping failed"); + } else { -+ debug3("%s: gssapi identity mapped to %s", __func__, *lname); ++ debug3_f("gssapi identity mapped to %s", *lname); + } + + return(0); @@ -1901,25 +1813,11 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.c OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) { -@@ -1098,7 +1188,8 @@ - if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - -- if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 || -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.647775391 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.242377684 +0200 -@@ -65,9 +65,13 @@ - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, - gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); --int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int gssapi_keyex); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h 2025-06-14 08:24:55.468730870 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.329790028 +0200 +@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ + int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +int mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user); @@ -1929,12 +1827,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-7.8p1/monitor_wrap.h int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); #endif -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-7.8p1/readconf.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.656775296 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/readconf.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.246377641 +0200 -@@ -2013,13 +2013,13 @@ - if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) - options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.733023595 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.330266207 +0200 +@@ -2881,11 +2881,11 @@ + if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) + options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; + options->gss_authentication = 1; @@ -1945,15 +1843,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-7.8p1/readconf.c - options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; + options->gss_deleg_creds = 1; if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) -- options->gss_trust_dns = 0; -+ options->gss_trust_dns = 1; + options->gss_trust_dns = 0; if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) - options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; - #ifdef GSSAPI -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-7.8p1/readconf.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.522776714 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/readconf.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.247377631 +0200 -@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h 2025-06-14 08:24:54.953487731 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.330993746 +0200 +@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ char *user; /* User to log in as. */ @@ -1962,20 +1857,20 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-7.8p1/readconf.h int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.672775127 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.247377631 +0200 -@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ - +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.733579673 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.331610935 +0200 +@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; + options->pam_service_name = NULL; + options->permit_pam_user_change = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; -@@ -127,9 +128,11 @@ +@@ -142,9 +143,11 @@ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; - options->kerberos_unique_ticket = -1; + options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->gss_keyex = -1; @@ -1984,28 +1879,19 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c + options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = -1; options->gss_store_rekey = -1; options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; - options->use_kuserok = -1; -@@ -177,6 +180,8 @@ - options->chroot_directory = NULL; - options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; - options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; -+ options->disable_usage_stats = 1; -+ options->usage_stats_targets = NULL; - options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; - options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; - options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; -@@ -269,6 +274,8 @@ - /* Portable-specific options */ - if (options->use_pam == -1) + options->gss_indicators = NULL; +@@ -317,6 +320,8 @@ options->use_pam = 0; + if (options->pam_service_name == NULL) + options->pam_service_name = xstrdup(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE); + if (options->permit_pam_user_change == -1) + options->permit_pam_user_change = 0; /* Standard Options */ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { -@@ -346,13 +353,17 @@ - if (options->kerberos_unique_ticket == -1) - options->kerberos_unique_ticket = 0; +@@ -398,13 +403,17 @@ + if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1) + options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; + options->gss_authentication = 1; @@ -2023,47 +1909,44 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) options->gss_store_rekey = 0; #ifdef GSSAPI -@@ -487,7 +498,7 @@ +@@ -578,7 +587,7 @@ typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ -- sUsePAM, -+ sUsePAM, sPermitPAMUserChange, +- sUsePAM, sPAMServiceName, ++ sUsePAM, sPAMServiceName, sPermitPAMUserChange, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, - sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, -@@ -509,10 +520,14 @@ - sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, - sHostKeyAlgorithms, + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose, +@@ -598,6 +607,9 @@ + sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize, + sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, + sGssDelegateCreds, + sGssCredsPath, + sGsiAllowLimitedProxy, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor, - sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sGssKexAlgorithms, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, - sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, -+ sDisUsageStats, sUsageStatsTarg, - sHostCertificate, - sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, - sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, -@@ -538,8 +553,10 @@ - /* Portable-specific options */ + sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey, + sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, +@@ -633,9 +645,11 @@ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "pamservicename", sPAMServiceName, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permitpamuserchange", sPermitPAMUserChange, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "pamservicename", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permitpamuserchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ -@@ -587,7 +604,14 @@ +@@ -688,8 +702,15 @@ { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapicredentialspath", sGssCredsPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#ifdef GSI + { "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sGsiAllowLimitedProxy, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, @@ -2073,29 +1956,30 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -595,7 +619,10 @@ - { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -698,8 +719,11 @@ + { "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapicredentialspath", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -666,6 +693,8 @@ +@@ -774,6 +798,8 @@ { "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+ { "disableusagestats", sDisUsageStats, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, -+ { "usagestatstargets", sUsageStatsTarg, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, ++ { "disableusagestats", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, ++ { "usagestatstargets", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, -@@ -1296,6 +1325,10 @@ - intptr = &options->use_pam; - goto parse_flag; +@@ -1454,6 +1480,10 @@ + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + case sPermitPAMUserChange: + intptr = &options->permit_pam_user_change; @@ -2103,8 +1987,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c + /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: - return -1; -@@ -1510,6 +1543,10 @@ + goto out; +@@ -1705,6 +1735,10 @@ intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; @@ -2115,7 +1999,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c case sGssKeyEx: intptr = &options->gss_keyex; goto parse_flag; -@@ -1518,6 +1555,10 @@ +@@ -1713,6 +1747,10 @@ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; @@ -2126,8 +2010,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c case sGssStrictAcceptor: intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; goto parse_flag; -@@ -1538,6 +1579,12 @@ - options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); +@@ -1742,6 +1780,12 @@ + options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg); break; +#ifdef GSI @@ -2139,54 +2023,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; -@@ -2051,6 +2098,35 @@ - *charptr = xstrdup(arg); - break; - -+ case sDisUsageStats: -+ arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%s line %d: missing value.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ if (!strcasecmp(arg, "true") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "enabled") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "yes") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "on") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "1")) -+ options->disable_usage_stats = 1; -+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "false") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "disabled") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "no") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "off") || -+ !strcasecmp(arg, "0")) -+ options->disable_usage_stats = 0; -+ else -+ fatal("Incorrect value for disable_usage_stats"); -+ break; -+ -+ case sUsageStatsTarg: -+ arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%s line %d: missing value.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ options->usage_stats_targets = xstrdup(arg); -+ break; -+ - case sTrustedUserCAKeys: - charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; - goto parse_filename; -@@ -2345,6 +2421,7 @@ +@@ -3012,6 +3056,7 @@ M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(gss_deleg_creds); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options); M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); - M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.535776576 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.248377620 +0200 -@@ -129,9 +129,12 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h 2025-06-14 08:24:55.713201111 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.332635999 +0200 +@@ -155,9 +155,12 @@ * be stored in per-session ccache */ int use_kuserok; int enable_k5users; @@ -2199,29 +2047,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ int gss_store_rekey; char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ -@@ -191,6 +194,7 @@ - char *adm_forced_command; +@@ -222,6 +225,7 @@ int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */ + char *pam_service_name; + int permit_pam_user_change; /* Allow PAM to change user name */ int permit_tun; -@@ -200,6 +204,10 @@ - u_int num_permitted_listens; - - char *chroot_directory; -+ -+ int disable_usage_stats; -+ char *usage_stats_targets; -+ - char *revoked_keys_file; - char *trusted_user_ca_keys; - char *authorized_keys_command; -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-7.8p1/ssh.1 ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.1 2018-10-24 14:09:16.525776682 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh.1 2018-10-24 14:09:54.249377610 +0200 -@@ -1423,6 +1423,18 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1 2025-06-14 08:24:55.527924262 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1 2025-06-14 08:25:50.333158134 +0200 +@@ -1528,6 +1528,18 @@ on to new connections). .It Ev USER Set to the name of the user logging in. @@ -2240,10 +2077,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-7.8p1/ssh.1 .El .Pp Additionally, -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.690774937 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.249377610 +0200 -@@ -541,6 +541,32 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.693276450 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c 2025-06-14 13:58:47.186170059 +0200 +@@ -578,6 +578,38 @@ fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); } else { @@ -2259,26 +2096,32 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gssapi", pw->pw_dir, + _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); + if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) -+ (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_arg, &options, 1); ++ (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, cmd, ++ &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | ++ (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass); +#ifdef GSI + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gsi", pw->pw_dir, + _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); + if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) -+ (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_arg, &options, 1); ++ (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, cmd, ++ &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | ++ (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass); +#endif +#if defined(KRB5) + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.krb", pw->pw_dir, + _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); + if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) -+ (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_arg, &options, 1); ++ (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, cmd, ++ &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | ++ (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass); +#endif +#endif r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) -@@ -1283,8 +1309,12 @@ - logit("FIPS mode initialized"); - } +@@ -1313,8 +1345,12 @@ + if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0) + cleanup_exit(255); - if (options.user == NULL) + if (options.user == NULL) { @@ -2288,29 +2131,27 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c + options.implicit = 0; + } - /* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */ - if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config 2018-10-24 14:09:16.427777719 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config 2018-10-24 14:09:54.249377610 +0200 -@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ + /* + * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now. +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config 2025-06-14 08:24:54.955694862 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config 2025-06-14 08:25:50.334427503 +0200 +@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ # ForwardX11 no # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no -# GSSAPIAuthentication no -# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no -# GSSAPIKeyExchange no --# GSSAPITrustDNS no +# GSSAPIAuthentication yes +# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes +# GSSAPIKeyExchange yes -+# GSSAPITrustDNS yes + # GSSAPITrustDNS no # BatchMode no - # CheckHostIP yes - # AddressFamily any -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5 ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.5 2018-10-24 14:09:16.599775899 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5 2018-10-24 14:09:54.250377599 +0200 + # CheckHostIP no +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5 2025-06-14 08:24:55.625225410 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5 2025-06-14 08:25:50.334845923 +0200 @@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ user's configuration file .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config @@ -2324,16 +2165,16 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5 system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config .El -@@ -717,7 +723,7 @@ +@@ -969,7 +975,7 @@ .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is -.Cm no . +.Cm yes . .It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity - If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when - connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default -@@ -725,12 +731,12 @@ + If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when + connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default +@@ -977,12 +983,12 @@ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is @@ -2346,18 +2187,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5 -.Dq no . +.Dq yes . .It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey - If set to + If set to .Dq yes -@@ -762,7 +768,7 @@ - the hostname entered on the - command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. - The default is --.Dq no . -+.Dq yes . - .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms - The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI - key exchange. Possible values are -@@ -1227,7 +1233,7 @@ +@@ -1645,7 +1651,7 @@ .Cm password ) . The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent @@ -2366,22 +2198,22 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5 keyboard-interactive,password .Ed .It Cm ProxyCommand -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-7.8p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshconnect2.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.658775275 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshconnect2.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.257377525 +0200 -@@ -863,6 +863,11 @@ - int r, ok = 0; - const char *gss_host = NULL; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.591449573 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.335562288 +0200 +@@ -858,6 +858,11 @@ + gss_OID mech = NULL; + char *gss_host = NULL; + if (!options.gss_authentication) { + verbose("GSSAPI authentication disabled."); + return 0; + } + - if (options.gss_server_identity) - gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; - else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { -@@ -956,7 +961,8 @@ + if (options.gss_server_identity) { + gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity); + } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { +@@ -966,7 +971,8 @@ if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ @@ -2391,7 +2223,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-7.8p1/sshconnect2.c if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -@@ -1126,6 +1132,20 @@ +@@ -1133,6 +1139,20 @@ return r; } @@ -2410,38 +2242,36 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-7.8p1/sshconnect2.c +#endif + int - userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) + userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh) { -@@ -1146,6 +1166,11 @@ +@@ -1155,6 +1175,12 @@ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); +#ifdef GSI + if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, "", authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id); + else +#endif ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, - "gssapi-keyex"); + "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id); -@@ -1158,7 +1183,13 @@ +@@ -1168,7 +1194,9 @@ } - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -+#ifdef GSI -+ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) -+ packet_put_cstring(""); -+ else -+#endif - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); -+ - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); - packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8 ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.8 2018-10-24 14:09:16.457777401 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8 2018-10-24 14:09:54.258377514 +0200 -@@ -788,6 +788,44 @@ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || +- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, ++ (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) ? ++ "" : authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 || +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8 2025-06-14 08:24:55.024336971 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8 2025-06-14 08:25:50.336280328 +0200 +@@ -840,6 +840,29 @@ # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... .Ed @@ -2449,21 +2279,6 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8 +.Nm +will normally set the following environment variables: +.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" -+.It Ev GLOBUS_USAGE_OPTOUT -+Setting this environment variable to "1" will disable the reporting -+of usage metrics. Usage metrics can also be disabled using the -+.Cm DisableUsageStats -+setting in -+.Xr sshd_config 5 . -+.It Ev GLOBUS_USAGE_TARGETS -+If -+.Cm UsageStatsTargets -+is not specified in -+.Xr sshd_config 5 , -+a comma-separated list of targets (without any tags specified) if -+specified in the environment variable -+.Ev GLOBUS_USAGE_TARGETS -+will be used. +.It Ev GRIDMAP +Applies to GSI authentication/authorization. Specifies the location of the +gridmapfile. If not specified, the gridmap file is assumed to be available at @@ -2486,60 +2301,26 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8 .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.hushlogin -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c 2018-10-24 14:09:16.691774926 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.259377504 +0200 -@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ - #include "auth-options.h" - #include "version.h" - #include "ssherr.h" -+#include "ssh-globus-usage.h" - - /* Re-exec fds */ - #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) -@@ -1797,6 +1798,13 @@ - /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ - fill_default_server_options(&options); - -+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE -+ if (ssh_usage_stats_init(options.disable_usage_stats, -+ options.usage_stats_targets) != GLOBUS_SUCCESS) { -+ error("Error initializing Globus Usage Metrics, but continuing ..."); -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE */ -+ - /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ - if (options.challenge_response_authentication) - options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; -@@ -2305,7 +2313,7 @@ - #endif - - #ifdef GSSAPI -- if (options.gss_authentication) { -+ if (options.gss_authentication && options.gss_deleg_creds) { - temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); - authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); - restore_uid(); -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config 2018-10-24 14:09:16.509776851 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config 2018-10-24 14:09:54.259377504 +0200 -@@ -84,10 +84,11 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config 2025-06-14 08:24:55.129477337 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config 2025-06-14 08:25:50.336709644 +0200 +@@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ #KerberosUseKuserok yes # GSSAPI options --GSSAPIAuthentication yes +-#GSSAPIAuthentication no +#GSSAPIAuthentication yes +#GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes - GSSAPICleanupCredentials no + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes -#GSSAPIKeyExchange no +#GSSAPIKeyExchange yes #GSSAPIEnablek5users no # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, -@@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ +@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@ # problems. - UsePAM yes + #UsePAM no +# Set to 'yes' to allow the PAM stack to change the user name during +# calls to authentication @@ -2548,37 +2329,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no -@@ -141,6 +146,10 @@ - # override default of no subsystems - Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server - -+# Usage Metrics -+#UsageStatsTargets usage-stats.example.edu:4810 -+#DisableUsageStats yes -+ - # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis - #Match User anoncvs - # X11Forwarding no -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5 2018-10-24 14:09:16.562776291 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 2018-10-24 14:09:54.259377504 +0200 -@@ -576,6 +576,15 @@ - TCP and StreamLocal. - This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may - simplify restricted configurations. -+.It Cm DisableUsageStats -+This keyword can be followed by one of the keywords "true", "enabled", "yes", -+"on" or "1" to disable reporting of usage metrics. Or it can be set to "false", -+"disabled", "no", "off", "0" to enable reporting of usage metrics. Setting the -+.Cm GLOBUS_USAGE_OPTOUT -+environment variable to "1" will also disable the reporting of usage metrics. -+Disabling reporting of usage metrics will cause the -+.Cm UsageStatsTargets -+setting to be ignored. - .It Cm ExposeAuthInfo - Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and - public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. -@@ -633,15 +642,34 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5 2025-06-14 08:24:55.713605773 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5 2025-06-14 08:25:50.337207823 +0200 +@@ -724,15 +724,34 @@ to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Cm no . @@ -2614,128 +2368,16 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 .It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication access control. Further details are described in -@@ -652,7 +680,7 @@ +@@ -743,7 +762,7 @@ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. The default is --.Dq no . -+.Dq yes . +-.Cm no . ++.Cm yes . .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. -@@ -691,7 +719,6 @@ - .Pp - The default is - .Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- . --This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. - .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes - Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication - as a list of comma-separated patterns. -@@ -1627,6 +1654,103 @@ - .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . - For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in - .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . -+.It Cm UsageStatsTargets -+This option can be used to specify the target collector hosts to which usage -+metrics should be reported. This setting will be ignored if -+.Cm DisableUsageStats -+is enabled. Multiple targets can be specified separated by comma(s), but no -+space(s). Each target specification is of the format -+.Pa host:port[!tags]. -+Tags control what data elements are reported. The following list specifies -+the tags for the corresponding data elements. -+.Pp -+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact -+.It -+.Cm V -+.Sm off -+- OpenSSH version, reported by default. -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm v -+.Sm off -+- SSL version, reported by default. -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm M -+.Sm off -+- User authentication method used such as "gssapi-keyex", "gssapi-with-mic", etc. Reported by default. -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm m -+.Sm off -+- User authentication mechanism used such as "GSI", "Kerberos", etc. Reported by default. -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm I -+.Sm off -+- Client IP address. Not reported by default. -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm u -+.Sm off -+- User name. Not reported by default. -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm U -+.Sm off -+- User DN. Not reported by default. -+.Sm on -+.Pp -+In addition to the above selected information, the following data are -+reported to ALL the specified/default target collectors. There's no way to -+exclude these from being reported other than by disabling the reporting of -+usage metrics altogether: -+.Pp -+.It -+.Cm Component code -+.Sm off -+- 12 for GSI OpenSSH -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm Component Data Format version -+.Sm off -+- 0 currently -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm IP Address -+.Sm off -+- IP address of reporting server -+.Sm on -+.It -+.Cm Timestamp -+.It -+.Cm Hostname -+.Sm off -+- Host name of reporting server -+.Sm on -+.Pp -+If no tags are specified in a host spec, or the special string -+.Cm default -+is specified, the tags -+.Cm VvMm -+are assumed. A site could choose to allow a -+different set of data to be reported by specifying a different tag set. The -+last 3 tags -+.Cm I , -+.Cm u -+and -+.Cm U -+above are more meant for a local collector that a -+site might like to deploy since they could be construed as private information. -+The special string -+.Cm all -+denotes all tags. -+.El -+.Pp -+Usage Metrics reporting is disabled unless -+.Cm UsageStatsTargets -+is specified. -+.Pp - .It Cm UseDNS - Specifies whether - .Xr sshd 8 -@@ -1668,6 +1792,12 @@ +@@ -2100,6 +2119,12 @@ as a non-root user. The default is .Cm no . @@ -2748,470 +2390,35 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-globus-usage.c openssh-7.8p1/ssh-globus-usage.c ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-globus-usage.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-globus-usage.c 2018-10-24 14:09:54.260377493 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 The Board of Trustees of the University -+ * of Illinois. See the LICENSE file for detailed license information. -+ * -+ * Portions, specifically log_usage_stats(), ssh_usage_stats_init(), -+ * ssh_usage_stats_close(), ssh_usage_ent_s, ssh_usage_tag_e and -+ * TAG #defines were based on those from Usage Metrics portions of: -+ * gridftp/server/source/globus_i_gfs_log.c -+ * -+ * Copyright 1999-2006 University of Chicago -+ * -+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at -+ * -+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -+ * -+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -+ * limitations under the License. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "log.h" -+#include "ssh-globus-usage.h" -+ -+static globus_list_t *usage_handle_list = NULL; -+ -+#define SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_ID 12 -+#define SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_VER 0 -+ -+#define SSH_GLOBUS_DEFAULT_TAGLIST "VvMm" -+#define SSH_GLOBUS_ALL_TAGLIST "VvMmIuU" -+#define SSH_GLOBUS_TAGCOUNT 25 -+ -+typedef enum ssh_usage_tag_e -+{ -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_SSH_VER = 'V', -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_SSL_VER = 'v', -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_METHOD = 'M', -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_MECHANISM = 'm', -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_CLIENTIP = 'I', -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_USERNAME = 'u', -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_USERDN = 'U' -+ /* !! ADD to ALL_TAGLIST above and to globus_usage_stats_send() -+ invocation below when adding here */ -+} ssh_usage_tag_t; -+ -+typedef struct ssh_usage_ent_s -+{ -+ globus_usage_stats_handle_t handle; -+ char * target; -+ char * taglist; -+} ssh_usage_ent_t; -+ -+ -+globus_result_t -+ssh_usage_stats_init(int disable_usage_stats, char *usage_stats_targets) -+{ -+ globus_result_t result; -+ char * target_str = NULL; -+ char * ptr = ptr; -+ char * target = NULL; -+ char * entry = NULL; -+ globus_list_t * list = NULL; -+ ssh_usage_ent_t * usage_ent = NULL; -+ -+ if (disable_usage_stats || !usage_stats_targets) -+ return GLOBUS_SUCCESS; -+ -+ result = globus_module_activate(GLOBUS_USAGE_MODULE); -+ if (result != GLOBUS_SUCCESS) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: couldn't activate USAGE STATS module"); -+ return result; -+ } -+ -+ target_str = strdup(usage_stats_targets); -+ if (target_str == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: strdup failure for target_str"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ debug("Processing usage_stats_target (%s)\n", target_str); -+ -+ if(target_str && (strchr(target_str, ',') || strchr(target_str, '!'))) -+ { -+ target = target_str; -+ -+ do { -+ usage_ent = (ssh_usage_ent_t *) malloc(sizeof(ssh_usage_ent_t)); -+ if (usage_ent == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: couldn't allocate for ssh_usage_ent_t"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ if ((ptr = strchr(target, ',')) != NULL) -+ *ptr = '\0'; -+ -+ entry = strdup(target); -+ if (entry == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: strdup failure for target"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ if (ptr) -+ target = ptr + 1; -+ else -+ target = NULL; -+ -+ if((ptr = strchr(entry, '!')) != NULL) -+ { -+ *ptr = '\0'; -+ usage_ent->taglist = strdup(ptr + 1); -+ if (usage_ent->taglist == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: strdup failure for taglist"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ if(strlen(usage_ent->taglist) > SSH_GLOBUS_TAGCOUNT) -+ { -+ usage_ent->taglist[SSH_GLOBUS_TAGCOUNT + 1] = '\0'; -+ } -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ usage_ent->taglist = strdup(SSH_GLOBUS_DEFAULT_TAGLIST); -+ if (usage_ent->taglist == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: couldn't allocate for taglist"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if(strcasecmp(usage_ent->taglist, "default") == 0) -+ { -+ free(usage_ent->taglist); -+ usage_ent->taglist = strdup(SSH_GLOBUS_DEFAULT_TAGLIST); -+ if (usage_ent->taglist == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: couldn't allocate for taglist"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ } -+ else if(strcasecmp(usage_ent->taglist, "all") == 0) -+ { -+ free(usage_ent->taglist); -+ usage_ent->taglist = strdup(SSH_GLOBUS_ALL_TAGLIST); -+ if (usage_ent->taglist == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: couldn't allocate for taglist"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ usage_ent->target = entry; -+ -+ globus_list_insert(&usage_handle_list, usage_ent); -+ } -+ while(target != NULL); -+ -+ free(target_str); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ usage_ent = (ssh_usage_ent_t *) malloc(sizeof(ssh_usage_ent_t)); -+ if (usage_ent == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: couldn't allocate for usage_ent"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ usage_ent->target = target_str; -+ usage_ent->taglist = strdup(SSH_GLOBUS_DEFAULT_TAGLIST); -+ if (usage_ent->taglist == NULL) -+ { -+ error("ERROR: couldn't allocate for taglist"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ globus_list_insert(&usage_handle_list, usage_ent); -+ } -+ -+ result = GLOBUS_SUCCESS; -+ for(list = usage_handle_list; -+ !globus_list_empty(list); -+ list = globus_list_rest(list)) -+ { -+ usage_ent = (ssh_usage_ent_t *) globus_list_first(list); -+ -+ usage_ent->handle = NULL; -+ if (globus_usage_stats_handle_init( -+ &usage_ent->handle, -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_ID, -+ SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_VER, -+ usage_ent->target) != GLOBUS_SUCCESS) -+ { -+ error("USAGE-STATS: Error initializing (%s) (%s)", -+ usage_ent->target?:"NULL", -+ usage_ent->taglist?:"NULL"); -+ result = GLOBUS_FAILURE; -+ } else -+ debug("USAGE-STATS: Initialized (%s) (%s)", usage_ent->target?:"NULL", -+ usage_ent->taglist?:"NULL"); -+ -+ } -+ -+ return result; -+ -+error: -+ if (target_str) -+ { -+ free(target_str); -+ target_str = NULL; -+ } -+ if (entry) -+ { -+ free(target_str); -+ target_str = NULL; -+ } -+ return GLOBUS_FAILURE; -+} -+ -+void -+ssh_usage_stats_close(int disable_usage_stats) -+{ -+ globus_list_t *list; -+ -+ if (disable_usage_stats) -+ return; -+ -+ list = usage_handle_list; -+ -+ while(!globus_list_empty(list)) -+ { -+ ssh_usage_ent_t *usage_ent; -+ -+ usage_ent = (ssh_usage_ent_t *) -+ globus_list_remove(&list, list); -+ -+ if(usage_ent) -+ { -+ if(usage_ent->handle) -+ { -+ globus_usage_stats_handle_destroy(usage_ent->handle); -+ } -+ if(usage_ent->target) -+ { -+ free(usage_ent->target); -+ } -+ if(usage_ent->taglist) -+ { -+ free(usage_ent->taglist); -+ } -+ free(usage_ent); -+ } -+ } -+ usage_handle_list = NULL; -+} -+ -+static void -+log_usage_stats(const char *ssh_release, const char *ssl_release, -+ const char *method, const char *mechanism, -+ const char *clientip, -+ const char *username, const char *userdn) -+{ -+ globus_result_t result; -+ globus_list_t * list; -+ ssh_usage_ent_t * usage_ent; -+ char * keys[SSH_GLOBUS_TAGCOUNT]; -+ char * values[SSH_GLOBUS_TAGCOUNT]; -+ char * ptr; -+ char * key; -+ char * value; -+ int i = 0; -+ char * save_taglist = NULL; -+ -+ for(list = usage_handle_list; -+ !globus_list_empty(list); -+ list = globus_list_rest(list)) -+ { -+ usage_ent = (ssh_usage_ent_t *) globus_list_first(list); -+ -+ if(!usage_ent || usage_ent->handle == NULL) -+ continue; -+ -+ if(save_taglist == NULL || -+ strcmp(save_taglist, usage_ent->taglist) != 0) -+ { -+ save_taglist = usage_ent->taglist; -+ -+ ptr = usage_ent->taglist; -+ i = 0; -+ while(ptr && *ptr) -+ { -+ switch(*ptr) -+ { -+ case SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_SSH_VER: -+ key = "SSH_VER"; -+ value = (char *) ssh_release; -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_SSL_VER: -+ key = "SSL_VER"; -+ value = (char *) ssl_release; -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_METHOD: -+ key = "METHOD"; -+ value = (char *) method; -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_MECHANISM: -+ key = "MECH"; -+ value = (char *) mechanism?:""; -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_CLIENTIP: -+ key = "CLIENTIP"; -+ value = (char *) clientip?:""; -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_USERNAME: -+ key = "USER"; -+ value = (char *) username?:""; -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_USERDN: -+ key = "USERDN"; -+ value = (char *) userdn?:""; -+ break; -+ -+ default: -+ key = NULL; -+ value = NULL; -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ if(key != NULL && value != NULL) -+ { -+ keys[i] = key; -+ values[i] = value; -+ i++; -+ } -+ -+ ptr++; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE_SEND_ARRAY -+ result = globus_usage_stats_send_array( -+ usage_ent->handle, i, keys, values); -+#else -+ if (i) -+ result = globus_usage_stats_send( -+ usage_ent->handle, i, -+ i>0?keys[0]:NULL, i>0?values[0]:NULL, -+ i>1?keys[1]:NULL, i>1?values[1]:NULL, -+ i>2?keys[2]:NULL, i>2?values[2]:NULL, -+ i>3?keys[3]:NULL, i>3?values[3]:NULL, -+ i>4?keys[4]:NULL, i>4?values[4]:NULL, -+ i>5?keys[5]:NULL, i>5?values[5]:NULL, -+ i>6?keys[6]:NULL, i>6?values[6]:NULL); -+#endif /* HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE_SEND_ARRAY */ -+ } -+ -+ return; -+} -+#endif /* HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE */ -+ -+void -+ssh_globus_send_usage_metrics(const char *ssh_release, -+ const char *ssl_release, -+ const char *method, -+ const char *mechanism, -+ const char *client_ip, -+ const char *username, -+ const char *userdn) -+{ -+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE -+ -+ log_usage_stats(ssh_release, ssl_release, method, mechanism, -+ client_ip, username, userdn); -+ -+#endif /* HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE */ -+} -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-globus-usage.h openssh-7.8p1/ssh-globus-usage.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-globus-usage.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-globus-usage.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.260377493 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2009 The Board of Trustees of the University -+ * of Illinois. See the LICENSE file for detailed license information. -+ * -+ * Portions, specifically ssh_usage_stats_init(), ssh_usage_stats_close() -+ * were based on those from: gridftp/server/source/globus_i_gfs_log.h -+ * Copyright 1999-2006 University of Chicago -+ * -+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at -+ * -+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -+ * -+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -+ * limitations under the License. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef __SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_H -+#define __SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_H -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE -+ -+#include "globus_usage.h" -+ -+globus_result_t -+ssh_usage_stats_init(int disable_usage_stats, char *usage_stats_targets); -+ -+void -+ssh_usage_stats_close(int disable_usage_stats); -+ -+#endif /* HAVE_GLOBUS_USAGE */ -+ -+void -+ssh_globus_send_usage_metrics(const char *ssh_release, -+ const char *ssl_release, -+ const char *method, -+ const char *mechanism, -+ const char *client_ip, -+ const char *username, -+ const char *userdn); -+ -+#endif /* __SSH_GLOBUS_USAGE_H */ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-7.8p1/ssh-gss.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-gss.h 2018-10-24 14:09:16.560776312 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-gss.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.260377493 +0200 -@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ - KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config_redhat +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat 2025-06-14 08:24:54.911947266 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config_redhat 2025-06-14 08:25:50.337806574 +0200 +@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@ - typedef struct { -+ char *filename; - char *envvar; - char *envval; - struct passwd *owner; -@@ -92,12 +93,14 @@ + KbdInteractiveAuthentication no + +-GSSAPIAuthentication yes +-GSSAPICleanupCredentials no +- + UsePAM yes + + X11Forwarding yes +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c 2025-06-14 08:24:55.591819733 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c 2025-06-14 08:25:50.338154455 +0200 +@@ -1448,7 +1448,7 @@ + #endif + + #ifdef GSSAPI +- if (options.gss_authentication) { ++ if (options.gss_authentication && options.gss_deleg_creds) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); + restore_uid(); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-10.0p1/ssh-gss.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh-gss.h 2025-06-14 08:24:55.713368522 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh-gss.h 2025-06-14 08:25:50.338720590 +0200 +@@ -105,12 +105,14 @@ } ssh_gssapi_ccache; typedef struct { @@ -3226,8 +2433,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-7.8p1/ssh-gss.h + gss_ctx_id_t context; /* needed for globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() */ int used; int updated; - } ssh_gssapi_client; -@@ -118,7 +121,7 @@ + char **indicators; /* auth indicators */ +@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 minor; /* both */ gss_ctx_id_t context; /* both */ gss_name_t name; /* both */ @@ -3236,7 +2443,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-7.8p1/ssh-gss.h gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ gss_name_t client; /* server */ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ -@@ -155,6 +158,9 @@ +@@ -179,6 +181,9 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); @@ -3244,31 +2451,14 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-7.8p1/ssh-gss.h +void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); + /* In the server */ - typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, + typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); -@@ -165,7 +171,7 @@ - int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, - const char *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); --int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); -+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int gssapi_keyex); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); - void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); -@@ -178,6 +184,7 @@ - int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); - - void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void); -+void ssh_gssapi_get_client_info(char **userdn, char **mech); - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ -diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/version.h openssh-7.8p1/version.h ---- openssh-7.8p1.orig/version.h 2018-08-23 07:41:42.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.8p1/version.h 2018-10-24 14:09:54.260377493 +0200 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h openssh-10.0p1/version.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/version.h 2025-06-14 08:41:29.417798618 +0200 @@ -2,5 +2,19 @@ - #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.8" + #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_10.0" +#ifdef GSI +#define GSI_VERSION " GSI" @@ -3282,8 +2472,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-7.8p1.orig/version.h openssh-7.8p1/version.h +#define KRB5_VERSION "" +#endif + - #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" + #define SSH_PORTABLE "p2" -#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE -+#define GSI_PORTABLE "b-GSI" ++#define GSI_PORTABLE "c-GSI" +#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \ + GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION diff --git a/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch b/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8349a52 --- /dev/null +++ b/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch @@ -0,0 +1,14980 @@ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c 2025-06-14 10:53:02.012331859 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c 2025-06-14 11:42:37.929224784 +0200 +@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ + #include "dispatch.h" + #include "pathnames.h" + #include "ssherr.h" ++#include "canohost.h" ++ + #ifdef GSSAPI + #include "ssh-gss.h" + #endif +@@ -75,6 +77,8 @@ + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + ++static int log_flag = 0; ++ + Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, +@@ -104,6 +108,9 @@ + #define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */ + static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *); + ++/* read the user banner from the path in sshd_config ++ * this isn't to read it on the client side but to read ++ * it into what we are going to send on the server side */ + char * + auth2_read_banner(void) + { +@@ -308,6 +315,11 @@ + + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", + user[0] ? user : "", service, method); ++ if (!log_flag) { ++ logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Authname;Remote: %s-%d;Name: %s", ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), user); ++ log_flag = 1; ++ } + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.c openssh-10.0p1/binn.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/binn.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.301771902 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,3541 @@ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include "binn.h" ++ ++#define UNUSED(x) (void)(x) ++#define roundval(dbl) dbl >= 0.0 ? (int)(dbl + 0.5) : ((dbl - (double)(int)dbl) <= -0.5 ? (int)dbl : (int)(dbl - 0.5)) ++ ++// magic number: 0x1F 0xb1 0x22 0x1F => 0x1FB1221F or 0x1F22B11F ++// because the BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES (binary 000) may not have so many sub-types (BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE = 0x10) ++#define BINN_MAGIC 0x1F22B11F ++ ++#define MAX_BINN_HEADER 9 // [1:type][4:size][4:count] ++#define MIN_BINN_SIZE 3 // [1:type][1:size][1:count] ++#define CHUNK_SIZE 256 // 1024 ++ ++#define BINN_STRUCT 1 ++#define BINN_BUFFER 2 ++ ++void* (*malloc_fn)(size_t len) = 0; ++void* (*realloc_fn)(void *ptr, size_t len) = 0; ++void (*free_fn)(void *ptr) = 0; ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++#if defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__mips__) || defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__sparc__) ++#define BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS ++#elif ( defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__) ) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) ++#define BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(_WIN32) ++#define BIG_ENDIAN 0x1000 ++#define LITTLE_ENDIAN 0x0001 ++#define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN ++#elif defined(__APPLE__) ++/* macros already defined */ ++#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) ++#include ++#elif defined(_AIX) ++#include ++#else ++#include ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef BYTE_ORDER ++#error "BYTE_ORDER not defined" ++#endif ++#ifndef BIG_ENDIAN ++#error "BIG_ENDIAN not defined" ++#endif ++#ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN ++#error "LITTLE_ENDIAN not defined" ++#endif ++#if BIG_ENDIAN == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++#error "BIG_ENDIAN == LITTLE_ENDIAN" ++#endif ++#if BYTE_ORDER!=BIG_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER!=LITTLE_ENDIAN ++#error "BYTE_ORDER not supported" ++#endif ++ ++typedef unsigned short int u16; ++typedef unsigned int u32; ++typedef unsigned long long int u64; ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void copy_be16(u16 *pdest, u16 *psource) { ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource; ++ unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest; ++ dest[0] = source[1]; ++ dest[1] = source[0]; ++#else // if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN ++#ifdef BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS ++ if ((uintptr_t)psource % 2 == 0){ // address aligned to 16 bit ++ *pdest = *psource; ++ } else { ++ unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource; ++ unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest; ++ dest[0] = source[0]; // indexes are the same ++ dest[1] = source[1]; ++ } ++#else ++ *pdest = *psource; ++#endif ++#endif ++} ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void copy_be32(u32 *pdest, u32 *psource) { ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource; ++ unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest; ++ dest[0] = source[3]; ++ dest[1] = source[2]; ++ dest[2] = source[1]; ++ dest[3] = source[0]; ++#else // if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN ++#ifdef BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS ++ if ((uintptr_t)psource % 4 == 0){ // address aligned to 32 bit ++ *pdest = *psource; ++ } else { ++ unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource; ++ unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest; ++ dest[0] = source[0]; // indexes are the same ++ dest[1] = source[1]; ++ dest[2] = source[2]; ++ dest[3] = source[3]; ++ } ++#else ++ *pdest = *psource; ++#endif ++#endif ++} ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void copy_be64(u64 *pdest, u64 *psource) { ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource; ++ unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest; ++ int i; ++ for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { ++ dest[i] = source[7-i]; ++ } ++#else // if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN ++#ifdef BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS ++ if ((uintptr_t)psource % 8 == 0){ // address aligned to 64 bit ++ *pdest = *psource; ++ } else { ++ unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource; ++ unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest; ++ int i; ++ for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { ++ dest[i] = source[i]; // indexes are the same ++ } ++ } ++#else ++ *pdest = *psource; ++#endif ++#endif ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++#ifndef _MSC_VER ++#define stricmp strcasecmp ++#define strnicmp strncasecmp ++#endif ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL IsValidBinnHeader(const void *pbuf, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize, int *pheadersize); ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++char * APIENTRY binn_version() { ++ return BINN_VERSION; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void APIENTRY binn_set_alloc_functions(void* (*new_malloc)(size_t), void* (*new_realloc)(void*,size_t), void (*new_free)(void*)) { ++ ++ malloc_fn = new_malloc; ++ realloc_fn = new_realloc; ++ free_fn = new_free; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void check_alloc_functions() { ++ ++ if (malloc_fn == 0) malloc_fn = &malloc; ++ if (realloc_fn == 0) realloc_fn = &realloc; ++ if (free_fn == 0) free_fn = &free; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void * binn_malloc(int size) { ++ check_alloc_functions(); ++ return malloc_fn(size); ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void * binn_memdup(const void *src, int size) { ++ void *dest; ++ ++ if (src == NULL || size <= 0) return NULL; ++ dest = binn_malloc(size); ++ if (dest == NULL) return NULL; ++ memcpy(dest, src, size); ++ return dest; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE size_t strlen2(char *str) { ++ ++ if (str == NULL) return 0; ++ return strlen(str); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_create_type(int storage_type, int data_type_index) { ++ if (data_type_index < 0) return -1; ++ if (storage_type < BINN_STORAGE_MIN || storage_type > BINN_STORAGE_MAX) return -1; ++ if (data_type_index < 16) ++ return storage_type | data_type_index; ++ else if (data_type_index < 4096) { ++ storage_type |= BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE; ++ storage_type <<= 8; ++ data_type_index >>= 4; ++ return storage_type | data_type_index; ++ } else ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_type_info(int long_type, int *pstorage_type, int *pextra_type) { ++ int storage_type, extra_type; ++ BOOL retval=TRUE; ++ ++again: ++ ++ if (long_type < 0) { ++ goto loc_invalid; ++ } else if (long_type <= 0xff) { ++ storage_type = long_type & BINN_STORAGE_MASK; ++ extra_type = long_type & BINN_TYPE_MASK; ++ } else if (long_type <= 0xffff) { ++ storage_type = long_type & BINN_STORAGE_MASK16; ++ storage_type >>= 8; ++ extra_type = long_type & BINN_TYPE_MASK16; ++ extra_type >>= 4; ++ } else if (long_type & BINN_STORAGE_VIRTUAL) { ++ //storage_type = BINN_STORAGE_VIRTUAL; ++ //extra_type = xxx; ++ long_type &= 0xffff; ++ goto again; ++ } else { ++loc_invalid: ++ storage_type = -1; ++ extra_type = -1; ++ retval = FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if (pstorage_type) *pstorage_type = storage_type; ++ if (pextra_type) *pextra_type = extra_type; ++ ++ return retval; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create(binn *item, int type, int size, void *pointer) { ++ BOOL retval=FALSE; ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_LIST: ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ break; ++ default: ++ goto loc_exit; ++ } ++ ++ if (item == NULL || size < 0) goto loc_exit; ++ if (size < MIN_BINN_SIZE) { ++ if (pointer) goto loc_exit; ++ else size = 0; ++ } ++ ++ memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (pointer) { ++ item->pre_allocated = TRUE; ++ } else { ++ item->pre_allocated = FALSE; ++ if (size == 0) size = CHUNK_SIZE; ++ pointer = binn_malloc(size); ++ if (pointer == 0) return INVALID_BINN; ++ } ++ ++ item->pbuf = pointer; ++ item->alloc_size = size; ++ ++ item->header = BINN_MAGIC; ++ //item->allocated = FALSE; -- already zeroed ++ item->writable = TRUE; ++ item->used_size = MAX_BINN_HEADER; // save space for the header ++ item->type = type; ++ //item->count = 0; -- already zeroed ++ item->dirty = TRUE; // the header is not written to the buffer ++ ++ retval = TRUE; ++ ++loc_exit: ++ return retval; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_new(int type, int size, void *pointer) { ++ binn *item; ++ ++ item = (binn*) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_create(item, type, size, pointer) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(item); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ item->allocated = TRUE; ++ return item; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_list(binn *list) { ++ ++ return binn_create(list, BINN_LIST, 0, NULL); ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_map(binn *map) { ++ ++ return binn_create(map, BINN_MAP, 0, NULL); ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_object(binn *object) { ++ ++ return binn_create(object, BINN_OBJECT, 0, NULL); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_list() { ++ return binn_new(BINN_LIST, 0, 0); ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map() { ++ return binn_new(BINN_MAP, 0, 0); ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object() { ++ return binn_new(BINN_OBJECT, 0, 0); ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_copy(const void *old) { ++ int type, count, size, header_size; ++ unsigned char *old_ptr = binn_ptr(old); ++ binn *item; ++ ++ size = 0; ++ if (!IsValidBinnHeader(old_ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size)) return NULL; ++ ++ item = binn_new(type, size - header_size + MAX_BINN_HEADER, NULL); ++ if( item ){ ++ unsigned char *dest; ++ dest = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + MAX_BINN_HEADER; ++ memcpy(dest, old_ptr + header_size, size - header_size); ++ item->used_size = MAX_BINN_HEADER + size - header_size; ++ item->count = count; ++ } ++ return item; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++// deprecated: unsecure. the size can be corrupted accidentally or intentionally ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_load(const void *data, binn *value) { ++ ++ if (data == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE; ++ memset(value, 0, sizeof(binn)); ++ value->header = BINN_MAGIC; ++ //value->allocated = FALSE; -- already zeroed ++ //value->writable = FALSE; ++ ++ if (binn_is_valid(data, &value->type, &value->count, &value->size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ value->ptr = (void*) data; ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_load_ex(const void *data, int size, binn *value) { ++ ++ if (data == NULL || value == NULL || size <= 0) return FALSE; ++ memset(value, 0, sizeof(binn)); ++ value->header = BINN_MAGIC; ++ //value->allocated = FALSE; -- already zeroed ++ //value->writable = FALSE; ++ ++ if (binn_is_valid_ex(data, &value->type, &value->count, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ value->ptr = (void*) data; ++ value->size = size; ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_open(const void *data) { ++ binn *item; ++ ++ item = (binn*) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_load(data, item) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(item); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ item->allocated = TRUE; ++ return item; ++ ++} ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_open_ex(const void *data, int size) { ++ binn *item; ++ ++ item = (binn*) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_load_ex(data, size, item) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(item); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ item->allocated = TRUE; ++ return item; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_get_ptr_type(const void *ptr) { ++ ++ if (ptr == NULL) return 0; ++ ++ switch (*(unsigned int *)ptr) { ++ case BINN_MAGIC: ++ return BINN_STRUCT; ++ default: ++ return BINN_BUFFER; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_struct(const void *ptr) { ++ ++ if (ptr == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if ((*(unsigned int *)ptr) == BINN_MAGIC) { ++ return TRUE; ++ } else { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int CalcAllocation(int needed_size, int alloc_size) { ++ int calc_size; ++ ++ calc_size = alloc_size; ++ while (calc_size < needed_size) { ++ calc_size <<= 1; // same as *= 2 ++ //calc_size += CHUNK_SIZE; -- this is slower than the above line, because there are more reallocations ++ } ++ return calc_size; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL CheckAllocation(binn *item, int add_size) { ++ int alloc_size; ++ void *ptr; ++ ++ if (item->used_size + add_size > item->alloc_size) { ++ if (item->pre_allocated) return FALSE; ++ alloc_size = CalcAllocation(item->used_size + add_size, item->alloc_size); ++ ptr = realloc_fn(item->pbuf, alloc_size); ++ if (ptr == NULL) return FALSE; ++ item->pbuf = ptr; ++ item->alloc_size = alloc_size; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int get_storage_size(int storage_type) { ++ ++ switch (storage_type) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ return 0; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE: ++ return 1; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ return 2; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ return 4; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ return 8; ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++#endif ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE unsigned char * AdvanceDataPos(unsigned char *p, unsigned char *plimit) { ++ unsigned char byte; ++ int storage_type, DataSize; ++ ++ if (p > plimit) return 0; ++ ++ byte = *p; p++; ++ storage_type = byte & BINN_STORAGE_MASK; ++ if (byte & BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE) p++; ++ ++ switch (storage_type) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ //p += 0; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE: ++ p ++; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ p += 2; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ p += 4; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ p += 8; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ if (p > plimit) return 0; ++ DataSize = *((unsigned char*)p); ++ if (DataSize & 0x80) { ++ if (p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return 0; ++ copy_be32((u32*)&DataSize, (u32*)p); ++ DataSize &= 0x7FFFFFFF; ++ p+=4; ++ } else { ++ p++; ++ } ++ p += DataSize; ++ if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_STRING) { ++ p++; // null terminator. ++ } ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER: ++ if (p > plimit) return 0; ++ DataSize = *((unsigned char*)p); ++ if (DataSize & 0x80) { ++ if (p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return 0; ++ copy_be32((u32*)&DataSize, (u32*)p); ++ DataSize &= 0x7FFFFFFF; ++ } ++ DataSize--; // remove the type byte already added before ++ p += DataSize; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return p; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++/* ++ ++The id can be stored with 1 to 5 bytes ++ ++S = signal bit ++X = bit part of id ++ ++ 0SXX XXXX ++ 100S XXXX + 1 byte ++ 101S XXXX + 2 bytes ++ 110S XXXX + 3 bytes ++ 1110 0000 + 4 bytes ++ ++*/ ++BINN_PRIVATE int read_map_id(unsigned char **pp, unsigned char *plimit) { ++ unsigned char *p, c, sign, type; ++ int id, extra_bytes; ++ ++ p = *pp; ++ if (p > plimit) return 0; ++ ++ c = *p++; ++ ++ if (c & 0x80) { ++ extra_bytes = ((c & 0x60) >> 5) + 1; ++ if (p + extra_bytes > plimit ) { ++ *pp = p + extra_bytes; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ type = c & 0xE0; ++ sign = c & 0x10; ++ ++ if ((c & 0x80) == 0) { ++ sign = c & 0x40; ++ id = c & 0x3F; ++ } else if (type == 0x80) { ++ id = c & 0x0F; ++ id = (id << 8) | *p++; ++ } else if (type == 0xA0) { ++ id = c & 0x0F; ++ id = (id << 8) | *p++; ++ id = (id << 8) | *p++; ++ } else if (type == 0xC0) { ++ id = c & 0x0F; ++ id = (id << 8) | *p++; ++ id = (id << 8) | *p++; ++ id = (id << 8) | *p++; ++ } else if (type == 0xE0) { ++ copy_be32((u32*)&id, (u32*)p); ++ p += 4; ++ } else { ++ *pp = plimit + 2; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (sign) id = -id; ++ ++ *pp = p; ++ ++ return id; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE unsigned char * SearchForID(unsigned char *p, int header_size, int size, int numitems, int id) { ++ unsigned char *plimit, *base; ++ int i, int32; ++ ++ base = p; ++ plimit = p + size - 1; ++ p += header_size; ++ ++ // search for the ID in all the arguments. ++ for (i = 0; i < numitems; i++) { ++ int32 = read_map_id(&p, plimit); ++ if (p > plimit) break; ++ // Compare if the IDs are equal. ++ if (int32 == id) return p; ++ // xxx ++ p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit); ++ if (p == 0 || p < base) break; ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE unsigned char * SearchForKey(unsigned char *p, int header_size, int size, int numitems, const char *key) { ++ unsigned char len, *plimit, *base; ++ int i, keylen; ++ ++ base = p; ++ plimit = p + size - 1; ++ p += header_size; ++ ++ keylen = strlen(key); ++ ++ // search for the key in all the arguments. ++ for (i = 0; i < numitems; i++) { ++ if (p > plimit) break; ++ len = *((unsigned char *)p); ++ p++; ++ if (p + len > plimit) break; ++ // Compare if the strings are equal. ++ if (len > 0) { ++ if (strnicmp((char*)p, key, len) == 0) { // note that there is no null terminator here ++ if (keylen == len) { ++ p += len; ++ return p; ++ } ++ } ++ p += len; ++ } else if (len == keylen) { // in the case of empty string: "" ++ return p; ++ } ++ // xxx ++ p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit); ++ if (p == 0 || p < base) break; ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL AddValue(binn *item, int type, void *pvalue, int size); ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_list_add_raw(binn *item, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ ++ if (item == NULL || item->type != BINN_LIST || item->writable == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ //if (CheckAllocation(item, 4) == FALSE) return FALSE; // 4 bytes used for data_store and data_format. ++ ++ if (AddValue(item, type, pvalue, size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ item->count++; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_object_set_raw(binn *item, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ unsigned char *p, len; ++ int int32; ++ ++ if (item == NULL || item->type != BINN_OBJECT || item->writable == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (key == NULL) return FALSE; ++ int32 = strlen(key); ++ if (int32 > 255) return FALSE; ++ ++ // is the key already in it? ++ p = SearchForKey(item->pbuf, MAX_BINN_HEADER, item->used_size, item->count, key); ++ if (p) return FALSE; ++ ++ // start adding it ++ ++ if (CheckAllocation(item, 1 + int32) == FALSE) return FALSE; // bytes used for the key size and the key itself. ++ ++ p = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + item->used_size; ++ len = int32; ++ *p = len; ++ p++; ++ memcpy(p, key, int32); ++ int32++; // now contains the strlen + 1 byte for the len ++ item->used_size += int32; ++ ++ if (AddValue(item, type, pvalue, size) == FALSE) { ++ item->used_size -= int32; ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ item->count++; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_map_set_raw(binn *item, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ unsigned char *base, *p, sign; ++ int id_size; ++ ++ if (item == NULL || item->type != BINN_MAP || item->writable == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ // is the ID already in it? ++ p = SearchForID(item->pbuf, MAX_BINN_HEADER, item->used_size, item->count, id); ++ if (p) return FALSE; ++ ++ // start adding it ++ ++ if (CheckAllocation(item, 5) == FALSE) return FALSE; // max 5 bytes used for the id. ++ ++ p = base = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + item->used_size; ++ ++ sign = (id < 0); ++ if (sign) id = -id; ++ ++ if (id <= 0x3F) { ++ *p++ = (sign << 6) | id; ++ } else if (id <= 0xFFF) { ++ *p++ = 0x80 | (sign << 4) | ((id & 0xF00) >> 8); ++ *p++ = id & 0xFF; ++ } else if (id <= 0xFFFFF) { ++ *p++ = 0xA0 | (sign << 4) | ((id & 0xF0000) >> 16); ++ *p++ = (id & 0xFF00) >> 8; ++ *p++ = id & 0xFF; ++ } else if (id <= 0xFFFFFFF) { ++ *p++ = 0xC0 | (sign << 4) | ((id & 0xF000000) >> 24); ++ *p++ = (id & 0xFF0000) >> 16; ++ *p++ = (id & 0xFF00) >> 8; ++ *p++ = id & 0xFF; ++ } else { ++ *p++ = 0xE0; ++ if (sign) id = -id; ++ copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&id); ++ p += 4; ++ } ++ ++ id_size = (p - base); ++ item->used_size += id_size; ++ ++ if (AddValue(item, type, pvalue, size) == FALSE) { ++ item->used_size -= id_size; ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ item->count++; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void * compress_int(int *pstorage_type, int *ptype, void *psource) { ++ int storage_type, storage_type2, type, type2=0; ++ int64 vint = 0; ++ uint64 vuint; ++ char *pvalue; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN ++ int size1, size2; ++#endif ++ ++ storage_type = *pstorage_type; ++ if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_BYTE) return psource; ++ ++ type = *ptype; ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_INT64: ++ vint = *(int64*)psource; ++ goto loc_signed; ++ case BINN_INT32: ++ vint = *(int*)psource; ++ goto loc_signed; ++ case BINN_INT16: ++ vint = *(short*)psource; ++ goto loc_signed; ++ case BINN_UINT64: ++ vuint = *(uint64*)psource; ++ goto loc_positive; ++ case BINN_UINT32: ++ vuint = *(unsigned int*)psource; ++ goto loc_positive; ++ case BINN_UINT16: ++ vuint = *(unsigned short*)psource; ++ goto loc_positive; ++ } ++ ++loc_signed: ++ ++ if (vint >= 0) { ++ vuint = vint; ++ goto loc_positive; ++ } ++ ++//loc_negative: ++ ++ if (vint >= INT8_MIN) { ++ type2 = BINN_INT8; ++ } else ++ if (vint >= INT16_MIN) { ++ type2 = BINN_INT16; ++ } else ++ if (vint >= INT32_MIN) { ++ type2 = BINN_INT32; ++ } ++ goto loc_exit; ++ ++loc_positive: ++ ++ if (vuint <= UINT8_MAX) { ++ type2 = BINN_UINT8; ++ } else ++ if (vuint <= UINT16_MAX) { ++ type2 = BINN_UINT16; ++ } else ++ if (vuint <= UINT32_MAX) { ++ type2 = BINN_UINT32; ++ } ++ ++loc_exit: ++ ++ pvalue = (char *) psource; ++ ++ if (type2 && type2 != type) { ++ *ptype = type2; ++ storage_type2 = binn_get_write_storage(type2); ++ *pstorage_type = storage_type2; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN ++ size1 = get_storage_size(storage_type); ++ size2 = get_storage_size(storage_type2); ++ pvalue += (size1 - size2); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ return pvalue; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int type_family(int type); ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL AddValue(binn *item, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ int int32, ArgSize, storage_type, extra_type; ++ unsigned char *p; ++ ++ binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, &extra_type); ++ ++ if (pvalue == NULL) { ++ switch (storage_type) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ if (size == 0) break; // the 2 above are allowed to have 0 length ++ /* fall through */ ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (type_family(type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT && item->disable_int_compression == FALSE) ++ pvalue = compress_int(&storage_type, &type, pvalue); ++ ++ switch (storage_type) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ size = 0; ++ ArgSize = size; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE: ++ size = 1; ++ ArgSize = size; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ size = 2; ++ ArgSize = size; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ size = 4; ++ ArgSize = size; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ size = 8; ++ ArgSize = size; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ if (size < 0) return FALSE; ++ //if (size == 0) ... ++ ArgSize = size + 4; // at least this size ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ if (size < 0) return FALSE; ++ if (size == 0) size = strlen2( (char *) pvalue); ++ ArgSize = size + 5; // at least this size ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER: ++ if (size <= 0) return FALSE; ++ ArgSize = size; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ ArgSize += 2; // at least 2 bytes used for data_type. ++ if (CheckAllocation(item, ArgSize) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ // Gets the pointer to the next place in buffer ++ p = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + item->used_size; ++ ++ // If the data is not a container, store the data type ++ if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER) { ++ if (type > 255) { ++ u16 type16 = type; ++ copy_be16((u16*)p, (u16*)&type16); ++ p += 2; ++ item->used_size += 2; ++ } else { ++ *p = type; ++ p++; ++ item->used_size++; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ switch (storage_type) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ // Nothing to do. ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE: ++ *((char *) p) = *((char *) pvalue); ++ item->used_size += 1; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ copy_be16((u16*)p, (u16*)pvalue); ++ item->used_size += 2; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)pvalue); ++ item->used_size += 4; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ copy_be64((u64*)p, (u64*)pvalue); ++ item->used_size += 8; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ if (size > 127) { ++ int32 = size | 0x80000000; ++ copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32); ++ p += 4; ++ item->used_size += 4; ++ } else { ++ *((unsigned char *) p) = size; ++ p++; ++ item->used_size++; ++ } ++ memcpy(p, pvalue, size); ++ if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_STRING) { ++ p += size; ++ *((char *) p) = (char) 0; ++ size++; // null terminator ++ } ++ item->used_size += size; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER: ++ memcpy(p, pvalue, size); ++ item->used_size += size; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ item->dirty = TRUE; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_save_header(binn *item) { ++ unsigned char byte, *p; ++ int int32, size; ++ ++ if (item == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++#ifndef BINN_DISABLE_SMALL_HEADER ++ ++ p = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + MAX_BINN_HEADER; ++ size = item->used_size - MAX_BINN_HEADER + 3; // at least 3 bytes for the header ++ ++ // write the count ++ if (item->count > 127) { ++ p -= 4; ++ size += 3; ++ int32 = item->count | 0x80000000; ++ copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32); ++ } else { ++ p--; ++ *p = (unsigned char) item->count; ++ } ++ ++ // write the size ++ if (size > 127) { ++ p -= 4; ++ size += 3; ++ int32 = size | 0x80000000; ++ copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32); ++ } else { ++ p--; ++ *p = (unsigned char) size; ++ } ++ ++ // write the type. ++ p--; ++ *p = (unsigned char) item->type; ++ ++ // set the values ++ item->ptr = p; ++ item->size = size; ++ ++ UNUSED(byte); ++ ++#else ++ ++ p = (unsigned char *) item->pbuf; ++ ++ // write the type. ++ byte = item->type; ++ *p = byte; p++; ++ // write the size ++ int32 = item->used_size | 0x80000000; ++ copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32); ++ p+=4; ++ // write the count ++ int32 = item->count | 0x80000000; ++ copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32); ++ ++ item->ptr = item->pbuf; ++ item->size = item->used_size; ++ ++#endif ++ ++ item->dirty = FALSE; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void APIENTRY binn_free(binn *item) { ++ ++ if (item == NULL) return; ++ ++ if (item->writable && item->pre_allocated == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(item->pbuf); ++ } ++ ++ if (item->freefn) item->freefn(item->ptr); ++ ++ if (item->allocated) { ++ free_fn(item); ++ } else { ++ memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn)); ++ item->header = BINN_MAGIC; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++// free the binn structure but keeps the binn buffer allocated, returning a pointer to it. use the free function to release the buffer later ++void * APIENTRY binn_release(binn *item) { ++ void *data; ++ ++ if (item == NULL) return NULL; ++ ++ data = binn_ptr(item); ++ ++ if (data > item->pbuf) { ++ memmove(item->pbuf, data, item->size); ++ data = item->pbuf; ++ } ++ ++ if (item->allocated) { ++ free_fn(item); ++ } else { ++ memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn)); ++ item->header = BINN_MAGIC; ++ } ++ ++ return data; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL IsValidBinnHeader(const void *pbuf, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize, int *pheadersize) { ++ unsigned char byte, *p, *plimit=0; ++ int int32, type, size, count; ++ ++ if (pbuf == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ p = (unsigned char *) pbuf; ++ ++ if (psize && *psize > 0) { ++ if (*psize < MIN_BINN_SIZE) return FALSE; ++ plimit = p + *psize - 1; ++ } ++ ++ // get the type ++ byte = *p; p++; ++ if ((byte & BINN_STORAGE_MASK) != BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER) return FALSE; ++ if (byte & BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE) return FALSE; ++ type = byte; ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_LIST: ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ // get the size ++ if (plimit && p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ int32 = *((unsigned char*)p); ++ if (int32 & 0x80) { ++ if (plimit && p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return FALSE; ++ copy_be32((u32*)&int32, (u32*)p); ++ int32 &= 0x7FFFFFFF; ++ p+=4; ++ } else { ++ p++; ++ } ++ size = int32; ++ ++ // get the count ++ if (plimit && p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ int32 = *((unsigned char*)p); ++ if (int32 & 0x80) { ++ if (plimit && p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return FALSE; ++ copy_be32((u32*)&int32, (u32*)p); ++ int32 &= 0x7FFFFFFF; ++ p+=4; ++ } else { ++ p++; ++ } ++ count = int32; ++ ++ if (size < MIN_BINN_SIZE || count < 0) return FALSE; ++ ++ // return the values ++ if (ptype) *ptype = type; ++ if (pcount) *pcount = count; ++ if (psize) *psize = size; ++ if (pheadersize) *pheadersize = (int) (p - (unsigned char*)pbuf); ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_buf_type(const void *pbuf) { ++ int type; ++ ++ if (!IsValidBinnHeader(pbuf, &type, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return INVALID_BINN; ++ ++ return type; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_buf_count(const void *pbuf) { ++ int nitems; ++ ++ if (!IsValidBinnHeader(pbuf, NULL, &nitems, NULL, NULL)) return 0; ++ ++ return nitems; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_buf_size(const void *pbuf) { ++ int size=0; ++ ++ if (!IsValidBinnHeader(pbuf, NULL, NULL, &size, NULL)) return 0; ++ ++ return size; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_ptr(const void *ptr) { ++ binn *item; ++ ++ switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) { ++ case BINN_STRUCT: ++ item = (binn*) ptr; ++ if (item->writable && item->dirty) { ++ binn_save_header(item); ++ } ++ return item->ptr; ++ case BINN_BUFFER: ++ return (void*)ptr; ++ default: ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_size(const void *ptr) { ++ binn *item; ++ ++ switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) { ++ case BINN_STRUCT: ++ item = (binn*) ptr; ++ if (item->writable && item->dirty) { ++ binn_save_header(item); ++ } ++ return item->size; ++ case BINN_BUFFER: ++ return binn_buf_size(ptr); ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_type(const void *ptr) { ++ binn *item; ++ ++ switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) { ++ case BINN_STRUCT: ++ item = (binn*) ptr; ++ return item->type; ++ case BINN_BUFFER: ++ return binn_buf_type(ptr); ++ default: ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_count(const void *ptr) { ++ binn *item; ++ ++ switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) { ++ case BINN_STRUCT: ++ item = (binn*) ptr; ++ return item->count; ++ case BINN_BUFFER: ++ return binn_buf_count(ptr); ++ default: ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++// the container can be smaller than the informed size ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_is_valid_ex2(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize) { ++ int i, type, count, size, header_size; ++ unsigned char *p, *plimit, *base, len; ++ ++ if (ptr == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ // is there an informed size? ++ if (psize && *psize > 0) { ++ size = *psize; ++ } else { ++ size = 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (!IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size)) return FALSE; ++ ++ // is there an informed size? ++ if (psize && *psize > 0) { ++ // is it bigger than the buffer? ++ if (size > *psize) return FALSE; ++ } ++ // is there an informed count? ++ if (pcount && *pcount > 0) { ++ // is it the same as the one in the buffer? ++ if (count != *pcount) return FALSE; ++ } ++ // is there an informed type? ++ if (ptype && *ptype != 0) { ++ // is it the same as the one in the buffer? ++ if (type != *ptype) return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ p = (unsigned char *)ptr; ++ base = p; ++ plimit = p + size - 1; ++ ++ p += header_size; ++ ++ // process each (key and) value ++ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ if (p > plimit) goto Invalid; ++ // get the key (string) size ++ len = *p; ++ p++; ++ //if (len == 0) goto Invalid; ++ // advance over the key ++ p += len; ++ break; ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ // advance over the key ++ read_map_id(&p, plimit); ++ break; ++ case BINN_LIST: ++ // no key ++ break; ++ default: ++ goto Invalid; ++ } ++ // check the value ++ if (p > plimit) goto Invalid; ++ if ((*p & BINN_STORAGE_MASK) == BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER) { ++ // recursively check the internal container ++ int size2 = plimit - p + 1; // maximum container size ++ if (binn_is_valid_ex2(p, NULL, NULL, &size2) == FALSE) goto Invalid; ++ p += size2; ++ } else { ++ // advance over the value ++ p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit); ++ if (p == 0 || p < base) goto Invalid; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (ptype && *ptype==0) *ptype = type; ++ if (pcount && *pcount==0) *pcount = count; ++ if (psize) *psize = size; ++ return TRUE; ++ ++Invalid: ++ return FALSE; ++ ++} ++ ++// the container must have the informed size, if informed ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_valid_ex(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize) { ++ int size; ++ ++ if (psize && *psize > 0) { ++ size = *psize; ++ } else { ++ size = 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (binn_is_valid_ex2(ptr, ptype, pcount, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (psize) { ++ if (*psize > 0) { ++ if (size != *psize) return FALSE; ++ } else if (*psize==0) { ++ *psize = size; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_valid(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize) { ++ ++ if (ptype) *ptype = 0; ++ if (pcount) *pcount = 0; ++ if (psize) *psize = 0; ++ ++ return binn_is_valid_ex(ptr, ptype, pcount, psize); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/*** INTERNAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL GetValue(unsigned char *p, unsigned char *plimit, binn *value) { ++ unsigned char byte; ++ int data_type, storage_type; //, extra_type; ++ int DataSize; ++ void *p2; ++ ++ if (value == NULL) return FALSE; ++ memset(value, 0, sizeof(binn)); ++ value->header = BINN_MAGIC; ++ //value->allocated = FALSE; -- already zeroed ++ //value->writable = FALSE; ++ ++ // saves for use with BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER ++ p2 = p; ++ ++ // read the data type ++ if (p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ byte = *p; p++; ++ storage_type = byte & BINN_STORAGE_MASK; ++ if (byte & BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE) { ++ data_type = byte << 8; ++ if (p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ byte = *p; p++; ++ data_type |= byte; ++ //extra_type = data_type & BINN_TYPE_MASK16; ++ } else { ++ data_type = byte; ++ //extra_type = byte & BINN_TYPE_MASK; ++ } ++ ++ //value->storage_type = storage_type; ++ value->type = data_type; ++ ++ switch (storage_type) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE: ++ if (p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ value->vuint8 = *((unsigned char *) p); ++ value->ptr = p; //value->ptr = &value->vuint8; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ if (p + 1 > plimit) return FALSE; ++ copy_be16((u16*)&value->vint16, (u16*)p); ++ value->ptr = &value->vint16; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ if (p + 3 > plimit) return FALSE; ++ copy_be32((u32*)&value->vint32, (u32*)p); ++ value->ptr = &value->vint32; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ if (p + 7 > plimit) return FALSE; ++ copy_be64((u64*)&value->vint64, (u64*)p); ++ value->ptr = &value->vint64; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ if (p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ DataSize = *((unsigned char*)p); ++ if (DataSize & 0x80) { ++ if (p + 3 > plimit) return FALSE; ++ copy_be32((u32*)&DataSize, (u32*)p); ++ DataSize &= 0x7FFFFFFF; ++ p+=4; ++ } else { ++ p++; ++ } ++ if (p + DataSize - 1 > plimit) return FALSE; ++ value->size = DataSize; ++ value->ptr = p; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER: ++ value->ptr = p2; // <-- it returns the pointer to the container, not the data ++ if (IsValidBinnHeader(p2, NULL, &value->count, &value->size, NULL) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ // convert the returned value, if needed ++ ++ switch (value->type) { ++ case BINN_TRUE: ++ value->type = BINN_BOOL; ++ value->vbool = TRUE; ++ value->ptr = &value->vbool; ++ break; ++ case BINN_FALSE: ++ value->type = BINN_BOOL; ++ value->vbool = FALSE; ++ value->ptr = &value->vbool; ++ break; ++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED ++ case BINN_SINGLE_STR: ++ value->type = BINN_SINGLE; ++ value->vfloat = (float) atof((const char*)value->ptr); // converts from string to double, and then to float ++ value->ptr = &value->vfloat; ++ break; ++ case BINN_DOUBLE_STR: ++ value->type = BINN_DOUBLE; ++ value->vdouble = atof((const char*)value->ptr); // converts from string to double ++ value->ptr = &value->vdouble; ++ break; ++#endif ++ /* ++ case BINN_DECIMAL: ++ case BINN_CURRENCYSTR: ++ case BINN_DATE: ++ case BINN_DATETIME: ++ case BINN_TIME: ++ */ ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ ++// on little-endian devices we store the value so we can return a pointer to integers. ++// it's valid only for single-threaded apps. multi-threaded apps must use the _get_ functions instead. ++ ++binn local_value; ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void * store_value(binn *value) { ++ ++ memcpy(&local_value, value, sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ switch (binn_get_read_storage(value->type)) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ // return a valid pointer ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ return &local_value.vint32; // returns the pointer to the converted value, from big-endian to little-endian ++ } ++ ++ return value->ptr; // returns from the on stack value to be thread-safe (for list, map, object, string and blob) ++ ++} ++ ++#endif ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/*** READ FUNCTIONS ********************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_value(const void *ptr, const char *key, binn *value) { ++ int type, count, size=0, header_size; ++ unsigned char *p, *plimit; ++ ++ ptr = binn_ptr(ptr); ++ if (ptr == NULL || key == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ // check the header ++ if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type != BINN_OBJECT) return FALSE; ++ if (count == 0) return FALSE; ++ ++ p = (unsigned char *) ptr; ++ plimit = p + size - 1; ++ ++ p = SearchForKey(p, header_size, size, count, key); ++ if (p == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ return GetValue(p, plimit, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_value(const void *ptr, int id, binn *value) { ++ int type, count, size=0, header_size; ++ unsigned char *p, *plimit; ++ ++ ptr = binn_ptr(ptr); ++ if (ptr == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ // check the header ++ if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type != BINN_MAP) return FALSE; ++ if (count == 0) return FALSE; ++ ++ p = (unsigned char *) ptr; ++ plimit = p + size - 1; ++ ++ p = SearchForID(p, header_size, size, count, id); ++ if (p == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ return GetValue(p, plimit, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get_value(const void *ptr, int pos, binn *value) { ++ int i, type, count, size=0, header_size; ++ unsigned char *p, *plimit, *base; ++ ++ ptr = binn_ptr(ptr); ++ if (ptr == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ // check the header ++ if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type != BINN_LIST) return FALSE; ++ if (count == 0) return FALSE; ++ if (pos <= 0 || pos > count) return FALSE; ++ pos--; // convert from base 1 to base 0 ++ ++ p = (unsigned char *) ptr; ++ base = p; ++ plimit = p + size - 1; ++ p += header_size; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < pos; i++) { ++ p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit); ++ if (p == 0 || p < base) return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return GetValue(p, plimit, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/*** READ PAIR BY POSITION *************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_read_pair(int expected_type, const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, char *pkey, binn *value) { ++ int type, count, size=0, header_size; ++ int i, int32, id = 0, counter=0; ++ unsigned char *p, *plimit, *base, *key = NULL, len = 0; ++ ++ ptr = binn_ptr(ptr); ++ ++ // check the header ++ if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type != expected_type || count == 0 || pos < 1 || pos > count) return FALSE; ++ ++ p = (unsigned char *) ptr; ++ base = p; ++ plimit = p + size - 1; ++ p += header_size; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ int32 = read_map_id(&p, plimit); ++ if (p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ id = int32; ++ break; ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ len = *((unsigned char *)p); p++; ++ if (p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ key = p; ++ p += len; ++ if (p > plimit) return FALSE; ++ break; ++ } ++ counter++; ++ if (counter == pos) goto found; ++ // ++ p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit); ++ if (p == 0 || p < base) return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return FALSE; ++ ++found: ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ if (pid) *pid = id; ++ break; ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ if (pkey) { ++ memcpy(pkey, key, len); ++ pkey[len] = 0; ++ } ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ return GetValue(p, plimit, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, binn *value) { ++ ++ return binn_read_pair(BINN_MAP, ptr, pos, pid, NULL, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, char *pkey, binn *value) { ++ ++ return binn_read_pair(BINN_OBJECT, ptr, pos, NULL, pkey, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_pair(const void *map, int pos, int *pid) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_read_pair(BINN_MAP, map, pos, pid, NULL, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_pair(const void *obj, int pos, char *pkey) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_read_pair(BINN_OBJECT, obj, pos, NULL, pkey, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_map_get_pair(ptr, pos, pid, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_object_get_pair(ptr, pos, pkey, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/*** SEQUENTIAL READ FUNCTIONS *********************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_iter_init(binn_iter *iter, const void *ptr, int expected_type) { ++ int type, count, size=0, header_size; ++ ++ ptr = binn_ptr(ptr); ++ if (ptr == NULL || iter == NULL) return FALSE; ++ memset(iter, 0, sizeof(binn_iter)); ++ ++ // check the header ++ if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type != expected_type) return FALSE; ++ //if (count == 0) return FALSE; -- should not be used ++ ++ iter->plimit = (unsigned char *)ptr + size - 1; ++ iter->pnext = (unsigned char *)ptr + header_size; ++ iter->count = count; ++ iter->current = 0; ++ iter->type = type; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_next(binn_iter *iter, binn *value) { ++ unsigned char *pnow; ++ ++ if (iter == NULL || iter->pnext == NULL || iter->pnext > iter->plimit || iter->current > iter->count || iter->type != BINN_LIST) return FALSE; ++ ++ iter->current++; ++ if (iter->current > iter->count) return FALSE; ++ ++ pnow = iter->pnext; ++ iter->pnext = AdvanceDataPos(pnow, iter->plimit); ++ if (iter->pnext != 0 && iter->pnext < pnow) return FALSE; ++ ++ return GetValue(pnow, iter->plimit, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_read_next_pair(int expected_type, binn_iter *iter, int *pid, char *pkey, binn *value) { ++ int int32, id; ++ unsigned char *p, *key; ++ unsigned short len; ++ ++ if (iter == NULL || iter->pnext == NULL || iter->pnext > iter->plimit || iter->current > iter->count || iter->type != expected_type) return FALSE; ++ ++ iter->current++; ++ if (iter->current > iter->count) return FALSE; ++ ++ p = iter->pnext; ++ ++ switch (expected_type) { ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ int32 = read_map_id(&p, iter->plimit); ++ if (p > iter->plimit) return FALSE; ++ id = int32; ++ if (pid) *pid = id; ++ break; ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ len = *((unsigned char *)p); p++; ++ key = p; ++ p += len; ++ if (p > iter->plimit) return FALSE; ++ if (pkey) { ++ memcpy(pkey, key, len); ++ pkey[len] = 0; ++ } ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ iter->pnext = AdvanceDataPos(p, iter->plimit); ++ if (iter->pnext != 0 && iter->pnext < p) return FALSE; ++ ++ return GetValue(p, iter->plimit, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, binn *value) { ++ ++ return binn_read_next_pair(BINN_MAP, iter, pid, NULL, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, binn *value) { ++ ++ return binn_read_next_pair(BINN_OBJECT, iter, NULL, pkey, value); ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_next_value(binn_iter *iter) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_list_next(iter, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_next_value(binn_iter *iter, int *pid) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_map_next(iter, pid, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_next_value(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_object_next(iter, pkey, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_list_next(iter, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_map_next(iter, pid, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_object_next(iter, pkey, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/****** EXTENDED INTERFACE ***********************************************************/ ++/****** none of the functions above call the functions below *************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_get_write_storage(int type) { ++ int storage_type; ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_SINGLE_STR: ++ case BINN_DOUBLE_STR: ++ return BINN_STORAGE_STRING; ++ ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ return BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES; ++ ++ default: ++ binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, NULL); ++ return storage_type; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_get_read_storage(int type) { ++ int storage_type; ++ ++ switch (type) { ++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED ++ case BINN_SINGLE_STR: ++ return BINN_STORAGE_DWORD; ++ case BINN_DOUBLE_STR: ++ return BINN_STORAGE_QWORD; ++#endif ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ case BINN_TRUE: ++ case BINN_FALSE: ++ return BINN_STORAGE_DWORD; ++ default: ++ binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, NULL); ++ return storage_type; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL GetWriteConvertedData(int *ptype, void **ppvalue, int *psize) { ++ int type; ++ float f1; ++ double d1; ++ char pstr[128]; ++ ++ UNUSED(pstr); ++ UNUSED(d1); ++ UNUSED(f1); ++ ++ type = *ptype; ++ ++ if (*ppvalue == NULL) { ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_NULL: ++ case BINN_TRUE: ++ case BINN_FALSE: ++ break; ++ case BINN_STRING: ++ case BINN_BLOB: ++ if (*psize == 0) break; ++ /* fall through */ ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ switch (type) { ++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED ++ case BINN_SINGLE: ++ f1 = **(float**)ppvalue; ++ d1 = f1; // convert from float (32bits) to double (64bits) ++ type = BINN_SINGLE_STR; ++ goto conv_double; ++ case BINN_DOUBLE: ++ d1 = **(double**)ppvalue; ++ type = BINN_DOUBLE_STR; ++conv_double: ++ // the '%.17e' is more precise than the '%g' ++ snprintf(pstr, 127, "%.17e", d1); ++ *ppvalue = pstr; ++ *ptype = type; ++ break; ++#endif ++ case BINN_DECIMAL: ++ case BINN_CURRENCYSTR: ++ /* ++ if (binn_malloc_extptr(128) == NULL) return FALSE; ++ snprintf(sptr, 127, "%E", **ppvalue); ++ *ppvalue = sptr; ++ */ ++ return TRUE; //! temporary ++ break; ++ ++ case BINN_DATE: ++ case BINN_DATETIME: ++ case BINN_TIME: ++ return TRUE; //! temporary ++ break; ++ ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ if (**((BOOL**)ppvalue) == FALSE) { ++ type = BINN_FALSE; ++ } else { ++ type = BINN_TRUE; ++ } ++ *ptype = type; ++ break; ++ ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int type_family(int type) { ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_LIST: ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_BINN; ++ ++ case BINN_INT8: ++ case BINN_INT16: ++ case BINN_INT32: ++ case BINN_INT64: ++ case BINN_UINT8: ++ case BINN_UINT16: ++ case BINN_UINT32: ++ case BINN_UINT64: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_INT; ++ ++ case BINN_FLOAT32: ++ case BINN_FLOAT64: ++ //case BINN_SINGLE: ++ case BINN_SINGLE_STR: ++ //case BINN_DOUBLE: ++ case BINN_DOUBLE_STR: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_FLOAT; ++ ++ case BINN_STRING: ++ case BINN_HTML: ++ case BINN_CSS: ++ case BINN_XML: ++ case BINN_JSON: ++ case BINN_JAVASCRIPT: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_STRING; ++ ++ case BINN_BLOB: ++ case BINN_JPEG: ++ case BINN_GIF: ++ case BINN_PNG: ++ case BINN_BMP: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_BLOB; ++ ++ case BINN_DECIMAL: ++ case BINN_CURRENCY: ++ case BINN_DATE: ++ case BINN_TIME: ++ case BINN_DATETIME: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_STRING; ++ ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_BOOL; ++ ++ case BINN_NULL: ++ return BINN_FAMILY_NULL; ++ ++ default: ++ // if it wasn't found ++ return BINN_FAMILY_NONE; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE int int_type(int type) { ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case BINN_INT8: ++ case BINN_INT16: ++ case BINN_INT32: ++ case BINN_INT64: ++ return BINN_SIGNED_INT; ++ ++ case BINN_UINT8: ++ case BINN_UINT16: ++ case BINN_UINT32: ++ case BINN_UINT64: ++ return BINN_UNSIGNED_INT; ++ ++ default: ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_raw_value(const void *psource, void *pdest, int data_store) { ++ ++ switch (data_store) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE: ++ *((char *) pdest) = *(char *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ *((short *) pdest) = *(short *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ *((int *) pdest) = *(int *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ *((uint64 *) pdest) = *(uint64 *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER: ++ *((char **) pdest) = (char *)psource; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_int_value(const void *psource, void *pdest, int source_type, int dest_type) { ++ uint64 vuint64 = 0; int64 vint64 = 0; ++ ++ switch (source_type) { ++ case BINN_INT8: ++ vint64 = *(signed char *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_INT16: ++ vint64 = *(short *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_INT32: ++ vint64 = *(int *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_INT64: ++ vint64 = *(int64 *)psource; ++ break; ++ ++ case BINN_UINT8: ++ vuint64 = *(unsigned char *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_UINT16: ++ vuint64 = *(unsigned short *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_UINT32: ++ vuint64 = *(unsigned int *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_UINT64: ++ vuint64 = *(uint64 *)psource; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ ++ // copy from int64 to uint64, if possible ++ ++ if (int_type(source_type) == BINN_UNSIGNED_INT && int_type(dest_type) == BINN_SIGNED_INT) { ++ if (vuint64 > INT64_MAX) return FALSE; ++ vint64 = vuint64; ++ } else if (int_type(source_type) == BINN_SIGNED_INT && int_type(dest_type) == BINN_UNSIGNED_INT) { ++ if (vint64 < 0) return FALSE; ++ vuint64 = vint64; ++ } ++ ++ ++ switch (dest_type) { ++ case BINN_INT8: ++ if (vint64 < INT8_MIN || vint64 > INT8_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *(signed char *)pdest = (signed char) vint64; ++ break; ++ case BINN_INT16: ++ if (vint64 < INT16_MIN || vint64 > INT16_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *(short *)pdest = (short) vint64; ++ break; ++ case BINN_INT32: ++ if (vint64 < INT32_MIN || vint64 > INT32_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *(int *)pdest = (int) vint64; ++ break; ++ case BINN_INT64: ++ *(int64 *)pdest = vint64; ++ break; ++ ++ case BINN_UINT8: ++ if (vuint64 > UINT8_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *(unsigned char *)pdest = (unsigned char) vuint64; ++ break; ++ case BINN_UINT16: ++ if (vuint64 > UINT16_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *(unsigned short *)pdest = (unsigned short) vuint64; ++ break; ++ case BINN_UINT32: ++ if (vuint64 > UINT32_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *(unsigned int *)pdest = (unsigned int) vuint64; ++ break; ++ case BINN_UINT64: ++ *(uint64 *)pdest = vuint64; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_float_value(const void *psource, void *pdest, int source_type, int dest_type) { ++ ++ switch (source_type) { ++ case BINN_FLOAT32: ++ *(double *)pdest = *(float *)psource; ++ break; ++ case BINN_FLOAT64: ++ *(float *)pdest = (float) *(double *)psource; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE void zero_value(const void *pvalue, int type) { ++ //int size=0; ++ ++ switch (binn_get_read_storage(type)) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE: ++ *((char *) pvalue) = 0; ++ //size=1; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_WORD: ++ *((short *) pvalue) = 0; ++ //size=2; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD: ++ *((int *) pvalue) = 0; ++ //size=4; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD: ++ *((uint64 *) pvalue) = 0; ++ //size=8; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER: ++ *(char **)pvalue = NULL; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ //if (size>0) memset(pvalue, 0, size); ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_value(void *psource, void *pdest, int source_type, int dest_type, int data_store) { ++ ++ if (type_family(source_type) != type_family(dest_type)) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type_family(source_type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT && source_type != dest_type) { ++ return copy_int_value(psource, pdest, source_type, dest_type); ++ } else if (type_family(source_type) == BINN_FAMILY_FLOAT && source_type != dest_type) { ++ return copy_float_value(psource, pdest, source_type, dest_type); ++ } else { ++ return copy_raw_value(psource, pdest, data_store); ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*** WRITE FUNCTIONS *****************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_add(binn *list, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ ++ if (GetWriteConvertedData(&type, &pvalue, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ return binn_list_add_raw(list, type, pvalue, size); ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_set(binn *map, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ ++ if (GetWriteConvertedData(&type, &pvalue, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ return binn_map_set_raw(map, id, type, pvalue, size); ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_set(binn *obj, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ ++ if (GetWriteConvertedData(&type, &pvalue, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ return binn_object_set_raw(obj, key, type, pvalue, size); ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++// this function is used by the wrappers ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_add_value(binn *item, int binn_type, int id, char *name, int type, void *pvalue, int size) { ++ ++ switch (binn_type) { ++ case BINN_LIST: ++ return binn_list_add(item, type, pvalue, size); ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ return binn_map_set(item, id, type, pvalue, size); ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ return binn_object_set(item, name, type, pvalue, size); ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_add_new(binn *list, binn *value) { ++ BOOL retval; ++ ++ retval = binn_list_add_value(list, value); ++ if (value) free_fn(value); ++ return retval; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_set_new(binn *map, int id, binn *value) { ++ BOOL retval; ++ ++ retval = binn_map_set_value(map, id, value); ++ if (value) free_fn(value); ++ return retval; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_set_new(binn *obj, const char *key, binn *value) { ++ BOOL retval; ++ ++ retval = binn_object_set_value(obj, key, value); ++ if (value) free_fn(value); ++ return retval; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*** READ FUNCTIONS ******************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_value(const void *ptr, int pos) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_list_get_value(ptr, pos, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_value(const void *ptr, int id) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_map_get_value(ptr, id, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_value(const void *ptr, const char *key) { ++ binn *value; ++ ++ value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ ++ if (binn_object_get_value(ptr, key, value) == FALSE) { ++ free_fn(value); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ value->allocated = TRUE; ++ return value; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read(const void *list, int pos, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_list_get_value(list, pos, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read(const void *map, int id, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_map_get_value(map, id, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read(const void *obj, const char *key, int *ptype, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ ++ if (binn_object_get_value(obj, key, &value) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ if (ptype) *ptype = value.type; ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN ++ return store_value(&value); ++#else ++ return value.ptr; ++#endif ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get(const void *ptr, int pos, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ int storage_type; ++ ++ storage_type = binn_get_read_storage(type); ++ if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES && pvalue == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ zero_value(pvalue, type); ++ ++ if (binn_list_get_value(ptr, pos, &value) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (copy_value(value.ptr, pvalue, value.type, type, storage_type) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get(const void *ptr, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ int storage_type; ++ ++ storage_type = binn_get_read_storage(type); ++ if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES && pvalue == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ zero_value(pvalue, type); ++ ++ if (binn_map_get_value(ptr, id, &value) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (copy_value(value.ptr, pvalue, value.type, type, storage_type) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++// if (binn_object_get(obj, "multiplier", BINN_INT32, &multiplier, NULL) == FALSE) xxx; ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get(const void *ptr, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize) { ++ binn value; ++ int storage_type; ++ ++ storage_type = binn_get_read_storage(type); ++ if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES && pvalue == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ zero_value(pvalue, type); ++ ++ if (binn_object_get_value(ptr, key, &value) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (copy_value(value.ptr, pvalue, value.type, type, storage_type) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (psize) *psize = value.size; ++ ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++// these functions below may not be implemented as inline functions, because ++// they use a lot of space, even for the variable. so they will be exported. ++ ++// but what about using as static? ++// is there any problem with wrappers? can these wrappers implement these functions using the header? ++// if as static, will they be present even on modules that don't use the functions? ++ ++signed char APIENTRY binn_list_int8(const void *list, int pos) { ++ signed char value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT8, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++short APIENTRY binn_list_int16(const void *list, int pos) { ++ short value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT16, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_list_int32(const void *list, int pos) { ++ int value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++int64 APIENTRY binn_list_int64(const void *list, int pos) { ++ int64 value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_list_uint8(const void *list, int pos) { ++ unsigned char value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT8, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_list_uint16(const void *list, int pos) { ++ unsigned short value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT16, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_list_uint32(const void *list, int pos) { ++ unsigned int value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++uint64 APIENTRY binn_list_uint64(const void *list, int pos) { ++ uint64 value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++float APIENTRY binn_list_float(const void *list, int pos) { ++ float value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++double APIENTRY binn_list_double(const void *list, int pos) { ++ double value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_bool(const void *list, int pos) { ++ BOOL value = TRUE; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BOOL, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_null(const void *list, int pos) { ++ ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++} ++ ++char * APIENTRY binn_list_str(const void *list, int pos) { ++ char *value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_STRING, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_blob(const void *list, int pos, int *psize) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BLOB, &value, psize); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_list(const void *list, int pos) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_LIST, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_map(const void *list, int pos) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_MAP, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_object(const void *list, int pos) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_OBJECT, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++signed char APIENTRY binn_map_int8(const void *map, int id) { ++ signed char value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT8, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++short APIENTRY binn_map_int16(const void *map, int id) { ++ short value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT16, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_map_int32(const void *map, int id) { ++ int value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++int64 APIENTRY binn_map_int64(const void *map, int id) { ++ int64 value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_map_uint8(const void *map, int id) { ++ unsigned char value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT8, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_map_uint16(const void *map, int id) { ++ unsigned short value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT16, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_map_uint32(const void *map, int id) { ++ unsigned int value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++uint64 APIENTRY binn_map_uint64(const void *map, int id) { ++ uint64 value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++float APIENTRY binn_map_float(const void *map, int id) { ++ float value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++double APIENTRY binn_map_double(const void *map, int id) { ++ double value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_bool(const void *map, int id) { ++ BOOL value = TRUE; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BOOL, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_null(const void *map, int id) { ++ ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++} ++ ++char * APIENTRY binn_map_str(const void *map, int id) { ++ char *value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_STRING, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_blob(const void *map, int id, int *psize) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BLOB, &value, psize); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_list(const void *map, int id) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_LIST, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_map(const void *map, int id) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_MAP, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_object(const void *map, int id) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_OBJECT, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++signed char APIENTRY binn_object_int8(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ signed char value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT8, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++short APIENTRY binn_object_int16(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ short value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT16, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_object_int32(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ int value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++int64 APIENTRY binn_object_int64(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ int64 value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_object_uint8(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ unsigned char value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT8, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_object_uint16(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ unsigned short value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT16, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_object_uint32(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ unsigned int value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++uint64 APIENTRY binn_object_uint64(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ uint64 value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++float APIENTRY binn_object_float(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ float value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++double APIENTRY binn_object_double(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ double value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_bool(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ BOOL value = TRUE; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BOOL, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_null(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++} ++ ++char * APIENTRY binn_object_str(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ char *value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_STRING, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_blob(const void *obj, const char *key, int *psize) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BLOB, &value, psize); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_list(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_LIST, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_map(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_MAP, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_object(const void *obj, const char *key) { ++ void *value; ++ ++ binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_OBJECT, &value, NULL); ++ ++ return value; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE binn * binn_alloc_item() { ++ binn *item; ++ item = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn)); ++ if (item) { ++ memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn)); ++ item->header = BINN_MAGIC; ++ item->allocated = TRUE; ++ //item->writable = FALSE; -- already zeroed ++ } ++ return item; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_value(int type, void *pvalue, int size, binn_mem_free freefn) { ++ int storage_type; ++ binn *item = binn_alloc_item(); ++ if (item) { ++ item->type = type; ++ binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, NULL); ++ switch (storage_type) { ++ case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES: ++ break; ++ case BINN_STORAGE_STRING: ++ if (size == 0) size = strlen((char*)pvalue) + 1; ++ /* fall through */ ++ case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB: ++ case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER: ++ if (freefn == BINN_TRANSIENT) { ++ item->ptr = binn_memdup(pvalue, size); ++ if (item->ptr == NULL) { ++ free_fn(item); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ item->freefn = free_fn; ++ if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_STRING) size--; ++ } else { ++ item->ptr = pvalue; ++ item->freefn = freefn; ++ } ++ item->size = size; ++ break; ++ default: ++ item->ptr = &item->vint32; ++ copy_raw_value(pvalue, item->ptr, storage_type); ++ } ++ } ++ return item; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_string(binn *item, char *str, binn_mem_free pfree) { ++ ++ if (item == NULL || str == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (pfree == BINN_TRANSIENT) { ++ item->ptr = binn_memdup(str, strlen(str) + 1); ++ if (item->ptr == NULL) return FALSE; ++ item->freefn = free_fn; ++ } else { ++ item->ptr = str; ++ item->freefn = pfree; ++ } ++ ++ item->type = BINN_STRING; ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_blob(binn *item, void *ptr, int size, binn_mem_free pfree) { ++ ++ if (item == NULL || ptr == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (pfree == BINN_TRANSIENT) { ++ item->ptr = binn_memdup(ptr, size); ++ if (item->ptr == NULL) return FALSE; ++ item->freefn = free_fn; ++ } else { ++ item->ptr = ptr; ++ item->freefn = pfree; ++ } ++ ++ item->type = BINN_BLOB; ++ item->size = size; ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*** READ CONVERTED VALUE ************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++#ifdef _MSC_VER ++#define atoi64 _atoi64 ++#else ++int64 atoi64(char *str) { ++ int64 retval; ++ int is_negative=0; ++ ++ if (*str == '-') { ++ is_negative = 1; ++ str++; ++ } ++ retval = 0; ++ for (; *str; str++) { ++ retval = 10 * retval + (*str - '0'); ++ } ++ if (is_negative) retval *= -1; ++ return retval; ++} ++#endif ++ ++/*****************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL is_integer(char *p) { ++ BOOL retval; ++ ++ if (p == NULL) return FALSE; ++ if (*p == '-') p++; ++ if (*p == 0) return FALSE; ++ ++ retval = TRUE; ++ ++ for (; *p; p++) { ++ if ( (*p < '0' || *p > '9') ) { ++ retval = FALSE; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++/*****************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL is_float(char *p) { ++ BOOL retval, number_found=FALSE; ++ ++ if (p == NULL) return FALSE; ++ if (*p == '-') p++; ++ if (*p == 0) return FALSE; ++ ++ retval = TRUE; ++ ++ for (; *p; p++) { ++ if (*p == '.' || *p == ',') { ++ if (!number_found) retval = FALSE; ++ } else if ( *p >= '0' && *p <= '9' ) { ++ number_found = TRUE; ++ } else { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return retval; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL is_bool_str(char *str, BOOL *pbool) { ++ int64 vint; ++ double vdouble; ++ ++ if (str == NULL || pbool == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (stricmp(str, "true") == 0) goto loc_true; ++ if (stricmp(str, "yes") == 0) goto loc_true; ++ if (stricmp(str, "on") == 0) goto loc_true; ++ //if (stricmp(str, "1") == 0) goto loc_true; ++ ++ if (stricmp(str, "false") == 0) goto loc_false; ++ if (stricmp(str, "no") == 0) goto loc_false; ++ if (stricmp(str, "off") == 0) goto loc_false; ++ //if (stricmp(str, "0") == 0) goto loc_false; ++ ++ if (is_integer(str)) { ++ vint = atoi64(str); ++ *pbool = (vint != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE; ++ return TRUE; ++ } else if (is_float(str)) { ++ vdouble = atof(str); ++ *pbool = (vdouble != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE; ++ return TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ return FALSE; ++ ++loc_true: ++ *pbool = TRUE; ++ return TRUE; ++ ++loc_false: ++ *pbool = FALSE; ++ return TRUE; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_int32(binn *value, int *pint) { ++ ++ if (value == NULL || pint == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) { ++ return copy_int_value(value->ptr, pint, value->type, BINN_INT32); ++ } ++ ++ switch (value->type) { ++ case BINN_FLOAT: ++ if (value->vfloat < (float)INT32_MIN || value->vfloat > (float)INT32_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *pint = roundval(value->vfloat); ++ break; ++ case BINN_DOUBLE: ++ if (value->vdouble < (double)INT32_MIN || value->vdouble > (double)INT32_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *pint = roundval(value->vdouble); ++ break; ++ case BINN_STRING: ++ if (is_integer((char*)value->ptr)) ++ *pint = atoi((char*)value->ptr); ++ else if (is_float((char*)value->ptr)) ++ *pint = roundval(atof((char*)value->ptr)); ++ else ++ return FALSE; ++ break; ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ *pint = value->vbool; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_int64(binn *value, int64 *pint) { ++ ++ if (value == NULL || pint == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) { ++ return copy_int_value(value->ptr, pint, value->type, BINN_INT64); ++ } ++ ++ switch (value->type) { ++ case BINN_FLOAT: ++ if (value->vfloat < (float)INT64_MIN || value->vfloat > (float)INT64_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *pint = roundval(value->vfloat); ++ break; ++ case BINN_DOUBLE: ++ if (value->vdouble < (double)INT64_MIN || value->vdouble > (double)INT64_MAX) return FALSE; ++ *pint = roundval(value->vdouble); ++ break; ++ case BINN_STRING: ++ if (is_integer((char*)value->ptr)) ++ *pint = atoi64((char*)value->ptr); ++ else if (is_float((char*)value->ptr)) ++ *pint = roundval(atof((char*)value->ptr)); ++ else ++ return FALSE; ++ break; ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ *pint = value->vbool; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_double(binn *value, double *pfloat) { ++ int64 vint; ++ ++ if (value == NULL || pfloat == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) { ++ if (copy_int_value(value->ptr, &vint, value->type, BINN_INT64) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ *pfloat = (double) vint; ++ return TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ switch (value->type) { ++ case BINN_FLOAT: ++ *pfloat = value->vfloat; ++ break; ++ case BINN_DOUBLE: ++ *pfloat = value->vdouble; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STRING: ++ if (is_integer((char*)value->ptr)) ++ *pfloat = (double) atoi64((char*)value->ptr); ++ else if (is_float((char*)value->ptr)) ++ *pfloat = atof((char*)value->ptr); ++ else ++ return FALSE; ++ break; ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ *pfloat = value->vbool; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_bool(binn *value, BOOL *pbool) { ++ int64 vint; ++ ++ if (value == NULL || pbool == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) { ++ if (copy_int_value(value->ptr, &vint, value->type, BINN_INT64) == FALSE) return FALSE; ++ *pbool = (vint != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE; ++ return TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ switch (value->type) { ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ *pbool = value->vbool; ++ break; ++ case BINN_FLOAT: ++ *pbool = (value->vfloat != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE; ++ break; ++ case BINN_DOUBLE: ++ *pbool = (value->vdouble != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE; ++ break; ++ case BINN_STRING: ++ return is_bool_str((char*)value->ptr, pbool); ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++char * APIENTRY binn_get_str(binn *value) { ++ int64 vint; ++ char buf[128]; ++ ++ if (value == NULL) return NULL; ++ ++ if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) { ++ if (copy_int_value(value->ptr, &vint, value->type, BINN_INT64) == FALSE) return NULL; ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%" INT64_FORMAT, vint); ++ goto loc_convert_value; ++ } ++ ++ switch (value->type) { ++ case BINN_FLOAT: ++ value->vdouble = value->vfloat; ++ /* fall through */ ++ case BINN_DOUBLE: ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%g", value->vdouble); ++ goto loc_convert_value; ++ case BINN_STRING: ++ return (char*) value->ptr; ++ case BINN_BOOL: ++ if (value->vbool) ++ strcpy(buf, "true"); ++ else ++ strcpy(buf, "false"); ++ goto loc_convert_value; ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++ ++loc_convert_value: ++ ++ //value->vint64 = 0; ++ value->ptr = strdup(buf); ++ if (value->ptr == NULL) return NULL; ++ value->freefn = free; ++ value->type = BINN_STRING; ++ return (char*) value->ptr; ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*** GENERAL FUNCTIONS ***************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_container(binn *item) { ++ ++ if (item == NULL) return FALSE; ++ ++ switch (item->type) { ++ case BINN_LIST: ++ case BINN_MAP: ++ case BINN_OBJECT: ++ return TRUE; ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.h openssh-10.0p1/binn.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/binn.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.303905629 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,945 @@ ++ ++// TO ENABLE INLINE FUNCTIONS: ++// ON MSVC: enable the 'Inline Function Expansion' (/Ob2) compiler option, and maybe the ++// 'Whole Program Optimitazion' (/GL), that requires the ++// 'Link Time Code Generation' (/LTCG) linker option to be enabled too ++ ++#ifndef BINN_H ++#define BINN_H ++ ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++extern "C" { ++#endif ++ ++#define BINN_VERSION "3.0.0" /* using semantic versioning */ ++ ++#ifndef NULL ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++#define NULL 0 ++#else ++#define NULL ((void *)0) ++#endif ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef TRUE ++#define TRUE 1 ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef FALSE ++#define FALSE 0 ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef BOOL ++typedef int BOOL; ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef APIENTRY ++ #ifdef _WIN32 ++ #define APIENTRY __stdcall ++ #else ++ //#define APIENTRY __attribute__((stdcall)) ++ #define APIENTRY ++ #endif ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef BINN_PRIVATE ++ #ifdef DEBUG ++ #define BINN_PRIVATE ++ #else ++ #define BINN_PRIVATE static ++ #endif ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef _MSC_VER ++ #define INLINE __inline ++ #define ALWAYS_INLINE __forceinline ++#else ++ // you can change to 'extern inline' if using the gcc option -flto ++ #define INLINE static inline ++ #define ALWAYS_INLINE static inline __attribute__((always_inline)) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef int64 ++#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__BORLANDC__) ++ typedef __int64 int64; ++ typedef unsigned __int64 uint64; ++#else ++ typedef long long int int64; ++ typedef unsigned long long int uint64; ++#endif ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef _WIN32 ++#define INT64_FORMAT "I64i" ++#define UINT64_FORMAT "I64u" ++#define INT64_HEX_FORMAT "I64x" ++#else ++#define INT64_FORMAT "lli" ++#define UINT64_FORMAT "llu" ++#define INT64_HEX_FORMAT "llx" ++#endif ++ ++ ++// BINN CONSTANTS ---------------------------------------- ++ ++#define INVALID_BINN 0 ++ ++// Storage Data Types ------------------------------------ ++ ++#define BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES 0x00 ++#define BINN_STORAGE_BYTE 0x20 // 8 bits ++#define BINN_STORAGE_WORD 0x40 // 16 bits -- the endianess (byte order) is automatically corrected ++#define BINN_STORAGE_DWORD 0x60 // 32 bits -- the endianess (byte order) is automatically corrected ++#define BINN_STORAGE_QWORD 0x80 // 64 bits -- the endianess (byte order) is automatically corrected ++#define BINN_STORAGE_STRING 0xA0 // Are stored with null termination ++#define BINN_STORAGE_BLOB 0xC0 ++#define BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER 0xE0 ++#define BINN_STORAGE_VIRTUAL 0x80000 ++ ++#define BINN_STORAGE_MIN BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES ++#define BINN_STORAGE_MAX BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER ++ ++#define BINN_STORAGE_MASK 0xE0 ++#define BINN_STORAGE_MASK16 0xE000 ++#define BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE 0x10 ++#define BINN_TYPE_MASK 0x0F ++#define BINN_TYPE_MASK16 0x0FFF ++ ++#define BINN_MAX_VALUE_MASK 0xFFFFF ++ ++ ++// Data Formats ------------------------------------------ ++ ++#define BINN_LIST 0xE0 ++#define BINN_MAP 0xE1 ++#define BINN_OBJECT 0xE2 ++ ++#define BINN_NULL 0x00 ++#define BINN_TRUE 0x01 ++#define BINN_FALSE 0x02 ++ ++#define BINN_UINT8 0x20 // (BYTE) (unsigned byte) Is the default format for the BYTE type ++#define BINN_INT8 0x21 // (BYTE) (signed byte, from -128 to +127. The 0x80 is the sign bit, so the range in hex is from 0x80 [-128] to 0x7F [127], being 0x00 = 0 and 0xFF = -1) ++#define BINN_UINT16 0x40 // (WORD) (unsigned integer) Is the default format for the WORD type ++#define BINN_INT16 0x41 // (WORD) (signed integer) ++#define BINN_UINT32 0x60 // (DWORD) (unsigned integer) Is the default format for the DWORD type ++#define BINN_INT32 0x61 // (DWORD) (signed integer) ++#define BINN_UINT64 0x80 // (QWORD) (unsigned integer) Is the default format for the QWORD type ++#define BINN_INT64 0x81 // (QWORD) (signed integer) ++ ++#define BINN_SCHAR BINN_INT8 ++#define BINN_UCHAR BINN_UINT8 ++ ++#define BINN_STRING 0xA0 // (STRING) Raw String ++#define BINN_DATETIME 0xA1 // (STRING) iso8601 format -- YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS ++#define BINN_DATE 0xA2 // (STRING) iso8601 format -- YYYY-MM-DD ++#define BINN_TIME 0xA3 // (STRING) iso8601 format -- HH:MM:SS ++#define BINN_DECIMAL 0xA4 // (STRING) High precision number - used for generic decimal values and for those ones that cannot be represented in the float64 format. ++#define BINN_CURRENCYSTR 0xA5 // (STRING) With currency unit/symbol - check for some iso standard format ++#define BINN_SINGLE_STR 0xA6 // (STRING) Can be restored to float32 ++#define BINN_DOUBLE_STR 0xA7 // (STRING) May be restored to float64 ++ ++#define BINN_FLOAT32 0x62 // (DWORD) ++#define BINN_FLOAT64 0x82 // (QWORD) ++#define BINN_FLOAT BINN_FLOAT32 ++#define BINN_SINGLE BINN_FLOAT32 ++#define BINN_DOUBLE BINN_FLOAT64 ++ ++#define BINN_CURRENCY 0x83 // (QWORD) ++ ++#define BINN_BLOB 0xC0 // (BLOB) Raw Blob ++ ++ ++// virtual types: ++ ++#define BINN_BOOL 0x80061 // (DWORD) The value may be 0 or 1 ++ ++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED ++//#define BINN_SINGLE 0x800A1 // (STRING) Can be restored to float32 ++//#define BINN_DOUBLE 0x800A2 // (STRING) May be restored to float64 ++#endif ++ ++//#define BINN_BINN 0x800E1 // (CONTAINER) ++//#define BINN_BINN_BUFFER 0x800C1 // (BLOB) user binn. it's not open by the parser ++ ++ ++// extended content types: ++ ++// strings: ++ ++#define BINN_HTML 0xB001 ++#define BINN_XML 0xB002 ++#define BINN_JSON 0xB003 ++#define BINN_JAVASCRIPT 0xB004 ++#define BINN_CSS 0xB005 ++ ++// blobs: ++ ++#define BINN_JPEG 0xD001 ++#define BINN_GIF 0xD002 ++#define BINN_PNG 0xD003 ++#define BINN_BMP 0xD004 ++ ++ ++// type families ++#define BINN_FAMILY_NONE 0x00 ++#define BINN_FAMILY_NULL 0xf1 ++#define BINN_FAMILY_INT 0xf2 ++#define BINN_FAMILY_FLOAT 0xf3 ++#define BINN_FAMILY_STRING 0xf4 ++#define BINN_FAMILY_BLOB 0xf5 ++#define BINN_FAMILY_BOOL 0xf6 ++#define BINN_FAMILY_BINN 0xf7 ++ ++// integer types related to signal ++#define BINN_SIGNED_INT 11 ++#define BINN_UNSIGNED_INT 22 ++ ++ ++typedef void (*binn_mem_free)(void*); ++#define BINN_STATIC ((binn_mem_free)0) ++#define BINN_TRANSIENT ((binn_mem_free)-1) ++ ++ ++// --- BINN STRUCTURE -------------------------------------------------------------- ++ ++ ++struct binn_struct { ++ int header; // this struct header holds the magic number (BINN_MAGIC) that identifies this memory block as a binn structure ++ BOOL allocated; // the struct can be allocated using malloc_fn() or can be on the stack ++ BOOL writable; // did it was create for writing? it can use the pbuf if not unified with ptr ++ BOOL dirty; // the container header is not written to the buffer ++ // ++ void *pbuf; // use *ptr below? ++ BOOL pre_allocated; ++ int alloc_size; ++ int used_size; ++ // ++ int type; ++ void *ptr; ++ int size; ++ int count; ++ // ++ binn_mem_free freefn; // used only when type == BINN_STRING or BINN_BLOB ++ // ++ union { ++ signed char vint8; ++ signed short vint16; ++ signed int vint32; ++ int64 vint64; ++ unsigned char vuint8; ++ unsigned short vuint16; ++ unsigned int vuint32; ++ uint64 vuint64; ++ // ++ signed char vchar; ++ unsigned char vuchar; ++ signed short vshort; ++ unsigned short vushort; ++ signed int vint; ++ unsigned int vuint; ++ // ++ float vfloat; ++ double vdouble; ++ // ++ BOOL vbool; ++ }; ++ // ++ BOOL disable_int_compression; ++}; ++ ++typedef struct binn_struct binn; ++ ++ ++ ++// --- GENERAL FUNCTIONS ---------------------------------------------------------- ++ ++char * APIENTRY binn_version(); ++ ++void APIENTRY binn_set_alloc_functions(void* (*new_malloc)(size_t), void* (*new_realloc)(void*,size_t), void (*new_free)(void*)); ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_create_type(int storage_type, int data_type_index); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_type_info(int long_type, int *pstorage_type, int *pextra_type); ++ ++int APIENTRY binn_get_write_storage(int type); ++int APIENTRY binn_get_read_storage(int type); ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_container(binn *item); ++ ++ ++// --- WRITE FUNCTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------ ++ ++// create a new binn allocating memory for the structure ++binn * APIENTRY binn_new(int type, int size, void *buffer); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_list(); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map(); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object(); ++ ++// create a new binn storing the structure on the stack ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create(binn *item, int type, int size, void *buffer); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_list(binn *list); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_map(binn *map); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_object(binn *object); ++ ++// create a new binn as a copy from another ++binn * APIENTRY binn_copy(const void *old); ++ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_add_new(binn *list, binn *value); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_set_new(binn *map, int id, binn *value); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_set_new(binn *obj, const char *key, binn *value); ++ ++ ++// extended interface ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_add(binn *list, int type, void *pvalue, int size); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_set(binn *map, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int size); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_set(binn *obj, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int size); ++ ++ ++// release memory ++ ++void APIENTRY binn_free(binn *item); ++void * APIENTRY binn_release(binn *item); // free the binn structure but keeps the binn buffer allocated, returning a pointer to it. use the free function to release the buffer later ++ ++ ++// --- CREATING VALUES --------------------------------------------------- ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_value(int type, void *pvalue, int size, binn_mem_free freefn); ++ ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int8(signed char value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_INT8, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int16(short value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_INT16, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int32(int value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_INT32, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int64(int64 value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_INT64, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint8(unsigned char value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_UINT8, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint16(unsigned short value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_UINT16, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint32(unsigned int value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_UINT32, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint64(uint64 value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_UINT64, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_float(float value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_FLOAT, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_double(double value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_DOUBLE, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_bool(BOOL value) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_BOOL, &value, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_null() { ++ return binn_value(BINN_NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_string(char *str, binn_mem_free freefn) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_STRING, str, 0, freefn); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_blob(void *ptr, int size, binn_mem_free freefn) { ++ return binn_value(BINN_BLOB, ptr, size, freefn); ++} ++ ++ ++// --- READ FUNCTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------- ++ ++// these functions accept pointer to the binn structure and pointer to the binn buffer ++void * APIENTRY binn_ptr(const void *ptr); ++int APIENTRY binn_size(const void *ptr); ++int APIENTRY binn_type(const void *ptr); ++int APIENTRY binn_count(const void *ptr); ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_valid(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize); ++/* the function returns the values (type, count and size) and they don't need to be ++ initialized. these values are read from the buffer. example: ++ ++ int type, count, size; ++ result = binn_is_valid(ptr, &type, &count, &size); ++*/ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_valid_ex(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize); ++/* if some value is informed (type, count or size) then the function will check if ++ the value returned from the serialized data matches the informed value. otherwise ++ the values must be initialized to zero. example: ++ ++ int type=0, count=0, size = known_size; ++ result = binn_is_valid_ex(ptr, &type, &count, &size); ++*/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_struct(const void *ptr); ++ ++ ++// Loading a binn buffer into a binn value - this is optional ++ ++binn * APIENTRY binn_open(const void *data); // allocated - unsecure ++binn * APIENTRY binn_open_ex(const void *data, int size); // allocated - secure ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_load(const void *data, binn *item); // on stack - unsecure ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_load_ex(const void *data, int size, binn *value); // secure ++ ++ ++// easiest interface to use, but don't check if the value is there ++ ++signed char APIENTRY binn_list_int8(const void *list, int pos); ++short APIENTRY binn_list_int16(const void *list, int pos); ++int APIENTRY binn_list_int32(const void *list, int pos); ++int64 APIENTRY binn_list_int64(const void *list, int pos); ++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_list_uint8(const void *list, int pos); ++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_list_uint16(const void *list, int pos); ++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_list_uint32(const void *list, int pos); ++uint64 APIENTRY binn_list_uint64(const void *list, int pos); ++float APIENTRY binn_list_float(const void *list, int pos); ++double APIENTRY binn_list_double(const void *list, int pos); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_bool(const void *list, int pos); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_null(const void *list, int pos); ++char * APIENTRY binn_list_str(const void *list, int pos); ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_blob(const void *list, int pos, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_list(const void *list, int pos); ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_map(const void *list, int pos); ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_object(const void *list, int pos); ++ ++signed char APIENTRY binn_map_int8(const void *map, int id); ++short APIENTRY binn_map_int16(const void *map, int id); ++int APIENTRY binn_map_int32(const void *map, int id); ++int64 APIENTRY binn_map_int64(const void *map, int id); ++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_map_uint8(const void *map, int id); ++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_map_uint16(const void *map, int id); ++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_map_uint32(const void *map, int id); ++uint64 APIENTRY binn_map_uint64(const void *map, int id); ++float APIENTRY binn_map_float(const void *map, int id); ++double APIENTRY binn_map_double(const void *map, int id); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_bool(const void *map, int id); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_null(const void *map, int id); ++char * APIENTRY binn_map_str(const void *map, int id); ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_blob(const void *map, int id, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_list(const void *map, int id); ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_map(const void *map, int id); ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_object(const void *map, int id); ++ ++signed char APIENTRY binn_object_int8(const void *obj, const char *key); ++short APIENTRY binn_object_int16(const void *obj, const char *key); ++int APIENTRY binn_object_int32(const void *obj, const char *key); ++int64 APIENTRY binn_object_int64(const void *obj, const char *key); ++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_object_uint8(const void *obj, const char *key); ++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_object_uint16(const void *obj, const char *key); ++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_object_uint32(const void *obj, const char *key); ++uint64 APIENTRY binn_object_uint64(const void *obj, const char *key); ++float APIENTRY binn_object_float(const void *obj, const char *key); ++double APIENTRY binn_object_double(const void *obj, const char *key); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_bool(const void *obj, const char *key); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_null(const void *obj, const char *key); ++char * APIENTRY binn_object_str(const void *obj, const char *key); ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_blob(const void *obj, const char *key, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_list(const void *obj, const char *key); ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_map(const void *obj, const char *key); ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_object(const void *obj, const char *key); ++ ++ ++// return a pointer to an allocated binn structure - must be released with the free() function or equivalent set in binn_set_alloc_functions() ++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_value(const void *list, int pos); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_value(const void *map, int id); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_value(const void *obj, const char *key); ++ ++// read the value to a binn structure on the stack ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get_value(const void *list, int pos, binn *value); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_value(const void *map, int id, binn *value); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_value(const void *obj, const char *key, binn *value); ++ ++// single interface - these functions check the data type ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get(const void *list, int pos, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get(const void *map, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get(const void *obj, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize); ++ ++// these 3 functions return a pointer to the value and the data type ++// they are thread-safe on big-endian devices ++// on little-endian devices they are thread-safe only to return pointers to list, map, object, blob and strings ++// the returned pointer to 16, 32 and 64 bits values must be used only by single-threaded applications ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read(const void *list, int pos, int *ptype, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read(const void *map, int id, int *ptype, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read(const void *obj, const char *key, int *ptype, int *psize); ++ ++ ++// READ PAIR FUNCTIONS ++ ++// these functions use base 1 in the 'pos' argument ++ ++// on stack ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_pair(const void *map, int pos, int *pid, binn *value); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_pair(const void *obj, int pos, char *pkey, binn *value); // the key must be declared as: char key[256]; ++ ++// allocated ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_pair(const void *map, int pos, int *pid); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_pair(const void *obj, int pos, char *pkey); // the key must be declared as: char key[256]; ++ ++// these 2 functions return a pointer to the value and the data type ++// they are thread-safe on big-endian devices ++// on little-endian devices they are thread-safe only to return pointers to list, map, object, blob and strings ++// the returned pointer to 16, 32 and 64 bits values must be used only by single-threaded applications ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize); ++ ++ ++// SEQUENTIAL READ FUNCTIONS ++ ++typedef struct binn_iter_struct { ++ unsigned char *pnext; ++ unsigned char *plimit; ++ int type; ++ int count; ++ int current; ++} binn_iter; ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_iter_init(binn_iter *iter, const void *pbuf, int type); ++ ++// allocated ++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_next_value(binn_iter *iter); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_next_value(binn_iter *iter, int *pid); ++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_next_value(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey); // the key must be declared as: char key[256]; ++ ++// on stack ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_next(binn_iter *iter, binn *value); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, binn *value); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, binn *value); // the key must be declared as: char key[256]; ++ ++// these 3 functions return a pointer to the value and the data type ++// they are thread-safe on big-endian devices ++// on little-endian devices they are thread-safe only to return pointers to list, map, object, blob and strings ++// the returned pointer to 16, 32 and 64 bits values must be used only by single-threaded applications ++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *ptype, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize); ++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize); // the key must be declared as: char key[256]; ++ ++ ++// --- MACROS ------------------------------------------------------------ ++ ++ ++#define binn_is_writable(item) (item)->writable; ++ ++ ++// set values on stack allocated binn structures ++ ++#define binn_set_null(item) do { (item)->type = BINN_NULL; } while (0) ++ ++#define binn_set_bool(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_BOOL; (item)->vbool = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vbool); } while (0) ++ ++#define binn_set_int(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_INT32; (item)->vint32 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vint32); } while (0) ++#define binn_set_int64(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_INT64; (item)->vint64 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vint64); } while (0) ++ ++#define binn_set_uint(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_UINT32; (item)->vuint32 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vuint32); } while (0) ++#define binn_set_uint64(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_UINT64; (item)->vuint64 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vuint64); } while (0) ++ ++#define binn_set_float(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_FLOAT; (item)->vfloat = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vfloat); } while (0) ++#define binn_set_double(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_DOUBLE; (item)->vdouble = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vdouble); } while (0) ++ ++//#define binn_set_string(item,str,pfree) do { (item)->type = BINN_STRING; (item)->ptr = str; (item)->freefn = pfree; } while (0) ++//#define binn_set_blob(item,ptr,size,pfree) do { (item)->type = BINN_BLOB; (item)->ptr = ptr; (item)->freefn = pfree; (item)->size = size; } while (0) ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_string(binn *item, char *str, binn_mem_free pfree); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_blob(binn *item, void *ptr, int size, binn_mem_free pfree); ++ ++ ++//#define binn_double(value) { (item)->type = BINN_DOUBLE; (item)->vdouble = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vdouble) } ++ ++ ++ ++// FOREACH MACROS ++// -------------- ++// ++// We must use these declarations inside the functions that will use the macros: ++// ++// binn_iter iter; ++// binn value; ++// char key[256]; // only for objects ++// int id; // only for maps ++ ++#define binn_object_foreach(object, key, value) \ ++ binn_iter_init(&iter, object, BINN_OBJECT); \ ++ while (binn_object_next(&iter, key, &value)) ++ ++#define binn_map_foreach(map, id, value) \ ++ binn_iter_init(&iter, map, BINN_MAP); \ ++ while (binn_map_next(&iter, &id, &value)) ++ ++#define binn_list_foreach(list, value) \ ++ binn_iter_init(&iter, list, BINN_LIST); \ ++ while (binn_list_next(&iter, &value)) ++ ++// If you need nested foreach loops, use the macros below for the nested loop ++// Also we need to add an additional declaration on the function to hold the iterator ++// We can add in the same line as the first iterator: ++// ++// binn_iter iter, iter2; ++ ++#define binn_object_foreach2(object, key, value) \ ++ binn_iter_init(&iter2, object, BINN_OBJECT); \ ++ while (binn_object_next(&iter2, key, &value)) ++ ++#define binn_map_foreach2(map, id, value) \ ++ binn_iter_init(&iter2, map, BINN_MAP); \ ++ while (binn_map_next(&iter2, &id, &value)) ++ ++#define binn_list_foreach2(list, value) \ ++ binn_iter_init(&iter2, list, BINN_LIST); \ ++ while (binn_list_next(&iter2, &value)) ++ ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*** SET FUNCTIONS *******************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int8(binn *list, signed char value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT8, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int16(binn *list, short value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT16, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int32(binn *list, int value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int64(binn *list, int64 value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint8(binn *list, unsigned char value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT8, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint16(binn *list, unsigned short value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT16, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint32(binn *list, unsigned int value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint64(binn *list, uint64 value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_float(binn *list, float value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_double(binn *list, double value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_bool(binn *list, BOOL value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_BOOL, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_null(binn *list) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_NULL, NULL, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_str(binn *list, char *str) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_STRING, str, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_blob(binn *list, void *ptr, int size) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_BLOB, ptr, size); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_list(binn *list, void *list2) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_LIST, binn_ptr(list2), binn_size(list2)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_map(binn *list, void *map) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_MAP, binn_ptr(map), binn_size(map)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_object(binn *list, void *obj) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, BINN_OBJECT, binn_ptr(obj), binn_size(obj)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_value(binn *list, binn *value) { ++ return binn_list_add(list, value->type, binn_ptr(value), binn_size(value)); ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int8(binn *map, int id, signed char value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT8, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int16(binn *map, int id, short value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT16, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int32(binn *map, int id, int value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int64(binn *map, int id, int64 value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint8(binn *map, int id, unsigned char value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT8, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint16(binn *map, int id, unsigned short value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT16, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint32(binn *map, int id, unsigned int value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint64(binn *map, int id, uint64 value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_float(binn *map, int id, float value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_double(binn *map, int id, double value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_bool(binn *map, int id, BOOL value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_BOOL, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_null(binn *map, int id) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_NULL, NULL, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_str(binn *map, int id, char *str) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_STRING, str, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_blob(binn *map, int id, void *ptr, int size) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_BLOB, ptr, size); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_list(binn *map, int id, void *list) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_LIST, binn_ptr(list), binn_size(list)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_map(binn *map, int id, void *map2) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_MAP, binn_ptr(map2), binn_size(map2)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_object(binn *map, int id, void *obj) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_OBJECT, binn_ptr(obj), binn_size(obj)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_value(binn *map, int id, binn *value) { ++ return binn_map_set(map, id, value->type, binn_ptr(value), binn_size(value)); ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int8(binn *obj, const char *key, signed char value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT8, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int16(binn *obj, const char *key, short value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT16, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int32(binn *obj, const char *key, int value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int64(binn *obj, const char *key, int64 value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint8(binn *obj, const char *key, unsigned char value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT8, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint16(binn *obj, const char *key, unsigned short value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT16, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint32(binn *obj, const char *key, unsigned int value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint64(binn *obj, const char *key, uint64 value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_float(binn *obj, const char *key, float value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_double(binn *obj, const char *key, double value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_bool(binn *obj, const char *key, BOOL value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_BOOL, &value, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_null(binn *obj, const char *key) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_NULL, NULL, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_str(binn *obj, const char *key, char *str) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_STRING, str, 0); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_blob(binn *obj, const char *key, void *ptr, int size) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_BLOB, ptr, size); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_list(binn *obj, const char *key, void *list) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_LIST, binn_ptr(list), binn_size(list)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_map(binn *obj, const char *key, void *map) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_MAP, binn_ptr(map), binn_size(map)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_object(binn *obj, const char *key, void *obj2) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_OBJECT, binn_ptr(obj2), binn_size(obj2)); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_value(binn *obj, const char *key, binn *value) { ++ return binn_object_set(obj, key, value->type, binn_ptr(value), binn_size(value)); ++} ++ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++/*** GET FUNCTIONS *******************************************************************/ ++/*************************************************************************************/ ++ ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int8(const void *list, int pos, signed char *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT8, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int16(const void *list, int pos, short *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT16, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int32(const void *list, int pos, int *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int64(const void *list, int pos, int64 *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint8(const void *list, int pos, unsigned char *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT8, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint16(const void *list, int pos, unsigned short *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT16, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint32(const void *list, int pos, unsigned int *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint64(const void *list, int pos, uint64 *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_float(const void *list, int pos, float *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_double(const void *list, int pos, double *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_bool(const void *list, int pos, BOOL *pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BOOL, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_str(const void *list, int pos, char **pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_STRING, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_blob(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue, int *psize) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BLOB, pvalue, psize); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_list(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_LIST, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_map(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_MAP, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_object(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_OBJECT, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int8(const void *map, int id, signed char *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT8, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int16(const void *map, int id, short *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT16, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int32(const void *map, int id, int *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int64(const void *map, int id, int64 *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint8(const void *map, int id, unsigned char *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT8, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint16(const void *map, int id, unsigned short *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT16, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint32(const void *map, int id, unsigned int *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint64(const void *map, int id, uint64 *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_float(const void *map, int id, float *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_double(const void *map, int id, double *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_bool(const void *map, int id, BOOL *pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BOOL, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_str(const void *map, int id, char **pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_STRING, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_blob(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue, int *psize) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BLOB, pvalue, psize); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_list(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_LIST, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_map(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_MAP, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_object(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_OBJECT, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++// usage: ++// if (binn_object_get_int32(obj, "key", &value) == FALSE) xxx; ++ ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int8(const void *obj, const char *key, signed char *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT8, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int16(const void *obj, const char *key, short *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT16, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int32(const void *obj, const char *key, int *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int64(const void *obj, const char *key, int64 *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint8(const void *obj, const char *key, unsigned char *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT8, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint16(const void *obj, const char *key, unsigned short *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT16, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint32(const void *obj, const char *key, unsigned int *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint64(const void *obj, const char *key, uint64 *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_float(const void *obj, const char *key, float *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT32, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_double(const void *obj, const char *key, double *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT64, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_bool(const void *obj, const char *key, BOOL *pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BOOL, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_str(const void *obj, const char *key, char **pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_STRING, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_blob(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue, int *psize) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BLOB, pvalue, psize); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_list(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_LIST, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_map(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_MAP, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_object(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue) { ++ return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_OBJECT, pvalue, NULL); ++} ++ ++/***************************************************************************/ ++ ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_int32(binn *value, int *pint); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_int64(binn *value, int64 *pint); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_double(binn *value, double *pfloat); ++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_bool(binn *value, BOOL *pbool); ++char * APIENTRY binn_get_str(binn *value); ++ ++// boolean string values: ++// 1, true, yes, on ++// 0, false, no, off ++ ++// boolean number values: ++// !=0 [true] ++// ==0 [false] ++ ++ ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++} ++#endif ++ ++#endif //BINN_H +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.c openssh-10.0p1/channels.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.614387370 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/channels.c 2025-06-14 11:44:14.886309096 +0200 +@@ -99,6 +99,11 @@ + /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ + #define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 + ++/* in version of OpenSSH later than 8.8 if we advertise a window ++ * 16MB or larger is causes a pathological behaviour that reduces ++ * throughput. This is not a great solution. */ ++#define NON_HPN_WINDOW_MAX (15 * 1024 * 1024) ++ + /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */ + typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c); + +@@ -227,6 +232,9 @@ + /* Setup helper */ + static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc); + ++/* default values to enable hpn and the initial buffer size */ ++static int hpn_disabled = 0; ++ + /* -- channel core */ + + void +@@ -521,6 +529,16 @@ + (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); ++ ++ /* these buffers are important in terms of tracking channel ++ * buffer usage so label and type them with descriptive names */ ++ sshbuf_relabel(c->input, "channel input"); ++ sshbuf_type(c->input, BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT); ++ sshbuf_relabel(c->output, "channel output"); ++ sshbuf_type(c->output, BUF_CHANNEL_OUTPUT); ++ sshbuf_relabel(c->extended, "channel extended"); ++ sshbuf_type(c->extended, BUF_CHANNEL_EXTENDED); ++ + if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_set_max_size"); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; +@@ -532,6 +550,7 @@ + c->local_window = window; + c->local_window_max = window; + c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; ++ c->dynamic_window = 0; + c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); + c->ctl_chan = -1; + c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ +@@ -1259,6 +1278,33 @@ + c->io_want = SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W; + } + ++static int ++channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0; ++ socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz); ++ int ret = -1; ++ ++ /* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */ ++ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) ++ return 128 * 1024; ++ ++ ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), ++ SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz); ++ /* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */ ++ if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) ++ tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; ++ /* if the remote side is OpenSSH after version 8.8 we need to restrict ++ * the size of the advertised window. Now this means that any HPN to non-HPN ++ * connection will be window limited to 15MB of receive space. This is a ++ * non-optimal solution. ++ */ ++ ++ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW) && (tcpwinsz > NON_HPN_WINDOW_MAX)) ++ tcpwinsz = NON_HPN_WINDOW_MAX; ++ return (tcpwinsz); ++} ++ + static void + channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) + { +@@ -2366,18 +2412,29 @@ + c->local_maxpacket*3) || + c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && + c->local_consumed > 0) { ++ int addition = 0; ++ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh); ++ /* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment ++ * and the tcp receive buffer is larger than the ssh window */ ++ if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) { ++ /* aggressively grow the window */ ++ addition = tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max; ++ c->local_window_max += addition; ++ debug_f("Channel %d: Window growth to %d by %d bytes",c->self, ++ c->local_window_max, addition); ++ } + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || +- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed + addition)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); + } + debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, +- c->local_window, c->local_consumed); +- c->local_window += c->local_consumed; ++ c->local_window, c->local_consumed + addition); ++ c->local_window += c->local_consumed + addition; + c->local_consumed = 0; + } + return 1; +@@ -2963,9 +3020,7 @@ + * in use. + */ + if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) +- debug2("channel %d: " +- "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", +- c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); ++ {} + else + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + } +@@ -3674,7 +3729,7 @@ + error_fr(r, "parse adjust"); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message"); + } +- debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust); ++ debug3_f("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust); + if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) { + fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", + c->self, adjust, c->remote_window); +@@ -3789,6 +3844,13 @@ + return addr; + } + ++void ++channel_set_hpn_disabled(int external_hpn_disabled) ++{ ++ hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled; ++ debug("HPN Disabled: %d", hpn_disabled); ++} ++ + static int + channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type, + struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.h openssh-10.0p1/channels.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.h 2025-06-14 10:53:01.467785388 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/channels.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.306120024 +0200 +@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ + u_int local_window_max; + u_int local_consumed; + u_int local_maxpacket; ++ int dynamic_window; + int extended_usage; + int single_connection; + +@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ + #define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK (SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R|SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) + + /* Read buffer size */ +-#define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024) ++#define CHAN_RBUF CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT + + /* Maximum size for direct reads to buffers */ + #define CHANNEL_MAX_READ CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT +@@ -399,4 +400,6 @@ + void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); + void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); + ++/* hpn handler */ ++void channel_set_hpn_disabled(int); + #endif +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.716919856 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher.c 2025-06-14 12:01:51.076334585 +0200 +@@ -48,23 +48,39 @@ + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "digest.h" ++#include "log.h" + + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + ++/* for provider functions */ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void ++#define EVP_CIPHER void ++#else ++/* for multi-threaded aes-ctr cipher */ ++extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void); + #endif + + struct sshcipher_ctx { + int plaintext; + int encrypt; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp; ++ const EVP_CIPHER *meth_ptr; /*used to free memory in aes_ctr_mt */ + struct chachapoly_ctx *cp_ctx; ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cp_ctx_mt; ++#endif + struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + }; + +-static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { ++static struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES + { "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, +@@ -86,6 +102,10 @@ + #endif + { "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com", + 8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ { "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org", ++ 8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY|CFLAG_MT, NULL }, ++#endif + { "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } +@@ -131,12 +151,63 @@ + #endif + } + ++/* used to get the cipher name when we are testing to ++ * see if we can move from a serial to parallel cipher ++ * only called in cipher-switch.c ++ */ ++const char * ++cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) ++{ ++ return cc->cipher->name; ++} ++ + u_int + cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c) + { + return (c->block_size); + } + ++uint64_t ++cipher_rekey_blocks(const struct sshcipher *c) ++{ ++ /* ++ * Chacha20-Poly1305 does not benefit from data-based rekeying, ++ * per "The Security of ChaCha20-Poly1305 in the Multi-user Setting", ++ * Degabriele, J. P., Govinden, J, Gunther, F. and Paterson K. ++ * ACM CCS 2021; https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/085.pdf ++ * ++ * Cryptanalysis aside, we do still want do need to prevent the SSH ++ * sequence number wrapping and also to rekey to provide some ++ * protection for long lived sessions against key disclosure at the ++ * endpoints, so arrange for rekeying every 2**32 blocks as the ++ * 128-bit block ciphers do (i.e. every 32GB data). ++ */ ++ if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ++ return (uint64_t)1 << 32; ++ ++ /* there is no actual need to rekey the NULL cipher but ++ * rekeying is a necessary step. In part, as mentioned above, ++ * to keep the seqnr from wrapping. So we set it to the ++ * maximum possible -cjr 4/10/23 */ ++ if ((c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) ++ return (uint64_t)1 << 32; ++ ++ /* ++ * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, ++ * so enforce a 1GB data limit for small blocksizes. ++ * See discussion in RFC4344 section 3.2. ++ */ ++ if (c->block_size < 16) ++ return ((uint64_t)1 << 30) / c->block_size; ++ /* ++ * Otherwise, use the RFC4344 s3.2 recommendation of 2**(L/4) blocks ++ * before rekeying where L is the blocksize in bits. ++ * Most other ciphers have a 128 bit blocksize, so this equates to ++ * 2**32 blocks / 64GB data. ++ */ ++ return (uint64_t)1 << (c->block_size * 2); ++} ++ + u_int + cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c) + { +@@ -180,10 +251,10 @@ + return cc->plaintext; + } + +-const struct sshcipher * ++struct sshcipher * + cipher_by_name(const char *name) + { +- const struct sshcipher *c; ++ struct sshcipher *c; + for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c; +@@ -205,7 +276,8 @@ + for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { + c = cipher_by_name(p); +- if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) { ++ if (c == NULL || ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0 && ++ (c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)) { + free(cipher_list); + return 0; + } +@@ -226,7 +298,7 @@ + int + cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher, + const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen, +- int do_encrypt) ++ u_int seqnr, int do_encrypt, int enable_threads) + { + struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +@@ -241,6 +313,7 @@ + + cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0; + cc->encrypt = do_encrypt; ++ cc->meth_ptr = NULL; + + if (keylen < cipher->key_len || + (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) { +@@ -250,8 +323,19 @@ + + cc->cipher = cipher; + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) { ++ cc->cp_ctx_mt = chachapoly_new_mt(seqnr, key, keylen); ++ ret = cc->cp_ctx_mt != NULL ? 0 : ++ SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ cc->cp_ctx = chachapoly_new(key, keylen); ++ ret = cc->cp_ctx != NULL ? 0 : SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } ++#else + cc->cp_ctx = chachapoly_new(key, keylen); + ret = cc->cp_ctx != NULL ? 0 : SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++#endif + goto out; + } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { +@@ -273,6 +357,53 @@ + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } ++ /* the following block is for AES-CTR-MT cipher switching ++ * if we are using the ctr cipher and we are post-auth then ++ * start the threaded cipher. If OSSL supports providers (OSSL 3.0+) then ++ * we load our hpnssh provider. If it doesn't (OSSL < 1.1) then we use the ++ * _meth_new process found in cipher-ctr-mt.c */ ++ if (strstr(cc->cipher->name, "ctr") && enable_threads) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++ /* this version of openssl uses providers */ ++ OSSL_LIB_CTX *aes_lib = NULL; /* probably not needed */ ++ OSSL_PROVIDER *aes_mt_provider = NULL; ++ type = NULL; ++ ++ if (OSSL_PROVIDER_add_builtin(aes_lib, "hpnssh", ++ OSSL_provider_init) != 1) { ++ fatal("Failed to add HPNSSH provider for AES-CTR"); ++ } ++ aes_mt_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(aes_lib, "hpnssh"); ++ ++ if (aes_mt_provider != NULL) { ++ /* use the previous key length to determine which cipher to load */ ++ if (cipher->key_len == 32) ++ type = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(aes_lib, "aes_ctr_mt_256", NULL); ++ if (cipher->key_len == 24) ++ type = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(aes_lib, "aes_ctr_mt_192", NULL); ++ if (cipher->key_len == 16) ++ type = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(aes_lib, "aes_ctr_mt_128", NULL); ++ if (type == NULL) { ++ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ++ fatal("FAILED TO LOAD aes_ctr_mt"); ++ } else { ++ debug("LOADED aes_ctr_mt"); ++ } ++ } ++ else { ++ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ++ fatal("Failed to load HPN-SSH AES-CTR-MT provider."); ++ } ++#else ++ type = (*evp_aes_ctr_mt)(); /* see cipher-ctr-mt.c */ ++ /* we need to free this later if using aes_ctr_mt ++ * under OSSL 1.1. Honestly, we could avoid this by making ++ * it a global in cipher-ctr_mt.c and exporting it here ++ * then we'd only have to call EVP_CIPHER_meth once but this ++ * works for now. TODO: This. cjr 02.22.2023 */ ++ cc->meth_ptr = type; ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */ ++ } /* if (strstr()) */ + if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv, + (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +@@ -327,6 +458,12 @@ + const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen) + { + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) { ++ return chachapoly_crypt_mt(cc->cp_ctx_mt, seqnr, dest, ++ src, len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); ++ } ++#endif + return chachapoly_crypt(cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, + len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); + } +@@ -389,9 +526,16 @@ + cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, + const u_char *cp, u_int len) + { +- if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ++ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) { ++ return chachapoly_get_length_mt(cc->cp_ctx_mt, plenp, ++ seqnr, cp, len); ++ } ++#endif + return chachapoly_get_length(cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr, + cp, len); ++ } + if (len < 4) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + *plenp = PEEK_U32(cp); +@@ -404,13 +548,33 @@ + if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) + return; + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) { ++ chachapoly_free_mt(cc->cp_ctx_mt); ++ cc->cp_ctx_mt = NULL; ++ } else { ++ chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx); ++ cc->cp_ctx = NULL; ++ } ++#else + chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx); + cc->cp_ctx = NULL; ++#endif + } else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) + explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx)); + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp); + cc->evp = NULL; ++ /* if meth_ptr isn't null then we are using the aes_ctr_mt ++ * evp_cipher_meth_new() in cipher-ctr-mt.c under OSSL 1.1 ++ * if we don't explicitly free it then, even though we free ++ * the ctx it is a part of it doesn't get freed. So... ++ * cjr 2/7/2023 ++ */ ++ if (cc->meth_ptr != NULL) { ++ EVP_CIPHER_meth_free((void *)(EVP_CIPHER *)cc->meth_ptr); ++ cc->meth_ptr = NULL; ++ } + #endif + freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); + } +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.307925846 +0200 +@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ + if (!do_encrypt) { + const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len; + +- poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key); ++ poly1305_auth(NULL, expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; + goto out; +@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ + + /* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */ + if (do_encrypt) { +- poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len, ++ poly1305_auth(NULL, dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len, + poly_key); + } + r = 0; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.308400139 +0200 +@@ -34,8 +34,18 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" + ++ ++/* using the EVP_MAC interface for poly1305 is significantly ++ * faster than the version bundled with OpenSSH. However, ++ * this interface is only available in OpenSSL 3.0+ ++ * -cjr 10/21/2022 */ + struct chachapoly_ctx { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *main_evp, *header_evp; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++ EVP_MAC_CTX *poly_ctx; ++#else ++ char *poly_ctx; ++#endif + }; + + struct chachapoly_ctx * +@@ -56,6 +66,15 @@ + goto fail; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx->header_evp) != 16) + goto fail; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++ EVP_MAC *mac = NULL; ++ if ((mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "POLY1305", NULL)) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ if ((ctx->poly_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++#else ++ ctx->poly_ctx = NULL; ++#endif + return ctx; + fail: + chachapoly_free(ctx); +@@ -69,6 +88,9 @@ + return; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->main_evp); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->header_evp); ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(cpctx->poly_ctx); ++#endif + freezero(cpctx, sizeof(*cpctx)); + } + +@@ -107,7 +129,7 @@ + if (!do_encrypt) { + const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len; + +- poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key); ++ poly1305_auth(ctx->poly_ctx, expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; + goto out; +@@ -133,7 +155,7 @@ + + /* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */ + if (do_encrypt) { +- poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len, ++ poly1305_auth(ctx->poly_ctx, dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len, + poly_key); + } + r = 0; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.309077322 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,695 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2023 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University. ++ * ++ * Author: Mitchell Dorrell ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * ++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the MIT License. ++ * ++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or ++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the MIT License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library; ++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++/* TODO: audit includes */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20) ++ ++#include ++#include /* needed for getpid under C99 */ ++#include /* needed for log.h */ ++#include ++#include /* needed for misc.h */ ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "defines.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "cipher-chachapoly.h" ++#include "cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h" ++ ++#ifndef likely ++# define likely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) ++#endif ++#ifndef unlikely ++# define unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0) ++#endif ++ ++/* Size of keystream to pregenerate, measured in bytes ++ * we want to round up to the nearest chacha block and have ++ * 128 bytes for overhead */ ++#define ROUND_UP(x,y) (((((x)-1)/(y))+1)*(y)) ++#define KEYSTREAMLEN (ROUND_UP((SSH_IOBUFSZ) + 128, (CHACHA_BLOCKLEN))) ++ ++/* BEGIN TUNABLES */ ++ ++/* Number of worker threads to spawn. */ ++/* the goal is to ensure that main is never ++ * waiting on the worker threads for keystream data */ ++#define NUMTHREADS 1 ++ ++/* 64 seems to be a pretty blance between memory and performance ++ * 128 is another option with somewhat higher memory consumption */ ++#define NUMSTREAMS 64 ++ ++/* END TUNABLES */ ++ ++struct mt_keystream { ++ u_char poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]; /* POLY1305_KEYLEN == 32 */ ++ u_char headerStream[CHACHA_BLOCKLEN]; /* CHACHA_BLOCKLEN == 64 */ ++ u_char mainStream[KEYSTREAMLEN]; /* KEYSTREAMLEN == 32768 */ ++}; ++ ++struct threadData { ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX * main_evp; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX * header_evp; ++ u_char seqbuf[16]; ++}; ++ ++struct mt_keystream_batch { ++ u_int batchID; ++ struct threadData tds[NUMTHREADS]; ++ struct mt_keystream streams[NUMSTREAMS]; ++}; ++ ++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt { ++ u_int seqnr; ++ u_int batchID; ++ ++ struct mt_keystream_batch batches[2]; ++ ++ pthread_t manager_tid[2]; ++ pthread_t self_tid; ++ ++ pid_t mainpid; ++ u_char zeros[KEYSTREAMLEN]; /* KEYSTREAMLEN == 32768 */ ++ ++ /* if OpenSSL has support for Poly1305 in the MAC EVPs ++ * use that (OSSL >= 3.0) if not then it's OSSL 1.1 so ++ * use the Poly1305 digest methods. Failing that use the ++ * internal poly1305 methods */ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++ EVP_MAC_CTX *poly_ctx; ++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *poly_ctx; ++ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey; ++ size_t ptaglen; ++#else ++ char *poly_ctx; ++#endif ++}; ++ ++struct manager_thread_args { ++ struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt; ++ u_int oldBatchID; ++ int retval; ++}; ++ ++struct worker_thread_args { ++ u_int batchID; ++ struct mt_keystream_batch * batch; ++ int threadIndex; ++ u_char * zeros; ++ int retval; ++}; ++ ++/* generate the keystream and header ++ * we use nulls for the "data" (the zeros variable) in order to ++ * get the raw keystream ++ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ ++int ++generate_keystream(struct mt_keystream * ks, u_int seqnr, ++ struct threadData * td, u_char * zeros) ++{ ++ /* generate poly1305 key */ ++ memset(td->seqbuf, 0, sizeof(td->seqbuf)); ++ POKE_U64(td->seqbuf + 8, seqnr); ++ memset(ks->poly_key , 0, sizeof(ks->poly_key)); ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->main_evp, NULL, NULL, td->seqbuf, 1) || ++ EVP_Cipher(td->main_evp, ks->poly_key, ks->poly_key, ++ sizeof(ks->poly_key)) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* generate header keystream for encrypting payload length */ ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->header_evp, NULL, NULL, td->seqbuf, 1) || ++ EVP_Cipher(td->header_evp, ks->headerStream, zeros, CHACHA_BLOCKLEN) ++ < 0 ) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* generate main keystream for encrypting payload */ ++ td->seqbuf[0] = 1; ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->main_evp, NULL, NULL, td->seqbuf, 1) || ++ EVP_Cipher(td->main_evp, ks->mainStream, zeros, KEYSTREAMLEN) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* free the EVP contexts associated with the give thread */ ++void ++free_threadData(struct threadData * td) ++{ ++ if (td == NULL) ++ return; ++ if (td->main_evp) /* false if initialization didn't get this far */ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(td->main_evp); ++ if (td->header_evp) /* false if initialization didn't get this far */ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(td->header_evp); ++ explicit_bzero(td, sizeof(*td)); ++} ++ ++/* initialize the EVPs used by the worker thread ++ Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ ++int ++initialize_threadData(struct threadData * td, const u_char *key) ++{ ++ memset(td,0,sizeof(*td)); ++ if ((td->main_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL || ++ (td->header_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->main_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key, NULL, 1)) ++ goto fail; ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->header_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key + 32, NULL, 1)) ++ goto fail; ++ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(td->header_evp) != 16) ++ goto fail; ++ return 0; ++ fail: ++ free_threadData(td); ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++struct worker_thread_args * ++worker_thread(struct worker_thread_args * args) ++{ ++ /* check first */ ++ if (args == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ if (args->batch == NULL || args->zeros == NULL) { ++ args->retval = 1; ++ return args; ++ } ++ ++ int threadIndex = args->threadIndex; ++ struct threadData * td = &(args->batch->tds[threadIndex]); ++ u_int refseqnr = args->batchID * NUMSTREAMS; ++ ++ for (int i = threadIndex; i < NUMSTREAMS; i += NUMTHREADS) { ++ if (generate_keystream(&(args->batch->streams[i]), refseqnr + i, ++ td, args->zeros) == -1) { ++ args->retval = 1; ++ return args; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ args->retval = 0; ++ return args; ++} ++ ++int ++join_manager_thread(pthread_t manager_tid) ++{ ++ struct manager_thread_args * args; ++ if (pthread_join(manager_tid, (void **) &args) == 0) { ++ if (args == NULL) { ++ debug_f("Manager thread returned NULL!"); ++ return 1; ++ } else if (args == PTHREAD_CANCELED) { ++ debug_f("Manager thread canceled!"); ++ return 1; ++ } else if (args->retval != 0) { ++ debug_f("Manager thread error (%d)", args->retval); ++ free(args); ++ return 1; ++ } else { ++ free(args); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } else { ++ debug_f("pthread_join error!"); ++ return 1; ++ } ++} ++ ++void ++chachapoly_free_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt) ++{ ++ if (ctx_mt == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++ if (ctx_mt->poly_ctx != NULL) { ++ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_mt->poly_ctx); ++ ctx_mt->poly_ctx = NULL; ++ } ++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) ++ if (ctx_mt->md_ctx != NULL) { ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_mt->md_ctx); ++ ctx_mt->md_ctx = NULL; ++ } ++ if (ctx_mt->pkey != NULL) { ++ EVP_PKEY_free(ctx_mt->pkey); ++ ctx_mt->pkey = NULL; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * Only cleanup the manager threads if we are the PID that initialized ++ * them! If we're a fork, the threads don't really exist. ++ */ ++ ++ if (getpid() == ctx_mt->mainpid) { ++ if (ctx_mt->manager_tid[0] != ctx_mt->self_tid) { ++ join_manager_thread(ctx_mt->manager_tid[0]); ++ ctx_mt->manager_tid[0] = ctx_mt->self_tid; ++ } ++ if (ctx_mt->manager_tid[1] != ctx_mt->self_tid) { ++ join_manager_thread(ctx_mt->manager_tid[1]); ++ ctx_mt->manager_tid[1] = ctx_mt->self_tid; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Cleanup thread data structures. */ ++ for (int i=0; i<2; i++) ++ for (int j=0; jbatches[i].tds[j])); ++ ++ /* Zero and free the whole multithreaded cipher context. */ ++ freezero(ctx_mt, sizeof(*ctx_mt)); ++ ++ return; ++} ++ ++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ++chachapoly_new_mt(u_int startseqnr, const u_char * key, u_int keylen) ++{ ++ struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt = xmalloc(sizeof(*ctx_mt)); ++ memset(ctx_mt, 0, sizeof(*ctx_mt)); ++ /* Initialize the sequence number. When rekeying, this won't be zero. */ ++ ctx_mt->seqnr = startseqnr; ++ ctx_mt->batchID = startseqnr / NUMSTREAMS; ++ struct threadData mainData; ++ int tDataI; ++ int genKSfailed = 0; ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++ EVP_MAC *mac = NULL; ++ if ((mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "POLY1305", NULL)) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ if ((ctx_mt->poly_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) ++ if ((ctx_mt->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ if ((ctx_mt->pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305, NULL, ++ ctx_mt->zeros, POLY1305_KEYLEN)) == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_mt->md_ctx, &ctx_mt->poly_ctx, NULL, NULL, ++ ctx_mt->pkey) == 0) ++ goto fail; ++#else ++ ctx_mt->poly_ctx = NULL; ++#endif ++ ++ ctx_mt->batches[ctx_mt->batchID % 2].batchID = ctx_mt->batchID; ++ ctx_mt->batches[(ctx_mt->batchID + 1) % 2].batchID = ++ ctx_mt->batchID + 1; ++ ++ /* initialize batches[0] tds */ ++ for (tDataI = 0; tDataI < NUMTHREADS; tDataI++) { ++ if (initialize_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[0].tds[tDataI]), ++ key) != 0) ++ break; ++ } ++ if (tDataI < NUMTHREADS) { ++ /* Backtrack starting with 'tDataI - 1' */ ++ for (tDataI--; tDataI >= 0; tDataI--) ++ free_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[0].tds[tDataI])); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ /* initialize batches[1] tds */ ++ for (tDataI = 0; tDataI < NUMTHREADS; tDataI++) { ++ if (initialize_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[1].tds[tDataI]), ++ key) != 0) ++ break; ++ } ++ if (tDataI < NUMTHREADS) { ++ /* Backtrack starting with 'tDataI - 1' */ ++ for (tDataI--; tDataI >= 0; tDataI--) ++ free_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[1].tds[tDataI])); ++ /* Free the batches[0] tds too */ ++ for (tDataI = NUMTHREADS; tDataI >= 0; tDataI--) ++ free_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[0].tds[tDataI])); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ if (initialize_threadData(&mainData, key) != 0) { ++ chachapoly_free_mt(ctx_mt); ++ explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr)); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ for (int i=0; i<2; i++) { ++ u_int refseqnr = ctx_mt->batches[i].batchID * NUMSTREAMS; ++ for (int j = startseqnr > refseqnr ? startseqnr - refseqnr : 0; ++ jbatches[i].streams[j]), ++ refseqnr + j, &mainData, ctx_mt->zeros) == -1) { ++ debug_f("generate_keystream failed in " ++ "chacha20-poly1305@hpnssh.org"); ++ genKSfailed = 1; ++ break; /* imperfect, but it helps */ ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ free_threadData(&mainData); ++ ++ if (genKSfailed != 0) { ++ chachapoly_free_mt(ctx_mt); ++ explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr)); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* Store the PID so that in the future, we can tell if we're a fork */ ++ ctx_mt->mainpid = getpid(); ++ ctx_mt->self_tid = pthread_self(); ++ ctx_mt->manager_tid[0] = ctx_mt->self_tid; ++ ctx_mt->manager_tid[1] = ctx_mt->self_tid; ++ /* was reporting the TID using gettid() but it's not portable */ ++ debug2_f("
", getpid(), pthread_self()); ++ ++ /* Success! */ ++ explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr)); ++ return ctx_mt; ++ ++ fail: ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++ if (ctx_mt->poly_ctx != NULL) { ++ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_mt->poly_ctx); ++ ctx_mt->poly_ctx = NULL; ++ } ++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) ++ if (ctx_mt->md_ctx != NULL) { ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_mt->md_ctx); ++ ctx_mt->md_ctx = NULL; ++ } ++ if (ctx_mt->pkey != NULL) { ++ EVP_PKEY_free(ctx_mt->pkey); ++ ctx_mt->pkey = NULL; ++ } ++#endif ++ freezero(ctx_mt, sizeof(*ctx_mt)); ++ explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr)); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++/* a fast method to XOR the keystream against the data */ ++static inline void ++fastXOR(u_char *dest, const u_char *src, const u_char *keystream, u_int len) ++{ ++ ++ /* XXX: this was __uint128_t but that was causing unaligned load errors. ++ * this works but we need to explore it more. */ ++ typedef uint32_t chunk; ++ size_t i; ++ ++ for (i=0; i < (len / sizeof(chunk)); i++) ++ ((chunk *)dest)[i]=((chunk *)src)[i]^((chunk *)keystream)[i]; ++ for (i=i*(sizeof(chunk) / sizeof(char)); i < len; i++) ++ dest[i]=src[i]^keystream[i]; ++} ++ ++struct manager_thread_args * ++manager_thread(struct manager_thread_args * margs) { ++ /* make sure we have valid data before proceeding */ ++ if (margs == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt = margs->ctx_mt; ++ if (ctx_mt == NULL) { ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ return margs; ++ } ++ ++ u_int oldBatchID = margs->oldBatchID; ++ ++ struct mt_keystream_batch * batch = &(ctx_mt->batches[oldBatchID % 2]); ++ if (batch->batchID != oldBatchID) { ++ debug_f("Post-crypt batch miss! Seeking %u, found %u. Failing.", ++ oldBatchID, batch->batchID); ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ return margs; ++ } ++ ++ margs->retval = 0; ++ u_int batchID = oldBatchID + 2; ++ ++ pthread_t tid[NUMTHREADS]; ++ struct worker_thread_args * wargs = malloc(NUMTHREADS * sizeof(*wargs)); ++ int ti; ++ ++ for (ti = 0; ti < NUMTHREADS; ti++) { ++ wargs[ti].batchID = batchID; ++ wargs[ti].batch = batch; ++ wargs[ti].threadIndex = ti; ++ wargs[ti].zeros = ctx_mt->zeros; ++ if (pthread_create(&(tid[ti]), NULL, (void *) worker_thread, ++ &(wargs[ti])) != 0) { ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ for (; ti < NUMTHREADS; ti++) /* for error condition */ ++ tid[ti] = pthread_self(); ++ ++ struct worker_thread_args * retwargs; ++ ++ for (ti = 0; ti < NUMTHREADS; ti++) { ++ if (tid[ti] == pthread_self()) { ++ margs->retval = 1; /* redundant, but harmless */ ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (pthread_join(tid[ti], (void **) &retwargs) == 0) { ++ if (retwargs == NULL) { ++ debug_f("Worker thread returned NULL!"); ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ } else if (retwargs == PTHREAD_CANCELED) { ++ debug_f("Worker thread canceled!"); ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ } else { ++ if (retwargs->retval != 0) { ++ debug_f("Worker thread error (%d)", ++ retwargs->retval); ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ } ++ if (retwargs != &(wargs[ti])) { ++ debug_f("Worker thread didn't return " ++ "expected structure!"); ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ } else { ++ debug_f("pthread_join error!"); ++ margs->retval = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ free(wargs); ++ ++ if (margs->retval == 0) { ++ batch->batchID = batchID; ++ } ++ ++ return margs; ++} ++ ++int ++chachapoly_crypt_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *ctx_mt, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, ++ const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt) ++{ ++#ifdef SAFETY ++ if (ctx_mt->mainpid != getpid()) { /* we're a fork */ ++ /* ++ * TODO: this is EXTREMELY RARE, may never happen at all (only ++ * if the fork calls crypt), so we should tell the compiler. ++ */ ++ /* The worker threads don't exist, we could spawn them? */ ++ debug_f("Fork called crypt without workers!"); ++ chachapoly_free_mt(ctx_mt); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ pthread_t * manager_tid = &(ctx_mt->manager_tid[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]); ++ if (unlikely(*manager_tid != ctx_mt->self_tid)) { ++ int ret = join_manager_thread(*manager_tid); ++ *manager_tid = ctx_mt->self_tid; ++ if (ret != 0) ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ struct mt_keystream_batch * batch = ++ &(ctx_mt->batches[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]); ++ ++ struct mt_keystream * ks = &(batch->streams[seqnr % NUMSTREAMS]); ++ ++ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ ++#ifdef SAFETY ++ if (batch->batchID == ctx_mt->batchID) { /* Safety check */ ++#endif ++ /* check tag before anything else */ ++ if (!do_encrypt) { ++ const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len; ++ u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN]; ++#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) ++ if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, -1, ++ EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, ++ POLY1305_KEYLEN, ks->poly_key) <= 0) || ++ (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx_mt->md_ctx, src, aadlen + len) == 0)) { ++ debug_f("SSL error while decrypting poly1305 tag"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++ ctx_mt->ptaglen = POLY1305_TAGLEN; ++ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_mt->md_ctx, expected_tag, ++ &ctx_mt->ptaglen) == 0) { ++ debug_f("SSL error while finalizing decyrpted poly1305"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++#else ++ poly1305_auth(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, expected_tag, src, ++ aadlen + len, ks->poly_key); ++#endif ++ if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) ++ != 0) ++ r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; ++ explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag)); ++ } ++ if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) { ++ /* Crypt additional data (i.e., packet length) */ ++ /* TODO: is aadlen always four bytes? */ ++ /* TODO: do we always have an aadlen? */ ++ if (aadlen) ++ for (u_int i=0; iheaderStream[i] ^ src[i]; ++ /* Crypt payload */ ++ fastXOR(dest+aadlen,src+aadlen,ks->mainStream,len); ++ /* calculate and append tag */ ++#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) ++ if (do_encrypt) { ++ if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, -1, ++ EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY, ++ POLY1305_KEYLEN, ks->poly_key) <=0) || ++ (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx_mt->md_ctx, dest, aadlen + len) == 0)) { ++ debug_f ("SSL error while encrypting poly1305 tag"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++ ctx_mt->ptaglen = POLY1305_TAGLEN; ++ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_mt->md_ctx, dest+aadlen+len, ++ &ctx_mt->ptaglen) == 0) { ++ debug_f("SSL error while finalizing decyrpted poly1305"); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++ } ++#else ++ if (do_encrypt) ++ poly1305_auth(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, dest+aadlen+len, ++ dest, aadlen+len, ks->poly_key); ++#endif ++ r=0; /* Success! */ ++ } ++ if (r) /* Anything nonzero is an error. */ ++ return r; ++ ++ ctx_mt->seqnr = seqnr + 1; ++ ++ if (unlikely(ctx_mt->seqnr / NUMSTREAMS > ctx_mt->batchID)) { ++ struct manager_thread_args * args = ++ malloc(sizeof(*args)); ++ if (args == NULL) { ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++ args->ctx_mt = ctx_mt; ++ args->oldBatchID = ctx_mt->batchID; ++ if (pthread_create(&(ctx_mt->manager_tid[ctx_mt->batchID ++ % 2]), NULL, (void *) manager_thread, args) != 0) { ++ free(args); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++ ctx_mt->batchID = ctx_mt->seqnr / NUMSTREAMS; ++ } ++ ++ /* TODO: Nothing we need to sanitize here? */ ++ ++ return 0; ++#ifdef SAFETY ++ } else { /* Bad, it's the wrong batch. */ ++ debug_f( "Pre-crypt batch miss! Seeking %u, found %u. Failing.", ++ ctx_mt->batchID, batch->batchID); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++chachapoly_get_length_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *ctx_mt, u_int *plenp, ++ u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) ++{ ++ /* TODO: add compiler hints */ ++#ifdef SAFETY ++ if (ctx_mt->mainpid != getpid()) { /* Use serial mode if we're a fork */ ++ debug_f("We're a fork. Failing."); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if (len < 4) ++ return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; ++ ++ pthread_t * manager_tid = &(ctx_mt->manager_tid[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]); ++ if (unlikely(*manager_tid != ctx_mt->self_tid)) { ++ int ret = join_manager_thread(*manager_tid); ++ *manager_tid = ctx_mt->self_tid; ++ if (ret != 0) ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ u_char buf[4]; ++#ifdef SAFETY ++ u_int sought_batchID = seqnr / NUMSTREAMS; ++#endif ++ struct mt_keystream_batch * batch = ++ &(ctx_mt->batches[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]); ++ struct mt_keystream * ks = &(batch->streams[seqnr % NUMSTREAMS]); ++#ifdef SAFETY ++ if (batch->batchID == sought_batchID) { ++#endif ++ for (u_int i=0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) ++ buf[i]=ks->headerStream[i] ^ cp[i]; ++ *plenp = PEEK_U32(buf); ++ return 0; ++#ifdef SAFETY ++ } else { ++ debug_f("Batch miss! Seeking %u, found %u. Failing.", ++ sought_batchID, batch->batchID); ++ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ } ++#endif ++} ++#endif /* defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20) */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.309455724 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2023 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University. ++ * ++ * Author: Mitchell Dorrell ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * ++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the MIT License. ++ * ++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or ++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the MIT License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library; ++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef CHACHA_POLY_LIBCRYPTO_MT_H ++#define CHACHA_POLY_LIBCRYPTO_MT_H ++ ++#include ++#include "chacha.h" ++#include "poly1305.h" ++ ++#ifndef CHACHA_KEYLEN ++#define CHACHA_KEYLEN 32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */ ++#endif ++ ++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt; /* defined in cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c */ ++ ++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *chachapoly_new_mt(u_int startseqnr, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) ++ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); ++ ++void chachapoly_free_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cpctx); ++ ++int chachapoly_crypt_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cpctx, u_int seqnr, ++ u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, ++ u_int authlen, int do_encrypt); ++ ++int chachapoly_get_length_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cpctx, ++ u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) ++ __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5))); ++ ++#endif /* CHACHA_POLY_LIBCRYPTO_MT_H */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.309949084 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@ ++/* ++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher ++ * ++ * Author: Benjamin Bennett ++ * Author: Mike Tasota ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * Copyright (c) 2008-2021 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged, ++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include ++#include "uthash.h" ++ ++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ ++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" ++ ++#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL ++#include ++#endif ++ ++#include ++ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++#include ++#include ++#endif ++ ++/* note regarding threads and queues */ ++/* initially this cipher was written in a way that ++ * the key stream was generated in a per cipher block ++ * loop. For example, if the key stream queue length was ++ * 16k and the cipher block size was 16 bytes it would ++ * fill the queue 16 bytes at a time. Mitch Dorrell pointed ++ * out that we could fill the queue in once call eliminating ++ * loop and multiple calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate. Doing so ++ * dramatically reduced CPU load in the threads and indicated ++ * that we could also eliminate most of the threads and queues ++ * as it would take far less time for a queue to ebter KQ_FULL ++ * state. As such, we've reduced the default number of threads ++ * and queues from 2 and 8 (respectively) to 1 and 2. We've also ++ * elimnated the need to determine the physical number of cores on ++ * the system and, if the user desires, can spin up more threads ++ * using an environment variable. Additionally, queues is now fixed ++ * at thread_count + 1. ++ * cjr 10/19/2022 */ ++ ++/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/ ++/* maximum number of threads and queues */ ++#define MAX_THREADS 4 ++#define MAX_NUMKQ (MAX_THREADS + 1) ++ ++/* Number of pregen threads to use */ ++/* this is a default value. The actual number is ++ * determined during init as a function of the number ++ * of available cores */ ++int cipher_threads = 1; ++ ++/* Number of keystream queues */ ++/* ideally this should be large enough so that there is ++ * always a key queue for a thread to work on ++ * so maybe double of the number of threads. Again this ++ * is a default and the actual value is determined in init*/ ++int numkq = 2; ++ ++/* Length of a keystream queue */ ++/* one queue holds 512KB (1024 * 32 * 16) of key data ++ * being that the queues are destroyed after a rekey ++ * and at leats one has to be fully filled prior to ++ * enciphering data we don't want this to be too large */ ++#define KQLEN (1024 * 32) ++ ++/* Processor cacheline length */ ++#define CACHELINE_LEN 64 ++ ++/* Can the system do unaligned loads natively? */ ++#if defined(__aarch64__) || \ ++ defined(__i386__) || \ ++ defined(__powerpc__) || \ ++ defined(__x86_64__) ++# define CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK ++#endif ++#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) ++# define CIPHER_INT128_OK ++#endif ++/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/ ++ ++#define HAVE_NONE 0 ++#define HAVE_KEY 1 ++#define HAVE_IV 2 ++int X = 0; ++ ++const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void); ++ ++/* Keystream Queue state */ ++enum { ++ KQINIT, ++ KQEMPTY, ++ KQFILLING, ++ KQFULL, ++ KQDRAINING ++}; ++ ++/* Keystream Queue struct */ ++struct kq { ++ u_char keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* [32768][16B] */ ++ u_char ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */ ++ u_char pad0[CACHELINE_LEN]; ++ pthread_mutex_t lock; ++ pthread_cond_t cond; ++ int qstate; ++ u_char pad1[CACHELINE_LEN]; ++}; ++ ++/* Context struct */ ++struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt ++{ ++ long unsigned int struct_id; ++ int keylen; ++ int state; ++ int qidx; ++ int ridx; ++ int id[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */ ++ AES_KEY aes_key; ++ const u_char *orig_key; ++ u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */ ++ pthread_t tid[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */ ++ pthread_rwlock_t tid_lock; ++ struct kq q[MAX_NUMKQ]; /* 33 */ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ pthread_rwlock_t stop_lock; ++ int exit_flag; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++}; ++ ++/* this defines the hash and elements of evp context pointers ++ * that are created in thread_loop. We use this to clear and ++ * free the contexts in stop_and_prejoin ++ */ ++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs { ++ pthread_t tid; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *pointer; /* 32 */ ++ UT_hash_handle hh; ++}; ++ ++/* globals */ ++/* how we increment the id the structs we create */ ++long unsigned int global_struct_id = 0; ++ ++/* keep a copy of the pointers created in thread_loop to free later */ ++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *evp_ptrs = NULL; ++ ++/* ++ * Add num to counter 'ctr' ++ */ ++static void ++ssh_ctr_add(u_char *ctr, uint32_t num, u_int len) ++{ ++ int i; ++ uint16_t n; ++ ++ for (n = 0, i = len - 1; i >= 0 && (num || n); i--) { ++ n = ctr[i] + (num & 0xff) + n; ++ num >>= 8; ++ ctr[i] = n & 0xff; ++ n >>= 8; ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Threads may be cancelled in a pthread_cond_wait, we must free the mutex ++ */ ++static void ++thread_loop_cleanup(void *x) ++{ ++ pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x); ++} ++ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition ++ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have ++ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang ++ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread. ++ */ ++static void ++thread_loop_check_exit(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c) ++{ ++ int exit_flag; ++ ++ pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->stop_lock); ++ exit_flag = c->exit_flag; ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock); ++ ++ if (exit_flag) ++ pthread_exit(NULL); ++} ++#else ++# define thread_loop_check_exit(s) ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads ++ */ ++static void ++stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ /* notify threads that they should exit */ ++ pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->stop_lock); ++ c->exit_flag = TRUE; ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock); ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ /* Cancel pregen threads */ ++ for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) { ++ debug ("Canceled %lu (%lu,%d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]); ++ pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]); ++ } ++ for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[i].lock); ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&c->q[i].cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[i].lock); ++ } ++ for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) { ++ if (pthread_kill(c->tid[i], 0) != 0) ++ debug3("AES-CTR MT pthread_join failure: Invalid thread id %lu in %s", ++ c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__); ++ else { ++ debug ("Joining %lu (%lu, %d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]); ++ pthread_mutex_destroy(&c->q[i].lock); ++ pthread_cond_destroy(&c->q[i].cond); ++ pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL); ++ /* this finds the entry in the hash that corresponding to the ++ * thread id. That's used to find the pointer to the cipher struct ++ * created in thread_loop. */ ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr; ++ HASH_FIND_INT(evp_ptrs, &c->tid[i], ptr); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ptr->pointer); ++ HASH_DEL(evp_ptrs, ptr); ++ free(ptr); } ++ } ++ pthread_rwlock_destroy(&c->tid_lock); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * The life of a pregen thread: ++ * Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter. ++ * When done, update counter for the next fill. ++ */ ++/* previously this used the low level interface which is, sadly, ++ * slower than the EVP interface by a long shot. The original ctx (from the ++ * body of the code) isn't passed in here but we have the key and the counter ++ * which means we should be able to create the exact same ctx and use that to ++ * fill the keystream queues. I'm concerned about additional overhead but the ++ * additional speed from AESNI should make up for it. */ ++/* The above comment was made when I thought I needed to do a new EVP init for ++ * each counter increment. Turns out not to be the case -cjr 10/15/21*/ ++ ++static void * ++thread_loop(void *x) ++{ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *aesni_ctx; ++ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c = x; ++ struct kq *q; ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr; ++ int qidx; ++ pthread_t first_tid; ++ int outlen; ++ u_char mynull[KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ memset(&mynull, 0, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ++ /* get the thread id to see if this is the first one */ ++ pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->tid_lock); ++ first_tid = c->tid[0]; ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock); ++ ++ /* create the context for this thread */ ++ aesni_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ ++ /* keep track of the pointer for the evp in this struct ++ * so we can free it later. So we place it in a hash indexed on the ++ * thread id, which is available to us in the free function. ++ * Note, the thread id isn't necessary unique across rekeys but ++ * that's okay as they are unique during a key. */ ++ ptr = malloc(sizeof *ptr); /*freed in stop & prejoin */ ++ ptr->tid = pthread_self(); /* index for hash */ ++ ptr->pointer = aesni_ctx; ++ HASH_ADD_INT(evp_ptrs, tid, ptr); ++ ++ /* initialize the cipher ctx with the key provided ++ * determine which cipher to use based on the key size */ ++ if (c->keylen == 256) ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr(), NULL, c->orig_key, NULL); ++ else if (c->keylen == 128) ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), NULL, c->orig_key, NULL); ++ else if (c->keylen == 192) ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, EVP_aes_192_ctr(), NULL, c->orig_key, NULL); ++ else { ++ logit("Invalid key length of %d in AES CTR MT. Exiting", c->keylen); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill ++ * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout. ++ */ ++ ++ if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) { ++ /* get the first element of the keyque struct */ ++ q = &c->q[0]; ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ /* if we are in the INIT state then fill the queue */ ++ if (q->qstate == KQINIT) { ++ /* set the initial counter */ ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr); ++ ++ /* encypher a block sized null string (mynull) with the key. This ++ * returns the keystream because xoring the keystream ++ * against null returns the keystream. Store that in the appropriate queue */ ++ EVP_EncryptUpdate(aesni_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ++ /* add the number of blocks creates to the aes counter */ ++ ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ q->qstate = KQDRAINING; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ } ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over ++ * queues already filled by other threads and stopping to wait for ++ * a draining queue to become empty. ++ * ++ * Multiple threads may be waiting on a draining queue and awoken ++ * when empty. The first thread to wake will mark it as filling, ++ * others will move on to fill, skip, or wait on the next queue. ++ */ ++ for (qidx = 1;; qidx = (qidx + 1) % numkq) { ++ /* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */ ++ pthread_testcancel(); ++ ++ /* Check if we should exit as well */ ++ thread_loop_check_exit(c); ++ ++ /* Lock queue and block if its draining */ ++ q = &c->q[qidx]; ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock); ++ while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) { ++ thread_loop_check_exit(c); ++ pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock); ++ } ++ pthread_cleanup_pop(0); ++ ++ /* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */ ++ if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) { ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Empty, let's fill it. ++ * Queue lock is relinquished while we do this so others ++ * can see that it's being filled. ++ */ ++ q->qstate = KQFILLING; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ ++ /* set the initial counter */ ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr); ++ ++ /* see coresponding block above for useful comments */ ++ EVP_EncryptUpdate(aesni_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ++ /* Re-lock, mark full and signal consumer */ ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ q->qstate = KQFULL; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++/* this is where the data is actually enciphered and deciphered */ ++/* this may also benefit from upgrading to the EVP API */ ++static int ++ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, ++ size_t len) ++{ ++ typedef union { ++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK ++ __uint128_t *u128; ++#endif ++ uint64_t *u64; ++ uint32_t *u32; ++ uint8_t *u8; ++ const uint8_t *cu8; ++ uintptr_t u; ++ } ptrs_t; ++ ptrs_t destp, srcp, bufp; ++ uintptr_t align; ++ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c; ++ struct kq *q, *oldq; ++ int ridx; ++ u_char *buf; ++ ++ if (len == 0) ++ return 1; ++ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ q = &c->q[c->qidx]; ++ ridx = c->ridx; ++ ++ /* src already padded to block multiple */ ++ srcp.cu8 = src; ++ destp.u8 = dest; ++ do { /* do until len is 0 */ ++ buf = q->keys[ridx]; ++ bufp.u8 = buf; ++ ++ /* figure out the alignment on the fly */ ++#ifdef CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK ++ align = 0; ++#else ++ align = destp.u | srcp.u | bufp.u; ++#endif ++ ++ /* xor the src against the key (buf) ++ * different systems can do all 16 bytes at once or ++ * may need to do it in 8 or 4 bytes chunks ++ * worst case is doing it as a loop */ ++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK ++ /* with GCC 13 we have having consistent seg faults ++ * in this section of code. Since this is a critical ++ * code path we are removing this until we have a solution ++ * in place -cjr 02/22/24 ++ * TODO: FIX THIS ++ */ ++ /* if ((align & 0xf) == 0) { */ ++ /* destp.u128[0] = srcp.u128[0] ^ bufp.u128[0]; */ ++ /* } else */ ++#endif ++ /* 64 bits */ ++ if ((align & 0x7) == 0) { ++ destp.u64[0] = srcp.u64[0] ^ bufp.u64[0]; ++ destp.u64[1] = srcp.u64[1] ^ bufp.u64[1]; ++ /* 32 bits */ ++ } else if ((align & 0x3) == 0) { ++ destp.u32[0] = srcp.u32[0] ^ bufp.u32[0]; ++ destp.u32[1] = srcp.u32[1] ^ bufp.u32[1]; ++ destp.u32[2] = srcp.u32[2] ^ bufp.u32[2]; ++ destp.u32[3] = srcp.u32[3] ^ bufp.u32[3]; ++ } else { ++ /*1 byte at a time*/ ++ size_t i; ++ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) ++ dest[i] = src[i] ^ buf[i]; ++ } ++ ++ /* inc/decrement the pointers by the block size (16)*/ ++ destp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ srcp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ ++ /* Increment read index, switch queues on rollover */ ++ if ((ridx = (ridx + 1) % KQLEN) == 0) { ++ oldq = q; ++ ++ /* Mark next queue draining, may need to wait */ ++ c->qidx = (c->qidx + 1) % numkq; ++ q = &c->q[c->qidx]; ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ while (q->qstate != KQFULL) { ++ pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock); ++ } ++ q->qstate = KQDRAINING; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ ++ /* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */ ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock); ++ oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock); ++ } ++ } while (len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ c->ridx = ridx; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv, ++ int enc) ++{ ++ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c; ++ int i; ++ ++ char *aes_threads = getenv("SSH_CIPHER_THREADS"); ++ if (aes_threads != NULL && strlen(aes_threads) != 0) ++ cipher_threads = atoi(aes_threads); ++ else ++ cipher_threads = 1; ++ ++ if (cipher_threads < 1) ++ cipher_threads = 1; ++ ++ if (cipher_threads > MAX_THREADS) ++ cipher_threads = MAX_THREADS; ++ ++ numkq = cipher_threads + 1; ++ ++ if (numkq > MAX_NUMKQ) ++ numkq = MAX_NUMKQ; ++ ++ debug("Starting %d threads and %d queues\n", cipher_threads, numkq); ++ ++ /* set up the initial state of c (our cipher stream struct) */ ++ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { ++ c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&c->tid_lock, NULL); ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&c->stop_lock, NULL); ++ c->exit_flag = FALSE; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ c->state = HAVE_NONE; ++ ++ /* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */ ++ for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { ++ pthread_mutex_init(&c->q[i].lock, NULL); ++ pthread_cond_init(&c->q[i].cond, NULL); ++ } ++ ++ /* attach our struct to the context */ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); ++ } ++ ++ /* we are initializing but the current structure already ++ has an IV and key so we want to kill the existing key data ++ and start over. This is important when we need to rekey the data stream */ ++ if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) { ++ /* tell the pregen threads to exit */ ++ stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c); ++ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ /* reset the exit flag */ ++ c->exit_flag = FALSE; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ /* Start over getting key & iv */ ++ c->state = HAVE_NONE; ++ } ++ ++ /* set the initial key for this key stream queue */ ++ if (key != NULL) { ++ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, ++ &c->aes_key); ++ c->orig_key = key; ++ c->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8; ++ c->state |= HAVE_KEY; ++ } ++ ++ /* set the IV */ ++ if (iv != NULL) { ++ /* init the counter this is just a 16byte uchar */ ++ memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ c->state |= HAVE_IV; ++ } ++ ++ if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) { ++ /* Clear queues */ ++ /* set the first key in the key queue to the current counter */ ++ memcpy(c->q[0].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ /* indicate that it needs to be initialized */ ++ c->q[0].qstate = KQINIT; ++ /* for each of the remaining queues set the first counter to the ++ * counter and then add the size of the queue to the counter */ ++ for (i = 1; i < numkq; i++) { ++ memcpy(c->q[i].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ssh_ctr_add(c->q[i].ctr, i * KQLEN, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ c->q[i].qstate = KQEMPTY; ++ } ++ c->qidx = 0; ++ c->ridx = 0; ++ c->struct_id = global_struct_id++; ++ ++ ++ /* Start threads */ ++#define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024) ++ pthread_attr_t attr; ++ pthread_attr_init(&attr); ++ pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, STACK_SIZE); ++ for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) { ++ pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock); ++ if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], &attr, thread_loop, c) != 0) ++ fatal ("AES-CTR MT Could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__); ++ /*should die here */ ++ else { ++ c->id[i] = i; ++ debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%lu, %d)", ++ c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]); ++ } ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock); ++ } ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[0].lock); ++ // wait for all of the threads to be initialized ++ while (c->q[0].qstate == KQINIT) ++ pthread_cond_wait(&c->q[0].cond, &c->q[0].lock); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[0].lock); ++ } ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) ++{ ++ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c; ++ ++ if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { ++ stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c); ++ ++ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); ++ free(c); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); ++ } ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++/* */ ++const EVP_CIPHER * ++evp_aes_ctr_mt(void) ++{ ++ static EVP_CIPHER *aes_ctr; ++ aes_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 16/*block*/, 16/*key*/); ++ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(aes_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_init); ++ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup); ++ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr); ++# ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP ++ EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(aes_ctr, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ++ | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH ++ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT ++ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV); ++# endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/ ++ return aes_ctr; ++} ++#endif /* OSSL Check */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.310535264 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@ ++/* ++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher Provider for OpenSSL 3 ++ * ++ * Author: Benjamin Bennett ++ * Author: Mike Tasota ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * Copyright (c) 2008-2022 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged, ++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++/* only for systems with OSSL 3 */ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include ++#include "cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h" ++#include "log.h" ++ ++/* for provider error struct */ ++#include "ossl3-provider-err.h" ++#include "num.h" ++ ++/* note regarding threads and queues */ ++/* initially this cipher was written in a way that ++ * the key stream was generated in a per cipher block ++ * loop. For example, if the key stream queue length was ++ * 16k and the cipher block size was 16 bytes it would ++ * fill the queue 16 bytes at a time. Mitch Dorrell pointed ++ * out that we could fill the queue in once call eliminating ++ * loop and multiple calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate. Doing so ++ * dramatically reduced CPU load in the threads and indicated ++ * that we could also eliminate most of the threads and queues ++ * as it would take far less time for a queue to ebter KQ_FULL ++ * state. As such, we've reduced the default number of threads ++ * and queues from 2 and 8 (respectively) to 1 and 2. We've also ++ * elimnated the need to determine the physical number of cores on ++ * the system and, if the user desires, can spin up more threads ++ * using an environment variable. Additionally, queues is now fixed ++ * at thread_count + 1. ++ * cjr 10/19/2022 */ ++ ++/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/ ++/* Number of pregen threads to use */ ++/* this is a default value. The actual number is ++ * determined during init as a function of the number ++ * of available cores */ ++int cipher_threads = 1; ++ ++/* Number of keystream queues */ ++/* ideally this should be large enough so that there is ++ * always a key queue for a thread to work on ++ * so maybe double of the number of threads. Again this ++ * is a default and the actual value is determined in init*/ ++int numkq = 2; ++/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/ ++ ++/* globals */ ++/* how we increment the id the structs we create */ ++long unsigned int global_struct_id = 0; ++ ++/* keep a copy of the pointers created in thread_loop to free later */ ++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *evp_ptrs = NULL; ++ ++/* private functions */ ++ ++/* ++ * Add num to counter 'ctr' ++ */ ++static void ++ssh_ctr_add(u_char *ctr, uint32_t num, u_int len) ++{ ++ int i; ++ uint16_t n; ++ ++ for (n = 0, i = len - 1; i >= 0 && (num || n); i--) { ++ n = ctr[i] + (num & 0xff) + n; ++ num >>= 8; ++ ctr[i] = n & 0xff; ++ n >>= 8; ++ } ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Threads may be cancelled in a pthread_cond_wait, we must free the mutex ++ */ ++static void ++thread_loop_cleanup(void *x) ++{ ++ pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x); ++} ++ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition ++ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have ++ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang ++ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread. ++ */ ++static void ++thread_loop_check_exit(struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx) ++{ ++ int exit_flag; ++ ++ pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock); ++ exit_flag = aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag; ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock); ++ ++ if (exit_flag) ++ pthread_exit(NULL); ++} ++#else ++# define thread_loop_check_exit(s) ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++/* ++ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads ++ */ ++static void ++stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ /* notify threads that they should exit */ ++ pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock); ++ aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = TRUE; ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock); ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ /* Cancel pregen threads */ ++ for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) { ++ debug_f ("Canceled %lu (%lu,%d)", aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], aes_mt_ctx->struct_id, ++ aes_mt_ctx->id[i]); ++ pthread_cancel(aes_mt_ctx->tid[i]); ++ } ++ for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) { ++ if (pthread_kill(aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], 0) != 0) ++ debug3("AES-CTR MT pthread_join failure: Invalid thread id %lu in %s", ++ aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], __func__); ++ else { ++ debug_f ("Joining %lu (%lu, %d)", aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], aes_mt_ctx->struct_id, ++ aes_mt_ctx->id[i]); ++ pthread_join(aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], NULL); ++ /* this finds the entry in the hash that corresponding to the ++ * thread id. That's used to find the pointer to the cipher struct ++ * created in thread_loop. */ ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr; ++ HASH_FIND_INT(evp_ptrs, &aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], ptr); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ptr->pointer); ++ HASH_DEL(evp_ptrs, ptr); ++ free(ptr); ++ } ++ } ++ pthread_rwlock_destroy(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock); ++} ++ ++/* determine the number of threads to use ++ * Testing indicates that in most all situations the optimal number of ++ * threads is 1 meaning 1 for inbound and 1 for outbound. The optimal ++ * queue count has also been determined to be thread_count + 1. ++ * note this function updates two globals - numkq and cipher_threads ++ * it returns the value of cipher_threads but it doesn't need to */ ++static int get_thread_count() { ++ ++ char * aes_threads = getenv("SSH_CIPHER_THREADS"); ++ debug_f ("SSH thread count is %s", aes_threads); ++ if (aes_threads != NULL && strlen(aes_threads) != 0) ++ cipher_threads = atoi(aes_threads); ++ else ++ cipher_threads = 1; ++ ++ if (cipher_threads < 1) ++ cipher_threads = 1; ++ ++ if (cipher_threads > MAX_THREADS) ++ cipher_threads = MAX_THREADS; ++ ++ numkq = cipher_threads + 1; ++ ++ if (numkq > MAX_NUMKQ) ++ numkq = MAX_NUMKQ; ++ ++ debug_f ("Starting %d threads and %d queues\n", cipher_threads, numkq); ++ ++ return (cipher_threads); ++} ++ ++ ++/* ++ * The life of a pregen thread: ++ * Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter. ++ * When done, update counter for the next fill. ++ */ ++static void * ++thread_loop(void *job) ++{ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx; ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = job; ++ struct kq *q; ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr; ++ pthread_t first_tid; ++ int outlen; ++ u_char mynull[KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ memset(&mynull, 0, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ++ /* get the thread id to see if this is the first one */ ++ pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock); ++ first_tid = aes_mt_ctx->tid[0]; ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock); ++ ++ /* create the context for this thread */ ++ evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ ++ /* keep track of the pointer for the evp in this struct ++ * so we can free it later. So we place it in a hash indexed on the ++ * thread id, which is available to us in the free function. ++ * Note, the thread id isn't necessary unique across rekeys but ++ * that's okay as they are unique during a key. */ ++ ptr = malloc(sizeof *ptr); /*freed in stop & prejoin */ ++ ptr->tid = pthread_self(); /* index for hash */ ++ ptr->pointer = evp_ctx; ++ HASH_ADD_INT(evp_ptrs, tid, ptr); ++ ++ /* initialize the cipher ctx with the key provided ++ * determinbe which cipher to use based on the key size */ ++ if (aes_mt_ctx->keylen == 256) ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr(), NULL, aes_mt_ctx->orig_key, NULL); ++ else if (aes_mt_ctx->keylen == 128) ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), NULL, aes_mt_ctx->orig_key, NULL); ++ else if (aes_mt_ctx->keylen == 192) ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_192_ctr(), NULL, aes_mt_ctx->orig_key, NULL); ++ else ++ fatal("Invalid key length of %d in AES CTR MT. Exiting", aes_mt_ctx->keylen); ++ ++ /* ++ * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill ++ * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout. ++ */ ++ if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) { ++ /* get the first element of the key queue struct */ ++ q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[0]; ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ /* if we are in the INIT state then fill the queue */ ++ if (q->qstate == KQINIT) { ++ /* set the initial counter */ ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr); ++ /* encypher a block sized null string (mynull) with the key. This ++ * returns the keystream because xoring the keystream ++ * against null returns the keystream. Store that in the appropriate queue */ ++ EVP_EncryptUpdate(evp_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ /* Update the aes counter */ ++ ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ /* since this is the first thread set it to draining */ ++ q->qstate = KQDRAINING; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ } ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over ++ * queues already filled by other threads and stopping to wait for ++ * a draining queue to become empty. ++ * ++ * Multiple threads may be waiting on a draining queue and awoken ++ * when empty. The first thread to wake will mark it as filling, ++ * others will move on to fill, skip, or wait on the next queue. ++ * We init qidx here because if we do it at the top of the function ++ * we get a warning about it possibly being clobbered. The exact reason ++ * doesn't make a lot of sense but it has to happen after the ++ * first pthread_rwlock_rdlock(). Might have something to do with ++ * incorrect compiler optimizations. ++ */ ++ int qidx; ++ for (qidx = 1;; qidx = (qidx + 1) % numkq) { ++ /* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */ ++ pthread_testcancel(); ++ ++ /* Check if we should exit as well */ ++ thread_loop_check_exit(aes_mt_ctx); ++ ++ /* Lock queue and block if its draining */ ++ q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[qidx]; ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock); ++ while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) { ++ thread_loop_check_exit(aes_mt_ctx); ++ pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock); ++ } ++ pthread_cleanup_pop(0); ++ ++ /* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */ ++ if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) { ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Empty, let's fill it. ++ * Queue lock is relinquished while we do this so others ++ * can see that it's being filled. ++ */ ++ q->qstate = KQFILLING; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ ++ /* set the initial counter */ ++ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr); ++ ++ /* see coresponding block above for useful comments */ ++ EVP_EncryptUpdate(evp_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ++ /* Re-lock, mark full and signal consumer */ ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ q->qstate = KQFULL; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++ ++/* Our version of the EVP functions ++ * these are public as they are used by the provider */ ++ ++/* instantiate the cipher context. ++ * in this we create the EVP ctx and the AES ctx, setup the AES ctx ++ * initialize the EVP and then attach the AES ctx to the EVP ctx. ++ * The *only* difference between aes_mt_newctx_256|192|128 is the ++ * keylength of the cipher used in EVP_CipherInit ++ * parameters: provider context ++ * returns: EVP context ++ */ ++/* honestly the way this works makes me think that there has to be ++ * a better way of doing this however, I've yet to find one that doesn't ++ * involve more madness. I think that's mostly becase I don't understand ++ * how params work properly. I feel like I shoudl be able to use them ++ * to specify the key length but... also, I'd think I'd be able to ++ * set aes_mt_ctx_st->keylen to the keylength but that doesn't seem to ++ * work either. That said, this does work even if it's a bit clunky. ++ * -cjr 09/08/2022 */ ++void *aes_mt_newctx_256(void *provctx) ++{ ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx)); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ ++ if ((aes_mt_ctx != NULL) && (evp_ctx != NULL)) { ++ get_thread_count(); /* update cipher_threads and numkq */ ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock, NULL); ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock, NULL); ++ aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE; ++ ++ /* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */ ++ for (int i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { ++ pthread_mutex_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].lock, NULL); ++ pthread_cond_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].cond, NULL); ++ } ++ aes_mt_ctx->provctx = provctx; ++ EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr(), NULL, NULL, 0); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, aes_mt_ctx); ++ return evp_ctx; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++void *aes_mt_newctx_192(void *provctx) ++{ ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx)); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ ++ if ((aes_mt_ctx != NULL) && (evp_ctx != NULL)) { ++ get_thread_count(); /* update cipher_threads and numkq */ ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock, NULL); ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock, NULL); ++ aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE; ++ ++ /* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */ ++ for (int i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { ++ pthread_mutex_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].lock, NULL); ++ pthread_cond_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].cond, NULL); ++ } ++ aes_mt_ctx->provctx = provctx; ++ EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_192_ctr(), NULL, NULL, 0); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, aes_mt_ctx); ++ return evp_ctx; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++void *aes_mt_newctx_128(void *provctx) ++{ ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx)); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ ++ if ((aes_mt_ctx != NULL) && (evp_ctx != NULL)) { ++ get_thread_count(); /* update cipher_threads and numkq */ ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock, NULL); ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock, NULL); ++ aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE; ++ ++ /* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */ ++ for (int i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { ++ pthread_mutex_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].lock, NULL); ++ pthread_cond_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].cond, NULL); ++ } ++ aes_mt_ctx->provctx = provctx; ++ EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), NULL, NULL, 0); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, aes_mt_ctx); ++ return evp_ctx; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++/* this function expects a void but we need the actual context ++ * to get the app_data. ++ */ ++void aes_mt_freectx(void *vevp_ctx) ++{ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = vevp_ctx; ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx; ++ ++ if ((aes_mt_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp_ctx)) != NULL) { ++ stop_and_join_pregen_threads(aes_mt_ctx); ++ ++ memset(aes_mt_ctx, 0, sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx)); ++ free(aes_mt_ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, NULL); ++ } ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx); ++} ++ ++/* this function takes the EVP context, gets the AES context ++ * and starts the various threads we need */ ++int aes_mt_start_threads(void *vevp_ctx, const u_char *key, ++ size_t keylen, const u_char *iv, ++ size_t ivlen, const OSSL_PARAM *ossl_params) ++{ ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = vevp_ctx; ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx; ++ ++ ++ /* get the initial state of aes_mt_ctx (our cipher stream struct) */ ++ if ((aes_mt_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp_ctx)) == NULL) { ++ fatal("Missing AES MT context data!"); ++ } ++ ++ /* we are initializing but the current structure already ++ * has an IV and key so we want to kill the existing key data ++ * and start over. This is important when we need to rekey the data stream */ ++ if (aes_mt_ctx->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) { ++ /* tell the pregen threads to exit */ ++ stop_and_join_pregen_threads(aes_mt_ctx); ++ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ /* reset the exit flag */ ++ aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ ++ /* Start over getting key & iv */ ++ aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE; ++ } ++ ++ /* set the initial key for this key stream queue */ ++ if (key != NULL) { ++ aes_mt_ctx->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx) * 8; ++ aes_mt_ctx->orig_key = key; ++ aes_mt_ctx->state |= HAVE_KEY; ++ } ++ ++ /* set the IV */ ++ if (iv != NULL) { ++ /* init the counter this is just a 16byte uchar */ ++ memcpy(aes_mt_ctx->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ aes_mt_ctx->state |= HAVE_IV; ++ } ++ ++ if (aes_mt_ctx->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) { ++ /* Clear queues */ ++ /* set the first key in the key queue to the current counter */ ++ memcpy(aes_mt_ctx->q[0].ctr, aes_mt_ctx->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ /* indicate that it needs to be initialized */ ++ aes_mt_ctx->q[0].qstate = KQINIT; ++ /* for each of the remaining queues set the first counter to the ++ * counter and then add the size of the queue to the counter */ ++ for (int i = 1; i < numkq; i++) { ++ memcpy(aes_mt_ctx->q[i].ctr, aes_mt_ctx->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ ssh_ctr_add(aes_mt_ctx->q[i].ctr, i * KQLEN, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ aes_mt_ctx->q[i].qstate = KQEMPTY; ++ } ++ aes_mt_ctx->qidx = 0; ++ aes_mt_ctx->ridx = 0; ++ aes_mt_ctx->struct_id = global_struct_id++; ++ ++ /* Start threads. Make sure we have enough stack space (under alpine) ++ * and aren't using more than we need (linux). This can be as low as ++ * 512KB but that's a minimum. 1024KB gives us a little headroom if we ++ * need it */ ++#define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024) ++ pthread_attr_t attr; ++ pthread_attr_init(&attr); ++ pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, STACK_SIZE); ++ for (int i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) { ++ pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock); ++ if (pthread_create(&aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], &attr, thread_loop, aes_mt_ctx) != 0) ++ fatal ("AES-CTR MT Could not create thread in %s", __func__); ++ else { ++ aes_mt_ctx->id[i] = i; ++ debug_f ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu (%lu, %d)", ++ aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], aes_mt_ctx->struct_id, ++ aes_mt_ctx->id[i]); ++ } ++ pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock); ++ } ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&aes_mt_ctx->q[0].lock); ++ // wait for all of the threads to be initialized ++ while (aes_mt_ctx->q[0].qstate == KQINIT) ++ pthread_cond_wait(&aes_mt_ctx->q[0].cond, &aes_mt_ctx->q[0].lock); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->q[0].lock); ++ } ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++/* this should correspond to ssh_aes_ctr ++ * OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, cipher_cipher, ++ * (void *cctx, ++ * unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize, ++ * const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)) ++ */ ++ ++int aes_mt_do_cipher(void *vevp_ctx, ++ u_char *dest, size_t *destlen, size_t destsize, ++ const u_char *src, size_t len) ++{ ++ typedef union { ++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK ++ __uint128_t *u128; ++#endif ++ uint64_t *u64; ++ uint32_t *u32; ++ uint8_t *u8; ++ const uint8_t *cu8; ++ uintptr_t u; ++ } ptrs_t; ++ ptrs_t destp, srcp, bufp; ++ uintptr_t align; ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx; ++ struct kq *q, *oldq; ++ int ridx; ++ u_char *buf; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = vevp_ctx; ++ ++ if (len == 0) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if ((aes_mt_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp_ctx)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[aes_mt_ctx->qidx]; ++ ridx = aes_mt_ctx->ridx; ++ ++ /* src already padded to block multiple */ ++ srcp.cu8 = src; ++ destp.u8 = dest; ++ do { /* do until len is 0 */ ++ buf = q->keys[ridx]; ++ bufp.u8 = buf; ++ ++ /* figure out the alignment on the fly */ ++#ifdef CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK ++ align = 0; ++#else ++ align = destp.u | srcp.u | bufp.u; ++#endif ++ ++ /* xor the src against the key (buf) ++ * different systems can do all 16 bytes at once or ++ * may need to do it in 8 or 4 bytes chunks ++ * worst case is doing it as a loop */ ++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK ++ /* with GCC 13 we have having consistent seg faults ++ * in this section of code. Since this is a critical ++ * code path we are removing this until we have a solution ++ * in place -cjr 02/22/24 ++ * TODO: FIX THIS ++ */ ++ /* if ((align & 0xf) == 0) { */ ++ /* destp.u128[0] = srcp.u128[0] ^ bufp.u128[0]; */ ++ /* } else */ ++#endif ++ /* 64 bits */ ++ if ((align & 0x7) == 0) { ++ destp.u64[0] = srcp.u64[0] ^ bufp.u64[0]; ++ destp.u64[1] = srcp.u64[1] ^ bufp.u64[1]; ++ /* 32 bits */ ++ } else if ((align & 0x3) == 0) { ++ destp.u32[0] = srcp.u32[0] ^ bufp.u32[0]; ++ destp.u32[1] = srcp.u32[1] ^ bufp.u32[1]; ++ destp.u32[2] = srcp.u32[2] ^ bufp.u32[2]; ++ destp.u32[3] = srcp.u32[3] ^ bufp.u32[3]; ++ } else { ++ /*1 byte at a time*/ ++ size_t i; ++ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) ++ dest[i] = src[i] ^ buf[i]; ++ } ++ ++ /* inc/decrement the pointers by the block size (16)*/ ++ destp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ srcp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ ++ /* Increment read index, switch queues on rollover */ ++ if ((ridx = (ridx + 1) % KQLEN) == 0) { ++ oldq = q; ++ ++ /* Mark next queue draining, may need to wait */ ++ aes_mt_ctx->qidx = (aes_mt_ctx->qidx + 1) % numkq; ++ q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[aes_mt_ctx->qidx]; ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock); ++ while (q->qstate != KQFULL) { ++ pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock); ++ } ++ q->qstate = KQDRAINING; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock); ++ ++ /* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */ ++ pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock); ++ oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY; ++ pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond); ++ pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock); ++ } ++ } while (len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ aes_mt_ctx->ridx = ridx; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++#endif /*WITH_OPENSSL3*/ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.310937760 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ ++/* ++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher Provider for OpenSSL 3 ++ * ++ * Author: Benjamin Bennett ++ * Author: Mike Tasota ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * Copyright (c) 2008-2022 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged, ++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef CTR_MT_FUNCS ++#define CTR_MT_FUNCS ++ ++/* includes */ ++#include "includes.h" /* needed to get version number */ ++#include ++#include ++#include "cipher-aesctr.h" ++#include "uthash.h" ++ ++#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL ++#include ++#endif ++ ++/* only for systems with OSSL 3 */ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++ ++/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/ ++/* maximum number of threads and queues */ ++#define MAX_THREADS 32 ++#define MAX_NUMKQ (MAX_THREADS + 1) ++ ++/* one queue holds 8192 * 4 * 16B (512KB) of key data ++ * being that the queues are destroyed after a rekey ++ * and at leats one has to be fully filled prior to ++ * enciphering data we don't want this to be too large */ ++#define KQLEN (8192 * 4) ++ ++/* Processor cacheline length */ ++#define CACHELINE_LEN 64 ++ ++/* Can the system do unaligned loads natively? */ ++#if defined(__aarch64__) || \ ++ defined(__i386__) || \ ++ defined(__powerpc__) || \ ++ defined(__x86_64__) ++# define CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK ++#endif ++#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) ++# define CIPHER_INT128_OK ++#endif ++ ++/* context states */ ++#define HAVE_NONE 0 ++#define HAVE_KEY 1 ++#define HAVE_IV 2 ++ ++/* Keystream Queue state */ ++enum { ++ KQINIT, ++ KQEMPTY, ++ KQFILLING, ++ KQFULL, ++ KQDRAINING ++}; ++ ++/* structs */ ++ ++/* provider struct */ ++struct provider_ctx_st { ++ const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core_handle; ++ struct proverr_functions_st *proverr_handle; ++}; ++ ++/* Keystream Queue struct */ ++struct kq { ++ u_char keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* [32768][16B] */ ++ u_char ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */ ++ u_char pad0[CACHELINE_LEN]; ++ pthread_mutex_t lock; ++ pthread_cond_t cond; ++ int qstate; ++ u_char pad1[CACHELINE_LEN]; ++}; ++ ++/* AES MT context struct */ ++struct aes_mt_ctx_st { ++ struct provider_ctx_st *provctx; ++ long unsigned int struct_id; ++ int keylen; ++ int state; ++ int qidx; ++ int ridx; ++ int id[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */ ++ AES_KEY aes_key; ++ const u_char *orig_key; ++ u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */ ++ pthread_t tid[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */ ++ pthread_rwlock_t tid_lock; ++ struct kq q[MAX_NUMKQ]; /* 33 */ ++#ifdef __APPLE__ ++ pthread_rwlock_t stop_lock; ++ int exit_flag; ++#endif /* __APPLE__ */ ++ int ongoing; /* possibly not needed */ ++}; ++ ++/* this holds an array of evp context pointers that are ++ * created in thread_loop. Since we can't effectively free those ++ * contexts in thread_loop we keep a copy of those pointers here ++ * and then free them in stop_and_join_pregenthreads ++ * cjr 2/2/2023 ++ */ ++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs { ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *pointer; ++ pthread_t tid; ++ UT_hash_handle hh; ++}; ++ ++int aes_mt_do_cipher(void *, u_char *, size_t *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t); ++int aes_mt_start_threads(void *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const OSSL_PARAM *); ++void aes_mt_freectx(void *); ++void *aes_mt_newctx_256(void *); ++void *aes_mt_newctx_192(void *); ++void *aes_mt_newctx_128(void *); ++ ++#endif /* WITH OPENSSL */ ++#endif /* CTR_MT_FUNCS */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.311329711 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@ ++/* ++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher Provider for OpenSSL 3 ++ * ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * Copyright (c) 2022 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any ++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above ++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. ++ * ++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES ++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES ++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF ++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ++ */ ++ ++/* based on vienere.c from https://github.com/provider-corner/vigenere by ++ * Richard Levitte provided under a CC0 Public License. */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++/* only for systems with OSSL 3.0+ */ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "ossl3-provider-err.h" ++#include "num.h" ++#include "cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h" ++ ++#define ERR_HANDLE(ctx) ((ctx)->provctx->proverr_handle) ++ ++/* forward declartion of cipher functions */ ++/* cipher context functions */ ++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_newctx_fn aes_mt_newctx_256; ++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_newctx_fn aes_mt_newctx_192; ++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_newctx_fn aes_mt_newctx_128; ++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_freectx_fn aes_mt_freectx; ++ ++/* param related function*/ ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_params_fn aes_mt_get_params_256; ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_params_fn aes_mt_get_params_192; ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_params_fn aes_mt_get_params_128; ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_gettable_params_fn aes_mt_gettable_params; ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_set_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_set_ctx_params; ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_get_ctx_params; ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_settable_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_settable_ctx_params; ++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_gettable_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params; ++ ++/* en/decipher functions */ ++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_encrypt_init_fn aes_mt_start_threads; ++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_decrypt_init_fn aes_mt_start_threads; ++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_update_fn aes_mt_do_cipher; ++ ++/* provider context */ ++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_query_operation_fn aes_mt_prov_query; ++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_get_reason_strings_fn aes_mt_prov_reasons; ++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_teardown_fn aes_mt_prov_teardown; ++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_get_params_fn aes_mt_prov_get_params; ++OSSL_provider_init_fn OSSL_provider_init; /* need this? */ ++ ++/* error functions */ ++OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error_fn *c_new_error; ++OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug_fn *c_set_error_debug; ++OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *c_vset_error; ++OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_mark_fn *c_set_error_mark; ++OSSL_FUNC_core_clear_last_error_mark_fn *c_clear_last_error_mark; ++OSSL_FUNC_core_pop_error_to_mark_fn *c_pop_error_to_mark; ++ ++/* Errors used in this provider */ ++#define AES_MT_E_MALLOC 1 ++#define AES_MT_ONGOING_OPERATION 2 ++#define AES_MT_BAD_KEYLEN 3 ++ ++/* typedef for function pointers */ ++typedef void(*fptr_t)(void); ++ ++/* all of the various arrays we need */ ++ ++/* BAD_KEYLEN isn't being used at the moment */ ++const OSSL_ITEM reasons[] = { ++ { AES_MT_E_MALLOC, "Memory allocation failure" }, ++ { AES_MT_ONGOING_OPERATION, "Operation underway" }, ++ { AES_MT_BAD_KEYLEN, "Only 256, 192, and 128 Key lengths are supported" }, ++ { 0, NULL } /* Termination */ ++}; ++ ++/* function mapping for 256|192|128 key lengths */ ++const OSSL_DISPATCH aes_mt_funcs_256[] = { ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_newctx_256 } , ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_freectx }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (fptr_t)aes_mt_do_cipher }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_params_256 }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, ++ (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_set_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, ++ (fptr_t)aes_mt_settable_ctx_params }, ++ { 0, NULL } ++}; ++ ++const OSSL_DISPATCH aes_mt_funcs_192[] = { ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_newctx_192 } , ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_freectx }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (fptr_t)aes_mt_do_cipher }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_params_192 }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, ++ (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_set_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, ++ (fptr_t)aes_mt_settable_ctx_params }, ++ { 0, NULL } ++}; ++ ++const OSSL_DISPATCH aes_mt_funcs_128[] = { ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_newctx_128 } , ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_freectx }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (fptr_t)aes_mt_do_cipher }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_params_128 }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, ++ (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_set_ctx_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, ++ (fptr_t)aes_mt_settable_ctx_params }, ++ { 0, NULL } ++}; ++ ++/* the ciphers found in this provider */ ++const OSSL_ALGORITHM aes_mt_ciphers[] = { ++ { "aes_ctr_mt_256", "provider=hpnssh", aes_mt_funcs_256, NULL }, ++ { "aes_ctr_mt_192", "provider=hpnssh", aes_mt_funcs_192, NULL }, ++ { "aes_ctr_mt_128", "provider=hpnssh", aes_mt_funcs_128, NULL }, ++ { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL } ++}; ++ ++/* function mapping for provider methods */ ++const OSSL_DISPATCH provider_functions[] = { ++ { OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_TEARDOWN, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_teardown }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_QUERY_OPERATION, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_query }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_get_params }, ++ { OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_GET_REASON_STRINGS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_reasons }, ++ { 0, NULL } ++}; ++ ++static const OSSL_PARAM ctx_get_param_table[] = { ++ { "keylen", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 }, ++ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0 }, ++}; ++ ++static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_get_param_table[] = { ++ { "blocksize", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 }, ++ { "keylen", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 }, ++ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0 }, ++}; ++ ++static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_set_param_table[] = { ++ { "keylen", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 }, ++ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0 }, ++}; ++ ++ ++/* provider functions start here */ ++ ++static void provider_ctx_free(struct provider_ctx_st *ctx) ++{ ++ if (ctx != NULL) ++ proverr_free_handle(ctx->proverr_handle); ++ free(ctx); ++} ++ ++static struct provider_ctx_st *provider_ctx_new(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core, ++ const OSSL_DISPATCH *in) ++{ ++ struct provider_ctx_st *ctx; ++ ++ if ((ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx))) != NULL ++ && (ctx->proverr_handle = proverr_new_handle(core, in)) != NULL) { ++ ctx->core_handle = core; ++ } else { ++ provider_ctx_free(ctx); ++ ctx = NULL; ++ } ++ return ctx; ++} ++ ++ ++/* returns the appropriate algo table for the requested function ++ * in this case we should only be working with OP_CIPHER */ ++const OSSL_ALGORITHM *aes_mt_prov_query(void *provctx, int operation_id, ++ int *no_store) ++{ ++ switch (operation_id) { ++ case OSSL_OP_CIPHER: ++ return aes_mt_ciphers; ++ } ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++const OSSL_ITEM *aes_mt_prov_reasons(void *provctx) ++{ ++ return reasons; ++} ++ ++static int aes_mt_prov_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM *params) ++{ ++ OSSL_PARAM *p; ++ int ok = 1; ++ ++ char *VERSION="1.0"; ++ char *BUILDTYPE="aes_ctr_mt@hpnssh.org"; ++ ++ for(p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "version") == 0) { ++ *(const void **)p->data = VERSION; ++ p->return_size = strlen(VERSION); ++ } else if (strcasecmp(p->key, "buildinfo") == 0 ++ && BUILDTYPE[0] != '\0') { ++ *(const void **)p->data = BUILDTYPE; ++ p->return_size = strlen(BUILDTYPE); ++ } ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++/* The function that tears down this provider */ ++static void aes_mt_prov_teardown(void *vprovctx) ++{ ++ provider_ctx_free(vprovctx); ++} ++ ++int OSSL_provider_init(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core, ++ const OSSL_DISPATCH *in, ++ const OSSL_DISPATCH **out, ++ void **vprovctx) ++{ ++ if ((*vprovctx = provider_ctx_new(core, in)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ *out = provider_functions; ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++/* parameter functions for 256|192|128 bit key lengths */ ++static int aes_mt_get_params_256(OSSL_PARAM params[]) ++{ ++ OSSL_PARAM *p; ++ int ok = 1; ++ ++ for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) { ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "blocksize") == 0) ++ if (provnum_set_size_t(p, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) { ++ size_t keyl = 32; ++ ++ if (provnum_set_size_t(p, keyl) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++static int aes_mt_get_params_192(OSSL_PARAM params[]) ++{ ++ OSSL_PARAM *p; ++ int ok = 1; ++ ++ for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) { ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "blocksize") == 0) ++ if (provnum_set_size_t(p, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) { ++ size_t keyl = 24; ++ ++ if (provnum_set_size_t(p, keyl) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++static int aes_mt_get_params_128(OSSL_PARAM params[]) ++{ ++ OSSL_PARAM *p; ++ int ok = 1; ++ ++ for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) { ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "blocksize") == 0) ++ if (provnum_set_size_t(p, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) { ++ size_t keyl = 16; ++ ++ if (provnum_set_size_t(p, keyl) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++/* Parameters that libcrypto can get from this implementation */ ++static const OSSL_PARAM *aes_mt_gettable_params(void *provctx) ++{ ++ return cipher_get_param_table; ++} ++ ++static const OSSL_PARAM *aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params(void *cctx, void *provctx) ++{ ++ return ctx_get_param_table; ++} ++ ++static int aes_mt_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) ++{ ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *ctx = vctx; ++ int ok = 1; ++ ++ if (ctx->keylen > 0) { ++ OSSL_PARAM *p; ++ ++ for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0 ++ && provnum_set_size_t(p, ctx->keylen) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++/* Parameters that libcrypto can send to this implementation */ ++static const OSSL_PARAM *aes_mt_settable_ctx_params(void *cctx, void *provctx) ++{ ++ return cipher_set_param_table; ++} ++ ++static int aes_mt_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) ++{ ++ struct aes_mt_ctx_st *ctx = vctx; ++ const OSSL_PARAM *p; ++ int ok = 1; ++ ++ if (ctx->ongoing) { ++ ERR_raise(ERR_HANDLE(ctx), AES_MT_ONGOING_OPERATION); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) ++ if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) { ++ size_t keyl = 0; ++ ++ if (provnum_get_size_t(&keyl, p) < 0) { ++ ok = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ ctx->keylen = keyl; ++ } ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++#endif /*WITH_OPENSSL3*/ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.h 2025-06-14 10:53:01.717078466 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher.h 2025-06-14 13:45:10.880862884 +0200 +@@ -42,11 +42,17 @@ + #include + #endif + #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++#include "cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h" ++#endif + #include "cipher-aesctr.h" + + #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 + #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 + ++#define CIPHER_MULTITHREAD 1 ++#define CIPHER_SERIAL 0 ++ + struct sshcipher { + char *name; + u_int block_size; +@@ -60,6 +66,7 @@ + #define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) + #define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++#define CFLAG_MT (1<<4) + const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); + #else + void *ignored; +@@ -68,24 +75,27 @@ + + struct sshcipher_ctx; + +-const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); ++struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); + const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); + int ciphers_valid(const char *); + char *cipher_alg_list(char, int); + const char *compression_alg_list(int); + int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *, +- const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int); ++ const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, u_int, int, int); + int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *, + u_int, u_int, u_int); + int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int, + const u_char *, u_int); + void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *); + u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *); ++uint64_t cipher_rekey_blocks(const struct sshcipher *); + u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *); + u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *); + u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *); + u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *); + u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *); ++void cipher_reset_multithreaded(void); ++const char *cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); + + u_int cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *); + +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.312566045 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2023 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University. ++ * ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * ++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the MIT License. ++ * ++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or ++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the MIT License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library; ++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++/* This provides the function to switch from a serial to parallel ++ * cipher. This has been moved into it's own file in order to make it ++ * available to both the client and server without having to clutter ++ * up other files. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++#include ++#include ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++ ++ ++/* if we are using a parallel cipher there can be issues in either ++ * a fork or sandbox. Essentially, if we switch too early the ++ * threads get lost and the application hangs. So what we do is ++ * test if either the send or receive context cipher name ++ * matches the known available parallel ciphers. If it does ++ * then we force a rekey which automatically loads the parallel ++ * cipher. */ ++ ++void ++cipher_switch(struct ssh *ssh) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ /* get the send and receive context and extract the cipher name */ ++ const void *send_cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh); ++ const void *recv_cc = ssh_packet_get_receive_context(ssh); ++ const char *send = cipher_ctx_name(send_cc); ++ const char *recv = cipher_ctx_name(recv_cc); ++ ++ debug_f("Send: %s Recv: %s", send, recv); ++ ++ /* if the name of the cipher matches then we set the context ++ * to authenticated (it likely already is though) and then ++ * force the rekey. Either side can do this. One downside of ++ * this method is that both sides can request a rekey so you ++ * can end up duplicating work. This is annoying but the ++ * performance gains make it worthwhile. Also I ++ * use strstr here because strcmp would require a 6 part ++ * if statement */ ++ if (strstr(send, "ctr") || strstr(recv, "ctr")) { ++ debug("Serial to parallel AES-CTR cipher swap"); ++ /* cipher_reset_multithreaded(); */ ++ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh); ++ packet_request_rekeying(); ++ } ++ /* do the same for multithreaded chacha20 but with strcmp */ ++ if ((strcmp(send, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com") == 0) || ++ (strcmp(recv, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com") == 0)) { ++ debug("Serial to parallel Chacha20-poly1305 cipher swap"); ++ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh); ++ packet_request_rekeying(); ++ } ++#endif ++} +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.312822014 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2015 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University. ++ * ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * ++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the MIT License. ++ * ++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or ++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the MIT License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library; ++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++void cipher_switch (struct ssh *); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/clientloop.c openssh-10.0p1/clientloop.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/clientloop.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.223339310 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/clientloop.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.313407565 +0200 +@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ + #include "msg.h" + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "hostfile.h" ++#include "metrics.h" + + #ifdef GSSAPI + #include "ssh-gss.h" +@@ -171,6 +172,10 @@ + + static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh); + int session_ident = -1; ++int metrics_hdr_remote_flag = 0; ++int metrics_hdr_local_flag = 0; ++int remote_no_poll_flag = 0; ++int local_no_poll_flag = 0; + + /* Track escape per proto2 channel */ + struct escape_filter_ctx { +@@ -197,6 +202,8 @@ + static struct global_confirms global_confirms = + TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); + ++void client_request_metrics(struct ssh *); ++ + static void quit_message(const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2))); + +@@ -1453,6 +1460,7 @@ + double start_time, total_time; + int channel_did_enqueue = 0, r; + u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; ++ time_t previous_time; + int conn_in_ready, conn_out_ready; + sigset_t bsigset, osigset; + +@@ -1494,6 +1502,7 @@ + client_repledge(); + + start_time = monotime_double(); ++ previous_time = time(NULL); /* for metrics polling */ + + /* Initialize variables. */ + last_was_cr = 1; +@@ -1535,6 +1544,8 @@ + } + + schedule_server_alive_check(); ++ if (options.metrics) ++ client_request_metrics(ssh); /* initial metrics polling */ + + if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || + sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGHUP) == -1 || +@@ -1545,6 +1556,12 @@ + + /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ + while (!quit_pending) { ++ if (options.metrics) { ++ if ((time(NULL) - previous_time) >= options.metrics_interval) { ++ client_request_metrics(ssh); ++ previous_time = time(NULL); ++ } ++ } + channel_did_enqueue = 0; + + /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ +@@ -1637,6 +1654,10 @@ + } + } + } ++ ++ if (options.metrics) ++ client_request_metrics(ssh); /* final metrics polling */ ++ + free(pfd); + + /* Terminate the session. */ +@@ -2648,6 +2669,167 @@ + return 1; + } + ++/* take the response from the server and parse out the data. ++ * the _ctx should be null. It's just here because the format ++ * of the callback handler expects it. Likewise, seq is ++ * not used. */ ++static void ++client_process_request_metrics (struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) { ++ struct tcp_info local_tcp_info; ++ const u_char *blob; ++ FILE *remfptr; ++ FILE *localfptr; ++ char remfilename[1024]; ++ char localfilename[1024]; ++ time_t now; ++ struct tm *info; ++ char timestamp[40]; ++ char *metricsstring = NULL; ++ size_t tcpi_len, len = 0; ++ binn *metricsobj = NULL; ++ int r, kernel_version = 0; ++ ++ time(&now); ++ info = localtime(&now); ++ strftime(timestamp, 40, "%d-%m-%Y %H:%M:%S", info); ++ ++ /* malloc the string 1KB should be large enough */ ++ metricsstring = malloc(1024); ++ ++ /* get the local socket information */ ++ int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); ++ ++ /* the user can specify a name/path with options.metrics_path ++ * but if it's not defined we'll use a default name. In either case ++ * the name will have a suffix of local for the local data and remote for ++ * the remote data */ ++ if (options.metrics_path == NULL) { ++ snprintf(remfilename, 1024, "%s", "./ssh_stack_metrics.remote"); ++ snprintf(localfilename, 1024, "%s", "./ssh_stack_metrics.local"); ++ } else { ++ snprintf(remfilename, 1024, "%s.%s", options.metrics_path, "remote"); ++ snprintf(localfilename, 1024, "%s.%s", options.metrics_path, "local"); ++ } ++ ++ /* should be type 81 and if it's not then its likley that ++ * the remote does not support polling. We can still get local data though ++ */ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { ++ if (remote_no_poll_flag == 0) { ++ error("Remote does not support stack metric polling. Local data only."); ++ remote_no_poll_flag = 1; ++ } ++ goto localonly; ++ } ++ ++ /* open the file handle to write the remote data*/ ++ remfptr = fopen(remfilename, "a"); ++ if (remfptr == NULL) ++ fatal("Error opening %s: %s", remfilename, strerror(errno)); ++ ++ /* read the entire packet string into blob ++ * blob has to be a const uchar as that's what string_direct expects ++ * we cast it as a void for the binn functions */ ++ sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len); ++ if (len == 0) { ++ /* received no data. which is weird */ ++ error("Received no remote metrics data. Continuing."); ++ } ++ ++ /* get the kernel version printing the header */ ++ kernel_version = binn_object_int32((void *)blob, "kernel_version"); ++ ++ /* create a string of the data from the binn object blob */ ++ metrics_read_binn_object((void *)blob, metricsstring); ++ ++ /* have we printed the header? */ ++ if (metrics_hdr_remote_flag == 0) { ++ metrics_print_header(remfptr, "REMOTE CONNECTION", kernel_version); ++ metrics_hdr_remote_flag = 1; ++ } ++ fprintf(remfptr, "%s, ", timestamp); ++ fprintf(remfptr, "%s\n", metricsstring); ++ ++ /* close remote file pointer*/ ++ fclose(remfptr); ++ ++ /* got the remote data, now get the local */ ++localonly: ++/* TCP_INFO is defined in metrics.h*/ ++#if !defined TCP_INFO ++ if (local_no_poll_flag == 0) { ++ error("Local host does not support metric polling. Remote data only."); ++ local_no_poll_flag = 1; ++ } ++#else ++ /* open file handle for local data */ ++ localfptr = fopen(localfilename, "a"); ++ if(localfptr == NULL) ++ fatal("Error opening %s: %s", localfilename, strerror(errno)); ++ ++ /* create the binn object*/ ++ metricsobj = binn_object(); ++ if (metricsobj == NULL) { ++ fatal("Could not create metrics object"); ++ } ++ ++ tcpi_len = (size_t)sizeof(local_tcp_info); ++ if ((r = getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_INFO, (void *)&local_tcp_info, ++ (socklen_t *)&tcpi_len)) != 0){ ++ error("Could not read tcp_info from socket"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* we write and read to a binn object because it lets us ++ * format the data consistently */ ++ metrics_write_binn_object(&local_tcp_info, metricsobj); ++ ++ /* create a string of the data from the binn object metricsobj */ ++ metrics_read_binn_object((void *)metricsobj, metricsstring); ++ ++ /* get the kernel version printing the header */ ++ kernel_version = binn_object_int32(metricsobj, "kernel_version"); ++ ++ if (metrics_hdr_local_flag == 0) { ++ metrics_print_header(localfptr, "LOCAL CONNECTION", kernel_version); ++ metrics_hdr_local_flag = 1; ++ } ++ ++ fprintf(localfptr, "%s, ", timestamp); ++ fprintf(localfptr, "%s\n", metricsstring); ++ fclose (localfptr); ++#endif /* TCP_INFO */ ++out: ++ free(metricsstring); ++} ++ ++/* Use the SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST protocol to ++ * ask the server to send metrics back to the client. ++ * we use the non-canonical string stack-metrics@hpnssh.org ++ * to indicate the type of request we want. If the receiver doesn't ++ * understand it then the response indiactes a failure. ++ * I can probably do this by using clint_input_global_request but ++ * I need to understand that better. ++ */ ++void client_request_metrics(struct ssh *ssh) { ++ int r; ++ ++ debug_f("Asking server for TCP stack metrics"); ++ /* create a pakcet of GLOBAL_REQUEST type */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || ++ /* define the type of GLOBAL_REQUEST message */ ++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, ++ "stack-metrics@hpnssh.org")) != 0 || ++ /* indicate if we want a response. 1 for yes 0 for no */ ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "prepare stack request failure"); ++ /* send the packet */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal_fr(r, "send stack request"); ++ /* i believe this indicates what we are to use for a callback */ ++ client_register_global_confirm(client_process_request_metrics, NULL); ++} ++ + static int + client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + { +@@ -2773,6 +2955,43 @@ + + len = sshbuf_len(cmd); + if (len > 0) { ++ /* we may be connecting to a server that has hpn prefixed ++ * binaries installed. In that case we need to rewrite any ++ * scp commands to look for hpnscp instead. ++ */ ++ if (ssh->compat & SSH_HPNSSH_PREFIX) { ++ char *new_cmd; ++ new_cmd = malloc(len+4); ++ /* read the existing command into a temp buffer */ ++ sprintf(new_cmd, "%s", (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); ++ const char *pos; ++ /* see if the command starts with scp */ ++ pos = strstr(new_cmd, "scp"); ++ /* by substracting the pointer new_cmd from the pointer ++ * pos we end up with the position of the needle in the ++ * haystack. If it's 0 then we can mess with it ++ */ ++ if (pos - new_cmd == 0) { ++ debug_f("Rewriting scp command for hpnscp."); ++ sprintf(new_cmd, "hpn%s", (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); ++ debug_f("Command was: %s and is now %s", ++ (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd), new_cmd); ++ /* free the existing sshbuf 'cmd' ++ * recreate it and then write our new_cmd into ++ * the sshbuf struct ++ */ ++ sshbuf_free(cmd); ++ if ((cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("sshbuf_new failed in scp rewrite"); ++ sshbuf_putf(cmd, "%s", new_cmd); ++ /* we use len later on so don't forget to ++ * increment it by the number of new chars in the ++ * command ++ */ ++ len += 3; ++ free(new_cmd); ++ } ++ } + if (len > 900) + len = 900; + if (want_subsystem) { +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.c openssh-10.0p1/compat.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.849953032 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/compat.c 2025-06-14 12:24:07.747714342 +0200 +@@ -135,6 +135,35 @@ + ssh->compat = check[i].bugs; + if (forbid_ssh_rsa) + ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA; ++ /* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */ ++ /* TODO: See if we can work this into the new method for bug checks */ ++ if (strstr(version, "OpenSSH") != NULL) { ++ if (strstr(version, "hpn")) { ++ ssh->compat |= SSH_HPNSSH; ++ debug("Remote is HPN enabled"); ++ /* this checks to see if the remote ++ * version string indicates that we ++ * have access to hpn prefixed binaries ++ * You'll need to change this to include ++ * new major version numbers. Which is ++ * why we should figure out how to make ++ * the match pattern list work ++ */ ++ if ((strstr(version, "hpn16") != NULL) || ++ (strstr(version, "hpn17") != NULL) || ++ (strstr(version, "hpn18") != NULL)) { ++ ssh->compat |= SSH_HPNSSH_PREFIX; ++ debug("Remote uses HPNSSH prefixes."); ++ } ++ } ++ /* if it's openssh and not hpn */ ++ else if ((strstr(version, "OpenSSH_8.9") != NULL) || ++ (strstr(version, "OpenSSH_9") != NULL)) { ++ ssh->compat |= SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW; ++ debug("Restricting advertised window size."); ++ } ++ } ++ debug("ssh->compat is %u", ssh->compat); + return; + } + } +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.h openssh-10.0p1/compat.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.h 2025-06-14 10:53:01.850139160 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/compat.h 2025-06-14 12:25:55.470697341 +0200 +@@ -46,17 +46,18 @@ + /* #define unused 0x00010000 */ + /* #define unused 0x00020000 */ + /* #define unused 0x00040000 */ +-/* #define unused 0x00100000 */ ++#define SSH_HPNSSH 0x00100000 /* basically a notice that this is HPN aware */ + #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000 + #define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000 +-/* #define unused 0x00800000 */ ++#define SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW 0x00800000 /* restrict advertised window to OpenSSH clients */ + #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000 +-/* #define unused 0x02000000 */ ++#define SSH_HPNSSH_PREFIX 0x02000000 /* indicates that we have hpn prefixes binaries */ + #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 + #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 + #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 + #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 + #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 ++/* #define unused 0x80000000 */ + + struct ssh; + +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac 2025-06-14 10:53:02.015907743 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac 2025-06-14 10:54:01.316233073 +0200 +@@ -2621,6 +2621,39 @@ + ) + fi + ++ ++# Testing MPTCP Support ++# Does the OS support MPTCP? ++# We don't use this at the moment ++# but I am holding it in resrve -cjr 04/04/2025 ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether the OS supports MPTCP]) ++ AC_RUN_IFELSE( ++ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include ++ ++ ]], [[ ++ int sock = -1; ++ sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_MPTCP); ++ if (sock < 0) { ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ ]])], ++ [ ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ++ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MPTCP], [1], ++ [OS Supports MPTCP]) ++ ], ++ [ ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ++ ] ++ ) ++ + if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) +@@ -3029,8 +3062,8 @@ + 200*) # LibreSSL + lver=`echo "$sslver" | sed 's/.*libressl-//'` + case "$lver" in +- 2*|300*) # 2.x, 3.0.0 +- AC_MSG_ERROR([LibreSSL >= 3.1.0 required (have "$ssl_showver")]) ++ 2*|300*|301*|302*|303*|304*|306*) # 2.x, 3.0.0 ++ AC_MSG_ERROR([LibreSSL >= 3.7.0 required (have "$ssl_showver")]) + ;; + *) ;; # Assume all other versions are good. + esac +@@ -3039,6 +3072,7 @@ + # OpenSSL 3; we use the 1.1x API + # https://openssl.org/policies/general/versioning-policy.html + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L" ++ AC_DEFINE([WITH_OPENSSL3], [1], [With OpenSSL3]) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_showver")]) +@@ -3158,6 +3192,29 @@ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \ + ]) + ++ # OpenSSL 3.0 API ++ # Does OpenSSL support the EVP_MAC functions for Poly1305? ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL supports Poly1305 MAC EVP]) ++ AC_RUN_IFELSE( ++ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ ++ #include ++ #include ++ #include ++ ]], [[ ++ EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "poly1305", NULL); ++ if (mac == NULL) ++ exit(1); ++ ]])], ++ [ ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ++ AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP], [1], ++ [Libcrypto supports Poly1305 MAC EVP]) ++ ], ++ [ ++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ++ ] ++ ) ++ + if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/defines.h openssh-10.0p1/defines.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/defines.h 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/defines.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.317208898 +0200 +@@ -931,7 +931,11 @@ + #endif + + #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ +-# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192 ++# define SSH_IOBUFSZ (32*1024) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef IPPROTO_MPTCP ++#define IPPROTO_MPTCP 262 + #endif + + /* +@@ -987,3 +991,12 @@ + # define USE_MLKEM768X25519 1 + #endif + #endif /* _DEFINES_H */ ++ ++/* used to enable checking linux kernel versions */ ++#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(__alpine__) ++#include ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef KERNEL_VERSION /* shouldn't be necessary to define this */ ++#define KERNEL_VERSION(a,b,c) (((a) <<16) + ((b) << 8) +(c)) ++#endif +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest.h openssh-10.0p1/digest.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest.h 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/digest.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.317584436 +0200 +@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ + #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 2 + #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 3 + #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 4 +-#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 5 ++#define SSH_DIGEST_NULL 5 ++#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 6 + + struct sshbuf; + struct ssh_digest_ctx; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest-openssl.c openssh-10.0p1/digest-openssl.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest-openssl.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/digest-openssl.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.317859402 +0200 +@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ + { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 }, + { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 }, + { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 }, ++ { SSH_DIGEST_NULL, "NONEMAC", 0, EVP_md_null}, + { -1, NULL, 0, NULL }, + }; + +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/FUNDING.yml openssh-10.0p1/FUNDING.yml +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/FUNDING.yml 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/FUNDING.yml 2025-06-14 10:54:01.318133600 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++# These are supported funding model platforms ++ ++github:rapier1 # Replace with up to 4 GitHub Sponsors-enabled usernames e.g., [user1, user2] ++#patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username ++#open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username ++#ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username ++#tidelift: # Replace with a single Tidelift platform-name/package-name e.g., npm/babel ++#community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry ++#liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username ++#issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username ++#otechie: # Replace with a single Otechie username ++#custom: # Replace with up to 4 custom sponsorship URLs e.g., ['link1', 'link2'] +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPN-README openssh-10.0p1/HPN-README +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPN-README 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/HPN-README 2025-06-14 10:54:01.318366032 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ ++Notes: ++ ++MPTCP Support in 18.7.0: ++Multipath TCP is now available as a runtime option for HPN-SSH. MPTCP ++is available only on Linux and Mac OSX operating systems. Using MPTCP on a system that ++doesn't support it will result in a notice and failure. The use cases for MPTCP include ++seamless handovers when changing networks and aggregating multiple interfaces to improve ++available bandwidth. As of 18.7.0 this options should be considered somewhat experimental. ++ ++Usage: ++-oUseMPTCP=[Yes|No] will enable MPTCP. The default is no. ++ ++LibreSSL Support: ++Changes in LibreSSL version 3.5 and 3.6 prevent the use of the threaded AES CTR cipher. ++In those cases HPNSSH will fallback to the serial version of the AES CTR cipher. A warning ++is printed to stderr. ++ ++Automatic Port Fallback (in version 17v3) ++The hpnssh client now uses TCP port 2222 to connect automatically as this is the ++default hpnsshd port. However, we understand that many users will be end up connecting ++standard SSH servers on port 22. To make the easier for users the client will fall back to ++port 22 in the event that there is no hpnssh server running on port 2222. The behaviour can ++be modifed as follows: ++-oFallback=[yes|no] will enable or disable port fallback. Default is yes. ++-oFallbackPort=[N] where N is the port number that should be used for fall back. ++ Default is 22. ++ ++TCP_INFO Metrics ++This features allows the client to request tcp networking information from the ++TCP_INFO struct. This includes data on retransmits, round trip time, lost packets, ++data transferred, and the like. The metrics are polled periodically through the ++life of the connection. By default this is every 5 seconds but users can pick different ++polling periods. The resulting data is stored in two distinct files; one for local ++metrics and one for remote metrics. Remote metrics are only available if the remote ++supports this feature. This feature will *not* diagnose a poorly performing connection ++but may provide insight into what is happening during the connection. ++ ++Usage: ++-oMetrics=[yes|no] will enable metrics polling. Default: No. ++-oMetricsInterval=[N] where N is the polling period in seconds. Default: 5 seconds. ++-oMetricsPath=[/filepath/filename] is the name of the file where the remote and ++ local data will be stored. Default: ./ssh_stack_metrics.[local|remote]. ++ Any other option chosen by the user will have a .local or .remote suffix appended to it. ++ ++The number of instruments polled by this features is dependent on the kernel of the host. ++This means that a remote host with an older kernel may report fewer instruments than a client ++host running a current kernel or vice versa. If there is a discrepency in the number of instruments ++in the ssh_stack_metrics.local and .remote file this is the most likely reason. ++ ++Additionally, determining which file represents sender side versus receiver side is dependent ++on the nature of the connection. Therfore, it's up to the user to make that determination. ++ ++Linux Note: Currently this is only supported on Linux kernel versions 3.7 and greater. Newer kernels ++may have more instruments available to poll than older kernels. ++ ++FreeBSD Note: This is supported on Release 6 and higher. However, FreeBSD has fewer available ++instruments than new Linux kernels. ++ ++Multiplexing Note: The metrics are reported from the TCP socket which means that gathering ++metrics from multiplexed sessions will report on the activity of all sessions on that socket. ++This will likely result in less clear results and, as such, we suggest only gathering metrics ++from non-multiplexed session. ++ ++HPNSCP with Resume functionality ++This feature allows hpnscp to resume failed transfers. In the event of a failed transfer ++issues the same scp command with the '-R' option. For example - if you issued: ++'hpnscp myhugefile me@host:~' ++and it dies halfway through the transfer issuing ++'hpnscp -Z myhugefile me@host:~' ++will resume the transfer at the point where it left off. ++ ++This is implemented by having the source host send a hash (blake2b512) of the file to the ++target host. The target host then computes it's own hash of the target file. If the hashes match ++then the file is skipped as this indicates a successful transfer. However, if the hashes do not ++match then the target sends the source its hash along with the size of the file. The source then ++computes the hash of the file *up to* the size of the target file. If those hashes match then ++the source only send the necessary bytes to complete the transfer. If the hashes do not match then ++the entire file is resent. If the target file is larger then the source file then the entire ++source file is sent and any existing target file is overwritten. ++ ++ ++MULTI-THREADED AES CIPHER: ++The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations ++on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption. ++Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up ++to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to ++achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this ++more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single ++thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal ++performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection. ++The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same ++nomenclature. ++Usage examples: ++ ssh -caes128-ctr you@host.com ++ scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you@host.com:~/file ++ ++MULTI-THREADED ChaCha20-Poly1305 CIPHER: ++The default cipher used by HPN-SSH is now a threaded implementation of the ++ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher. In tests this cipher results in an approximately 90% gain in ++throughput performance in comparison to the serial implementation found in OpenSSH. ++This cipher is fully compatible with all known existing implementations of ChaCha20-Poly1305. ++ ++Internally this cipher is referred to as chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org (CC20-MT) ++similar to how the OpenSSH implementation is known as chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com ++(CC20-S (for serial)). No changes are required on the part of the user to make use of CC20-MT. ++However, if the users doesn't want to make use of this cipher they can explicitly load CC20-S using ++'-cchach20-poly1305@openssh.com` on the command line. ++ ++NONE CIPHER: ++To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and ++you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE ++feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not ++spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will ++be disabled. ++ ++The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning ++on the reciever side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need ++at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The ++HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail. ++ ++http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh ++ ++NONE MAC: ++Starting with HPN 15v1 users will have the option to disable HMAC (message ++authentication ciphers) when using the NONE cipher. You must enable the following: ++NoneEnabled, NoneSwitch, and NoneMacEnabled. If all three are not enabled the None MAC ++will be automatically disabled. In tests the use of the None MAC improved throuput by ++more than 30%. ++ ++ex: scp -oNoneSwitch=yes -oNoneEnabled=yes -oNoneMacEnabled=yes file host:~ ++ ++HPN Specific Configuration options ++ ++TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server ++ Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life ++of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled ++for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista) ++default is yes. ++ ++NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server ++ Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used ++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However, ++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted ++even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default. ++ ++NoneMacEnabled=[yes/no] client/server ++ Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh ++will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use ++with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and ++protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication ++remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is no. ++ ++NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client ++ Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after ++authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client ++and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE ++cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an ++error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly ++have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in ++interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default. ++ ++HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server ++ In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact ++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is ++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no. ++ ++Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier@psc.edu) ++ The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed ++ by Michael Stevens (mstevens@andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was ++ implemented by Ben Bennet (ben@psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota ++ (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013. ++ Allan Jude provided the code for the NoneMac and buffer normalization. ++ This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National ++ Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation. ++ ++Sponsors: Thanks to Niklas Hambuchen for being the first sponsor of HPN-SSH ++ via github's sponsor program! ++ ++ ++Edited: October 11, 2023 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPNSSHInstallation.txt openssh-10.0p1/HPNSSHInstallation.txt +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPNSSHInstallation.txt 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/HPNSSHInstallation.txt 2025-06-14 10:54:01.318659925 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ ++HPN-SSH Installation ++ ++The process of installing HPN-SSH from source is a relatively painless process ++but does have some nuances. This document will go through the process step by ++step to help you get the most from your installation. If you find any errors ++please contact us at hpnssh@psc.edu. ++ ++ ++Step 1: Get the source code. ++ ++The official repository for HPN-SSH is found at ++https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh. Get a copy with ++"git clone https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh”. ++ ++ ++Step 2: Install dependencies. ++ ++What you need to install is dependent on your distribution but will include: ++* OpenSSL development package ++ * Debian: libssl-dev ++ * Fedora: openssl-devel ++* Alternatively you can use LIbreSSL ++ * However, in this case we suggest compiling and installing libressl manually as ++ there are few maintained linux packages for LibreSSL. ++ * Also, LibreSSL v3.5 and v3.6 do not support the threaded AES-CTR cipher. ++ If that’s important to you then you should use OpenSSL. ++* Z compression library ++ * Debian: zlib1g-dev ++ * Fedora: zlib-devel ++* Autoconf ++* Automake ++ ++ ++Step 3: Install optional dependencies. ++ ++This optional libraries will extend the functionality of HPN-SSH to allow the use of PAM ++authentication, Kerberos, graphical password tools, etc. ++* PAM ++* Kerberos ++* GTK ++ ++ ++Step 4: Build the configure file ++ ++generate ./configure with “autoreconf -f -i” ++ ++ ++Step 5: Configuration ++ ++Configure the installation. You can get detailed information on how to do this by ++issuing “./configure --help”. However, commonly you will want to change the default installation ++location of the binaries. This can be done with “--prefix=/[desired_path]”. For example, ++if you want the binaries installed into /usr/bin as opposed to the default of ++/usr/local/bin you’d use “./configure --prefix=/usr”. Other common options would be to ++incorporate pam, kerberos, alternative SSL libraries, and so forth. However, for most users ++either no additional configuration options or modifying the prefix will suffice. ++ ++ ++Step 6: Make ++ ++Make the application with “make -j[num cores]”. So if you have an 8 core system ++you’d use “make -j8” ++ ++ ++Step 7: Set up the hpnsshd user. ++ ++This user is part of the privilege separation routines used in the ++pre-authentication sandbox. I suggest using the following command: ++ ++sudo useradd --system --shell /usr/sbin/nologin --comment="Privilege separated HPNSSH User" \ ++--home=/run/hpnsshd hpnsshd ++ ++Alternatively, you can use vipw to add the user manually. ++ ++ ++Step 8: Installation ++ ++After HPN-SSH successfully builds, install it with “sudo make install”. This will install the ++binaries, configuration files, and generate the unique host keys used. At this point you can ++make changes to the ssh client and server default configuration. These files are ++found, generally, in /etc/hpnssh/ssh_config and sshd_config respectively. You may want to ++change the default port from 2222 to some other value. You may also want to enable the ++NoneCipher and NoneMac options. For more information use “man hpnsshd_config” and ++“man hpnssh_config”. Note: The hpnssh client expects the server to be on port 2222 but will ++fallback to 22 if it’s not found there. So if you do change the default port you’ll need to ++make sure the clients point at the correct port. ++ ++Step 9: Finishing up. ++ ++At this point you can start hpnsshd manually by running “sudo /usr/sbin/hpnsshd” ++or whatever the full path to the hpnsshd binary might be. However, this won’t ++restart automatically on reboot. To do this you’ll need to install an appropriate ++systemd configuration file. If that seems like a good idea to you then following steps may be ++of help. Otherwise, you are done. Enjoy! ++ ++ ++Step 10: Installing a systemd startup file. ++ ++The correct systemd startup file depends on the distribution you are using. For system ++using systemd (you start a service with systemctl) create a file at /lib/systemd/system/hpnsshd.service ++with the following contents NB: you may need to update the paths to match your installation: ++ ++[Unit] ++Description=HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server ++Documentation=man:hpnsshd(8) man:hpnsshd_config(5) ++After=network.target auditd.service ++ConditionPathExists=!/etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run ++ ++[Service] ++EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/hpnssh ++ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/hpnsshd -t ++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/hpnsshd -D $SSHD_OPTS ++ExecReload=/usr/sbin/hpnsshd -t ++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID ++KillMode=process ++Restart=on-failure ++RestartPreventExitStatus=255 ++Type=notify ++RuntimeDirectory=hpnsshd ++RuntimeDirectoryMode=0755 ++ ++[Install] ++WantedBy=multi-user.target ++Alias=hpnsshd.service ++ ++Alternatively, the ./configure command will generate a hpnsshd.service file from ++hpnsshd.service.in. You can use this file by copying it to ++/libsystemd/system/hpnsshd.service instead of copying the above text. ++ ++Then create the defaults file at /etc/default/hpnsshd with the following content: ++# Default settings for openssh-server. ++# Options to pass to sshd ++SSHD_OPTS= ++ ++Enter any runtime options you want on the SSHD_OPTS line. If you can’t think of any, simply ++leave it blank. A sample /etc/defauls/hpnssh file may be found in defaults.hpnsshd. ++ ++You must then reload the systemd service to make it aware of this new service with ++sudo systemctl daemon-reload ++ ++If you are using an init.d (you start a service with ‘system’) then you need to install an ++init.d. Create the file /etc/init.d/hpnssh and copy the following into it. NB: The following is ++for where hpnsshd is found at /usr/sbin/hpnsshd. If it is not in that location you’ll need to ++update the paths. ++ ++Alternatively, you may use the hpnsshd.init file created during configure. This will be ++prepopulated with the correct paths by the configure script. ++ ++#! /bin/sh ++ ++### BEGIN INIT INFO ++# Provides: hpnsshd ++# Required-Start: $remote_fs $syslog ++# Required-Stop: $remote_fs $syslog ++# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5 ++# Default-Stop: ++# Short-Description: OpenBSD Secure Shell server with HPN ++### END INIT INFO ++ ++set -e ++ ++# /etc/init.d/hpnssh: start and stop the OpenBSD "secure shell(tm)" daemon ++ ++test -x /usr/sbin/hpnsshd || exit 0 ++( /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -\? 2>&1 | grep -q OpenSSH ) 2>/dev/null || exit 0 ++ ++umask 022 ++ ++if test -f /etc/default/hpnssh; then ++ . /etc/default/hpnssh ++fi ++ ++. /lib/lsb/init-functions ++ ++ ++if [ -n "$2" ]; then ++ SSHD_OPTS="$SSHD_OPTS $2" ++fi ++ ++# Are we running from init? ++run_by_init() { ++ ([ "$previous" ] && [ "$runlevel" ]) || [ "$runlevel" = S ] ++} ++ ++check_for_no_start() { ++ # forget it if we're trying to start, and /etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run exists ++ if [ -e /etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run ]; then ++ if [ "$1" = log_end_msg ]; then ++ log_end_msg 0 || true ++ fi ++ if ! run_by_init; then ++ log_action_msg "HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server not in use (/etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run)" || true ++ fi ++ exit 0 ++ fi ++} ++ ++check_dev_null() { ++ if [ ! -c /dev/null ]; then ++ if [ "$1" = log_end_msg ]; then ++ log_end_msg 1 || true ++ fi ++ if ! run_by_init; then ++ log_action_msg "/dev/null is not a character device!" || true ++ fi ++ exit 1 ++ fi ++} ++ ++check_privsep_dir() { ++ # Create the PrivSep empty dir if necessary ++ if [ ! -d /run/hpnsshd ]; then ++ mkdir /run/hpnsshd ++ chmod 0755 /run/hpnsshd ++ fi ++} ++ ++check_config() { ++ if [ ! -e /etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run ]; then ++ # shellcheck disable=SC2086 ++ /usr/sbin/hpnsshd $SSHD_OPTS -t || exit 1 ++ fi ++} ++ ++export PATH="${PATH:+$PATH:}/usr/sbin:/sbin" ++ ++case "$1" in ++ start) ++ check_privsep_dir ++ check_for_no_start ++ check_dev_null ++ log_daemon_msg "Starting HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true ++ # shellcheck disable=SC2086 ++ if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --chuid 0:0 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then ++ log_end_msg 0 || true ++ else ++ log_end_msg 1 || true ++ fi ++ ;; ++ stop) ++ log_daemon_msg "Stopping HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true ++ if start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd; then ++ log_end_msg 0 || true ++ else ++ log_end_msg 1 || true ++ fi ++ ;; ++ ++ ++ reload|force-reload) ++ check_for_no_start ++ check_config ++ log_daemon_msg "Reloading HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server's configuration" "hpnsshd" || true ++ if start-stop-daemon --stop --signal 1 --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd; then ++ log_end_msg 0 || true ++ else ++ log_end_msg 1 || true ++ fi ++ ;; ++ ++ ++ restart) ++ check_privsep_dir ++ check_config ++ log_daemon_msg "Restarting HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true ++ start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --oknodo --retry 30 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd ++ check_for_no_start log_end_msg ++ check_dev_null log_end_msg ++ # shellcheck disable=SC2086 ++ if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --chuid 0:0 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then ++ log_end_msg 0 || true ++ else ++ log_end_msg 1 || true ++ fi ++ ;; ++ ++ ++ try-restart) ++ check_privsep_dir ++ check_config ++ log_daemon_msg "Restarting HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true ++ RET=0 ++ start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --retry 30 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd || RET="$?" ++ case $RET in ++ 0) ++ # old daemon stopped ++ check_for_no_start log_end_msg ++ check_dev_null log_end_msg ++ # shellcheck disable=SC2086 ++ if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --chuid 0:0 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then ++ log_end_msg 0 || true ++ else ++ log_end_msg 1 || true ++ fi ++ ;; ++ 1) ++ # daemon not running ++ log_progress_msg "(not running)" || true ++ log_end_msg 0 || true ++ ;; ++ *) ++ # failed to stop ++ log_progress_msg "(failed to stop)" || true ++ log_end_msg 1 || true ++ ;; ++ esac ++ ;; ++ ++ ++ status) ++ status_of_proc -p /run/hpnsshd.pid /usr/sbin/hpnsshd hpnsshd && exit 0 || exit $? ++ ;; ++ ++ ++ *) ++ log_action_msg "Usage: /etc/init.d/hpnssh {start|stop|reload|force-reload|restart|try-restart|status}" || true ++ exit 1 ++esac ++ ++exit 0 ++ ++ ++Step 10: Working with SELinux. ++ ++If you are using SELinux you’ll need to run a few more commands in order to grant hpnssh the ++necessary exceptions to open sockets, files, read keys, and so forth. Run the following commands ++to allow this. Note, I’m not sure every single one of these is needed so if someone knows better ++please let me know. Again, double check the paths of the files being updated. ++ ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_rsa_key ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_exec_t /usr/sbin/hpnsshd ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_keygen_exec_t /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsshd-keygen ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t bin_t /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsftp-server ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t ssh_exec_t /usr/bin/hpnssh ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t ssh_agent_exec_t /usr/bin/hpnssh-agent ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t ssh_keygen_exec_t /usr/bin/hpnssh-keygen ++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t etc_t /etc/pam.d/hpnsshd ++semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222 ++restorecon /usr/sbin/hpnsshd ++restorecon /etc/hpnssh/ssh*_key ++restorecon /etc/hpnssh/ssh*_key\.pub ++restorecon /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsshd-keygen ++restorecon /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsftp-server ++restorecon /usr/bin/hpnssh ++restorecon /usr/bin/hpnssh-agent ++restorecon /usr/bin/hpnssh-keygen ++restorecon /etc/pam.d/hpnsshd +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/kex.c openssh-10.0p1/kex.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/kex.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.833082539 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/kex.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.319010460 +0200 +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ + + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" ++#include "canohost.h" + #include "digest.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "audit.h" +@@ -775,17 +776,83 @@ + free(kex); + } + ++/* ++ * This function seeks through a comma-separated list and checks for instances ++ * of the multithreaded CC20 cipher. If found, it then ensures that the serial ++ * CC20 cipher is also in the list, adding it if necessary. ++ */ ++char * ++patch_list(char * orig) ++{ ++ char * adj = xstrdup(orig); ++ char * match; ++ u_int next; ++ ++ const char * ccpstr = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"; ++ const char * ccpmtstr = "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org"; ++ ++ match = match_list(ccpmtstr, orig, &next); ++ if (match != NULL) { /* CC20-MT found in the list */ ++ free(match); ++ match = match_list(ccpstr, orig, NULL); ++ if (match == NULL) { /* CC20-Serial NOT found in the list */ ++ adj = xreallocarray(adj, ++ strlen(adj) /* original string length */ ++ + 1 /* for the original null-terminator */ ++ + strlen(ccpstr) /* make room for ccpstr */ ++ + 1 /* make room for the comma delimiter */ ++ , sizeof(char)); ++ /* ++ * adj[next] points to the character after the CC20-MT ++ * string. adj[next] might be ',' or '\0' at this point. ++ */ ++ adj[next] = ','; ++ /* adj + next + 1 is the character after that comma */ ++ memcpy(adj + next + 1, ccpstr, strlen(ccpstr)); ++ /* rewrite the rest of the original list */ ++ memcpy(adj + next + 1 + strlen(ccpstr), orig + next, ++ strlen(orig + next) + 1); ++ } else { /* CC20-Serial found in the list, nothing to do */ ++ free(match); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return adj; ++} ++ + int + kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) + { +- int r; ++ int r = 0; ++ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ char * orig_ctos = proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]; ++ char * orig_stoc = proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]; ++ proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ patch_list(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); ++ proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = ++ patch_list(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); ++ ++ /* ++ * TODO: Likely memory leak here. The original contents of ++ * proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] are no longer accessible or ++ * freeable. ++ */ ++#endif + + if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0) +- return r; ++ goto restoreProposal; + ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL; + kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); +- return 0; ++ restoreProposal: ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ free(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); ++ free(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); ++ proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = orig_ctos; ++ proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = orig_stoc; ++#endif ++ return r; + } + + int +@@ -974,6 +1041,11 @@ + int nenc, nmac, ncomp; + u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; + int r, first_kex_follows; ++ int auth_flag = 0; ++ int log_flag = 0; ++ ++ auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh); ++ debug("AUTH STATE IS %d", auth_flag); + + debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client"); + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0) +@@ -1050,6 +1122,31 @@ + peer[nenc] = NULL; + goto out; + } ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if ((strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com") ++ == 0) && (match_list("chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org", ++ my[nenc], NULL) != NULL)) { ++ /* ++ * if we're using the serial CC20 cipher while the ++ * multithreaded implementation is an option... ++ */ ++ free(newkeys->enc.name); ++ newkeys->enc.cipher = cipher_by_name( ++ "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org"); ++ if (newkeys->enc.cipher == NULL) { ++ error_f("%s cipher not found.", ++ "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; ++ peer[nenc] = NULL; ++ goto out; ++ } else { ++ newkeys->enc.name = xstrdup( ++ "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org"); ++ } ++ /* we promote to the multithreaded implementation */ ++ } ++#endif + authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher); + /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */ + if (authlen == 0 && +@@ -1065,11 +1162,43 @@ + peer[ncomp] = NULL; + goto out; + } ++ debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name); ++ debug("REQUESTED MAC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->mac.name); ++ if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) { ++ if (auth_flag == 1) { ++ debug("None requested post authentication."); ++ ssh->none = 1; ++ } ++ else ++ fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed."); ++ ++ if (newkeys->mac.name != NULL && strcmp(newkeys->mac.name, "none") == 0) { ++ debug("Requesting: NONEMAC. Authflag is %d", auth_flag); ++ ssh->none_mac = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ + debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s", + ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", + newkeys->enc.name, + authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", + newkeys->comp.name); ++ /* ++ * client starts with ctos = 0 && log flag = 0 and no log. ++ * 2nd client pass ctos = 1 and flag = 1 so no log. ++ * server starts with ctos = 1 && log_flag = 0 so log. ++ * 2nd sever pass ctos = 1 && log flag = 1 so no log. ++ * -cjr ++ */ ++ if (ctos && !log_flag) { ++ logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Kex;Remote: %s-%d;Enc: %s;MAC: %s;Comp: %s", ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), ++ newkeys->enc.name, ++ authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", ++ newkeys->comp.name); ++ } ++ log_flag = 1; + } + need = dh_need = 0; + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { +@@ -1429,7 +1558,7 @@ + if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0') + version_addendum = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%s%s%s\r\n", +- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, ++ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE, + version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ", + version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) { + oerrno = errno; +@@ -1565,9 +1694,24 @@ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } ++ ++ /* report the version information to syslog if this is the server */ ++ if (timeout_ms == -1) { /* only the server uses this value */ ++ logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Version;Remote: %s-%d;Protocol: %d.%d;Client: %.100s", ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ++ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); ++ } ++ + debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + compat_banner(ssh, remote_version); ++ if (ssh->compat & SSH_HPNSSH) ++ debug("HPN to HPN Connection."); ++ else ++ debug("Non-HPN to HPN Connection."); ++ ++ if(ssh->compat & SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW) ++ debug ("Window size restricted."); + + mismatch = 0; + switch (remote_major) { +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/log.c openssh-10.0p1/log.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/log.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.364646329 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/log.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.319781160 +0200 +@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include "packet.h" /* needed for host and port look ups */ ++#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H ++# include /* to get current time */ ++#endif + #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) + # include + #endif +@@ -67,6 +71,8 @@ + + extern char *__progname; + ++extern struct ssh *active_state; ++ + #define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL) + #define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL) + +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/mac.c openssh-10.0p1/mac.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/mac.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.717727014 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/mac.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.320122336 +0200 +@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ + { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, ++ { "none", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 }, + { "umac-128@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 }, + +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in 2025-06-14 14:54:57.417594122 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in 2025-06-14 14:54:42.451734455 +0200 +@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ + CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@ + CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ + PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@ +-LIBS=@LIBS@ ++LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread + CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@ + K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ + GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ +@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ + LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + authfd.o authfile.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \ +- cleanup.o \ ++ cleanup.o cipher-ctr-mt.o \ + compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ + log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \ + readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \ +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ + ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ + poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \ ++ cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.o \ + ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \ + hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \ + kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ +@@ -119,12 +120,13 @@ + kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ + kexgssc.o \ + sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ +- sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o ++ sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o metrics.o binn.o cipher-ctr-mt-provider.o \ ++ cipher-ctr-mt-functions.o ossl3-provider-err.o num.o + + SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o + + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ +- sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS) ++ sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o cipher-switch.o $(SKOBJS) + + SSHDOBJS=sshd.o \ + platform-listen.o \ +@@ -143,7 +145,7 @@ + auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-gsi.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ +- uidswap.o platform-listen.o $(SKOBJS) ++ uidswap.o platform-listen.o cipher-switch.o $(SKOBJS) + + SSHD_AUTH_OBJS=sshd-auth.o \ + auth2-methods.o \ +@@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ + sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-darwin.o \ + sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-solaris.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ +- uidswap.o $(SKOBJS) ++ uidswap.o cipher-switch.o $(SKOBJS) + + SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-client.o sftp-glob.o + +@@ -243,7 +245,7 @@ + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHD_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB) + + scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS) +- $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) + + ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.c openssh-10.0p1/metrics.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/metrics.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.321376410 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2022 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University. ++ * ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * ++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the MIT License. ++ * ++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or ++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the MIT License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library; ++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++#include "metrics.h" ++#include "ssherr.h" ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* kernel version macro moved to defines.h */ ++ ++/* add the information from the tcp_info struct to the ++ * serialized binary object ++ */ ++void ++metrics_write_binn_object(struct tcp_info *data, struct binn_struct *binnobj) { ++#if !defined TCP_INFO ++ /*tcp info isn't supported on this system */ ++ return; ++#else ++ ++/* the base set of tcpi_ measurements starting from kernel 3.7.0 ++ * these measurements existed in previous kernels but the oldest this ++ * is going to support is 3.7.0. We do need to store the kernel version as well */ ++ ++/* obvioulsy the version code macro only exists under linux so ++ * on non linux systems we set the kernel version to 0 ++ * which will get us the base set of metrics from netinet/tcp.h ++ */ ++#if (defined __linux__) && !defined(__alpine__) ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "kernel_version", LINUX_VERSION_CODE); ++#else ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "kernel_version", 0); ++#endif ++ ++ /* the following are common under both linux and BSD */ ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wscale", ++ data->tcpi_snd_wscale); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_wscale", ++ data->tcpi_rcv_wscale); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_state", ++ data->tcpi_state); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_options", ++ data->tcpi_options); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_ssthresh", ++ data->tcpi_snd_ssthresh); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rtt", ++ data->tcpi_rtt); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_recv", ++ data->tcpi_last_data_recv); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rttvar", ++ data->tcpi_rttvar); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_cwnd", ++ data->tcpi_snd_cwnd); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_mss", ++ data->tcpi_rcv_mss); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rto", ++ data->tcpi_rto); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_mss", ++ data->tcpi_snd_mss); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_space", ++ data->tcpi_rcv_space); ++ ++/* the following exist under both but with different names */ ++#ifdef __linux__ ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_ca_state", ++ data->tcpi_ca_state); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_probes", ++ data->tcpi_probes); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_backoff", ++ data->tcpi_backoff); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_retransmits", ++ data->tcpi_retransmits); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ssthresh", ++ data->tcpi_rcv_ssthresh); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_sacked", ++ data->tcpi_sacked); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_pmtu", ++ data->tcpi_pmtu); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_fackets", ++ data->tcpi_fackets); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_lost", ++ data->tcpi_lost); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_sent", ++ data->tcpi_last_ack_sent); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_unacked", ++ data->tcpi_unacked); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_sent", ++ data->tcpi_last_data_sent); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_recv", ++ data->tcpi_last_ack_recv); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reordering", ++ data->tcpi_reordering); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_advmss", ++ data->tcpi_advmss); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_retrans", ++ data->tcpi_retrans); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_ato", ++ data->tcpi_ato); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_rtt", ++ data->tcpi_rcv_rtt); ++#else ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_backoff", ++ data->__tcpi_backoff); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_ca_state", ++ data->__tcpi_ca_state); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_probes", ++ data->__tcpi_probes); ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_retransmits", ++ data->__tcpi_retransmits); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ssthresh", ++ data->__tcpi_rcv_ssthresh); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_sacked", ++ data->__tcpi_sacked); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_pmtu", ++ data->__tcpi_pmtu); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_fackets", ++ data->__tcpi_fackets); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_lost", ++ data->__tcpi_lost); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_sent", ++ data->__tcpi_last_ack_sent); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_unacked", ++ data->__tcpi_unacked); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_sent", ++ data->__tcpi_last_data_sent); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_recv", ++ data->__tcpi_last_ack_recv); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reordering", ++ data->__tcpi_reordering); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_advmss", ++ data->__tcpi_advmss); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_retrans", ++ data->__tcpi_retrans); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_ato", ++ data->__tcpi_ato); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_rtt", ++ data->__tcpi_rcv_rtt); ++#endif ++ ++/* Under BSD snd_rexmitpack is the same as linux total_retrans*/ ++#ifdef __linux__ ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_total_retrans", ++ data->tcpi_total_retrans); ++#else ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_total_retrans", ++ data->tcpi_snd_rexmitpack); ++#endif ++ ++/* The last section are for kernel specific metrics in linux */ ++#ifdef __linux__ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(3,15,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_max_pacing_rate", ++ data->tcpi_max_pacing_rate); ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_pacing_rate", ++ data->tcpi_pacing_rate); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,1,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_acked", ++ data->tcpi_bytes_acked); ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_received", ++ data->tcpi_bytes_received); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,2,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_in", ++ data->tcpi_segs_in); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_out", ++ data->tcpi_segs_out); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,6,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_notsent_bytes", ++ data->tcpi_notsent_bytes); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_min_rtt", ++ data->tcpi_min_rtt); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_in", ++ data->tcpi_data_segs_in); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_out", ++ data->tcpi_data_segs_out); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,9,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate_app_limited", ++ data->tcpi_delivery_rate_app_limited); ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate", ++ data->tcpi_delivery_rate); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,10,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_busy_time", ++ data->tcpi_busy_time); ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_sndbuf_limited", ++ data->tcpi_sndbuf_limited); ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_rwnd_limited", ++ data->tcpi_rwnd_limited); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,18,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered", ++ data->tcpi_delivered); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered_ce", ++ data->tcpi_delivered_ce); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,19,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_sent", ++ data->tcpi_bytes_sent); ++ binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_retrans", ++ data->tcpi_bytes_retrans); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_dsack_dups", ++ data->tcpi_dsack_dups); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reord_seen", ++ data->tcpi_reord_seen); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,4,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wnd", ++ data->tcpi_snd_wnd); ++ binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ooopack", ++ data->tcpi_rcv_ooopack); ++#endif ++ ++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,5,0) ++ binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_fastopen_client_fail", ++ data->tcpi_fastopen_client_fail); ++#endif ++#endif /*endif for #ifdef __linux__ */ ++#endif /*endif for TCP_INFO */ ++} ++ ++/* this reads out the tcp_info binn object and formats it into a single line ++ * the object will not necessarily have all of the elements. If it's empty it ++ * current just spits out 0. This isn't optimal as 0 can also be a valid value */ ++void ++metrics_read_binn_object (void *binnobj, char *output) { ++ int len = 0; ++ int buflen = 1023; ++ int kernel_version = 0; ++ if (binnobj == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Metric polling returned bad data.\n"); ++ return; ++ } ++ kernel_version = binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "kernel_version"); ++ ++ /* base set of metrics */ ++ len = snprintf(output, buflen, "%d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d", ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_state"), ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_ca_state"), ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_retransmits"), ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_probes"), ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_backoff"), ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_options"), ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wscale"), ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_wscale"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rto"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_ato"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_mss"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_mss"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_unacked"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_sacked"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_lost"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_retrans"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_fackets"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_sent"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_sent"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_recv"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_recv"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_pmtu"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ssthresh"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rtt"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rttvar"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_ssthresh"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_cwnd"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_advmss"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reordering"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_rtt"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_space"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_total_retrans") ++ ); ++ ++ /* compare the received kernel version to the version that supports ++ * any given metric. This means that a remote host that has a different ++ * kernel that the local host will be able to process the data in terms of ++ * the remote kernel version. Only necessary under linux*/ ++#ifdef __linux__ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(3,15,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu", ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_max_pacing_rate"), ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_pacing_rate") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,1,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu", ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_acked"), ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_received") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,2,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d", ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_in"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_out") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,6,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d, %d, %d", ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_notsent_bytes"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_min_rtt"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_in"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_out") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,9,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %llu", ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate_app_limited"), ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,10,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu, %llu", ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_busy_time"), ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_sndbuf_limited"), ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_rwnd_limited") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,18,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d", ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered_ce") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,19,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu, %d, %d", ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_sent"), ++ binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_retrans"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_dsack_dups"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reord_seen") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,4,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d", ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wnd"), ++ binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ooopack") ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,5,0)) { ++ len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d", ++ binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_fastopen_client_fail") ++ ); ++ } ++#endif /* ifdef __linux__ */ ++} ++ ++/* Print out the header to the file so that the column header matches the ++ * data in the metrics object. That varies by kernel version so we have to ++ * do tests for each possible version where they added new values to tcp_info ++ * NOTE: This doesn't put the values/headers in the most useful order but the ++ * resulting file is probably going to get processed by something */ ++void ++metrics_print_header(FILE *fptr, char *extra_text, int kernel_version) { ++ if (extra_text != NULL) { ++ fprintf(fptr, "%s\n", extra_text); ++ } ++ fprintf(fptr, "timestamp, state, ca_state, retransmits, probes, backoff, options, "); ++ fprintf(fptr, "snd_wscale, rcv_wscale, rto, ato, snd_mss, rcv_mss, unacked, sacked, lost, retrans, "); ++ fprintf(fptr, "fackets, last_data_sent, last_ack_sent, last_data_recv, "); ++ fprintf(fptr, "last_ack_recv, pmtu, rcv_ssthresh, rtt, rttvar, snd_ssthresh, "); ++ fprintf(fptr, "snd_cwnd, advmss, reordering, rcv_rtt, rcv_space, total_retrans"); ++ ++ /* compare the received kernel version to the version that supports ++ * any given metric. This way we can print consistent headers. ++ * Only necessary under linux*/ ++#ifdef __linux__ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(3,15,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", max_pacing_rate, pacing_rate"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,1,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", bytes_acked, bytes_received"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,2,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", segs_in, segs_out"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,6,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", notsent_bytes, min_rtt, data_segs_in, data_seg_out"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,9,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", delivery_rate_app_limited, delivery_rate"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,10,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", busy_time, sndbuf_limited, rwnd_limited"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,18,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", delivered, delivered_ce"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,19,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", bytes_sent, bytes_retrans, dsack_dups, reord_seen"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,4,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", snd_wnd, rcv_ooopack"); ++ } ++ ++ if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,5,0)) { ++ fprintf(fptr, ", fastopen_client_fail"); ++ } ++#endif /* ifdef __linux__ */ ++ fprintf(fptr, "\n\n"); ++} +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.h openssh-10.0p1/metrics.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/metrics.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.321618830 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2022 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University. ++ * ++ * Author: Chris Rapier ++ * ++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the MIT License. ++ * ++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or ++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the MIT License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library; ++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef METRICS_H ++#define METRICS_H ++ ++#include "binn.h" ++ ++/* linux, freebsd, and netbsd have tcp_info structs. ++ * I don't know about other systems so we disable this ++ * functionality for them */ ++#if defined __linux__ || defined __FreeBSD__ || defined __NetBSD__ && !defined(__alpine__) ++#define TCP_INFO 1 ++#if defined __linux__ && !defined(__alpine__) ++#include ++#else ++#include ++#endif ++#else ++/* make a null struct for tcp_info on systems that don't support it*/ ++typedef struct tcp_info { ++ void *dummy; ++} tcp_info; ++#endif ++ ++void metrics_write_binn_object(struct tcp_info *, struct binn_struct *); ++void metrics_read_binn_object(void *, char *); ++void metrics_print_header(FILE *, char *, int); ++ ++ ++#endif /* define metrics_h */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c openssh-10.0p1/misc.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c 2025-06-14 10:53:02.019076801 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.321922850 +0200 +@@ -77,6 +77,29 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "platform.h" + ++void ++read_mem_stats(statm_t *result, int post_auth) ++{ ++ if (!post_auth) ++ return; ++ ++ const char* statm_path = "/proc/self/statm"; ++ ++ FILE *f = fopen(statm_path,"r"); ++ if(!f){ ++ perror(statm_path); ++ abort(); ++ } ++ if(7 != fscanf(f,"%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu", ++ &result->size, &result->resident, &result->share, &result->text, &result->lib, ++ &result->data, &result->dt)) ++ { ++ perror(statm_path); ++ abort(); ++ } ++ fclose(f); ++} ++ + /* remove newline at end of string */ + char * + chop(char *s) +@@ -1670,20 +1693,6 @@ + return (v); + } + +-u_int32_t +-get_u32_le(const void *vp) +-{ +- const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; +- u_int32_t v; +- +- v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; +- v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; +- v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; +- v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; +- +- return (v); +-} +- + u_int16_t + get_u16(const void *vp) + { +@@ -1723,17 +1732,6 @@ + } + + void +-put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) +-{ +- u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; +- +- p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; +- p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; +- p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; +- p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; +-} +- +-void + put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v) + { + u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h openssh-10.0p1/misc.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h 2025-06-14 10:53:02.019622613 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.322621684 +0200 +@@ -167,12 +167,6 @@ + void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); + +-/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */ +-u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *) +- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); +-void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t) +- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); +- + struct bwlimit { + size_t buflen; + u_int64_t rate; /* desired rate in kbit/s */ +@@ -259,4 +253,16 @@ + /* On OpenBSD time_t is int64_t which is long long. */ + /* #define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX */ + ++typedef struct statm_t { ++ unsigned long size; ++ unsigned long resident; ++ unsigned long share; ++ unsigned long text; ++ unsigned long lib; ++ unsigned long data; ++ unsigned long dt; ++} statm_t; ++ ++void read_mem_stats(struct statm_t *, int); ++ + #endif /* _MISC_H */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/myproposal.h openssh-10.0p1/myproposal.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/myproposal.h 2025-06-14 10:53:01.775906378 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/myproposal.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.323105546 +0200 +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ + "rsa-sha2-256" + + #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ ++ "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org," \ + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.c openssh-10.0p1/num.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/num.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.323584938 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ ++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */ ++ ++#include ++#include "num.h" ++ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++ ++typedef enum { BIG = 1, LITTLE = -1 } endian_t; ++typedef enum { NEGATIVE = 0xff, POSITIVE = 0x00 } sign_t; ++ ++static endian_t nativeendian(void) ++{ ++ const int endiantest = 1; ++ ++ return *((char *)&endiantest) == 1 ? LITTLE : BIG; ++} ++ ++static sign_t paramsign(const OSSL_PARAM *param) ++{ ++ size_t srcmsb = nativeendian() == BIG ? 0 : param->data_size - 1; ++ ++ return ++ param->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER ++ ? POSITIVE ++ : (((unsigned char *)param->data)[srcmsb] & 0x80 ++ ? NEGATIVE ++ : POSITIVE); ++} ++ ++struct numdesc { ++ void *data; ++ unsigned int data_type; /* The OSSL_PARAM data type */ ++ ++ /* These fields concern the whole number */ ++ size_t size; ++ endian_t endian; ++ sign_t sign; ++ ++ /* These fields concern the limbs of the number */ ++ size_t limbsize; ++ endian_t limbendian; ++ /* This is for odd archs. */ ++ /* see the manual for mpz_import() for an in depth explanation. */ ++ size_t limbnailbits; ++}; ++ ++struct resultdesc { ++ size_t size; ++ int result; /* 1 or (negative) error */ ++}; ++ ++static struct resultdesc provnum_copy(struct numdesc dest, struct numdesc src) ++{ ++ struct resultdesc result = { dest.size, 1, }; ++ ++ if (src.data_type != OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER ++ && src.data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER) { ++ result.result = PROVNUM_E_WRONG_TYPE; ++ return result; ++ } ++ ++ if (src.size == 0) { ++ memset(dest.data, 0, dest.size); ++ return result; ++ } ++ ++ /* Extra data */ ++ size_t srcmsb = src.endian == BIG ? 0 : src.size - 1; ++ int srcmsb2lsb = src.endian == BIG ? 1 : -1; ++ ++ /* ++ * If the source is bigger than the destination, analyse to see if the ++ * most significant byte is just padding that can be ignored. ++ * The rules to determine if the most significant byte is just padding ++ * are: ++ * ++ * 1. the most significant byte equals srcsigned, which just so happens ++ * to have the 2's complement padding value. ++ * 2. The most significant bit of the next to most significant byte ++ * equals the most significant bit of srcsigned. ++ */ ++ size_t end = dest.data == NULL ? 1 : dest.size; ++ for (; src.size > end; srcmsb += srcmsb2lsb, src.size--) ++ if (((unsigned char *)src.data)[srcmsb] != src.sign ++ || ((((unsigned char *)src.data)[srcmsb + srcmsb2lsb] & 0x80) ++ != (src.sign & 0x80))) ++ break; ++ ++ if (src.size > dest.size) { ++ result.result = PROVNUM_E_TOOBIG; ++ return result; ++ } ++ ++ size_t srclsb = srcmsb + srcmsb2lsb * (src.size - 1); ++ ++ /* Simple case, all significant details match */ ++ if (dest.endian == src.endian ++ && dest.limbsize == 1 ++ && dest.limbnailbits == 0 ++ && (dest.data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER || src.sign == POSITIVE)) { ++ ++ if (src.size < dest.size) { ++ size_t padstart = dest.endian == BIG ? 0 : dest.size - src.size; ++ ++ memset((unsigned char *)dest.data + padstart, src.sign, ++ dest.size - src.size); ++ } ++ ++ size_t deststart = dest.endian == BIG ? dest.size - src.size : 0; ++ size_t srcstart = src.endian == BIG ? srcmsb : srclsb; ++ ++ memcpy((unsigned char *)dest.data + deststart, ++ (unsigned char *)src.data + srcstart, ++ src.size); ++ return result; ++ } ++ ++ /* Complex case, for sign or limb conversion. Currently unsupported */ ++ result.result = PROVNUM_E_UNSUPPORTED; ++ return result; ++} ++ ++#define implement_provnum(T, DT) \ ++ int provnum_get_##T(T *dest, const OSSL_PARAM *param) \ ++ { \ ++ endian_t endian = nativeendian(); \ ++ struct numdesc destnd = { \ ++ dest, DT, sizeof(T), endian, POSITIVE, 1, endian, 0 \ ++ }; \ ++ struct numdesc srcnd = { \ ++ param->data, param->data_type, param->data_size, \ ++ endian, paramsign(param), 1, endian, 0 \ ++ }; \ ++ \ ++ struct resultdesc result = provnum_copy(destnd, srcnd); \ ++ return result.result; \ ++ } \ ++ int provnum_set_##T(OSSL_PARAM *param, T src) \ ++ { \ ++ endian_t endian = nativeendian(); \ ++ struct numdesc destnd = { \ ++ param->data, param->data_type, param->data_size, \ ++ endian, POSITIVE, 1, endian, 0 \ ++ }; \ ++ struct numdesc srcnd = { \ ++ &src, DT, sizeof(T), endian, POSITIVE, 1, endian, 0 \ ++ }; \ ++ \ ++ struct resultdesc result = provnum_copy(destnd, srcnd); \ ++ param->return_size = result.size; \ ++ return result.result; \ ++ } ++ ++implement_provnum(size_t, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER) ++ ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.h openssh-10.0p1/num.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/num.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.323769040 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ ++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++ ++#include ++ ++/* Convert between OSSL_PARAM and size_t */ ++int provnum_get_size_t(size_t *dest, const OSSL_PARAM *param); ++int provnum_set_size_t(OSSL_PARAM *param, size_t src); ++ ++#define PROVNUM_E_WRONG_TYPE -1 ++#define PROVNUM_E_TOOBIG -2 ++#define PROVNUM_E_UNSUPPORTED -3 ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.c openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.323964806 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ ++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include "ossl3-provider-err.h" ++ ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++ ++struct proverr_functions_st { ++ const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core; ++ OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error_fn *core_new_error; ++ OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug_fn *core_set_error_debug; ++ OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *core_vset_error; ++}; ++ ++struct proverr_functions_st * ++proverr_new_handle(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core, const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch) ++{ ++ /* ++ * libcrypto gives providers the tools to create error routines similar ++ * to the ones defined in ++ */ ++ OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error_fn *c_new_error = NULL; ++ OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug_fn *c_set_error_debug = NULL; ++ OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *c_vset_error = NULL; ++ struct proverr_functions_st *handle = NULL; ++ ++ assert(core != NULL); ++ assert(dispatch != NULL); ++ ++#ifndef DEBUG ++ if (core == NULL || dispatch == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++#endif ++ ++ for (; dispatch->function_id != 0; dispatch++) ++ switch (dispatch->function_id) { ++ case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_NEW_ERROR: ++ c_new_error = OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error(dispatch); ++ break; ++ case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_SET_ERROR_DEBUG: ++ c_set_error_debug = OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug(dispatch); ++ break; ++ case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_VSET_ERROR: ++ c_vset_error = OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error(dispatch); ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ assert(c_new_error != NULL); ++ assert(c_set_error_debug != NULL); ++ assert(c_vset_error != NULL); ++ ++#ifdef NDEBUG ++ if (c_new_error == NULL || c_set_error_debug == NULL || c_vset_error == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++#endif ++ ++ if ((handle = malloc(sizeof(*handle))) != NULL) { ++ handle->core = core; ++ handle->core_new_error = c_new_error; ++ handle->core_set_error_debug = c_set_error_debug; ++ handle->core_vset_error = c_vset_error; ++ } ++ return handle; ++} ++ ++struct proverr_functions_st * ++proverr_dup_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *src) ++{ ++ struct proverr_functions_st *dst = NULL; ++ ++ if (src != NULL ++ && (dst = malloc(sizeof(*dst))) != NULL) { ++ dst->core = src->core; ++ dst->core_new_error = src->core_new_error; ++ dst->core_set_error_debug = src->core_set_error_debug; ++ dst->core_vset_error = src->core_vset_error; ++ } ++ return dst; ++} ++ ++void proverr_free_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *handle) ++{ ++ free(handle); ++} ++ ++void proverr_new_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle) ++{ ++ handle->core_new_error(handle->core); ++} ++ ++void proverr_set_error_debug(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle, ++ const char *file, int line, const char *func) ++{ ++ handle->core_set_error_debug(handle->core, file, line, func); ++} ++ ++void proverr_set_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle, ++ uint32_t reason, const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ va_list ap; ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ handle->core_vset_error(handle->core, reason, fmt, ap); ++ va_end(ap); ++} ++ ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.h openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.324153727 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ ++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3 ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++/* ++ * The idea with this library is to replace OpenSSL's ERR_raise() and ++ * ERR_raise_data() with variants that are more suitable for providers that ++ * have their own error reason table. ++ * ++ * This assumes variadic function-like macros, i.e. C99 or newer. ++ * ++ * A minimal amount of preparation is needed on provider initialization and ++ * takedown: ++ * ++ * 1. The provider's outgoing OSSL_DISPATCH table must include an entry ++ * got OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_GET_REASON_STRINGS, with a function that returns ++ * the provider's table of reasons. ++ * That table of reasons is a simple OSSL_ITEM array, where each element ++ * contains a numeric reason identity for the reason, and the description ++ * text string for that reason. ++ * Each numeric reason identity MUST be unique within this array. ++ * ++ * 2. On provider initialization, an error handle must be created using ++ * proverr_new_handle(). The returned pointer is passed as first argument ++ * to ERR_raise() and ERR_raise_data(). ++ * ++ * 3. On provider takedown, the error handle must be freed, using ++ * proverr_free_handle(). ++ * ++ * With this preparation, the provider code can use ERR_raise() and ++ * ERR_raise_data() "as usual", with the exception that the first argument is ++ * the error handle instead of one of the OpenSSL ERR_LIB_ macros. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * In case was included, we throw away its error recording ++ * macros. ++ * Note that ERR_put_error() is NOT recreated. It's deprecated and should not ++ * be used any more. ++ */ ++#undef ERR_put_error ++#undef ERR_raise ++#undef ERR_raise_data ++ ++#define ERR_raise(handle, reason) ERR_raise_data((handle),(reason),NULL) ++ ++#define ERR_raise_data(handle, reason, ...) \ ++ (proverr_new_error(handle), \ ++ proverr_set_error_debug(handle, OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE,OPENSSL_FUNC), \ ++ proverr_set_error(handle, reason, __VA_ARGS__)) ++ ++/* ++ * The structure where the libcrypto core handle and core functions are ++ * captured. ++ */ ++struct proverr_functions_st; ++ ++struct proverr_functions_st * ++proverr_new_handle(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core, const OSSL_DISPATCH *in); ++struct proverr_functions_st * ++proverr_dup_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *src); ++void proverr_free_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *handle); ++ ++void proverr_new_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle); ++void proverr_set_error_debug(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle, ++ const char *file, int line, const char *func); ++void proverr_set_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle, ++ uint32_t reason, const char *fmt, ...); ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.c openssh-10.0p1/packet.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.719334626 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/packet.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.324483728 +0200 +@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ + #endif + #include + #include ++#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H ++# include ++#endif + + /* + * Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have +@@ -104,7 +107,20 @@ + #define DBG(x) + #endif + +-#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024) ++/* OpenSSH usings 256KB packet size max but that consumes a ++ * lot of memory with the buffers we are using. However, we need ++ * a large packet size if the banner that's being sent is large. ++ * So we need a 256KB packet pre authentication and a smaller one ++ * in this case SSH_IOBUFSZ + 1KB, afterwards. So we change ++ * PACKET_MAX_SIZE from a #define to a global. Then, in the function ++ * ssh_packet_set_authentcated we reduce the size to something ++ * more memory efficient. -cjr 04/07/23 ++ */ ++u_int packet_max_size = 256 * 1024; ++ ++/* global to support forced rekeying */ ++int rekey_requested = 0; ++ + + struct packet_state { + u_int32_t seqnr; +@@ -241,12 +257,23 @@ + (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + goto fail; ++ /* these buffers are important in terms of tracking buffer usage ++ * so we explicitly label and type them with descriptive names */ ++ sshbuf_relabel(state->input, "input"); ++ sshbuf_type(state->input, BUF_PACKET_INPUT); ++ sshbuf_relabel(state->incoming_packet, "inpacket"); ++ sshbuf_type(state->incoming_packet, BUF_PACKET_INCOMING); ++ sshbuf_relabel(state->output, "output"); ++ sshbuf_type(state->output, BUF_PACKET_OUTPUT); ++ sshbuf_relabel(state->outgoing_packet, "outpacket"); ++ sshbuf_type(state->outgoing_packet, BUF_PACKET_OUTGOING); ++ + TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing); + TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys); + TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys); + state->connection_in = -1; + state->connection_out = -1; +- state->max_packet_size = 32768; ++ state->max_packet_size = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; + state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; + state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0; + state->initialized = 1; +@@ -294,7 +321,7 @@ + ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) + { + struct session_state *state; +- const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); ++ struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); + int r; + + if (none == NULL) { +@@ -311,9 +338,11 @@ + state->connection_in = fd_in; + state->connection_out = fd_out; + if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none, +- (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || ++ (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT, ++ state->after_authentication)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none, +- (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) { ++ (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT, ++ state->after_authentication)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "cipher_init failed"); + free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */ + return NULL; +@@ -384,7 +413,7 @@ + + if (state->packet_discard_mac) { + char buf[1024]; +- size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE; ++ size_t dlen = packet_max_size; + + if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already) + dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already; +@@ -977,6 +1006,7 @@ + const char *wmsg; + int r, crypt_type; + const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in"; ++ char blocks_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], bytes_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; + + debug2_f("mode %d", mode); + +@@ -1015,12 +1045,32 @@ + if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0) + return r; + } +- mac->enabled = 1; ++ ++ /* if we are using NONE MAC then we don't need to enable the ++ * mac routines. This disables them and we can claw back some cycles ++ * from the CPU -cjr 3/21/2023 */ ++ if (ssh->none_mac != 1) ++ mac->enabled = 1; ++ + DBG(debug_f("cipher_init: %s", dir)); + cipher_free(*ccp); + *ccp = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if (strcmp(enc->name, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") == 0) { ++ if (state->after_authentication) ++ enc->cipher = cipher_by_name( ++ "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org"); ++ else ++ enc->cipher = cipher_by_name( ++ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"); ++ if (enc->cipher == NULL) ++ return r; ++ } ++#endif + if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, +- enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0) ++ enc->iv, enc->iv_len, ++ crypt_type ? state->p_send.seqnr : state->p_read.seqnr, ++ crypt_type, state->after_authentication)) != 0) + return r; + if (!state->cipher_warning_done && + (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) { +@@ -1044,23 +1094,45 @@ + } + comp->enabled = 1; + } +- /* +- * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, +- * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. +- * See RFC4344 section 3.2. +- */ +- if (enc->block_size >= 16) +- *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); +- else +- *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size; ++ ++ /* get the maximum number of blocks the cipher can ++ * handle safely */ ++ *max_blocks = cipher_rekey_blocks(enc->cipher); ++ ++ /* if we have a custom oRekeyLimit use that. */ + if (state->rekey_limit) + *max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks, + state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size); +- debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir, +- (unsigned long long)*max_blocks); ++ ++ /* these lines support the debug */ ++ strlcpy(blocks_s, "?", sizeof(blocks_s)); ++ strlcpy(bytes_s, "?", sizeof(bytes_s)); ++ if (*max_blocks * enc->block_size < LLONG_MAX) { ++ fmt_scaled((long long)*max_blocks, blocks_s); ++ fmt_scaled((long long)*max_blocks * enc->block_size, bytes_s); ++ } ++ debug("rekey %s after %s blocks / %sB data", dir, blocks_s, bytes_s); ++ + return 0; + } + ++/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */ ++void ++packet_request_rekeying(void) ++{ ++ rekey_requested = 1; ++} ++ ++/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr ++ * and none cipher switch */ ++int ++packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct session_state *state = ssh->state; ++ ++ return state->after_authentication; ++} ++ + #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) + static int + ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) +@@ -1087,6 +1159,14 @@ + if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0) + return 0; + ++ /* used to force rekeying when called for by the none ++ * cipher switch and aes-mt-ctr methods -cjr */ ++ if (rekey_requested == 1) { ++ debug_f("Got the rekey request"); ++ rekey_requested = 0; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ + /* Time-based rekeying */ + if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && + (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) +@@ -1445,7 +1525,7 @@ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + int len, r, ms_remain = 0; + struct pollfd pfd; +- char buf[8192]; ++ char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; + struct timeval start; + struct timespec timespec, *timespecp = NULL; + +@@ -1549,7 +1629,7 @@ + return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ + state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp); + if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 || +- state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) ++ state->packlen > packet_max_size) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + } + need = state->packlen + 4; +@@ -1608,7 +1688,7 @@ + sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0) + return 0; + if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || +- state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { ++ state->packlen > packet_max_size) { + #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); + #endif +@@ -1635,7 +1715,7 @@ + goto out; + state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)); + if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || +- state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { ++ state->packlen > packet_max_size) { + #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "input: \n"); + sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); +@@ -1644,7 +1724,7 @@ + #endif + logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); + return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, +- PACKET_MAX_SIZE); ++ packet_max_size); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0) + goto out; +@@ -1667,7 +1747,7 @@ + logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", + need, block_size, need % block_size); + return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, +- PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size); ++ packet_max_size - block_size); + } + /* + * check if the entire packet has been received and +@@ -1711,11 +1791,11 @@ + if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) + goto out; + logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); +- if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) ++ if (need + block_size > packet_max_size) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, + sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), +- PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size); ++ packet_max_size - need - block_size); + } + /* Remove MAC from input buffer */ + DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr)); +@@ -1938,7 +2018,7 @@ + int r; + size_t rlen; + +- if ((r = sshbuf_read(fd, state->input, PACKET_MAX_SIZE, &rlen)) != 0) ++ if ((r = sshbuf_read(fd, state->input, packet_max_size, &rlen)) != 0) + return r; + + if (state->packet_discard) { +@@ -2017,17 +2097,21 @@ + switch (r) { + case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); ++ sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh); + logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id); + case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); ++ sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh); + logdie("Connection %s %s timed out", + ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id); + case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); ++ sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh); + logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id); + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + if (errno == ECONNRESET) { + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); ++ sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh); + logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ +@@ -2069,6 +2153,24 @@ + logdie_f("should have exited"); + } + ++/* this prints out the final log entry */ ++void ++sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *ssh) { ++ double total_time; ++ ++ if (ssh->start_time < 1) ++ /* this will produce a NaN in the output. -cjr */ ++ total_time = 0; ++ else ++ total_time = monotime_double() - ssh->start_time; ++ ++ logit("SSH: Server;LType: Throughput;Remote: %s-%d;IN: %lu;OUT: %lu;Duration: %.1f;tPut_in: %.1f;tPut_out: %.1f", ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ++ ssh->stdin_bytes, ssh->fdout_bytes, total_time, ++ ssh->stdin_bytes / total_time, ++ ssh->fdout_bytes / total_time); ++} ++ + /* + * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the + * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message +@@ -2323,10 +2425,19 @@ + ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */ + } + ++/* Set the state of the connection to post auth ++ * While we are here also decrease the size of ++ * packet_max_size to something more reasonable. ++ * In this case thats 33k. Which is the size of ++ * the largest packet we expect to see and some space ++ * for overhead. This reduces memory usage in high ++ * BDP environments without impacting performance ++ * -cjr 4/11/23 */ + void + ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh) + { + ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; ++ packet_max_size = SSH_IOBUFSZ + 1024; + } + + void * +@@ -2949,3 +3060,17 @@ + ssh->state->extra_pad = pad; + return 0; + } ++ ++/* used for cipher switching ++ * only called in cipher-swtich.c */ ++void * ++ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ return ssh->state->send_context; ++} ++ ++void * ++ssh_packet_get_receive_context(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ return ssh->state->receive_context; ++} +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.h openssh-10.0p1/packet.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.h 2025-06-14 10:53:01.719644792 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/packet.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.325502017 +0200 +@@ -88,6 +88,17 @@ + + /* APP data */ + void *app_data; ++ ++ /* logging data for ServerLogging patch*/ ++ double start_time; ++ u_long fdout_bytes; ++ u_long stdin_bytes; ++ ++ /* track that we are in a none cipher state */ ++ int none; ++ ++ /* track if we have disabled the mac as well */ ++ int none_mac; + }; + + typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *, +@@ -157,6 +168,8 @@ + int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int); + u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *); + ++int packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *); ++ + int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); + int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); + +@@ -172,6 +185,13 @@ + + void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *); + void *ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *); ++void *ssh_packet_get_receive_context(struct ssh *); ++void *ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *); ++ ++/* for forced packet rekeying post auth */ ++void packet_request_rekeying(void); ++/* final log entry support */ ++void sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *); + + /* new API */ + int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.c openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.325842914 +0200 +@@ -13,6 +13,16 @@ + + #include "poly1305.h" + ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++void ++poly1305_auth(EVP_MAC_CTX *poly_ctx, unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) { ++ size_t poly_out_len; ++ EVP_MAC_init(poly_ctx, (const u_char *)key, POLY1305_KEYLEN, NULL); ++ EVP_MAC_update(poly_ctx, m, inlen); ++ EVP_MAC_final(poly_ctx, out, &poly_out_len, (size_t)POLY1305_TAGLEN); ++} ++#else ++ + #define mul32x32_64(a,b) ((uint64_t)(a) * (b)) + + #define U8TO32_LE(p) \ +@@ -30,7 +40,7 @@ + } while (0) + + void +-poly1305_auth(unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) { ++poly1305_auth(char *unused, unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) { + uint32_t t0,t1,t2,t3; + uint32_t h0,h1,h2,h3,h4; + uint32_t r0,r1,r2,r3,r4; +@@ -157,3 +167,4 @@ + U32TO8_LE(&out[ 8], f2); f3 += (f2 >> 32); + U32TO8_LE(&out[12], f3); + } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.h openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.h 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.326132826 +0200 +@@ -13,8 +13,15 @@ + #define POLY1305_KEYLEN 32 + #define POLY1305_TAGLEN 16 + +-void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen, ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP ++#include ++ ++void poly1305_auth(EVP_MAC_CTX *poly_key, u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen, ++ const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) ++#else ++void poly1305_auth(char *unused, u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen, + const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) ++#endif + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN))); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/progressmeter.c openssh-10.0p1/progressmeter.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/progressmeter.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/progressmeter.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.326416661 +0200 +@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ + static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */ + static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */ + static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */ ++static off_t last_pos; ++static off_t max_delta_pos = 0; + static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */ + static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */ + static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */ +@@ -131,6 +133,7 @@ + int cur_speed; + int hours, minutes, seconds; + int file_len, cols; ++ off_t delta_pos; + + if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output()) + return; +@@ -146,6 +149,10 @@ + now = monotime_double(); + bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos; + ++ delta_pos = cur_pos - last_pos; ++ if (delta_pos > max_delta_pos) ++ max_delta_pos = delta_pos; ++ + if (bytes_left > 0) + elapsed = now - last_update; + else { +@@ -175,7 +182,7 @@ + return; + + /* filename */ +- file_len = cols = win_size - 36; ++ file_len = cols = win_size - 45; + if (file_len > 0) { + asmprintf(&buf, INT_MAX, &cols, "%-*s", file_len, file); + /* If we used fewer columns than expected then pad */ +@@ -192,6 +199,12 @@ + xextendf(&buf, NULL, " %3d%% %s %s/s ", percent, format_size(cur_pos), + format_rate((off_t)bytes_per_second)); + ++ /* instantaneous rate */ ++ if (bytes_left > 0) ++ xextendf(&buf, NULL, "%s/s", format_rate((off_t)delta_pos)); ++ else ++ xextendf(&buf, NULL, "%s/s", format_rate((off_t)max_delta_pos)); ++ + /* ETA */ + if (!transferred) + stalled += elapsed; +@@ -234,6 +247,7 @@ + } + free(buf); + free(obuf); ++ last_pos = cur_pos; + } + + static void +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c 2025-06-14 10:53:02.021809909 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.327045863 +0200 +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ + #include "uidswap.h" + #include "myproposal.h" + #include "digest.h" ++#include "sshbuf.h" + #include "version.h" + #include "ssh-gss.h" + +@@ -174,6 +175,10 @@ + oHashKnownHosts, + oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, + oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, ++ oTcpRcvBufPoll, oHPNDisabled, ++ oNoneEnabled, oNoneMacEnabled, oNoneSwitch, ++ oDisableMTAES, oUseMPTCP, ++ oMetrics, oMetricsPath, oMetricsInterval, oFallback, oFallbackPort, + oVisualHostKey, + oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull, + oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, +@@ -321,6 +326,16 @@ + { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, + { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, + { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, ++ { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled }, ++ { "nonemacenabled", oNoneMacEnabled }, ++ { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch }, ++ { "usemptcp", oUseMPTCP}, ++ { "disablemtaes", oDisableMTAES }, ++ { "metrics", oMetrics }, ++ { "metricspath", oMetricsPath }, ++ { "metricsinterval", oMetricsInterval }, ++ { "fallback", oFallback }, ++ { "fallbackport", oFallbackPort }, + { "sessiontype", oSessionType }, + { "stdinnull", oStdinNull }, + { "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication }, +@@ -343,6 +358,8 @@ + { "proxyjump", oProxyJump }, + { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider }, + { "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand }, ++ { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll }, ++ { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled }, + { "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize }, + { "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */ + { "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline }, +@@ -542,7 +559,7 @@ + + if (port == 0) { + sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); +- port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; ++ port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : HPNSSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + } + return port; + } +@@ -1381,6 +1398,67 @@ + intptr = &options->check_host_ip; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oHPNDisabled: ++ intptr = &options->hpn_disabled; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oTcpRcvBufPoll: ++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oNoneEnabled: ++ intptr = &options->none_enabled; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oNoneMacEnabled: ++ intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oUseMPTCP: ++ intptr = &options->use_mptcp; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oDisableMTAES: ++ intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oMetrics: ++ intptr = &options->metrics; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oMetricsInterval: ++ intptr = &options->metrics_interval; ++ goto parse_int; ++ ++ case oMetricsPath: ++ charptr = &options->metrics_path; ++ options->metrics = 1; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oFallback: ++ intptr = &options->fallback; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oFallbackPort: ++ intptr = &options->fallback_port; ++ goto parse_int; ++ ++ /* ++ * We check to see if the command comes from the command ++ * line or not. If it does then enable it otherwise fail. ++ * NONE should never be a default configuration. ++ */ ++ case oNoneSwitch: ++ if (strcmp(filename, "command-line") == 0) { ++ intptr = &options->none_switch; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ } else { ++ error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename); ++ error("Continuing..."); ++ debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: + intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; + multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; +@@ -2798,6 +2876,18 @@ + options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; + options->request_tty = -1; ++ options->none_switch = -1; ++ options->none_enabled = -1; ++ options->nonemac_enabled = -1; ++ options->use_mptcp = -1; ++ options->disable_multithreaded = -1; ++ options->metrics = -1; ++ options->metrics_path = NULL; ++ options->metrics_interval = -1; ++ options->hpn_disabled = -1; ++ options->fallback = -1; ++ options->fallback_port = -1; ++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1; + options->session_type = -1; + options->stdin_null = -1; + options->fork_after_authentication = -1; +@@ -2982,8 +3072,39 @@ + options->server_alive_interval = 0; + if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) + options->server_alive_count_max = 3; ++ if (options->hpn_disabled == -1) ++ options->hpn_disabled = 0; ++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1) ++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1; ++ if (options->none_switch == -1) ++ options->none_switch = 0; ++ if (options->none_enabled == -1) ++ options->none_enabled = 0; ++ if (options->none_enabled == 0 && options->none_switch > 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "NoneEnabled must be enabled to use the None Switch option. None cipher disabled.\n"); ++ options->none_enabled = 0; ++ } ++ if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1) ++ options->nonemac_enabled = 0; ++ if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && (options->none_enabled == 0 || ++ options->none_switch == 0)) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "None MAC can only be used with the None cipher. None MAC disabled.\n"); ++ options->nonemac_enabled = 0; ++ } ++ if (options->use_mptcp == -1) ++ options->use_mptcp = 0; ++ if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1) ++ options->disable_multithreaded = 0; ++ if (options->metrics == -1) ++ options->metrics = 0; ++ if (options->metrics_interval == -1) ++ options->metrics_interval = 5; + if (options->control_master == -1) + options->control_master = 0; ++ if (options->fallback == -1) ++ options->fallback = 1; ++ if (options->fallback_port == -1) ++ options->fallback_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->control_persist == -1) { + options->control_persist = 0; + options->control_persist_timeout = 0; +@@ -3757,6 +3878,14 @@ + dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableEscapeCommandline, o->enable_escape_commandline); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oTcpRcvBufPoll, o->tcp_rcv_buf_poll); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHPNDisabled, o->hpn_disabled); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoneSwitch, o->none_switch); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoneEnabled, o->none_enabled); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoneMacEnabled, o->nonemac_enabled); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oFallback, o->fallback); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(oMetrics, o->metrics); ++ + + /* Integer options */ + dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); +@@ -3768,6 +3897,8 @@ + dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size); + dump_cfg_int(oObscureKeystrokeTiming, + o->obscure_keystroke_timing_interval); ++ dump_cfg_int(oMetricsInterval, o->metrics_interval); ++ dump_cfg_int(oFallbackPort, o->fallback_port); + + /* String options */ + dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address); +@@ -3796,6 +3927,7 @@ + dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); + dump_cfg_string(oKnownHostsCommand, o->known_hosts_command); + dump_cfg_string(oTag, o->tag); ++ dump_cfg_string(oMetricsPath, o->metrics_path); + dump_cfg_string(oVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum); + + /* Forwards */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h 2025-06-14 10:53:02.022395739 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.328092159 +0200 +@@ -128,6 +128,21 @@ + int enable_ssh_keysign; + int64_t rekey_limit; + int rekey_interval; ++ ++ /* hpnssh options */ ++ int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */ ++ int hpn_disabled; /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */ ++ int none_switch; /* Use none cipher */ ++ int none_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */ ++ int nonemac_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */ ++ int disable_multithreaded; /* Disable multithreaded aes-ctr */ ++ int metrics; /* enable metrics */ ++ int metrics_interval; /* time in seconds between polls */ ++ char *metrics_path; /* path for the metrics files */ ++ int fallback; /* en|disable fallback port (def: true) */ ++ int fallback_port; /* port to fallback to (def: 22) */ ++ int use_mptcp; ++ + int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; + int identities_only; + int server_alive_interval; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/README.md openssh-10.0p1/README.md +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/README.md 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/README.md 2025-06-14 10:54:01.328596415 +0200 +@@ -1,16 +1,22 @@ +-# Portable OpenSSH ++# HPNSSH: Based on Portable OpenSSH + +-[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml) +-[![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh) +-[![Coverity Status](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/21341/badge.svg)](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/openssh-portable) ++HPN-SSH is a high performance soft fork of OpenSSH that can provide significnatly faster throughput for bulk data transfers over a wide range of network paths. In some situations we've seen throughput rates more than 100 times faster than OpenSSH. HPN-SSH is able to do this by optimizing the application layer receive buffer to match the TCP receive buffer. Notably, to see performance improvements HPN-SSH only needs to be the data receiver so users can see notable improvements with many other SSH implementations. HPN-SSH also incorporate two parallelized ciphers, AES-CTR and Chacha20 (the default). When using these ciphers a throughput performance increase of 30% is typical. More information on how we do this work and other features of HPN-SSH is available from [https://hpnssh.org](https://hpnssh.org). + +-OpenSSH is a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``ssh`` and server ``sshd``, file transfer utilities ``scp`` and ``sftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``ssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``ssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs. ++Starting with version HPN17v0 there will be significant changes to the naming convention used for executables and installation locations. The last version that does not include these changes is HPN16v1 corresponding to the HPN-8_8_P1 tag on the master branch. + +-This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM). ++HPNSSH is a variant of OpenSSH. It a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``hpnssh`` and server ``hpnsshd``, file transfer utilities ``hpnscp`` and ``hpnsftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``hpnssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``hpnssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs. It includes numerous performance and functionality enhancements focused on high performance networks and computing envrironments. Complete information can be found in the HPN-README file. ++ ++It is fully compatible with all compliant implementations of the SSH protocol and OpenSSH in particular. ++ ++This version of HPNSSH is significant departure in terms of naming executables and installation locations. Specifically, all executables are now prefixed with ``hpn``. So ``ssh`` becomes ``hpnssh`` and ``scp`` is now ``hpnscp``. Configuation files and host keys can now be found in ``/etc/hpnssh``. By default ``hpnsshd`` now runs on port 2222 but this is configurable. This change was made in order to prevent installations of hpnssh, particularly from package distributions, from interfering with default installations of OpenSSH. HPNSSH is backwards compatible with all versions of OpenSSH including configuration files, keys, and run time options. Additionally, the client will, by default attempt to connect to port 2222 but will automatically fall back to port 22. This is also user configurable. ++ ++HPNSSH is based on OpenSSH portable. This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM). ++ ++This document will be changing over time to reflect new changes and features. This document is built off of the OpenSSH README.md + + ## Documentation + +-The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool: ++The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool. + + * [ssh(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1) + * [sshd(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8) +@@ -21,15 +27,15 @@ + * [ssh-keyscan(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keyscan.8) + * [sftp-server(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8) + +-## Stable Releases ++All options in OpenSSH are respected by HPN-SSH. The man pages for HPN-SSH tools are the same as the name of the tool. + +-Stable release tarballs are available from a number of [download mirrors](https://www.openssh.com/portable.html#downloads). We recommend the use of a stable release for most users. Please read the [release notes](https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html) for details of recent changes and potential incompatibilities. ++## Building HPNSSH + +-## Building Portable OpenSSH ++Detailed step by step instructions can be found at https://psc.edu/hpn-ssh-home/ + + ### Dependencies + +-Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers. ++HPNSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers. + + ``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) may also be used. OpenSSH may be built without either of these, but the resulting binaries will have only a subset of the cryptographic algorithms normally available. + +@@ -44,8 +50,9 @@ + Release tarballs and release branches in git include a pre-built copy of the ``configure`` script and may be built using: + + ``` +-tar zxvf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz +-cd openssh ++tar zxvf hpnssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz ++cd hpn-ssh ++autoreconf -f -i + ./configure # [options] + make && make tests + ``` +@@ -57,9 +64,9 @@ + If building from the git master branch, you'll need [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/) installed to build the ``configure`` script. The following commands will check out and build portable OpenSSH from git: + + ``` +-git clone https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable # or https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git +-cd openssh-portable +-autoreconf ++git clone https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh ++cd hpn-ssh ++autoreconf -f -i + ./configure + make && make tests + ``` +@@ -76,6 +83,7 @@ + ``--with-libedit`` | Enable [libedit](https://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/) support for sftp. + ``--with-kerberos5`` | Enable Kerberos/GSSAPI support. Both [Heimdal](https://www.h5l.org/) and [MIT](https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/) Kerberos implementations are supported. + ``--with-selinux`` | Enable [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) support. ++``--with-security-key-builtin`` | Include built-in support for U2F/FIDO2 security keys. This requires [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) be installed. + + ## Development + +@@ -84,3 +92,4 @@ + ## Reporting bugs + + _Non-security_ bugs may be reported to the developers via [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/) or via the mailing list above. Security bugs should be reported to [openssh@openssh.com](mailto:openssh.openssh.com). ++ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c openssh-10.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.776677219 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.328916358 +0200 +@@ -295,6 +295,9 @@ + #ifdef __NR_geteuid32 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_getpeername /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */ ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpeername), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_getpgid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid), + #endif +@@ -413,6 +416,9 @@ + #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask + SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_socketcall ++ SC_ALLOW(__NR_socketcall), ++#endif + #ifdef __NR_time + SC_ALLOW(__NR_time), + #endif +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.1 openssh-10.0p1/scp.1 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.1 2025-06-14 10:53:01.646933368 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/scp.1 2025-06-14 10:54:01.329403433 +0200 +@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ + .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy + .Sh SYNOPSIS + .Nm scp +-.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv ++.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTvZ + .Op Fl c Ar cipher + .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path + .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config +@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ + .Sh DESCRIPTION + .Nm + copies files between hosts on a network. ++It is binary compatible with OpenSSH's scp including ++the use of the same directives and configuration options except where noted. + .Pp + .Nm + uses the SFTP protocol over a +@@ -257,6 +259,7 @@ + .It Tunnel + .It TunnelDevice + .It UpdateHostKeys ++.It UseMPTCP + .It User + .It UserKnownHostsFile + .It VerifyHostKeyDNS +@@ -291,6 +294,10 @@ + Note that + .Nm + follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. ++.It Fl Z ++Resume failed or interrupted transfer. Identical files will be skipped. Remote must have resume option. ++.Nm ++only option. + .It Fl S Ar program + Name of + .Ar program +@@ -298,6 +305,14 @@ + The program must understand + .Xr ssh 1 + options. ++.It Fl z Ar program ++Path to hpnscp on remote system. Useful if remote has multiple scp installs. ++For example, using the resume option but the default remote scp does not have the resume option. ++Use -z to point the version that does - e.g. -z /opt/hpnssh/bin/hpnscp. ++.Nm ++only option. ++.It Fl s ++Use the SFTP protocol for transfers rather than the original scp protocol. + .It Fl T + Disable strict filename checking. + By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory +@@ -324,10 +339,13 @@ + .It Cm nrequests Ns = Ns Ar value + Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests may be in progress + at any point in time during a download or upload. +-By default 64 requests may be active concurrently. ++This value must be between 1 and 8192. ++By default 1024 requests may be active concurrently. + .It Cm buffer Ns = Ns Ar value + Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP read/write operation used + during download or upload. ++This value must be between 1B and 255KB. You may use ++the K unit for the size. E.g. 32768 or 32K. + By default a 32KB buffer is used. + .El + .El +@@ -361,6 +379,7 @@ + .Sh AUTHORS + .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi + .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi ++.An Chris Rapier Aq Mt rapier@psc.edu + .Sh CAVEATS + The legacy SCP protocol (selected by the + .Fl O +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.c openssh-10.0p1/scp.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.663335155 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/scp.c 2025-06-14 12:35:32.946245567 +0200 +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + /* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2021 Chris Rapier. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -133,6 +134,12 @@ + #include "misc.h" + #include "progressmeter.h" + #include "utf8.h" ++/* libressl doesn't support the blake2b512 digest so ++ * we need to prevent libressl from using the resume feature ++ * cjr 7/18/2023 */ ++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) ++#include ++#endif + #include "sftp.h" + + #include "sftp-common.h" +@@ -175,6 +182,10 @@ + /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ + char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; + ++/* this is path to the remote scp program allowing the user to specify ++ * a non-default scp */ ++char *remote_path; ++ + /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ + pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; + pid_t do_cmd_pid2 = -1; +@@ -189,6 +200,17 @@ + int sftp_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, + int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ + ++/* Flag to indicate that this is a file resume */ ++int resume_flag = 0; /* 0 is off, 1 is on */ ++ ++/* we want the host name for debugging purposes */ ++char hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1]; ++ ++/* defines for the resume function. Need them even if not supported */ ++#define HASH_LEN 128 /*40 sha1, 64 blake2s256 128 blake2b512*/ ++#define BUF_AND_HASH HASH_LEN + 64 /* length of the hash and other data to get size of buffer */ ++#define HASH_BUFLEN 8192 /* 8192 seems to be a good balance between freads ++ * and the digest func*/ + static void + killchild(int signo) + { +@@ -236,6 +258,9 @@ + int status; + pid_t pid; + ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "In do_local_cmd\n"); ++#endif + if (a->num == 0) + fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); + +@@ -462,6 +487,8 @@ + void tolocal(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct); + void toremote(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct); + void usage(void); ++void calculate_hash(char *, char *, off_t); /*get the hash of file to length*/ ++void rand_str(char *, size_t); /*gen randome char string */ + + void source_sftp(int, char *, char *, struct sftp_conn *); + void sink_sftp(int, char *, const char *, struct sftp_conn *); +@@ -480,11 +507,18 @@ + char *sftp_direct = NULL; + long long llv; + ++ /* we use this to prepend the debugging statements ++ * so we know which side is saying what */ ++ gethostname(hostname, HOST_NAME_MAX + 1); ++ + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + msetlocale(); + ++ /* for use with rand function when resume option is used*/ ++ srand(time(NULL)); ++ + /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ + argv0 = argv[0]; + newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); +@@ -509,7 +543,7 @@ + + fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, +- "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:X:")) != -1) { ++ "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvZD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:X:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + /* User-visible flags. */ + case '1': +@@ -590,24 +624,36 @@ + addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); + showprogress = 0; + break; ++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) ++ case 'Z': ++ /* currently resume only works in SCP mode */ ++ resume_flag = 1; ++ mode = MODE_SCP; ++ break; ++#endif + case 'X': + /* Please keep in sync with sftp.c -X */ + if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) { + r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv); +- if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) { ++ /* don't ask for a buffer larger than the maximum ++ * size that SFTP can handle */ ++ if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > (SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024))) { + r = -1; + errno = EINVAL; + } + if (r == -1) { +- fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s", +- optarg + 7, strerror(errno)); ++ fatal("Invalid buffer size. Must be between 1B and 255KB." ++ "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 7, strerror(errno)); + } + sftp_copy_buflen = (size_t)llv; + } else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) { +- llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024, ++ /* more than 10k to 15k requests starts stalling the connection ++ * 8192 * default buffer size is 256MB of outstanding data. ++ * if users need more then they need to up the buffer size */ ++ llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 8 * 1024, + &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) { +- fatal("Invalid number of requests " ++ fatal("Invalid number of requests. Must be between 1 and 8192. " + "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr); + } + sftp_nrequests = (size_t)llv; +@@ -695,11 +741,20 @@ + remin = remout = -1; + do_cmd_pid = -1; + /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ +- (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", +- verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", +- iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", +- targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); ++ /* In the event of an hpn to hpn connection the scp ++ * command is rewritten to hpnscp. This happens in ++ * clientloop.c -cjr 12/12/2022 */ + ++ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s%s%s%s%s%s", ++ remote_path ? remote_path : "scp", ++ verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", ++ iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", ++ pflag ? " -p" : "", ++ targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "", ++ resume_flag ? " -Z" : ""); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Sending cmd %s\n", hostname, cmd); ++#endif + (void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); + + if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */ +@@ -1324,6 +1379,74 @@ + free(src); + } + ++/* calculate the hash of a file up to length bytes ++ * this is used to determine if remote and local file ++ * fragments match. There may be a more efficient process for the hashing ++ * Note: LibreSSL doesn't support blake2b512 so we can't offer them ++ * the resume feature cjr 7/18/2023 */ ++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) ++void calculate_hash(char *filename, char *output, off_t length) ++{ ++ int n, md_len; ++ EVP_MD_CTX *c; ++ const EVP_MD *md; ++ char buf[HASH_BUFLEN]; ++ ssize_t bytes; ++ unsigned char out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ char tmp[3]; ++ FILE *file_ptr; ++ *output = '\0'; ++ ++ /* open file for calculating hash */ ++ file_ptr = fopen(filename, "r"); ++ if (file_ptr==NULL) ++ { ++ if (verbose_mode) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: error opening file %s\n", hostname, filename); ++ /* file the expected output with spaces */ ++ snprintf(output, HASH_LEN, "%s", " "); ++ } ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ md = EVP_get_digestbyname("blake2b512"); ++ c = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); ++ EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, md, NULL); ++ ++ while (length > 0) { ++ if (length > HASH_BUFLEN) ++ /* fread returns the number of elements read. ++ * in this case 1. Multiply by the length to get the bytes */ ++ bytes=fread(buf, HASH_BUFLEN, 1, file_ptr) * HASH_BUFLEN; ++ else ++ bytes=fread(buf, length, 1, file_ptr) * length; ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(c, buf, bytes); ++ length -= HASH_BUFLEN; ++ } ++ EVP_DigestFinal(c, out, &md_len); ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(c); ++ /* convert the hash into a string */ ++ for(n=0; n < md_len; n++) { ++ snprintf(tmp, 3, "%02x", out[n]); ++ strncat(output, tmp, 3); ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: HASH IS '%s' of length %ld\n", hostname, output, strlen(output)); ++#endif ++ fclose(file_ptr); ++} ++#else ++void calculate_hash(char *filename, char *output, off_t length) ++{ ++ /* empty function for builds without openssl or are using libressl */ ++} ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ++ ++#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \ ++ ((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \ ++ (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \ ++ (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) ++ + /* Prepare remote path, handling ~ by assuming cwd is the homedir */ + static char * + prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) +@@ -1407,14 +1530,23 @@ + struct stat stb; + static BUF buffer; + BUF *bp; +- off_t i, statbytes; ++ off_t i, statbytes, xfer_size; + size_t amt, nr; + int fd = -1, haderr, indx; +- char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX]; ++ char *cp, *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + BUF_AND_HASH], encname[PATH_MAX]; + int len; ++ char hashsum[HASH_LEN+1], test_hashsum[HASH_LEN+1]; ++ char inbuf[PATH_MAX + BUF_AND_HASH]; ++ size_t insize; ++ unsigned long long ull; ++ char *match; /* used to communicate fragment match */ ++ match = "\0"; /*default is to fail the match. NULL and F both indicate fail*/ + + for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { + name = argv[indx]; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s index is %d, name is %s\n", hostname, indx, name); ++#endif + statbytes = 0; + len = strlen(name); + while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') +@@ -1436,6 +1568,14 @@ + unset_nonblock(fd); + switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFREG: ++ /* only calculate hash if we are in resume mode and a file*/ ++ if (resume_flag) { ++ calculate_hash(name, hashsum, stb.st_size); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Name is '%s' and hash '%s'\n", hostname, name, hashsum); ++ fprintf (stderr,"%s: size of %s is %ld\n", hostname, name, stb.st_size); ++#endif ++ } + break; + case S_IFDIR: + if (iamrecursive) { +@@ -1457,14 +1597,133 @@ + goto next; + } + #define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) +- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", +- (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), +- (long long)stb.st_size, last); +- if (verbose_mode) +- fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); ++ /* Add a hash of the file along with the filemode if in resume */ ++ if (resume_flag) ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s %s\n", ++ (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), ++ (long long)stb.st_size, hashsum, last); ++ else ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", ++ (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), ++ (long long)stb.st_size, last); ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Sending file modes: %s", hostname, buf); ++#endif + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); +- if (response() < 0) ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: inbuf length %ld buf length %ld\n", hostname, strlen(inbuf), strlen(buf)); ++#endif ++ if (resume_flag) { /* get the hash response from the remote */ ++ (void) atomicio(read, remin, inbuf, BUF_AND_HASH - 1); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: we got '%s' in inbuf length %ld buf was %ld\n", ++ hostname, inbuf, strlen(inbuf), strlen(buf)); ++#endif ++ } ++ if (response() < 0) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: response is less than 0\n", hostname); ++#endif + goto next; ++ } ++ xfer_size = stb.st_size; ++ ++ /* we only do the following in resume mode because we have a ++ * new buf from the remote to parse */ ++ if (resume_flag) { ++ cp = inbuf; ++ if (*cp == 'R') { /* resume file transfer*/ ++ char *in_hashsum; /* where to hold the incoming hash */ ++ in_hashsum = calloc(HASH_LEN+1, sizeof(char)); ++ for (++cp; cp < inbuf + 5; cp++) { ++ /* skip over the mode */ ++ } ++ if (*cp++ != ' ') { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: mode not delineated!\n", hostname); ++ } ++ ++ if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: size not present\n", hostname); ++ ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); ++ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: size not delimited\n", hostname); ++ if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull)) ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: size out of range\n", hostname); ++ insize = (off_t)ull; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: received size of %ld\n", hostname, insize); ++#endif ++ ++ /* copy the cp pointer byte by byte */ ++ int i; ++ for (i = 0; i < HASH_LEN; i++) { ++ strncat(in_hashsum, cp++, 1); ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: in_hashsum '%s'\n", hostname, in_hashsum); ++#endif ++ ++ /*get the hash of the source file to the byte length we just got*/ ++ calculate_hash(name, test_hashsum, insize); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: calculated hashsum of local %s to %ld is %s\n", ++ hostname, last, insize, test_hashsum); ++#endif ++ /* compare the incoming hash to the hash of the local file*/ ++ if (strcmp(in_hashsum, test_hashsum) == 0) { ++ /* the fragments match so we should seek to the appropriate place in the ++ * local file and set the remote file to append */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: File fragments match\n", hostname); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: seeking to %ld\n", hostname, insize); ++#endif ++ xfer_size = stb.st_size - insize; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: xfer_size: %ld, stb.st_size: %ld insize: %ld\n", ++ hostname, xfer_size, stb.st_size, insize); ++#endif ++ if (lseek(fd, insize, SEEK_CUR) != (off_t)insize) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: lseek did not return %ld\n", hostname, insize) ; ++#endif ++ goto next; ++ } ++ match = "M"; ++ } else { ++ /* the fragments don't match so we should start over from the begining */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: File fragments do not match '%s'(in) '%s'(local)\n", ++ hostname, in_hashsum, test_hashsum); ++#endif ++ match = "F"; ++ xfer_size = stb.st_size; ++ } ++ free(in_hashsum); ++ } ++ if (*cp == 'S') { /* skip file */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Should be skipping this file\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ goto next; ++ } ++ if (*cp == 'C') { /*transfer entire file*/ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Resending entire file\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ xfer_size = stb.st_size; ++ } ++ /* need to send the match status ++ * We always send the match status or we get out of sync ++ */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sending match %s\n", hostname, match); ++#endif ++ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, match, 1); ++ } ++ + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { + next: if (fd != -1) { + (void) close(fd); +@@ -1472,13 +1731,17 @@ + } + continue; + } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: going to xfer %ld\n", hostname, xfer_size); ++#endif + if (showprogress) +- start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); ++ start_progress_meter(curfile, xfer_size, &statbytes); + set_nonblock(remout); +- for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { ++ for (haderr = i = 0; i < xfer_size; i += bp->cnt) { + amt = bp->cnt; +- if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) +- amt = stb.st_size - i; ++ if (i + (off_t)amt > xfer_size) ++ amt = xfer_size - i; + if (!haderr) { + if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, + bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { +@@ -1675,24 +1938,35 @@ + sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) + { + static BUF buffer; +- struct stat stb; ++ struct stat stb, cpstat, npstat; + BUF *bp; + off_t i; + size_t j, count; + int amt, exists, first, ofd; + mode_t mode, omode, mask; +- off_t size, statbytes; ++ off_t size, statbytes, xfer_size; + unsigned long long ull; + int setimes, targisdir, wrerr; +- char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; ++ char ch, *cp, *np, *np_tmp, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384], visbuf[16384]; + char **patterns = NULL; + size_t n, npatterns = 0; + struct timeval tv[2]; ++ char remote_hashsum[HASH_LEN+1]; ++ char local_hashsum[HASH_LEN+1]; ++ char tmpbuf[BUF_AND_HASH]; ++ char outbuf[BUF_AND_HASH]; ++ char match; ++ int bad_match_flag = 0; ++ np = NULL; /* this was originally '/0' but that's wrong */ ++ np_tmp = NULL; + + #define atime tv[0] + #define mtime tv[1] + #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } + ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: LOCAL In sink with %s\n", hostname, src); ++#endif + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0)) + SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size"); + +@@ -1708,9 +1982,16 @@ + if (targetshouldbedirectory) + verifydir(targ); + ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n",hostname); ++#endif + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + targisdir = 1; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Target is %s with a size of %ld\n", hostname, targ, stb.st_size); ++#endif + if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) { + /* + * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match +@@ -1720,6 +2001,10 @@ + fatal_f("could not expand pattern"); + } + for (first = 1;; first = 0) { ++ bad_match_flag = 0; /* used in resume mode. */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: At start of loop buf is %s\n", hostname, buf); ++#endif + cp = buf; + if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) + goto done; +@@ -1747,6 +2032,9 @@ + continue; + } + if (buf[0] == 'E') { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname); ++#endif + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + goto done; + } +@@ -1754,6 +2042,9 @@ + *--cp = 0; + + cp = buf; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: buf is %s\n", hostname, buf); ++#endif + if (*cp == 'T') { + setimes++; + cp++; +@@ -1781,9 +2072,19 @@ + if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || + atime.tv_usec > 999999) + SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname); ++#endif + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + continue; + } ++ if (*cp == 'R') { /*resume file transfer (dont' think I need this here)*/ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Received a RESUME request with %s\n", hostname, cp); ++#endif ++ resume_flag = 1; ++ } + if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { + /* + * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". +@@ -1799,6 +2100,18 @@ + SCREWUP("expected control record"); + } + mode = 0; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: buf is %s\n", hostname, buf); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp); ++#endif ++ /* we need to track if this object is a directory ++ * before we move the pointer. If we are in resume mode ++ * we might end up trying to get an mdsum on a directory ++ * and that doesn't work */ ++ int dir_flag = 0; ++ if (*cp == 'D') ++ dir_flag = 1; ++ + for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { + if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') + SCREWUP("bad mode"); +@@ -1809,6 +2122,10 @@ + if (*cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); + ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp); ++#endif ++ + if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) + SCREWUP("size not present"); + ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); +@@ -1818,11 +2135,32 @@ + SCREWUP("size out of range"); + size = (off_t)ull; + ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp); ++#endif ++ if (resume_flag && !dir_flag) { ++ *remote_hashsum = '\0'; ++ int i; ++ for (i = 0; i < HASH_LEN; i++) { ++ strncat (remote_hashsum, cp++, 1); ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: '%s'\n", hostname, remote_hashsum); ++#endif ++ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') ++ SCREWUP("hash not delimited"); ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp); ++#endif + if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || + strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) { + run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); + exit(1); + } ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s cp is %s\n", hostname, cp); ++#endif + if (npatterns > 0) { + for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) { + if (strcmp(patterns[n], cp) == 0 || +@@ -1892,11 +2230,195 @@ + } + omode = mode; + mode |= S_IWUSR; ++ stat(cp, &cpstat); ++ xfer_size = size; ++ if (resume_flag) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: np is %s\n", hostname, np); ++#endif ++ /* does the file exist and if it does it writable? */ ++ if (stat(np, &npstat) == -1) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s Local file does not exist size is %ld!\n", ++ hostname, npstat.st_size); ++#endif ++ npstat.st_size = 0; ++ } else { ++ /* check to see if the file is writeable ++ * if it isn't then we need to skip it but ++ * before we skip it we need to send the remote ++ * what they are expecting so BUF_AND_HASH bytes and then ++ * a null. ++ * NOTE!!! The format in the snprintf needs the actual numeric ++ * because using a define isn't working */ ++ if (access (np, W_OK) != 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "scp: %s: Permission denied on %s\n", np, hostname); ++ snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "S%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-2, " "); ++ (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf)); ++ (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ /* this file is already here do we need to move it? ++ * Check to make sure npstat.st_size > 0. If it is 0 then we ++ * may trying to be moving a zero byte file in which case this ++ * following block fails. See on 0 byte files the hashes will ++ * always match and the file won't be created even though it should ++ */ ++ if (xfer_size == npstat.st_size && (npstat.st_size > 0)) { ++ calculate_hash(np, local_hashsum, npstat.st_size); ++ if (strcmp(local_hashsum,remote_hashsum) == 0) { ++ /* we can skip this file if we want to. */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Files are the same\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ /* the remote is expecting something so we need to send them something*/ ++ snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "S%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-2, " "); ++ (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf)); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr,"%s: sent '%s' to remote\n", hostname, outbuf); ++#endif ++ /* the remote is waiting on an ack so send a null */ ++ (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); ++ if (showprogress) ++ fprintf (stderr, "Skipping identical file: %s\n", np); ++ continue; ++ } else { ++ /* file sizes are the same but they don't match */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: target(%ld) is different than source(%ld)!\n", ++ hostname, npstat.st_size, size); ++#endif ++ snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof outbuf, "C%04o %lld %s", ++ (u_int) (npstat.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), ++ (long long)npstat.st_size, local_hashsum); ++ snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-1, tmpbuf); ++ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf)); ++ bad_match_flag = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ /* if npstat.st_size is 0 then the local file doesn't exist and ++ * we have to move it. Since we are in resume mode treat it as a resume */ ++ if (npstat.st_size < xfer_size || (npstat.st_size == 0)) { ++ char rand_string[9]; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s is smaller than %s\n", hostname, np, cp); ++#endif ++ calculate_hash(np, local_hashsum, npstat.st_size); ++#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) ++ snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof outbuf, "R%04o %lld %s", ++ (u_int) (npstat.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), ++ (long long)npstat.st_size, local_hashsum); ++ snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-1, tmpbuf); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: new buf is %s of length %ld\n", ++ hostname, outbuf, strlen(outbuf)); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Sending new file (%s) modes: %s\n", ++ hostname, np, outbuf); ++#endif ++ /*now we have to send np's length and hash to the other end ++ * if the computed hashes match then we seek to np's length in ++ * file and append to np starting from there */ ++ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf)); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: New size: %ld, size: %ld, st_size: %ld\n", ++ hostname, size - npstat.st_size, size, npstat.st_size); ++#endif ++ xfer_size = size - npstat.st_size; ++ resume_flag = 1; ++ np_tmp = xstrdup(np); ++ /* We should have a random component to avoid clobbering a ++ * local file */ ++ rand_str(rand_string, 8); ++ strcat(np, rand_string); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Will concat %s to %s after xfer\n", ++ hostname, np, np_tmp); ++#endif ++ } else if (npstat.st_size > size) { ++ /* the target file is larger than the source. ++ * so we need to overwrite it. We don't need to send the hash though. */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: target(%ld) is larger than source(%ld)!\n", ++ hostname, npstat.st_size, size); ++#endif ++ snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof outbuf, "C%04o %lld", ++ (u_int) (npstat.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), ++ (long long)npstat.st_size); ++ snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-1, tmpbuf); ++ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf)); ++ bad_match_flag = 1; ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: CP is %s(%ld) NP is %s(%ld)\n", ++ hostname, cp, size, np, npstat.st_size); ++#endif ++ /* we are in resume mode so we need this *here* and not later ++ * because we need to get the file match information from the remote ++ * outside of resume mode we don't get that so we get out of sync ++ * so we have a test for the resume_flag after this block */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); ++ ++ /* the remote is always going to send a match status ++ * so we need to read it so we don't get out of sync */ ++ (void) atomicio(read, remin, &match, 1); ++ if (match != 'M') {/*fragments do not match*/ ++ /* expected response of F, M and NULL *but* ++ * anything other than M is a failure ++ * if it's a NULL then we reset xfer_size but ++ * we retain the file pointers */ ++ xfer_size = size; ++ bad_match_flag = 1; ++ if (match == 'F') { ++ /* got an F for failure and not NULL ++ * so we want to swap over the filename from ++ * the temp back to the original */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: match status is F\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ if (np_tmp != NULL) ++ np = np_tmp; ++ else { ++ continue; ++ } ++ } else { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: match received is NULL\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ } ++ } else { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s match status is M\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ bad_match_flag = 0; /* while this is set at the beginning of the ++ * loop I'm setting it here explicitly as well */ ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Creating file. mode is %d for %s\n", ++ hostname, mode, np); ++#endif + if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) { + bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); + continue; + } +- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); ++ ++ /* in the case of not using the resume function we need this vwrite here ++ * in the case of using the resume flag it comes in the above if (resume_flag) block ++ * why? because scp is weird and depends on an intricate and silly dance of ++ * call and response at just the right time. That's why */ ++ if (!resume_flag) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname); ++#endif ++ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); ++ } ++ + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { + (void) close(ofd); + continue; +@@ -1911,13 +2433,17 @@ + */ + statbytes = 0; + if (showprogress) +- start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); ++ start_progress_meter(curfile, xfer_size, &statbytes); + set_nonblock(remin); +- for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: xfer_size is %ld\n", hostname, xfer_size); ++#endif ++ for (count = i = 0; i < xfer_size; i += bp->cnt) { + amt = bp->cnt; +- if (i + amt > size) +- amt = size - i; ++ if (i + amt > xfer_size) ++ amt = xfer_size - i; + count += amt; ++ /* read the data from the socket*/ + do { + j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, + scpio, &statbytes); +@@ -1952,8 +2478,78 @@ + wrerr = 1; + } + if (!wrerr && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && +- ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) ++ ftruncate(ofd, xfer_size) != 0) + note_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); ++ ++ /* if np_tmp isn't set then we don't have a resume file to cat */ ++ /* likewise, bad match flag means no resume flag */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: resume_flag: %d, np_tmp: %s, bad_match_flag: %d\n", ++ hostname, resume_flag, np_tmp, bad_match_flag); ++#endif ++ if (resume_flag && np_tmp && !bad_match_flag) { ++ FILE *orig, *resume; ++ char res_buf[512]; /* set at 512 just because, might want to increase*/ ++ ssize_t res_bytes = 0; ++ off_t sum = 0; ++ struct stat res_stat; ++ *res_buf = '\0'; ++ orig = NULL; /*supress warnings*/ ++ resume = NULL; /*supress warnings*/ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Resume flag is set. Going to concat %s to %s now\n", ++ hostname, np, np_tmp); ++#endif ++ /* np/ofd is the resume file so open np_tmp for appending ++ * close ofd because we are going to be shifting it ++ * and I don't wnat the same file open in multiple descriptors */ ++ if (close(ofd) == -1) ++ note_err("%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno)); ++ /* orig is the target file, resume is the temp file */ ++ orig = fopen(np_tmp, "a"); /*open for appending*/ ++ if (orig == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Could not open %s for appending.", hostname, np_tmp); ++ goto stopcat; ++ } ++ resume = fopen(np, "r"); /*open for reading only*/ ++ if (resume == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Could not open %s for reading.", hostname, np); ++ goto stopcat; ++ } ++ /* get the number of bytes in the temp file*/ ++ if (fstat(fileno(resume), &res_stat) == -1) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Could not stat %s", hostname, np); ++ goto stopcat; ++ } ++ /* while the number of bytes read from the temp file ++ * is less than the size of the file read in a chunk and ++ * write it to the target file */ ++ do { ++ res_bytes = fread(res_buf, 1, 512, resume); ++ fwrite(res_buf, 1, res_bytes, orig); ++ sum += res_bytes; ++ } while (sum < res_stat.st_size); ++ ++stopcat: if (orig) ++ fclose(orig); ++ if (resume) ++ fclose(resume); ++ /* delete the resume file */ ++ remove(np); ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: np(%s) and np_tmp(%s)\n", hostname, np, np_tmp); ++#endif ++ np = np_tmp; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s np(%s) and np_tmp(%s)\n", hostname, np, np_tmp); ++#endif ++ /* reset ofd to the original np */ ++ if ((ofd = open(np_tmp, O_WRONLY)) == -1) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: couldn't open %s in append function\n", hostname, np_tmp); ++ atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ } + if (pflag) { + if (exists || omode != mode) + #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD +@@ -1988,8 +2584,17 @@ + } + } + /* If no error was noted then signal success for this file */ +- if (note_err(NULL) == 0) ++ if (note_err(NULL) == 0) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname); ++#endif + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); ++ } ++ /* we are in resume mode and we have allocated memory for np_tmp */ ++ if (resume_flag && np_tmp != NULL) { ++ free(np_tmp); ++ np_tmp = NULL; ++ } + } + done: + for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) +@@ -2133,11 +2738,20 @@ + void + usage(void) + { ++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) ++ (void) fprintf(stderr, ++ "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTvZ] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n" ++ " [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option]\n" ++ " [-P port] [-S program] [-X sftp_option] source ... target\n"); ++ exit(1); ++#else + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n" + " [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option]\n" + " [-P port] [-S program] [-X sftp_option] source ... target\n"); + exit(1); ++#endif ++ + } + + void +@@ -2276,6 +2890,18 @@ + exit(1); + } + ++void rand_str(char *dest, size_t length) { ++ char charset[] = "0123456789" ++ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" ++ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"; ++ ++ while (length-- > 0) { ++ size_t index = (double) rand() / RAND_MAX * (sizeof charset - 1); ++ *dest++ = charset[index]; ++ } ++ *dest = '\0'; ++} ++ + void + cleanup_exit(int i) + { +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c 2025-06-14 10:53:02.022835252 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c 2025-06-14 12:36:43.529579310 +0200 +@@ -217,6 +217,12 @@ + options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; ++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1; ++ options->hpn_disabled = -1; ++ options->none_enabled = -1; ++ options->nonemac_enabled = -1; ++ options->use_mptcp = -1; ++ options->disable_multithreaded = -1; + options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; + options->version_addendum = NULL; +@@ -511,6 +517,22 @@ + } + if (options->permit_tun == -1) + options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; ++ if (options->none_enabled == -1) ++ options->none_enabled = 0; ++ if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1) ++ options->nonemac_enabled = 0; ++ if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && options->none_enabled == 0) { ++ debug ("Attempted to enabled None MAC without setting None Enabled to true. None MAC disabled."); ++ options->nonemac_enabled = 0; ++ } ++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1) ++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1; ++ if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1) ++ options->disable_multithreaded = 0; ++ if (options->hpn_disabled == -1) ++ options->hpn_disabled = 0; ++ if (options->use_mptcp == -1) ++ options->use_mptcp = 0; + if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) + options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; + if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) +@@ -595,6 +617,8 @@ + sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication, + sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, + sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, ++ sNoneEnabled, sNoneMacEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, ++ sDisableMTAES, sUseMPTCP, + sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost, + sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, + sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, +@@ -804,6 +828,12 @@ + { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "nonemacenabled", sNoneMacEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "usemptcp", sUseMPTCP, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "disableMTAES", sDisableMTAES, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, +@@ -869,6 +899,7 @@ + + for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { ++ debug("Config token is %s", keywords[i].name); + *flags = keywords[i].flags; + return keywords[i].opcode; + } +@@ -1640,6 +1671,30 @@ + multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts; + goto parse_multistate; + ++ case sTcpRcvBufPoll: ++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sHPNDisabled: ++ intptr = &options->hpn_disabled; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sNoneEnabled: ++ intptr = &options->none_enabled; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sNoneMacEnabled: ++ intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sDisableMTAES: ++ intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sUseMPTCP: ++ intptr = &options->use_mptcp; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: + intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; + parse_flag: +@@ -3434,6 +3489,11 @@ + dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sHPNDisabled, o->hpn_disabled); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sTcpRcvBufPoll, o->tcp_rcv_buf_poll); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sNoneEnabled, o->none_enabled); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sNoneMacEnabled, o->nonemac_enabled); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseMPTCP, o->use_mptcp); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sRefuseConnection, o->refuse_connection); + + /* string arguments */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h 2025-06-14 10:53:02.023331755 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.332534777 +0200 +@@ -227,6 +227,13 @@ + char *pam_service_name; + int permit_pam_user_change; /* Allow PAM to change user name */ + ++ /* hpnssh options */ ++ int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/ ++ int hpn_disabled; /* disable hpn functionality. false by default */ ++ int none_enabled; /* Enable NONE cipher switch */ ++ int nonemac_enabled; /* Enable NONE MAC switch */ ++ int use_mptcp; /* Use MPTCP - Linux only */ ++ int disable_multithreaded; /* Disable multithreaded aes-ctr cipher */ + int permit_tun; + + char **permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/serverloop.c openssh-10.0p1/serverloop.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/serverloop.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.992010916 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/serverloop.c 2025-06-14 12:39:09.690199658 +0200 +@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ + #include "serverloop.h" + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "compat.h" ++#include "metrics.h" ++#include "cipher-switch.h" + + extern ServerOptions options; + +@@ -326,6 +328,7 @@ + sigset_t bsigset, osigset; + + debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2."); ++ ssh->start_time = monotime_double(); + + if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGCHLD) == -1) + error_f("bsigset setup: %s", strerror(errno)); +@@ -370,9 +373,15 @@ + collect_children(ssh); + free(pfd); + ++ /* write final log entry (do we need this here? -cjr)*/ ++ sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh); ++ + /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ + channel_free_all(ssh); + ++ /* final entry must come after channels close -cjr */ ++ sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh); ++ + /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ + session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL); + } +@@ -574,6 +583,8 @@ + c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, + -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "server-session", 1); ++ if ((options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll) && (!options.hpn_disabled)) ++ c->dynamic_window = 1; + if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { + debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); + channel_free(ssh, c); +@@ -642,6 +653,67 @@ + return 0; + } + ++/* we need to get the actual socket in use and from there ++ * read the values in the TCP_INFO struct. ++ * shout out to Rene Pfiffer for the article https://linuxgazette.net/136/pfeiffer.html ++ * for getting me started. This only works on systems that support the tcp_info ++ * struct; linux, freebsd, netbsd as of now. Apple has one but it's completely different ++ * than any of the others. ++ */ ++static int ++server_input_metrics_request(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp) ++{ ++ int success = 0; ++ /* TCP_INFO is defined in metrics.h ++ * if it's not defined then we don't support tcp_info ++ * so just return a failure code */ ++#if !defined TCP_INFO ++ return success; ++#else ++ struct tcp_info tcp_info; ++ struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; ++ int tcp_info_len; ++ /* this is the socket of the current connection */ ++ int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); ++ int r; ++ binn *metricsobj; ++ ++ tcp_info_len = sizeof(tcp_info); /*expect around 330 bytes */ ++ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new"); ++ ++ /* create the binn object to hold the serialized metrics */ ++ metricsobj = binn_object(); ++ if (metricsobj == NULL) { ++ error_f("Could not create metrics object"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Stack metrics request for connection %d", sock_in); ++ if ((r = getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_INFO, (void *)&tcp_info, ++ (socklen_t *)&tcp_info_len)) != 0) { ++ error_f("Could not read tcp_info from socket"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* write the tcp_info data to the binn object */ ++ metrics_write_binn_object(&tcp_info, metricsobj); ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, binn_ptr(metricsobj), ++ binn_size(metricsobj))) != 0) { ++ error_fr(r, "Failed to build tcp_info object"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ /* copy the pointer of the response to the passed in response pointer */ ++ *respp = resp; ++ resp = NULL; /* don't free it */ ++ /* everything worked so set success to true */ ++ success = 1; ++out: ++ sshbuf_free(resp); ++ binn_free(metricsobj); ++ return success; ++#endif /* TCP_INFO */ ++} ++ + static int + server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp) + { +@@ -818,6 +890,10 @@ + success = 1; + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) { + success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp); ++ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "stack-metrics@hpnssh.org") == 0) { ++ /* resp is the response (sshbuf struct) from the function which is ++ * handled below in the want_reply stanza */ ++ success = server_input_metrics_request(ssh, &resp); + } + /* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */ + if (want_reply) { +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/session.c openssh-10.0p1/session.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/session.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.741334418 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/session.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.333888095 +0200 +@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ + #include "monitor_wrap.h" + #include "sftp.h" + #include "atomicio.h" ++#include "cipher-switch.h" + + #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) + #include +@@ -237,6 +238,7 @@ + goto authsock_err; + + /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ ++ /* this shouldn't matter if its hpn or not - cjr */ + nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth-listener", + SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, +@@ -564,6 +566,9 @@ + session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], + s->is_subsystem, 0); + #endif ++ /* switch to the parallel ciphers if necessary */ ++ if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) ++ cipher_switch(ssh); + return 0; + } + +@@ -677,6 +682,9 @@ + ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1, + options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); + session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); ++ /* switch to the parallel cipher if appropriate */ ++ if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) ++ cipher_switch(ssh); + return 0; + } + +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.1 openssh-10.0p1/sftp.1 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.1 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sftp.1 2025-06-14 10:54:01.334573170 +0200 +@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ + transport. + It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and + compression. ++.Nm ++is binary compatible with OpenSSH's sftp and uses the same directive and configuration ++options except where noted. + .Pp + The + .Ar destination +@@ -338,7 +341,8 @@ + Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. + Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed + but will increase memory usage. +-The default is 64 outstanding requests. ++The default is 1024 outstanding requests providing for 32MB ++of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer. + .It Fl r + Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. + Note that +@@ -367,10 +371,13 @@ + .It Cm nrequests Ns = Ns Ar value + Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests may be in progress + at any point in time during a download or upload. +-By default 64 requests may be active concurrently. ++This value must be between 1 and 8192. ++By default 1024 requests may be active concurrently. + .It Cm buffer Ns = Ns Ar value + Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP read/write operation used + during download or upload. ++This value must be between 1B and 255KB. You may use ++the K unit for the size. E.g. 32768 or 32K. + By default a 32KB buffer is used. + .El + .El +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.c openssh-10.0p1/sftp.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.664429990 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sftp.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.335020156 +0200 +@@ -2570,20 +2570,25 @@ + /* Please keep in sync with ssh.c -X */ + if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) { + r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv); +- if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) { ++ /* don't ask for a buffer larger than the maximum ++ * size that SFTP can handle */ ++ if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > (SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024))) { + r = -1; + errno = EINVAL; + } + if (r == -1) { +- fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s", +- optarg + 7, strerror(errno)); ++ fatal("Invalid buffer size. Must be between 1B and 255KB." ++ "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 7, strerror(errno)); + } + copy_buffer_len = (size_t)llv; + } else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) { +- llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024, ++ /* more than 10k to 15k requests starts stalling the connection ++ * 8192 * default buffer size is 256MB of outstanding data. ++ * if users need more then they need to up the buffer size */ ++ llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 8 * 1024, + &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) { +- fatal("Invalid number of requests " ++ fatal("Invalid number of requests. Must be between 1 and 8192. " + "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr); + } + num_requests = (size_t)llv; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp-client.c openssh-10.0p1/sftp-client.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp-client.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.663814268 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sftp-client.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.335625123 +0200 +@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ + #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 + + /* Default number of concurrent xfer requests (fix sftp.1 scp.1 if changed) */ +-#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 ++/* 1024 xfer requests gives us 32MB of receive buffer space */ ++#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 1024 + + /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ + #define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1 2025-06-14 10:53:02.023904385 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1 2025-06-14 11:29:03.370919913 +0200 +@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@ + X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and + .Ux Ns -domain + sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. ++.Nm ++is binary compatible with the more well known OpenSSH and uses the same configuration ++directives, methods, and keywords except where noted with the exception of the default port. ++HPN-SSH servers, by default, use port 2222 for connection, and as such, ++.Nm ++clients ++attempt to connect on that port. If the connection attempt on port 2222 fails it will fallback to ++port 22. Please see the -p switch for more information. + .Pp + .Nm + connects and logs into the specified +@@ -527,12 +535,14 @@ + .It ControlMaster + .It ControlPath + .It ControlPersist ++.It DisableMTAES* + .It DynamicForward + .It EnableSSHKeysign + .It EnableEscapeCommandline + .It EnableSSHKeysign + .It EscapeChar + .It ExitOnForwardFailure ++.It FallbackPort + .It FingerprintHash + .It ForkAfterAuthentication + .It ForwardAgent +@@ -556,6 +566,7 @@ + .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms + .It HostbasedAuthentication + .It Hostname ++.It HPNDisabled* + .It IPQoS + .It IdentitiesOnly + .It IdentityAgent +@@ -571,7 +582,13 @@ + .It LogLevel + .It LogVerbose + .It MACs ++.It Metrics ++.It MetricsInterval ++.It MetricsPath + .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost ++.It NoneCipherEnabled* ++.It NoneEnabled* ++.It NoneMacEnabled* + .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts + .It ObscureKeystrokeTiming + .It PKCS11Provider +@@ -605,15 +622,19 @@ + .It StrictHostKeyChecking + .It SyslogFacility + .It TCPKeepAlive ++.It TcpRcvBufPoll* + .It Tag + .It Tunnel + .It TunnelDevice + .It UpdateHostKeys ++.It UseMPTCP + .It User + .It UserKnownHostsFile + .It VerifyHostKeyDNS + .It VisualHostKey + .It XAuthLocation ++.Pp ++.It * Hpnssh specific configuration option. + .El + .Pp + .It Fl P Ar tag +@@ -630,6 +651,13 @@ + Port to connect to on the remote host. + This can be specified on a + per-host basis in the configuration file. ++HPN-SSH uses a default port of 2222. It will automatically ++fallback to use the SSH standard port 22 if it cannot connect ++on port 2222. This fallback behaviour can be modified with the ++FallbackPort option. Note: if outbound port 2222 is ++blocked it may appear that the hpnssh client is non-responsive. In that event, ++either specify the correct port or use the ConnectTimeout option ++to trigger the port fallback more quickly. + .Pp + .It Fl Q Ar query_option + Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the following features: +@@ -1821,3 +1849,7 @@ + created OpenSSH. + Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH + protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. ++Chris Rapier, Michael Stevens, Ben Bennet, and Mike Tasota developed ++the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center with grants ++from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and the National Science ++Foundation. +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_api.c openssh-10.0p1/ssh_api.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_api.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_api.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.337078874 +0200 +@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ + char *cp; + int r; + +- if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0) ++ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_RELEASE)) != 0) + return r; + if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0) + return r; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.c openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.337433040 +0200 +@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ + #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "misc.h" ++/* #include "log.h" */ ++ ++#define BUF_WATERSHED 256*1024 + + #ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG + # define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \ +@@ -49,8 +52,29 @@ + int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */ + u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */ + struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */ ++ char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN]; /* String for buffer label - debugging use */ ++ int type; /* type of buffer enum (sshbuf_types)*/ + }; + ++/* update the label string for a given sshbuf. Useful ++ * for debugging */ ++void ++sshbuf_relabel(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *label) ++{ ++ if (label != NULL) ++ strncpy(buf->label, label, MAX_LABEL_LEN-1); ++} ++ ++/* set the type (from enum sshbuf_type) of the given sshbuf. ++ * The purpose is to allow different classes of buffers to ++ * follow different code paths if necessary */ ++void ++sshbuf_type(struct sshbuf *buf, int type) ++{ ++ if (type < BUF_MAX_TYPE) ++ buf->type = type; ++} ++ + static inline int + sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf) + { +@@ -90,7 +114,7 @@ + } + + struct sshbuf * +-sshbuf_new(void) ++sshbuf_new_label (const char *label) + { + struct sshbuf *ret; + +@@ -101,6 +125,8 @@ + ret->readonly = 0; + ret->refcount = 1; + ret->parent = NULL; ++ if (label != NULL) ++ strncpy(ret->label, label, MAX_LABEL_LEN-1); + if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; +@@ -290,7 +316,18 @@ + { + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return 0; +- return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off); ++ /* we need to reserve a small amount of overhead on the input buffer ++ * or we can enter into a pathological state during bulk ++ * data transfers. We use a fraction of the max size as we want it to scale ++ * with the size of the input buffer. If we do it for all of the buffers ++ * we fail the regression unit tests. This seems like a reasonable ++ * solution. Of course, I still need to figure out *why* this is ++ * happening and come up with an actual fix. TODO ++ * cjr 4/19/2024 */ ++ if (buf->type == BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT) ++ return buf->max_size / 1.05 - (buf->size - buf->off); ++ else ++ return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off); + } + + const u_char * +@@ -350,9 +387,36 @@ + */ + need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc; + rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); ++ /* With the changes in 8.9 the output buffer end up growing pretty ++ * slowly. It's knows that it needs to grow but it only does so 32K ++ * at a time. This means a lot of calls to realloc and memcpy which ++ * kills performance until the buffer reaches some maximum size. ++ * So we explicitly test for a buffer that's trying to grow and ++ * if it is then we push the growth by 4MB at a time. This can result in ++ * the buffer being over allocated (in terms of actual needs) but the ++ * process is fast. This significantly reduces overhead ++ * and improves performance. In this case we look for a buffer that is trying ++ * to grow larger than BUF_WATERSHED (256*1024 taken from PACKET_MAX_SIZE) ++ * and explcitly check that the buffer is being used for inbound outbound ++ * channel buffering. ++ * Updated for 18.4.1 -cjr 04/20/24 ++ */ ++ if (rlen > BUF_WATERSHED && (buf->type == BUF_CHANNEL_OUTPUT || buf->type == BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT)) { ++ /* debug_f ("Prior: label: %s, %p, rlen is %zu need is %zu max_size is %zu", ++ buf->label, buf, rlen, need, buf->max_size); */ ++ /* easiest thing to do is grow the nuffer by 4MB each time. It might end ++ * up being somewhat overallocated but works quickly */ ++ need = (4*1024*1024); ++ rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); ++ /* debug_f ("Post: label: %s, %p, rlen is %zu need is %zu max_size is %zu", */ ++ /* buf->label, buf, rlen, need, buf->max_size); */ ++ } + SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen)); ++ ++ /* rlen might be above the max allocation */ + if (rlen > buf->max_size) +- rlen = buf->alloc + need; ++ rlen = buf->max_size; ++ + SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen)); + if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail")); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.h openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.h 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.337808997 +0200 +@@ -29,18 +29,49 @@ + # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +-#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */ ++#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size 128MB */ + #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */ + #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */ + #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */ ++#define MAX_LABEL_LEN 64 /*maximum size of sshbuf label */ ++#define sshbuf_new() sshbuf_new_label(__func__) + + struct sshbuf; + ++enum buffer_types { ++ BUF_CHANNEL_OUTPUT, ++ BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT, ++ BUF_CHANNEL_EXTENDED, ++ BUF_PACKET_INPUT, ++ BUF_PACKET_INCOMING, ++ BUF_PACKET_OUTPUT, ++ BUF_PACKET_OUTGOING, ++ BUF_MAX_TYPE ++}; ++ + /* + * Create a new sshbuf buffer. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +-struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void); ++/* struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);*/ ++ ++/* ++ * Create a new labeled sshbuf buffer. ++ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. ++ */ ++struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new_label(const char *); ++ ++/* ++ * relabel the sshbuf struct ++ */ ++void sshbuf_relabel(struct sshbuf *, const char *); ++ ++/* ++ * assign a type (from the buffer_types enum) to ++ * the buffer. Used to quickly identify the purpose of ++ * the buffer. ++ */ ++void sshbuf_type(struct sshbuf *, int); + + /* + * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data. +@@ -76,12 +107,13 @@ + void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf); + + /* +- * Return the maximum size of buf ++ * Return the maximum usable size of buf + */ + size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf); + + /* +- * Set the maximum size of buf ++ * Set the maximum usable size of buf. Note that the buffer may consume up ++ * to 2x this memory plus bookkeeping overhead. + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ + int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size); +@@ -346,6 +378,9 @@ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \ + } while (0) + ++ ++void sshbuf_set_window_max(struct sshbuf *buf , size_t len); ++ + /* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */ + #ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL + +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c 2025-06-14 10:53:02.024428197 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c 2025-06-14 11:26:41.535259834 +0200 +@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ + #include "myproposal.h" + #include "utf8.h" + #include "hostfile.h" ++#include "cipher-switch.h" + + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +@@ -1122,6 +1123,10 @@ + break; + case 'T': + options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; ++ /* ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a */ ++ /* null cipher switch on an interactive session */ ++ /* so explicitly disable it no matter what */ ++ options.none_switch=0; + break; + case 'o': + line = xstrdup(optarg); +@@ -1743,10 +1748,36 @@ + } + + /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ ++ /* we try initially on the default hpnssh port returned by ++ * default_ssh_port() which now returns HPNSSH_DEFAULT_PORT ++ * if that fails we reset the port to SSH_DEFAULT_PORT ++ * -cjr 8/17/2022 ++ */ ++tryagain: + if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, options.host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, + options.port, options.connection_attempts, +- &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) ++ &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) { ++ /* could not connect. If the port requested is the same as ++ * hpnssh default port then fallback. Otherwise, exit */ ++ if ((options.port == default_ssh_port()) && options.fallback) { ++ int port = options.fallback_port; ++ options.port = port; ++ fprintf(stderr, "HPNSSH server not available on default port %d\n", ++ default_ssh_port()); ++ if (port == 22) ++ fprintf(stderr, "Falling back to OpenSSH default port %d\n", ++ port); ++ else ++ fprintf(stderr, "Falling back to user defined port %d\n", ++ port); ++ addrs = resolve_host(host, port, 1, ++ cname, sizeof(cname)); ++ goto tryagain; ++ } else { ++ exit(255); ++ } + exit(255); ++ } + + if (addrs != NULL) + freeaddrinfo(addrs); +@@ -1957,7 +1988,7 @@ + + /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ + static void +-fork_postauth(void) ++fork_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) + { + if (need_controlpersist_detach) + control_persist_detach(); +@@ -1967,17 +1998,21 @@ + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1) + error_f("stdfd_devnull failed"); ++ /* we do the cipher switch here in the event that the client ++ is forking or has a delayed fork */ ++ if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) ++ cipher_switch(ssh); + } + + static void +-forwarding_success(void) ++forwarding_success(struct ssh *ssh) + { + if (forward_confirms_pending == -1) + return; + if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) { + debug_f("all expected forwarding replies received"); + if (options.fork_after_authentication) +- fork_postauth(); ++ fork_postauth(ssh); + } else { + debug2_f("%d expected forwarding replies remaining", + forward_confirms_pending); +@@ -2044,7 +2079,7 @@ + "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + } + } +- forwarding_success(); ++ forwarding_success(ssh); + } + + static void +@@ -2071,7 +2106,7 @@ + } + + debug_f("tunnel forward established, id=%d", id); +- forwarding_success(); ++ forwarding_success(ssh); + } + + static void +@@ -2272,6 +2307,15 @@ + NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ); + } + ++/* this used to do a lot more but now it just checks to see ++ * if we are disabling hpn */ ++static void ++hpn_options_init(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ channel_set_hpn_disabled(options.hpn_disabled); ++ debug_f("HPN disabled: %d", options.hpn_disabled); ++} ++ + /* open new channel for a session */ + static int + ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -2293,6 +2337,7 @@ + window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; + if (tty_flag) { ++ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + window >>= 1; + packetmax >>= 1; + } +@@ -2301,6 +2346,12 @@ + window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, + "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); + ++ /* TODO: Is this the right place for these options? */ ++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) { ++ c->dynamic_window = 1; ++ debug("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling"); ++ } ++ + debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self); + + channel_send_open(ssh, c->self); +@@ -2317,6 +2368,13 @@ + int r, interactive, id = -1; + char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL; + ++ /* ++ * We need to initialize this early because the forwarding logic below ++ * might open channels that use the hpn buffer sizes. We can't send a ++ * window of -1 (the default) to the server as it breaks things. ++ */ ++ hpn_options_init(ssh); ++ + /* XXX should be pre-session */ + if (!options.control_persist) + ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); +@@ -2415,7 +2473,14 @@ + debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " + "confirmation received"); + } else +- fork_postauth(); ++ fork_postauth(ssh); ++ } else { ++ /* check to see if we are switching ciphers to ++ * one of our parallel versions. If the client is ++ * forking then we handle it in fork_postauth() ++ */ ++ if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) ++ cipher_switch(ssh); + } + + return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ? +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config 2025-06-14 10:53:02.024947608 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config 2025-06-14 11:01:39.412445292 +0200 +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ + # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com + # RekeyLimit 1G 1h + # UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k ++# UseMPTCP no + # + # This system is following system-wide crypto policy. + # To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a *.conf +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5 2025-06-14 10:53:02.025331736 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5 2025-06-14 10:54:01.339955855 +0200 +@@ -62,6 +62,19 @@ + .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config + .El + .Pp ++.Xr hpnssh 1 ++is fully compatible with OpenSSH's ssh and uses the same configuration format, directives, and options. ++.Xr hpnssh 1 ++can use the same configuration file as ++.Xr ssh 1 ++though the inverse is not necessarily true. This is because ++.Xr hpnssh 1 ++has some additional options which are discussed below. As such users should either not ++use ++.Xr hpnssh 1 ++specific directives in their default ssh_config files or ensure that they always use a ++custom config file. ++.Pp + Unless noted otherwise, for each parameter, the first obtained value + will be used. + The configuration files contain sections separated by +@@ -833,6 +846,9 @@ + or + .Cm no + (the default). ++.It Cm FallbackPort ++Specifies the port hpnssh should try to connect to if it fails connecting to the ++default hpnsshd port of 2222. The default is port 22. HPN-SSH only. + .It Cm FingerprintHash + Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. + Valid options are: +@@ -1159,6 +1175,11 @@ + .Cm Hostname + specifications). + The default is the name given on the command line. ++.It Cm HPNDisabled ++In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact ++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is ++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to ++.Cm no. HPNSSH only. + .It Cm IdentitiesOnly + Specifies that + .Xr ssh 1 +@@ -1547,6 +1568,63 @@ + .Pp + The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q mac . ++.It Cm Metrics ++Indicate that the ssh client should gather and write TCP stack metrics from the ++TCP_INFO socket structure on compliant operating systems to a text file. ++These metrics will be collected from both the local and remote hosts if metrics ++are supported by the version of SSH and TCP_INFO is supported by the ++operating system. Currently operating system support is limited to Linux ++version 3.7 and greater, NetBSD, and FreeBSD (version 6 or greater). ++ ++If one of the hosts does not support the Metrics option then only data ++from the the host that does will be reported. See the HPN-README file ++for more detail. ++ ++The argument to the keyword must be ++.Cm yes ++or ++.Cm no ++(the default). ++ ++See ++.Cm MetricsInterval ++and ++.Cm MetricsPath ++for more metrics options. ++.Cm HPNSSH only. ++.It Cm MetricsInterval ++The frequency, in seconds, with which the TCP_INFO struct will be polled. The ++default value is 5 seconds. ++ ++.Cm Metrics ++must be set to ++.Cm yes ++fot this option to have any effect. ++.Cm HPNSSH only. ++.It Cm MetricsPath ++The file path where ++.Cm Metrics ++should write the TCP stack metrics. ++ ++The default is ++.Sm off ++.Ar ./ssh_stack_metrics.local ++ and ++.Ar ./ssh_stack_metrics.remote ++.Sm on ++ ++The user may specify any other filepath and filename that they have write ++access to. E.g. MetricsPath=/tmp/my_metrics. The suffix of .local ++and .remote will be appended to this path. Files are ++.Cm not ++overwritten by subsequent metrics sessions. Instead, data from new sessions ++will be appended if the file already exists. ++ ++.Cm Metrics ++must be set to ++.Cm yes ++fot this option to have any effect. ++.Cm HPNSSH only. + .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost + Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses). + The argument to this keyword must be +@@ -1554,6 +1632,36 @@ + or + .Cm no + (the default). ++.It Cm NoneEnabled ++Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used ++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However, ++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted ++even if this option is enabled. Default is ++.Cm no. HPNSSH only. ++.It Cm NoneMacEnabled ++Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh ++will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use ++with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and ++protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication ++remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is ++.Cm no. HPNSSH only. ++.It Cm NoneSwitch ++Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after ++authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client ++and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE ++cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an ++error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly ++have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in ++interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to ++.Cm no ++by default. ++.Cm HPNSSH only. ++.Pp ++.Cm Note: ++this options cannot actualy be set in the ssh_config file. It must be ++set on the command line use -oNoneEnabled. This is to prevent it from being ++used accidentally. It is included here for completeness as neither NoneMacEnabled ++or NoneCipherEnabled have any effect without this option. + .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts + Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. + The argument to this keyword must be an integer. +@@ -2124,6 +2232,12 @@ + Specify a configuration tag name that may be later used by a + .Cm Match + directive to select a block of configuration. ++.It Cm TcpRcvBufPoll ++Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life ++of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled ++for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista). ++Default is ++.Cm yes. HPNSSH only. + .It Cm Tunnel + Request + .Xr tun 4 +@@ -2209,6 +2323,12 @@ + from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the + .Qq hostkeys@openssh.com + protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. ++.It Cm UseMPTCP ++If set to ++.Cm yes , ++this will enable Multipath TCP (MPTCP) instead of TCP (this only works on Linux). ++The default is ++.Cm no . + .It Cm User + Specifies the user to log in as. + This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. +@@ -2497,3 +2617,11 @@ + created OpenSSH. + .An Markus Friedl + contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. ++.An Chris Rapier, ++.An Michael Stevens, ++.An Ben Bennet, ++and ++.An Mike Tasota ++developed the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center ++with grants from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and ++the National Science Foundation. +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c 2025-06-14 10:53:02.025925109 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.340908632 +0200 +@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ + #include "utf8.h" + #include "ssh-sk.h" + #include "sk-api.h" ++#include "cipher-switch.h" + + #ifdef GSSAPI + #include "ssh-gss.h" +@@ -85,6 +86,13 @@ + extern Options options; + + /* ++ * tty_flag is set in ssh.c. Use this in ssh_userauth2: ++ * if it is set, then prevent the switch to the null cipher. ++ */ ++ ++extern int tty_flag; ++ ++/* + * SSH2 key exchange + */ + +@@ -574,6 +582,42 @@ + + if (!authctxt.success) + fatal("Authentication failed."); ++ ++ /* ++ * If the user wants to use the none cipher and/or none mac, do it post authentication ++ * and only if the right conditions are met -- both of the NONE commands ++ * must be true and there must be no tty allocated. ++ */ ++ if (options.none_switch == 1 && options.none_enabled == 1) { ++ char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; ++ char *s = NULL; ++ const char *none_cipher = "none"; ++ if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */ ++ debug("Requesting none rekeying..."); ++ kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, none_cipher, ++ options.macs, ++ compression_alg_list(options.compression), ++ options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER!!!\n"); ++ ++ /* NONEMAC can only be used in context of the NONE CIPHER */ ++ if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) { ++ const char *none_mac = "none"; ++ kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, none_cipher, ++ none_mac, ++ compression_alg_list(options.compression), ++ options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE MAC\n"); ++ } ++ kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal); ++ packet_request_rekeying(); ++ } else { ++ /* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */ ++ debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated"); ++ fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n"); ++ } ++ } ++ + if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { + verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect.c openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.488393170 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.341617244 +0200 +@@ -359,9 +359,14 @@ + #endif + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + +- sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); ++ if (options.use_mptcp) ++ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, IPPROTO_MPTCP); ++ else ++ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); + if (sock == -1) { + error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (options.use_mptcp) ++ error ("You asked to use MPTCP. Please ensure it is enabled."); + return -1; + } + (void)fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8 2025-06-14 10:53:02.026331727 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8 2025-06-14 10:54:01.342080852 +0200 +@@ -1079,3 +1079,7 @@ + protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. + Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support + for privilege separation. ++Chris Rapier, Michael Stevens, Ben Bennet, and Mike Tasota developed ++the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center with grants ++from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and the National Science ++Foundation. +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-auth.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd-auth.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-auth.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.779184668 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd-auth.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.342636371 +0200 +@@ -832,6 +832,25 @@ + struct kex *kex; + int r; + ++ /* this used to be in sshd.c when we read the configuration file ++ * but needed to be moved here as do_ssh2_kex in sshd-auth wasn't ++ * picking up the none options. CJR 4/10/2025 ++ */ ++ if (options.none_enabled == 1) { ++ debug("WARNING: None cipher enabled"); ++ char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers; ++ xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers); ++ free(old_ciphers); ++ ++ /* only enable the none MAC in context of the none cipher -cjr */ ++ if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) { ++ debug("WARNING: None MAC enabled"); ++ char *old_macs = options.macs; ++ xasprintf(&options.macs, "%s,none", old_macs); ++ free(old_macs); ++ } ++ } ++ + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.779446364 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.343195243 +0200 +@@ -822,6 +822,8 @@ + int ret, listen_sock; + struct addrinfo *ai; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; ++ int socksize; ++ int socksizelen = sizeof(int); + + for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) +@@ -837,11 +839,17 @@ + continue; + } + /* Create socket for listening. */ +- listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, +- ai->ai_protocol); ++ if (options.use_mptcp) ++ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ++ IPPROTO_MPTCP); ++ else ++ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ++ ai->ai_protocol); + if (listen_sock == -1) { + /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ + verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (options.use_mptcp) ++ verbose("MPTCP requested but may not be available."); + continue; + } + if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { +@@ -867,6 +875,10 @@ + + debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); + ++ getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, ++ &socksize, &socksizelen); ++ debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize); ++ + /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ + if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { + error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config 2025-06-14 10:53:02.026903728 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config 2025-06-14 11:00:18.384210561 +0200 +@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ + # SELinux about this change. + # semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER + # +-#Port 22 ++Port 2222 + #AddressFamily any + #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 + #ListenAddress :: +@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ + #PermitTunnel no + #ChrootDirectory none + #VersionAddendum none ++#UseMPTCP no + + # no default banner path + #Banner none +@@ -129,6 +130,19 @@ + # override default of no subsystems + Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server + ++# the following are HPN related configuration options ++# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels ++#TcpRcvBufPoll yes ++ ++# disable hpn performance boosts ++#HPNDisabled no ++ ++# allow the use of the none cipher ++#NoneEnabled no ++ ++# allow the use of the none MAC ++#NoneMacEnabled no ++ + # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis + #Match User anoncvs + # X11Forwarding no +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5 2025-06-14 10:53:02.027286949 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5 2025-06-14 10:54:01.344536060 +0200 +@@ -56,6 +56,16 @@ + .Pq \&" + in order to represent arguments containing spaces. + .Pp ++.Xr hpnsshd 8 ++is fully compatible with OpenSSH's sshd and uses the same configuration format, directives, and options. ++.Xr hpnsshd 8 ++can use the same configuration file as ++.Xr sshd 8 ++though the inverse is not necessarily true. This is because ++.Xr hpnssh 8 ++has some additional options which are discussed below. As such administrators should maintain ++seperate configuration files for each. ++.Pp + The possible + keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that + keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): +@@ -667,6 +677,10 @@ + TCP and StreamLocal. + This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may + simplify restricted configurations. ++.It Cm DisableMTAES ++Switch the encryption cipher being used from the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher ++back to the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher. Default is ++.Cm no. HPNSSH only. + .It Cm ExposeAuthInfo + Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and + public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. +@@ -944,6 +958,11 @@ + The default for this option is: + The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using + .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms . ++.It Cm HPNDisabled ++In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact ++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is ++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to ++.CM no. + .It Cm IgnoreRhosts + Specifies whether to ignore per-user + .Pa .rhosts +@@ -1467,6 +1486,19 @@ + key exchange methods. + The default is + .Pa /etc/moduli . ++.It Cm NoneEnabled ++Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used ++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However, ++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted ++even if this option is enabled. Default is ++.Cm no ++.It Cm NoneMacEnabled ++Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh ++will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use ++with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and ++protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication ++remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is ++.Cm no. + .It Cm PAMServiceName + Specifies the service name used for Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) + authentication, authorisation and session controls when +@@ -2035,6 +2067,13 @@ + .Pp + To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to + .Cm no . ++.IT Cm TcpRcvBufPoll ++Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer throughout the life ++of the connection. Make sure that this option is enabled for systems making ++use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista) in order to ++maximize throughput on high performance networks. ++Default is ++.Cm yes. + .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys + Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are + trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or +@@ -2095,6 +2134,12 @@ + .Cm Match + .Cm Host + directives. ++.It Cm UseMPTCP ++If set to ++.Cm yes , ++this will enable Multipath TCP (MPTCP) instead of TCP (this only works on Linux). ++The default is ++.Cm no . + .It Cm UsePAM + Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. + If set to +@@ -2333,3 +2378,11 @@ + and + .An Markus Friedl + contributed support for privilege separation. ++.An Chris Rapier, ++.An Michael Stevens, ++.An Ben Bennet, ++and ++.An Mike Tasota ++developed the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center ++with grants from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and ++the National Science Foundation. +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c 2025-06-14 10:53:02.028087821 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.345322405 +0200 +@@ -1164,6 +1164,20 @@ + } + endpwent(); + ++ /* get NONE options */ ++ if (options.none_enabled == 1) { ++ char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers; ++ xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers); ++ free(old_ciphers); ++ ++ /* only enable the none MAC in context of the none cipher -cjr */ ++ if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) { ++ char *old_macs = options.macs; ++ xasprintf(&options.macs, "%s,none", old_macs); ++ free(old_macs); ++ } ++ } ++ + if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag) { + if ((startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD)) == -1) + fatal("internal error: no startup pipe"); +@@ -1375,6 +1389,9 @@ + rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\""); + free(laddr); + ++ /* set the HPN options for the child */ ++ channel_set_hpn_disabled(options.hpn_disabled); ++ + /* + * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.h openssh-10.0p1/ssh.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.h 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.345905093 +0200 +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ + + /* Default port number. */ + #define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22 ++#define HPNSSH_DEFAULT_PORT 2222 + + /* + * Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified +@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ + * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the + * default port if present. + */ +-#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh" ++#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "hpnssh" + + /* + * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey.c openssh-10.0p1/sshkey.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey.c 2025-06-14 10:53:01.935152884 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshkey.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.346333152 +0200 +@@ -1775,7 +1775,8 @@ + stderr); + #endif + if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher), +- keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0) ++ keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0, ++ CIPHER_ENCRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */ +@@ -1910,7 +1911,8 @@ + keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher), +- keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0) ++ keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0, ++ CIPHER_DECRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0) + goto out; + #ifdef DEBUG_PK + fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__); +@@ -2965,6 +2967,13 @@ + kdfname = "none"; + } else if (ciphername == NULL) + ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; ++ /* ++ * NOTE: Without OpenSSL, this string comparison is still safe, even ++ * though it will never match because the multithreaded cipher is not ++ * enabled. ++ */ ++ else if (strcmp(ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") == 0) ++ ciphername = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"; + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; +@@ -3000,7 +3009,7 @@ + goto out; + } + if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, +- key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0) ++ key + keylen, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || +@@ -3187,6 +3196,8 @@ + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) + goto out; + ++ if (strcmp(ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") == 0) ++ strcpy(ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"); + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; +@@ -3242,7 +3253,7 @@ + /* decrypt private portion of key */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, +- key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0) ++ key + keylen, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded), + encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) { +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey-xmss.c openssh-10.0p1/sshkey-xmss.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey-xmss.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshkey-xmss.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.347175650 +0200 +@@ -903,9 +903,29 @@ + state->enc_keyiv == NULL || + state->enc_ciphername == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { +- r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- goto out; ++ /* ++ * chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com ++ * represent different implementations of the same cipher. For key ++ * encryption purposes, they're equivalent, and the multithreaded ++ * implementation is excessive. It can be assumed that references to the ++ * multithreaded implementation in this context are unintentional, so ++ * these checks should look for the serial implementation instead. ++ * ++ * Additionally, the following code is safe regardless of whether the ++ * multithreaded implementation is enabled, so no #ifdefs are necessary. ++ */ ++ if (strcmp(state->enc_ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") ++ == 0) { ++ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name("chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com")) ++ == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } else { ++ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } + } + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); +@@ -956,7 +976,7 @@ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, + encrypted_len + aadlen + authlen, &cp)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, +- iv, ivlen, 1)) != 0 || ++ iv, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encoded), + encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; +@@ -995,9 +1015,29 @@ + state->enc_keyiv == NULL || + state->enc_ciphername == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +- if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { +- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; +- goto out; ++ /* ++ * chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com ++ * represent different implementations of the same cipher. For key ++ * encryption purposes, they're equivalent, and the multithreaded ++ * implementation is excessive. It can be assumed that references to the ++ * multithreaded implementation in this context are unintentional, so ++ * these checks should look for the serial implementation instead. ++ * ++ * Additionally, the following code is safe regardless of whether the ++ * multithreaded implementation is enabled, so no #ifdefs are necessary. ++ */ ++ if (strcmp(state->enc_ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") ++ == 0) { ++ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name("chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com")) ++ == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } else { ++ if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; ++ goto out; ++ } + } + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); +@@ -1049,7 +1089,7 @@ + /* decrypt private state of key */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, aadlen + encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, +- iv, ivlen, 0)) != 0 || ++ iv, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(copy), + encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/umac.c openssh-10.0p1/umac.c +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/umac.c 2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/umac.c 2025-06-14 10:54:01.347637721 +0200 +@@ -134,15 +134,48 @@ + /* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */ + /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + ++ ++/* Using local statically defined versions of the get/put functions ++ * found in misc.c allows them to be inlined. This improves throughput ++ * performance by 10% to 15% on well connected (10Gb/s+) systems. ++ * Chris Rapier 2022-03-09 */ ++ ++static __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))) ++u_int32_t umac_get_u32_le(const void *vp) ++{ ++ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; ++ u_int32_t v; ++ ++ v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; ++ v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; ++ v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; ++ v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; ++ ++ return (v); ++} ++ ++#if 0 /* compile time warning thrown otherwise */ ++static __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); ++void umac_put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) ++{ ++ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; ++ ++ p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; ++ p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; ++ p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; ++ p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; ++} ++#endif ++ + #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) + #define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p) + #define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v) + #else +-#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p) +-#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v) ++#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) umac_get_u32_le(p) ++#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) umac_put_u32_le(p,v) + #endif + +-#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p)) ++#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (umac_get_u32_le(p)) + #define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v) + + /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/uthash.h openssh-10.0p1/uthash.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/uthash.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/uthash.h 2025-06-14 10:54:01.348457241 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,1140 @@ ++/* ++Copyright (c) 2003-2022, Troy D. Hanson https://troydhanson.github.io/uthash/ ++All rights reserved. ++ ++Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: ++ ++ * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ ++THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS ++IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED ++TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A ++PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER ++OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, ++EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ++PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR ++PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF ++LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING ++NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS ++SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++*/ ++ ++#ifndef UTHASH_H ++#define UTHASH_H ++ ++#define UTHASH_VERSION 2.3.0 ++ ++#include /* memcmp, memset, strlen */ ++#include /* ptrdiff_t */ ++#include /* exit */ ++ ++#if defined(HASH_DEFINE_OWN_STDINT) && HASH_DEFINE_OWN_STDINT ++/* This codepath is provided for backward compatibility, but I plan to remove it. */ ++#warning "HASH_DEFINE_OWN_STDINT is deprecated; please use HASH_NO_STDINT instead" ++typedef unsigned int uint32_t; ++typedef unsigned char uint8_t; ++#elif defined(HASH_NO_STDINT) && HASH_NO_STDINT ++#else ++#include /* uint8_t, uint32_t */ ++#endif ++ ++/* These macros use decltype or the earlier __typeof GNU extension. ++ As decltype is only available in newer compilers (VS2010 or gcc 4.3+ ++ when compiling c++ source) this code uses whatever method is needed ++ or, for VS2008 where neither is available, uses casting workarounds. */ ++#if !defined(DECLTYPE) && !defined(NO_DECLTYPE) ++#if defined(_MSC_VER) /* MS compiler */ ++#if _MSC_VER >= 1600 && defined(__cplusplus) /* VS2010 or newer in C++ mode */ ++#define DECLTYPE(x) (decltype(x)) ++#else /* VS2008 or older (or VS2010 in C mode) */ ++#define NO_DECLTYPE ++#endif ++#elif defined(__MCST__) /* Elbrus C Compiler */ ++#define DECLTYPE(x) (__typeof(x)) ++#elif defined(__BORLANDC__) || defined(__ICCARM__) || defined(__LCC__) || defined(__WATCOMC__) ++#define NO_DECLTYPE ++#else /* GNU, Sun and other compilers */ ++#define DECLTYPE(x) (__typeof(x)) ++#endif ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE ++#define DECLTYPE(x) ++#define DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst,src) \ ++do { \ ++ char **_da_dst = (char**)(&(dst)); \ ++ *_da_dst = (char*)(src); \ ++} while (0) ++#else ++#define DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst,src) \ ++do { \ ++ (dst) = DECLTYPE(dst)(src); \ ++} while (0) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef uthash_malloc ++#define uthash_malloc(sz) malloc(sz) /* malloc fcn */ ++#endif ++#ifndef uthash_free ++#define uthash_free(ptr,sz) free(ptr) /* free fcn */ ++#endif ++#ifndef uthash_bzero ++#define uthash_bzero(a,n) memset(a,'\0',n) ++#endif ++#ifndef uthash_strlen ++#define uthash_strlen(s) strlen(s) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef HASH_FUNCTION ++#define HASH_FUNCTION(keyptr,keylen,hashv) HASH_JEN(keyptr, keylen, hashv) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef HASH_KEYCMP ++#define HASH_KEYCMP(a,b,n) memcmp(a,b,n) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef uthash_noexpand_fyi ++#define uthash_noexpand_fyi(tbl) /* can be defined to log noexpand */ ++#endif ++#ifndef uthash_expand_fyi ++#define uthash_expand_fyi(tbl) /* can be defined to log expands */ ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef HASH_NONFATAL_OOM ++#define HASH_NONFATAL_OOM 0 ++#endif ++ ++#if HASH_NONFATAL_OOM ++/* malloc failures can be recovered from */ ++ ++#ifndef uthash_nonfatal_oom ++#define uthash_nonfatal_oom(obj) do {} while (0) /* non-fatal OOM error */ ++#endif ++ ++#define HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed) do { (oomed) = 1; } while (0) ++#define IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(x) x ++ ++#else ++/* malloc failures result in lost memory, hash tables are unusable */ ++ ++#ifndef uthash_fatal ++#define uthash_fatal(msg) exit(-1) /* fatal OOM error */ ++#endif ++ ++#define HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed) uthash_fatal("out of memory") ++#define IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(x) ++ ++#endif ++ ++/* initial number of buckets */ ++#define HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS 32U /* initial number of buckets */ ++#define HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS_LOG2 5U /* lg2 of initial number of buckets */ ++#define HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH 10U /* expand when bucket count reaches */ ++ ++/* calculate the element whose hash handle address is hhp */ ++#define ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl,hhp) ((void*)(((char*)(hhp)) - ((tbl)->hho))) ++/* calculate the hash handle from element address elp */ ++#define HH_FROM_ELMT(tbl,elp) ((UT_hash_handle*)(void*)(((char*)(elp)) + ((tbl)->hho))) ++ ++#define HASH_ROLLBACK_BKT(hh, head, itemptrhh) \ ++do { \ ++ struct UT_hash_handle *_hd_hh_item = (itemptrhh); \ ++ unsigned _hd_bkt; \ ++ HASH_TO_BKT(_hd_hh_item->hashv, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hd_bkt); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_hd_bkt].count++; \ ++ _hd_hh_item->hh_next = NULL; \ ++ _hd_hh_item->hh_prev = NULL; \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_VALUE(keyptr,keylen,hashv) \ ++do { \ ++ HASH_FUNCTION(keyptr, keylen, hashv); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen,hashval,out) \ ++do { \ ++ (out) = NULL; \ ++ if (head) { \ ++ unsigned _hf_bkt; \ ++ HASH_TO_BKT(hashval, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hf_bkt); \ ++ if (HASH_BLOOM_TEST((head)->hh.tbl, hashval) != 0) { \ ++ HASH_FIND_IN_BKT((head)->hh.tbl, hh, (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[ _hf_bkt ], keyptr, keylen, hashval, out); \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_FIND(hh,head,keyptr,keylen,out) \ ++do { \ ++ (out) = NULL; \ ++ if (head) { \ ++ unsigned _hf_hashv; \ ++ HASH_VALUE(keyptr, keylen, _hf_hashv); \ ++ HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen, _hf_hashv, out); \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#ifdef HASH_BLOOM ++#define HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN (1UL << HASH_BLOOM) ++#define HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN (HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN/8UL) + (((HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN%8UL)!=0UL) ? 1UL : 0UL) ++#define HASH_BLOOM_MAKE(tbl,oomed) \ ++do { \ ++ (tbl)->bloom_nbits = HASH_BLOOM; \ ++ (tbl)->bloom_bv = (uint8_t*)uthash_malloc(HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN); \ ++ if (!(tbl)->bloom_bv) { \ ++ HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed); \ ++ } else { \ ++ uthash_bzero((tbl)->bloom_bv, HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN); \ ++ (tbl)->bloom_sig = HASH_BLOOM_SIGNATURE; \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_BLOOM_FREE(tbl) \ ++do { \ ++ uthash_free((tbl)->bloom_bv, HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_BLOOM_BITSET(bv,idx) (bv[(idx)/8U] |= (1U << ((idx)%8U))) ++#define HASH_BLOOM_BITTEST(bv,idx) (bv[(idx)/8U] & (1U << ((idx)%8U))) ++ ++#define HASH_BLOOM_ADD(tbl,hashv) \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_BITSET((tbl)->bloom_bv, ((hashv) & (uint32_t)((1UL << (tbl)->bloom_nbits) - 1U))) ++ ++#define HASH_BLOOM_TEST(tbl,hashv) \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_BITTEST((tbl)->bloom_bv, ((hashv) & (uint32_t)((1UL << (tbl)->bloom_nbits) - 1U))) ++ ++#else ++#define HASH_BLOOM_MAKE(tbl,oomed) ++#define HASH_BLOOM_FREE(tbl) ++#define HASH_BLOOM_ADD(tbl,hashv) ++#define HASH_BLOOM_TEST(tbl,hashv) (1) ++#define HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN 0U ++#endif ++ ++#define HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh,head,oomed) \ ++do { \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl = (UT_hash_table*)uthash_malloc(sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \ ++ if (!(head)->hh.tbl) { \ ++ HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed); \ ++ } else { \ ++ uthash_bzero((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->tail = &((head)->hh); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets = HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS; \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->log2_num_buckets = HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS_LOG2; \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->hho = (char*)(&(head)->hh) - (char*)(head); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->buckets = (UT_hash_bucket*)uthash_malloc( \ ++ HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->signature = HASH_SIGNATURE; \ ++ if (!(head)->hh.tbl->buckets) { \ ++ HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed); \ ++ uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \ ++ } else { \ ++ uthash_bzero((head)->hh.tbl->buckets, \ ++ HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_MAKE((head)->hh.tbl, oomed); \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( \ ++ if (oomed) { \ ++ uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets, \ ++ HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \ ++ uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \ ++ } \ ++ ) \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add,replaced,cmpfcn) \ ++do { \ ++ (replaced) = NULL; \ ++ HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, replaced); \ ++ if (replaced) { \ ++ HASH_DELETE(hh, head, replaced); \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add, cmpfcn); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add,replaced) \ ++do { \ ++ (replaced) = NULL; \ ++ HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, replaced); \ ++ if (replaced) { \ ++ HASH_DELETE(hh, head, replaced); \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add,replaced) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _hr_hashv; \ ++ HASH_VALUE(&((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, _hr_hashv); \ ++ HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, fieldname, keylen_in, _hr_hashv, add, replaced); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_REPLACE_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add,replaced,cmpfcn) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _hr_hashv; \ ++ HASH_VALUE(&((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, _hr_hashv); \ ++ HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, fieldname, keylen_in, _hr_hashv, add, replaced, cmpfcn); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_APPEND_LIST(hh, head, add) \ ++do { \ ++ (add)->hh.next = NULL; \ ++ (add)->hh.prev = ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, (head)->hh.tbl->tail); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->tail->next = (add); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->tail = &((add)->hh); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP(hh,head,add,cmpfcn) \ ++do { \ ++ do { \ ++ if (cmpfcn(DECLTYPE(head)(_hs_iter), add) > 0) { \ ++ break; \ ++ } \ ++ } while ((_hs_iter = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->next)); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE ++#undef HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP ++#define HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP(hh,head,add,cmpfcn) \ ++do { \ ++ char *_hs_saved_head = (char*)(head); \ ++ do { \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hs_iter); \ ++ if (cmpfcn(head, add) > 0) { \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hs_saved_head); \ ++ break; \ ++ } \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hs_saved_head); \ ++ } while ((_hs_iter = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->next)); \ ++} while (0) ++#endif ++ ++#if HASH_NONFATAL_OOM ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add,oomed) \ ++do { \ ++ if (!(oomed)) { \ ++ unsigned _ha_bkt; \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->num_items++; \ ++ HASH_TO_BKT(hashval, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _ha_bkt); \ ++ HASH_ADD_TO_BKT((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_ha_bkt], hh, &(add)->hh, oomed); \ ++ if (oomed) { \ ++ HASH_ROLLBACK_BKT(hh, head, &(add)->hh); \ ++ HASH_DELETE_HH(hh, head, &(add)->hh); \ ++ (add)->hh.tbl = NULL; \ ++ uthash_nonfatal_oom(add); \ ++ } else { \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_ADD((head)->hh.tbl, hashval); \ ++ HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in); \ ++ } \ ++ } else { \ ++ (add)->hh.tbl = NULL; \ ++ uthash_nonfatal_oom(add); \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#else ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add,oomed) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _ha_bkt; \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->num_items++; \ ++ HASH_TO_BKT(hashval, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _ha_bkt); \ ++ HASH_ADD_TO_BKT((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_ha_bkt], hh, &(add)->hh, oomed); \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_ADD((head)->hh.tbl, hashval); \ ++ HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#endif ++ ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add,cmpfcn) \ ++do { \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( int _ha_oomed = 0; ) \ ++ (add)->hh.hashv = (hashval); \ ++ (add)->hh.key = (char*) (keyptr); \ ++ (add)->hh.keylen = (unsigned) (keylen_in); \ ++ if (!(head)) { \ ++ (add)->hh.next = NULL; \ ++ (add)->hh.prev = NULL; \ ++ HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh, add, _ha_oomed); \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( if (!_ha_oomed) { ) \ ++ (head) = (add); \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( } ) \ ++ } else { \ ++ void *_hs_iter = (head); \ ++ (add)->hh.tbl = (head)->hh.tbl; \ ++ HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP(hh, head, add, cmpfcn); \ ++ if (_hs_iter) { \ ++ (add)->hh.next = _hs_iter; \ ++ if (((add)->hh.prev = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->prev)) { \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, (add)->hh.prev)->next = (add); \ ++ } else { \ ++ (head) = (add); \ ++ } \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->prev = (add); \ ++ } else { \ ++ HASH_APPEND_LIST(hh, head, add); \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, hashval, add, _ha_oomed); \ ++ HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER"); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_INORDER(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,add,cmpfcn) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _hs_hashv; \ ++ HASH_VALUE(keyptr, keylen_in, _hs_hashv); \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, _hs_hashv, add, cmpfcn); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add,cmpfcn) \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add, cmpfcn) ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add,cmpfcn) \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_INORDER(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, add, cmpfcn) ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add) \ ++do { \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( int _ha_oomed = 0; ) \ ++ (add)->hh.hashv = (hashval); \ ++ (add)->hh.key = (const void*) (keyptr); \ ++ (add)->hh.keylen = (unsigned) (keylen_in); \ ++ if (!(head)) { \ ++ (add)->hh.next = NULL; \ ++ (add)->hh.prev = NULL; \ ++ HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh, add, _ha_oomed); \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( if (!_ha_oomed) { ) \ ++ (head) = (add); \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( } ) \ ++ } else { \ ++ (add)->hh.tbl = (head)->hh.tbl; \ ++ HASH_APPEND_LIST(hh, head, add); \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, hashval, add, _ha_oomed); \ ++ HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE"); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,add) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _ha_hashv; \ ++ HASH_VALUE(keyptr, keylen_in, _ha_hashv); \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, _ha_hashv, add); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_ADD_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add) \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add) ++ ++#define HASH_ADD(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add) \ ++ HASH_ADD_KEYPTR(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, add) ++ ++#define HASH_TO_BKT(hashv,num_bkts,bkt) \ ++do { \ ++ bkt = ((hashv) & ((num_bkts) - 1U)); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* delete "delptr" from the hash table. ++ * "the usual" patch-up process for the app-order doubly-linked-list. ++ * The use of _hd_hh_del below deserves special explanation. ++ * These used to be expressed using (delptr) but that led to a bug ++ * if someone used the same symbol for the head and deletee, like ++ * HASH_DELETE(hh,users,users); ++ * We want that to work, but by changing the head (users) below ++ * we were forfeiting our ability to further refer to the deletee (users) ++ * in the patch-up process. Solution: use scratch space to ++ * copy the deletee pointer, then the latter references are via that ++ * scratch pointer rather than through the repointed (users) symbol. ++ */ ++#define HASH_DELETE(hh,head,delptr) \ ++ HASH_DELETE_HH(hh, head, &(delptr)->hh) ++ ++#define HASH_DELETE_HH(hh,head,delptrhh) \ ++do { \ ++ const struct UT_hash_handle *_hd_hh_del = (delptrhh); \ ++ if ((_hd_hh_del->prev == NULL) && (_hd_hh_del->next == NULL)) { \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_FREE((head)->hh.tbl); \ ++ uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets, \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \ ++ uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \ ++ (head) = NULL; \ ++ } else { \ ++ unsigned _hd_bkt; \ ++ if (_hd_hh_del == (head)->hh.tbl->tail) { \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->tail = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hd_hh_del->prev); \ ++ } \ ++ if (_hd_hh_del->prev != NULL) { \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hd_hh_del->prev)->next = _hd_hh_del->next; \ ++ } else { \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hd_hh_del->next); \ ++ } \ ++ if (_hd_hh_del->next != NULL) { \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hd_hh_del->next)->prev = _hd_hh_del->prev; \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_TO_BKT(_hd_hh_del->hashv, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hd_bkt); \ ++ HASH_DEL_IN_BKT((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_hd_bkt], _hd_hh_del); \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->num_items--; \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_DELETE_HH"); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* convenience forms of HASH_FIND/HASH_ADD/HASH_DEL */ ++#define HASH_FIND_STR(head,findstr,out) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _uthash_hfstr_keylen = (unsigned)uthash_strlen(findstr); \ ++ HASH_FIND(hh, head, findstr, _uthash_hfstr_keylen, out); \ ++} while (0) ++#define HASH_ADD_STR(head,strfield,add) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _uthash_hastr_keylen = (unsigned)uthash_strlen((add)->strfield); \ ++ HASH_ADD(hh, head, strfield[0], _uthash_hastr_keylen, add); \ ++} while (0) ++#define HASH_REPLACE_STR(head,strfield,add,replaced) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _uthash_hrstr_keylen = (unsigned)uthash_strlen((add)->strfield); \ ++ HASH_REPLACE(hh, head, strfield[0], _uthash_hrstr_keylen, add, replaced); \ ++} while (0) ++#define HASH_FIND_INT(head,findint,out) \ ++ HASH_FIND(hh,head,findint,sizeof(int),out) ++#define HASH_ADD_INT(head,intfield,add) \ ++ HASH_ADD(hh,head,intfield,sizeof(int),add) ++#define HASH_REPLACE_INT(head,intfield,add,replaced) \ ++ HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,intfield,sizeof(int),add,replaced) ++#define HASH_FIND_PTR(head,findptr,out) \ ++ HASH_FIND(hh,head,findptr,sizeof(void *),out) ++#define HASH_ADD_PTR(head,ptrfield,add) \ ++ HASH_ADD(hh,head,ptrfield,sizeof(void *),add) ++#define HASH_REPLACE_PTR(head,ptrfield,add,replaced) \ ++ HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,ptrfield,sizeof(void *),add,replaced) ++#define HASH_DEL(head,delptr) \ ++ HASH_DELETE(hh,head,delptr) ++ ++/* HASH_FSCK checks hash integrity on every add/delete when HASH_DEBUG is defined. ++ * This is for uthash developer only; it compiles away if HASH_DEBUG isn't defined. ++ */ ++#ifdef HASH_DEBUG ++#include /* fprintf, stderr */ ++#define HASH_OOPS(...) do { fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__); exit(-1); } while (0) ++#define HASH_FSCK(hh,head,where) \ ++do { \ ++ struct UT_hash_handle *_thh; \ ++ if (head) { \ ++ unsigned _bkt_i; \ ++ unsigned _count = 0; \ ++ char *_prev; \ ++ for (_bkt_i = 0; _bkt_i < (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets; ++_bkt_i) { \ ++ unsigned _bkt_count = 0; \ ++ _thh = (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].hh_head; \ ++ _prev = NULL; \ ++ while (_thh) { \ ++ if (_prev != (char*)(_thh->hh_prev)) { \ ++ HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid hh_prev %p, actual %p\n", \ ++ (where), (void*)_thh->hh_prev, (void*)_prev); \ ++ } \ ++ _bkt_count++; \ ++ _prev = (char*)(_thh); \ ++ _thh = _thh->hh_next; \ ++ } \ ++ _count += _bkt_count; \ ++ if ((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].count != _bkt_count) { \ ++ HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid bucket count %u, actual %u\n", \ ++ (where), (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].count, _bkt_count); \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ if (_count != (head)->hh.tbl->num_items) { \ ++ HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid hh item count %u, actual %u\n", \ ++ (where), (head)->hh.tbl->num_items, _count); \ ++ } \ ++ _count = 0; \ ++ _prev = NULL; \ ++ _thh = &(head)->hh; \ ++ while (_thh) { \ ++ _count++; \ ++ if (_prev != (char*)_thh->prev) { \ ++ HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid prev %p, actual %p\n", \ ++ (where), (void*)_thh->prev, (void*)_prev); \ ++ } \ ++ _prev = (char*)ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _thh); \ ++ _thh = (_thh->next ? HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _thh->next) : NULL); \ ++ } \ ++ if (_count != (head)->hh.tbl->num_items) { \ ++ HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid app item count %u, actual %u\n", \ ++ (where), (head)->hh.tbl->num_items, _count); \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++#else ++#define HASH_FSCK(hh,head,where) ++#endif ++ ++/* When compiled with -DHASH_EMIT_KEYS, length-prefixed keys are emitted to ++ * the descriptor to which this macro is defined for tuning the hash function. ++ * The app can #include to get the prototype for write(2). */ ++#ifdef HASH_EMIT_KEYS ++#define HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh,head,keyptr,fieldlen) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _klen = fieldlen; \ ++ write(HASH_EMIT_KEYS, &_klen, sizeof(_klen)); \ ++ write(HASH_EMIT_KEYS, keyptr, (unsigned long)fieldlen); \ ++} while (0) ++#else ++#define HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh,head,keyptr,fieldlen) ++#endif ++ ++/* The Bernstein hash function, used in Perl prior to v5.6. Note (x<<5+x)=x*33. */ ++#define HASH_BER(key,keylen,hashv) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _hb_keylen = (unsigned)keylen; \ ++ const unsigned char *_hb_key = (const unsigned char*)(key); \ ++ (hashv) = 0; \ ++ while (_hb_keylen-- != 0U) { \ ++ (hashv) = (((hashv) << 5) + (hashv)) + *_hb_key++; \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++ ++/* SAX/FNV/OAT/JEN hash functions are macro variants of those listed at ++ * http://eternallyconfuzzled.com/tuts/algorithms/jsw_tut_hashing.aspx ++ * (archive link: https://archive.is/Ivcan ) ++ */ ++#define HASH_SAX(key,keylen,hashv) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _sx_i; \ ++ const unsigned char *_hs_key = (const unsigned char*)(key); \ ++ hashv = 0; \ ++ for (_sx_i=0; _sx_i < keylen; _sx_i++) { \ ++ hashv ^= (hashv << 5) + (hashv >> 2) + _hs_key[_sx_i]; \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++/* FNV-1a variation */ ++#define HASH_FNV(key,keylen,hashv) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _fn_i; \ ++ const unsigned char *_hf_key = (const unsigned char*)(key); \ ++ (hashv) = 2166136261U; \ ++ for (_fn_i=0; _fn_i < keylen; _fn_i++) { \ ++ hashv = hashv ^ _hf_key[_fn_i]; \ ++ hashv = hashv * 16777619U; \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_OAT(key,keylen,hashv) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _ho_i; \ ++ const unsigned char *_ho_key=(const unsigned char*)(key); \ ++ hashv = 0; \ ++ for(_ho_i=0; _ho_i < keylen; _ho_i++) { \ ++ hashv += _ho_key[_ho_i]; \ ++ hashv += (hashv << 10); \ ++ hashv ^= (hashv >> 6); \ ++ } \ ++ hashv += (hashv << 3); \ ++ hashv ^= (hashv >> 11); \ ++ hashv += (hashv << 15); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_JEN_MIX(a,b,c) \ ++do { \ ++ a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 13 ); \ ++ b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 8 ); \ ++ c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 13 ); \ ++ a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 12 ); \ ++ b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 16 ); \ ++ c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 5 ); \ ++ a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 3 ); \ ++ b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 10 ); \ ++ c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 15 ); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_JEN(key,keylen,hashv) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _hj_i,_hj_j,_hj_k; \ ++ unsigned const char *_hj_key=(unsigned const char*)(key); \ ++ hashv = 0xfeedbeefu; \ ++ _hj_i = _hj_j = 0x9e3779b9u; \ ++ _hj_k = (unsigned)(keylen); \ ++ while (_hj_k >= 12U) { \ ++ _hj_i += (_hj_key[0] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[1] << 8 ) \ ++ + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[2] << 16 ) \ ++ + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[3] << 24 ) ); \ ++ _hj_j += (_hj_key[4] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[5] << 8 ) \ ++ + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[6] << 16 ) \ ++ + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[7] << 24 ) ); \ ++ hashv += (_hj_key[8] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[9] << 8 ) \ ++ + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[10] << 16 ) \ ++ + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[11] << 24 ) ); \ ++ \ ++ HASH_JEN_MIX(_hj_i, _hj_j, hashv); \ ++ \ ++ _hj_key += 12; \ ++ _hj_k -= 12U; \ ++ } \ ++ hashv += (unsigned)(keylen); \ ++ switch ( _hj_k ) { \ ++ case 11: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[10] << 24 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 10: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[9] << 16 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 9: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[8] << 8 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 8: _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[7] << 24 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 7: _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[6] << 16 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 6: _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[5] << 8 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 5: _hj_j += _hj_key[4]; /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 4: _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[3] << 24 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 3: _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[2] << 16 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 2: _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[1] << 8 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ case 1: _hj_i += _hj_key[0]; /* FALLTHROUGH */ \ ++ default: ; \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_JEN_MIX(_hj_i, _hj_j, hashv); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* The Paul Hsieh hash function */ ++#undef get16bits ++#if (defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) \ ++ || defined(_MSC_VER) || defined (__BORLANDC__) || defined (__TURBOC__) ++#define get16bits(d) (*((const uint16_t *) (d))) ++#endif ++ ++#if !defined (get16bits) ++#define get16bits(d) ((((uint32_t)(((const uint8_t *)(d))[1])) << 8) \ ++ +(uint32_t)(((const uint8_t *)(d))[0]) ) ++#endif ++#define HASH_SFH(key,keylen,hashv) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned const char *_sfh_key=(unsigned const char*)(key); \ ++ uint32_t _sfh_tmp, _sfh_len = (uint32_t)keylen; \ ++ \ ++ unsigned _sfh_rem = _sfh_len & 3U; \ ++ _sfh_len >>= 2; \ ++ hashv = 0xcafebabeu; \ ++ \ ++ /* Main loop */ \ ++ for (;_sfh_len > 0U; _sfh_len--) { \ ++ hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key); \ ++ _sfh_tmp = ((uint32_t)(get16bits (_sfh_key+2)) << 11) ^ hashv; \ ++ hashv = (hashv << 16) ^ _sfh_tmp; \ ++ _sfh_key += 2U*sizeof (uint16_t); \ ++ hashv += hashv >> 11; \ ++ } \ ++ \ ++ /* Handle end cases */ \ ++ switch (_sfh_rem) { \ ++ case 3: hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key); \ ++ hashv ^= hashv << 16; \ ++ hashv ^= (uint32_t)(_sfh_key[sizeof (uint16_t)]) << 18; \ ++ hashv += hashv >> 11; \ ++ break; \ ++ case 2: hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key); \ ++ hashv ^= hashv << 11; \ ++ hashv += hashv >> 17; \ ++ break; \ ++ case 1: hashv += *_sfh_key; \ ++ hashv ^= hashv << 10; \ ++ hashv += hashv >> 1; \ ++ break; \ ++ default: ; \ ++ } \ ++ \ ++ /* Force "avalanching" of final 127 bits */ \ ++ hashv ^= hashv << 3; \ ++ hashv += hashv >> 5; \ ++ hashv ^= hashv << 4; \ ++ hashv += hashv >> 17; \ ++ hashv ^= hashv << 25; \ ++ hashv += hashv >> 6; \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* iterate over items in a known bucket to find desired item */ ++#define HASH_FIND_IN_BKT(tbl,hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,out) \ ++do { \ ++ if ((head).hh_head != NULL) { \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(out, ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl, (head).hh_head)); \ ++ } else { \ ++ (out) = NULL; \ ++ } \ ++ while ((out) != NULL) { \ ++ if ((out)->hh.hashv == (hashval) && (out)->hh.keylen == (keylen_in)) { \ ++ if (HASH_KEYCMP((out)->hh.key, keyptr, keylen_in) == 0) { \ ++ break; \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ if ((out)->hh.hh_next != NULL) { \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(out, ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl, (out)->hh.hh_next)); \ ++ } else { \ ++ (out) = NULL; \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* add an item to a bucket */ ++#define HASH_ADD_TO_BKT(head,hh,addhh,oomed) \ ++do { \ ++ UT_hash_bucket *_ha_head = &(head); \ ++ _ha_head->count++; \ ++ (addhh)->hh_next = _ha_head->hh_head; \ ++ (addhh)->hh_prev = NULL; \ ++ if (_ha_head->hh_head != NULL) { \ ++ _ha_head->hh_head->hh_prev = (addhh); \ ++ } \ ++ _ha_head->hh_head = (addhh); \ ++ if ((_ha_head->count >= ((_ha_head->expand_mult + 1U) * HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH)) \ ++ && !(addhh)->tbl->noexpand) { \ ++ HASH_EXPAND_BUCKETS(addhh,(addhh)->tbl, oomed); \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( \ ++ if (oomed) { \ ++ HASH_DEL_IN_BKT(head,addhh); \ ++ } \ ++ ) \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* remove an item from a given bucket */ ++#define HASH_DEL_IN_BKT(head,delhh) \ ++do { \ ++ UT_hash_bucket *_hd_head = &(head); \ ++ _hd_head->count--; \ ++ if (_hd_head->hh_head == (delhh)) { \ ++ _hd_head->hh_head = (delhh)->hh_next; \ ++ } \ ++ if ((delhh)->hh_prev) { \ ++ (delhh)->hh_prev->hh_next = (delhh)->hh_next; \ ++ } \ ++ if ((delhh)->hh_next) { \ ++ (delhh)->hh_next->hh_prev = (delhh)->hh_prev; \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* Bucket expansion has the effect of doubling the number of buckets ++ * and redistributing the items into the new buckets. Ideally the ++ * items will distribute more or less evenly into the new buckets ++ * (the extent to which this is true is a measure of the quality of ++ * the hash function as it applies to the key domain). ++ * ++ * With the items distributed into more buckets, the chain length ++ * (item count) in each bucket is reduced. Thus by expanding buckets ++ * the hash keeps a bound on the chain length. This bounded chain ++ * length is the essence of how a hash provides constant time lookup. ++ * ++ * The calculation of tbl->ideal_chain_maxlen below deserves some ++ * explanation. First, keep in mind that we're calculating the ideal ++ * maximum chain length based on the *new* (doubled) bucket count. ++ * In fractions this is just n/b (n=number of items,b=new num buckets). ++ * Since the ideal chain length is an integer, we want to calculate ++ * ceil(n/b). We don't depend on floating point arithmetic in this ++ * hash, so to calculate ceil(n/b) with integers we could write ++ * ++ * ceil(n/b) = (n/b) + ((n%b)?1:0) ++ * ++ * and in fact a previous version of this hash did just that. ++ * But now we have improved things a bit by recognizing that b is ++ * always a power of two. We keep its base 2 log handy (call it lb), ++ * so now we can write this with a bit shift and logical AND: ++ * ++ * ceil(n/b) = (n>>lb) + ( (n & (b-1)) ? 1:0) ++ * ++ */ ++#define HASH_EXPAND_BUCKETS(hh,tbl,oomed) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _he_bkt; \ ++ unsigned _he_bkt_i; \ ++ struct UT_hash_handle *_he_thh, *_he_hh_nxt; \ ++ UT_hash_bucket *_he_new_buckets, *_he_newbkt; \ ++ _he_new_buckets = (UT_hash_bucket*)uthash_malloc( \ ++ sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket) * (tbl)->num_buckets * 2U); \ ++ if (!_he_new_buckets) { \ ++ HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed); \ ++ } else { \ ++ uthash_bzero(_he_new_buckets, \ ++ sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket) * (tbl)->num_buckets * 2U); \ ++ (tbl)->ideal_chain_maxlen = \ ++ ((tbl)->num_items >> ((tbl)->log2_num_buckets+1U)) + \ ++ ((((tbl)->num_items & (((tbl)->num_buckets*2U)-1U)) != 0U) ? 1U : 0U); \ ++ (tbl)->nonideal_items = 0; \ ++ for (_he_bkt_i = 0; _he_bkt_i < (tbl)->num_buckets; _he_bkt_i++) { \ ++ _he_thh = (tbl)->buckets[ _he_bkt_i ].hh_head; \ ++ while (_he_thh != NULL) { \ ++ _he_hh_nxt = _he_thh->hh_next; \ ++ HASH_TO_BKT(_he_thh->hashv, (tbl)->num_buckets * 2U, _he_bkt); \ ++ _he_newbkt = &(_he_new_buckets[_he_bkt]); \ ++ if (++(_he_newbkt->count) > (tbl)->ideal_chain_maxlen) { \ ++ (tbl)->nonideal_items++; \ ++ if (_he_newbkt->count > _he_newbkt->expand_mult * (tbl)->ideal_chain_maxlen) { \ ++ _he_newbkt->expand_mult++; \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ _he_thh->hh_prev = NULL; \ ++ _he_thh->hh_next = _he_newbkt->hh_head; \ ++ if (_he_newbkt->hh_head != NULL) { \ ++ _he_newbkt->hh_head->hh_prev = _he_thh; \ ++ } \ ++ _he_newbkt->hh_head = _he_thh; \ ++ _he_thh = _he_hh_nxt; \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ uthash_free((tbl)->buckets, (tbl)->num_buckets * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \ ++ (tbl)->num_buckets *= 2U; \ ++ (tbl)->log2_num_buckets++; \ ++ (tbl)->buckets = _he_new_buckets; \ ++ (tbl)->ineff_expands = ((tbl)->nonideal_items > ((tbl)->num_items >> 1)) ? \ ++ ((tbl)->ineff_expands+1U) : 0U; \ ++ if ((tbl)->ineff_expands > 1U) { \ ++ (tbl)->noexpand = 1; \ ++ uthash_noexpand_fyi(tbl); \ ++ } \ ++ uthash_expand_fyi(tbl); \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++ ++/* This is an adaptation of Simon Tatham's O(n log(n)) mergesort */ ++/* Note that HASH_SORT assumes the hash handle name to be hh. ++ * HASH_SRT was added to allow the hash handle name to be passed in. */ ++#define HASH_SORT(head,cmpfcn) HASH_SRT(hh,head,cmpfcn) ++#define HASH_SRT(hh,head,cmpfcn) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _hs_i; \ ++ unsigned _hs_looping,_hs_nmerges,_hs_insize,_hs_psize,_hs_qsize; \ ++ struct UT_hash_handle *_hs_p, *_hs_q, *_hs_e, *_hs_list, *_hs_tail; \ ++ if (head != NULL) { \ ++ _hs_insize = 1; \ ++ _hs_looping = 1; \ ++ _hs_list = &((head)->hh); \ ++ while (_hs_looping != 0U) { \ ++ _hs_p = _hs_list; \ ++ _hs_list = NULL; \ ++ _hs_tail = NULL; \ ++ _hs_nmerges = 0; \ ++ while (_hs_p != NULL) { \ ++ _hs_nmerges++; \ ++ _hs_q = _hs_p; \ ++ _hs_psize = 0; \ ++ for (_hs_i = 0; _hs_i < _hs_insize; ++_hs_i) { \ ++ _hs_psize++; \ ++ _hs_q = ((_hs_q->next != NULL) ? \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q->next) : NULL); \ ++ if (_hs_q == NULL) { \ ++ break; \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ _hs_qsize = _hs_insize; \ ++ while ((_hs_psize != 0U) || ((_hs_qsize != 0U) && (_hs_q != NULL))) { \ ++ if (_hs_psize == 0U) { \ ++ _hs_e = _hs_q; \ ++ _hs_q = ((_hs_q->next != NULL) ? \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q->next) : NULL); \ ++ _hs_qsize--; \ ++ } else if ((_hs_qsize == 0U) || (_hs_q == NULL)) { \ ++ _hs_e = _hs_p; \ ++ if (_hs_p != NULL) { \ ++ _hs_p = ((_hs_p->next != NULL) ? \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_p->next) : NULL); \ ++ } \ ++ _hs_psize--; \ ++ } else if ((cmpfcn( \ ++ DECLTYPE(head)(ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_p)), \ ++ DECLTYPE(head)(ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q)) \ ++ )) <= 0) { \ ++ _hs_e = _hs_p; \ ++ if (_hs_p != NULL) { \ ++ _hs_p = ((_hs_p->next != NULL) ? \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_p->next) : NULL); \ ++ } \ ++ _hs_psize--; \ ++ } else { \ ++ _hs_e = _hs_q; \ ++ _hs_q = ((_hs_q->next != NULL) ? \ ++ HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q->next) : NULL); \ ++ _hs_qsize--; \ ++ } \ ++ if ( _hs_tail != NULL ) { \ ++ _hs_tail->next = ((_hs_e != NULL) ? \ ++ ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_e) : NULL); \ ++ } else { \ ++ _hs_list = _hs_e; \ ++ } \ ++ if (_hs_e != NULL) { \ ++ _hs_e->prev = ((_hs_tail != NULL) ? \ ++ ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_tail) : NULL); \ ++ } \ ++ _hs_tail = _hs_e; \ ++ } \ ++ _hs_p = _hs_q; \ ++ } \ ++ if (_hs_tail != NULL) { \ ++ _hs_tail->next = NULL; \ ++ } \ ++ if (_hs_nmerges <= 1U) { \ ++ _hs_looping = 0; \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->tail = _hs_tail; \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_list)); \ ++ } \ ++ _hs_insize *= 2U; \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_SRT"); \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++/* This function selects items from one hash into another hash. ++ * The end result is that the selected items have dual presence ++ * in both hashes. There is no copy of the items made; rather ++ * they are added into the new hash through a secondary hash ++ * hash handle that must be present in the structure. */ ++#define HASH_SELECT(hh_dst, dst, hh_src, src, cond) \ ++do { \ ++ unsigned _src_bkt, _dst_bkt; \ ++ void *_last_elt = NULL, *_elt; \ ++ UT_hash_handle *_src_hh, *_dst_hh, *_last_elt_hh=NULL; \ ++ ptrdiff_t _dst_hho = ((char*)(&(dst)->hh_dst) - (char*)(dst)); \ ++ if ((src) != NULL) { \ ++ for (_src_bkt=0; _src_bkt < (src)->hh_src.tbl->num_buckets; _src_bkt++) { \ ++ for (_src_hh = (src)->hh_src.tbl->buckets[_src_bkt].hh_head; \ ++ _src_hh != NULL; \ ++ _src_hh = _src_hh->hh_next) { \ ++ _elt = ELMT_FROM_HH((src)->hh_src.tbl, _src_hh); \ ++ if (cond(_elt)) { \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( int _hs_oomed = 0; ) \ ++ _dst_hh = (UT_hash_handle*)(void*)(((char*)_elt) + _dst_hho); \ ++ _dst_hh->key = _src_hh->key; \ ++ _dst_hh->keylen = _src_hh->keylen; \ ++ _dst_hh->hashv = _src_hh->hashv; \ ++ _dst_hh->prev = _last_elt; \ ++ _dst_hh->next = NULL; \ ++ if (_last_elt_hh != NULL) { \ ++ _last_elt_hh->next = _elt; \ ++ } \ ++ if ((dst) == NULL) { \ ++ DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst, _elt); \ ++ HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh_dst, dst, _hs_oomed); \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( \ ++ if (_hs_oomed) { \ ++ uthash_nonfatal_oom(_elt); \ ++ (dst) = NULL; \ ++ continue; \ ++ } \ ++ ) \ ++ } else { \ ++ _dst_hh->tbl = (dst)->hh_dst.tbl; \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_TO_BKT(_dst_hh->hashv, _dst_hh->tbl->num_buckets, _dst_bkt); \ ++ HASH_ADD_TO_BKT(_dst_hh->tbl->buckets[_dst_bkt], hh_dst, _dst_hh, _hs_oomed); \ ++ (dst)->hh_dst.tbl->num_items++; \ ++ IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( \ ++ if (_hs_oomed) { \ ++ HASH_ROLLBACK_BKT(hh_dst, dst, _dst_hh); \ ++ HASH_DELETE_HH(hh_dst, dst, _dst_hh); \ ++ _dst_hh->tbl = NULL; \ ++ uthash_nonfatal_oom(_elt); \ ++ continue; \ ++ } \ ++ ) \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_ADD(_dst_hh->tbl, _dst_hh->hashv); \ ++ _last_elt = _elt; \ ++ _last_elt_hh = _dst_hh; \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ } \ ++ HASH_FSCK(hh_dst, dst, "HASH_SELECT"); \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_CLEAR(hh,head) \ ++do { \ ++ if ((head) != NULL) { \ ++ HASH_BLOOM_FREE((head)->hh.tbl); \ ++ uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets, \ ++ (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \ ++ uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \ ++ (head) = NULL; \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ ++#define HASH_OVERHEAD(hh,head) \ ++ (((head) != NULL) ? ( \ ++ (size_t)(((head)->hh.tbl->num_items * sizeof(UT_hash_handle)) + \ ++ ((head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets * sizeof(UT_hash_bucket)) + \ ++ sizeof(UT_hash_table) + \ ++ (HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN))) : 0U) ++ ++#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE ++#define HASH_ITER(hh,head,el,tmp) \ ++for(((el)=(head)), ((*(char**)(&(tmp)))=(char*)((head!=NULL)?(head)->hh.next:NULL)); \ ++ (el) != NULL; ((el)=(tmp)), ((*(char**)(&(tmp)))=(char*)((tmp!=NULL)?(tmp)->hh.next:NULL))) ++#else ++#define HASH_ITER(hh,head,el,tmp) \ ++for(((el)=(head)), ((tmp)=DECLTYPE(el)((head!=NULL)?(head)->hh.next:NULL)); \ ++ (el) != NULL; ((el)=(tmp)), ((tmp)=DECLTYPE(el)((tmp!=NULL)?(tmp)->hh.next:NULL))) ++#endif ++ ++/* obtain a count of items in the hash */ ++#define HASH_COUNT(head) HASH_CNT(hh,head) ++#define HASH_CNT(hh,head) ((head != NULL)?((head)->hh.tbl->num_items):0U) ++ ++typedef struct UT_hash_bucket { ++ struct UT_hash_handle *hh_head; ++ unsigned count; ++ ++ /* expand_mult is normally set to 0. In this situation, the max chain length ++ * threshold is enforced at its default value, HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH. (If ++ * the bucket's chain exceeds this length, bucket expansion is triggered). ++ * However, setting expand_mult to a non-zero value delays bucket expansion ++ * (that would be triggered by additions to this particular bucket) ++ * until its chain length reaches a *multiple* of HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH. ++ * (The multiplier is simply expand_mult+1). The whole idea of this ++ * multiplier is to reduce bucket expansions, since they are expensive, in ++ * situations where we know that a particular bucket tends to be overused. ++ * It is better to let its chain length grow to a longer yet-still-bounded ++ * value, than to do an O(n) bucket expansion too often. ++ */ ++ unsigned expand_mult; ++ ++} UT_hash_bucket; ++ ++/* random signature used only to find hash tables in external analysis */ ++#define HASH_SIGNATURE 0xa0111fe1u ++#define HASH_BLOOM_SIGNATURE 0xb12220f2u ++ ++typedef struct UT_hash_table { ++ UT_hash_bucket *buckets; ++ unsigned num_buckets, log2_num_buckets; ++ unsigned num_items; ++ struct UT_hash_handle *tail; /* tail hh in app order, for fast append */ ++ ptrdiff_t hho; /* hash handle offset (byte pos of hash handle in element */ ++ ++ /* in an ideal situation (all buckets used equally), no bucket would have ++ * more than ceil(#items/#buckets) items. that's the ideal chain length. */ ++ unsigned ideal_chain_maxlen; ++ ++ /* nonideal_items is the number of items in the hash whose chain position ++ * exceeds the ideal chain maxlen. these items pay the penalty for an uneven ++ * hash distribution; reaching them in a chain traversal takes >ideal steps */ ++ unsigned nonideal_items; ++ ++ /* ineffective expands occur when a bucket doubling was performed, but ++ * afterward, more than half the items in the hash had nonideal chain ++ * positions. If this happens on two consecutive expansions we inhibit any ++ * further expansion, as it's not helping; this happens when the hash ++ * function isn't a good fit for the key domain. When expansion is inhibited ++ * the hash will still work, albeit no longer in constant time. */ ++ unsigned ineff_expands, noexpand; ++ ++ uint32_t signature; /* used only to find hash tables in external analysis */ ++#ifdef HASH_BLOOM ++ uint32_t bloom_sig; /* used only to test bloom exists in external analysis */ ++ uint8_t *bloom_bv; ++ uint8_t bloom_nbits; ++#endif ++ ++} UT_hash_table; ++ ++typedef struct UT_hash_handle { ++ struct UT_hash_table *tbl; ++ void *prev; /* prev element in app order */ ++ void *next; /* next element in app order */ ++ struct UT_hash_handle *hh_prev; /* previous hh in bucket order */ ++ struct UT_hash_handle *hh_next; /* next hh in bucket order */ ++ const void *key; /* ptr to enclosing struct's key */ ++ unsigned keylen; /* enclosing struct's key len */ ++ unsigned hashv; /* result of hash-fcn(key) */ ++} UT_hash_handle; ++ ++#endif /* UTHASH_H */ +diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h openssh-10.0p1/version.h +--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h 2025-06-14 10:53:02.028786585 +0200 ++++ openssh-10.0p1/version.h 2025-06-14 11:34:35.359783615 +0200 +@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@ + + #define SSH_PORTABLE "p2" + #define GSI_PORTABLE "c-GSI" +-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \ ++#define SSH_HPN "_hpn18.7.0" ++#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE SSH_HPN \ + GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION diff --git a/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf b/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..419c529 --- /dev/null +++ b/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#Type Name ID GECOS Home directory Shell +u sshd 74 "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd - diff --git a/gsi-openssh.spec b/gsi-openssh.spec index c76558b..ef847b1 100644 --- a/gsi-openssh.spec +++ b/gsi-openssh.spec @@ -10,10 +10,6 @@ %global _hardened_build 1 -# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID -%global sshd_uid 74 -%global sshd_gid 74 - # Build position-independent executables (requires toolchain support)? %global pie 1 @@ -27,166 +23,175 @@ # Do we want libedit support %global libedit 1 -# Do we want LDAP support -%global ldap 1 - -%global openssh_ver 7.8p1 -%global openssh_rel 1 +%global openssh_ver 10.0p1 Summary: An implementation of the SSH protocol with GSI authentication Name: gsi-openssh Version: %{openssh_ver} -Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist} +Release: 4%{?dist} Provides: gsissh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: gsissh < 5.8p2-2 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc Source2: gsisshd.pam -Source3: DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg +Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg Source7: gsisshd.sysconfig Source9: gsisshd@.service Source10: gsisshd.socket Source11: gsisshd.service Source12: gsisshd-keygen@.service Source13: gsisshd-keygen -Source14: gsisshd.tmpfiles Source15: gsisshd-keygen.target +Source19: %{name}-server-systemd-sysusers.conf +Source20: gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh +Source21: gsissh-host-keys-migration.service Source99: README.sshd-and-gsisshd -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581 -Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1894 -#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=735889 -#Patch102: openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch -# OpenSSL 1.1.0 compatibility -Patch104: openssh-7.3p1-openssl-1.1.0.patch - +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX) +Patch0001: 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch +#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634 +Patch0002: 0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch +Patch0003: 0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644 +Patch0004: 0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch +#(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925 +Patch0005: 0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch +Patch0006: 0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789 +Patch0007: 0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch +Patch0008: 0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch +#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332 +Patch0009: 0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX) +Patch0010: 0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch +# warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545) +Patch0011: 0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch +# GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732) +# from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master +# and +# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures +# upstream MR: +# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21 +Patch0012: 0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch +#http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html +Patch0013: 0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch +# Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494) +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775 +Patch0014: 0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch +# Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243) +Patch0015: 0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780 +Patch0016: 0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch +# Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650) +Patch0017: 0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch +# privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580) +Patch0018: 0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch +# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681) +Patch0019: 0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch +# scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223) +Patch0020: 0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch +# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843) +# CVE-2014-9278 +Patch0021: 0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch +# apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521) +Patch0022: 0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch +# Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055) +Patch0023: 0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch +# make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom +Patch0024: 0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch +# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302) +Patch0025: 0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch +# Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level +Patch0026: 0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch +# Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit +Patch0027: 0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch +# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration) +# https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11 +# git show > ~/devel/fedora/openssh/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch +Patch0028: 0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch +# Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333) +Patch0029: 0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch +# Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325) +# clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config +Patch0030: 0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch +# Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761) +Patch0031: 0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch +# sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work +Patch0032: 0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch +# Do not break X11 without IPv6 +Patch0033: 0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch +# sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503) +Patch0034: 0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch +# Implement kill switch for SCP protocol +Patch0035: 0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch +# Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854 +# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299 +# downstream only +Patch0036: 0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch +# Downstream alias for MinRSABits +Patch0037: 0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch +# downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix +# From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14 +Patch0038: 0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248 # record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event -Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch +Patch0039: 0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch # Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684) -Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch +Patch0040: 0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947 +Patch0041: 0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch +Patch0042: 0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch +# Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage +# upstream bug: +# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455 +Patch0043: 0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch +# Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation +# upstream MR: +# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323 +Patch0044: 0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch +Patch0045: 0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch +Patch0046: 0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch +Patch0047: 0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch +Patch0048: 0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch +Patch0049: 0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch +# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/02/22/1 +Patch0050: 0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch +# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/564 +Patch0051: 0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch +# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/567 +Patch0052: 0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch +# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500 +Patch0053: 0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX) -Patch400: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch -#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634 -Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch - -#?-- unwanted child :( -Patch501: openssh-6.7p1-ldap.patch -#? -Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch - -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644 -Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1893 (WONTFIX) -Patch604: openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch -#(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925 -Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch -#? -Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789 -Patch609: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch - -#? -Patch700: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch -#? -Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch -#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332 -Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX) -Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1640 (WONTFIX) -Patch709: openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch -# warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545) -Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch -# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL -Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch -# add cavs test binary for the aes-ctr -Patch713: openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch -# add SSH KDF CAVS test driver -Patch714: openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch - -#http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html -#changed cache storage type - #848228 -Patch800: openssh-7.8p1-gsskex.patch -#http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html -Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch -# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843) -# CVE-2014-9278 -Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch -# Documentation about GSSAPI -# from https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=765655 -Patch803: openssh-7.1p1-gssapi-documentation.patch -# Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494) -# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775 -Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch -# Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243) -Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch -# Support SHA2 in GSS key exchanges from draft-ssorce-gss-keyex-sha2-02 -Patch807: openssh-7.5p1-gssapi-kex-with-ec.patch - -Patch900: openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch -#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780 -Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch -# Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650) -Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch -# privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580) -Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch -# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681) -Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch -# scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223) -Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch -# Config parser shouldn't accept ip/port syntax (#1130733) -Patch920: openssh-7.8p1-ip-port-config-parser.patch -# apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521) -Patch922: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch -# Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055) -Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch -# Restore compatible default (#89216) -Patch929: openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch -# Add GSSAPIKexAlgorithms option for server and client application -Patch932: openssh-7.0p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch -# make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom -Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch -# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302) -Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch -# Help systemd to track the running service -Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch -# Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level -Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch -# Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit -Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch -# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration) -Patch951: openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-uri.patch -# PKCS#11 ECDSA keys (upstream #2474, 8th iteration) -Patch952: openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-ecdsa.patch -# Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333) -Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch +#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581 +Patch1000: 1000-openssh-coverity.patch # This is the patch that adds GSI support # Based on hpn_isshd-gsi.7.5p1b.patch from Globus upstream -Patch98: openssh-7.8p1-gsissh.patch +Patch2000: 2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch -License: BSD -Group: Applications/Internet +# This is the HPN patch +# Based on https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh/ tag: hpn-18.7.0 +Patch2001: 2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch + +License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant Requires: /sbin/nologin -Obsoletes: %{name}-clients-fips, %{name}-server-fips +Requires: openssl-libs >= 3.5.0 -%if %{ldap} -BuildRequires: openldap-devel -%endif BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl-interpreter, perl-generators, zlib-devel BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5 BuildRequires: util-linux, groff BuildRequires: pam-devel -BuildRequires: fipscheck-devel >= 1.3.0 -BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j +BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 3.5.0 BuildRequires: systemd-devel -BuildRequires: gcc +BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros +BuildRequires: gcc make BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel +BuildRequires: libfido2-devel +BuildRequires: libxcrypt-devel Recommends: p11-kit %if %{kerberos5} @@ -197,7 +202,6 @@ BuildRequires: krb5-devel BuildRequires: globus-gss-assist-devel >= 8 BuildRequires: globus-gssapi-gsi-devel >= 12.12 BuildRequires: globus-common-devel >= 14 -BuildRequires: globus-usage-devel >= 3 %endif %if %{libedit} @@ -219,22 +223,24 @@ BuildRequires: gnupg2 Summary: SSH client applications with GSI authentication Provides: gsissh-clients = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: gsissh-clients < 5.8p2-2 -Group: Applications/Internet Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release} -Requires: fipscheck-lib%{_isa} >= 1.3.0 -Requires: crypto-policies >= 20180306-1 +Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1 + +%package keysign +Summary: A helper program used for host-based authentication +Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release} %package server Summary: SSH server daemon with GSI authentication Provides: gsissh-server = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: gsissh-server < 5.8p2-2 -Group: System Environment/Daemons Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release} Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/useradd Requires: pam >= 1.0.1-3 -Requires: fipscheck-lib%{_isa} >= 1.3.0 -Requires: crypto-policies >= 20180306-1 +Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1 %{?systemd_requires} +Requires(pre): policycoreutils-python-utils +Requires(postun): policycoreutils-python-utils %description SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing @@ -259,6 +265,11 @@ the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. This version of OpenSSH has been modified to support GSI authentication. +%description keysign +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. ssh-keysign is a +helper program used for host-based authentication disabled by default. + %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains @@ -269,80 +280,18 @@ This version of OpenSSH has been modified to support GSI authentication. %prep gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0} -%setup -q -n openssh-%{version} - -# investigate %%patch102 -p1 -b .getaddrinfo - -%patch400 -p1 -b .role-mls -%patch404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux - -%if %{ldap} -%patch501 -p1 -b .ldap -%endif -%patch502 -p1 -b .keycat - -%patch601 -p1 -b .ip-opts -%patch604 -p1 -b .keyperm -%patch606 -p1 -b .ipv6man -%patch607 -p1 -b .sigpipe -%patch609 -p1 -b .x11 - -%patch702 -p1 -b .progress -%patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info -%patch707 -p1 -b .redhat -%patch709 -p1 -b .vendor -%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no -%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr -%patch713 -p1 -b .ctr-cavs -%patch714 -p1 -b .kdf-cavs - -%patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex -%patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb -%patch803 -p1 -b .gss-docs -%patch804 -p1 -b .ccache_name -%patch805 -p1 -b .k5login - -%patch900 -p1 -b .canohost -%patch901 -p1 -b .kuserok -%patch906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote -%patch916 -p1 -b .contexts -%patch918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot -%patch919 -p1 -b .scp -%patch920 -p1 -b .config -%patch802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users -%patch922 -p1 -b .sshdt -%patch926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode -%patch929 -p1 -b .root-login -%patch932 -p1 -b .gsskexalg -%patch939 -p1 -b .s390-dev -%patch944 -p1 -b .x11max -%patch948 -p1 -b .systemd -%patch807 -p1 -b .gsskex-ec -%patch949 -p1 -b .refactor -%patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox -%patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri -%patch952 -p1 -b .pkcs11-ecdsa -%patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6 - -%patch200 -p1 -b .audit -%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race -%patch700 -p1 -b .fips - -%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity -%patch104 -p1 -b .openssl - -%patch98 -p1 -b .gsi +%autosetup -T -b 0 -p1 -n openssh-%{version} sed 's/sshd.pid/gsisshd.pid/' -i pathnames.h sed 's!$(piddir)/sshd.pid!$(piddir)/gsisshd.pid!' -i Makefile.in -sed 's!/etc/sysconfig/sshd!/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config +sed 's!/etc/pam.d/sshd!/etc/pam.d/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config_redhat cp -p %{SOURCE99} . autoreconf %build -CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"; export CFLAGS +%set_build_flags %if %{pie} %ifarch s390 s390x sparc sparcv9 sparc64 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC" @@ -375,22 +324,19 @@ fi --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh \ --datadir=%{_datadir}/gsissh \ - --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \ - --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ - --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/gsisshd \ - --enable-vendor-patchlevel="FC-%{openssh_ver}-%{openssh_rel}" \ + --with-default-path=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \ + --with-superuser-path=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \ + --with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \ --disable-strip \ --without-zlib-version-check \ - --with-ssl-engine \ --with-ipaddr-display \ --with-pie=no \ --without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \ --with-systemd \ --with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \ -%if %{ldap} - --with-ldap \ -%endif + --with-security-key-builtin=yes \ --with-pam \ + --with-pam-service=gsisshd \ %if %{WITH_SELINUX} --with-selinux --with-audit=linux \ --with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \ @@ -411,33 +357,25 @@ fi --without-libedit %endif -make SSH_PROGRAM=%{_bindir}/gsissh \ +%make_build SSH_PROGRAM=%{_bindir}/gsissh \ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass -# Add generation of HMAC checksums of the final stripped binaries -%global __spec_install_post \ - %%{?__debug_package:%%{__debug_install_post}} \ - %%{__arch_install_post} \ - %%{__os_install_post} \ - fipshmac -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/fipscheck $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/gsissh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/gsisshd \ -%{nil} - %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh -mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/gsisshd -make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT -rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ldap.conf +%make_install install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh -install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/fipscheck install -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/gsisshd install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd -install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gsissh/ssh_config.d/05-redhat.conf +install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf +install -m644 sshd_config_redhat_cp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf +install -m644 sshd_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir} install -m644 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd@.service install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd.socket @@ -445,43 +383,56 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd.service install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen@.service install -m644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen.target install -m755 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-keygen -install -m644 -D %{SOURCE14} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_tmpfilesdir}/gsissh.conf +install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd +install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE19} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysusersdir}/%{name}-server.conf +# Migration service/script for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys +# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit +install -m744 %{SOURCE20} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh +# Pulled-in via a `Wants=` in `gsisshd.service` & `gsisshd@.service` +install -m644 %{SOURCE21} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib +touch $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-add rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-agent rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan -rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ctr-cavstest -rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-cavs -rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-cavs_driver.pl -rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-ldap-helper -rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-ldap-wrapper rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keycat rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-pkcs11-helper rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* -rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/ssh-ldap.conf.5* -rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-ldap-helper.8* rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* for f in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/* \ +%if "%{_sbindir}" != "%{_bindir}" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/* \ +%endif $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* ; do mv $f `dirname $f`/gsi`basename $f` done +# Add scp and hpnscp symlinks in gsisshd's path +mkdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin +ln -nrs $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/gsiscp \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/scp +ln -nrs $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/gsiscp \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/hpnscp + perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* -%pre -getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || : - %pre server -getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || : -getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ - useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \ - -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /var/empty/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : +%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE19} +semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222 2>/dev/null || : %post server +if [ $1 -gt 1 ]; then + # In the case of an upgrade (never true on OSTree systems) run the migration + # script for Fedora 38 to remove group ownership for host keys. + %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh + # Prevent the systemd unit that performs the same service (useful for + # OSTree systems) from running. + touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration +fi %systemd_post gsisshd.service gsisshd.socket %preun server @@ -489,35 +440,45 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ %postun server %systemd_postun_with_restart gsisshd.service +if [ $1 -eq 0 ]; then + semanage port -d -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222 2>/dev/null || : +fi %files -%license LICENCE LICENSE.globus_usage -%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns README.sshd-and-gsisshd TODO +%license LICENCE +%doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README HPN-README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns README.sshd-and-gsisshd TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/moduli %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsissh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsissh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/gsissh -%attr(2755,root,ssh_keys) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keysign -%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-keysign.8* %files clients %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsissh -%attr(0644,root,root) %{_libdir}/fipscheck/gsissh.hmac %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsissh.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsiscp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsiscp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config %dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/ -%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/05-redhat.conf +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/gsissh_config.5* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsisftp +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-sk-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsisftp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-sk-helper.8* +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin +%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/scp +%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/hpnscp + +%files keysign +%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keysign +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-keysign.8* %files server -%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_var}/empty/gsisshd +%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/gsisshd -%attr(0644,root,root) %{_libdir}/fipscheck/gsisshd.hmac +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-session +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-auth %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sftp-server %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/gsisshd_config.5* @@ -525,6 +486,9 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsisshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsisftp-server.8* %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config +%dir %attr(0700,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/ +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/gsisshd %attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/sysconfig/gsisshd %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd.service @@ -532,9 +496,256 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd.socket %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen@.service %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen.target -%attr(0644,root,root) %{_tmpfilesdir}/gsissh.conf +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/%{name}-server.conf +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service +%attr(0744,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh +%ghost %attr(0644,root,root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration %changelog +* Mon Sep 01 2025 Mattias Ellert - 10.0p1-4 +- Based on openssh-10.0p1-6.fc44 + +* Mon Sep 01 2025 Mattias Ellert - 10.0p1-3 +- Based on openssh-10.0p1-4.fc43 + +* Thu Jul 24 2025 Fedora Release Engineering - 10.0p1-2 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild + +* Mon Jun 16 2025 Mattias Ellert - 10.0p1-1 +- Based on openssh-10.0p1-3.fc43 + +* Sun Apr 20 2025 Mattias Ellert - 9.9p1-6 +- Based on openssh-9.9p1-15.fc43 + +* Wed Mar 05 2025 Mattias Ellert - 9.9p1-5 +- Based on openssh-9.9p1-11.fc43 + +* Wed Mar 05 2025 Mattias Ellert - 9.9p1-4 +- Based on openssh-9.9p1-9.fc42 + +* Wed Feb 05 2025 Mattias Ellert - 9.9p1-3 +- Based on openssh-9.9p1-8.fc42 + +* Wed Feb 05 2025 Mattias Ellert - 9.9p1-2 +- Based on openssh-9.9p1-7.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-2.fc41 + +* Sat Feb 01 2025 Björn Esser - 9.9p1-1.1 +- Add explicit BR: libxcrypt-devel + +* Mon Jan 20 2025 Mattias Ellert - 9.9p1-1 +- Based on openssh-9.9p1-5.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-1.fc41 + +* Fri Jan 17 2025 Fedora Release Engineering - 9.8p1-2.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild + +* Wed Oct 02 2024 Mattias Ellert - 9.8p1-2 +- Based on openssh-9.8p1-4.fc42 + +* Fri Sep 27 2024 Mattias Ellert - 9.8p1-1 +- Based on openssh-9.8p1-3.fc41.1 + +* Thu Jul 18 2024 Fedora Release Engineering - 9.6p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild + +* Fri Jul 12 2024 Mattias Ellert - 9.6p1-3 +- Add scp and hpnscp symlinks in gsisshd's path + +* Sat Jul 06 2024 Mattias Ellert - 9.6p1-2 +- Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc41.13 + +* Sat Jul 06 2024 Mattias Ellert - 9.6p1-1 +- Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc40.4 + +* Wed Jan 24 2024 Fedora Release Engineering - 9.3p1-7.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild + +* Sat Jan 20 2024 Mattias Ellert - 9.3p1-7 +- Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40.1 + +* Sat Jan 20 2024 Fedora Release Engineering - 9.3p1-6.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild + +* Tue Oct 24 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.3p1-6 +- Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40 +- Drop patch openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch (now included in + openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch) + +* Tue Oct 17 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.3p1-5 +- Based on openssh-9.3p1-12.fc40 + +* Tue Oct 17 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.3p1-4 +- Based on openssh-9.3p1-9.fc39 + +* Fri Aug 11 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.3p1-3 +- Based on openssh-9.3p1-8.fc39 + +* Sun Jul 23 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.3p1-2 +- Based on openssh-9.3p1-5.fc39.1 + +* Wed Jul 19 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.3p1-1 +- Based on openssh-9.3p1-3.fc39 +- Fix keyex patch + +* Sun Apr 16 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.0p1-6 +- Based on openssh-9.0p1-17.fc39 + +* Wed Apr 12 2023 Florian Weimer - 9.0p1-5.1 +- C99 compatiblity fixes + +* Sat Mar 11 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.0p1-5 +- Based on openssh-9.0p1-12.fc38 + +* Thu Jan 19 2023 Fedora Release Engineering - 9.0p1-4.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild + +* Tue Jan 10 2023 Mattias Ellert - 9.0p1-4 +- Based on openssh-9.0p1-9.fc38 + +* Wed Nov 09 2022 Mattias Ellert - 9.0p1-3 +- Based on openssh-9.0p1-7.fc38 + +* Tue Oct 04 2022 Mattias Ellert - 9.0p1-2 +- Based on openssh-9.0p1-5.fc38 + +* Tue Aug 30 2022 Mattias Ellert - 9.0p1-1 +- Based on openssh-9.0p1-3.fc38 + +* Tue Aug 30 2022 Mattias Ellert - 8.8p1-3 +- Based on openssh-8.8p1-6.fc37 + +* Thu Jul 21 2022 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.8p1-2.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild + +* Sun May 08 2022 Mattias Ellert - 8.8p1-2 +- Based on openssh-8.8p1-2.fc37 + +* Thu Jan 20 2022 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.8p1-1.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild + +* Wed Dec 01 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.8p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.8p1-1.fc36 + +* Sun Oct 24 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.7p1-2 +- Based on openssh-8.7p1-3.fc36 + +* Sun Oct 24 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.7p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.7p1-2.fc35 + +* Tue Sep 14 2021 Sahana Prasad - 8.6p1-3.2 +- Rebuilt with OpenSSL 3.0.0 + +* Thu Jul 22 2021 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.6p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild + +* Mon Jun 21 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.6p1-3 +- Based on openssh-8.6p1-5.fc35 + +* Mon Jun 21 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.6p1-2 +- Based on openssh-8.6p1-4.fc34 + +* Sat May 22 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.6p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.6p1-3.fc35 + +* Tue Mar 30 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.5p1-3 +- Disable MTAES + +* Tue Mar 16 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.5p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.5p1-1.fc34 +- Fix issue with read-only ssh buffer during gssapi key exchange +- Add HPN patch + +* Tue Mar 02 2021 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek - 8.4p1-4.1 +- Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros + See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583. + +* Fri Feb 05 2021 Mattias Ellert - 8.4p1-4 +- Based on openssh-8.4p1-5.fc34 + +* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.4p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild + +* Wed Dec 09 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.4p1-3 +- Based on openssh-8.4p1-4.fc33 + +* Mon Nov 30 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.4p1-2 +- Based on openssh-8.4p1-3.fc33 + +* Tue Oct 06 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.4p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.4p1-2.fc33 + +* Tue Jul 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.3p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild + +* Thu Jun 11 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.3p1-3 +- Based on openssh-8.3p1-3.fc32 + +* Thu Jun 04 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.3p1-2 +- Based on openssh-8.3p1-2.fc32 + +* Sat May 30 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.3p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.3p1-1.fc32 + +* Mon May 04 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.2p1-2 +- Add missing buffer initialization in gsissh patch + +* Tue Apr 14 2020 Mattias Ellert - 8.2p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.2p1-3.fc32 + +* Wed Jan 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.1p1-1.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild + +* Mon Oct 21 2019 Mattias Ellert - 8.1p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.1p1-1.fc31 + +* Thu Aug 08 2019 Mattias Ellert - 8.0p1-6 +- Based on openssh-8.0p1-8.fc31 + +* Fri Aug 02 2019 Mattias Ellert - 8.0p1-5 +- Based on openssh-8.0p1-5.fc30 + +* Thu Jul 25 2019 Fedora Release Engineering - 8.0p1-4.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild + +* Wed Jun 19 2019 Mattias Ellert - 8.0p1-4 +- Based on openssh-8.0p1-4.fc30 + +* Tue May 28 2019 Mattias Ellert - 8.0p1-3 +- Based on openssh-8.0p1-3.fc30 +- Change GSSAPITrustDNS default to no + +* Mon May 20 2019 Mattias Ellert - 8.0p1-2 +- Based on openssh-8.0p1-2.fc30 + +* Fri May 03 2019 Mattias Ellert - 8.0p1-1 +- Based on openssh-8.0p1-1.fc30 + +* Fri Mar 22 2019 Mattias Ellert - 7.9p1-7 +- Based on openssh-7.9p1-5.fc29 + +* Wed Feb 27 2019 Mattias Ellert - 7.9p1-6 +- Remove usage statistics collection support + +* Fri Feb 08 2019 Mattias Ellert - 7.9p1-5 +- CVE-2019-7639 + +* Thu Feb 07 2019 Mattias Ellert - 7.9p1-4 +- Based on openssh-7.9p1-4.fc29 + +* Fri Feb 01 2019 Fedora Release Engineering - 7.9p1-3.1 +- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild + +* Tue Jan 15 2019 Mattias Ellert - 7.9p1-3 +- Based on openssh-7.9p1-3.fc29 + +* Mon Jan 14 2019 Björn Esser - 7.9p1-2.1 +- Rebuilt for libcrypt.so.2 (#1666033) + +* Wed Nov 14 2018 Mattias Ellert - 7.9p1-2 +- Based on openssh-7.9p1-2.fc29 + +* Tue Oct 23 2018 Mattias Ellert - 7.9p1-1 +- Based on openssh-7.9p1-1.fc29 + * Tue Oct 23 2018 Mattias Ellert - 7.8p1-1 - Based on openssh-7.8p1-3.fc28 diff --git a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db91516 --- /dev/null +++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +[Unit] +Description=Update gsissh host key permissions +Documentation=https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit +Before=gsisshd.service +After=gsissh-keygen.target +ConditionPathExists=!/var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration + +[Service] +Type=oneshot +ExecStart=-/usr/libexec/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh +ExecStart=touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration +RemainAfterExit=yes + +[Install] +WantedBy=gsisshd.service diff --git a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..775cf39 --- /dev/null +++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +#!/usr/bin/bash +set -eu -o pipefail +# Detect existing non-conforming host keys and perform the permissions migration +# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit +# +# Example output looks like: +# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ +# @ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @ +# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ +# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' are too open. +# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others. +# This private key will be ignored. +# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ +# @ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @ +# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ +# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key' are too open. +# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others. +# This private key will be ignored. +# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ +# @ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @ +# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ +# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key' are too open. +# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others. +# This private key will be ignored. +# gsisshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting. +# +output="$(gsisshd -T 2>&1 || true)" # expected to fail +while read line; do + if [[ $line =~ ^Permissions\ [0-9]+\ for\ \'(.*)\'\ are\ too\ open. ]]; then + keyfile=${BASH_REMATCH[1]} + echo $line + echo -e "\t-> changing permissions on $keyfile" + chmod --verbose g-r $keyfile + chown --verbose root:root $keyfile + fi +done <<< "$output" diff --git a/gsisshd-keygen b/gsisshd-keygen index af0a740..c49da87 100644 --- a/gsisshd-keygen +++ b/gsisshd-keygen @@ -9,8 +9,14 @@ case $KEYTYPE in if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then exit 0 fi ;; - "rsa") ;; # always ok - "ecdsa") ;; + "rsa") + if [[ ! -z $SSH_RSA_BITS ]]; then + SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_RSA_BITS" + fi ;; # always ok + "ecdsa") + if [[ ! -z $SSH_ECDSA_BITS ]]; then + SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_ECDSA_BITS" + fi ;; *) # wrong argument exit 12 ;; esac @@ -25,13 +31,12 @@ fi rm -f $KEY{,.pub} # create new keys -if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then +if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE $SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then exit 1 fi # sanitize permissions -/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY -/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY +/usr/bin/chmod 600 $KEY /usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then /usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub} diff --git a/gsisshd-keygen@.service b/gsisshd-keygen@.service index 6b2898b..62a1898 100644 --- a/gsisshd-keygen@.service +++ b/gsisshd-keygen@.service @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_%i_key [Service] Type=oneshot +# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line +# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty. +Environment=OPTIONS= EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd ExecStart=/usr/libexec/gsissh/sshd-keygen %i diff --git a/gsisshd.service b/gsisshd.service index bfa96b5..55dd115 100644 --- a/gsisshd.service +++ b/gsisshd.service @@ -3,12 +3,17 @@ Description=gsissh server daemon Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5) After=network.target gsisshd-keygen.target Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target +# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys +# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit +Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service [Service] Type=notify -EnvironmentFile=-/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config +# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line +# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty. +Environment=OPTIONS= EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd -ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd -D $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY +ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd -D $OPTIONS ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID KillMode=process Restart=on-failure diff --git a/gsisshd.sysconfig b/gsisshd.sysconfig index 2981eee..e968b50 100644 --- a/gsisshd.sysconfig +++ b/gsisshd.sysconfig @@ -6,6 +6,6 @@ # of DSA key or systemctl mask gsisshd-keygen@rsa.service to disable RSA key # creation. -# System-wide crypto policy: -# To opt-out, uncomment the following line -# CRYPTO_POLICY= +#SSH_RSA_BITS=3072 +#SSH_ECDSA_BITS=256 +OPTIONS="" diff --git a/gsisshd.tmpfiles b/gsisshd.tmpfiles deleted file mode 100644 index e13d962..0000000 --- a/gsisshd.tmpfiles +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -d /var/empty/gsisshd 711 root root - diff --git a/gsisshd@.service b/gsisshd@.service index 3bbdd78..093931e 100644 --- a/gsisshd@.service +++ b/gsisshd@.service @@ -3,9 +3,16 @@ Description=gsissh per-connection server daemon Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5) Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target After=gsisshd-keygen.target +# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys +# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit +Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service [Service] -EnvironmentFile=-/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config +# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line +# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty. +Environment=OPTIONS= EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd -ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY +ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS +ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys" StandardInput=socket +ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all diff --git a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch b/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e9a0b0d..0000000 --- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info 2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100 -@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi - err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0, - GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, - GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE, -- "Could not grab %s. " -- "A malicious client may be eavesdropping " -- "on your session.", what); -+ "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n" -+ "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, " -+ "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping " -+ "on your session.\n" -+ "Either close the application which grabs the %s or " -+ "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what); - gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); - - gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err)); diff --git a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch b/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6601fbf..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100 -@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - #include - #include - -@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia - gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK); - } - -+static void -+move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress) -+{ -+ gdouble step; -+ g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); -+ -+ step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1); -+ gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step); -+ gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress)); -+} -+ - static int - passphrase_dialog(char *message) - { - const char *failed; - char *passphrase, *local; - int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer; -- GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry; -+ GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox; - GdkGrabStatus status; - - grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL); -@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message) - "%s", - message); - -+ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); -+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE, -+ FALSE, 0); -+ gtk_widget_show(hbox); -+ - entry = gtk_entry_new(); - gtk_box_pack_start( -- GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry, -- FALSE, FALSE, 0); -+ GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, -+ TRUE, FALSE, 0); -+ gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2); - gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); - gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); - gtk_widget_show(entry); - -+ hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0); -+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE, -+ FALSE, 8); -+ gtk_widget_show(hbox); -+ -+ progress = gtk_progress_bar_new(); -+ -+ gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally"); -+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE, -+ TRUE, 5); -+ gtk_widget_show(progress); -+ - gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH"); - gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); - gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); -@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message) - gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK); - g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate", - G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog); -+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed", -+ G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress); - - gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); - diff --git a/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch b/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 76deaef..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/channels.c ---- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo 2012-02-14 16:12:54.427852524 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c 2012-02-14 16:13:22.818928690 +0100 -@@ -3275,6 +3275,9 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; - hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; -+#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG -+ hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG; -+#endif - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; - snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); - if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { -diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c ---- openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo 2012-02-14 16:09:25.057964291 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c 2012-02-14 16:09:25.106047007 +0100 -@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct soc - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = family; - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; -+ hints.ai_flags = AI_V4MAPPED | AI_ADDRCONFIG; - snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); - if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) - fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, diff --git a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 56af045..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c ---- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe 2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c 2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200 -@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - fdlim_set(maxfd); - fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); - -+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); -+ - read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); - read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); - diff --git a/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch b/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3e6c9cc..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost 2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c 2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100 -@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) - static u_int mech = 0; - OM_uint32 min; - int r, ok = 0; -- const char *gss_host; -+ const char *gss_host = NULL; - - if (options.gss_server_identity) - gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; -- else if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) { - gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1); -+ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) -+ gss_host = authctxt->host; -+ } - else - gss_host = authctxt->host; - diff --git a/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch b/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1af5e9d..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,142 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor 2016-12-23 13:34:51.681253844 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac 2016-12-23 13:34:51.694253847 +0100 -@@ -4930,6 +4930,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], - fi - ] - ) -+AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel, -+ [ --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG specify a vendor patch level], -+ [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.]) -+ SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"], -+ [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.]) -+ SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none]) - - dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection - dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the -@@ -5194,6 +5200,7 @@ echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack - echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" - echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" - echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" -+echo " Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL" - - echo "" - -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 13:36:07.555268628 +0100 -@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->max_authtries = -1; - options->max_sessions = -1; - options->banner = NULL; -+ options->show_patchlevel = -1; - options->use_dns = -1; - options->client_alive_interval = -1; - options->client_alive_count_max = -1; -@@ -325,6 +326,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; - if (options->version_addendum == NULL) - options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); -+ if (options->show_patchlevel == -1) -+ options->show_patchlevel = 0; - if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) - options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; - if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) -@@ -402,7 +405,7 @@ typedef enum { - sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile, - sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, - sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, -- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, -+ sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, - sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, - sHostKeyAlgorithms, - sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, -@@ -528,6 +531,7 @@ static struct { - { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+ { "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1369,6 +1373,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - intptr = &options->disable_forwarding; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sShowPatchLevel: -+ intptr = &options->show_patchlevel; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sAllowUsers: - while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { - if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1) -@@ -2269,6 +2277,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 13:34:51.694253847 +0100 -@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ typedef struct { - int max_authtries; - int max_sessions; - char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ -+ int show_patchlevel; /* Show vendor patch level to clients */ - int use_dns; - int client_alive_interval; /* - * poke the client this often to -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor 2016-12-23 13:34:51.695253847 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 13:37:17.482282253 +0100 -@@ -1334,6 +1334,13 @@ an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as - .Cm AcceptEnv - or - .Cm PermitUserEnvironment . -+.It Cm ShowPatchLevel -+Specifies whether -+.Nm sshd -+will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. -+The patch level is set at compile-time. -+The default is -+.Dq no . - .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask - Sets the octal file creation mode mask - .Pq umask -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor 2016-12-23 13:34:51.690253846 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 13:34:51.695253847 +0100 -@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ X11Forwarding yes - #Compression delayed - #ClientAliveInterval 0 - #ClientAliveCountMax 3 -+#ShowPatchLevel no - #UseDNS no - #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid - #MaxStartups 10:30:100 -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor 2016-12-23 13:34:51.682253844 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 13:38:32.434296856 +0100 -@@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh - char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ - - xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n", -- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, -+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, -+ (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION, - *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", - options.version_addendum); - -@@ -1650,7 +1651,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - exit(1); - } - -- debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, -+ debug("sshd version %s, %s", -+ (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION, - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) - #else diff --git a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch b/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ddcb7f1..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,101 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp 2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c 2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100 -@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in - - struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx - { -- AES_KEY aes_ctx; -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ecbctx; - u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; - }; - -@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char - { - struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; - size_t n = 0; -- u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; -+ u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256]; -+ u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256]; - - if (len == 0) - return (1); - if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) - return (0); - -- while ((len--) > 0) { -+ for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) { -+ u_int r,a,b; -+ - if (n == 0) { -- AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx); -- ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ int outl, i, buflen; -+ -+ buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf)); -+ -+ for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { -+ memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); -+ } -+ -+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl, -+ ctrbuf, buflen); - } -- *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n]; -- n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; -+ -+ memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a)); -+ memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b)); -+ r = a ^ b; -+ memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r)); -+ src += sizeof(a); -+ dest += sizeof(r); -+ -+ n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf); - } -+ memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf)); -+ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); - return (1); - } - -@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co - c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); - } -- if (key != NULL) -- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, -- &c->aes_ctx); -+ -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx); -+ -+ if (key != NULL) { -+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; -+ switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) { -+ case 128: -+ cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); -+ break; -+ case 192: -+ cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); -+ break; -+ case 256: -+ cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length"); -+ } -+ if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL)) -+ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption"); -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0); -+ } - if (iv != NULL) - memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - return (1); -@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) - struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; - - if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx); - memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); - free(c); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); diff --git a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch b/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4a7d849..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c -index d98fa67..25d347b 100644 ---- a/scp.c -+++ b/scp.c -@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv) - addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); - addargs(&alist, "-x"); - addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); -- addargs(&alist, "-n"); -+ if (isatty(fileno(stdin))) -+ addargs(&alist, "-t"); -+ else -+ addargs(&alist, "-n"); - for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { - addargs(&alist, "%s", - remote_remote_args.list[j]); diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7f822ab..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,263 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100 -@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...) - void - log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) - { -+ log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1); -+} -+ -+void -+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) { - #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) - struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; - #endif -@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl - exit(1); - } - -- log_handler = NULL; -- log_handler_ctx = NULL; -+ if (reset_handler) { -+ log_handler = NULL; -+ log_handler_ctx = NULL; -+ } - - log_on_stderr = on_stderr; - if (on_stderr) -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h 2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100 -@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum { - typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *); - - void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); -+void log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int); - LogLevel log_level_get(void); - int log_change_level(LogLevel); - int log_is_on_stderr(void); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100 -@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx - close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); - pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; - -+ pmonitor->m_state = "preauth"; -+ - authctxt = _authctxt; - memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); - ssh->authctxt = authctxt; -@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p - close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); - pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; - -+ pmonitor->m_state = "postauth"; -+ - monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); - signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); - signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); -@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito - if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) - fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", - __func__, level); -- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg); -+ do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state); - - sshbuf_free(logmsg); - free(msg); -@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void) - mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); - monitor_openfds(mon, 1); - -+ mon->m_state = ""; -+ - return mon; - } - - void --monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) -+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir) - { -- monitor_openfds(mon, 0); -+ struct stat dev_log_stat; -+ char *dev_log_path; -+ int do_logfds = 0; -+ -+ if (chroot_dir != NULL) { -+ xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir); -+ -+ if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) { -+ debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir); -+ do_logfds = 1; -+ } -+ free(dev_log_path); -+ } -+ monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds); - } - - #ifdef GSSAPI -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h 2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100 -@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor { - int m_log_sendfd; - struct kex **m_pkex; - pid_t m_pid; -+ char *m_state; - }; - - struct monitor *monitor_init(void); --void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *); -+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *); - - struct Authctxt; - void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100 -@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc; - - static int is_child = 0; - static int in_chroot = 0; -+static int have_dev_log = 1; - - /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */ - static char *auth_info_file = NULL; -@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) - int ret; - const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; - char session_type[1024]; -+ struct stat dev_log_stat; - - if (options.adm_forced_command) { - original_command = command; -@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) - tty += 5; - } - -+ if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) { -+ have_dev_log = 0; -+ } -+ - verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d", - session_type, - tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", -@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void) - * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. - */ - endpwent(); -- -- /* -- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them -- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after -- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file -- * descriptors open. -- */ -- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); - } - - /* -@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - exit(1); - } - -- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); -- - do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell); - - /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ -@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - argv[i] = NULL; - optind = optreset = 1; - __progname = argv[0]; -- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); -+ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log)); - } - -+ /* -+ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them -+ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after -+ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file -+ * descriptors open. -+ */ -+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); -+ - fflush(NULL); - - /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h 2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100 -@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@ - - struct passwd; - --int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *); -+int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int); - void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100 -@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void) - } - - int --sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) -+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler) - { - fd_set *rset, *wset; - int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; -@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, - - ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ - __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); -- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); -+ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); - - pw = pwcopy(user_pw); - -@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, - } - } - -- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); -+ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler); - - /* - * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100 -@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - return 1; - } - -- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw)); -+ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0)); - } -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100 -@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - } - - /* New socket pair */ -- monitor_reinit(pmonitor); -+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory); - - pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); - if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) -@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - - close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); - pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; -+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); -+ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; -+ -+ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1) -+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); - - /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ - demote_sensitive_data(); diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5412bc5..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ ---- a/scp.c -+++ a/scp.c -@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) - free(vect[0]); - continue; - } -+ if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') { -+ errno = ENOTDIR; -+ goto bad; -+ } - omode = mode; - mode |= S_IWUSR; - if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) { --- diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8bf6c78..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,126 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c -index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644 ---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c -+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c -@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ - #include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ - #include "servconf.h" - #include "port-linux.h" -+#include "misc.h" - #include "sshkey.h" - #include "hostfile.h" - #include "auth.h" -@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) - void - sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) - { -- security_context_t *ctx; -+ char *ctx; - - if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) - return; -@@ -461,6 +462,58 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) - } - } - -+void -+sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void) -+{ -+ int len; -+ char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg; -+ const char *contexts_path; -+ FILE *contexts_file; -+ -+ contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path(); -+ if (contexts_path != NULL) { -+ if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) != NULL) { -+ struct stat sb; -+ -+ if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) == 0 && ((sb.st_uid == 0) && ((sb.st_mode & 022) == 0))) { -+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) { -+ /* Strip trailing whitespace */ -+ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { -+ if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL) -+ break; -+ line[len] = '\0'; -+ } -+ -+ if (line[0] == '\0') -+ continue; -+ -+ cp = line; -+ arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ if (arg && *arg == '\0') -+ arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ -+ if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) { -+ arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') { -+ debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__); -+ fclose(contexts_file); -+ return; -+ } -+ preauth_context = xstrdup(arg); -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ fclose(contexts_file); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (preauth_context == NULL) -+ preauth_context = xstrdup("sshd_net_t"); -+ -+ ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context); -+ free(preauth_context); -+} -+ - #endif - #endif - -diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c -index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644 ---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c -+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c -@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include "log.h" - #include "xmalloc.h" -@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname) - strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len); - if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':'))) - strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen); -- debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__, -+ debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__, - oldctx, newctx); - if (setcon(newctx) < 0) - switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__, -diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h -index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644 ---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h -+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h -@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); - void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); - void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); - int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); -+void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void); - #endif - - #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c -index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644 ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) - demote_sensitive_data(); - - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); -+ sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(); - #endif - - /* Demote the child */ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c56313d..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,257 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs 2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign - SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper - SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper - SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat -+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest - SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ -@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ - MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ - INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ - --TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) -+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) - - XMSS_OBJS=\ - ssh-xmss.o \ -@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l - ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS) - -+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o -+ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) -+ - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) - -@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ - fi - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs 2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c 2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ -+/* -+ * -+ * invocation (all of the following are equal): -+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 -+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000 -+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "ssherr.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+ -+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ -+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" -+ -+void usage(void) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo \n" -+ " --key --mode \n" -+ " [--iv ] --data \n\n" -+ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n" -+ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n"); -+ exit(1); -+} -+ -+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len) -+{ -+ unsigned char *bin; -+ char *p; -+ size_t n = 0; -+ int shift = 4; -+ unsigned char out = 0; -+ unsigned char *optr; -+ -+ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2); -+ optr = bin; -+ -+ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) { -+ unsigned char c; -+ -+ c = *p; -+ if (isspace(c)) -+ continue; -+ -+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { -+ c = c - '0'; -+ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') { -+ c = c - 'A' + 10; -+ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') { -+ c = c - 'a' + 10; -+ } else { -+ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */ -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ out |= c << shift; -+ shift = (shift + 4) % 8; -+ -+ if (shift) { -+ *(optr++) = out; -+ out = 0; -+ ++n; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ *len = n; -+ return bin; -+} -+ -+#define READ_CHUNK 4096 -+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100 -+char *read_stdin(void) -+{ -+ char *buf; -+ size_t n, total = 0; -+ -+ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK); -+ -+ do { -+ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin); -+ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */ -+ break; -+ -+ total += n; -+ buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1); -+ } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE); -+ return buf; -+} -+ -+int main (int argc, char *argv[]) -+{ -+ -+ const struct sshcipher *c; -+ struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; -+ char *algo = "aes128-ctr"; -+ char *hexkey = NULL; -+ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000"; -+ char *hexdata = NULL; -+ char *p; -+ int i, r; -+ int encrypt = 1; -+ void *key; -+ size_t keylen; -+ void *iv; -+ size_t ivlen; -+ void *data; -+ size_t datalen; -+ void *outdata; -+ -+ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { -+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) { -+ algo = argv[++i]; -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) { -+ hexkey = argv[++i]; -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) { -+ ++i; -+ if (argv[i] == NULL) { -+ usage(); -+ } -+ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) { -+ encrypt = 1; -+ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) { -+ encrypt = 0; -+ } else { -+ usage(); -+ } -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) { -+ hexiv = argv[++i]; -+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) { -+ hexdata = argv[++i]; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) { -+ usage(); -+ } -+ -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ -+ c = cipher_by_name(algo); -+ if (c == NULL) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ if (hexdata == NULL) { -+ hexdata = read_stdin(); -+ } else { -+ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata); -+ } -+ -+ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen); -+ -+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen); -+ -+ if (ivlen != 16) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen); -+ -+ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ free(key); -+ free(iv); -+ -+ outdata = malloc(datalen); -+ if(outdata == NULL) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n"); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); -+ return 2; -+ } -+ -+ free(data); -+ -+ cipher_free(cc); -+ -+ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) { -+ printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p); -+ } -+ -+ free(outdata); -+ -+ printf("\n"); -+ return 0; -+} -+ diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fbe33b0..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c -index e93d867..4fc5b3d 100644 ---- a/authfile.c -+++ b/authfile.c -@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ - - #include - #include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) - #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN - if (check_ntsec(filename)) - #endif -+ if (st.st_mode & 040) { -+ struct group *gr; -+ -+ if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) -+ st.st_mode &= ~040; -+ } -+ - if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1365506..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,121 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100 -@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const - void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); - void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); - -+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); - void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); - #endif - -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100 -@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw - debug3("%s: done", __func__); - } - -+void -+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void) -+{ -+ security_context_t *ctx; -+ -+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) -+ return; -+ -+ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) { -+ logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); -+ return; -+ } -+ if (ctx != NULL) { -+ /* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */ -+ if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); -+ if (setcon(ctx) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); -+ freecon(ctx); -+ } -+} -+ - #endif - #endif - -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100 -@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) - - platform_setusercontext(pw); - -- if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { -+ if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) { - #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP - if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, - (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { -@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) - (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); - chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, - "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); -+#endif - safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); - free(tmp); - free(chroot_path); -@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) - /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ - permanently_set_uid(pw); - #endif -+ -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (in_chroot == 0) -+ sshd_selinux_copy_context(); -+#endif - } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && - strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { - fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); -@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s) - if (s->ttyfd != -1) { - fprintf(stderr, - "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); --#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- setexeccon(NULL); --#endif - #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME - execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, - (char *)NULL); -@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - argv[i] = NULL; - optind = optreset = 1; - __progname = argv[0]; --#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); --#endif - exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); - } - -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100 -@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) - /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ - demote_sensitive_data(); - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t"); -+#endif -+ - /* Demote the child */ - if (privsep_chroot) { - /* Change our root directory */ -@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - { - #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING - if (1) { -+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX) -+ if (0) { -+ /* even root user can be confined by SELinux */ - #else - if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { - #endif diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0d238dd..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,185 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100 -@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd - - /* enable nonblocking mode */ - if (nonblock) { -- if (rfd != -1) -+ if (rfd >= 0) - set_nonblock(rfd); -- if (wfd != -1) -+ if (wfd >= 0) - set_nonblock(wfd); -- if (efd != -1) -+ if (efd >= 0) - set_nonblock(efd); - } - } -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100 -@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx - mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); - - /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ -- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) -+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) - ; - - if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100 -@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, - if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || - (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { - error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); -- if (tmp1 > 0) -+ if (tmp1 >= 0) - close(tmp1); -- if (tmp2 > 0) -- close(tmp2); -+ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0) -+ close(tmp2);*/ - return 0; - } - close(tmp1); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100 -@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr - struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; - u_int16_t *portp; - u_int16_t port; -- socklen_t salen; -+ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); - int i; - - if (sa == NULL) { -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100 -@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo) - { - if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { - kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); -- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); -+ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); - } - - if (signo) -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100 -@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", - filename, linenum); - if (!*activep) { -- arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp); - break; - } - for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) -@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { - *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); - /* increase optional counter */ -- if (intptr != NULL) -- *intptr = *intptr + 1; -+ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;) -+ if (intptr != NULL) -+ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */ - } - break; - -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100 -@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void) - static void - notify_parent(void) - { -- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) -+ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0) - (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); - } - static void - notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) - { -- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) -+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0) - FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); - } - static void -@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset) - { - char c; - -- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) -- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) -+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) -+ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0) - debug2("%s: reading", __func__); - } - -@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void) - } - - tun = packet_get_int(); -- if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) { -+ if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) { - if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && auth_opts->force_tun_device != tun) - goto done; - tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device; -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100 -@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo) - { - if (sshpid > 1) { - kill(sshpid, SIGTERM); -- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); -+ (void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); - } - - _exit(1); -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100 -@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - sanitise_stdfd(); - - /* drop */ -- setegid(getgid()); -- setgid(getgid()); -+ (void) setegid(getgid()); -+ (void) setgid(getgid()); - - platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */ - -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100 -@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - - privsep_preauth_child(); - setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); -- if (box != NULL) -+ if (box != NULL) { - ssh_sandbox_child(box); -+ free(box); -+ } - - return 0; - } -@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so - if (num_listen_socks < 0) - break; - } -+ -+ if (fdset != NULL) -+ free(fdset); - } - - /* diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 181267c..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,608 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100 -@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h - SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper - SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat - CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest -+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs - SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ -@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ - MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ - INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ - --TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) -+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) - - XMSS_OBJS=\ - ssh-xmss.o \ -@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD - ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o - $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - -+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) - -@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files: - fi - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, -+ * including the disclaimer of warranties. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote -+ * products derived from this software without specific prior -+ * written permission. -+ * -+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of -+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 -+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is -+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and -+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED -+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF -+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE -+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR -+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT -+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR -+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF -+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE -+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -+ * DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "sshbuf.h" -+#include "sshkey.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "digest.h" -+ -+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex) -+{ -+ if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex) -+ return (hex - 48); -+ if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex) -+ return (hex - 55); -+ if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex) -+ return (hex - 87); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Convert hex representation into binary string -+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation -+ * @hexlen length of hex -+ * @bin output buffer with binary data -+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least -+ * half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted) -+ */ -+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen, -+ unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen) -+{ -+ size_t i = 0; -+ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) { -+ bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4; -+ bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]); -+ } -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex -+ * and convert hex into bin -+ * -+ * Caller must free bin -+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation -+ * @hexlen length of hex -+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer -+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin -+ * -+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise -+ */ -+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen, -+ unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen) -+{ -+ unsigned char *out = NULL; -+ size_t outlen = 0; -+ -+ if (!hexlen) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ -+ outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2; -+ -+ out = calloc(1, outlen); -+ if (!out) -+ return -errno; -+ -+ hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen); -+ *bin = out; -+ *binlen = outlen; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', -+ '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' }; -+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', -+ '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; -+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u) -+{ -+ if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l)) -+ return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin]; -+ return 'X'; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Convert binary string into hex representation -+ * @bin input buffer with binary data -+ * @binlen length of bin -+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data -+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least -+ * twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted) -+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case) -+ */ -+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen, -+ char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u) -+{ -+ size_t i = 0; -+ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) { -+ hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u); -+ hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u); -+ } -+} -+ -+struct kdf_cavs { -+ unsigned char *K; -+ size_t Klen; -+ unsigned char *H; -+ size_t Hlen; -+ unsigned char *session_id; -+ size_t session_id_len; -+ -+ unsigned int iv_len; -+ unsigned int ek_len; -+ unsigned int ik_len; -+}; -+ -+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test) -+{ -+ int ret = 0; -+ struct kex kex; -+ BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL; -+ int mode = 0; -+ struct newkeys *ctoskeys; -+ struct newkeys *stockeys; -+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL; -+ -+#define HEXOUTLEN 500 -+ char hex[HEXOUTLEN]; -+ -+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex)); -+ -+ Kbn = BN_new(); -+ BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn); -+ if (!Kbn) { -+ printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n"); -+ ret = 1; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ kex.session_id = test->session_id; -+ kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len; -+ -+ /* setup kex */ -+ -+ /* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */ -+ switch (test->ik_len) { -+ case 20: -+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; -+ break; -+ case 32: -+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; -+ break; -+ case 48: -+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384; -+ break; -+ case 64: -+ kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; -+ break; -+ default: -+ printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len); -+ ret = 1; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ /* implement choose_enc */ -+ for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) { -+ kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys)); -+ if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) { -+ printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n"); -+ ret = 1; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len; -+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len; -+ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16; -+ kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len; -+ } -+ -+ /* implement kex_choose_conf */ -+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len; -+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size) -+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size; -+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len) -+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len; -+ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len) -+ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len; -+ -+ /* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client -+ * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */ -+ kex.server = 1; -+ -+ /* do it */ -+ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){ -+ printf("Allocation error\n"); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ ssh->kex = &kex; -+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn); -+ -+ ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0]; -+ stockeys = kex.newkeys[1]; -+ -+ /* get data */ -+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); -+ bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len, -+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); -+ printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex); -+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); -+ bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len, -+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); -+ printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex); -+ -+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); -+ bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len, -+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); -+ printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex); -+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); -+ bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len, -+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); -+ printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex); -+ -+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); -+ bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len, -+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); -+ printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex); -+ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); -+ bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len, -+ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); -+ printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex); -+ -+out: -+ if (Kbn) -+ BN_free(Kbn); -+ if (ssh) -+ ssh_packet_close(ssh); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static void usage(void) -+{ -+ fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n"); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Test command example: -+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20 -+ * -+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a -+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308 -+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed -+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0 -+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640 -+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479 -+ */ -+int main(int argc, char *argv[]) -+{ -+ struct kdf_cavs test; -+ int ret = 1; -+ int opt = 0; -+ -+ memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs)); -+ while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1) -+ { -+ size_t len = 0; -+ switch(opt) -+ { -+ /* -+ * CAVS K is MPINT -+ * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the -+ * following transformations already happened): -+ * 1. cut off first four bytes -+ * 2. if most significant bit of value is -+ * 1, prepend 0 byte -+ */ -+ case 'K': -+ len = strlen(optarg); -+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len, -+ &test.K, &test.Klen); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ break; -+ case 'H': -+ len = strlen(optarg); -+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len, -+ &test.H, &test.Hlen); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ break; -+ case 's': -+ len = strlen(optarg); -+ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len, -+ &test.session_id, -+ &test.session_id_len); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ break; -+ case 'i': -+ test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); -+ break; -+ case 'e': -+ test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); -+ break; -+ case 'm': -+ test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); -+ break; -+ default: -+ usage(); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test); -+ -+out: -+ if (test.session_id) -+ free(test.session_id); -+ if (test.K) -+ free(test.K); -+ if (test.H) -+ free(test.H); -+ return ret; -+ -+} -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl ---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ -+#!/usr/bin/env perl -+# -+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH -+# -+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller -+# -+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy -+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal -+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights -+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell -+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is -+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: -+# -+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in -+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. -+# -+# NO WARRANTY -+# -+# BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY -+# FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN -+# OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES -+# PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED -+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS -+# TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE -+# PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, -+# REPAIR OR CORRECTION. -+# -+# IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING -+# WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR -+# REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, -+# INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING -+# OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED -+# TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY -+# YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER -+# PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE -+# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. -+# -+use strict; -+use warnings; -+use IPC::Open2; -+ -+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving -+# STDOUT -+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN -+# rest: program and args -+# returns: STDOUT of program as string -+sub pipe_through_program($@) { -+ my $in = shift; -+ my @args = @_; -+ -+ my ($CO, $CI); -+ my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args); -+ -+ my $out = ""; -+ my $len = length($in); -+ my $first = 1; -+ while (1) { -+ my $rin = ""; -+ my $win = ""; -+ # Output of prog is FD that we read -+ vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1; -+ # Input of prog is FD that we write -+ # check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input -+ # that is to be written to the app -+ if ( $len > 0 || $first) { -+ (vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1); -+ $first=0; -+ } -+ # Let us wait for 100ms -+ my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1); -+ if ( $wout ) { -+ my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len); -+ die "broken pipe" if !defined $written; -+ $len -= $written; -+ substr($in, 0, $written) = ""; -+ if ($len <= 0) { -+ close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!"; -+ } -+ } -+ if ( $rout ) { -+ my $tmp_out = ""; -+ my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096); -+ $out .= $tmp_out; -+ last if ($bytes_read == 0); -+ } -+ } -+ close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!"; -+ waitpid $pid, 0; -+ -+ return $out; -+} -+ -+# Parser of CAVS test vector file -+# $1: Test vector file -+# $2: Output file for test results -+# return: nothing -+sub parse($$) { -+ my $infile = shift; -+ my $outfile = shift; -+ -+ my $out = ""; -+ -+ my $K = ""; -+ my $H = ""; -+ my $session_id = ""; -+ my $ivlen = 0; -+ my $eklen = ""; -+ my $iklen = ""; -+ -+ open(IN, "<$infile"); -+ while() { -+ -+ my $line = $_; -+ chomp($line); -+ $line =~ s/\r//; -+ -+ if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) { -+ $iklen = 20; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) { -+ $iklen = 32; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) { -+ $iklen = 48; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) { -+ $iklen = 64; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) { -+ $ivlen = $1; -+ $ivlen = $ivlen / 8; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) { -+ $eklen = $1; -+ $eklen = $eklen / 8; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) { -+ $K = $1; -+ $K = substr($K, 8); -+ $K = "00" . $K; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) { -+ $H = $1; -+ } elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) { -+ $session_id = $1; -+ } -+ $out .= $line . "\n"; -+ -+ if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" && -+ $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) { -+ $out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen"); -+ -+ $K = ""; -+ $H = ""; -+ $session_id = ""; -+ } -+ } -+ close IN; -+ $out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file -+ open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?"; -+ print OUT $out; -+ close OUT; -+} -+ -+############################################################ -+# -+# let us pretend to be C :-) -+sub main() { -+ -+ my $infile=$ARGV[0]; -+ die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile); -+ -+ my $outfile = $infile; -+ # let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req -+ $outfile =~ s/\.req$//; -+ $outfile .= ".rsp"; -+ if (-f $outfile) { -+ die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?" -+ unless unlink($outfile); -+ } -+ print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n"; -+ -+ # Do the job -+ parse($infile, $outfile); -+} -+ -+########################################### -+# Call it -+main(); -+1; diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-ldap.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-ldap.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ee44fdb..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.7p1-ldap.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2742 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap openssh-6.8p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys ---- openssh-6.8p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.029801467 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys 2015-03-18 11:11:29.029801467 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ -+ -+HOW TO START -+ -+1) configure LDAP server -+ * Use LDAP server documentation -+2) add appropriate LDAP schema -+ * For OpenLDAP or SunONE Use attached schema, otherwise you have to create it. -+ * LDAP user entry -+ User entry: -+ - attached to the 'ldapPublicKey' objectclass -+ - attached to the 'posixAccount' objectclass -+ - with a filled 'sshPublicKey' attribute -+3) insert users into LDAP -+ * Use LDAP Tree management tool as useful -+ * Entry in the LDAP server must respect 'posixAccount' and 'ldapPublicKey' which are defined in core.schema and the additionnal lpk.schema. -+ * Example: -+ dn: uid=captain,ou=commanders,dc=enterprise,dc=universe -+ objectclass: top -+ objectclass: person -+ objectclass: organizationalPerson -+ objectclass: posixAccount -+ objectclass: ldapPublicKey -+ description: Jonathan Archer -+ userPassword: Porthos -+ cn: onathan Archer -+ sn: onathan Archer -+ uid: captain -+ uidNumber: 1001 -+ gidNumber: 1001 -+ homeDirectory: /home/captain -+ sshPublicKey: ssh-rss AAAAB3.... =captain@universe -+ sshPublicKey: command="kill -9 1" ssh-rss AAAAM5... -+4) on the ssh side set in sshd_config -+ * Set up the backend -+ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-wrapper -+ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser -+ * Do not forget to set -+ PubkeyAuthentication yes -+ * Swith off unnecessary auth methods -+5) confugure ldap.conf -+ * Default ldap.conf is placed in /etc/ssh -+ * The configuration style is the same as other ldap based aplications -+6) if necessary edit ssh-ldap-wrapper -+ * There is a possibility to change ldap.conf location -+ * There are some debug options -+ * Example -+ /usr/libexec/openssh -s -f /etc/ldap.conf -w -d >> /tmp/ldapdebuglog.txt -+7) Configure SELinux boolean which allows ldap-helper to bind ldap server -+ Run this command -+ # setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap on -+ -+HOW TO MIGRATE FROM LPK -+ -+1) goto HOW TO START 4) .... the ldap schema is the same -+ -+2) convert the group requests to the appropriate LDAP requests -+ -+HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS -+ -+1) use debug in sshd -+ * /usr/sbin/sshd -d -d -d -d -+2) use debug in ssh-ldap-helper -+ * ssh-ldap-helper -d -d -d -d -s -+3) use tcpdump ... other ldap client etc. -+ -+HOW TO CONFIGURE SSH FOR OTHER LDAP CONFIGURATION / SERVER /SCHEMA -+ -+You can adjust search format string in /etc/ldap.conf using -+ 1) SSH_Filter option to limit results for only specified users -+ (this appends search condition after original query) -+ 2) Search_Format option to define your own search string using expansion -+ characters %u for username, %c for objectclass and %f for above mentioned filter. -+ -+Example: -+Search_Format (&(objectclass=posixAccount)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%u)%f) -+ -+ADVANTAGES -+ -+1) Blocking an user account can be done directly from LDAP (if sshd is using PubkeyAuthentication + AuthorizedKeysCommand with ldap only). -+ -+DISADVANTAGES -+ -+1) LDAP must be well configured, getting the public key of some user is not a problem, but if anonymous LDAP -+ allows write to users dn, somebody could replace some user's public key by his own and impersonate some -+ of your users in all your server farm -- be VERY CAREFUL. -+2) With incomplete PKI the MITM attack when sshd is requesting the public key, could lead to a compromise of your servers allowing login -+ as the impersonated user. -+3) If LDAP server is down there may be no fallback on passwd auth. -+ -+MISC. -+ -+1) todo -+ * Possibility to reuse the ssh-ldap-helper. -+ * Tune the LDAP part to accept all possible LDAP configurations. -+ -+2) differences from original lpk -+ * No LDAP code in sshd. -+ * Support for various LDAP platforms and configurations. -+ * LDAP is configured in separate ldap.conf file. -+ -+3) docs/link -+ * http://pacsec.jp/core05/psj05-barisani-en.pdf -+ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/openssh-lpk/ -+ * http://fritz.potsdam.edu/projects/sshgate/ -+ * http://dev.inversepath.com/trac/openssh-lpk -+ * http://lam.sf.net/ ( http://lam.sourceforge.net/documentation/supportedSchemas.htm ) -+ -+4) contributors/ideas/greets -+ - Eric AUGE -+ - Andrea Barisani -+ - Falk Siemonsmeier. -+ - Jacob Rief. -+ - Michael Durchgraf. -+ - frederic peters. -+ - Finlay dobbie. -+ - Stefan Fisher. -+ - Robin H. Johnson. -+ - Adrian Bridgett. -+ -+5) Author -+ Jan F. Chadima -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ldap openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ldap 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-18 11:13:10.147561177 +0100 -@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh - ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass - SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server - SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign -+SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper -+SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper - SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ -@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ - CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ - CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ - LIBS=@LIBS@ -+LDAPLIBS=@LDAPLIBS@ - K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ - GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ - SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@ -@@ -61,8 +63,9 @@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ - EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ - MANFMT=@MANFMT@ - MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ -+INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@ - --TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) -+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) - - XMSS_OBJS=\ - ssh-xmss.o \ -@@ -112,8 +115,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw - sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \ - sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o - --MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out --MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 -+MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out ssh-ldap-helper.8.out ssh-ldap.conf.5.out -+MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 ssh-ldap-helper.8 ssh-ldap.conf.5 - MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ - - CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out -@@ -184,6 +187,9 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss - ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - -+ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o -+ $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) $(LDAPLIBS) -+ - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) - -@@ -311,6 +317,10 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -+ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \ -+ fi - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -@@ -327,6 +337,10 @@ install-files: - $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 - $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -+ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \ -+ fi - - install-sysconf: - $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) -@@ -356,6 +370,13 @@ install-sysconf: - else \ - echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ - fi -+ if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER)" ; then \ -+ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf ]; then \ -+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ldap.conf $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf; \ -+ else \ -+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ldap.conf already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ -+ fi ; \ -+ fi - - host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) - @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ -@@ -419,6 +440,8 @@ uninstall: - -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER)$(EXEEXT) - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 -@@ -430,6 +453,7 @@ uninstall: - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 - -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 - - regress-prep: - $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/configure.ac.ldap openssh-6.8p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-6.8p1/configure.ac.ldap 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/configure.ac 2015-03-18 11:11:29.030801464 +0100 -@@ -1605,6 +1605,110 @@ if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then - fi - fi - -+# Check whether user wants LDAP support -+LDAP_MSG="no" -+INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="" -+AC_ARG_WITH(ldap, -+ [ --with-ldap[[=PATH]] Enable LDAP pubkey support (optionally in PATH)], -+ [ -+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then -+ -+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER="yes" -+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DLDAP_DEPRECATED" -+ -+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then -+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" -+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" -+ fi -+ -+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_LDAP_PUBKEY], 1, [Enable LDAP pubkey support]) -+ LDAP_MSG="yes" -+ -+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(lber.h) -+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate )) -+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(ldap_ssl.h) -+ -+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldap-lib, -+ [ --with-ldap-lib=type select ldap library [auto|netscape5|netscape4|netscape3|umich|openldap]]) -+ -+ if test -z "$with_ldap_lib"; then -+ with_ldap_lib=auto -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = umich -o $with_ldap_lib = openldap \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(lber, main, LDAPLIBS="-llber $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap, main, LDAPLIBS="-lldap $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape5 \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap50, main, LDAPLIBS="-lldap50 -lssldap50 -lssl3 -lnss3 -lnspr4 -lprldap50 -lplc4 -lplds4 $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape4 \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl41, main, LDAPLIBS="-lldapssl41 -lplc3 -lplds3 -lnspr3 $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl40, main, LDAPLIBS="-lldapssl40 $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap41, main, LDAPLIBS="-lldap41 $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldap40, main, LDAPLIBS="-lldap40 $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib" -a \( $with_ldap_lib = auto -o $with_ldap_lib = netscape3 \); then -+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ldapssl30, main, LDAPLIBS="-lldapssl30 $LDAPLIBS" found_ldap_lib=yes) -+ fi -+ -+ if test -z "$found_ldap_lib"; then -+ AC_MSG_ERROR(could not locate a valid LDAP library) -+ fi -+ -+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS" -+ LIBS="$LIBS $LDAPLIBS" -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working LDAP support]) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include -+ #include ], -+ [(void)ldap_init(0, 0);], -+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], -+ [ -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) -+ AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldap libraries **]) -+ ]) -+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \ -+ ldap_init \ -+ ldap_get_lderrno \ -+ ldap_set_lderrno \ -+ ldap_parse_result \ -+ ldap_memfree \ -+ ldap_controls_free \ -+ ldap_set_option \ -+ ldap_get_option \ -+ ldapssl_init \ -+ ldap_start_tls_s \ -+ ldap_pvt_tls_set_option \ -+ ldap_initialize \ -+ ) -+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(ldap_set_rebind_proc, -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include -+ #include ], -+ [ldap_set_rebind_proc(0, 0, 0);], -+ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=3], -+ [ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc=2]) -+ AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc) -+ AC_DEFINE(LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS, $ac_cv_ldap_set_rebind_proc, [number arguments of ldap_set_rebind_proc]) -+ ) -+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS" -+ fi -+ ] -+) -+AC_SUBST(INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER) -+AC_SUBST(LDAPLIBS) -+ - dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ - Blowfish_initstate \ -@@ -5227,6 +5352,9 @@ - echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" - echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" - echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" -+if test ! -z "${LDAPLIBS}"; then -+echo " +for ldap: ${LDAPLIBS}" -+fi - if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then - echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" - fi -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.030801464 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.c 2015-03-18 11:11:29.030801464 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pka-ldap.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "ldapconf.h" -+#include "ldapbody.h" -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+static int config_debug = 0; -+int config_exclusive_config_file = 0; -+static char *config_file_name = "/etc/ssh/ldap.conf"; -+static char *config_single_user = NULL; -+static int config_verbose = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; -+int config_warning_config_file = 0; -+extern char *__progname; -+ -+static void -+usage(void) -+{ -+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options]\n", -+ __progname); -+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -d Output the log messages to stderr.\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -e Check the config file for unknown commands.\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -f file Use alternate config file (default is /etc/ssh/ldap.conf).\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -s user Do not demonize, send the user's key to stdout.\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -v Increase verbosity of the debug output (implies -d).\n"); -+ fprintf(stderr, " -w Warn on unknown commands in the config file.\n"); -+ exit(1); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Main program for the ssh pka ldap agent. -+ */ -+ -+int -+main(int ac, char **av) -+{ -+ int opt; -+ FILE *outfile = NULL; -+ -+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); -+ -+ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); -+ -+ /* -+ * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been -+ * set. -+ */ -+ initialize_options(); -+ -+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */ -+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "def:s:vw")) != -1) { -+ switch (opt) { -+ case 'd': -+ config_debug = 1; -+ break; -+ -+ case 'e': -+ config_exclusive_config_file = 1; -+ config_warning_config_file = 1; -+ break; -+ -+ case 'f': -+ config_file_name = optarg; -+ break; -+ -+ case 's': -+ config_single_user = optarg; -+ outfile = fdopen (dup (fileno (stdout)), "w"); -+ break; -+ -+ case 'v': -+ config_debug = 1; -+ if (config_verbose < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) -+ config_verbose++; -+ break; -+ -+ case 'w': -+ config_warning_config_file = 1; -+ break; -+ -+ case '?': -+ default: -+ usage(); -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* Initialize loging */ -+ log_init(__progname, config_verbose, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, config_debug); -+ -+ if (ac != optind) -+ fatal ("illegal extra parameter %s", av[1]); -+ -+ /* Ensure that fds 0 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ -+ if (config_debug == 0) -+ sanitise_stdfd(); -+ -+ /* Read config file */ -+ read_config_file(config_file_name); -+ fill_default_options(); -+ if (config_verbose == SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { -+ debug3 ("=== Configuration ==="); -+ dump_config(); -+ debug3 ("=== *** ==="); -+ } -+ -+ ldap_checkconfig(); -+ ldap_do_connect(); -+ -+ if (config_single_user) { -+ process_user (config_single_user, outfile); -+ } else { -+ usage(); -+ fatal ("Not yet implemented"); -+/* TODO -+ * open unix socket a run the loop on it -+ */ -+ } -+ -+ ldap_do_close(); -+ return 0; -+} -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldap-helper.h 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldap-helper.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAP_HELPER_H -+#define LDAP_HELPER_H -+ -+extern int config_exclusive_config_file; -+extern int config_warning_config_file; -+ -+#endif /* LDAP_HELPER_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldap.conf.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldap.conf ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldap.conf.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldap.conf 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ -+# $Id: openssh-5.5p1-ldap.patch,v 1.3 2010/07/07 13:48:36 jfch2222 Exp $ -+# -+# This is the example configuration file for the OpenSSH -+# LDAP backend -+# -+# see ssh-ldap.conf(5) -+# -+ -+# URI with your LDAP server name. This allows to use -+# Unix Domain Sockets to connect to a local LDAP Server. -+#uri ldap://127.0.0.1/ -+#uri ldaps://127.0.0.1/ -+#uri ldapi://%2fvar%2frun%2fldapi_sock/ -+# Note: %2f encodes the '/' used as directory separator -+ -+# Another way to specify your LDAP server is to provide an -+# host name and the port of our LDAP server. Host name -+# must be resolvable without using LDAP. -+# Multiple hosts may be specified, each separated by a -+# space. How long nss_ldap takes to failover depends on -+# whether your LDAP client library supports configurable -+# network or connect timeouts (see bind_timelimit). -+#host 127.0.0.1 -+ -+# The port. -+# Optional: default is 389. -+#port 389 -+ -+# The distinguished name to bind to the server with. -+# Optional: default is to bind anonymously. -+#binddn cn=openssh_keys,dc=example,dc=org -+ -+# The credentials to bind with. -+# Optional: default is no credential. -+#bindpw TopSecret -+ -+# The distinguished name of the search base. -+#base dc=example,dc=org -+ -+# The LDAP version to use (defaults to 3 -+# if supported by client library) -+#ldap_version 3 -+ -+# The search scope. -+#scope sub -+#scope one -+#scope base -+ -+# Search timelimit -+#timelimit 30 -+ -+# Bind/connect timelimit -+#bind_timelimit 30 -+ -+# Reconnect policy: hard (default) will retry connecting to -+# the software with exponential backoff, soft will fail -+# immediately. -+#bind_policy hard -+ -+# SSL setup, may be implied by URI also. -+#ssl no -+#ssl on -+#ssl start_tls -+ -+# OpenLDAP SSL options -+# Require and verify server certificate (yes/no) -+# Default is to use libldap's default behavior, which can be configured in -+# /etc/openldap/ldap.conf using the TLS_REQCERT setting. The default for -+# OpenLDAP 2.0 and earlier is "no", for 2.1 and later is "yes". -+#tls_checkpeer hard -+ -+# CA certificates for server certificate verification -+# At least one of these are required if tls_checkpeer is "yes" -+#tls_cacertfile /etc/ssl/ca.cert -+#tls_cacertdir /etc/pki/tls/certs -+ -+# Seed the PRNG if /dev/urandom is not provided -+#tls_randfile /var/run/egd-pool -+ -+# SSL cipher suite -+# See man ciphers for syntax -+#tls_ciphers TLSv1 -+ -+# Client certificate and key -+# Use these, if your server requires client authentication. -+#tls_cert -+#tls_key -+ -+# OpenLDAP search_format -+# format used to search for users in LDAP directory using substitution -+# for %u for user name and %f for SSH_Filter option (optional, empty by default) -+#search_format (&(objectclass=%c)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%u)%f) -+ -+#AccountClass posixAccount -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.c.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.c.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.c 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "ldapconf.h" -+#include "ldapmisc.h" -+#include "ldapbody.h" -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include "misc.h" -+ -+#define LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT "(&(objectclass=%c)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%u)%f)" -+#define PUBKEYATTR "sshPublicKey" -+#define LDAP_LOGFILE "%s/ldap.%d" -+ -+static FILE *logfile = NULL; -+static LDAP *ld; -+ -+static char *attrs[] = { -+ PUBKEYATTR, -+ NULL -+}; -+ -+void -+ldap_checkconfig (void) -+{ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE -+ if (options.host == NULL && options.uri == NULL) -+#else -+ if (options.host == NULL) -+#endif -+ fatal ("missing \"host\" in config file"); -+} -+ -+#if defined(LDAP_API_FEATURE_X_OPENLDAP) && (LDAP_API_VERSION > 2000) -+static int -+_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, LDAP_CONST char *url, int request, ber_int_t msgid) -+{ -+ struct timeval timeout; -+ int rc; -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ LDAPMessage *result; -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ -+ -+ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind to %s", options.binddn); -+ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ error ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; -+ } -+ } -+ -+#if !defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) || !defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ return ldap_simple_bind_s (ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw); -+#else -+ if (ldap_simple_bind(ld, options.binddn, options.bindpw) < 0) -+ fatal ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); -+ -+ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; -+ timeout.tv_usec = 0; -+ result = NULL; -+ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, 0, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { -+ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0))); -+ ldap_msgfree (result); -+ return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR; -+ } -+ debug3 ("LDAP rebind to %s succesfull", options.binddn); -+ return rc; -+#endif -+} -+#else -+ -+static int -+_rebind_proc (LDAP * ld, char **whop, char **credp, int *methodp, int freeit) -+{ -+ if (freeit) -+ return LDAP_SUCCESS; -+ -+ *whop = strdup (options.binddn); -+ *credp = strdup (options.bindpw); -+ *methodp = LDAP_AUTH_SIMPLE; -+ debug2 ("Doing LDAP rebind for %s", *whop); -+ return LDAP_SUCCESS; -+} -+#endif -+ -+void -+ldap_do_connect(void) -+{ -+ int rc, msgid, ld_errno = 0; -+ struct timeval timeout; -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ int parserc; -+ LDAPMessage *result; -+ LDAPControl **controls; -+ int reconnect = 0; -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT && HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE */ -+ -+ debug ("LDAP do connect"); -+ -+retry: -+ if (reconnect) { -+ debug3 ("Reconnecting with ld_errno %d", ld_errno); -+ if (options.bind_policy == 0 || -+ (ld_errno != LDAP_SERVER_DOWN && ld_errno != LDAP_TIMEOUT) || -+ reconnect > 5) -+ fatal ("Cannot connect to LDAP server"); -+ -+ if (reconnect > 1) -+ sleep (reconnect - 1); -+ -+ if (ld != NULL) { -+ ldap_unbind (ld); -+ ld = NULL; -+ } -+ logit("reconnecting to LDAP server..."); -+ } -+ -+ if (ld == NULL) { -+ int rc; -+ struct timeval tv; -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION -+ if (options.debug > 0) { -+#ifdef LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE -+ if (options.logdir) { -+ char *logfilename; -+ int logfilenamelen; -+ -+ logfilenamelen = strlen(LDAP_LOGFILE) -+ + strlen("000000") + strlen (options.logdir); -+ logfilename = xmalloc (logfilenamelen); -+ snprintf (logfilename, logfilenamelen, LDAP_LOGFILE, options.logdir, (int) getpid ()); -+ logfilename[logfilenamelen - 1] = 0; -+ if ((logfile = fopen (logfilename, "a")) == NULL) -+ fatal ("cannot append to %s: %s", logfilename, strerror (errno)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP debug into %s", logfilename); -+ free (logfilename); -+ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_LOG_PRINT_FILE, logfile); -+ } -+#endif -+ if (options.debug) { -+#ifdef LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL -+ ber_set_option (NULL, LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); -+#endif /* LBER_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ -+#ifdef LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL -+ (void) ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, &options.debug); -+#endif /* LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL */ -+ debug3 ("Set LDAP debug to %d", options.debug); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION */ -+ -+ ld = NULL; -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT -+ if (options.host != NULL) { -+ if (options.ssl_on == SSL_LDAPS) { -+ if ((rc = ldapssl_client_init (options.sslpath, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldapssl_client_init %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAPssl client init"); -+ } -+ -+ if (options.ssl_on != SSL_OFF) { -+ if ((ld = ldapssl_init (options.host, options.port, 1)) == NULL) -+ fatal ("ldapssl_init failed"); -+ debug3 ("LDAPssl init"); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAPSSL_INIT */ -+ -+ /* continue with opening */ -+ if (ld == NULL) { -+#if defined (HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S) || (defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS)) -+ /* Some global TLS-specific options need to be set before we create our -+ * session context, so we set them here. */ -+ -+#ifdef LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE -+ /* rand file */ -+ if (options.tls_randfile != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE, -+ options.tls_randfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS random file %s", options.tls_randfile); -+ } -+#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_RANDOM_FILE */ -+ -+ /* ca cert file */ -+ if (options.tls_cacertfile != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE, -+ options.tls_cacertfile)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ error ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert file %s ", options.tls_cacertfile); -+ } -+ -+ /* ca cert directory */ -+ if (options.tls_cacertdir != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR, -+ options.tls_cacertdir)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTDIR): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS CA cert dir %s ", options.tls_cacertdir); -+ } -+ -+ /* require cert? */ -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT, -+ &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_REQUIRE_CERT): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS check peer to %d ", options.tls_checkpeer); -+ -+ /* set cipher suite, certificate and private key: */ -+ if (options.tls_ciphers != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE, -+ options.tls_ciphers)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CIPHER_SUITE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS ciphers to %s ", options.tls_ciphers); -+ } -+ -+ /* cert file */ -+ if (options.tls_cert != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE, -+ options.tls_cert)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CERTFILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS cert file %s ", options.tls_cert); -+ } -+ -+ /* key file */ -+ if (options.tls_key != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE, -+ options.tls_key)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_KEYFILE): %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("Set TLS key file %s ", options.tls_key); -+ } -+#endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE -+ if (options.uri != NULL) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_initialize (&ld, options.uri)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_initialize %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP initialize %s", options.uri); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INTITIALIZE */ -+ -+ /* continue with opening */ -+ if ((ld == NULL) && (options.host != NULL)) { -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INIT -+ if ((ld = ldap_init (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) -+ fatal ("ldap_init failed"); -+ debug3 ("LDAP init %s:%d", options.host, options.port); -+#else -+ if ((ld = ldap_open (options.host, options.port)) == NULL) -+ fatal ("ldap_open failed"); -+ debug3 ("LDAP open %s:%d", options.host, options.port); -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_INIT */ -+ } -+ -+ if (ld == NULL) -+ fatal ("no way to open ldap"); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) -+ if (options.ssl == SSL_LDAPS) { -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS, &options.tls_checkpeer)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_set_option(LDAP_OPT_X_TLS) %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_%d", options.tls_checkpeer); -+ } -+#endif /* LDAP_OPT_X_TLS */ -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, -+ &options.ldap_version); -+#else -+ ld->ld_version = options.ldap_version; -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", options.ldap_version); -+ -+#if LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 3 -+ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc, NULL); -+#elif LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS == 2 -+ ldap_set_rebind_proc (ld, _rebind_proc); -+#else -+#warning unknown LDAP_SET_REBIND_PROC_ARGS -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set rebind proc"); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_DEREF) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_DEREF, &options.deref); -+#else -+ ld->ld_deref = options.deref; -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set deref to %d", options.deref); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_TIMELIMIT, -+ &options.timelimit); -+#else -+ ld->ld_timelimit = options.timelimit; -+#endif -+ debug3 ("LDAP set timelimit to %d", options.timelimit); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT) -+ /* -+ * This is a new option in the Netscape SDK which sets -+ * the TCP connect timeout. For want of a better value, -+ * we use the bind_timelimit to control this. -+ */ -+ timeout = options.bind_timelimit * 1000; -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_X_OPT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, &timeout); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set opt connect timeout to %d", timeout); -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT) -+ tv.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; -+ tv.tv_usec = 0; -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &tv); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set opt network timeout to %ld.0", tv.tv_sec); -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, -+ options.referrals ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set referrals to %d", options.referrals); -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_RESTART) -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESTART, -+ options.restart ? LDAP_OPT_ON : LDAP_OPT_OFF); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set restart to %d", options.restart); -+#endif -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S -+ if (options.ssl == SSL_START_TLS) { -+ int version; -+ -+ if (ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &version) -+ == LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ if (version < LDAP_VERSION3) { -+ version = LDAP_VERSION3; -+ (void) ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, -+ &version); -+ debug3 ("LDAP set version to %d", version); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if ((rc = ldap_start_tls_s (ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_starttls_s: %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP start TLS"); -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S */ -+ } -+ -+ if ((msgid = ldap_simple_bind (ld, options.binddn, -+ options.bindpw)) == -1) { -+ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); -+ -+ error ("ldap_simple_bind %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); -+ reconnect++; -+ goto retry; -+ } -+ debug3 ("LDAP simple bind (%s)", options.binddn); -+ -+ timeout.tv_sec = options.bind_timelimit; -+ timeout.tv_usec = 0; -+ if ((rc = ldap_result (ld, msgid, 0, &timeout, &result)) < 1) { -+ ld_errno = ldap_get_lderrno (ld, 0, 0); -+ -+ error ("ldap_result %s", ldap_err2string (ld_errno)); -+ reconnect++; -+ goto retry; -+ } -+ debug3 ("LDAP result in time"); -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_PARSE_RESULT) && defined(HAVE_LDAP_CONTROLS_FREE) -+ controls = NULL; -+ if ((parserc = ldap_parse_result (ld, result, &rc, 0, 0, 0, &controls, 1)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_parse_result %s", ldap_err2string (parserc)); -+ debug3 ("LDAP parse result OK"); -+ -+ if (controls != NULL) { -+ ldap_controls_free (controls); -+ } -+#else -+ rc = ldap_result2error (session->ld, result, 1); -+#endif -+ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("error trying to bind as user \"%s\" (%s)", -+ options.binddn, ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ -+ debug2 ("LDAP do connect OK"); -+} -+ -+void -+process_user (const char *user, FILE *output) -+{ -+ LDAPMessage *res, *e; -+ char *buffer, *format; -+ int rc, i; -+ struct timeval timeout; -+ -+ debug ("LDAP process user"); -+ -+ /* quick check for attempts to be evil */ -+ if ((strchr(user, '(') != NULL) || (strchr(user, ')') != NULL) || -+ (strchr(user, '*') != NULL) || (strchr(user, '\\') != NULL)) { -+ logit ("illegal user name %s not processed", user); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* build filter for LDAP request */ -+ format = LDAPSEARCH_FORMAT; -+ if (options.search_format != NULL) -+ format = options.search_format; -+ buffer = percent_expand(format, "c", options.account_class, "u", user, "f", options.ssh_filter, (char *)NULL); -+ -+ debug3 ("LDAP search scope = %d %s", options.scope, buffer); -+ -+ timeout.tv_sec = options.timelimit; -+ timeout.tv_usec = 0; -+ if ((rc = ldap_search_st(ld, options.base, options.scope, buffer, attrs, 0, &timeout, &res)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ error ("ldap_search_st(): %s", ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ free (buffer); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* free */ -+ free (buffer); -+ -+ for (e = ldap_first_entry(ld, res); e != NULL; e = ldap_next_entry(ld, e)) { -+ int num; -+ struct berval **keys; -+ -+ keys = ldap_get_values_len(ld, e, PUBKEYATTR); -+ num = ldap_count_values_len(keys); -+ for (i = 0 ; i < num ; i++) { -+ char *cp; //, *options = NULL; -+ -+ for (cp = keys[i]->bv_val; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); -+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') -+ continue; -+ -+ /* We have found the desired key. */ -+ fprintf (output, "%s\n", keys[i]->bv_val); -+ } -+ -+ ldap_value_free_len(keys); -+ } -+ -+ ldap_msgfree(res); -+ debug2 ("LDAP process user finished"); -+} -+ -+void -+ldap_do_close(void) -+{ -+ int rc; -+ -+ debug ("LDAP do close"); -+ if ((rc = ldap_unbind_ext(ld, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ fatal ("ldap_unbind_ext: %s", -+ ldap_err2string (rc)); -+ -+ ld = NULL; -+ debug2 ("LDAP do close OK"); -+ return; -+} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.h.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.h.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldapbody.h 2015-03-18 11:11:29.031801462 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPBODY_H -+#define LDAPBODY_H -+ -+#include -+ -+void ldap_checkconfig(void); -+void ldap_do_connect(void); -+void process_user(const char *, FILE *); -+void ldap_do_close(void); -+ -+#endif /* LDAPBODY_H */ -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.c.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.c.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.c 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,729 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "ldap-helper.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "ldapconf.h" -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+/* Keyword tokens. */ -+ -+typedef enum { -+ lBadOption, -+ lHost, lURI, lBase, lBindDN, lBindPW, lRootBindDN, -+ lScope, lDeref, lPort, lTimeLimit, lBind_TimeLimit, -+ lLdap_Version, lBind_Policy, lSSLPath, lSSL, lReferrals, -+ lRestart, lTLS_CheckPeer, lTLS_CaCertFile, -+ lTLS_CaCertDir, lTLS_Ciphers, lTLS_Cert, lTLS_Key, -+ lTLS_RandFile, lLogDir, lDebug, lSSH_Filter, lSearch_Format, -+ lAccountClass, lDeprecated, lUnsupported -+} OpCodes; -+ -+/* Textual representations of the tokens. */ -+ -+static struct { -+ const char *name; -+ OpCodes opcode; -+} keywords[] = { -+ { "URI", lURI }, -+ { "Base", lBase }, -+ { "BindDN", lBindDN }, -+ { "BindPW", lBindPW }, -+ { "RootBindDN", lRootBindDN }, -+ { "Host", lHost }, -+ { "Port", lPort }, -+ { "Scope", lScope }, -+ { "Deref", lDeref }, -+ { "TimeLimit", lTimeLimit }, -+ { "TimeOut", lTimeLimit }, -+ { "Bind_Timelimit", lBind_TimeLimit }, -+ { "Network_TimeOut", lBind_TimeLimit }, -+/* -+ * Todo -+ * SIZELIMIT -+ */ -+ { "Ldap_Version", lLdap_Version }, -+ { "Version", lLdap_Version }, -+ { "Bind_Policy", lBind_Policy }, -+ { "SSLPath", lSSLPath }, -+ { "SSL", lSSL }, -+ { "Referrals", lReferrals }, -+ { "Restart", lRestart }, -+ { "TLS_CheckPeer", lTLS_CheckPeer }, -+ { "TLS_ReqCert", lTLS_CheckPeer }, -+ { "TLS_CaCertFile", lTLS_CaCertFile }, -+ { "TLS_CaCert", lTLS_CaCertFile }, -+ { "TLS_CaCertDir", lTLS_CaCertDir }, -+ { "TLS_Ciphers", lTLS_Ciphers }, -+ { "TLS_Cipher_Suite", lTLS_Ciphers }, -+ { "TLS_Cert", lTLS_Cert }, -+ { "TLS_Certificate", lTLS_Cert }, -+ { "TLS_Key", lTLS_Key }, -+ { "TLS_RandFile", lTLS_RandFile }, -+/* -+ * Todo -+ * TLS_CRLCHECK -+ * TLS_CRLFILE -+ */ -+ { "LogDir", lLogDir }, -+ { "Debug", lDebug }, -+ { "SSH_Filter", lSSH_Filter }, -+ { "search_format", lSearch_Format }, -+ { "AccountClass", lAccountClass }, -+ { NULL, lBadOption } -+}; -+ -+/* Configuration ptions. */ -+ -+Options options; -+ -+/* -+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. -+ */ -+ -+static OpCodes -+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum) -+{ -+ u_int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) -+ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) -+ return keywords[i].opcode; -+ -+ if (config_warning_config_file) -+ logit("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", -+ filename, linenum, cp); -+ return lBadOption; -+} -+ -+/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ -+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" -+ -+/* return next token in configuration line */ -+static char * -+ldap_strdelim(char **s) -+{ -+ char *old; -+ int wspace = 0; -+ -+ if (*s == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ old = *s; -+ -+ *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE); -+ if (*s == NULL) -+ return (old); -+ -+ *s[0] = '\0'; -+ -+ /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ -+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; -+ if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace) -+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; -+ -+ return (old); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This -+ * only sets those values that have not already been set. -+ */ -+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" -+ -+static int -+process_config_line(char *line, const char *filename, int linenum) -+{ -+ char *s, **charptr, **xstringptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg; -+ char *rootbinddn = NULL; -+ int opcode, *intptr, value; -+ size_t len; -+ -+ /* Strip trailing whitespace */ -+ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { -+ if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) -+ break; -+ line[len] = '\0'; -+ } -+ -+ s = line; -+ /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ -+ if ((keyword = ldap_strdelim(&s)) == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ -+ if (*keyword == '\0') -+ keyword = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') -+ return 0; -+ -+ opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum); -+ -+ switch (opcode) { -+ case lBadOption: -+ /* don't panic, but count bad options */ -+ return -1; -+ /* NOTREACHED */ -+ -+ case lHost: -+ xstringptr = &options.host; -+parse_xstring: -+ if (!s || *s == '\0') -+ fatal("%s line %d: missing dn",filename,linenum); -+ if (*xstringptr == NULL) -+ *xstringptr = xstrdup(s); -+ return 0; -+ -+ case lURI: -+ xstringptr = &options.uri; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lBase: -+ xstringptr = &options.base; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lBindDN: -+ xstringptr = &options.binddn; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lBindPW: -+ charptr = &options.bindpw; -+parse_string: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*charptr == NULL) -+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); -+ break; -+ -+ case lRootBindDN: -+ xstringptr = &rootbinddn; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lScope: -+ intptr = &options.scope; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp (arg, "sub") == 0 || strcasecmp (arg, "subtree") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; -+ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "one") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL; -+ else if (strcasecmp (arg, "base") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad sub/one/base argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lDeref: -+ intptr = &options.scope; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (!strcasecmp (arg, "never")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "searching")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "finding")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_FINDING; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "always")) -+ value = LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/searching/finding/always argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lPort: -+ intptr = &options.port; -+parse_int: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); -+ -+ /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ -+ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); -+ if (arg == endofnumber) -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lTimeLimit: -+ intptr = &options.timelimit; -+parse_time: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) -+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lBind_TimeLimit: -+ intptr = &options.bind_timelimit; -+ goto parse_time; -+ -+ case lLdap_Version: -+ intptr = &options.ldap_version; -+ goto parse_int; -+ -+ case lBind_Policy: -+ intptr = &options.bind_policy; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_open") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "hard_init") == 0) -+ value = 1; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "soft") == 0) -+ value = 0; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad soft/hard argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lSSLPath: -+ charptr = &options.sslpath; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lSSL: -+ intptr = &options.ssl; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) -+ value = SSL_LDAPS; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) -+ value = SSL_OFF; -+ else if (!strcasecmp (arg, "start_tls")) -+ value = SSL_START_TLS; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no/start_tls argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lReferrals: -+ intptr = &options.referrals; -+parse_flag: -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) -+ value = 1; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) -+ value = 0; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lRestart: -+ intptr = &options.restart; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case lTLS_CheckPeer: -+ intptr = &options.tls_checkpeer; -+ arg = ldap_strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); -+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */ -+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "never") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "false") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "off") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "hard") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "true") == 0 || strcasecmp(arg, "on") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "demand") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "allow") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW; -+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "try") == 0) -+ value = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY; -+ else -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad never/hard/demand/alow/try argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*intptr == -1) -+ *intptr = value; -+ break; -+ -+ case lTLS_CaCertFile: -+ charptr = &options.tls_cacertfile; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_CaCertDir: -+ charptr = &options.tls_cacertdir; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_Ciphers: -+ xstringptr = &options.tls_ciphers; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lTLS_Cert: -+ charptr = &options.tls_cert; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_Key: -+ charptr = &options.tls_key; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lTLS_RandFile: -+ charptr = &options.tls_randfile; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lLogDir: -+ charptr = &options.logdir; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lDebug: -+ intptr = &options.debug; -+ goto parse_int; -+ -+ case lSSH_Filter: -+ xstringptr = &options.ssh_filter; -+ goto parse_xstring; -+ -+ case lSearch_Format: -+ charptr = &options.search_format; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lAccountClass: -+ charptr = &options.account_class; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case lDeprecated: -+ debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", -+ filename, linenum, keyword); -+ return 0; -+ -+ case lUnsupported: -+ error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", -+ filename, linenum, keyword); -+ return 0; -+ -+ default: -+ fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode); -+ } -+ -+ /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ -+ if ((arg = ldap_strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", -+ filename, linenum, arg); -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options -+ * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if -+ * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. -+ */ -+ -+void -+read_config_file(const char *filename) -+{ -+ FILE *f; -+ char line[1024]; -+ int linenum; -+ int bad_options = 0; -+ struct stat sb; -+ -+ if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) -+ fatal("fopen %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); -+ -+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) -+ fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); -+ if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || -+ (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) -+ fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); -+ -+ debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); -+ -+ /* -+ * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned -+ * on/off by Host specifications. -+ */ -+ linenum = 0; -+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { -+ /* Update line number counter. */ -+ linenum++; -+ if (process_config_line(line, filename, linenum) != 0) -+ bad_options++; -+ } -+ fclose(f); -+ if ((bad_options > 0) && config_exclusive_config_file) -+ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", -+ filename, bad_options); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet -+ * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options -+ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, -+ * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. -+ */ -+ -+void -+initialize_options(void) -+{ -+ memset(&options, 'X', sizeof(options)); -+ options.host = NULL; -+ options.uri = NULL; -+ options.base = NULL; -+ options.binddn = NULL; -+ options.bindpw = NULL; -+ options.scope = -1; -+ options.deref = -1; -+ options.port = -1; -+ options.timelimit = -1; -+ options.bind_timelimit = -1; -+ options.ldap_version = -1; -+ options.bind_policy = -1; -+ options.sslpath = NULL; -+ options.ssl = -1; -+ options.referrals = -1; -+ options.restart = -1; -+ options.tls_checkpeer = -1; -+ options.tls_cacertfile = NULL; -+ options.tls_cacertdir = NULL; -+ options.tls_ciphers = NULL; -+ options.tls_cert = NULL; -+ options.tls_key = NULL; -+ options.tls_randfile = NULL; -+ options.logdir = NULL; -+ options.debug = -1; -+ options.ssh_filter = NULL; -+ options.search_format = NULL; -+ options.account_class = NULL; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those -+ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. -+ */ -+ -+void -+fill_default_options(void) -+{ -+ if (options.uri != NULL) { -+ LDAPURLDesc *ludp; -+ -+ if (ldap_url_parse(options.uri, &ludp) == LDAP_SUCCESS) { -+ if (options.ssl == -1) { -+ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap") == 0) -+ options.ssl = 2; -+ if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldapi") == 0) -+ options.ssl = 0; -+ else if (strcmp (ludp->lud_scheme, "ldaps") == 0) -+ options.ssl = 1; -+ } -+ if (options.host == NULL) -+ options.host = xstrdup (ludp->lud_host); -+ if (options.port == -1) -+ options.port = ludp->lud_port; -+ -+ ldap_free_urldesc (ludp); -+ } -+ } -+ if (options.ssl == -1) -+ options.ssl = SSL_START_TLS; -+ if (options.port == -1) -+ options.port = (options.ssl == 0) ? 389 : 636; -+ if (options.uri == NULL) { -+ int len; -+#define MAXURILEN 4096 -+ -+ options.uri = xmalloc (MAXURILEN); -+ len = snprintf (options.uri, MAXURILEN, "ldap%s://%s:%d", -+ (options.ssl == 0) ? "" : "s", options.host, options.port); -+ options.uri[MAXURILEN - 1] = 0; -+ options.uri = xreallocarray(options.uri, len + 1, 1); -+ } -+ if (options.binddn == NULL) -+ options.binddn = ""; -+ if (options.bindpw == NULL) -+ options.bindpw = ""; -+ if (options.scope == -1) -+ options.scope = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE; -+ if (options.deref == -1) -+ options.deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; -+ if (options.timelimit == -1) -+ options.timelimit = 10; -+ if (options.bind_timelimit == -1) -+ options.bind_timelimit = 10; -+ if (options.ldap_version == -1) -+ options.ldap_version = 3; -+ if (options.bind_policy == -1) -+ options.bind_policy = 1; -+ if (options.referrals == -1) -+ options.referrals = 1; -+ if (options.restart == -1) -+ options.restart = 1; -+ if (options.tls_checkpeer == -1) -+ options.tls_checkpeer = LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD; -+ if (options.debug == -1) -+ options.debug = 0; -+ if (options.ssh_filter == NULL) -+ options.ssh_filter = ""; -+ if (options.account_class == NULL) -+ options.account_class = "posixAccount"; -+} -+ -+static const char * -+lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) -+{ -+ u_int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) -+ if (keywords[i].opcode == code) -+ return(keywords[i].name); -+ return "UNKNOWN"; -+} -+ -+static void -+dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) -+{ -+ if (val == NULL) -+ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); -+ else -+ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); -+} -+ -+static void -+dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) -+{ -+ if (val == -1) -+ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); -+ else -+ debug3("%s %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); -+} -+ -+struct names { -+ int value; -+ char *name; -+}; -+ -+static void -+dump_cfg_namedint(OpCodes code, int val, struct names *names) -+{ -+ u_int i; -+ -+ if (val == -1) -+ debug3("%s ", lookup_opcode_name(code)); -+ else { -+ for (i = 0; names[i].value != -1; i++) -+ if (names[i].value == val) { -+ debug3("%s %s", lookup_opcode_name(code), names[i].name); -+ return; -+ } -+ debug3("%s unknown: %d", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); -+ } -+} -+ -+static struct names _yesnotls[] = { -+ { 0, "No" }, -+ { 1, "Yes" }, -+ { 2, "Start_TLS" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _scope[] = { -+ { LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, "Base" }, -+ { LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL, "One" }, -+ { LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE, "Sub"}, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _deref[] = { -+ { LDAP_DEREF_NEVER, "Never" }, -+ { LDAP_DEREF_SEARCHING, "Searching" }, -+ { LDAP_DEREF_FINDING, "Finding" }, -+ { LDAP_DEREF_ALWAYS, "Always" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _yesno[] = { -+ { 0, "No" }, -+ { 1, "Yes" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _bindpolicy[] = { -+ { 0, "Soft" }, -+ { 1, "Hard" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+static struct names _checkpeer[] = { -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_NEVER, "Never" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_HARD, "Hard" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_DEMAND, "Demand" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_ALLOW, "Allow" }, -+ { LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_TRY, "TRY" }, -+ { -1, NULL }}; -+ -+void -+dump_config(void) -+{ -+ dump_cfg_string(lURI, options.uri); -+ dump_cfg_string(lHost, options.host); -+ dump_cfg_int(lPort, options.port); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lSSL, options.ssl, _yesnotls); -+ dump_cfg_int(lLdap_Version, options.ldap_version); -+ dump_cfg_int(lTimeLimit, options.timelimit); -+ dump_cfg_int(lBind_TimeLimit, options.bind_timelimit); -+ dump_cfg_string(lBase, options.base); -+ dump_cfg_string(lBindDN, options.binddn); -+ dump_cfg_string(lBindPW, options.bindpw); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lScope, options.scope, _scope); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lDeref, options.deref, _deref); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lReferrals, options.referrals, _yesno); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lRestart, options.restart, _yesno); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lBind_Policy, options.bind_policy, _bindpolicy); -+ dump_cfg_string(lSSLPath, options.sslpath); -+ dump_cfg_namedint(lTLS_CheckPeer, options.tls_checkpeer, _checkpeer); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertFile, options.tls_cacertfile); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_CaCertDir, options.tls_cacertdir); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Ciphers, options.tls_ciphers); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Cert, options.tls_cert); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_Key, options.tls_key); -+ dump_cfg_string(lTLS_RandFile, options.tls_randfile); -+ dump_cfg_string(lLogDir, options.logdir); -+ dump_cfg_int(lDebug, options.debug); -+ dump_cfg_string(lSSH_Filter, options.ssh_filter); -+ dump_cfg_string(lSearch_Format, options.search_format); -+ dump_cfg_string(lAccountClass, options.account_class); -+} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.h.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.h.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldapconf.h 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPCONF_H -+#define LDAPCONF_H -+ -+#define SSL_OFF 0 -+#define SSL_LDAPS 1 -+#define SSL_START_TLS 2 -+ -+/* Data structure for representing option data. */ -+ -+typedef struct { -+ char *host; -+ char *uri; -+ char *base; -+ char *binddn; -+ char *bindpw; -+ int scope; -+ int deref; -+ int port; -+ int timelimit; -+ int bind_timelimit; -+ int ldap_version; -+ int bind_policy; -+ char *sslpath; -+ int ssl; -+ int referrals; -+ int restart; -+ int tls_checkpeer; -+ char *tls_cacertfile; -+ char *tls_cacertdir; -+ char *tls_ciphers; -+ char *tls_cert; -+ char *tls_key; -+ char *tls_randfile; -+ char *logdir; -+ int debug; -+ char *ssh_filter; -+ char *search_format; -+ char *account_class; -+} Options; -+ -+extern Options options; -+ -+void read_config_file(const char *); -+void initialize_options(void); -+void fill_default_options(void); -+void dump_config(void); -+ -+#endif /* LDAPCONF_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldapincludes.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldapincludes.h 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPINCLUDES_H -+#define LDAPINCLUDES_H -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LBER_H -+#include -+#endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_H -+#include -+#endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SSL_H -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#endif /* LDAPINCLUDES_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.c 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+#include "ldapmisc.h" -+ -+#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_GET_LDERRNO -+int -+ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP * ld, char **m, char **s) -+{ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION -+ int rc; -+#endif -+ int lderrno; -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) -+ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ lderrno = ld->ld_errno; -+#endif -+ -+ if (s != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) -+ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ *s = ld->ld_error; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ if (m != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_GET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) -+ if ((rc = ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ *m = ld->ld_matched; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ return lderrno; -+} -+#endif -+ -+#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_SET_LDERRNO -+int -+ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP * ld, int lderrno, const char *m, const char *s) -+{ -+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION -+ int rc; -+#endif -+ -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER) -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &lderrno)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ ld->ld_errno = lderrno; -+#endif -+ -+ if (s != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING) -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING, s)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ ld->ld_error = s; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ if (m != NULL) { -+#if defined(HAVE_LDAP_SET_OPTION) && defined(LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN) -+ if ((rc = ldap_set_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_MATCHED_DN, m)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) -+ return rc; -+#else -+ ld->ld_matched = m; -+#endif -+ } -+ -+ return LDAP_SUCCESS; -+} -+#endif -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ldapmisc.h 2015-03-18 11:11:29.032801460 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ -+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef LDAPMISC_H -+#define LDAPMISC_H -+ -+#include "ldapincludes.h" -+ -+int ldap_get_lderrno (LDAP *, char **, char **); -+int ldap_set_lderrno (LDAP *, int, const char *, const char *); -+ -+#endif /* LDAPMISC_H */ -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema ---- openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ -+# -+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey -+# useful with PKA-LDAP also -+# -+# Author: Eric AUGE -+# -+# Based on the proposal of : Mark Ruijter -+# -+ -+ -+# octetString SYNTAX -+attributetype ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' -+ EQUALITY octetStringMatch -+ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) -+ -+# printableString SYNTAX yes|no -+objectclass ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' -+ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) -+ ) -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema ---- openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ -+# -+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey -+# useful with PKA-LDAP also -+# -+# Author: Eric AUGE -+# -+# Schema for Sun Directory Server. -+# Based on the original schema, modified by Stefan Fischer. -+# -+ -+dn: cn=schema -+ -+# octetString SYNTAX -+attributeTypes: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 NAME 'sshPublicKey' -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' -+ EQUALITY octetStringMatch -+ SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) -+ -+# printableString SYNTAX yes|no -+objectClasses: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 NAME 'ldapPublicKey' SUP top AUXILIARY -+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' -+ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) -+ ) -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ -+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap-helper.8,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ -+.\" -+.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+.\" -+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+.\" -+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+.\" -+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 29 2010 $ -+.Dt SSH-LDAP-HELPER 8 -+.Os -+.Sh NAME -+.Nm ssh-ldap-helper -+.Nd sshd helper program for ldap support -+.Sh SYNOPSIS -+.Nm ssh-ldap-helper -+.Op Fl devw -+.Op Fl f Ar file -+.Op Fl s Ar user -+.Sh DESCRIPTION -+.Nm -+is used by -+.Xr sshd 1 -+to access keys provided by an LDAP. -+.Nm -+is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the -+sshd configuration file -+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config -+by setting -+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand -+to -+.Dq /usr/libexec/ssh-ldap-wrapper . -+.Pp -+.Nm -+is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from -+.Xr sshd 8 via -+.Xr ssh-ldap-wrapper . -+.Pp -+The options are as follows: -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -+.It Fl d -+Set the debug mode; -+.Nm -+prints all logs to stderr instead of syslog. -+.It Fl e -+Implies \-w; -+.Nm -+halts if it encounters an unknown item in the ldap.conf file. -+.It Fl f -+.Nm -+uses this file as the ldap configuration file instead of /etc/ssh/ldap.conf (default). -+.It Fl s -+.Nm -+prints out the user's keys to stdout and exits. -+.It Fl v -+Implies \-d; -+increases verbosity. -+.It Fl w -+.Nm -+writes warnings about unknown items in the ldap.conf configuration file. -+.El -+.Sh SEE ALSO -+.Xr sshd 8 , -+.Xr sshd_config 5 , -+.Xr ssh-ldap.conf 5 , -+.Sh HISTORY -+.Nm -+first appeared in -+OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . -+.Sh AUTHORS -+.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper ---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ -+#!/bin/sh -+ -+exec /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-helper -s "$1" -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5 2015-03-18 11:11:29.033801457 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ -+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap.conf.5,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $ -+.\" -+.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved. -+.\" -+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+.\" -+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+.\" -+.Dd $Mdocdate: may 12 2010 $ -+.Dt SSH-LDAP.CONF 5 -+.Os -+.Sh NAME -+.Nm ssh-ldap.conf -+.Nd configuration file for ssh-ldap-helper -+.Sh SYNOPSIS -+.Nm /etc/ssh/ldap.conf -+.Sh DESCRIPTION -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+reads configuration data from -+.Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf -+(or the file specified with -+.Fl f -+on the command line). -+The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. -+Lines starting with -+.Ql # -+and empty lines are interpreted as comments. -+.Pp -+The value starts with the first non-blank character after -+the keyword's name, and terminates at the end of the line, -+or at the last sequence of blanks before the end of the line. -+Quoting values that contain blanks -+may be incorrect, as the quotes would become part of the value. -+The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that -+keywords are case-insensitive, and arguments, on a case by case basis, may be case-sensitive). -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -+.It Cm URI -+The argument(s) are in the form -+.Pa ldap[si]://[name[:port]] -+and specify the URI(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+should connect. The URI scheme may be any of -+.Dq ldap , -+.Dq ldaps -+or -+.Dq ldapi , -+which refer to LDAP over TCP, LDAP over SSL (TLS) and LDAP -+over IPC (UNIX domain sockets), respectively. -+Each server's name can be specified as a -+domain-style name or an IP address literal. Optionally, the -+server's name can followed by a ':' and the port number the LDAP -+server is listening on. If no port number is provided, the default -+port for the scheme is used (389 for ldap://, 636 for ldaps://). -+For LDAP over IPC, name is the name of the socket, and no port -+is required, nor allowed; note that directory separators must be -+URL-encoded, like any other characters that are special to URLs; -+A space separated list of URIs may be provided. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm Base -+Specifies the default base Distinguished Name (DN) to use when performing ldap operations. -+The base must be specified as a DN in LDAP format. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm BindDN -+Specifies the default BIND DN to use when connecting to the ldap server. -+The bind DN must be specified as a Distinguished Name in LDAP format. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm BindPW -+Specifies the default password to use when connecting to the ldap server via -+.Cm BindDN . -+There is no default. -+.It Cm RootBindDN -+Intentionaly does nothing. Recognized for compatibility reasons. -+.It Cm Host -+The argument(s) specifies the name(s) of an LDAP server(s) to which the -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+should connect. Each server's name can be specified as a -+domain-style name or an IP address and optionally followed by a ':' and -+the port number the ldap server is listening on. A space-separated -+list of hosts may be provided. -+There is no default. -+.Cm Host -+is deprecated in favor of -+.Cm URI . -+.It Cm Port -+Specifies the default port used when connecting to LDAP servers(s). -+The port may be specified as a number. -+The default port is 389 for ldap:// or 636 for ldaps:// respectively. -+.Cm Port -+is deprecated in favor of -+.Cm URI . -+.It Cm Scope -+Specifies the starting point of an LDAP search and the depth from the base DN to which the search should descend. -+There are three options (values) that can be assigned to the -+.Cm Scope parameter: -+.Dq base , -+.Dq one -+and -+.Dq subtree . -+Alias for the subtree is -+.Dq sub . -+The value -+.Dq base -+is used to indicate searching only the entry at the base DN, resulting in only that entry being returned (keeping in mind that it also has to meet the search filter criteria!). -+The value -+.Dq one -+is used to indicate searching all entries one level under the base DN, but not including the base DN and not including any entries under that one level under the base DN. -+The value -+.Dq subtree -+is used to indicate searching of all entries at all levels under and including the specified base DN. -+The default is -+.Dq subtree . -+.It Cm Deref -+Specifies how alias dereferencing is done when performing a search. There are four -+possible values that can be assigned to the -+.Cm Deref -+parameter: -+.Dq never , -+.Dq searching , -+.Dq finding , -+and -+.Dq always . -+The value -+.Dq never -+means that the aliases are never dereferenced. -+The value -+.Dq searching -+means that the aliases are dereferenced in subordinates of the base object, but -+not in locating the base object of the search. -+The value -+.Dq finding -+means that the aliases are only dereferenced when locating the base object of the search. -+The value -+.Dq always -+means that the aliases are dereferenced both in searching and in locating the base object -+of the search. -+The default is -+.Dq never . -+.It Cm TimeLimit -+Specifies a time limit (in seconds) to use when performing searches. -+The number should be a non-negative integer. A -+.Cm TimeLimit -+of zero (0) specifies that the search time is unlimited. Please note that the server -+may still apply any server-side limit on the duration of a search operation. -+The default value is 10. -+.It Cm TimeOut -+Is an aliast to -+.Cm TimeLimit . -+.It Cm Bind_TimeLimit -+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) after which the poll(2)/select(2) -+following a connect(2) returns in case of no activity. -+The default value is 10. -+.It Cm Network_TimeOut -+Is an alias to -+.Cm Bind_TimeLimit . -+.It Cm Ldap_Version -+Specifies what version of the LDAP protocol should be used. -+The allowed values are 2 or 3. The default is 3. -+.It Cm Version -+Is an alias to -+.Cm Ldap_Version . -+.It Cm Bind_Policy -+Specifies the policy to use for reconnecting to an unavailable LDAP server. There are 2 available values: -+.Dq hard -+and -+.Dq soft. -+.Dq hard has 2 aliases -+.Dq hard_open -+and -+.Dq hard_init . -+The value -+.Dq hard -+means that reconects that the -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+tries to reconnect to the LDAP server 5 times before failure. There is exponential backoff before retrying. -+The value -+.Dq soft -+means that -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+fails immediately when it cannot connect to the LDAP seerver. -+The deault is -+.Dq hard . -+.It Cm SSLPath -+Specifies the path to the X.509 certificate database. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm SSL -+Specifies whether to use SSL/TLS or not. -+There are three allowed values: -+.Dq yes , -+.Dq no -+and -+.Dq start_tls -+Both -+.Dq true -+and -+.Dq on -+are the aliases for -+.Dq yes . -+.Dq false -+and -+.Dq off -+are the aliases for -+.Dq no . -+If -+.Dq start_tls -+is specified then StartTLS is used rather than raw LDAP over SSL. -+The default for ldap:// is -+.Dq start_tls , -+for ldaps:// -+.Dq yes -+and -+.Dq no -+for the ldapi:// . -+In case of host based configuration the default is -+.Dq start_tls . -+.It Cm Referrals -+Specifies if the client should automatically follow referrals returned -+by LDAP servers. -+The value can be or -+.Dq yes -+or -+.Dq no . -+.Dq true -+and -+.Dq on -+are the aliases for -+.Dq yes . -+.Dq false -+and -+.Dq off -+are the aliases for -+.Dq no . -+The default is yes. -+.It Cm Restart -+Specifies whether the LDAP client library should restart the select(2) system call when interrupted. -+The value can be or -+.Dq yes -+or -+.Dq no . -+.Dq true -+and -+.Dq on -+are the aliases for -+.Dq yes . -+.Dq false -+and -+.Dq off -+are the aliases for -+.Dq no . -+The default is yes. -+.It Cm TLS_CheckPeer -+Specifies what checks to perform on server certificates in a TLS session, -+if any. The value -+can be specified as one of the following keywords: -+.Dq never , -+.Dq hard , -+.Dq demand , -+.Dq allow -+and -+.Dq try . -+.Dq true , -+.Dq on -+and -+.Dq yes -+are aliases for -+.Dq hard . -+.Dq false , -+.Dq off -+and -+.Dq no -+are the aliases for -+.Dq never . -+The value -+.Dq never -+means that the client will not request or check any server certificate. -+The value -+.Dq allow -+means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, -+the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, it will -+be ignored and the session proceeds normally. -+The value -+.Dq try -+means that the server certificate is requested. If no certificate is provided, -+the session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided, -+the session is immediately terminated. -+The value -+.Dq demand -+means that the server certificate is requested. If no -+certificate is provided, or a bad certificate is provided, the session -+is immediately terminated. -+The value -+.Dq hard -+is the same as -+.Dq demand . -+It requires an SSL connection. In the case of the plain conection the -+session is immediately terminated. -+The default is -+.Dq hard . -+.It Cm TLS_ReqCert -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_CheckPeer . -+.It Cm TLS_CACertFile -+Specifies the file that contains certificates for all of the Certificate -+Authorities the client will recognize. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_CACert -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_CACertFile . -+.It Cm TLS_CACertDIR -+Specifies the path of a directory that contains Certificate Authority -+certificates in separate individual files. The -+.Cm TLS_CACert -+is always used before -+.Cm TLS_CACertDir . -+The specified directory must be managed with the OpenSSL c_rehash utility. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_Ciphers -+Specifies acceptable cipher suite and preference order. -+The value should be a cipher specification for OpenSSL, -+e.g., -+.Dq HIGH:MEDIUM:+SSLv2 . -+The default is -+.Dq ALL . -+.It Cm TLS_Cipher_Suite -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_Ciphers . -+.It Cm TLS_Cert -+Specifies the file that contains the client certificate. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_Certificate -+Is an alias for -+.Cm TLS_Cert . -+.It Cm TLS_Key -+Specifies the file that contains the private key that matches the certificate -+stored in the -+.Cm TLS_Cert -+file. Currently, the private key must not be protected with a password, so -+it is of critical importance that the key file is protected carefully. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm TLS_RandFile -+Specifies the file to obtain random bits from when /dev/[u]random is -+not available. Generally set to the name of the EGD/PRNGD socket. -+The environment variable RANDFILE can also be used to specify the filename. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm LogDir -+Specifies the directory used for logging by the LDAP client library. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm Debug -+Specifies the debug level used for logging by the LDAP client library. -+There is no default. -+.It Cm SSH_Filter -+Specifies the user filter applied on the LDAP search. -+The default is no filter. -+.It Cm AccountClass -+Specifies the LDAP class used to find user accounts. -+The default is posixAccount. -+.It Cm search_format -+Specifies the user format of search string in LDAP substituting %u for user name -+and %f for additional ssh filter -+.Cm SSH_Filter -+(optional). -+The default value is (&(objectclass=%c)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%u)%f) -+.El -+.Sh FILES -+.Bl -tag -width Ds -+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ldap.conf -+Ldap configuration file for -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 . -+.El -+.Sh "SEE ALSO" -+.Xr ldap.conf 5 , -+.Xr ssh-ldap-helper 8 -+.Sh HISTORY -+.Nm -+first appeared in -+OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP . -+.Sh AUTHORS -+.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com -diff --git a/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif b/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..9adf4b8 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif -@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ -+# -+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey -+# useful with PKA-LDAP also -+# -+# Author: Eric AUGE -+# -+# LDIF for openLDAP Directory Server. -+# Based on the original schema, modified by Jakub Jelen. -+# -+ -+dn: cn=openssh-lpk,cn=schema,cn=config -+objectClass: olcSchemaConfig -+cn: openssh-lpk -+olcAttributeTypes: {0}( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 -+ NAME 'sshPublicKey' DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' -+ EQUALITY octetStringMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) -+olcObjectClasses: {0}( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 -+ NAME 'ldapPublicKey' DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' -+ SUP top AUXILIARY MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) ) -diff --git a/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif b/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..9adf4b8 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif -@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ -+# -+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey -+# useful with PKA-LDAP also -+# -+# Author: Eric AUGE -+# -+# LDIF for Sun Directory Server. -+# Based on the original schema, modified by Jakub Jelen. -+# -+ -+dn: cn=schema -+attributeTypes: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.1.13 -+ NAME 'sshPublicKey' DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH Public key' -+ EQUALITY octetStringMatch SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 ) -+objectClasses: ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0 -+ NAME 'ldapPublicKey' DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass' -+ SUP top AUXILIARY MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) ) diff --git a/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch b/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7a843e7..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c ---- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt 2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200 -+++ openssh/servconf.c 2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200 -@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); - dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT); - dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC); -- dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); -+ dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none"); - dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); - dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); - dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); -diff -up openssh/ssh.1.sshdt openssh/ssh.1 ---- openssh/ssh.1.sshdt 2015-06-24 11:42:19.565102807 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh.1 2015-06-24 11:42:29.042078701 +0200 -@@ -441,7 +441,11 @@ For full details of the options listed b - .It GatewayPorts - .It GlobalKnownHostsFile - .It GSSAPIAuthentication -+.It GSSAPIKeyExchange -+.It GSSAPIClientIdentity - .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials -+.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey -+.It GSSAPITrustDNS - .It HashKnownHosts - .It Host - .It HostbasedAuthentication diff --git a/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch b/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6b4c4da..0000000 --- a/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login 2015-08-12 11:29:12.919269245 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config 2015-08-12 11:31:03.653096466 +0200 -@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV - # Authentication: - - #LoginGraceTime 2m --#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password -+PermitRootLogin yes - #StrictModes yes - #MaxAuthTries 6 - #MaxSessions 10 diff --git a/openssh-7.0p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch b/openssh-7.0p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2ba360e..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.0p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,422 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/gss-genr.c ---- openssh-7.0p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.024518959 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/gss-genr.c 2015-08-19 12:28:38.078518839 +0200 -@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { - */ - - char * --ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { -+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client, -+ const char *kex) { - gss_OID_set gss_supported; - OM_uint32 min_status; - -@@ -86,12 +87,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char - return NULL; - - return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, -- host, client)); -+ host, client, kex)); - } - - char * - ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, -- const char *host, const char *client) { -+ const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) { - struct sshbuf *buf; - size_t i; - int oidpos, enclen, r; -@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup - char deroid[2]; - const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); - EVP_MD_CTX md; -+ char *s, *cp, *p; - - if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { - for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) -@@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - - oidpos = 0; -+ s = cp = xstrdup(kex); - for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { - if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && - (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { -@@ -131,28 +134,25 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup - enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), - encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); - -- if (oidpos != 0) -- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0) -- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -- -- if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, -- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, -- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, -- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0) -- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex)); -+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; -+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { -+ if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0) -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", -+ __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", -+ __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ } - - gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); - gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; - oidpos++; - } - } -+ free(s); - gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; - gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; - -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/gss-serv.c ---- openssh-7.0p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.024518959 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/gss-serv.c 2015-08-19 12:28:38.078518839 +0200 -@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { - if (supported_oids == NULL) - ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); - return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids, -- &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL)); -+ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL, -+ options.gss_kex_algorithms)); - } - - /* Unprivileged */ -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/kex.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/kex.c ---- openssh-7.0p1/kex.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.078518839 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/kex.c 2015-08-19 12:30:13.249306371 +0200 -@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ - #include "misc.h" - #include "dispatch.h" - #include "monitor.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" - - #include "ssherr.h" - #include "sshbuf.h" -@@ -232,6 +232,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char - return r; - } - -+/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */ -+int -+gss_kex_names_valid(const char *names) -+{ -+ char *s, *cp, *p; -+ -+ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0') -+ return 0; -+ s = cp = xstrdup(names); -+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; -+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { -+ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0 -+ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { -+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); -+ free(s); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ } -+ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names); -+ free(s); -+ return 1; -+} -+ - /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ - int - kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/kex.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/kex.h ---- openssh-7.0p1/kex.h.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.078518839 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/kex.h 2015-08-19 12:30:52.404218958 +0200 -@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int kex_names_valid(const char *); - char *kex_alg_list(char); - char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); - int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); -+int gss_kex_names_valid(const char *); - - int kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **); - int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c ---- openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.026518955 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/readconf.c 2015-08-19 12:31:28.333138747 +0200 -@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ - #include "uidswap.h" - #include "myproposal.h" - #include "digest.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" - - /* Format of the configuration file: - -@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ typedef enum { - oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, - oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, - oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, -- oGssServerIdentity, -+ oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms, - oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, - oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, - oHashKnownHosts, -@@ -200,6 +201,7 @@ static struct { - { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, - { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, - { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, -+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms }, - # else - { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, -@@ -207,6 +209,7 @@ static struct { - { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported }, - #endif - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, -@@ -929,6 +932,18 @@ parse_time: - intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssKexAlgorithms: -+ arg = strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg)) -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", -+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); -+ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) -+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); -+ break; -+ - case oBatchMode: - intptr = &options->batch_mode; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1638,6 +1653,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) - options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; - options->gss_client_identity = NULL; - options->gss_server_identity = NULL; -+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; -@@ -1773,6 +1789,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - options->gss_trust_dns = 0; - if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) - options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) -+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); -+#endif - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/readconf.h ---- openssh-7.0p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.026518955 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/readconf.h 2015-08-19 12:28:38.079518836 +0200 -@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ typedef struct { - int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ - char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ - char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ -+ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ - int password_authentication; /* Try password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.0p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.074518847 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/servconf.c 2015-08-19 12:33:13.599902732 +0200 -@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ - #include "auth.h" - #include "myproposal.h" - #include "digest.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" - - static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, - const char *, int); -@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; - options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; - options->gss_store_rekey = -1; -+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL; - options->use_kuserok = -1; - options->enable_k5users = -1; - options->password_authentication = -1; -@@ -288,6 +290,10 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; - if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) - options->gss_store_rekey = 0; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) -+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX); -+#endif - if (options->use_kuserok == -1) - options->use_kuserok = 1; - if (options->enable_k5users == -1) -@@ -427,7 +431,7 @@ typedef enum { - sHostKeyAlgorithms, - sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, - sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor, -- sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, -+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sGssKexAlgorithms, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, - sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, - sHostCertificate, -@@ -506,6 +510,7 @@ static struct { - { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -513,6 +518,7 @@ static struct { - { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #endif - { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1273,6 +1279,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssKexAlgorithms: -+ arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", -+ filename, linenum); -+ if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg)) -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.", -+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); -+ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL) -+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); -+ break; -+ - case sPasswordAuthentication: - intptr = &options->password_authentication; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -2304,6 +2322,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); -+ dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms); - #endif - dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-7.0p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.080518834 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/servconf.h 2015-08-19 12:34:46.328693944 +0200 -@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef struct { - int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ - int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ - int gss_store_rekey; -+ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */ - int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/ssh.1.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/ssh.1 ---- openssh-7.0p1/ssh.1.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.081518832 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/ssh.1 2015-08-19 12:35:31.741591692 +0200 -@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ For full details of the options listed b - .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials - .It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey - .It GSSAPITrustDNS -+.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms - .It HashKnownHosts - .It Host - .It HostbasedAuthentication -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/ssh_config.5.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/ssh_config.5 ---- openssh-7.0p1/ssh_config.5.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.028518950 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/ssh_config.5 2015-08-19 12:28:38.082518830 +0200 -@@ -786,6 +786,18 @@ command line will be passed untouched to - command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. - The default is - .Dq no . -+.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms -+The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI -+key exchange. Possible values are -+.Bd -literal -offset 3n -+gss-gex-sha1-, -+gss-group1-sha1-, -+gss-group14-sha1- -+.Ed -+.Pp -+The default is -+.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- . -+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. - .It Cm HashKnownHosts - Indicates that - .Xr ssh 1 -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-7.0p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.045518912 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/sshconnect2.c 2015-08-19 12:28:38.081518832 +0200 -@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - else - gss_host = host; - -- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, -+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); - if (gss) { - debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); - xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms, ---- openssh-7.1p1/sshd_config.5.gsskexalg 2015-12-10 15:32:48.105418092 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.1p1/sshd_config.5 2015-12-10 15:33:47.771279548 +0100 -@@ -663,6 +663,18 @@ or updated credentials from a compatible - For this to work - .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange - needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. -+.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms -+The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI -+key exchange. Possible values are -+.Bd -literal -offset 3n -+gss-gex-sha1-, -+gss-group1-sha1-, -+gss-group14-sha1- -+.Ed -+.Pp -+The default is -+.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- . -+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. - .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes - Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication - as a list of comma-separated patterns. -diff -up openssh-7.0p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.0p1/ssh-gss.h ---- openssh-7.0p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg 2015-08-19 12:28:38.031518944 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.0p1/ssh-gss.h 2015-08-19 12:28:38.081518832 +0200 -@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds; - #define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" - #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" - -+#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ -+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \ -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID -+ - typedef struct { - char *envvar; - char *envval; -@@ -147,9 +151,9 @@ int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssct - /* In the server */ - typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, - const char *); --char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *); - char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, -- const char *); -+ const char *, const char *); - gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); - int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, - const char *); diff --git a/openssh-7.1p1-gssapi-documentation.patch b/openssh-7.1p1-gssapi-documentation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index db689d4..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.1p1-gssapi-documentation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gss-docs openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5 ---- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gss-docs 2016-12-23 14:28:34.051714486 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5 2016-12-23 14:34:24.568522417 +0100 -@@ -765,10 +765,19 @@ The default is - If set to - .Dq yes - then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the --ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed -+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this will delegate the renewed - credentials to a session on the server. -+.Pp -+Checks are made to ensure that credentials are only propagated when the new -+credentials match the old ones on the originating client and where the -+receiving server still has the old set in its cache. -+.Pp - The default is - .Dq no . -+.Pp -+For this to work -+.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. - .It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity - If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when - connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the -@@ -776,9 +785,11 @@ expected GSSAPI server identity will be - hostname. - .It Cm GSSAPITrustDns - Set to --.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize -+.Dq yes -+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize - the name of the host being connected to. If --.Dq no, the hostname entered on the -+.Dq no , -+the hostname entered on the - command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. - The default is - .Dq no . -diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gss-docs openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gss-docs 2016-12-23 14:28:34.043714490 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 14:28:34.051714486 +0100 -@@ -652,6 +652,10 @@ Controls whether the user's GSSAPI crede - successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed - or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is - .Dq no . -+.Pp -+For this to work -+.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client. - .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes - Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication - as a list of comma-separated patterns. diff --git a/openssh-7.3p1-openssl-1.1.0.patch b/openssh-7.3p1-openssl-1.1.0.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5c18666..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.3p1-openssl-1.1.0.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2677 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.openssl openssh/auth-pam.c ---- openssh/auth-pam.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.662248869 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth-pam.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.793249672 +0200 -@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; - typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; - #else - typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t; -+# define pthread_create(a, b, c, d) _ssh_compat_pthread_create(a, b, c, d) -+# define pthread_exit(a) _ssh_compat_pthread_exit(a) -+# define pthread_cancel(a) _ssh_compat_pthread_cancel(a) -+# define pthread_join(a, b) _ssh_compat_pthread_join(a, b) - #endif - - struct pam_ctxt { -diff -up openssh/cipher.c.openssl openssh/cipher.c ---- openssh/cipher.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.782249605 +0200 -+++ openssh/cipher.c 2017-09-26 13:27:37.424040367 +0200 -@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv, -+ if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv, - (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; -@@ -301,10 +301,6 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, - goto out; - } - } -- if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -- goto out; -- } - ret = 0; - #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - out: -@@ -490,7 +486,7 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c - len, iv)) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } else -- memcpy(iv, cc->evp->iv, len); -+ memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(cc->evp), len); - #endif - return 0; - } -@@ -524,14 +520,14 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c - EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv)) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } else -- memcpy(cc->evp->iv, iv, evplen); -+ memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(cc->evp), iv, evplen); - #endif - return 0; - } - - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL --#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp)->cipher_data --#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp)->cipher->ctx_size -+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(evp) -+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(evp)) - #endif - - int -diff -up openssh/ctr-cavstest.c.openssl openssh/ctr-cavstest.c ---- openssh/ctr-cavstest.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.707249145 +0200 -+++ openssh/ctr-cavstest.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.794249679 +0200 -@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int main (int argc, char *argv[]) - usage(); - } - -- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); - - c = cipher_by_name(algo); - if (c == NULL) { -diff -up openssh/dh.c.openssl openssh/dh.c ---- openssh/dh.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/dh.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.794249679 +0200 -@@ -212,14 +212,15 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max - /* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */ - - int --dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) -+dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub) - { - int i; - int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub); - int bits_set = 0; - BIGNUM *tmp; -+ const BIGNUM *p; - -- if (dh_pub->neg) { -+ if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) { - logit("invalid public DH value: negative"); - return 0; - } -@@ -232,7 +233,8 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) - error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - return 0; - } -- if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) || -+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL); -+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, p, BN_value_one()) || - BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */ - BN_clear_free(tmp); - logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1"); -@@ -243,14 +245,14 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) - for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) - if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i)) - bits_set++; -- debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); -+ debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(p)); - - /* - * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial - */ - if (bits_set < 4) { - logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", -- bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); -+ bits_set, BN_num_bits(p)); - return 0; - } - return 1; -@@ -260,9 +262,11 @@ int - dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) - { - int pbits; -+ const BIGNUM *p, *pub_key; - -- if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL || -- (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 || -+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL); -+ if (need < 0 || p == NULL || -+ (pbits = BN_num_bits(p)) <= 0 || - need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - if (need < 256) -@@ -271,11 +275,11 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) - * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)), - * so double requested need here. - */ -- dh->length = MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1); -- if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 || -- !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) { -- BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key); -- dh->priv_key = NULL; -+ DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)); -+ if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) -+ return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) { - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } - return 0; -@@ -284,15 +289,22 @@ DH * - dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus) - { - DH *dh; -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; - -- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) -- return NULL; -- if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 || -- BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) { -- DH_free(dh); -- return NULL; -- } -+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL || -+ (p = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (g = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ if (BN_hex2bn(&p, modulus) == 0 || -+ BN_hex2bn(&g, gen) == 0 || -+ DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g) == 0) -+ goto err; - return (dh); -+err: -+ DH_free(dh); -+ BN_free(p); -+ BN_free(g); -+ return NULL; - } - - /* -@@ -307,8 +319,7 @@ dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulu - - if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) - return NULL; -- dh->p = modulus; -- dh->g = gen; -+ DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen); - - return (dh); - } -diff -up openssh/dh.h.openssl openssh/dh.h ---- openssh/dh.h.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.783249611 +0200 -+++ openssh/dh.h 2017-09-26 13:19:31.794249679 +0200 -@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ DH *dh_new_group18(void); - DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); - - int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); --int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); -+int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *); - - u_int dh_estimate(int); - -diff -up openssh/digest-openssl.c.openssl openssh/digest-openssl.c ---- openssh/digest-openssl.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/digest-openssl.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.795249685 +0200 -@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ - - struct ssh_digest_ctx { - int alg; -- EVP_MD_CTX mdctx; -+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; - }; - - struct ssh_digest { -@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) - size_t - ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) - { -- return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx); -+ return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx); - } - - struct ssh_digest_ctx * -@@ -118,8 +118,10 @@ ssh_digest_start(int alg) - if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)) - return NULL; - ret->alg = alg; -- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ret->mdctx); -- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) { -+ ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); -+ if (ret->mdctx == NULL || -+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) { -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ret->mdctx); - free(ret); - return NULL; - } -@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ - if (from->alg != to->alg) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - /* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */ -- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx)) -+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx)) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - return 0; - } -@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ - int - ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) - { -- if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1) -+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - return 0; - } -@@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx * - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1) -+ if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */ - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ void - ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) - { - if (ctx != NULL) { -- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx); -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); - explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); - free(ctx); - } -diff -up openssh/entropy.c.openssl openssh/entropy.c ---- openssh/entropy.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.783249611 +0200 -+++ openssh/entropy.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.795249685 +0200 -@@ -218,7 +218,9 @@ seed_rng(void) - "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); - - /* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L - atexit(RAND_cleanup); -+#endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY - if (RAND_status() == 1) { -diff -up openssh/gss-genr.c.openssl openssh/gss-genr.c ---- openssh/gss-genr.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.773249550 +0200 -+++ openssh/gss-genr.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.796249691 +0200 -@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup - u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - char deroid[2]; - const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); -- EVP_MD_CTX md; -+ EVP_MD_CTX *md; - char *s, *cp, *p; - - if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { -@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup - if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - -+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - oidpos = 0; - s = cp = xstrdup(kex); - for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { -@@ -122,12 +123,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup - deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; - deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; - -- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); -- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); -- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, -+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md); -+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, deroid, 2); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, - gss_supported->elements[i].elements, - gss_supported->elements[i].length); -- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); -+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, NULL); - - encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); - enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), -@@ -149,6 +151,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup - } - } - free(s); -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); - gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; - gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; - -diff -up openssh/includes.h.openssl openssh/includes.h ---- openssh/includes.h.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/includes.h 2017-09-26 13:19:31.796249691 +0200 -@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ - - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - #include /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ -+#include "libcrypto-compat.h" - #endif - - #include "defines.h" -diff -up openssh/kexdhc.c.openssl openssh/kexdhc.c ---- openssh/kexdhc.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexdhc.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.797249697 +0200 -@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) - { - struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; - int r; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key; - - /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ - switch (kex->kex_type) { -@@ -81,21 +82,27 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) - goto out; - } - debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT"); -- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || -+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH - DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); - fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); -- BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key); -+ BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - #endif - debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY"); - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh); - r = 0; - out: -+ if (r != 0) { -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ } - return r; - } - -@@ -109,6 +116,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, st - u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen; - int kout, r; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key; - - if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -@@ -168,6 +176,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, st - #endif - - /* calc and verify H */ -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); - hashlen = sizeof(hash); - if ((r = kex_dh_hash( - kex->hash_alg, -@@ -176,7 +185,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, st - sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), - sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), - server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, -- kex->dh->pub_key, -+ pub_key, - dh_server_pub, - shared_secret, - hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -diff -up openssh/kexdhs.c.openssl openssh/kexdhs.c ---- openssh/kexdhs.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexdhs.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.797249697 +0200 -@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init); - r = 0; - out: -+ if (r != 0) { -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ } - return r; - } - -@@ -101,6 +105,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se - size_t sbloblen, slen; - size_t klen = 0, hashlen; - int kout, r; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key; - - if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || - kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { -@@ -163,6 +168,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se - goto out; - /* calc H */ - hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); - if ((r = kex_dh_hash( - kex->hash_alg, - kex->client_version_string, -@@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se - sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), - server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, - dh_client_pub, -- kex->dh->pub_key, -+ pub_key, - shared_secret, - hash, &hashlen)) != 0) - goto out; -@@ -197,7 +203,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t se - /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */ - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ - (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; -diff -up openssh/kexgexc.c.openssl openssh/kexgexc.c ---- openssh/kexgexc.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.783249611 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexgexc.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.797249697 +0200 -@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32 - struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; - BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; - int r, bits; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key; - - debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP"); - -@@ -119,24 +120,30 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32 - p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ - - /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ -- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || -+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent"); - #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH - DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); - fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); -- BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key); -+ BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - #endif - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL); - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply); - r = 0; - out: - BN_clear_free(p); - BN_clear_free(g); -+ if (r != 0) { -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ } - return r; - } - -@@ -152,6 +157,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32 - u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen; - int kout, r; -+ const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key; - - debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY"); - if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { -@@ -214,6 +220,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32 - kex->min = kex->max = -1; - - /* calc and verify H */ -+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g); -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); - hashlen = sizeof(hash); - if ((r = kexgex_hash( - kex->hash_alg, -@@ -223,8 +231,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32 - sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), - server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, - kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, -- kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g, -- kex->dh->pub_key, -+ p, g, -+ pub_key, - dh_server_pub, - shared_secret, - hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -diff -up openssh/kexgexs.c.openssl openssh/kexgexs.c ---- openssh/kexgexs.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.783249611 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexgexs.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.797249697 +0200 -@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int - struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; - int r; - u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; -+ const BIGNUM *p, *g; - - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || -@@ -101,9 +102,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int - goto out; - } - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent"); -+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g); - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - -@@ -115,6 +117,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init); - r = 0; - out: -+ if (r != 0) { -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ } - return r; - } - -@@ -129,6 +135,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_ - size_t sbloblen, slen; - size_t klen = 0, hashlen; - int kout, r; -+ const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key; - - if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || - kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { -@@ -191,6 +198,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_ - goto out; - /* calc H */ - hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g); -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); - if ((r = kexgex_hash( - kex->hash_alg, - kex->client_version_string, -@@ -199,9 +208,9 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_ - sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), - server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, - kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, -- kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g, -+ p, g, - dh_client_pub, -- kex->dh->pub_key, -+ pub_key, - shared_secret, - hash, &hashlen)) != 0) - goto out; -@@ -227,7 +236,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_ - /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */ - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ - (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; -diff -up openssh/kexgssc.c.openssl openssh/kexgssc.c ---- openssh/kexgssc.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.771249537 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexgssc.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.797249697 +0200 -@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; - BIGNUM *p = NULL; - BIGNUM *g = NULL; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *p1, *g1; - u_char *kbuf; - u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; - u_char *empty = ""; -@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - - /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ - dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8); -+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); - - /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ - dh_server_pub = BN_new(); -@@ -173,7 +175,7 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); - packet_put_string(send_tok.value, - send_tok.length); -- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)pub_key); - first = 0; - } else { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -@@ -282,13 +284,14 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), - (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -- dh->pub_key, /* e */ -+ pub_key, /* e */ - dh_server_pub, /* f */ - shared_secret, /* K */ - hash, &hashlen - ); - break; - case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p1, NULL, &g1); - kexgex_hash( - ssh->kex->hash_alg, - ssh->kex->client_version_string, -@@ -297,8 +300,8 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), - (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, - min, nbits, max, -- dh->p, dh->g, -- dh->pub_key, -+ p1, g1, -+ pub_key, - dh_server_pub, - shared_secret, - hash, &hashlen -diff -up openssh/kexgsss.c.openssl openssh/kexgsss.c ---- openssh/kexgsss.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.771249537 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexgsss.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.798249703 +0200 -@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - char *mechs; - u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - size_t hashlen; -+ const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key; - - /* Initialise GSSAPI */ - -@@ -127,9 +128,10 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - if (dh == NULL) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); - -+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g); - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -- packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); -- packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); -+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)p); -+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)g); - packet_send(); - - packet_write_wait(); -@@ -221,6 +223,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - memset(kbuf, 0, klen); - free(kbuf); - -+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); - hashlen = sizeof(hash); - switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { - case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -@@ -232,7 +235,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), - NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ -- dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, -+ dh_client_pub, pub_key, shared_secret, - hash, &hashlen - ); - break; -@@ -244,9 +247,9 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), - NULL, 0, - cmin, nbits, cmax, -- dh->p, dh->g, -+ p, g, - dh_client_pub, -- dh->pub_key, -+ pub_key, - shared_secret, - hash, &hashlen - ); -@@ -270,7 +273,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); - - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); -- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ packet_put_bignum2((BIGNUM *)pub_key); - packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); - - if (send_tok.length != 0) { -diff -up openssh/libcrypto-compat.c.openssl openssh/libcrypto-compat.c ---- openssh/libcrypto-compat.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.798249703 +0200 -+++ openssh/libcrypto-compat.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.798249703 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. -+ * -+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use -+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy -+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at -+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num) -+{ -+ void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num); -+ -+ if (ret != NULL) -+ memset(ret, 0, num); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) -+{ -+ /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input -+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be -+ * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). -+ */ -+ if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) -+ || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (n != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->n); -+ r->n = n; -+ } -+ if (e != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->e); -+ r->e = e; -+ } -+ if (d != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->d); -+ r->d = d; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) -+{ -+ /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input -+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. -+ */ -+ if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) -+ || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (p != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->p); -+ r->p = p; -+ } -+ if (q != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->q); -+ r->q = q; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) -+{ -+ /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input -+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. -+ */ -+ if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) -+ || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) -+ || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (dmp1 != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->dmp1); -+ r->dmp1 = dmp1; -+ } -+ if (dmq1 != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->dmq1); -+ r->dmq1 = dmq1; -+ } -+ if (iqmp != NULL) { -+ BN_free(r->iqmp); -+ r->iqmp = iqmp; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, -+ const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) -+{ -+ if (n != NULL) -+ *n = r->n; -+ if (e != NULL) -+ *e = r->e; -+ if (d != NULL) -+ *d = r->d; -+} -+ -+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) -+{ -+ if (p != NULL) -+ *p = r->p; -+ if (q != NULL) -+ *q = r->q; -+} -+ -+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, -+ const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, -+ const BIGNUM **iqmp) -+{ -+ if (dmp1 != NULL) -+ *dmp1 = r->dmp1; -+ if (dmq1 != NULL) -+ *dmq1 = r->dmq1; -+ if (iqmp != NULL) -+ *iqmp = r->iqmp; -+} -+ -+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, -+ const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) -+{ -+ if (p != NULL) -+ *p = d->p; -+ if (q != NULL) -+ *q = d->q; -+ if (g != NULL) -+ *g = d->g; -+} -+ -+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) -+{ -+ /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input -+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. -+ */ -+ if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) -+ || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) -+ || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (p != NULL) { -+ BN_free(d->p); -+ d->p = p; -+ } -+ if (q != NULL) { -+ BN_free(d->q); -+ d->q = q; -+ } -+ if (g != NULL) { -+ BN_free(d->g); -+ d->g = g; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, -+ const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) -+{ -+ if (pub_key != NULL) -+ *pub_key = d->pub_key; -+ if (priv_key != NULL) -+ *priv_key = d->priv_key; -+} -+ -+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) -+{ -+ /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input -+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. The priv_key field may -+ * be left NULL. -+ */ -+ if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (pub_key != NULL) { -+ BN_free(d->pub_key); -+ d->pub_key = pub_key; -+ } -+ if (priv_key != NULL) { -+ BN_free(d->priv_key); -+ d->priv_key = priv_key; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) -+{ -+ if (pr != NULL) -+ *pr = sig->r; -+ if (ps != NULL) -+ *ps = sig->s; -+} -+ -+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) -+{ -+ if (r == NULL || s == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ BN_clear_free(sig->r); -+ BN_clear_free(sig->s); -+ sig->r = r; -+ sig->s = s; -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) -+{ -+ if (pr != NULL) -+ *pr = sig->r; -+ if (ps != NULL) -+ *ps = sig->s; -+} -+ -+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) -+{ -+ if (r == NULL || s == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ BN_clear_free(sig->r); -+ BN_clear_free(sig->s); -+ sig->r = r; -+ sig->s = s; -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, -+ const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) -+{ -+ if (p != NULL) -+ *p = dh->p; -+ if (q != NULL) -+ *q = dh->q; -+ if (g != NULL) -+ *g = dh->g; -+} -+ -+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) -+{ -+ /* If the fields p and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input -+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. q may remain NULL. -+ */ -+ if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) -+ || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (p != NULL) { -+ BN_free(dh->p); -+ dh->p = p; -+ } -+ if (q != NULL) { -+ BN_free(dh->q); -+ dh->q = q; -+ } -+ if (g != NULL) { -+ BN_free(dh->g); -+ dh->g = g; -+ } -+ -+ if (q != NULL) { -+ dh->length = BN_num_bits(q); -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) -+{ -+ if (pub_key != NULL) -+ *pub_key = dh->pub_key; -+ if (priv_key != NULL) -+ *priv_key = dh->priv_key; -+} -+ -+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length) -+{ -+ dh->length = length; -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) -+{ -+ return ctx->iv; -+} -+ -+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) -+{ -+ return ctx->iv; -+} -+ -+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) -+{ -+ return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); -+} -+ -+static void OPENSSL_clear_free(void *str, size_t num) -+{ -+ if (str == NULL) -+ return; -+ if (num) -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(str, num); -+ OPENSSL_free(str); -+} -+ -+/* This call frees resources associated with the context */ -+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+{ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return 1; -+ -+ /* -+ * Don't assume ctx->md_data was cleaned in EVP_Digest_Final, because -+ * sometimes only copies of the context are ever finalised. -+ */ -+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup -+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED)) -+ ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx); -+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data -+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE)) { -+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); -+ } -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx->pctx); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -+ ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine); -+#endif -+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -+{ -+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); -+ OPENSSL_free(ctx); -+} -+ -+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth) -+{ -+ RSA_METHOD *ret; -+ -+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_METHOD)); -+ -+ if (ret != NULL) { -+ memcpy(ret, meth, sizeof(*meth)); -+ ret->name = OPENSSL_strdup(meth->name); -+ if (ret->name == NULL) { -+ OPENSSL_free(ret); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name) -+{ -+ char *tmpname; -+ -+ tmpname = OPENSSL_strdup(name); -+ if (tmpname == NULL) { -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_free((char *)meth->name); -+ meth->name = tmpname; -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, -+ int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, -+ int padding)) -+{ -+ meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc; -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, -+ int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, -+ int padding)) -+{ -+ meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec; -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa)) -+{ -+ meth->finish = finish; -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth) -+{ -+ if (meth != NULL) { -+ OPENSSL_free((char *)meth->name); -+ OPENSSL_free(meth); -+ } -+} -+ -+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r) -+{ -+ return (BN_num_bits(r->n)); -+} -+ -+int DSA_bits(const DSA *dsa) -+{ -+ return BN_num_bits(dsa->p); -+} -+ -+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) -+{ -+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ return pkey->pkey.rsa; -+} -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ -diff -up openssh/libcrypto-compat.h.openssl openssh/libcrypto-compat.h ---- openssh/libcrypto-compat.h.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.798249703 +0200 -+++ openssh/libcrypto-compat.h 2017-09-26 13:19:31.798249703 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ -+#ifndef LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H -+#define LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H -+ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d); -+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q); -+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp); -+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d); -+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q); -+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp); -+ -+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); -+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); -+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); -+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); -+ -+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); -+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); -+ -+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); -+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); -+ -+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g); -+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); -+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); -+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length); -+ -+const unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -+unsigned char *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); -+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void); -+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); -+#define EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(e) e->ctx_size -+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx) ctx->cipher_data -+ -+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth); -+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name); -+#define RSA_meth_get_finish(meth) meth->finish -+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); -+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec) (int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); -+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish) (RSA *rsa)); -+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth); -+ -+int RSA_bits(const RSA *r); -+int DSA_bits(const DSA *d); -+ -+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); -+ -+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ -+ -+#endif /* LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H */ -+ -diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.openssl openssh/Makefile.in ---- openssh/Makefile.in.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.784249617 +0200 -+++ openssh/Makefile.in 2017-09-26 13:19:31.798249703 +0200 -@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ - kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ - kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \ - platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ -- auditstub.o -+ auditstub.o libcrypto-compat.o - - SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o -diff -up openssh/monitor.c.openssl openssh/monitor.c ---- openssh/monitor.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.789249648 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.799249709 +0200 -@@ -631,9 +631,12 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m) - return (0); - } else { - /* Send first bignum */ -+ const BIGNUM *p, *g; -+ -+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh->g)) != 0) -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, g)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - - DH_free(dh); -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c.openssl openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.799249709 +0200 -@@ -70,12 +70,19 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, l - void - ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void) - { -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L - OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); - - /* Enable use of crypto hardware */ - ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L - ENGINE_register_all_complete(); -+#endif - OPENSSL_config(NULL); -+#else -+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | -+ OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL); -+#endif - } - #endif - -diff -up openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.openssl openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c ---- openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.799249709 +0200 -@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void) - struct sshbuf *buf, *pw; - BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; - char *cp; -+ const BIGNUM *n, *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key; - - TEST_START("load passphrase"); - pw = load_text_file("pw"); -@@ -60,9 +61,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void) - a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n"); - b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p"); - c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q"); -- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a); -- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->p, b); -- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->q, c); -+ RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL); -+ RSA_get0_factors(k1->rsa, &p, &q); -+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(n, a); -+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(p, b); -+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(q, c); - BN_free(a); - BN_free(b); - BN_free(c); -@@ -151,9 +154,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void) - a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g"); - b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv"); - c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub"); -- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->g, a); -- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, b); -- ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->pub_key, c); -+ DSA_get0_pqg(k1->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g); -+ DSA_get0_key(k1->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key); -+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(g, a); -+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(priv_key, b); -+ ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(pub_key, c); - BN_free(a); - BN_free(b); - BN_free(c); -diff -up openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.openssl openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c ---- openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.800249715 +0200 -@@ -197,9 +197,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void) - k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); - sshkey_free(k1); - TEST_DONE(); - -@@ -207,8 +204,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void) - k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); - sshkey_free(k1); - TEST_DONE(); - -@@ -234,9 +229,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void) - k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); - sshkey_free(k1); - TEST_DONE(); -@@ -245,8 +237,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void) - k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); - sshkey_free(k1); - TEST_DONE(); -@@ -285,18 +275,13 @@ sshkey_tests(void) - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL); -- ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 1024); -+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(RSA_bits(kr->rsa), 1024); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL); - TEST_DONE(); - - #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -@@ -323,9 +308,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void) - ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA"); -@@ -339,8 +321,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void) - ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); -- ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA"); -diff -up openssh/ssh.c.openssl openssh/ssh.c ---- openssh/ssh.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.786249629 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.800249715 +0200 -@@ -530,7 +530,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - sanitise_stdfd(); - - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L - SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+#endif - if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) - if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)){ - if (FIPS_mode()) -diff -up openssh/sshd.c.openssl openssh/sshd.c ---- openssh/sshd.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.792249666 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshd.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.801249721 +0200 -@@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - #endif - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); - -- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); - if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) - if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { - openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV); -diff -up openssh/ssh-dss.c.openssl openssh/ssh-dss.c ---- openssh/ssh-dss.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-dss.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.801249721 +0200 -@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u - size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ const BIGNUM *r, *s; - - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = 0; -@@ -76,15 +77,16 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u - goto out; - } - -- rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r); -- slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s); -+ DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s); -+ rlen = BN_num_bytes(r); -+ slen = BN_num_bytes(s); - if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { - ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto out; - } - explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); -- BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); -- BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); -+ BN_bn2bin(r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); -+ BN_bn2bin(s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); - - if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -@@ -137,6 +139,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - char *ktype = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; - - if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || -@@ -177,16 +180,19 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, - - /* parse signature */ - if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || -- (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL || -- (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ (r = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (s = BN_new()) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) || -- (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) { -+ if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, r) == NULL) || -+ (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, s) == NULL) || -+ (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0)) { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -+ r = NULL; -+ s = NULL; - - /* sha1 the data */ - if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, -@@ -207,7 +213,9 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, - - out: - explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); -+ BN_free(r); -+ BN_free(s); - DSA_SIG_free(sig); - sshbuf_free(b); - free(ktype); - if (sigblob != NULL) { -diff -up openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c.openssl openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c ---- openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-ecdsa.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.801249721 +0200 -@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, - size_t len, dlen; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -+ const BIGNUM *r, *s; - - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = 0; -@@ -80,8 +81,9 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->r)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->s)) != 0) -+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s); -+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, r)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, s)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 || - (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0) -@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *ke - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; - char *ktype = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; - - if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || -@@ -147,15 +150,23 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *ke - } - - /* parse signature */ -- if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { -+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || -+ (r = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (s = BN_new()) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->r) != 0 || -- sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->s) != 0) { -+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, r) != 0 || -+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, s) != 0) { - ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - } -+ if (ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ r = NULL; -+ s = NULL; - if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { - ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; - goto out; -@@ -180,7 +191,9 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *ke - explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - sshbuf_free(sigbuf); - sshbuf_free(b); -+ BN_free(r); -+ BN_free(s); - ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); - free(ktype); - return ret; - } -diff -up openssh/sshkey.c.openssl openssh/sshkey.c ---- openssh/sshkey.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.786249629 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshkey.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.802249728 +0200 -@@ -267,10 +267,10 @@ sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k) - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: -- return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); -+ return RSA_bits(k->rsa); - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); -+ return DSA_bits(k->dsa); - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid); -@@ -302,11 +302,17 @@ sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k - switch (k->type) { - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA_CERT: -- case KEY_RSA: -- return k->rsa->d != NULL; -+ case KEY_RSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *d; -+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); -+ return d != NULL; -+ } - case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- case KEY_DSA: -- return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; -+ case KEY_DSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *priv_key; -+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); -+ return priv_key != NULL; -+ } - #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA: -@@ -496,10 +501,7 @@ sshkey_new(int type) - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: -- if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || -- (rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL || -- (rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) { -- RSA_free(rsa); -+ if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { - free(k); - return NULL; - } -@@ -508,12 +509,7 @@ sshkey_new(int type) - break; - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || -- (dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL || -- (dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL || -- (dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL || -- (dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { -- DSA_free(dsa); -+ if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) { - free(k); - return NULL; - } -@@ -553,21 +548,10 @@ sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k) - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: --#define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL) -- if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->d) || -- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->iqmp) || -- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->q) || -- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->p) || -- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmq1) || -- bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmp1)) -- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - break; - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->dsa->priv_key)) -- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - break; --#undef bn_maybe_alloc_failed - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ -@@ -684,17 +668,31 @@ sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey - switch (a->type) { - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA_CERT: -- case KEY_RSA: -- return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && -- BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 && -- BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0; -+ case KEY_RSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *a_e, *a_n, *b_e, *b_n; -+ -+ if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &a_n, &a_e, NULL); -+ RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &b_n, &b_e, NULL); -+ return BN_cmp(a_e, b_e) == 0 && BN_cmp(a_n, b_n) == 0; -+ } - case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- case KEY_DSA: -- return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL && -- BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 && -- BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 && -- BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 && -- BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0; -+ case KEY_DSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *a_p, *a_q, *a_g, *a_pub_key; -+ const BIGNUM *b_p, *b_q, *b_g, *b_pub_key; -+ -+ if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &a_p, &a_q, &a_g); -+ DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &a_pub_key, NULL); -+ DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &b_p, &b_q, &b_g); -+ DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &b_pub_key, NULL); -+ return BN_cmp(a_p, b_p) == 0 && -+ BN_cmp(a_q, b_q) == 0 && -+ BN_cmp(a_g, b_g) == 0 && -+ BN_cmp(a_pub_key, b_pub_key) == 0; -+ } - # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA: -@@ -769,15 +767,21 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, st - return ret; - break; - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -- case KEY_DSA: -- if (key->dsa == NULL) -- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) -- return ret; -+ case KEY_DSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key; -+ -+ if (key->dsa == NULL) -+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ -+ DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &p, &q, &g); -+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &pub_key, NULL); -+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, g)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, pub_key)) != 0) -+ return ret; -+ } - break; - # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: -@@ -790,13 +794,18 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, st - return ret; - break; - # endif -- case KEY_RSA: -- if (key->rsa == NULL) -- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0) -- return ret; -+ case KEY_RSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *e, *n; -+ -+ if (key->rsa == NULL) -+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ -+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL); -+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, e)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, n)) != 0) -+ return ret; -+ } - break; - #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - case KEY_ED25519: -@@ -1672,15 +1681,32 @@ sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey - switch (k->type) { - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_DSA: -- case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) -- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) || -- (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) || -- (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) || -- (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) { -- sshkey_free(n); -- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: { -+ const BIGNUM *k_p, *k_q, *k_g, *k_pub_key; -+ BIGNUM *n_p = NULL, *n_q = NULL, *n_g = NULL, *n_pub_key = NULL; -+ -+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ -+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &k_p, &k_q, &k_g); -+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &k_pub_key, NULL); -+ -+ if (((n_p = BN_dup(k_p)) == NULL) || -+ ((n_q = BN_dup(k_q)) == NULL) || -+ ((n_g = BN_dup(k_g)) == NULL) || -+ (DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, n_p, n_q, n_g) == 0)) { -+ sshkey_free(n); -+ BN_free(n_p); -+ BN_free(n_q); -+ BN_free(n_g); -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } -+ if (((n_pub_key = BN_dup(k_pub_key)) == NULL) || -+ (DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, n_pub_key, NULL) == 0)) { -+ sshkey_free(n); -+ BN_free(n_pub_key); -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } - } - break; - # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -@@ -1702,13 +1728,22 @@ sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey - break; - # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - case KEY_RSA: -- case KEY_RSA_CERT: -- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) -- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) || -- (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) { -- sshkey_free(n); -- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: { -+ const BIGNUM *k_n, *k_e; -+ BIGNUM *n_n = NULL, *n_e = NULL; -+ -+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ -+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &k_n, &k_e, NULL); -+ if (((n_n = BN_dup(k_n)) == NULL) || -+ ((n_e = BN_dup(k_e)) == NULL) || -+ RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, n_n, n_e, NULL) == 0) { -+ sshkey_free(n); -+ BN_free(n_n); -+ BN_free(n_e); -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } - } - break; - #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -@@ -1907,12 +1942,22 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) != 0 || -- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) != 0) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; -- goto out; -+ { -+ BIGNUM *e, *n; -+ -+ e = BN_new(); -+ n = BN_new(); -+ if (e == NULL || n == NULL || -+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, e) != 0 || -+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, n) != 0 || -+ RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) { -+ BN_free(e); -+ BN_free(n); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } - } -- if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { -+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { - ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - goto out; - } -@@ -1932,12 +1977,34 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) != 0 || -- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) != 0 || -- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) != 0 || -- sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) != 0) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; -- goto out; -+ { -+ BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key; -+ -+ p = BN_new(); -+ q = BN_new(); -+ g = BN_new(); -+ pub_key = BN_new(); -+ -+ if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL || -+ pub_key == NULL || -+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, p) != 0 || -+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, q) != 0 || -+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, g) != 0 || -+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, pub_key) != 0 || -+ DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, p, q, g) == 0) { -+ BN_free(p); -+ BN_free(q); -+ BN_free(g); -+ BN_free(pub_key); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, pub_key, NULL) == 0) { -+ BN_free(pub_key); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } - } - #ifdef DEBUG_PK - DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); -@@ -2171,26 +2238,53 @@ sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, st - if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) - goto fail; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ -- case KEY_RSA: -- if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || -- (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL || -- (pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- goto fail; -+ case KEY_RSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *k_e, *k_n; -+ BIGNUM *pk_e = NULL, *pk_n = NULL; -+ -+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &k_n, &k_e, NULL); -+ if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || -+ (pk_e = BN_dup(k_e)) == NULL || -+ (pk_n = BN_dup(k_n)) == NULL || -+ RSA_set0_key(pk->rsa, pk_n, pk_e, NULL) == 0) { -+ BN_free(pk_e); -+ BN_free(pk_n); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto fail; - } -+ } - break; - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) - goto fail; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ -- case KEY_DSA: -- if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || -- (pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL || -- (pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL || -- (pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL || -- (pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- goto fail; -+ case KEY_DSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *k_p, *k_q, *k_g, *k_pub_key; -+ BIGNUM *pk_p = NULL, *pk_q = NULL, *pk_g = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *pk_pub_key = NULL; -+ -+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &k_p, &k_q, &k_g); -+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &k_pub_key, NULL); -+ -+ if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || -+ (pk_p = BN_dup(k_p)) == NULL || -+ (pk_q = BN_dup(k_q)) == NULL || -+ (pk_g = BN_dup(k_g)) == NULL || -+ (pk_pub_key = BN_dup(k_pub_key)) == NULL || -+ DSA_set0_pqg(pk->dsa, pk_p, pk_q, pk_g) == 0) { -+ BN_free(pk_p); -+ BN_free(pk_q); -+ BN_free(pk_g); -+ BN_free(pk_pub_key); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ -+ if (DSA_set0_key(pk->dsa, pk_pub_key, NULL) == 0) { -+ BN_free(pk_pub_key); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto fail; -+ } - } - break; - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: -@@ -2312,12 +2406,17 @@ sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, - /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */ - switch (k->type) { - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -- case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: { -+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key; -+ -+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g); -+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL); -+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, p)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, q)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, g)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, pub_key)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ } - break; - # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: -@@ -2329,10 +2428,15 @@ sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, - goto out; - break; - # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -- case KEY_RSA_CERT: -- if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || -- (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->n)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: { -+ const BIGNUM *e, *n; -+ -+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, NULL); -+ if (e == NULL || n == NULL || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, e)) != 0 || -+ (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, n)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ } - break; - #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: -@@ -2505,43 +2609,65 @@ sshkey_private_serialize(const struct ss - goto out; - switch (key->type) { - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -- case KEY_RSA: -- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ case KEY_RSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *iqmp, *p, *q; -+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, &d); -+ RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp); -+ RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, n)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, e)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, d)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, iqmp)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ } - break; - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } -- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ { -+ const BIGNUM *d, *iqmp, *p, *q; -+ -+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); -+ RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q); -+ RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &iqmp); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, d)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, iqmp)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ } - break; -- case KEY_DSA: -- if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ case KEY_DSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key; -+ -+ DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &p, &q, &g); -+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, q)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, g)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, pub_key)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, priv_key)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ } - break; - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } -- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ { -+ const BIGNUM *priv_key; -+ -+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, priv_key)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ } - break; - # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: -@@ -2617,18 +2743,51 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ { -+ BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key; -+ -+ p = BN_new(); -+ q = BN_new(); -+ g = BN_new(); -+ pub_key = BN_new(); -+ priv_key = BN_new(); -+ if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL || -+ pub_key == NULL || priv_key == NULL || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, g)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, pub_key)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, priv_key)) != 0 || -+ (r = ((DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, p, q, g) == 0) -+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) { -+ BN_free(p); -+ BN_free(q); -+ BN_free(g); -+ BN_free(pub_key); -+ BN_free(priv_key); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, pub_key, priv_key) == 0) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ BN_free(pub_key); -+ BN_free(priv_key); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } - break; -- case KEY_DSA_CERT: -- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || -- (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: { -+ BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_new(); -+ -+ if (priv_key == NULL || -+ (r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, priv_key)) != 0 || -+ (r = ((DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, priv_key) == 0) -+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) { -+ BN_free(priv_key); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } - break; - # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: -@@ -2687,29 +2846,89 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->n)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || -- (r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k)) != 0) -- goto out; -- if (BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { -+ { -+ BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *iqmp, *p, *q; -+ -+ n = BN_new(); -+ e = BN_new(); -+ d = BN_new(); -+ iqmp = BN_new(); -+ p = BN_new(); -+ q = BN_new(); -+ -+ if (n == NULL || e == NULL || d == NULL || -+ iqmp == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, n)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, e)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, d)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, iqmp)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 || -+ (r = ((RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, n, e, d) == 0) -+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) { -+ BN_free(n); -+ BN_free(e); -+ BN_free(d); -+ BN_free(iqmp); -+ BN_free(p); -+ BN_free(q); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ BN_free(iqmp); -+ BN_free(p); -+ BN_free(q); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if ((r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k, iqmp)) != 0) { -+ BN_free(iqmp); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ if (RSA_bits(k->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - goto out; - } - break; -- case KEY_RSA_CERT: -- if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || -- (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || -- (r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k)) != 0) -- goto out; -- if (BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: { -+ BIGNUM *d, *iqmp, *p, *q; -+ -+ /* N and E are already set so make sure we will not overwrite them */ -+ d = BN_new(); -+ iqmp = BN_new(); -+ p = BN_new(); -+ q = BN_new(); -+ -+ if (d == NULL || iqmp == NULL || p == NULL || -+ q == NULL || -+ (r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, d)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, iqmp)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, q)) != 0 || -+ (r = ((RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, d) == 0) -+ ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0)) != 0) { -+ BN_free(d); -+ BN_free(iqmp); -+ BN_free(p); -+ BN_free(q); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ BN_free(p); -+ BN_free(q); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k, iqmp) != 0) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ free(iqmp); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ if (RSA_bits(k->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - goto out; - } -@@ -3427,7 +3646,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long - switch (pem_reason) { - case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT: - return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; -+#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR - case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR: -+#endif - case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR: - #ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR - case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR: -@@ -3492,7 +3713,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct - r = convert_libcrypto_error(); - goto out; - } -- if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && -+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && - (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) { - if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -@@ -3507,11 +3728,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -- if (BN_num_bits(prv->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { -+ if (RSA_bits(prv->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - goto out; - } -- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && -+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA && - (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) { - if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -@@ -3523,7 +3744,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct - DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); - #endif - #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC && -+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC && - (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) { - if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -diff -up openssh/ssh-keygen.c.openssl openssh/ssh-keygen.c ---- openssh/ssh-keygen.c.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.787249636 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-keygen.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.802249728 +0200 -@@ -501,40 +501,67 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char - free(type); - - switch (key->type) { -- case KEY_DSA: -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->p); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->g); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->q); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->pub_key); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->priv_key); -+ case KEY_DSA: { -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; -+ -+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (g = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (q = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, p); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, g); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, q); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, pub_key); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, priv_key); -+ if (DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, p, q, g) == 0 || -+ DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, pub_key, priv_key) == 0) { -+ fatal("failed to set DSA key"); -+ } -+ } - break; -- case KEY_RSA: -- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || -- (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || -- (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) -- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -- e = e1; -- debug("e %lx", e); -- if (e < 30) { -- e <<= 8; -- e += e2; -- debug("e %lx", e); -- e <<= 8; -- e += e3; -+ case KEY_RSA: { -+ BIGNUM *bn_e = NULL, *bn_d = NULL, *bn_n = NULL, *bn_iqmp = NULL, *bn_p = NULL, *bn_q = NULL; -+ -+ if ((bn_e = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (bn_d = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (bn_n = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (bn_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (bn_p = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (bn_q = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || -+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || -+ (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ e = e1; - debug("e %lx", e); -+ if (e < 30) { -+ e <<= 8; -+ e += e2; -+ debug("e %lx", e); -+ e <<= 8; -+ e += e3; -+ debug("e %lx", e); -+ } -+ if (!BN_set_word(bn_e, e)) { -+ sshbuf_free(b); -+ sshkey_free(key); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_d); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_n); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_iqmp); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_q); -+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_p); -+ if (RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, bn_n, bn_e, bn_d) == 0 || -+ RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, bn_p, bn_q) == 0) -+ fatal("Failed to set RSA parameters"); -+ if ((r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key, bn_iqmp)) != 0) -+ fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - } -- if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) { -- sshbuf_free(b); -- sshkey_free(key); -- return NULL; -- } -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->d); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->n); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q); -- buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p); -- if ((r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key)) != 0) -- fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - break; - } - rlen = sshbuf_len(b); -@@ -642,7 +669,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, - identity_file); - } - fclose(fp); -- switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) { -+ switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) { - case EVP_PKEY_RSA: - if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) - fatal("sshkey_new failed"); -@@ -666,7 +693,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, - #endif - default: - fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__, -- EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)); -+ EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)); - } - EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); - return; -@@ -1798,6 +1825,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - pkcs11_terminate(); - #endif -+ free(ca); - exit(0); - } - -diff -up openssh/sshkey.h.openssl openssh/sshkey.h ---- openssh/sshkey.h.openssl 2017-09-26 13:19:31.780249593 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshkey.h 2017-09-26 13:19:31.803249734 +0200 -@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(s - const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); - - /* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */ --int ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(struct sshkey *); -+int ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(struct sshkey *, BIGNUM *iqmp); - - /* stateful keys (e.g. XMSS) */ - #ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS -diff -up openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.openssl openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c ---- openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.803249734 +0200 -@@ -143,12 +143,16 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con - static int - wrap_rsa_key(RSA *rsa) - { -- static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa; -+ static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa; - -- memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa)); -- helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper"; -- helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; -- RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa); -+ if (helper_rsa == NULL) { -+ helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method()); -+ if (helper_rsa == NULL) -+ error("RSA_meth_dup failed"); -+ RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper"); -+ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt); -+ } -+ RSA_set_method(rsa, helper_rsa); - return (0); - } - -diff -up openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c.openssl openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c ---- openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.803249734 +0200 -@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key { - CK_ULONG slotidx; - CK_ULONG key_type; - int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa); -- RSA_METHOD rsa_method; -+ RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; - char *keyid; - int keyid_len; - char *label; -@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) - pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); - free(k11->keyid); - free(k11->label); -+ RSA_meth_free(k11->rsa_method); - free(k11); - } - return (rv); -@@ -326,13 +326,21 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider * - memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen); - k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; - } -- k11->orig_finish = def->finish; -- memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method)); -- k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11"; -- k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; -- k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt; -- k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish; -- RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method); -+ k11->orig_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(def); -+ if ((k11->rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(def)) == NULL || -+ RSA_meth_set1_name(k11->rsa_method, "pkcs11") == 0 || -+ RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) == 0 || -+ RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt) == 0 || -+ RSA_meth_set_finish(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_finish) == 0) { -+ RSA_meth_free(k11->rsa_method); -+ k11->rsa_method = NULL; -+ pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); -+ free(k11->keyid); -+ free(k11); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ -+ RSA_set_method(rsa, k11->rsa_method); - RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11); - return (0); - } -@@ -460,6 +468,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - CK_ULONG nfound; - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; -+ const BIGNUM *n, *e; - - f = p->module->function_list; - session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; -@@ -512,10 +521,16 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { - error("RSA_new failed"); - } else { -- rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, -+ BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; -+ -+ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, - attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL); -- rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[3].pValue, -+ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[3].pValue, - attribs[3].ulValueLen, NULL); -+ if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) -+ error("BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ if (RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL) == 0) -+ error("RSA_set0_key failed"); - } - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA - } else if (attribs[2].type == CKA_EC_PARAMS ) { -@@ -920,19 +936,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) { - debug("X509_get_pubkey failed"); - } else { -- switch (evp->type) { -+ switch (EVP_PKEY_id(evp)) { - case EVP_PKEY_RSA: -- if (evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) -+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) - debug("Missing RSA key"); -- else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup( -- evp->pkey.rsa)) == NULL) -+ else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup( -+ EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) - error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed"); - break; - case EVP_PKEY_EC: -- if (evp->pkey.ecdsa == NULL) -+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) - debug("Missing ECDSA key"); -- else if ((ecdsa = EC_KEY_dup( -- evp->pkey.ecdsa)) == NULL) -+ else if ((ecdsa = EC_KEY_dup( -+ EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp))) == NULL) - error("EC_KEY_dup failed"); - break; - default: -@@ -538,7 +551,9 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - } - key = NULL; - if (rsa || ecdsa) { -- if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && -+ if (rsa) -+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL); -+ if (rsa && n && e && - pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], &attribs[1], rsa) == 0) { - if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) - fatal("sshkey_new failed"); -diff -up openssh/ssh-rsa.c.openssl openssh/ssh-rsa.c ---- openssh/ssh-rsa.c.openssl 2017-09-19 06:26:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-rsa.c 2017-09-26 13:19:31.803249734 +0200 -@@ -78,38 +78,50 @@ rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) - } - - int --ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(struct sshkey *key) -+ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(struct sshkey *key, BIGNUM *iqmp) - { - BIGNUM *aux = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; -- BIGNUM d; -+ BIGNUM *d = NULL; - int r; -+ const BIGNUM *p, *q, *rsa_d; -+ BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL; - - if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - -- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) -- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q); -+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d); -+ -+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || -+ (aux = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (d = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - BN_set_flags(aux, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - -- BN_init(&d); -- BN_with_flags(&d, key->rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); -+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa_d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - -- if ((BN_sub(aux, key->rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || -- (BN_mod(key->rsa->dmq1, &d, aux, ctx) == 0) || -- (BN_sub(aux, key->rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || -- (BN_mod(key->rsa->dmp1, &d, aux, ctx) == 0)) { -+ if ((BN_sub(aux, q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || -+ (BN_mod(dmq1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) || -+ (BN_sub(aux, p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || -+ (BN_mod(dmp1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) || -+ (RSA_set0_crt_params(key->rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp) == 0)) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -+ dmp1 = NULL; -+ dmq1 = NULL; - r = 0; - out: -+ BN_free(d); - BN_clear_free(aux); -+ BN_clear_free(dmp1); -+ BN_clear_free(dmq1); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - return r; - } -@@ -136,7 +145,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u - if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) -+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); - if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) -@@ -210,7 +219,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || - sig == NULL || siglen == 0) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) -+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - - if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) ---- openssh-7.6p1/configure.ac.openssl 2017-10-04 15:47:48.440672023 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/configure.ac 2017-10-04 15:47:23.327531495 +0200 -@@ -2730,6 +2730,7 @@ - AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) - ;; - 100*) ;; # 1.0.x -+ 101*) ;; # 1.1.x is supported by this patch too - 200*) ;; # LibreSSL - *) - AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.1.0 is not yet supported (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) diff --git a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch b/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4f9e58a..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@ -commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31 -Author: Jakub Jelen -Date: Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100 - - systemd stuff - -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], - AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) - AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) - -+# Check whether user wants systemd support -+SYSTEMD_MSG="no" -+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd, -+ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support], -+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then -+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) -+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd]) -+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then -+ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd` -+ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd` -+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS" -+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) -+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.]) -+ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes" -+ else -+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) -+ fi -+ fi -+ fi ] -+) -+ -+ - # Looking for programs, paths and files - - PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty -@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" - echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" - echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" - echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" -+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG" - echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" - echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" - echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" -diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..e0d4923 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/contrib/sshd.service -@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ -+[Unit] -+Description=OpenSSH server daemon -+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5) -+After=network.target -+ -+[Service] -+Type=notify -+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS -+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID -+KillMode=process -+Restart=on-failure -+RestartPreventExitStatus=255 -+ -+[Install] -+WantedBy=multi-user.target -+ -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c -index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644 ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ - #include - #endif - -+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD -+#include -+#endif -+ - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "ssh.h" - #include "ssh2.h" -@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - } - } - -+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD -+ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */ -+ sd_notify(0, "READY=1"); -+#endif -+ - /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ - server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, - &newsock, config_s); diff --git a/openssh-7.5p1-gssapi-kex-with-ec.patch b/openssh-7.5p1-gssapi-kex-with-ec.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5f2763a..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.5p1-gssapi-kex-with-ec.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1377 +0,0 @@ -From 6ff8f667f792052fd47689c3e421fcd6ddca1cd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jakub Jelen -Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 19:15:48 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/3] GSSAPI Key exchange methods with DH and SHA2 - ---- - gss-genr.c | 10 ++++++++++ - kex.c | 2 ++ - kex.h | 2 ++ - kexgssc.c | 6 ++++++ - kexgsss.c | 6 ++++++ - monitor.c | 2 ++ - regress/kextype.sh | 4 +++- - regress/rekey.sh | 8 ++++++-- - ssh-gss.h | 2 ++ - ssh_config.5 | 4 +++- - sshconnect2.c | 2 ++ - sshd.c | 2 ++ - sshd_config.5 | 4 +++- - 13 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c -index dc63682d..c6eff3d7 100644 ---- a/gss-genr.c -+++ b/gss-genr.c -@@ -183,6 +183,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { - return GSS_C_NO_OID; - name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; - break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID) - 1; -+ break; - case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: - if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) - return GSS_C_NO_OID; -diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c -index 63e028fa..e798fecb 100644 ---- a/kex.c -+++ b/kex.c -@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { - { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, - { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, - { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, - #endif - { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, - }; -diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h -index 8a2b37c5..f27958ae 100644 ---- a/kex.h -+++ b/kex.h -@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ enum kex_exchange { - #ifdef GSSAPI - KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, - KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, - KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, - #endif - KEX_MAX -diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c -index 132df8b5..ed23f06d 100644 ---- a/kexgssc.c -+++ b/kexgssc.c -@@ -88,8 +88,12 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - dh = dh_new_group1(); - break; - case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: - dh = dh_new_group14(); - break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -+ dh = dh_new_group16(); -+ break; - case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: - debug("Doing group exchange\n"); - nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8); -@@ -272,6 +276,8 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { - case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: - case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: - kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg, ssh->kex->client_version_string, - ssh->kex->server_version_string, - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), -diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c -index 82a715cc..b7da8823 100644 ---- a/kexgsss.c -+++ b/kexgsss.c -@@ -104,8 +104,12 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - dh = dh_new_group1(); - break; - case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: - dh = dh_new_group14(); - break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -+ dh = dh_new_group16(); -+ break; - case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: - debug("Doing group exchange"); - packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -@@ -223,6 +227,8 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { - case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: - case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: - kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg, - ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string, - sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), -diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c -index 17046936..d6bc7ac7 100644 ---- a/monitor.c -+++ b/monitor.c -@@ -1648,6 +1648,8 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) - if (options.gss_keyex) { - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; - } - #endif -diff --git a/regress/kextype.sh b/regress/kextype.sh -index 780362ca..45f4f16d 100644 ---- a/regress/kextype.sh -+++ b/regress/kextype.sh -@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy - - tries="1 2 3 4" - for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -- if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then -+ if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -+ $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ -+ $k = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then - continue - fi - verbose "kex $k" -diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh -index 9fbe9b38..a2921bef 100644 ---- a/regress/rekey.sh -+++ b/regress/rekey.sh -@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ increase_datafile_size 300 - - opts="" - for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -- if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then -+ if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -+ $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ -+ $i = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then - continue - fi - opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" -@@ -59,7 +61,9 @@ done - if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then - for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do - for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -- if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then -+ if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -+ $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ -+ $kex = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then - continue - fi - verbose "client rekey $c $kex" -diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h -index 6b6adb2b..7bf8d75e 100644 ---- a/ssh-gss.h -+++ b/ssh-gss.h -@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ - #define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 - #define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" - #define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-" - #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" - - #define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ -diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 -index 6b24649e..3d6da510 100644 ---- a/ssh_config.5 -+++ b/ssh_config.5 -@@ -760,7 +760,9 @@ key exchange. Possible values are - .Bd -literal -offset 3n - gss-gex-sha1-, - gss-group1-sha1-, --gss-group14-sha1- -+gss-group14-sha1-, -+gss-group14-sha256-, -+gss-group16-sha512- - .Ed - .Pp - The default is -diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c -index 8db98293..5d6b8be0 100644 ---- a/sshconnect2.c -+++ b/sshconnect2.c -@@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) - if (options.gss_keyex) { - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_client; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; - } - #endif -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c -index 895df26f..e4c879a2 100644 ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -2244,6 +2244,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - if (options.gss_keyex) { - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; - } - #endif -diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 -index bf81f6af..0793418b 100644 ---- a/sshd_config.5 -+++ b/sshd_config.5 -@@ -675,7 +675,9 @@ key exchange. Possible values are - .Bd -literal -offset 3n - gss-gex-sha1-, - gss-group1-sha1-, --gss-group14-sha1- -+gss-group14-sha1-, -+gss-group14-sha256-, -+gss-group16-sha512- - .Ed - .Pp - The default is --- -2.13.5 - - -From 7d56144903fc625c33da7fabf103f4f6bba4d43a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jakub Jelen -Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:32:14 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/3] GSSAPI Key exchange using ECDH and SHA2 - ---- - gss-genr.c | 10 ++ - kex.c | 3 + - kex.h | 4 + - kexgssc.c | 392 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - kexgsss.c | 333 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - monitor.c | 5 +- - regress/kextype.sh | 1 + - regress/rekey.sh | 2 + - ssh-gss.h | 2 + - ssh_config.5 | 4 +- - sshconnect2.c | 2 + - sshd.c | 2 + - sshd_config.5 | 4 +- - 13 files changed, 754 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c -index c6eff3d7..22040244 100644 ---- a/gss-genr.c -+++ b/gss-genr.c -@@ -198,6 +198,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { - return GSS_C_NO_OID; - name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; - break; -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID) - 1; -+ break; - default: - return GSS_C_NO_OID; - } -diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c -index e798fecb..bdeeada9 100644 ---- a/kex.c -+++ b/kex.c -@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { - { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, - { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, - { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, -+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, - #endif - { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, - }; -diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h -index f27958ae..7def8561 100644 ---- a/kex.h -+++ b/kex.h -@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ enum kex_exchange { - KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, - KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, - KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, -+ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, - #endif - KEX_MAX - }; -@@ -211,6 +213,8 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *); - int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *); - int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *); - #ifdef GSSAPI -+int kexecgss_client(struct ssh *); -+int kexecgss_server(struct ssh *); - int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); - int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); - #endif -diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c -index ed23f06d..bdb3109a 100644 ---- a/kexgssc.c -+++ b/kexgssc.c -@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ - #include "packet.h" - #include "dh.h" - #include "digest.h" -+#include "ssherr.h" - - #include "ssh-gss.h" - -@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; - Gssctxt *ctxt; - OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -- u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen; -+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, packet_len; - DH *dh; - BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; - BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -@@ -201,20 +202,20 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); - if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) - fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -- recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -- recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&packet_len); -+ recv_tok.length = packet_len; - break; - case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: - debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); - packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); -- msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -- msg_tok.length = strlen; -+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&packet_len); -+ msg_tok.length = packet_len; - - /* Is there a token included? */ - if (packet_get_char()) { - recv_tok.value= -- packet_get_string(&strlen); -- recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ packet_get_string(&packet_len); -+ recv_tok.length = packet_len; - /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ - if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); -@@ -344,4 +345,382 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { - return kex_send_newkeys(ssh); - } - -+int -+kexecgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -+ u_int klen = 0, slen = 0, packet_len; -+ u_char *server_pub = NULL; -+ u_int server_pub_len = 0; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ u_char *kbuf = NULL; -+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; -+ u_char *empty = ""; -+ char *msg; -+ char *lang; -+ int type = 0; -+ int first = 1; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; -+ const EC_POINT *public_key; -+ struct sshbuf *Q_C = NULL; -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ EC_POINT *server_public = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *c25519_shared_secret = NULL; -+ int r; -+ -+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -+ == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); -+ -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) -+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); -+ -+ if (kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) -+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); -+ -+ if ((Q_C = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if ((kex->ec_client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(kex->ec_client_key) != 1) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(kex->ec_client_key); -+ public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(kex->ec_client_key); -+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH -+ fputs("client private key:\n", stderr); -+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(kex->ec_client_key); -+#endif -+ -+ sshbuf_put_ec(Q_C, public_key, group); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, kex->c25519_client_pubkey); -+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH -+ dump_digest("client private key:", kex->c25519_client_key, -+ sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); -+#endif -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(Q_C, kex->c25519_client_pubkey, -+ sizeof(kex->c25519_client_pubkey))) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; -+ -+ do { -+ /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -+ -+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -+ &ret_flags); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ free(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (first) { -+ const u_char * ptr; -+ size_t len; -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ sshbuf_get_string_direct(Q_C, &ptr, &len); -+ packet_put_string(ptr, len); -+ first = 0; -+ } else { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ do { -+ type = packet_read(); -+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ serverhostkey = -+ packet_get_string(&slen); -+ } -+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -+ -+ switch (type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&packet_len); -+ recv_tok.length = packet_len; -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ server_pub = packet_get_string(&server_pub_len); -+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&packet_len); -+ msg_tok.length = packet_len; -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if (packet_get_char()) { -+ recv_tok.value= -+ packet_get_string(&packet_len); -+ recv_tok.length = packet_len; -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ /* No token included */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ maj_status = packet_get_int(); -+ min_status = packet_get_int(); -+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ token_ptr = &recv_tok; -+ } else { -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ /* -+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the -+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok -+ */ -+ -+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ -+ /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */ -+ /* 8. C computes shared secret */ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if (server_pub_len != 65) -+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match" -+ "expected length (expected 65, got %d)", server_pub_len); -+ -+ if (server_pub[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) -+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); -+ -+ if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, server_public, server_pub, -+ server_pub_len, NULL)) -+ fatal("Can not decode received NIST-P256 client key"); -+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH -+ fputs("server public key:\n", stderr); -+ sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, server_public); -+#endif -+ -+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0) { -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid client public key"); -+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, server_public, NULL)) -+ fatal("Received NIST-P256 client key is not on curve"); -+ -+ /* Calculate shared_secret */ -+ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; -+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || -+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public, -+ kex->ec_client_key, NULL) != (int)klen || -+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH -+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); -+#endif -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ if (server_pub_len != 32) -+ fatal("The received curve25519 key did not match" -+ "expected length (expected 32, got %d)", server_pub_len); -+ -+ if (server_pub[server_pub_len-1] & 0x80) -+ fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); -+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH -+ dump_digest("server public key:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); -+#endif -+ -+ /* generate shared secret */ -+ if ((c25519_shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(kex->c25519_client_key, -+ server_pub, c25519_shared_secret)) < 0) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* if all octets of the shared secret are zero octets, -+ * is already checked in kexc25519_shared_key() */ -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ kex_ecdh_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ group, -+ kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(kex->ec_client_key), -+ server_public, -+ shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ kex_c25519_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ kex->c25519_client_pubkey, server_pub, -+ sshbuf_ptr(c25519_shared_secret), sshbuf_len(c25519_shared_secret), -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); -+ -+ free(msg_tok.value); -+ -+ /* save session id */ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, c25519_shared_secret)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); -+out: -+ free(serverhostkey); -+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); -+ sshbuf_free(Q_C); -+ if (server_pub) -+ free(server_pub); -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if (kex->ec_client_key) { -+ EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); -+ kex->ec_client_key = NULL; -+ } -+ if (server_public) -+ EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public); -+ if (kbuf) { -+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); -+ free(kbuf); -+ } -+ if (shared_secret) -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); -+ sshbuf_free(c25519_shared_secret); -+ break; -+ } -+ return r; -+} - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c -index b7da8823..a7c42803 100644 ---- a/kexgsss.c -+++ b/kexgsss.c -@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ - #include "servconf.h" - #include "ssh-gss.h" - #include "digest.h" -+#include "ssherr.h" - - extern ServerOptions options; - -@@ -303,4 +304,338 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); - return 0; - } -+ -+int -+kexecgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ /* -+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -+ * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ */ -+ -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -+ u_int slen, klen = 0; -+ u_char *kbuf = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ int type = 0; -+ gss_OID oid; -+ char *mechs; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ u_char *client_pub = NULL; -+ u_int client_pub_len = 0; -+ const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; -+ EC_POINT *client_public = NULL; -+ EC_KEY *server_key = NULL; -+ const EC_POINT *public_key; -+ u_char c25519_server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; -+ u_char c25519_server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; -+ struct sshbuf *c25519_shared_secret = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *Q_S; -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ int r; -+ -+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ -+ -+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures -+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back -+ * into life -+ */ -+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) -+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) -+ free(mechs); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); -+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); -+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) -+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); -+ -+ if ((Q_S = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key); -+ public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key); -+ -+ sshbuf_put_ec(Q_S, public_key, group); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ kexc25519_keygen(c25519_server_key, c25519_server_pubkey); -+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH -+ dump_digest("server private key:", c25519_server_key, -+ sizeof(c25519_server_key)); -+#endif -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(Q_S, c25519_server_pubkey, -+ sizeof(c25519_server_pubkey))) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); -+ type = packet_read(); -+ switch(type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -+ if (client_pub != NULL) -+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ -+ client_pub = packet_get_string(&client_pub_len); -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ break; -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect( -+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ -+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -+ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); -+ -+ free(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ -+ if (client_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); -+ -+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ } -+ fatal("accept_ctx died"); -+ } -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ /* 3. S verifies that the (client) key is valid */ -+ /* calculate shared secret */ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if (client_pub_len != 65) -+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match" -+ "expected length (expected 65, got %d)", client_pub_len); -+ -+ if (client_pub[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) -+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); -+ -+ if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, client_public, client_pub, -+ client_pub_len, NULL)) -+ fatal("Can not decode received NIST-P256 client key"); -+ -+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0) { -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid client public key"); -+ r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, client_public, NULL)) -+ fatal("Received NIST-P256 client key is not on curve"); -+ -+ /* Calculate shared_secret */ -+ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; -+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || -+ (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public, -+ server_key, NULL) != (int)klen || -+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ if (client_pub_len != 32) -+ fatal("The received curve25519 key did not match" -+ "expected length (expected 32, got %d)", client_pub_len); -+ -+ if (client_pub[client_pub_len-1] & 0x80) -+ fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); -+ -+ /* generate shared secret */ -+ if ((c25519_shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(c25519_server_key, -+ client_pub, c25519_shared_secret)) < 0) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* if all octets of the shared secret are zero octets, -+ * is already checked in kexc25519_shared_key() */ -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ kex_ecdh_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ group, -+ kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, -+ client_public, -+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key), -+ shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ kex_c25519_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), -+ sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, -+ client_pub, c25519_server_pubkey, -+ sshbuf_ptr(c25519_shared_secret), sshbuf_len(c25519_shared_secret), -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) -+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); -+ { -+ const u_char *ptr; -+ size_t len; -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(Q_S, &ptr, &len)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ packet_put_string(ptr, len); -+ } -+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length); -+ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ } else { -+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, c25519_shared_secret)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ if ((r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we -+ * just exchanged. */ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey) -+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+out: -+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); -+ if (Q_S) -+ sshbuf_free(Q_S); -+ if (client_pub) -+ free(client_pub); -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if (server_key) -+ EC_KEY_free(server_key); -+ if (kbuf) { -+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); -+ free(kbuf); -+ } -+ if (shared_secret) -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ explicit_bzero(c25519_server_key, sizeof(c25519_server_key)); -+ sshbuf_free(c25519_shared_secret); -+ break; -+ } -+ return r; -+} - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c -index d6bc7ac7..b11616c8 100644 ---- a/monitor.c -+++ b/monitor.c -@@ -1651,6 +1651,8 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexecgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexecgss_server; - } - #endif - kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; -@@ -1867,7 +1869,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) - - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&data.value, &data.length)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -- if (data.length != 20) -+ /* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */ -+ if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64) - fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, - (int) data.length); - -diff --git a/regress/kextype.sh b/regress/kextype.sh -index 45f4f16d..d5b4a713 100644 ---- a/regress/kextype.sh -+++ b/regress/kextype.sh -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy - tries="1 2 3 4" - for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do - if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -+ $k = "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -o $k = "gss-curve25519-sha256-" -o \ - $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ - $k = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then - continue -diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh -index a2921bef..b118c6c8 100644 ---- a/regress/rekey.sh -+++ b/regress/rekey.sh -@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ increase_datafile_size 300 - opts="" - for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do - if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -+ $i = "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -o $i = "gss-curve25519-sha256-" -o \ - $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ - $i = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then - continue -@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then - for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do - for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do - if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -+ $kex = "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -o $kex = "gss-curve25519-sha256-" -o \ - $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ - $kex = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then - continue -diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h -index 7bf8d75e..1f73721d 100644 ---- a/ssh-gss.h -+++ b/ssh-gss.h -@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ - #define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-" - #define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-" - #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -+#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "gss-curve25519-sha256-" - - #define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ - KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \ -diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 -index 3d6da510..1dc29bf1 100644 ---- a/ssh_config.5 -+++ b/ssh_config.5 -@@ -762,7 +762,9 @@ gss-gex-sha1-, - gss-group1-sha1-, - gss-group14-sha1-, - gss-group14-sha256-, --gss-group16-sha512- -+gss-group16-sha512-, -+gss-nistp256-sha256-, -+gss-curve25519-sha256- - .Ed - .Pp - The default is -diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c -index 5d6b8be0..280ae5a6 100644 ---- a/sshconnect2.c -+++ b/sshconnect2.c -@@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_client; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_client; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexecgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexecgss_client; - } - #endif - kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c -index e4c879a2..a35735d8 100644 ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -2247,6 +2247,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; - kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexecgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexecgss_server; - } - #endif - kex->server = 1; -diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 -index 0793418b..888316bf 100644 ---- a/sshd_config.5 -+++ b/sshd_config.5 -@@ -677,7 +677,9 @@ gss-gex-sha1-, - gss-group1-sha1-, - gss-group14-sha1-, - gss-group14-sha256-, --gss-group16-sha512- -+gss-group16-sha512-, -+gss-nistp256-sha256-, -+gss-curve25519-sha256- - .Ed - .Pp - The default is --- -2.13.5 - - -From 0431695660d5eb1dd1169d42a1624c75a92aa5d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jakub Jelen -Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 15:30:51 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Simplify rough edges of GSSAPI Kex - ---- - gss-genr.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++------------------------------------ - regress/kextype.sh | 10 ++++------ - regress/rekey.sh | 20 ++++++++------------ - 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c -index 22040244..c671be31 100644 ---- a/gss-genr.c -+++ b/gss-genr.c -@@ -171,47 +171,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, - gss_OID - ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { - int i = 0; -- -- switch (kex_type) { -- case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -- if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) -- return GSS_C_NO_OID; -- name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -- if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) -- return GSS_C_NO_OID; -- name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -- if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID)) -- return GSS_C_NO_OID; -- name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID) - 1; -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -- if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID)) -- return GSS_C_NO_OID; -- name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID) - 1; -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -- if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) -- return GSS_C_NO_OID; -- name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -- if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID)) -- return GSS_C_NO_OID; -- name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID) - 1; -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -- if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID)) -- return GSS_C_NO_OID; -- name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID) - 1; -+ -+#define SKIP_KEX_NAME(type) \ -+ case type: \ -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(type##_ID)) \ -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; \ -+ name += sizeof(type##_ID) - 1; \ - break; -+ -+ switch (kex_type) { -+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1) -+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1) -+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256) -+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512) -+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1) -+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256) -+ SKIP_KEX_NAME(KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256) - default: - return GSS_C_NO_OID; - } - -+#undef SKIP_KEX_NAME -+ - while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && - strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) - i++; -diff --git a/regress/kextype.sh b/regress/kextype.sh -index d5b4a713..6b4af28a 100644 ---- a/regress/kextype.sh -+++ b/regress/kextype.sh -@@ -14,12 +14,10 @@ echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy - - tries="1 2 3 4" - for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -- if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -- $k = "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -o $k = "gss-curve25519-sha256-" -o \ -- $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ -- $k = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then -- continue -- fi -+ # ignore GSSAPI key exchange mechanisms (all of them start with gss-) -+ case $k in -+ gss-* ) continue ;; -+ esac - verbose "kex $k" - for i in $tries; do - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true -diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh -index b118c6c8..d6a8742f 100644 ---- a/regress/rekey.sh -+++ b/regress/rekey.sh -@@ -38,12 +38,10 @@ increase_datafile_size 300 - - opts="" - for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -- if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -- $i = "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -o $i = "gss-curve25519-sha256-" -o \ -- $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ -- $i = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then -- continue -- fi -+ # ignore GSSAPI key exchange mechanisms (all of them start with gss-) -+ case $i in -+ gss-* ) continue ;; -+ esac - opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" - done - for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do -@@ -62,12 +60,10 @@ done - if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then - for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do - for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -- if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o \ -- $kex = "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -o $kex = "gss-curve25519-sha256-" -o \ -- $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha256-" -o \ -- $kex = "gss-group16-sha512-" ]; then -- continue -- fi -+ # ignore GSSAPI key exchange mechanisms (all of them start with gss-) -+ case $kex in -+ gss-* ) continue ;; -+ esac - verbose "client rekey $c $kex" - ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c - done --- -2.13.5 - diff --git a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b761962..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock -and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11 -implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the -crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now, -this is only need on s390 architecture. - -Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto ---- - sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644 ---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { - #ifdef __NR_exit_group - SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), - #endif -+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__) -+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock), -+#endif - #ifdef __NR_geteuid - SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), - #endif -@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { - #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday - SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), - #endif -+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__) -+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc), -+#endif - #ifdef __NR_getuid - SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), - #endif --- -1.9.1 - -getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a -crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica). -Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code. - -Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto ---- - sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644 ---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { - #ifdef __NR_getpid - SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), - #endif -+#ifdef __NR_getuid -+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), -+#endif -+#ifdef __NR_getuid32 -+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), -+#endif -+#ifdef __NR_geteuid -+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), -+#endif -+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32 -+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), -+#endif - #ifdef __NR_getrandom - SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), - #endif --- 1.9.1 - -The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an -specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only. - -Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto ---- - sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -index e86aa2c..98062f1 100644 ---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { - SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK), - SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO), - SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT), -+ /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */ -+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB), - #endif - #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT) - /* --- -1.9.1 -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox 2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100 -@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ - #ifdef __NR_geteuid32 - SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), - #endif -+#ifdef __NR_gettid -+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid), -+#endif - #ifdef __NR_getrandom - SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), - #endif diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3b5001a..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,253 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor 2017-09-27 13:10:19.556830609 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c 2017-09-27 13:10:19.677831274 +0200 -@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ - extern ServerOptions options; - extern u_char *session_id2; - extern u_int session_id2_len; -+extern int inetd_flag; -+extern int rexeced_flag; -+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; - - static char * - format_key(const struct sshkey *key) -@@ -432,7 +435,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd * - - if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command, - ac, av, &f, -- SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) -+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, -+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0) - goto out; - - uid_swapped = 1; -@@ -762,7 +766,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd - - if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command, - ac, av, &f, -- SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) -+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD, -+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0) - goto out; - - uid_swapped = 1; -diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c ---- openssh/auth.c.refactor 2017-09-27 13:10:19.640831071 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth.c 2017-09-27 13:10:19.678831279 +0200 -@@ -1435,7 +1435,8 @@ argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv) - */ - pid_t - subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, -- int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags) -+ int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd, -+ void *the_authctxt) - { - FILE *f = NULL; - struct stat st; -@@ -1551,7 +1552,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw - } - - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) { -+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) { - error ("failed to copy environment: %s", - strerror(errno)); - _exit(127); -diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h ---- openssh/auth.h.refactor 2017-09-25 01:48:10.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth.h 2017-09-27 13:10:19.678831279 +0200 -@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, - #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */ - #define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */ - pid_t subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *, -- const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags); -+ const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *); - - int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *); - -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor 2017-09-27 13:10:19.634831038 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2017-09-27 13:10:54.954025248 +0200 -@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch - - int sshd_selinux_enabled(void); - void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void); --void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); --int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void); -+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int); -+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *); - void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void); - #endif - -diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c ---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor 2017-09-27 13:10:19.634831038 +0200 -+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2017-09-27 13:12:06.811420371 +0200 -@@ -48,11 +48,6 @@ - #include - #endif - --extern ServerOptions options; --extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; --extern int inetd_flag; --extern int rexeced_flag; -- - /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ - int - sshd_selinux_enabled(void) -@@ -222,7 +217,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con - } - - static void --ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) -+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level, -+ Authctxt *the_authctxt) - { - *role = NULL; - *level = NULL; -@@ -240,8 +236,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, - - /* Return the default security context for the given username */ - static int --sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, -- security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) -+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc, -+ security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt) - { - char *sename, *lvl; - char *role; -@@ -249,7 +245,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, - int r = 0; - context_t con = NULL; - -- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); -+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt); - - #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME - if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { -@@ -271,7 +267,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, - - if (r == 0) { - /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ -- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { -+ if (inetd) { - security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; - - if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) -@@ -332,7 +328,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, - - /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ - static int --sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *)) -+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd, -+ Authctxt *the_authctxt) - { - const char *reqlvl; - char *role; -@@ -341,11 +338,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it - - debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); - -- ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); -+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt); - - rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); - -- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { -+ if (inetd) { - use_current = "1"; - } else { - use_current = ""; -@@ -361,9 +358,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it - } - - static int --sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) -+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd, -+ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt) - { -- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv); -+ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt); - } - - static int -@@ -373,25 +371,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value) - } - - int --sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void) -+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt) - { -- return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv); -+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt; -+ return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt); - } - - /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ - void --sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) -+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd, -+ int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam) - { - security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; - int r = 0; - security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; -+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt; - - if (!sshd_selinux_enabled()) - return; - -- if (options.use_pam) { -+ if (use_pam) { - /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ -- if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { -+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) { - switch (security_getenforce()) { - case -1: - fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); -@@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw - - debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); - -- r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); -+ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt); - if (r >= 0) { - r = setexeccon(user_ctx); - if (r < 0) { -diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c ---- openssh/platform.c.refactor 2017-09-27 13:10:19.574830708 +0200 -+++ openssh/platform.c 2017-09-27 13:11:45.475303050 +0200 -@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ - - extern int use_privsep; - extern ServerOptions options; -+extern int inetd_flag; -+extern int rexeced_flag; -+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; - - void - platform_pre_listen(void) -@@ -184,7 +187,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru - } - #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); -+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, -+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt, -+ options.use_pam); - #endif - } - -diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c ---- openssh/sshd.c.refactor 2017-09-27 13:10:19.674831257 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshd.c 2017-09-27 13:12:01.635391909 +0200 -@@ -2135,7 +2135,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - } - #endif - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); -+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name, -+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt, -+ options.use_pam); - #endif - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) { diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-ecdsa.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-ecdsa.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2e73d45..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-ecdsa.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,801 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-ecdsa openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-ecdsa 2018-02-16 13:25:59.426469253 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2018-02-16 13:25:59.428469265 +0100 -@@ -31,6 +31,15 @@ - #include - - #include -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+#include -+#if ((defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ -+ (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20010002L))) || \ -+ (defined(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_METHOD_NEW)) || \ -+ (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+#define ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA 1 -+#endif -+#endif - - #include "pathnames.h" - #include "xmalloc.h" -@@ -139,9 +147,9 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con - return (ret); - } - --/* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ -+/* redirect the RSA private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ - static int --wrap_key(RSA *rsa) -+wrap_rsa_key(RSA *rsa) - { - static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa; - -@@ -152,6 +160,88 @@ wrap_key(RSA *rsa) - return (0); - } - -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+static ECDSA_SIG * -+pkcs11_ecdsa_private_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen, -+ const BIGNUM *inv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY * ecdsa) -+{ -+ struct sshkey *key = NULL; -+ u_char *blob, *signature = NULL; -+ size_t blen, slen = 0; -+ struct sshbuf *msg = NULL; -+ ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; -+ int rv; -+ -+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA)) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); -+ key->ecdsa = ecdsa; -+ key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ecdsa); -+ if (sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) -+ goto out; -+ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); -+ if ((rv = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || -+ (rv = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || -+ (rv = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 || -+ (rv = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(rv)); -+ free(blob); -+ send_msg(msg); -+ sshbuf_reset(msg); -+ -+ if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { -+ if ((rv = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(rv)); -+ if (slen <= (size_t)ECDSA_size(ecdsa)) { -+ int nlen = slen / 2; -+ ret = ECDSA_SIG_new(); -+ r = BN_new(); -+ s = BN_new(); -+ BN_bin2bn(&signature[0], nlen, r); -+ BN_bin2bn(&signature[nlen], nlen, s); -+ ECDSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s); -+ } -+ free(signature); -+ } -+out: -+ sshkey_free(key); -+ sshbuf_free(msg); -+ return (ret); -+} -+ -+/* redirect the ECDSA private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ -+static int -+wrap_ecdsa_key(EC_KEY *ecdsa) { -+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+ static EC_KEY_METHOD *helper_ecdsa = NULL; -+ if (helper_ecdsa == NULL) { -+ const EC_KEY_METHOD *def = EC_KEY_get_default_method(); -+ helper_ecdsa = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(def); -+ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, NULL, NULL, pkcs11_ecdsa_private_sign); -+ } -+ EC_KEY_set_method(ecdsa, helper_ecdsa); -+#else -+ static ECDSA_METHOD *helper_ecdsa = NULL; -+ if(helper_ecdsa == NULL) { -+ const ECDSA_METHOD *def = ECDSA_get_default_method(); -+# ifdef ECDSA_F_ECDSA_METHOD_NEW -+ helper_ecdsa = ECDSA_METHOD_new((ECDSA_METHOD *)def); -+ ECDSA_METHOD_set_name(helper_ecdsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper-ecdsa"); -+ ECDSA_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, pkcs11_ecdsa_private_sign); -+# else -+ helper_ecdsa = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*helper_ecdsa)); -+ memcpy(helper_ecdsa, def, sizeof(*helper_ecdsa)); -+ helper_ecdsa->name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper-ecdsa"; -+ helper_ecdsa->ecdsa_do_sign = pkcs11_ecdsa_private_sign; -+# endif -+ } -+ ECDSA_set_method(ecdsa, helper_ecdsa); -+#endif -+ return (0); -+} -+#endif -+ - static int - pkcs11_start_helper(void) - { -@@ -212,7 +281,15 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0) - fatal("%s: bad key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -- wrap_key(k->rsa); -+ if(k->type == KEY_RSA) { -+ wrap_rsa_key(k->rsa); -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ } else if(k->type == KEY_ECDSA) { -+ wrap_ecdsa_key(k->ecdsa); -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ } else { -+ /* Unsupported type */ -+ } - (*keysp)[i] = k; - free(blob); - } -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-ecdsa openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-ecdsa 2018-02-16 13:25:59.427469259 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2018-02-16 13:44:51.270554797 +0100 -@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - - #include -+#include -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+#include -+#if ((defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ -+ (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20010002L))) || \ -+ (defined(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_METHOD_NEW)) || \ -+ (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+#define ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA 1 -+#endif -+#endif - - #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT - #include "pkcs11.h" -@@ -67,6 +76,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_pro - struct pkcs11_key { - struct pkcs11_provider *provider; - CK_ULONG slotidx; -+ CK_ULONG key_type; - int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa); - RSA_METHOD rsa_method; - char *keyid; -@@ -75,6 +85,9 @@ struct pkcs11_key { - }; - - int pkcs11_interactive = 0; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+static int pkcs11_key_idx = -1; -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ - - /* - * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on -@@ -289,6 +302,40 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C - return (ret); - } - -+int pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si) { -+ char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { -+ if (!pkcs11_interactive) { -+ error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & -+ CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? -+ " on reader keypad" : ""); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) -+ verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); -+ else { -+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), -+ "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); -+ pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); -+ if (pin == NULL) -+ return (-1); /* bail out */ -+ } -+ rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, -+ (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); -+ if (pin != NULL) { -+ explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin)); -+ free(pin); -+ } -+ if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { -+ error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); -+ return (-1); -+ } -+ si->logged_in = 1; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ - /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ - static int - pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, -@@ -310,7 +357,6 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con - {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, - {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) } - }; -- char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; - int rval = -1; - - key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; -@@ -326,33 +372,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con - } - f = k11->provider->module->function_list; - si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; -- if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { -- if (!pkcs11_interactive) { -- error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & -- CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? -- " on reader keypad" : ""); -- return (-1); -- } -- if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) -- verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); -- else { -- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), -- "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); -- pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); -- if (pin == NULL) -- return (-1); /* bail out */ -- } -- rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, -- (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); -- if (pin != NULL) { -- explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin)); -- free(pin); -- } -- if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { -- error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); -- return (-1); -- } -- si->logged_in = 1; -+ if(pkcs11_login(k11, f, si)) { -+ return (-1); - } - key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; - key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; -@@ -390,6 +411,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider * - const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method(); - - k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); -+ k11->key_type = CKK_RSA; - k11->provider = provider; - provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ - k11->slotidx = slotidx; -@@ -415,6 +437,184 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider * - return (0); - } - -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+static ECDSA_SIG *pkcs11_ecdsa_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, -+ const BIGNUM *inv, const BIGNUM *rp, -+ EC_KEY *ecdsa) { -+ struct pkcs11_key *k11; -+ struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; -+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; -+ CK_ULONG tlen = 0; -+ CK_RV rv; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE; -+ CK_MECHANISM mech = { -+ CKM_ECDSA, NULL_PTR, 0 -+ }; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = { -+ {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) }, -+ {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, -+ {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) } -+ }; -+ ECDSA_SIG *rval = NULL; -+ key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; -+ key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val; -+ -+ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+ if ((k11 = (struct pkcs11_key *)EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, pkcs11_key_idx)) == NULL) { -+ error("EC_KEY_get_ex_data failed for ecdsa %p", ecdsa); -+ #else -+ if ((k11 = (struct pkcs11_key *)ECDSA_get_ex_data(ecdsa, pkcs11_key_idx)) == NULL) { -+ error("ECDSA_get_ex_data failed for ecdsa %p", ecdsa); -+ #endif -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { -+ error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for ecdsa %p", ecdsa); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; -+ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; -+ if(pkcs11_login(k11, f, si)) { -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; -+ key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; -+ /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */ -+ if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 && -+ pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) { -+ error("cannot find private key"); -+ } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { -+ error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); -+ } else { -+ CK_BYTE_PTR buf = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; -+ int nlen; -+ /* Make a call to C_Sign to find out the size of the signature */ -+ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, NULL, &tlen); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { -+ error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ if ((buf = xmalloc(tlen)) == NULL) { -+ error("failure to allocate signature buffer"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, buf, &tlen); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { -+ error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); -+ } -+ -+ if ((rval = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || -+ (r = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (s = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ error("failure to allocate ECDSA signature"); -+ } else { -+ /* -+ * ECDSA signature is 2 large integers of same size returned -+ * concatenated by PKCS#11, we separate them to create an -+ * ECDSA_SIG for OpenSSL. -+ */ -+ nlen = tlen / 2; -+ BN_bin2bn(&buf[0], nlen, r); -+ BN_bin2bn(&buf[nlen], nlen, s); -+ ECDSA_SIG_set0(rval, r, s); -+ } -+ free(buf); -+ } -+ return (rval); -+} -+ -+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+static EC_KEY_METHOD *get_pkcs11_ecdsa_method(void) { -+ static EC_KEY_METHOD *pkcs11_ecdsa_method = NULL; -+ if(pkcs11_key_idx == -1) { -+ pkcs11_key_idx = EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); -+ } -+ if (pkcs11_ecdsa_method == NULL) { -+ const EC_KEY_METHOD *def = EC_KEY_get_default_method(); -+ pkcs11_ecdsa_method = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(def); -+ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(pkcs11_ecdsa_method, NULL, NULL, pkcs11_ecdsa_sign); -+ } -+#else -+static ECDSA_METHOD *get_pkcs11_ecdsa_method(void) { -+ static ECDSA_METHOD *pkcs11_ecdsa_method = NULL; -+ if(pkcs11_key_idx == -1) { -+ pkcs11_key_idx = ECDSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); -+ } -+ if(pkcs11_ecdsa_method == NULL) { -+ const ECDSA_METHOD *def = ECDSA_get_default_method(); -+ #ifdef ECDSA_F_ECDSA_METHOD_NEW -+ pkcs11_ecdsa_method = ECDSA_METHOD_new((ECDSA_METHOD *)def); -+ ECDSA_METHOD_set_name(pkcs11_ecdsa_method, "pkcs11"); -+ ECDSA_METHOD_set_sign(pkcs11_ecdsa_method, pkcs11_ecdsa_sign); -+ #else -+ pkcs11_ecdsa_method = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pkcs11_ecdsa_method)); -+ memcpy(pkcs11_ecdsa_method, def, sizeof(*pkcs11_ecdsa_method)); -+ pkcs11_ecdsa_method->name = "pkcs11"; -+ pkcs11_ecdsa_method->ecdsa_do_sign = pkcs11_ecdsa_sign; -+ #endif -+ } -+#endif -+ return pkcs11_ecdsa_method; -+} -+ -+static int -+pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, EC_KEY *ecdsa) -+{ -+ struct pkcs11_key *k11; -+ k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); -+ k11->key_type = CKK_EC; -+ k11->provider = provider; -+ provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by ECDSA key */ -+ k11->slotidx = slotidx; -+ /* identify key object on smartcard */ -+ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; -+ if (k11->keyid_len > 0) { -+ k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); -+ memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); -+ } -+ if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) { -+ k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1); -+ memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen); -+ k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; -+ } -+ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+ EC_KEY_set_method(ecdsa, get_pkcs11_ecdsa_method()); -+ EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ecdsa, pkcs11_key_idx, k11); -+ #else -+ ECDSA_set_method(ecdsa, get_pkcs11_ecdsa_method()); -+ ECDSA_set_ex_data(ecdsa, pkcs11_key_idx, k11); -+ #endif -+ return (0); -+} -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ -+int pkcs11_del_key(struct sshkey *key) { -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ if(key->type == KEY_ECDSA) { -+ struct pkcs11_key *k11 = (struct pkcs11_key *) -+ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+ EC_KEY_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, pkcs11_key_idx); -+ #else -+ ECDSA_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, pkcs11_key_idx); -+ #endif -+ if (k11 == NULL) { -+ error("EC_KEY_get_ex_data failed for ecdsa %p", key->ecdsa); -+ } else { -+ if (k11->provider) -+ pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); -+ free(k11->keyid); -+ free(k11); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ sshkey_free(key); -+ return (0); -+} -+ - /* remove trailing spaces */ - static void - rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) -@@ -482,11 +646,13 @@ static int - pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, - struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) - { -- size_t filter_size = 1; -+ size_t filter_size = 2; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE pubkey_type = CKK_RSA; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; - CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = { - { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) }, -+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_type) }, - { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 } - }; -@@ -507,29 +673,60 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider - { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 } - }; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ CK_KEY_TYPE ecdsa_type = CKK_EC; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE ecdsa_filter[] = { -+ { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) }, -+ { CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, sizeof(ecdsa_type) }, -+ { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 } -+ }; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE ecdsa_attribs[] = { -+ { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_EC_POINT, NULL, 0 } -+ }; -+ ecdsa_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; -+ ecdsa_filter[1].pValue = &ecdsa_type; -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ - pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; -+ pubkey_filter[1].pValue = &pubkey_type; - cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; - - if (uri->id != NULL) { - pubkey_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->id; - pubkey_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; -- cert_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->id; -- cert_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ ecdsa_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->id; -+ ecdsa_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ cert_filter[filter_size-1].pValue = uri->id; -+ cert_filter[filter_size-1].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; - filter_size++; - } - if (uri->object != NULL) { - pubkey_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->object; - pubkey_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); - pubkey_filter[filter_size].type = CKA_LABEL; -- cert_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->object; -- cert_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); -- cert_filter[filter_size].type = CKA_LABEL; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ ecdsa_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->object; -+ ecdsa_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); -+ ecdsa_filter[filter_size].type = CKA_LABEL; -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ cert_filter[filter_size-1].pValue = uri->object; -+ cert_filter[filter_size-1].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); -+ cert_filter[filter_size-1].type = CKA_LABEL; - filter_size++; - } - - if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, filter_size, - pubkey_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0 || -- pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, filter_size, -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, ecdsa_filter, filter_size, -+ ecdsa_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0|| -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, filter_size - 1, - cert_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0) - return (-1); - return (0); -@@ -553,6 +746,11 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - { - struct sshkey *key; - RSA *rsa; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ EC_KEY *ecdsa; -+#else -+ void *ecdsa; -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ - X509 *x509; - EVP_PKEY *evp = NULL; - int i; -@@ -608,6 +806,9 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - * or ID, label, subject and value for certificates. - */ - rsa = NULL; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ ecdsa = NULL; -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ - if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, nattribs)) - != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); -@@ -620,6 +821,45 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[3].pValue, - attribs[3].ulValueLen, NULL); - } -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ } else if (attribs[2].type == CKA_EC_PARAMS ) { -+ if ((ecdsa = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { -+ error("EC_KEY_new failed"); -+ } else { -+ const unsigned char *ptr1 = attribs[2].pValue; -+ const unsigned char *ptr2 = attribs[3].pValue; -+ CK_ULONG len1 = attribs[2].ulValueLen; -+ CK_ULONG len2 = attribs[3].ulValueLen; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *point = NULL; -+ -+ /* -+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS contains the curve parameters of the key -+ * either referenced as an OID or directly with all values. -+ * CKA_EC_POINT contains the point (public key) on the curve. -+ * The point is should be returned inside a DER-encoded -+ * ASN.1 OCTET STRING value (but some implementation). -+ */ -+ if ((point = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &ptr2, len2))) { -+ /* Pointing to OCTET STRING content */ -+ ptr2 = point->data; -+ len2 = point->length; -+ } else { -+ /* No OCTET STRING */ -+ ptr2 = attribs[3].pValue; -+ } -+ -+ if((d2i_ECParameters(&ecdsa, &ptr1, len1) == NULL) || -+ (o2i_ECPublicKey(&ecdsa, &ptr2, len2) == NULL)) { -+ EC_KEY_free(ecdsa); -+ ecdsa = NULL; -+ error("EC public key parsing failed"); -+ } -+ -+ if(point) { -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(point); -+ } -+ } -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ - } else { - cp = attribs[3].pValue; - if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) { -@@ -639,13 +879,28 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - X509_free(x509); - EVP_PKEY_free(evp); - } -- if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && -- pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], &attribs[1], rsa) == 0) { -- if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) -- fatal("sshkey_new failed"); -- key->rsa = rsa; -- key->type = KEY_RSA; -- key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; -+ key = NULL; -+ if (rsa || ecdsa) { -+ if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && -+ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], &attribs[1], rsa) == 0) { -+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) -+ fatal("sshkey_new failed"); -+ key->rsa = rsa; -+ key->type = KEY_RSA; -+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ } else if(ecdsa && pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], &attribs[1], ecdsa) == 0) { -+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) -+ fatal("sshkey_new failed"); -+ key->ecdsa = ecdsa; -+ key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ecdsa); -+ key->type = KEY_ECDSA; -+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if(key) { - if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { - sshkey_free(key); - } else { -@@ -658,6 +913,10 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - } - } else if (rsa) { - RSA_free(rsa); -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ } else if (ecdsa) { -+ EC_KEY_free(ecdsa); -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ - } - for (i = 0; i < nattribs; i++) - free(attribs[i].pValue); -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c.pkcs11-ecdsa openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c.pkcs11-ecdsa 2017-10-02 21:34:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c 2018-02-16 13:25:59.428469265 +0100 -@@ -24,6 +24,17 @@ - - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - -+#include -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+#include -+#if ((defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ -+ (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20010002L))) || \ -+ (defined(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_METHOD_NEW)) || \ -+ (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00010100L) -+#define ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA 1 -+#endif -+#endif -+ - #include - #include - #include -@@ -80,7 +90,7 @@ del_keys_by_name(char *name) - if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) { - TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); - free(ki->providername); -- sshkey_free(ki->key); -+ pkcs11_del_key(ki->key); - free(ki); - } - } -@@ -164,6 +174,20 @@ process_del(void) - sshbuf_free(msg); - } - -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+static u_int EC_KEY_order_size(EC_KEY *key) -+{ -+ const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key); -+ BIGNUM *order = BN_new(); -+ u_int nbytes = 0; -+ if ((group != NULL) && (order != NULL) && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL)) { -+ nbytes = BN_num_bytes(order); -+ } -+ BN_clear_free(order); -+ return nbytes; -+} -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ - static void - process_sign(void) - { -@@ -180,14 +204,38 @@ process_sign(void) - else { - if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) { - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -- int ret; -- -- slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); -- signature = xmalloc(slen); -- if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature, -- found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) { -- slen = ret; -- ok = 0; -+ if(found->type == KEY_RSA) { -+ int ret; -+ slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); -+ signature = xmalloc(slen); -+ if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature, -+ found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) { -+ slen = ret; -+ ok = 0; -+ } -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA -+ } else if(found->type == KEY_ECDSA) { -+ ECDSA_SIG *sig; -+ const BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; -+ if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(data, dlen, found->ecdsa)) != NULL) { -+ /* PKCS11 2.3.1 recommends both r and s to have the order size for -+ backward compatiblity */ -+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s); -+ u_int o_len = EC_KEY_order_size(found->ecdsa); -+ u_int r_len = BN_num_bytes(r); -+ u_int s_len = BN_num_bytes(s); -+ if (o_len > 0 && r_len <= o_len && s_len <= o_len) { -+ signature = xcalloc(2, o_len); -+ BN_bn2bin(r, signature + o_len - r_len); -+ BN_bn2bin(s, signature + (2 * o_len) - s_len); -+ slen = 2 * o_len; -+ ok = 0; -+ } -+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); -+ } -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11_ECDSA */ -+ } else { -+ /* Unsupported type */ - } - #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - } -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-ecdsa openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h ---- openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-ecdsa 2018-02-16 13:25:59.429469272 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h 2018-02-16 13:45:29.623800048 +0100 -@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ - int pkcs11_init(int); - void pkcs11_terminate(void); - int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***); -+int pkcs11_del_key(struct sshkey *); - int pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***); - int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); - int pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); - - - -diff -up openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.old openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c ---- openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.old 2018-02-16 16:43:08.861520255 +0100 -+++ openssh-7.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2018-02-16 16:56:35.312601451 +0100 -@@ -917,13 +917,28 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_p - } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[3].ulValueLen) - == NULL) { - error("d2i_X509 failed"); -- } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL || -- evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || -- evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) { -- debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa"); -- } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa)) -- == NULL) { -- error("RSAPublicKey_dup"); -+ } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) { -+ debug("X509_get_pubkey failed"); -+ } else { -+ switch (evp->type) { -+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA: -+ if (evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) -+ debug("Missing RSA key"); -+ else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup( -+ evp->pkey.rsa)) == NULL) -+ error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed"); -+ break; -+ case EVP_PKEY_EC: -+ if (evp->pkey.ecdsa == NULL) -+ debug("Missing ECDSA key"); -+ else if ((ecdsa = EC_KEY_dup( -+ evp->pkey.ecdsa)) == NULL) -+ error("EC_KEY_dup failed"); -+ break; -+ default: -+ debug("not a RSA or ECDSA key"); -+ break; -+ } - } - X509_free(x509); - EVP_PKEY_free(evp); diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-uri.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6fd463e..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.6p1-pkcs11-uri.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4771 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in -index ac959c1f..f8ed1781 100644 ---- a/Makefile.in -+++ b/Makefile.in -@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ - monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ - kexgssc.o \ - msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ -- ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ -+ ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ - poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ - ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \ - sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \ -@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ clean: regressclean - rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) - rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) -+ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o -+ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) - rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o - rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) - (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) -@@ -276,6 +278,8 @@ distclean: regressclean - rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match - rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 -+ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o -+ rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 - rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o - rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz - (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) -@@ -437,6 +441,7 @@ regress-prep: - $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex - $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match - $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8 -+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11 - $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz - [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ - ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile -@@ -455,6 +460,11 @@ regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \ - $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - -+regress/soft-pkcs11.so: $(srcdir)/regress/soft-pkcs11.c $(REGRESSLIBS) -+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -fpic -c $(srcdir)/regress/soft-pkcs11.c \ -+ -o $(srcdir)/regress/soft-pkcs11.o -+ $(CC) -shared -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/soft-pkcs11.o -+ - regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \ - $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -@@ -556,6 +566,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \ - regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ - -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - -+UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\ -+ regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o -+ -+regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT): \ -+ ${UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS} \ -+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a -+ $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \ -+ regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ -+ -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ - MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\ - regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o - -@@ -566,6 +586,7 @@ regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a - regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \ -+ regress/soft-pkcs11.so \ - regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \ -@@ -575,6 +596,7 @@ regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \ -+ regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \ - regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) - - tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS) -diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c -index 1eff7ba9..35153f47 100644 ---- a/authfd.c -+++ b/authfd.c -@@ -312,6 +312,8 @@ ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl) - if (idl->comments != NULL) - free(idl->comments[i]); - } -+ free(idl->keys); -+ free(idl->comments); - free(idl); - } - -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index d7bcaf01..171a8597 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -1895,12 +1895,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE( - [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) - ]) - -+SCARD_MSG="yes" - disable_pkcs11= - AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11], - [ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]], - [ - if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then - disable_pkcs11=1 -+ SCARD_MSG="no" - fi - ] - ) -@@ -1916,6 +1918,40 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then - ) - fi - -+# Check whether we have a p11-kit, we got default provider on command line -+DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG="no" -+AC_ARG_WITH([default-pkcs11-provider], -+ [ --with-default-pkcs11-provider[[=PATH]] Use default pkcs11 provider (p11-kit detected by default)], -+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then -+ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then -+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) -+ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about p11-kit]) -+ if "$PKGCONFIG" "p11-kit-1"; then -+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) -+ use_pkgconfig_for_p11kit=yes -+ else -+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) -+ fi -+ fi -+ else -+ PKCS11_PATH="${withval}" -+ fi -+ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_p11kit" = "xyes"; then -+ PKCS11_PATH=`$PKGCONFIG --variable=proxy_module p11-kit-1` -+ fi -+ AC_CHECK_FILE("$PKCS11_PATH", -+ [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER], ["$PKCS11_PATH"], [Path to default PKCS#11 provider (p11-kit proxy)]) -+ DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG="$PKCS11_PATH" -+ ], -+ [ AC_MSG_ERROR([Requested PKCS11 provided not found]) ] -+ ) -+ else -+ AC_MSG_WARN([Needs PKCS11 support to enable default pkcs11 provider]) -+ fi ] -+) -+ -+ - # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ - AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) -@@ -5226,6 +5262,7 @@ echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" - echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" - echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" - echo " Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL" -+echo " Default PKCS#11 provider: $DEFAULT_PKCS11_PROVIDER_MSG" - - echo "" - -diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile -index d15898ad..9c15afa4 100644 ---- a/regress/Makefile -+++ b/regress/Makefile -@@ -108,9 +110,11 @@ CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \ - known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ - modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ - pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log \ -- remote_pid revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub \ -+ remote_pid revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub \ -+ rsa-agent-cert.pub rsa.pub \ - rsa1 rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ -- rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ -+ soft-pkcs11.so soft-pkcs11.o pkcs11*.crt pkcs11*.key \ -+ pkcs11.info rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ - scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ - sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ - ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \ -@@ -225,6 +229,7 @@ unit: - V="" ; \ - test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ - V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ -+ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 ; \ - $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ - $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ - -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ -diff --git a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh -index db3018b8..4991d0bc 100644 ---- a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh -+++ b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh -@@ -4,10 +4,17 @@ - tid="pkcs11 agent test" - - TEST_SSH_PIN="" --TEST_SSH_PKCS11=/usr/local/lib/soft-pkcs11.so.0.0 -+TEST_SSH_PKCS11=$OBJ/soft-pkcs11.so - - test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist" - -+# requires ssh-agent built with correct path to ssh-pkcs11-helper -+# otherwise it fails to start the helper -+strings ${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT} | grep "$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" -+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then -+ fatal "Needs to reconfigure with --libexecdir=\`pwd\` or so" -+fi -+ - # setup environment for soft-pkcs11 token - SOFTPKCS11RC=$OBJ/pkcs11.info - export SOFTPKCS11RC -@@ -23,7 +30,7 @@ notty() { - } - - trace "start agent" --eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null -+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -P "${OBJ}/*"` > /dev/null - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then - fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" -@@ -60,7 +67,7 @@ else - fi - - trace "remove pkcs11 keys" -- echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r" -diff --git a/regress/locl.h b/regress/locl.h -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..afefe27d ---- /dev/null -+++ b/regress/locl.h -@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Stockholms universitet -+ * (Stockholm University, Stockholm Sweden) -+ * All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. Neither the name of the university nor the names of its contributors -+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software -+ * without specific prior written permission. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" -+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE -+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE -+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR -+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF -+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE -+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+/* $Id: locl.h,v 1.5 2005/08/28 15:30:31 lha Exp $ */ -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H -+#include -+#endif -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include "../libcrypto-compat.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#define _GNU_SOURCE -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "../pkcs11.h" -+ -+#define OPENSSL_ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(T, B, BL, S, R) \ -+{ \ -+ unsigned char *p; \ -+ (BL) = i2d_##T((S), NULL); \ -+ if ((BL) <= 0) { \ -+ (R) = EINVAL; \ -+ } else { \ -+ (B) = malloc((BL)); \ -+ if ((B) == NULL) { \ -+ (R) = ENOMEM; \ -+ } else { \ -+ p = (B); \ -+ (R) = 0; \ -+ (BL) = i2d_##T((S), &p); \ -+ if ((BL) <= 0) { \ -+ free((B)); \ -+ (R) = EINVAL; \ -+ } \ -+ } \ -+ } \ -+} -diff --git a/regress/pkcs11.sh b/regress/pkcs11.sh -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..cf98e379 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/regress/pkcs11.sh -@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ -+# -+# Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat -+# -+# Authors: Jakub Jelen -+# -+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+# -+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+ -+tid="pkcs11 tests with soft token" -+ -+TEST_SSH_PIN="" -+TEST_SSH_PKCS11=$OBJ/soft-pkcs11.so -+ -+test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist" -+ -+# requires ssh-agent built with correct path to ssh-pkcs11-helper -+# otherwise it fails to start the helper -+strings ${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT} | grep "$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" -+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then -+ fatal "Needs to reconfigure with --libexecdir=\`pwd\` or so" -+fi -+ -+# setup environment for soft-pkcs11 token -+SOFTPKCS11RC=$OBJ/pkcs11.info -+rm -f $SOFTPKCS11RC -+export SOFTPKCS11RC -+# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass -+SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true -+export SSH_ASKPASS -+unset DISPLAY -+ -+# start command w/o tty, so ssh accepts pin from stdin (from agent-pkcs11.sh) -+notty() { -+ perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid(); -+ if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@" -+} -+ -+create_key() { -+ ID=$1 -+ LABEL=$2 -+ rm -f $OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.key $OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.crt -+ openssl genrsa -out $OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.key 2048 > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ chmod 600 $OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.key -+ openssl req -key $OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.key -new -x509 \ -+ -out $OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.crt -text -subj '/CN=pkcs11 test' >/dev/null -+ printf "${ID}\t${LABEL}\t$OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.crt\t$OBJ/pkcs11-${ID}.key\n" \ -+ >> $SOFTPKCS11RC -+} -+ -+trace "Create a key pairs on soft token" -+ID1="02" -+ID2="04" -+create_key "$ID1" "SSH RSA Key" -+create_key "$ID2" "SSH RSA Key 2" -+ -+trace "List the keys in the ssh-keygen with PKCS#11 URIs" -+${SSHKEYGEN} -D ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > $OBJ/token_keys -+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "keygen fails to enumerate keys on PKCS#11 token" -+fi -+grep "pkcs11:" $OBJ/token_keys > /dev/null -+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "The keys from ssh-keygen do not contain PKCS#11 URI as a comment" -+fi -+tail -n 1 $OBJ/token_keys > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER -+ -+ -+trace "Simple connect with ssh (without PKCS#11 URI)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -I ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} \ -+ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with pkcs11 failed (exit code $r)" -+fi -+ -+ -+trace "Connect with PKCS#11 URI" -+trace " (second key should succeed)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -i "pkcs11:id=${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" -+fi -+ -+trace " (first key should fail)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -i "pkcs11:id=${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" -+fi -+ -+trace "Connect with various filtering options in PKCS#11 URI" -+trace " (by object label, second key should succeed)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -i "pkcs11:object=SSH%20RSA%20Key%202?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" -+fi -+ -+trace " (by object label, first key should fail)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -i "pkcs11:object=SSH%20RSA%20Key?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" -+fi -+ -+trace " (by token label, second key should succeed)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -i "pkcs11:id=${ID2};token=SoftToken%20(token)?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI failed (exit code $r)" -+fi -+ -+trace " (by wrong token label, should fail)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -i "pkcs11:token=SoftToken?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI succeeded (should fail)" -+fi -+ -+ -+ -+ -+trace "Test PKCS#11 URI specification in configuration files" -+echo "IdentityFile \"pkcs11:id=${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}\"" \ -+ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy -+trace " (second key should succeed)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI in config failed (exit code $r)" -+fi -+ -+trace " (first key should fail)" -+head -n 1 $OBJ/token_keys > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI in config succeeded (should fail)" -+fi -+sed -i -e "/IdentityFile/d" $OBJ/ssh_proxy -+ -+trace "Test PKCS#11 URI specification in configuration files with bogus spaces" -+echo "IdentityFile \" pkcs11:id=${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} \"" \ -+ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI with bogus spaces in config failed" \ -+ "(exit code $r)" -+fi -+sed -i -e "/IdentityFile/d" $OBJ/ssh_proxy -+ -+ -+trace "Combination of PKCS11Provider and PKCS11URI on commandline" -+trace " (first key should succeed)" -+echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -i "pkcs11:id=${ID1}" -I ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with PKCS#11 URI and provider combination" \ -+ "failed (exit code $r)" -+fi -+ -+trace "Regress: Missing provider in PKCS11URI option" -+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -+ -o IdentityFile=\"pkcs11:token=segfault\" somehost exit 5 -+r=$? -+if [ $r -eq 139 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect with missing provider_id from configuration option" \ -+ "crashed (exit code $r)" -+fi -+ -+ -+trace "SSH Agent can work with PKCS#11 URI" -+trace "start the agent" -+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -P "${OBJ}/*"` > /dev/null -+ -+r=$? -+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" -+else -+ trace "add whole provider to agent" -+ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ -+ "pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add failed with whole provider: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " pkcs11 list via agent (all keys)" -+ ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add -l failed with whole provider: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (all keys)" -+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect failed with whole provider (exit code $r)" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " remove pkcs11 keys (all keys)" -+ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add -d failed with whole provider: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace "add only first key to the agent" -+ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ -+ "pkcs11:id=${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add failed with first key: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (first key)" -+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect failed with first key (exit code $r)" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " remove first pkcs11 key" -+ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ -+ > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add -d failed with first key: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace "add only second key to the agent" -+ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ -+ "pkcs11:id=${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add failed with second key: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (second key should fail)" -+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -eq 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect passed without key (should fail)" -+ fi -+ -+ trace "add also the first key to the agent" -+ echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} \ -+ "pkcs11:id=${ID1}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add failed with first key: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " remove second pkcs11 key" -+ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ -+ > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add -d failed with second key: exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " remove already-removed pkcs11 key should fail" -+ ${SSHADD} -d "pkcs11:id=${ID2}?module-path=${TEST_SSH_PKCS11}" \ -+ > /dev/null 2>&1 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -eq 0 ]; then -+ fail "ssh-add -d passed with non-existing key (should fail)" -+ fi -+ -+ trace " pkcs11 connect via agent (the first key should be still usable)" -+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 -+ r=$? -+ if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then -+ fail "ssh connect failed with first key (after removing second): exit code $r" -+ fi -+ -+ trace "kill agent" -+ ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null -+fi -+ -+rm -rf $OBJ/.tokens $OBJ/token_keys -diff --git a/regress/soft-pkcs11.c b/regress/soft-pkcs11.c -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..8b4981bd ---- /dev/null -+++ b/regress/soft-pkcs11.c -@@ -0,0 +1,2058 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Stockholms universitet -+ * (Stockholm University, Stockholm Sweden) -+ * All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * 3. Neither the name of the university nor the names of its contributors -+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software -+ * without specific prior written permission. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" -+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE -+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE -+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR -+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF -+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS -+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN -+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) -+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE -+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "locl.h" -+ -+/* RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.24 2006/01/11 12:42:53 lha Exp $"); */ -+ -+#define OBJECT_ID_MASK 0xfff -+#define HANDLE_OBJECT_ID(h) ((h) & OBJECT_ID_MASK) -+#define OBJECT_ID(obj) HANDLE_OBJECT_ID((obj)->object_handle) -+ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L -+ #define RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL -+#endif -+ -+struct st_attr { -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attribute; -+ int secret; -+}; -+ -+struct st_object { -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object_handle; -+ struct st_attr *attrs; -+ int num_attributes; -+ enum { -+ STO_T_CERTIFICATE, -+ STO_T_PRIVATE_KEY, -+ STO_T_PUBLIC_KEY -+ } type; -+ union { -+ X509 *cert; -+ EVP_PKEY *public_key; -+ struct { -+ const char *file; -+ EVP_PKEY *key; -+ X509 *cert; -+ } private_key; -+ } u; -+}; -+ -+static struct soft_token { -+ CK_VOID_PTR application; -+ CK_NOTIFY notify; -+ struct { -+ struct st_object **objs; -+ int num_objs; -+ } object; -+ struct { -+ int hardware_slot; -+ int app_error_fatal; -+ int login_done; -+ } flags; -+ int open_sessions; -+ struct session_state { -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session_handle; -+ -+ struct { -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes; -+ CK_ULONG num_attributes; -+ int next_object; -+ } find; -+ -+ int encrypt_object; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR encrypt_mechanism; -+ int decrypt_object; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR decrypt_mechanism; -+ int sign_object; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR sign_mechanism; -+ int verify_object; -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR verify_mechanism; -+ int digest_object; -+ } state[10]; -+#define MAX_NUM_SESSION (sizeof(soft_token.state)/sizeof(soft_token.state[0])) -+ FILE *logfile; -+} soft_token; -+ -+static void -+application_error(const char *fmt, ...) -+{ -+ va_list ap; -+ va_start(ap, fmt); -+ vprintf(fmt, ap); -+ va_end(ap); -+ if (soft_token.flags.app_error_fatal) -+ abort(); -+} -+ -+static void -+st_logf(const char *fmt, ...) -+{ -+ va_list ap; -+ if (soft_token.logfile == NULL) -+ return; -+ va_start(ap, fmt); -+ vfprintf(soft_token.logfile, fmt, ap); -+ va_end(ap); -+ fflush(soft_token.logfile); -+} -+ -+static void -+snprintf_fill(char *str, size_t size, char fillchar, const char *fmt, ...) -+{ -+ int len; -+ va_list ap; -+ len = vsnprintf(str, size, fmt, ap); -+ va_end(ap); -+ if (len < 0 || len > (int) size) -+ return; -+ while(len < (int) size) -+ str[len++] = fillchar; -+} -+ -+#ifndef TEST_APP -+#define printf error_use_st_logf -+#endif -+ -+#define VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(s, state) \ -+{ \ -+ CK_RV ret; \ -+ ret = verify_session_handle(s, state); \ -+ if (ret != CKR_OK) { \ -+ /* return CKR_OK */; \ -+ } \ -+} -+ -+static CK_RV -+verify_session_handle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ struct session_state **state) -+{ -+ size_t i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_SESSION; i++){ -+ if (soft_token.state[i].session_handle == hSession) -+ break; -+ } -+ if (i == MAX_NUM_SESSION) { -+ application_error("use of invalid handle: 0x%08lx\n", -+ (unsigned long)hSession); -+ return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; -+ } -+ if (state) -+ *state = &soft_token.state[i]; -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+static CK_RV -+object_handle_to_object(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle, -+ struct st_object **object) -+{ -+ int i = HANDLE_OBJECT_ID(handle); -+ -+ *object = NULL; -+ if (i >= soft_token.object.num_objs) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ if (soft_token.object.objs[i] == NULL) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ if (soft_token.object.objs[i]->object_handle != handle) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ *object = soft_token.object.objs[i]; -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+static int -+attributes_match(const struct st_object *obj, -+ const CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes, -+ CK_ULONG num_attributes) -+{ -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ int j; -+ st_logf("attributes_match: %ld\n", (unsigned long)OBJECT_ID(obj)); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < num_attributes; i++) { -+ int match = 0; -+ for (j = 0; j < obj->num_attributes; j++) { -+ if (attributes[i].type == obj->attrs[j].attribute.type && -+ attributes[i].ulValueLen == obj->attrs[j].attribute.ulValueLen && -+ memcmp(attributes[i].pValue, obj->attrs[j].attribute.pValue, -+ attributes[i].ulValueLen) == 0) { -+ match = 1; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ if (match == 0) { -+ st_logf("type %d attribute have no match\n", attributes[i].type); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ } -+ st_logf("attribute matches\n"); -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+static void -+print_attributes(const CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes, -+ CK_ULONG num_attributes) -+{ -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ -+ st_logf("find objects: attrs: %lu\n", (unsigned long)num_attributes); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < num_attributes; i++) { -+ st_logf(" type: "); -+ switch (attributes[i].type) { -+ case CKA_TOKEN: { -+ CK_BBOOL *ck_true; -+ if (attributes[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL)) { -+ application_error("token attribute wrong length\n"); -+ break; -+ } -+ ck_true = attributes[i].pValue; -+ st_logf("token: %s", *ck_true ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"); -+ break; -+ } -+ case CKA_CLASS: { -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS *class; -+ if (attributes[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_ULONG)) { -+ application_error("class attribute wrong length\n"); -+ break; -+ } -+ class = attributes[i].pValue; -+ st_logf("class "); -+ switch (*class) { -+ case CKO_CERTIFICATE: -+ st_logf("certificate"); -+ break; -+ case CKO_PUBLIC_KEY: -+ st_logf("public key"); -+ break; -+ case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: -+ st_logf("private key"); -+ break; -+ case CKO_SECRET_KEY: -+ st_logf("secret key"); -+ break; -+ case CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS: -+ st_logf("domain parameters"); -+ break; -+ default: -+ st_logf("[class %lx]", (long unsigned)*class); -+ break; -+ } -+ break; -+ } -+ case CKA_PRIVATE: -+ st_logf("private"); -+ break; -+ case CKA_LABEL: -+ st_logf("label"); -+ break; -+ case CKA_APPLICATION: -+ st_logf("application"); -+ break; -+ case CKA_VALUE: -+ st_logf("value"); -+ break; -+ case CKA_ID: -+ st_logf("id"); -+ break; -+ default: -+ st_logf("[unknown 0x%08lx]", (unsigned long)attributes[i].type); -+ break; -+ } -+ st_logf("\n"); -+ } -+} -+ -+static struct st_object * -+add_st_object(void) -+{ -+ struct st_object *o, **objs; -+ int i; -+ -+ o = malloc(sizeof(*o)); -+ if (o == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ memset(o, 0, sizeof(*o)); -+ o->attrs = NULL; -+ o->num_attributes = 0; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < soft_token.object.num_objs; i++) { -+ if (soft_token.object.objs == NULL) { -+ soft_token.object.objs[i] = o; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ if (i == soft_token.object.num_objs) { -+ objs = realloc(soft_token.object.objs, -+ (soft_token.object.num_objs + 1) * sizeof(soft_token.object.objs[0])); -+ if (objs == NULL) { -+ free(o); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ soft_token.object.objs = objs; -+ soft_token.object.objs[soft_token.object.num_objs++] = o; -+ } -+ soft_token.object.objs[i]->object_handle = -+ (random() & (~OBJECT_ID_MASK)) | i; -+ -+ return o; -+} -+ -+static CK_RV -+add_object_attribute(struct st_object *o, -+ int secret, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, -+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue, -+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen) -+{ -+ struct st_attr *a; -+ int i; -+ -+ i = o->num_attributes; -+ a = realloc(o->attrs, (i + 1) * sizeof(o->attrs[0])); -+ if (a == NULL) -+ return CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ o->attrs = a; -+ o->attrs[i].secret = secret; -+ o->attrs[i].attribute.type = type; -+ o->attrs[i].attribute.pValue = malloc(ulValueLen); -+ if (o->attrs[i].attribute.pValue == NULL && ulValueLen != 0) -+ return CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ memcpy(o->attrs[i].attribute.pValue, pValue, ulValueLen); -+ o->attrs[i].attribute.ulValueLen = ulValueLen; -+ o->num_attributes++; -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+static CK_RV -+add_pubkey_info(struct st_object *o, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, EVP_PKEY *key) -+{ -+ switch (key_type) { -+ case CKK_RSA: { -+ CK_BYTE *modulus = NULL; -+ size_t modulus_len = 0; -+ CK_ULONG modulus_bits = 0; -+ CK_BYTE *exponent = NULL; -+ size_t exponent_len = 0; -+ RSA* rsa = NULL; -+ const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL; -+ -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key); -+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL); -+ -+ modulus_bits = BN_num_bits(n); -+ -+ modulus_len = BN_num_bytes(n); -+ modulus = malloc(modulus_len); -+ BN_bn2bin(n, modulus); -+ -+ exponent_len = BN_num_bytes(e); -+ exponent = malloc(exponent_len); -+ BN_bn2bin(e, exponent); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS, modulus, modulus_len); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, -+ &modulus_bits, sizeof(modulus_bits)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, -+ exponent, exponent_len); -+ -+ RSA_set_method(rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()); -+ -+ free(modulus); -+ free(exponent); -+ } -+ default: -+ /* XXX */ -+ break; -+ } -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+ -+static int -+pem_callback(char *buf, int num, int w, void *key) -+{ -+ return -1; -+} -+ -+ -+static CK_RV -+add_certificate(char *label, -+ const char *cert_file, -+ const char *private_key_file, -+ char *id, -+ int anchor) -+{ -+ struct st_object *o = NULL; -+ CK_BBOOL bool_true = CK_TRUE; -+ CK_BBOOL bool_false = CK_FALSE; -+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS c; -+ CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE cert_type = CKC_X_509; -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; -+ void *cert_data = NULL; -+ size_t cert_length; -+ void *subject_data = NULL; -+ size_t subject_length; -+ void *issuer_data = NULL; -+ size_t issuer_length; -+ void *serial_data = NULL; -+ size_t serial_length; -+ CK_RV ret = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ X509 *cert; -+ EVP_PKEY *public_key; -+ -+ size_t id_len = strlen(id); -+ -+ { -+ FILE *f; -+ -+ f = fopen(cert_file, "r"); -+ if (f == NULL) { -+ st_logf("failed to open file %s\n", cert_file); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ cert = PEM_read_X509(f, NULL, NULL, NULL); -+ fclose(f); -+ if (cert == NULL) { -+ st_logf("failed reading PEM cert\n"); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ OPENSSL_ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(X509, cert_data, cert_length, cert, ret); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ -+ OPENSSL_ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(X509_NAME, issuer_data, issuer_length, -+ X509_get_issuer_name(cert), ret); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ -+ OPENSSL_ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(X509_NAME, subject_data, subject_length, -+ X509_get_subject_name(cert), ret); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ -+ OPENSSL_ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ASN1_INTEGER, serial_data, serial_length, -+ X509_get_serialNumber(cert), ret); -+ if (ret) -+ goto out; -+ -+ } -+ -+ st_logf("done parsing, adding to internal structure\n"); -+ -+ o = add_st_object(); -+ if (o == NULL) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ o->type = STO_T_CERTIFICATE; -+ o->u.cert = cert; -+ public_key = X509_get_pubkey(o->u.cert); -+ -+ switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(public_key)) { -+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA: -+ key_type = CKK_RSA; -+ break; -+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA: -+ key_type = CKK_DSA; -+ break; -+ default: -+ /* XXX */ -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ c = CKO_CERTIFICATE; -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_CLASS, &c, sizeof(c)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_TOKEN, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PRIVATE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODIFIABLE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_LABEL, label, strlen(label)); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, &cert_type, sizeof(cert_type)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_ID, id, id_len); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SUBJECT, subject_data, subject_length); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_ISSUER, issuer_data, issuer_length); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER, serial_data, serial_length); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_VALUE, cert_data, cert_length); -+ if (anchor) -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_TRUSTED, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ else -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_TRUSTED, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ -+ st_logf("add cert ok: %lx\n", (unsigned long)OBJECT_ID(o)); -+ -+ o = add_st_object(); -+ if (o == NULL) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ o->type = STO_T_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ o->u.public_key = public_key; -+ -+ c = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_CLASS, &c, sizeof(c)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_TOKEN, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PRIVATE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODIFIABLE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_LABEL, label, strlen(label)); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_ID, id, id_len); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_START_DATE, "", 1); /* XXX */ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_END_DATE, "", 1); /* XXX */ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_DERIVE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_LOCAL, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ mech_type = CKM_RSA_X_509; -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM, &mech_type, sizeof(mech_type)); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SUBJECT, subject_data, subject_length); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_ENCRYPT, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_VERIFY, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_WRAP, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_TRUSTED, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ -+ add_pubkey_info(o, key_type, public_key); -+ -+ st_logf("add key ok: %lx\n", (unsigned long)OBJECT_ID(o)); -+ -+ if (private_key_file) { -+ CK_FLAGS flags; -+ FILE *f; -+ -+ o = add_st_object(); -+ if (o == NULL) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ o->type = STO_T_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ o->u.private_key.file = strdup(private_key_file); -+ o->u.private_key.key = NULL; -+ -+ o->u.private_key.cert = cert; -+ -+ c = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_CLASS, &c, sizeof(c)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_TOKEN, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_PRIVATE, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_MODIFIABLE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_LABEL, label, strlen(label)); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(key_type)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_ID, id, id_len); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_START_DATE, "", 1); /* XXX */ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_END_DATE, "", 1); /* XXX */ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_DERIVE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_LOCAL, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ mech_type = CKM_RSA_X_509; -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM, &mech_type, sizeof(mech_type)); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SUBJECT, subject_data, subject_length); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SENSITIVE, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ flags = 0; -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, &flags, sizeof(flags)); -+ -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_DECRYPT, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SIGN, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_UNWRAP, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true)); -+ add_object_attribute(o, 0, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &bool_false, sizeof(bool_false)); -+ -+ add_pubkey_info(o, key_type, public_key); -+ -+ f = fopen(private_key_file, "r"); -+ if (f == NULL) { -+ st_logf("failed to open private key\n"); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ o->u.private_key.key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(f, NULL, pem_callback, NULL); -+ fclose(f); -+ if (o->u.private_key.key == NULL) { -+ st_logf("failed to read private key a startup\n"); -+ /* don't bother with this failure for now, -+ fix it at C_Login time */; -+ } else { -+ /* XXX verify keytype */ -+ -+ if (key_type == CKK_RSA) { -+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key); -+ RSA_set_method(rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()); -+ } -+ -+ if (X509_check_private_key(cert, o->u.private_key.key) != 1) { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(o->u.private_key.key); -+ o->u.private_key.key = NULL; -+ st_logf("private key doesn't verify\n"); -+ } else { -+ st_logf("private key usable\n"); -+ soft_token.flags.login_done = 1; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ -+ ret = CKR_OK; -+ out: -+ if (ret != CKR_OK) { -+ st_logf("something went wrong when adding cert!\n"); -+ -+ /* XXX wack o */; -+ } -+ free(cert_data); -+ free(serial_data); -+ free(issuer_data); -+ free(subject_data); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+static void -+find_object_final(struct session_state *state) -+{ -+ if (state->find.attributes) { -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < state->find.num_attributes; i++) { -+ if (state->find.attributes[i].pValue) -+ free(state->find.attributes[i].pValue); -+ } -+ free(state->find.attributes); -+ state->find.attributes = NULL; -+ state->find.num_attributes = 0; -+ state->find.next_object = -1; -+ } -+} -+ -+static void -+reset_crypto_state(struct session_state *state) -+{ -+ state->encrypt_object = -1; -+ if (state->encrypt_mechanism) -+ free(state->encrypt_mechanism); -+ state->encrypt_mechanism = NULL_PTR; -+ state->decrypt_object = -1; -+ if (state->decrypt_mechanism) -+ free(state->decrypt_mechanism); -+ state->decrypt_mechanism = NULL_PTR; -+ state->sign_object = -1; -+ if (state->sign_mechanism) -+ free(state->sign_mechanism); -+ state->sign_mechanism = NULL_PTR; -+ state->verify_object = -1; -+ if (state->verify_mechanism) -+ free(state->verify_mechanism); -+ state->verify_mechanism = NULL_PTR; -+ state->digest_object = -1; -+} -+ -+static void -+close_session(struct session_state *state) -+{ -+ if (state->find.attributes) { -+ application_error("application didn't do C_FindObjectsFinal\n"); -+ find_object_final(state); -+ } -+ -+ state->session_handle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ soft_token.application = NULL_PTR; -+ soft_token.notify = NULL_PTR; -+ reset_crypto_state(state); -+} -+ -+static const char * -+has_session(void) -+{ -+ return soft_token.open_sessions > 0 ? "yes" : "no"; -+} -+ -+static void -+read_conf_file(const char *fn) -+{ -+ char buf[1024], *cert, *key, *id, *label, *s, *p; -+ int anchor; -+ FILE *f; -+ -+ f = fopen(fn, "r"); -+ if (f == NULL) { -+ st_logf("can't open configuration file %s\n", fn); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { -+ buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; -+ -+ anchor = 0; -+ -+ st_logf("line: %s\n", buf); -+ -+ p = buf; -+ while (isspace(*p)) -+ p++; -+ if (*p == '#') -+ continue; -+ while (isspace(*p)) -+ p++; -+ -+ s = NULL; -+ id = strtok_r(p, "\t", &s); -+ if (id == NULL) -+ continue; -+ label = strtok_r(NULL, "\t", &s); -+ if (label == NULL) -+ continue; -+ cert = strtok_r(NULL, "\t", &s); -+ if (cert == NULL) -+ continue; -+ key = strtok_r(NULL, "\t", &s); -+ -+ /* XXX */ -+ if (strcmp(id, "anchor") == 0) { -+ id = "\x00\x00"; -+ anchor = 1; -+ } -+ -+ st_logf("adding: %s\n", label); -+ -+ add_certificate(label, cert, key, id, anchor); -+ } -+} -+ -+static CK_RV -+func_not_supported(void) -+{ -+ st_logf("function not supported\n"); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Initialize(CK_VOID_PTR a) -+{ -+ CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR args = a; -+ st_logf("Initialize\n"); -+ size_t i; -+ -+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); -+ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); -+ -+ srandom(getpid() ^ time(NULL)); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_SESSION; i++) { -+ soft_token.state[i].session_handle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; -+ soft_token.state[i].find.attributes = NULL; -+ soft_token.state[i].find.num_attributes = 0; -+ soft_token.state[i].find.next_object = -1; -+ reset_crypto_state(&soft_token.state[i]); -+ } -+ -+ soft_token.flags.hardware_slot = 1; -+ soft_token.flags.app_error_fatal = 0; -+ soft_token.flags.login_done = 0; -+ -+ soft_token.object.objs = NULL; -+ soft_token.object.num_objs = 0; -+ -+ soft_token.logfile = NULL; -+#if 1 -+// soft_token.logfile = stdout; -+#endif -+#if 0 -+ soft_token.logfile = fopen("/tmp/log-pkcs11.txt", "a"); -+#endif -+ -+ if (a != NULL_PTR) { -+ st_logf("\tCreateMutex:\t%p\n", args->CreateMutex); -+ st_logf("\tDestroyMutext\t%p\n", args->DestroyMutex); -+ st_logf("\tLockMutext\t%p\n", args->LockMutex); -+ st_logf("\tUnlockMutext\t%p\n", args->UnlockMutex); -+ st_logf("\tFlags\t%04x\n", (unsigned int)args->flags); -+ } -+ -+ { -+ char *fn = NULL, *home = NULL; -+ -+ if (getuid() == geteuid()) { -+ fn = getenv("SOFTPKCS11RC"); -+ if (fn) -+ fn = strdup(fn); -+ home = getenv("HOME"); -+ } -+ if (fn == NULL && home == NULL) { -+ struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(getuid()); -+ if(pw != NULL) -+ home = pw->pw_dir; -+ } -+ if (fn == NULL) { -+ if (home) -+ asprintf(&fn, "%s/.soft-token.rc", home); -+ else -+ fn = strdup("/etc/soft-token.rc"); -+ } -+ -+ read_conf_file(fn); -+ free(fn); -+ } -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Finalize(CK_VOID_PTR args) -+{ -+ size_t i; -+ -+ st_logf("Finalize\n"); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_SESSION; i++) { -+ if (soft_token.state[i].session_handle != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { -+ application_error("application finalized without " -+ "closing session\n"); -+ close_session(&soft_token.state[i]); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetInfo(CK_INFO_PTR args) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetInfo\n"); -+ -+ memset(args, 17, sizeof(*args)); -+ args->cryptokiVersion.major = 2; -+ args->cryptokiVersion.minor = 10; -+ snprintf_fill((char *)args->manufacturerID, -+ sizeof(args->manufacturerID), -+ ' ', -+ "SoftToken"); -+ snprintf_fill((char *)args->libraryDescription, -+ sizeof(args->libraryDescription), ' ', -+ "SoftToken"); -+ args->libraryVersion.major = 1; -+ args->libraryVersion.minor = 8; -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST funcs; -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetFunctionList(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList) -+{ -+ *ppFunctionList = &funcs; -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetSlotList(CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, -+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetSlotList: %s\n", -+ tokenPresent ? "tokenPresent" : "token not Present"); -+ if (pSlotList) -+ pSlotList[0] = 1; -+ *pulCount = 1; -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetSlotInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, -+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetSlotInfo: slot: %d : %s\n", (int)slotID, has_session()); -+ -+ memset(pInfo, 18, sizeof(*pInfo)); -+ -+ if (slotID != 1) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ snprintf_fill((char *)pInfo->slotDescription, -+ sizeof(pInfo->slotDescription), -+ ' ', -+ "SoftToken (slot)"); -+ snprintf_fill((char *)pInfo->manufacturerID, -+ sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID), -+ ' ', -+ "SoftToken (slot)"); -+ pInfo->flags = CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT; -+ if (soft_token.flags.hardware_slot) -+ pInfo->flags |= CKF_HW_SLOT; -+ pInfo->hardwareVersion.major = 1; -+ pInfo->hardwareVersion.minor = 0; -+ pInfo->firmwareVersion.major = 1; -+ pInfo->firmwareVersion.minor = 0; -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetTokenInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetTokenInfo: %s\n", has_session()); -+ -+ memset(pInfo, 19, sizeof(*pInfo)); -+ -+ snprintf_fill((char *)pInfo->label, -+ sizeof(pInfo->label), -+ ' ', -+ "SoftToken (token)"); -+ snprintf_fill((char *)pInfo->manufacturerID, -+ sizeof(pInfo->manufacturerID), -+ ' ', -+ "SoftToken (token)"); -+ snprintf_fill((char *)pInfo->model, -+ sizeof(pInfo->model), -+ ' ', -+ "SoftToken (token)"); -+ snprintf_fill((char *)pInfo->serialNumber, -+ sizeof(pInfo->serialNumber), -+ ' ', -+ "4711"); -+ pInfo->flags = -+ CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED | -+ CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED; -+ -+ if (soft_token.flags.login_done == 0) -+ pInfo->flags |= CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; -+ -+ /* CFK_RNG | -+ CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED | -+ */ -+ pInfo->ulMaxSessionCount = MAX_NUM_SESSION; -+ pInfo->ulSessionCount = soft_token.open_sessions; -+ pInfo->ulMaxRwSessionCount = MAX_NUM_SESSION; -+ pInfo->ulRwSessionCount = soft_token.open_sessions; -+ pInfo->ulMaxPinLen = 1024; -+ pInfo->ulMinPinLen = 0; -+ pInfo->ulTotalPublicMemory = 4711; -+ pInfo->ulFreePublicMemory = 4712; -+ pInfo->ulTotalPrivateMemory = 4713; -+ pInfo->ulFreePrivateMemory = 4714; -+ pInfo->hardwareVersion.major = 2; -+ pInfo->hardwareVersion.minor = 0; -+ pInfo->firmwareVersion.major = 2; -+ pInfo->firmwareVersion.minor = 0; -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetMechanismList(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetMechanismList\n"); -+ -+ *pulCount = 2; -+ if (pMechanismList == NULL_PTR) -+ return CKR_OK; -+ pMechanismList[0] = CKM_RSA_X_509; -+ pMechanismList[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetMechanismInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, -+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetMechanismInfo: slot %d type: %d\n", -+ (int)slotID, (int)type); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_InitToken(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel) -+{ -+ st_logf("InitToken: slot %d\n", (int)slotID); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_OpenSession(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, -+ CK_FLAGS flags, -+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, -+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, -+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession) -+{ -+ size_t i; -+ -+ st_logf("OpenSession: slot: %d\n", (int)slotID); -+ -+ if (soft_token.open_sessions == MAX_NUM_SESSION) -+ return CKR_SESSION_COUNT; -+ -+ soft_token.application = pApplication; -+ soft_token.notify = Notify; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_SESSION; i++) -+ if (soft_token.state[i].session_handle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ break; -+ if (i == MAX_NUM_SESSION) -+ abort(); -+ -+ soft_token.open_sessions++; -+ -+ soft_token.state[i].session_handle = -+ (CK_SESSION_HANDLE)(random() & 0xfffff); -+ *phSession = soft_token.state[i].session_handle; -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_CloseSession(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ st_logf("CloseSession\n"); -+ -+ if (verify_session_handle(hSession, &state) != CKR_OK) -+ application_error("closed session not open"); -+ else -+ close_session(state); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_CloseAllSessions(CK_SLOT_ID slotID) -+{ -+ size_t i; -+ -+ st_logf("CloseAllSessions\n"); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_SESSION; i++) -+ if (soft_token.state[i].session_handle != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) -+ close_session(&soft_token.state[i]); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetSessionInfo(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetSessionInfo\n"); -+ -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ -+ memset(pInfo, 20, sizeof(*pInfo)); -+ -+ pInfo->slotID = 1; -+ if (soft_token.flags.login_done) -+ pInfo->state = CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS; -+ else -+ pInfo->state = CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION; -+ pInfo->flags = CKF_SERIAL_SESSION; -+ pInfo->ulDeviceError = 0; -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, -+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, -+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen) -+{ -+ char *pin = NULL; -+ int i; -+ -+ st_logf("Login\n"); -+ -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ -+ if (pPin != NULL_PTR) { -+ asprintf(&pin, "%.*s", (int)ulPinLen, pPin); -+ st_logf("type: %d password: %s\n", (int)userType, pin); -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < soft_token.object.num_objs; i++) { -+ struct st_object *o = soft_token.object.objs[i]; -+ FILE *f; -+ -+ if (o->type != STO_T_PRIVATE_KEY) -+ continue; -+ -+ if (o->u.private_key.key) -+ continue; -+ -+ f = fopen(o->u.private_key.file, "r"); -+ if (f == NULL) { -+ st_logf("can't open private file: %s\n", o->u.private_key.file); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ o->u.private_key.key = PEM_read_PrivateKey(f, NULL, NULL, pin); -+ fclose(f); -+ if (o->u.private_key.key == NULL) { -+ st_logf("failed to read key: %s error: %s\n", -+ o->u.private_key.file, -+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); -+ /* just ignore failure */; -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ /* XXX check keytype */ -+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key); -+ RSA_set_method(rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()); -+ -+ if (X509_check_private_key(o->u.private_key.cert, o->u.private_key.key) != 1) { -+ EVP_PKEY_free(o->u.private_key.key); -+ o->u.private_key.key = NULL; -+ st_logf("private key %s doesn't verify\n", o->u.private_key.file); -+ continue; -+ } -+ -+ soft_token.flags.login_done = 1; -+ } -+ free(pin); -+ -+ return soft_token.flags.login_done ? CKR_OK : CKR_PIN_INCORRECT; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Logout(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) -+{ -+ st_logf("Logout\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetObjectSize(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize) -+{ -+ st_logf("GetObjectSize\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GetAttributeValue(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, -+ CK_ULONG ulCount) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ struct st_object *obj; -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ int j; -+ -+ st_logf("GetAttributeValue: %lx\n", -+ (unsigned long)HANDLE_OBJECT_ID(hObject)); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ if ((ret = object_handle_to_object(hObject, &obj)) != CKR_OK) { -+ st_logf("object not found: %lx\n", -+ (unsigned long)HANDLE_OBJECT_ID(hObject)); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ -+ ret = CKR_OK; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) { -+ st_logf(" getting 0x%08lx\n", (unsigned long)pTemplate[i].type); -+ for (j = 0; j < obj->num_attributes; j++) { -+ if (obj->attrs[j].secret) { -+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = (CK_ULONG)-1; -+ break; -+ } -+ if (pTemplate[i].type == obj->attrs[j].attribute.type) { -+ if (pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL_PTR && obj->attrs[j].secret == 0) { -+ if (pTemplate[i].ulValueLen >= obj->attrs[j].attribute.ulValueLen) -+ memcpy(pTemplate[i].pValue, obj->attrs[j].attribute.pValue, -+ obj->attrs[j].attribute.ulValueLen); -+ } -+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = obj->attrs[j].attribute.ulValueLen; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ if (j == obj->num_attributes) { -+ st_logf("key type: 0x%08lx not found\n", (unsigned long)pTemplate[i].type); -+ pTemplate[i].ulValueLen = (CK_ULONG)-1; -+ ret = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID; -+ } -+ -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_FindObjectsInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, -+ CK_ULONG ulCount) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ -+ st_logf("FindObjectsInit\n"); -+ -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ if (state->find.next_object != -1) { -+ application_error("application didn't do C_FindObjectsFinal\n"); -+ find_object_final(state); -+ } -+ if (ulCount) { -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ -+ print_attributes(pTemplate, ulCount); -+ -+ state->find.attributes = -+ calloc(1, ulCount * sizeof(state->find.attributes[0])); -+ if (state->find.attributes == NULL) -+ return CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) { -+ state->find.attributes[i].pValue = -+ malloc(pTemplate[i].ulValueLen); -+ if (state->find.attributes[i].pValue == NULL) { -+ find_object_final(state); -+ return CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ } -+ memcpy(state->find.attributes[i].pValue, -+ pTemplate[i].pValue, pTemplate[i].ulValueLen); -+ state->find.attributes[i].type = pTemplate[i].type; -+ state->find.attributes[i].ulValueLen = pTemplate[i].ulValueLen; -+ } -+ state->find.num_attributes = ulCount; -+ state->find.next_object = 0; -+ } else { -+ st_logf("find all objects\n"); -+ state->find.attributes = NULL; -+ state->find.num_attributes = 0; -+ state->find.next_object = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_FindObjects(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, -+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ int i; -+ -+ st_logf("FindObjects\n"); -+ -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ if (state->find.next_object == -1) { -+ application_error("application didn't do C_FindObjectsInit\n"); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ if (ulMaxObjectCount == 0) { -+ application_error("application asked for 0 objects\n"); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ *pulObjectCount = 0; -+ for (i = state->find.next_object; i < soft_token.object.num_objs; i++) { -+ st_logf("FindObjects: %d\n", i); -+ state->find.next_object = i + 1; -+ if (attributes_match(soft_token.object.objs[i], -+ state->find.attributes, -+ state->find.num_attributes)) { -+ *phObject++ = soft_token.object.objs[i]->object_handle; -+ ulMaxObjectCount--; -+ (*pulObjectCount)++; -+ if (ulMaxObjectCount == 0) -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_FindObjectsFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ -+ st_logf("FindObjectsFinal\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ find_object_final(state); -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+static CK_RV -+commonInit(CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr_match, int attr_match_len, -+ const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *mechs, int mechs_len, -+ const CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, -+ struct st_object **o) -+{ -+ CK_RV ret; -+ int i; -+ -+ *o = NULL; -+ if ((ret = object_handle_to_object(hKey, o)) != CKR_OK) -+ return ret; -+ -+ ret = attributes_match(*o, attr_match, attr_match_len); -+ if (!ret) { -+ application_error("called commonInit on key that doesn't " -+ "support required attr"); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < mechs_len; i++) -+ if (mechs[i] == pMechanism->mechanism) -+ break; -+ if (i == mechs_len) { -+ application_error("called mech (%08lx) not supported\n", -+ pMechanism->mechanism); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+ -+static CK_RV -+dup_mechanism(CK_MECHANISM_PTR *dup, const CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism) -+{ -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR p; -+ -+ p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); -+ if (p == NULL) -+ return CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ -+ if (*dup) -+ free(*dup); -+ *dup = p; -+ memcpy(p, pMechanism, sizeof(*p)); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_RV -+C_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechs[] = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RSA_X_509 }; -+ CK_BBOOL bool_true = CK_TRUE; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = { -+ { CKA_ENCRYPT, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true) } -+ }; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ -+ st_logf("EncryptInit\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ ret = commonInit(attr, sizeof(attr)/sizeof(attr[0]), -+ mechs, sizeof(mechs)/sizeof(mechs[0]), -+ pMechanism, hKey, &o); -+ if (ret) -+ return ret; -+ -+ ret = dup_mechanism(&state->encrypt_mechanism, pMechanism); -+ if (ret == CKR_OK) -+ state->encrypt_object = OBJECT_ID(o); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ void *buffer = NULL; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ RSA *rsa; -+ int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len; -+ -+ st_logf("Encrypt\n"); -+ -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ if (state->encrypt_object == -1) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ o = soft_token.object.objs[state->encrypt_object]; -+ -+ if (o->u.public_key == NULL) { -+ st_logf("public key NULL\n"); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.public_key); -+ if (rsa == NULL) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */ -+ -+ buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa); -+ -+ buffer = malloc(buffer_len); -+ if (buffer == NULL) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ ret = CKR_OK; -+ switch(state->encrypt_mechanism->mechanism) { -+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS: -+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; -+ padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; -+ break; -+ case CKM_RSA_X_509: -+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING; -+ padding_len = 0; -+ break; -+ default: -+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (buffer_len + padding_len < (long) ulDataLen) { -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pulEncryptedDataLen == NULL) { -+ st_logf("pulEncryptedDataLen NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pData == NULL_PTR) { -+ st_logf("data NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ len = RSA_public_encrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding); -+ if (len <= 0) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (len > buffer_len) -+ abort(); -+ -+ if (pEncryptedData != NULL_PTR) -+ memcpy(pEncryptedData, buffer, len); -+ *pulEncryptedDataLen = len; -+ -+ out: -+ if (buffer) { -+ memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len); -+ free(buffer); -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("EncryptUpdate\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_RV -+C_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("EncryptFinal\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+ -+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ -+CK_RV -+C_DecryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechs[] = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RSA_X_509 }; -+ CK_BBOOL bool_true = CK_TRUE; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = { -+ { CKA_DECRYPT, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true) } -+ }; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ -+ st_logf("DecryptInit\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ ret = commonInit(attr, sizeof(attr)/sizeof(attr[0]), -+ mechs, sizeof(mechs)/sizeof(mechs[0]), -+ pMechanism, hKey, &o); -+ if (ret) -+ return ret; -+ -+ ret = dup_mechanism(&state->decrypt_mechanism, pMechanism); -+ if (ret == CKR_OK) -+ state->decrypt_object = OBJECT_ID(o); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ void *buffer = NULL; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ RSA *rsa; -+ int padding, len, buffer_len, padding_len; -+ -+ st_logf("Decrypt\n"); -+ -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ if (state->decrypt_object == -1) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ o = soft_token.object.objs[state->decrypt_object]; -+ -+ if (o->u.private_key.key == NULL) { -+ st_logf("private key NULL\n"); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key); -+ if (rsa == NULL) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */ -+ -+ buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa); -+ -+ buffer = malloc(buffer_len); -+ if (buffer == NULL) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ ret = CKR_OK; -+ switch(state->decrypt_mechanism->mechanism) { -+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS: -+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; -+ padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; -+ break; -+ case CKM_RSA_X_509: -+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING; -+ padding_len = 0; -+ break; -+ default: -+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (buffer_len + padding_len < (long) ulEncryptedDataLen) { -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pulDataLen == NULL) { -+ st_logf("pulDataLen NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pEncryptedData == NULL_PTR) { -+ st_logf("data NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ len = RSA_private_decrypt(ulEncryptedDataLen, pEncryptedData, buffer, -+ rsa, padding); -+ if (len <= 0) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (len > buffer_len) -+ abort(); -+ -+ if (pData != NULL_PTR) -+ memcpy(pData, buffer, len); -+ *pulDataLen = len; -+ -+ out: -+ if (buffer) { -+ memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len); -+ free(buffer); -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_RV -+C_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, -+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) -+ -+{ -+ st_logf("DecryptUpdate\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_RV -+C_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("DecryptFinal\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism) -+{ -+ st_logf("DigestInit\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechs[] = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RSA_X_509 }; -+ CK_BBOOL bool_true = CK_TRUE; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = { -+ { CKA_SIGN, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true) } -+ }; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ -+ st_logf("SignInit\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ ret = commonInit(attr, sizeof(attr)/sizeof(attr[0]), -+ mechs, sizeof(mechs)/sizeof(mechs[0]), -+ pMechanism, hKey, &o); -+ if (ret) -+ return ret; -+ -+ ret = dup_mechanism(&state->sign_mechanism, pMechanism); -+ if (ret == CKR_OK) -+ state->sign_object = OBJECT_ID(o); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ void *buffer = NULL; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ RSA *rsa; -+ int padding, len, buffer_len; -+ size_t padding_len; -+ -+ st_logf("Sign\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ if (state->sign_object == -1) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ o = soft_token.object.objs[state->sign_object]; -+ -+ if (o->u.private_key.key == NULL) { -+ st_logf("private key NULL\n"); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.private_key.key); -+ if (rsa == NULL) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */ -+ -+ buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa); -+ -+ buffer = malloc(buffer_len); -+ if (buffer == NULL) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ switch(state->sign_mechanism->mechanism) { -+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS: -+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; -+ padding_len = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; -+ break; -+ case CKM_RSA_X_509: -+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING; -+ padding_len = 0; -+ break; -+ default: -+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if ((size_t) buffer_len < ulDataLen + padding_len) { -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pulSignatureLen == NULL) { -+ st_logf("signature len NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pData == NULL_PTR) { -+ st_logf("data NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ len = RSA_private_encrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding); -+ st_logf("private encrypt done\n"); -+ if (len <= 0) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (len > buffer_len) -+ abort(); -+ -+ if (pSignature != NULL_PTR) -+ memcpy(pSignature, buffer, len); -+ *pulSignatureLen = len; -+ -+ ret = CKR_OK; -+ -+ out: -+ if (buffer) { -+ memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len); -+ free(buffer); -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("SignUpdate\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_RV -+C_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, -+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("SignUpdate\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, -+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechs[] = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RSA_X_509 }; -+ CK_BBOOL bool_true = CK_TRUE; -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = { -+ { CKA_VERIFY, &bool_true, sizeof(bool_true) } -+ }; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ -+ st_logf("VerifyInit\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ ret = commonInit(attr, sizeof(attr)/sizeof(attr[0]), -+ mechs, sizeof(mechs)/sizeof(mechs[0]), -+ pMechanism, hKey, &o); -+ if (ret) -+ return ret; -+ -+ ret = dup_mechanism(&state->verify_mechanism, pMechanism); -+ if (ret == CKR_OK) -+ state->verify_object = OBJECT_ID(o); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, -+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) -+{ -+ struct session_state *state; -+ struct st_object *o; -+ void *buffer = NULL; -+ CK_RV ret; -+ RSA *rsa; -+ int padding, len, buffer_len; -+ -+ st_logf("Verify\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, &state); -+ -+ if (state->verify_object == -1) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ o = soft_token.object.objs[state->verify_object]; -+ -+ if (o->u.public_key == NULL) { -+ st_logf("public key NULL\n"); -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ } -+ -+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(o->u.public_key); -+ if (rsa == NULL) -+ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ -+ RSA_blinding_off(rsa); /* XXX RAND is broken while running in mozilla ? */ -+ -+ buffer_len = RSA_size(rsa); -+ -+ buffer = malloc(buffer_len); -+ if (buffer == NULL) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ ret = CKR_OK; -+ switch(state->verify_mechanism->mechanism) { -+ case CKM_RSA_PKCS: -+ padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; -+ break; -+ case CKM_RSA_X_509: -+ padding = RSA_NO_PADDING; -+ break; -+ default: -+ ret = CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (buffer_len < (long) ulDataLen) { -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pSignature == NULL) { -+ st_logf("signature NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (pData == NULL_PTR) { -+ st_logf("data NULL\n"); -+ ret = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ len = RSA_public_decrypt(ulDataLen, pData, buffer, rsa, padding); -+ st_logf("private encrypt done\n"); -+ if (len <= 0) { -+ ret = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (len > buffer_len) -+ abort(); -+ -+ if ((size_t) len != ulSignatureLen) { -+ ret = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (memcmp(pSignature, buffer, len) != 0) { -+ ret = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ out: -+ if (buffer) { -+ memset(buffer, 0, buffer_len); -+ free(buffer); -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_RV -+C_VerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, -+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("VerifyUpdate\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, -+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("VerifyFinal\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+CK_RV -+C_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, -+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen) -+{ -+ st_logf("GenerateRandom\n"); -+ VERIFY_SESSION_HANDLE(hSession, NULL); -+ return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; -+} -+ -+ -+CK_FUNCTION_LIST funcs = { -+ { 2, 11 }, -+ C_Initialize, -+ C_Finalize, -+ C_GetInfo, -+ C_GetFunctionList, -+ C_GetSlotList, -+ C_GetSlotInfo, -+ C_GetTokenInfo, -+ C_GetMechanismList, -+ C_GetMechanismInfo, -+ C_InitToken, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_InitPIN */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_SetPIN */ -+ C_OpenSession, -+ C_CloseSession, -+ C_CloseAllSessions, -+ C_GetSessionInfo, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_GetOperationState */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_SetOperationState */ -+ C_Login, -+ C_Logout, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_CreateObject */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_CopyObject */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DestroyObject */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_GetObjectSize */ -+ C_GetAttributeValue, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_SetAttributeValue */ -+ C_FindObjectsInit, -+ C_FindObjects, -+ C_FindObjectsFinal, -+ C_EncryptInit, -+ C_Encrypt, -+ C_EncryptUpdate, -+ C_EncryptFinal, -+ C_DecryptInit, -+ C_Decrypt, -+ C_DecryptUpdate, -+ C_DecryptFinal, -+ C_DigestInit, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_Digest */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DigestUpdate */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DigestKey */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DigestFinal */ -+ C_SignInit, -+ C_Sign, -+ C_SignUpdate, -+ C_SignFinal, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_SignRecoverInit */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_SignRecover */ -+ C_VerifyInit, -+ C_Verify, -+ C_VerifyUpdate, -+ C_VerifyFinal, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_VerifyRecoverInit */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_VerifyRecover */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DigestEncryptUpdate */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DecryptDigestUpdate */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_SignEncryptUpdate */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_GenerateKey */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_GenerateKeyPair */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_WrapKey */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_UnwrapKey */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_DeriveKey */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_SeedRandom */ -+ C_GenerateRandom, -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_GetFunctionStatus */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported, /* C_CancelFunction */ -+ (void *)func_not_supported /* C_WaitForSlotEvent */ -+}; -diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile b/regress/unittests/Makefile -index e464b085..a0e5a37c 100644 ---- a/regress/unittests/Makefile -+++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile -@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@ - - REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes - SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion --SUBDIR+=authopt -+SUBDIR+=pkcs11 authopt - - .include -diff --git a/regress/unittests/pkcs11/Makefile b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/Makefile -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..481b13d0 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/Makefile -@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ -+ -+PROG=test_pkcs11 -+SRCS=tests.c -+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} -+ -+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} -+ env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -+ -+.include -diff --git a/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..e83aca54 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c -@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat -+ * -+ * Authors: Jakub Jelen -+ * -+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+ * -+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" -+ -+#include "sshbuf.h" -+#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" -+ -+#define EMPTY_URI compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) -+ -+/* prototypes are not public -- specify them here internally for tests */ -+struct sshbuf *percent_encode(const char *, size_t, char *); -+int percent_decode(char *, char **); -+ -+void -+compare_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *a, struct pkcs11_uri *b) -+{ -+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(a, NULL); -+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); -+ ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a->id_len, b->id_len); -+ ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a->id, b->id, a->id_len); -+ if (b->object != NULL) -+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->object, b->object); -+ else /* both should be null */ -+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->object, b->object); -+ if (b->module_path != NULL) -+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->module_path, b->module_path); -+ else /* both should be null */ -+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->module_path, b->module_path); -+ if (b->token != NULL) -+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->token, b->token); -+ else /* both should be null */ -+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->token, b->token); -+ if (b->manuf != NULL) -+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->manuf, b->manuf); -+ else /* both should be null */ -+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->manuf, b->manuf); -+ if (b->lib_manuf != NULL) -+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf); -+ else /* both should be null */ -+ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf); -+} -+ -+void -+check_parse_rv(char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *expect, int expect_rv) -+{ -+ char *buf = NULL, *str; -+ struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11uri = NULL; -+ int rv; -+ -+ if (expect_rv == 0) -+ str = "Valid"; -+ else -+ str = "Invalid"; -+ asprintf(&buf, "%s PKCS#11 URI parsing: %s", str, uri); -+ TEST_START(buf); -+ free(buf); -+ pkcs11uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ rv = pkcs11_uri_parse(uri, pkcs11uri); -+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(rv, expect_rv); -+ if (rv == 0) /* in case of failure result is undefined */ -+ compare_uri(pkcs11uri, expect); -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(pkcs11uri); -+ free(expect); -+ TEST_DONE(); -+} -+ -+void -+check_parse(char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *expect) -+{ -+ check_parse_rv(uri, expect, 0); -+} -+ -+struct pkcs11_uri * -+compose_uri(unsigned char *id, size_t id_len, char *token, char *lib_manuf, -+ char *manuf, char *module_path, char *object) -+{ -+ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ if (id_len > 0) { -+ uri->id_len = id_len; -+ uri->id = id; -+ } -+ uri->module_path = module_path; -+ uri->token = token; -+ uri->lib_manuf = lib_manuf; -+ uri->manuf = manuf; -+ uri->object = object; -+ return uri; -+} -+ -+static void -+test_parse_valid(void) -+{ -+ /* path arguments */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:id=%01", -+ compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_parse("pkcs11:id=%00%01", -+ compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_parse("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_parse("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL)); -+ check_parse("pkcs11:object=SIGN%20Key", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "SIGN Key")); -+ /* query arguments */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL)); -+ -+ /* combinations */ -+ /* ID SHOULD be percent encoded */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Key;id=0", -+ compose_uri("0", 1, "SSH Key", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_parse( -+ "pkcs11:manufacturer=CAC?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "CAC", -+ "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL)); -+ check_parse( -+ "pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key?module-path=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, -+ "/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", "RSA Key")); -+ -+ /* empty path component matches everything */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI); -+ -+ /* empty string is a valid to match against (and different from NULL) */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:token=", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ /* Percent character needs to be percent-encoded */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:token=%25", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "%", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+} -+ -+static void -+test_parse_invalid(void) -+{ -+ /* Invalid percent encoding */ -+ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%0", EMPTY_URI, -1); -+ /* Invalid percent encoding */ -+ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%ZZ", EMPTY_URI, -1); -+ /* Space MUST be percent encoded -- XXX not enforced yet */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH Keys", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ /* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */ -+ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%01;id=%02", EMPTY_URI, -1); -+ /* Unrecognized attribute in path SHOULD be error */ -+ check_parse_rv("pkcs11:key_name=SSH", EMPTY_URI, -1); -+ /* Unrecognized attribute in query SHOULD be ignored */ -+ check_parse("pkcs11:?key_name=SSH", EMPTY_URI); -+} -+ -+void -+check_gen(char *expect, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) -+{ -+ char *buf = NULL, *uri_str; -+ -+ asprintf(&buf, "Valid PKCS#11 URI generation: %s", expect); -+ TEST_START(buf); -+ free(buf); -+ uri_str = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); -+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(uri_str, NULL); -+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(uri_str, expect); -+ free(uri_str); -+ TEST_DONE(); -+} -+ -+static void -+test_generate_valid(void) -+{ -+ /* path arguments */ -+ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%01", -+ compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%00%01", -+ compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_gen("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", /* space must be percent encoded */ -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ /* library-manufacturer is not implmented now */ -+ /*check_gen("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL));*/ -+ check_gen("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL)); -+ check_gen("pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "RSA Key")); -+ /* query arguments */ -+ check_gen("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL)); -+ -+ /* combinations */ -+ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%02;token=SSH%20Keys", -+ compose_uri("\x02", 1, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); -+ check_gen("pkcs11:id=%EE%02?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", -+ compose_uri("\xEE\x02", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL)); -+ check_gen("pkcs11:object=Encryption%20Key;manufacturer=piv_II", -+ compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, "Encryption Key")); -+ -+ /* empty path component matches everything */ -+ check_gen("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI); -+ -+} -+ -+void -+check_encode(char *source, size_t len, char *whitelist, char *expect) -+{ -+ char *buf = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *b; -+ -+ asprintf(&buf, "percent_encode: expected %s", expect); -+ TEST_START(buf); -+ free(buf); -+ -+ b = percent_encode(source, len, whitelist); -+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(b), expect); -+ sshbuf_free(b); -+ TEST_DONE(); -+} -+ -+static void -+test_percent_encode_multibyte(void) -+{ -+ /* SHOULD be encoded as octets according to the UTF-8 character encoding */ -+ -+ /* multi-byte characters are "for free" */ -+ check_encode("$", 1, "", "%24"); -+ check_encode("¢", 2, "", "%C2%A2"); -+ check_encode("€", 3, "", "%E2%82%AC"); -+ check_encode("𐍈", 4, "", "%F0%90%8D%88"); -+ -+ /* CK_UTF8CHAR is unsigned char (1 byte) */ -+ /* labels SHOULD be normalized to NFC [UAX15] */ -+ -+} -+ -+static void -+test_percent_encode(void) -+{ -+ /* Without whitelist encodes everything (for CKA_ID) */ -+ check_encode("A*", 2, "", "%41%2A"); -+ check_encode("\x00", 1, "", "%00"); -+ check_encode("\x7F", 1, "", "%7F"); -+ check_encode("\x80", 1, "", "%80"); -+ check_encode("\xff", 1, "", "%FF"); -+ -+ /* Default whitelist encodes anything but safe letters */ -+ check_encode("test" "\x00" "0alpha", 11, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, -+ "test%000alpha"); -+ check_encode(" ", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, -+ "%20"); /* Space MUST be percent encoded */ -+ check_encode("/", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, -+ "%2F"); /* '/' delimiter MUST be percent encoded (in the path) */ -+ check_encode("?", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, -+ "%3F"); /* delimiter '?' MUST be percent encoded (in the path) */ -+ check_encode("#", 1, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, -+ "%23"); /* '#' MUST be always percent encoded */ -+ check_encode("key=value;separator?query&#anch", 35, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST, -+ "key%3Dvalue%3Bseparator%3Fquery%26amp%3B%23anch"); -+ -+ /* Components in query can have '/' unencoded (useful for paths) */ -+ check_encode("/path/to.file", 13, PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "/", -+ "/path/to.file"); -+} -+ -+void -+check_decode(char *source, char *expect, int expect_len) -+{ -+ char *buf = NULL, *out = NULL; -+ int rv; -+ -+ asprintf(&buf, "percent_decode: %s", source); -+ TEST_START(buf); -+ free(buf); -+ -+ rv = percent_decode(source, &out); -+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(rv, expect_len); -+ if (rv >= 0) -+ ASSERT_MEM_EQ(out, expect, expect_len); -+ free(out); -+ TEST_DONE(); -+} -+ -+static void -+test_percent_decode(void) -+{ -+ /* simple valid cases */ -+ check_decode("%00", "\x00", 1); -+ check_decode("%FF", "\xFF", 1); -+ -+ /* normal strings shold be kept intact */ -+ check_decode("strings are left", "strings are left", 16); -+ check_decode("10%25 of trees", "10% of trees", 12); -+ -+ /* make sure no more than 2 bytes are parsed */ -+ check_decode("%222", "\x22" "2", 2); -+ -+ /* invalid expects failure */ -+ check_decode("%0", "", -1); -+ check_decode("%Z", "", -1); -+ check_decode("%FG", "", -1); -+} -+ -+void -+tests(void) -+{ -+ test_percent_encode(); -+ test_percent_encode_multibyte(); -+ test_percent_decode(); -+ test_parse_valid(); -+ test_parse_invalid(); -+ test_generate_valid(); -+} -diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c -index adcc4599..e4fd5623 100644 ---- a/ssh-add.c -+++ b/ssh-add.c -@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ - #include "misc.h" - #include "ssherr.h" - #include "digest.h" -+#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" - - /* argv0 */ - extern char *__progname; -@@ -188,6 +189,24 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd) - return ret; - } - -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+static int update_card(int, int, const char *); -+ -+int -+update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri) -+{ -+ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; -+ -+ /* dry-run parse to make sure the URI is valid and to report errors */ -+ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ if (pkcs11_uri_parse((char *) pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); -+ -+ return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri); -+} -+#endif -+ - static int - add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag) - { -@@ -480,6 +499,13 @@ lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock) - static int - do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag) - { -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+ if (strlen(file) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && -+ strncmp(file, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, -+ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { -+ return update_pkcs11_uri(agent_fd, !deleting, file); -+ } -+#endif - if (deleting) { - if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) - return -1; -diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c -index 2a4578b0..f6c86240 100644 ---- a/ssh-agent.c -+++ b/ssh-agent.c -@@ -546,10 +546,72 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e) - } - - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+static char * -+sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider) -+{ -+ struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL; -+ char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */ -+ char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; -+ -+ if (provider == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && -+ strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, -+ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { -+ /* PKCS#11 URI */ -+ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ if (uri == NULL) { -+ error("Failed to init PCKS#11 URI"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) { -+ error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ /* validate also provider from URI */ -+ if (uri->module_path) -+ module_path = strdup(uri->module_path); -+ } else -+ module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */ -+ -+ if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */ -+ if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) { -+ verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", -+ module_path, strerror(errno)); -+ free(module_path); -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ free(module_path); -+ if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) { -+ verbose("refusing PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": " -+ "not whitelisted", canonical_provider); -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ -+ /* copy verified and sanitized provider path back to the uri */ -+ if (uri) { -+ free(uri->module_path); -+ uri->module_path = xstrdup(canonical_provider); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (uri) { -+ sane_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); -+ return sane_uri; -+ } else { -+ return xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* simple path */ -+ } -+} -+ - static void - process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) - { -- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; -+ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, *sane_uri = NULL; - int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; - u_int seconds; - time_t death = 0; -@@ -585,28 +645,23 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) - goto send; - } - } -- if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { -- verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", -- provider, strerror(errno)); -- goto send; -- } -- if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) { -- verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": " -- "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider); -+ -+ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); -+ if (sane_uri == NULL) - goto send; -- } -- debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider); -+ - if (lifetime && !death) - death = monotime() + lifetime; - -- count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys); -+ debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, sane_uri); -+ count = pkcs11_add_provider(sane_uri, pin, &keys); - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - k = keys[i]; - if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) { - id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); - id->key = k; -- id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); -- id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */ -+ id->provider = xstrdup(sane_uri); -+ id->comment = xstrdup(sane_uri); - id->death = death; - id->confirm = confirm; - TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); -@@ -620,6 +675,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) - send: - free(pin); - free(provider); -+ free(sane_uri); - free(keys); - send_status(e, success); - } -@@ -627,7 +683,7 @@ send: - static void - process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) - { -- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; -+ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, *sane_uri = NULL; - int r, success = 0; - Identity *id, *nxt; - -@@ -638,30 +694,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) - } - free(pin); - -- if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { -- verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", -- provider, strerror(errno)); -+ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); -+ if (sane_uri == NULL) - goto send; -- } - -- debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider); -+ debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, sane_uri); - for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { - nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); - /* Skip file--based keys */ - if (id->provider == NULL) - continue; -- if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { -+ if (!strcmp(sane_uri, id->provider)) { - TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); - free_identity(id); - idtab->nentries--; - } - } -- if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0) -+ if (pkcs11_del_provider(sane_uri) == 0) - success = 1; - else - error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__); - send: - free(provider); -+ free(sane_uri); - send_status(e, success); - } - #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ -diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c -index d1ffc30c..00e38049 100644 ---- a/ssh-keygen.c -+++ b/ssh-keygen.c -@@ -820,6 +820,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw) - free(fp); - } else { - (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ -+ (void) pkcs11_uri_write(keys[i], stdout); - fprintf(stdout, "\n"); - } - sshkey_free(keys[i]); -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c -index a023f5f4..882e8381 100644 ---- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c -@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, - return (-1); - key.type = KEY_RSA; - key.rsa = rsa; -+ key.ecdsa_nid = 0; - if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { - error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return -1; -@@ -195,6 +196,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp) - u_int nkeys, i; - struct sshbuf *msg; - -+ debug("%s: called, name = %s", __func__, name); -+ - if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) - return (-1); - -@@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp) - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); -+ debug("%s: nkeys = %u", __func__, nkeys); - for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { - /* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..da15c164 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c -@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat -+ * -+ * Authors: Jakub Jelen -+ * -+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+ * -+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "sshkey.h" -+#include "sshbuf.h" -+#include "log.h" -+ -+#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT -+#include "pkcs11.h" -+ -+#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" -+ -+#define PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR ";" -+#define PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR "&" -+#define PKCS11_URI_VALUE_SEPARATOR "=" -+#define PKCS11_URI_ID "id" -+#define PKCS11_URI_TOKEN "token" -+#define PKCS11_URI_OBJECT "object" -+#define PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF "library-manufacturer" -+#define PKCS11_URI_MANUF "manufacturer" -+#define PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH "module-path" -+ -+/* Keyword tokens. */ -+typedef enum { -+ pId, pToken, pObject, pLibraryManufacturer, pManufacturer, pModulePath, -+ pBadOption -+} pkcs11uriOpCodes; -+ -+/* Textual representation of the tokens. */ -+static struct { -+ const char *name; -+ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; -+} keywords[] = { -+ { PKCS11_URI_ID, pId }, -+ { PKCS11_URI_TOKEN, pToken }, -+ { PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, pObject }, -+ { PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF, pLibraryManufacturer }, -+ { PKCS11_URI_MANUF, pManufacturer }, -+ { PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, pModulePath }, -+ { NULL, pBadOption } -+}; -+ -+static pkcs11uriOpCodes -+parse_token(const char *cp) -+{ -+ u_int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) -+ if (strncasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name, -+ strlen(keywords[i].name)) == 0) -+ return keywords[i].opcode; -+ -+ return pBadOption; -+} -+ -+int -+percent_decode(char *data, char **outp) -+{ -+ char tmp[3]; -+ char *out, *tmp_end; -+ char *p = data; -+ long value; -+ size_t outlen = 0; -+ -+ out = malloc(strlen(data)+1); /* upper bound */ -+ if (out == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ while (*p != '\0') { -+ switch (*p) { -+ case '%': -+ p++; -+ if (*p == '\0') -+ goto fail; -+ tmp[0] = *p++; -+ if (*p == '\0') -+ goto fail; -+ tmp[1] = *p++; -+ tmp[2] = '\0'; -+ tmp_end = NULL; -+ value = strtol(tmp, &tmp_end, 16); -+ if (tmp_end != tmp+2) -+ goto fail; -+ else -+ out[outlen++] = (char) value; -+ break; -+ default: -+ out[outlen++] = *p++; -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ /* zero terminate */ -+ out[outlen] = '\0'; -+ *outp = out; -+ return outlen; -+fail: -+ free(out); -+ return -1; -+} -+ -+struct sshbuf * -+percent_encode(const char *data, size_t length, const char *whitelist) -+{ -+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; -+ char tmp[4], *cp; -+ size_t i; -+ -+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { -+ cp = strchr(whitelist, data[i]); -+ /* if c is specified as '\0' pointer to terminator is returned !! */ -+ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { -+ if (sshbuf_put(b, &data[i], 1) != 0) -+ goto err; -+ } else -+ if (snprintf(tmp, 4, "%%%02X", (unsigned char) data[i]) < 3 -+ || sshbuf_put(b, tmp, 3) != 0) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (sshbuf_put(b, "\0", 1) == 0) -+ return b; -+err: -+ sshbuf_free(b); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+char * -+pkcs11_uri_append(char *part, const char *separator, const char *key, -+ struct sshbuf *value) -+{ -+ char *new_part; -+ size_t size = 0; -+ -+ if (value == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ size = asprintf(&new_part, -+ "%s%s%s" PKCS11_URI_VALUE_SEPARATOR "%s", -+ (part != NULL ? part : ""), -+ (part != NULL ? separator : ""), -+ key, sshbuf_ptr(value)); -+ sshbuf_free(value); -+ free(part); -+ -+ if (size <= 0) -+ return NULL; -+ return new_part; -+} -+ -+char * -+pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri) -+{ -+ size_t size = 0; -+ char *p = NULL, *path = NULL, *query = NULL; -+ -+ /* compose a percent-encoded ID */ -+ if (uri->id_len > 0) { -+ struct sshbuf *key_id = percent_encode(uri->id, uri->id_len, ""); -+ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, -+ PKCS11_URI_ID, key_id); -+ if (path == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Write object label */ -+ if (uri->object) { -+ struct sshbuf *label = percent_encode(uri->object, strlen(uri->object), -+ PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); -+ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, -+ PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, label); -+ if (path == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Write token label */ -+ if (uri->token) { -+ struct sshbuf *label = percent_encode(uri->token, strlen(uri->token), -+ PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); -+ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, -+ PKCS11_URI_TOKEN, label); -+ if (path == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Write manufacturer */ -+ if (uri->manuf) { -+ struct sshbuf *manuf = percent_encode(uri->manuf, -+ strlen(uri->manuf), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST); -+ path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, -+ PKCS11_URI_MANUF, manuf); -+ if (path == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* Write module_path */ -+ if (uri->module_path) { -+ struct sshbuf *module = percent_encode(uri->module_path, -+ strlen(uri->module_path), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "/"); -+ query = pkcs11_uri_append(query, PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR, -+ PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, module); -+ if (query == NULL) -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ size = asprintf(&p, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME "%s%s%s", -+ path != NULL ? path : "", -+ query != NULL ? "?" : "", -+ query != NULL ? query : ""); -+err: -+ free(query); -+ free(path); -+ if (size <= 0) -+ return NULL; -+ return p; -+} -+ -+struct pkcs11_uri * -+pkcs11_uri_init() -+{ -+ struct pkcs11_uri *d = calloc(1, sizeof(struct pkcs11_uri)); -+ return d; -+} -+ -+void -+pkcs11_uri_cleanup(struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11) -+{ -+ free(pkcs11->id); -+ free(pkcs11->module_path); -+ free(pkcs11->token); -+ free(pkcs11->object); -+ free(pkcs11->lib_manuf); -+ free(pkcs11->manuf); -+ free(pkcs11); -+} -+ -+int -+pkcs11_uri_parse(const char *uri, struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11) -+{ -+ char *saveptr1, *saveptr2, *str1, *str2, *tok; -+ int rv = 0, len; -+ char *p = NULL; -+ -+ size_t scheme_len = strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME); -+ if (strlen(uri) < scheme_len || /* empty URI matches everything */ -+ strncmp(uri, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, scheme_len) != 0) { -+ error("%s: The '%s' does not look like PKCS#11 URI", -+ __func__, uri); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (pkcs11 == NULL) { -+ error("%s: Bad arguments. The pkcs11 can't be null", __func__); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ /* skip URI schema name */ -+ p = strdup(uri); -+ str1 = p; -+ -+ /* everything before ? */ -+ tok = strtok_r(str1, "?", &saveptr1); -+ if (tok == NULL) { -+ free(p); -+ error("%s: pk11-path expected, got EOF", __func__); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ /* skip URI schema name: -+ * the scheme ensures that there is at least something before "?" -+ * allowing empty pk11-path. Resulting token at worst pointing to -+ * \0 byte */ -+ tok = tok + scheme_len; -+ -+ /* parse pk11-path */ -+ for (str2 = tok; ; str2 = NULL) { -+ char **charptr; -+ pkcs11uriOpCodes opcode; -+ tok = strtok_r(str2, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR, &saveptr2); -+ if (tok == NULL) -+ break; -+ opcode = parse_token(tok); -+ -+ char *arg = tok + strlen(keywords[opcode].name) + 1; /* separator "=" */ -+ switch (opcode) { -+ case pId: -+ /* CKA_ID */ -+ if (pkcs11->id != NULL) { -+ verbose("%s: The id already set in the PKCS#11 URI", -+ __func__); -+ rv = -1; -+ } -+ len = percent_decode(arg, &pkcs11->id); -+ if (len <= 0) { -+ verbose("%s: Failed to percent-decode CKA_ID: %s", -+ __func__, arg); -+ rv = -1; -+ } else -+ pkcs11->id_len = len; -+ debug3("%s: Setting CKA_ID = %s from PKCS#11 URI", -+ __func__, arg); -+ break; -+ case pToken: -+ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> label */ -+ charptr = &pkcs11->token; -+ parse_string: -+ if (*charptr != NULL) { -+ verbose("%s: The %s already set in the PKCS#11 URI", -+ keywords[opcode].name, __func__); -+ rv = -1; -+ } -+ percent_decode(arg, charptr); -+ debug3("%s: Setting %s = %s from PKCS#11 URI", -+ __func__, keywords[opcode].name, *charptr); -+ break; -+ -+ case pObject: -+ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> manufacturerID */ -+ charptr = &pkcs11->object; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case pManufacturer: -+ /* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> manufacturerID */ -+ charptr = &pkcs11->manuf; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case pLibraryManufacturer: -+ /* CK_INFO -> manufacturerID */ -+ charptr = &pkcs11->lib_manuf; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case pBadOption: -+ default: -+ /* Unrecognized attribute in the URI path SHOULD be error */ -+ verbose("%s: Unknown part of path in PKCS#11 URI: %s", -+ __func__, tok); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ tok = strtok_r(NULL, "?", &saveptr1); -+ if (tok == NULL) { -+ free(p); -+ return rv; -+ } -+ /* parse pk11-query (optional) */ -+ for (str2 = tok; ; str2 = NULL) { -+ size_t key_len = strlen(PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH) + 1; -+ tok = strtok_r(str2, PKCS11_URI_QUERY_SEPARATOR, &saveptr2); -+ if (tok == NULL) -+ break; -+ if (strncasecmp(tok, PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH -+ PKCS11_URI_VALUE_SEPARATOR, key_len) == 0) { -+ /* module-path is PKCS11Provider */ -+ if (pkcs11->module_path != NULL) { -+ verbose("%s: Multiple module-path attributes are" -+ "not supported the PKCS#11 URI", __func__); -+ rv = -1; -+ } -+ percent_decode(tok + key_len, &pkcs11->module_path); -+ debug3("%s: Setting PKCS11Provider = %s from PKCS#11 URI", -+ __func__, pkcs11->module_path); -+ /* } else if ( pin-value ) { */ -+ } else { -+ /* Unrecognized attribute in the URI query SHOULD be ignored */ -+ verbose("%s: Unknown part of query in PKCS#11 URI: %s", -+ __func__, tok); -+ } -+ } -+ free(p); -+ return rv; -+} -+ -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..609c4df1 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h -@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat -+ * -+ * Authors: Jakub Jelen -+ * -+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any -+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above -+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. -+ * -+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES -+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR -+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES -+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN -+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF -+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. -+ */ -+ -+#define PKCS11_URI_SCHEME "pkcs11:" -+#define PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" \ -+ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" \ -+ "0123456789_-.()" -+ -+struct pkcs11_uri { -+ /* path */ -+ char *id; -+ size_t id_len; -+ char *token; -+ char *object; -+ char *lib_manuf; -+ char *manuf; -+ /* query */ -+ char *module_path; -+}; -+ -+struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init(); -+void pkcs11_uri_cleanup(struct pkcs11_uri *); -+int pkcs11_uri_parse(const char *, struct pkcs11_uri *); -+struct pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init(); -+char * pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri); -+ -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c -index 88c9d6e2..a29b4451 100644 ---- a/ssh-pkcs11.c -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c -@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo { - int logged_in; - }; - --struct pkcs11_provider { -- char *name; -+struct pkcs11_module { -+ char *module_path; - void *handle; - CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; - CK_INFO info; -@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@ struct pkcs11_provider { - struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; - int valid; - int refcount; -+}; -+ -+struct pkcs11_provider { -+ char *name; -+ struct pkcs11_module *module; /* can be shared between various providers */ -+ int refcount; -+ int valid; - TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; - }; - -@@ -70,10 +77,46 @@ struct pkcs11_key { - RSA_METHOD rsa_method; - char *keyid; - int keyid_len; -+ char *label; - }; - - int pkcs11_interactive = 0; - -+/* -+ * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on -+ * PKCS#11 structures in ssh-agent (using client-helper communication) -+ */ -+int -+pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) -+{ -+ char *p = NULL; -+ struct pkcs11_uri uri; -+ struct pkcs11_key *k11; -+ -+ /* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */ -+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA || -+ (k11 = RSA_get_app_data(key->rsa)) == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ /* omit type -- we are looking for private-public or private-certificate pairs */ -+ uri.id = k11->keyid; -+ uri.id_len = k11->keyid_len; -+ uri.token = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.label; -+ uri.object = k11->label; -+ uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path; -+ uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID; -+ uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID; -+ -+ p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri); -+ /* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */ -+ if (p == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ fprintf(f, " %s", p); -+ free(p); -+ return 0; -+} -+ - int - pkcs11_init(int interactive) - { -@@ -89,26 +132,63 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive) - * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. - */ - static void --pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) -+pkcs11_module_finalize(struct pkcs11_module *m) - { - CK_RV rv; - CK_ULONG i; - -- debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", -- p, p->refcount, p->valid); -- if (!p->valid) -+ debug("%s: %p refcount %d valid %d", __func__, -+ m, m->refcount, m->valid); -+ if (!m->valid) - return; -- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { -- if (p->slotinfo[i].session && -- (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( -- p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) -+ for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) { -+ if (m->slotinfo[i].session && -+ (rv = m->function_list->C_CloseSession( -+ m->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) - error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); - } -- if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) -+ if ((rv = m->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) - error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); -+ m->valid = 0; -+ m->function_list = NULL; -+ dlclose(m->handle); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * remove a reference to the pkcs11 module. -+ * called when a provider is unregistered. -+ */ -+static void -+pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m) -+{ -+ debug("%s: %p refcount %d", __func__, m, m->refcount); -+ if (--m->refcount <= 0) { -+ pkcs11_module_finalize(m); -+ if (m->valid) -+ error("%s: %p still valid", __func__, m); -+ free(m->slotlist); -+ free(m->slotinfo); -+ free(m->module_path); -+ free(m); -+ } -+} -+ -+/* -+ * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable. -+ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, -+ * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). -+ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. -+ */ -+static void -+pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) -+{ -+ debug("%s: %p refcount %d valid %d", __func__, -+ p, p->refcount, p->valid); -+ if (!p->valid) -+ return; -+ pkcs11_module_unref(p->module); -+ p->module = NULL; - p->valid = 0; -- p->function_list = NULL; -- dlclose(p->handle); - } - - /* -@@ -118,12 +198,11 @@ pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) - static void - pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) - { -- debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); -+ debug("%s: %p refcount %d", __func__, p, p->refcount); - if (--p->refcount <= 0) { -- if (p->valid) -- error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); -- free(p->slotlist); -- free(p->slotinfo); -+ if (p->module) -+ pkcs11_module_unref(p->module); -+ free(p->name); - free(p); - } - } -@@ -141,6 +220,20 @@ pkcs11_terminate(void) - } - } - -+/* lookup provider by module path */ -+static struct pkcs11_module * -+pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(char *module_path) -+{ -+ struct pkcs11_provider *p; -+ -+ TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { -+ debug("check %p %s (%s)", p, p->name, p->module->module_path); -+ if (!strcmp(module_path, p->module->module_path)) -+ return (p->module); -+ } -+ return (NULL); -+} -+ - /* lookup provider by name */ - static struct pkcs11_provider * - pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) -@@ -155,19 +248,52 @@ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) - return (NULL); - } - -+int pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *); -+ - /* unregister provider by name */ - int - pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) -+{ -+ int rv; -+ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; -+ -+ debug("%s: called, provider_id = %s", __func__, provider_id); -+ -+ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ if (uri == NULL) -+ fatal("Failed to init PCKS#11 URI"); -+ -+ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && -+ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { -+ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); -+ } else { -+ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(uri); -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); -+ return rv; -+} -+ -+/* unregister provider by PKCS#11 URI */ -+int -+pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri) - { - struct pkcs11_provider *p; -+ int rv = -1; -+ char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); - -- if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { -+ debug3("%s(%s): called", __func__, provider_uri); -+ -+ if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) { - TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); - pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); - pkcs11_provider_unref(p); -- return (0); -+ rv = 0; - } -- return (-1); -+ free(provider_uri); -+ return rv; - } - - /* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */ -@@ -183,6 +309,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) - if (k11->provider) - pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); - free(k11->keyid); -+ free(k11->label); - free(k11); - } - return (rv); -@@ -199,8 +327,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, - CK_RV rv; - int ret = -1; - -- f = p->function_list; -- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; -+ f = p->module->function_list; -+ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; - if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { - error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); - return (-1); -@@ -247,12 +375,13 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, - error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa); - return (-1); - } -- if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { -+ if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid || !k11->provider->module -+ || !k11->provider->module->valid) { - error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa); - return (-1); - } -- f = k11->provider->function_list; -- si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; -+ f = k11->provider->module->function_list; -+ si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; - if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { - if (!pkcs11_interactive) { - error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & -@@ -311,7 +440,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, - /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ - static int - pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, -- CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, RSA *rsa) - { - struct pkcs11_key *k11; - const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method(); -@@ -326,6 +455,11 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, - k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); - memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); - } -+ if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) { -+ k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1); -+ memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen); -+ k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; -+ } - k11->orig_finish = def->finish; - memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method)); - k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11"; -@@ -372,16 +506,16 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - int login_required; - -- f = p->function_list; -- login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; -+ f = p->module->function_list; -+ login_required = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; - if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) { - error("pin required"); - return (-1); - } -- if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| -+ if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->module->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| - CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) - != CKR_OK) { -- error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); -+ error("C_OpenSession failed for slot %lu: %lu", slotidx, rv); - return (-1); - } - if (login_required && pin) { -@@ -393,9 +527,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) - error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); - return (-1); - } -- p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1; -+ p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1; - } -- p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session; -+ p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session; - return (0); - } - -@@ -405,38 +539,62 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) - * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. - */ - static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG, -- CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], struct sshkey ***, int *) -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE [], size_t, CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], struct sshkey ***, int *) - __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)))); - - static int - pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, -- struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) -+ struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri) - { -+ size_t filter_size = 1; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; - CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = { -- { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) } -+ { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) }, -+ { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 } - }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = { -- { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) } -+ { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) }, -+ { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 } - }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = { - { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 } - }; - CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = { - { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, -+ { CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 }, - { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 } - }; - pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; - cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; - -- if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs, -- keysp, nkeys) < 0 || -- pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs, -- keysp, nkeys) < 0) -+ if (uri->id != NULL) { -+ pubkey_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->id; -+ pubkey_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; -+ cert_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->id; -+ cert_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = uri->id_len; -+ filter_size++; -+ } -+ if (uri->object != NULL) { -+ pubkey_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->object; -+ pubkey_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); -+ pubkey_filter[filter_size].type = CKA_LABEL; -+ cert_filter[filter_size].pValue = uri->object; -+ cert_filter[filter_size].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object); -+ cert_filter[filter_size].type = CKA_LABEL; -+ filter_size++; -+ } -+ -+ if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, filter_size, -+ pubkey_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0 || -+ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, filter_size, -+ cert_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0) - return (-1); - return (0); - } -@@ -454,14 +612,15 @@ pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key) - - static int - pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, -- CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3], -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], size_t filter_size, CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[4], - struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) - { - struct sshkey *key; - RSA *rsa; - X509 *x509; -- EVP_PKEY *evp; -+ EVP_PKEY *evp = NULL; - int i; -+ int nattribs = 4; - const u_char *cp; - CK_RV rv; - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; -@@ -470,16 +629,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, - CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; - CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; - -- f = p->function_list; -- session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; -+ f = p->module->function_list; -+ session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session; - /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */ -- if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) { -+ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, filter_size)) != CKR_OK) { - error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); - return (-1); - } - while (1) { -- /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */ -- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { -+ for (i = 0; i < nattribs; i++) { - attribs[i].pValue = NULL; - attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0; - } -@@ -487,22 +645,22 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, - || nfound == 0) - break; - /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */ -- if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) -+ if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, nattribs)) - != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); - continue; - } - /* -- * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but -- * ensure that none of the others are zero length. -+ * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) and CKA_LABEL (second) -+ * to be empty, but ensure that none of the others are zero length. - * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. - */ -- if (attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 || -- attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) { -+ if (attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0 || -+ attribs[3].ulValueLen == 0) { - continue; - } - /* allocate buffers for attributes */ -- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { -+ for (i = 0; i < nattribs; i++) { - if (attribs[i].ulValueLen > 0) { - attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc( - attribs[i].ulValueLen); -@@ -510,27 +668,27 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, - } - - /* -- * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key, -- * or ID, subject and value for certificates. -+ * retrieve ID, label, modulus and public exponent of RSA key, -+ * or ID, label, subject and value for certificates. - */ - rsa = NULL; -- if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) -+ if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, nattribs)) - != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); -- } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) { -+ } else if (attribs[2].type == CKA_MODULUS ) { - if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { - error("RSA_new failed"); - } else { -- rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue, -- attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL); -- rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, -+ rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, - attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL); -+ rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[3].pValue, -+ attribs[3].ulValueLen, NULL); - } - } else { -- cp = attribs[2].pValue; -+ cp = attribs[3].pValue; - if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) { - error("X509_new failed"); -- } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen) -+ } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[3].ulValueLen) - == NULL) { - error("d2i_X509 failed"); - } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL || -@@ -546,9 +704,10 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, - error("RSAPublicKey_dup"); - } - X509_free(x509); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(evp); - } - if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && -- pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) { -+ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], &attribs[1], rsa) == 0) { - if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) - fatal("sshkey_new failed"); - key->rsa = rsa; -@@ -569,7 +728,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, - } else if (rsa) { - RSA_free(rsa); - } -- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) -+ for (i = 0; i < nattribs; i++) - free(attribs[i].pValue); - } - if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) -@@ -581,126 +740,239 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, - int - pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp) - { -- int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; -- struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; -+ int rv; -+ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; -+ -+ debug("%s: called, provider_id = %s", __func__, provider_id); -+ -+ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ if (uri == NULL) -+ fatal("Failed to init PCKS#11 URI"); -+ -+ if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && -+ strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { -+ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI"); -+ } else { -+ uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id); -+ } -+ -+ rv = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp); -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); -+ return rv; -+} -+ -+struct pkcs11_provider * -+pkcs11_provider_initialize(struct pkcs11_uri *uri) -+{ -+ int need_finalize = 0; - void *handle = NULL; - CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); - CK_RV rv; - CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; - CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; - CK_ULONG i; -+ char *provider_module = NULL; -+ struct pkcs11_provider *p; -+ struct pkcs11_module *m; - -- *keyp = NULL; -- if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { -- debug("%s: provider already registered: %s", -- __func__, provider_id); -+ /* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */ -+ if (uri->module_path == NULL) { -+#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER -+ provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER); -+#else -+ error("%s: No module path provided", __func__); - goto fail; -+#endif -+ } else -+ provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path); -+ -+ p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); -+ p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); -+ -+ if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL -+ && m->valid) { -+ debug("%s: provider module already initialized: %s", -+ __func__, provider_module); -+ free(provider_module); -+ /* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */ -+ m->refcount++; -+ p->module = m; -+ p->valid = 1; -+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); -+ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ -+ return p; -+ } else { -+ m = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*m)); -+ p->module = m; -+ m->refcount++; - } -+ - /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */ -- if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { -- error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); -+ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_module, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { -+ error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror()); - goto fail; - } - if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { - error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); - goto fail; - } -- p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); -- p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); -- p->handle = handle; -+ m->handle = handle; - /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ - if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu", -- provider_id, rv); -+ provider_module, rv); - goto fail; - } -- p->function_list = f; -+ m->function_list = f; - if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { - error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu", -- provider_id, rv); -+ provider_module, rv); - goto fail; - } - need_finalize = 1; -- if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { -+ if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&m->info)) != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu", -- provider_id, rv); -+ provider_module, rv); - goto fail; - } -- rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); -- rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); -+ rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID)); -+ if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL && -+ strcmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID)) { -+ debug("%s: Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer", -+ __func__, m->info.manufacturerID); -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription)); - debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" - " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", -- provider_id, -- p->info.manufacturerID, -- p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, -- p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, -- p->info.libraryDescription, -- p->info.libraryVersion.major, -- p->info.libraryVersion.minor); -- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { -+ provider_module, -+ m->info.manufacturerID, -+ m->info.cryptokiVersion.major, -+ m->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, -+ m->info.libraryDescription, -+ m->info.libraryVersion.major, -+ m->info.libraryVersion.minor); -+ -+ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &m->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); - goto fail; - } -- if (p->nslots == 0) { -+ if (m->nslots == 0) { - debug("%s: provider %s returned no slots", __func__, -- provider_id); -+ provider_module); - goto fail; - } -- p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); -- if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) -+ m->slotlist = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); -+ if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, m->slotlist, &m->nslots)) - != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu", -- provider_id, rv); -+ provider_module, rv); - goto fail; - } -- p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); -+ m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); -+ m->valid = 1; - p->valid = 1; -- nkeys = 0; -- for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { -- token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; -- if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) { -+ token = &m->slotinfo[i].token; -+ if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token)) - != CKR_OK) { - error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu " -- "failed: %lu", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, rv); -+ "failed: %lu", provider_module, (unsigned long)i, rv); - continue; - } - if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { -- debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in " -- "provider %s slot %lu", __func__, -- provider_id, (unsigned long)i); - continue; - } - rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); - rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); - rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); - rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); -+ } -+ m->module_path = provider_module; -+ provider_module = NULL; -+ -+ /* insert unconditionally -- remove if there will be no keys later */ -+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); -+ p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ -+ return p; -+ -+fail: -+ if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) -+ error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", -+ provider_module, rv); -+ free(provider_module); -+ free(p); -+ if (handle) -+ dlclose(handle); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+int -+pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp) -+{ -+ int nkeys; -+ struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; -+ CK_ULONG i; -+ char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); -+ -+ debug("%s: called, provider_uri = %s", __func__, provider_uri); -+ -+ *keyp = NULL; -+ if ((p = pkcs11_provider_initialize(uri)) == NULL) { -+ debug("%s: failed to initialize provider: %s", -+ __func__, provider_uri); -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ -+ nkeys = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) { -+ token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token; -+ if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { -+ debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in " -+ "provider %s slot %lu", __func__, -+ provider_uri, (unsigned long)i); -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (uri->token != NULL && -+ strcmp(token->label, uri->token) != 0) { -+ debug2("%s: ignoring token not matching label (%s) " -+ "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu", __func__, -+ token->label, (unsigned long)i); -+ continue; -+ } -+ if (uri->manuf != NULL && -+ strcmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf) != 0) { -+ debug2("%s: ignoring token not matching requrested " -+ "manufacturerID (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in " -+ "slot %lu", __func__, -+ token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i); -+ continue; -+ } - debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> " - "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx", -- provider_id, (unsigned long)i, -+ provider_uri, (unsigned long)i, - token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, - token->serialNumber, token->flags); -- /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */ -- if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0) -- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys); -+ /* open session if not yet opened, login with pin -+ * and retrieve public keys */ -+ if ((p->module->slotinfo[i].session != 0) || -+ pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0) -+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys, uri); - } - if (nkeys > 0) { -- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); -- p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ -+ free(provider_uri); - return (nkeys); - } -- debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__, provider_id); -+ debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__, provider_uri); - /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */ - fail: -- if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) -- error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", -- provider_id, rv); - if (p) { -- free(p->slotlist); -- free(p->slotinfo); -- free(p); -+ pkcs11_provider_unref(p); - } -- if (handle) -- dlclose(handle); -+ free(provider_uri); - return (-1); - } - -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h -index 0ced74f2..c63a88f6 100644 ---- a/ssh-pkcs11.h -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h -@@ -14,10 +14,15 @@ - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ -+ -+#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h" -+ - int pkcs11_init(int); - void pkcs11_terminate(void); - int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***); -+int pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***); - int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); -+int pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); - - #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) - #undef ENABLE_PKCS11 -diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c -index d3619fe2..180eb2e0 100644 ---- a/ssh.c -+++ b/ssh.c -@@ -769,6 +769,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; - break; - case 'i': -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+ if (strlen(optarg) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && -+ strncmp(optarg, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, -+ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { -+ add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1); -+ break; -+ } -+#endif - p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid()); - if (stat(p, &st) < 0) - fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " -@@ -1999,6 +2007,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw) - options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); - } - -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+static void -+load_pkcs11_identity(char *pkcs11_uri, char *identity_files[], -+ struct sshkey *identity_keys[], int *n_ids) -+{ -+ int nkeys, i; -+ struct sshkey **keys; -+ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; -+ -+ debug("identity file '%s' from pkcs#11", pkcs11_uri); -+ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ if (uri == NULL) -+ fatal("Failed to init PCKS#11 URI"); -+ -+ if (pkcs11_uri_parse(pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI %s", pkcs11_uri); -+ -+ /* we need to merge URI and provider together */ -+ if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && uri->module_path == NULL) -+ uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider); -+ -+ if (options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && -+ (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, NULL, &keys)) > 0) { -+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { -+ if (*n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { -+ sshkey_free(keys[i]); -+ continue; -+ } -+ identity_keys[*n_ids] = keys[i]; -+ identity_files[*n_ids] = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); -+ (*n_ids)++; -+ } -+ free(keys); -+ } -+ -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); -+} -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ -+ - /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ - static void - load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw) -@@ -2011,10 +2058,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw) - char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; - struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; - int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; --#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -- struct sshkey **keys; -- int nkeys; --#endif /* PKCS11 */ - - n_ids = n_certs = 0; - memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); -@@ -2023,32 +2066,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw) - sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); - - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -- if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && -- options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && -- (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && -- (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, -- &keys)) > 0) { -- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { -- if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { -- sshkey_free(keys[i]); -- continue; -- } -- identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; -- identity_files[n_ids] = -- xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */ -- n_ids++; -- } -- free(keys); -+ /* handle fallback from PKCS11Provider option */ -+ pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode); -+ -+ if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL) { -+ struct pkcs11_uri *uri; -+ -+ uri = pkcs11_uri_init(); -+ if (uri == NULL) -+ fatal("Failed to init PCKS#11 URI"); -+ -+ /* Construct simple PKCS#11 URI to simplify access */ -+ uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider); -+ -+ /* Add it as any other IdentityFile */ -+ cp = pkcs11_uri_get(uri); -+ add_identity_file(&options, NULL, cp, 1); -+ free(cp); -+ -+ pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri); - } - #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ - for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { -+ char *name = options.identity_files[i]; - if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || -- strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { -+ strcasecmp(name, "none") == 0) { - free(options.identity_files[i]); - options.identity_files[i] = NULL; - continue; - } -- cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid()); -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+ if (strlen(name) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && -+ strncmp(name, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, -+ strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { -+ load_pkcs11_identity(name, identity_files, -+ identity_keys, &n_ids); -+ free(options.identity_files[i]); -+ continue; -+ } -+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ -+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid()); - filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir, - "u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host, - "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); -diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 -index 71705cab..e0266609 100644 ---- a/ssh_config.5 -+++ b/ssh_config.5 -@@ -919,6 +919,19 @@ may also be used in conjunction with - .Cm CertificateFile - in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with - the identity. -+.Pp -+The authentication identity can be also specified in a form of PKCS#11 URI -+starting with a string -+.Cm pkcs11: . -+There is supported a subset of the PKCS#11 URI as defined -+in RFC 7512 (implemented path arguments -+.Cm id , -+.Cm manufacturer , -+.Cm object , -+.Cm token -+and query argument -+.Cm module-path -+). The URI can not be in quotes. - .It Cm IgnoreUnknown - Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are - encountered in configuration parsing. diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 084c903..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,705 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.814719906 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.821719965 +0200 -@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ - - #include - -+#include -+ - #include - #include - #include -@@ -90,6 +92,33 @@ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] - { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } - }; - -+static const struct sshcipher fips_ciphers[] = { -+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+ { "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, -+ { "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, -+ { "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, -+ { "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, -+ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", -+ 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, -+ { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, -+ { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, -+ { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, -+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM -+ { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", -+ 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, -+ { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", -+ 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, -+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */ -+#else -+ { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, -+ { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, -+ { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, -+#endif -+ { "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, -+ -+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } -+}; -+ - /*--*/ - - /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ -@@ -100,7 +129,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) - size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const struct sshcipher *c; - -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { - if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) - continue; - if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) -@@ -172,7 +201,7 @@ const struct sshcipher * - cipher_by_name(const char *name) - { - const struct sshcipher *c; -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) - return c; - return NULL; -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/cipher-ctr.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.709719021 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/cipher-ctr.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.821719965 +0200 -@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) - aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; - #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP - aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | -- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; -+ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | -+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; - #endif - return (&aes_ctr); - } -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/clientloop.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/clientloop.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/clientloop.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.769719527 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/clientloop.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.822719973 +0200 -@@ -1978,7 +1978,8 @@ key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct - { - const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key); - const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ? -- options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG; -+ options.hostkeyalgorithms : (FIPS_mode() ? -+ KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); - - if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) - return 0; -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/dh.h.fips openssh-7.7p1/dh.h ---- openssh-7.7p1/dh.h.fips 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/dh.h 2018-08-08 10:08:40.822719973 +0200 -@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ u_int dh_estimate(int); - * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks. - */ - #define DH_GRP_MIN 2048 -+#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS 2048 - #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 - - /* -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.698718928 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.822719973 +0200 -@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void) - fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " - "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); - -+ /* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */ -+ atexit(RAND_cleanup); -+ - #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY - if (RAND_status() == 1) { - debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/kex.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/kex.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.815719915 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/kex.c 2018-08-08 10:11:24.109081924 +0200 -@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - #include - #include -+#include - #endif - - #include "ssh2.h" -@@ -122,6 +123,26 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { - { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, - }; - -+static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = { -+ { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+ { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, -+ { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, -+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 -+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+#endif -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, -+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, -+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, -+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 -+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, -+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, -+# endif -+#endif -+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, -+}; -+ - char * - kex_alg_list(char sep) - { -@@ -129,7 +150,7 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep) - size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const struct kexalg *k; - -- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { -+ for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) { - if (ret != NULL) - ret[rlen++] = sep; - nlen = strlen(k->name); -@@ -149,7 +170,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) - { - const struct kexalg *k; - -- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { -+ for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) { - if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) - return k; - #ifdef GSSAPI -@@ -175,7 +196,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) - for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; - (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { - if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { -- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); -+ if (FIPS_mode()) -+ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p); -+ else -+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); - free(s); - return 0; - } -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/kexgexc.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/kexgexc.c.fips 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/kexgexc.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.822719973 +0200 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - -+#include - #include - - #include -@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) - - nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); - -- kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; -+ kex->min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN; - kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; - kex->nbits = nbits; - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/kexgexs.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/kexgexs.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/kexgexs.c.fips 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/kexgexs.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.823719982 +0200 -@@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int - kex->nbits = nbits; - kex->min = min; - kex->max = max; -- min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min); -+ min = MAXIMUM(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min); - max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max); -- nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); -+ nbits = MAXIMUM(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); - nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); - - if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/mac.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/mac.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/mac.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.815719915 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/mac.c 2018-08-08 10:11:56.915352642 +0200 -@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ - - #include - -+#include -+ - #include - #include - -@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ struct macalg { - int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ - }; - --static const struct macalg macs[] = { -+static const struct macalg all_macs[] = { - /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ - { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, - { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, -@@ -82,6 +84,24 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = { - { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } - }; - -+static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = { -+ /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ -+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, -+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 -+ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, -+ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, -+#endif -+ -+ /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */ -+ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, -+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 -+ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, -+ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, -+#endif -+ -+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } -+}; -+ - /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */ - char * - mac_alg_list(char sep) -@@ -90,7 +110,7 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep) - size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const struct macalg *m; - -- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { -+ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { - if (ret != NULL) - ret[rlen++] = sep; - nlen = strlen(m->name); -@@ -129,7 +149,7 @@ mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name - { - const struct macalg *m; - -- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { -+ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { - if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) - continue; - if (mac != NULL) -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.815719915 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in 2018-08-08 10:08:40.823719982 +0200 -@@ -179,25 +179,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) - $(RANLIB) $@ - - ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) -- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) - - sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) -- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) - - scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o - $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - - ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a - $(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o - $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.7p1/myproposal.h ---- openssh-7.7p1/myproposal.h.fips 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/myproposal.h 2018-08-08 10:08:40.823719982 +0200 -@@ -114,6 +114,14 @@ - "rsa-sha2-256," \ - "ssh-rsa" - -+#define KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG \ -+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ -+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ -+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ -+ "rsa-sha2-512," \ -+ "rsa-sha2-256," \ -+ "ssh-rsa" -+ - /* the actual algorithms */ - - #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ -@@ -137,6 +145,38 @@ - - #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC - -+#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ -+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ -+ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ -+ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" \ -+ AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES -+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 -+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ -+ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ -+ KEX_SHA2_METHODS \ -+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" -+# define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ -+ "hmac-sha1," \ -+ "hmac-sha2-256," \ -+ "hmac-sha2-512," \ -+ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ -+ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ -+ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" -+#else -+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 -+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ -+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ -+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ -+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" -+# else -+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \ -+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ -+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" -+# endif -+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ -+ "hmac-sha1" -+#endif -+ - #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - - #define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/readconf.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/readconf.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.769719527 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/readconf.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.824719990 +0200 -@@ -2081,17 +2081,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); - all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); - all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); --#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ -+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \ - do { \ - if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \ -- defaults, all)) != 0) \ -+ (FIPS_mode() ? fips_defaults : defaults), \ -+ all)) != 0) \ - fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \ - } while (0) -- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); -- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); -- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); -- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); -- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); -+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); -+ ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac); -+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex); -+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key); -+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key); - #undef ASSEMBLE - free(all_cipher); - free(all_mac); -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.794719737 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.824719990 +0200 -@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ - #ifdef __NR_open - SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES), - #endif -+#ifdef __NR_socket -+ SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES), -+#endif - #ifdef __NR_openat - SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES), - #endif -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.778719603 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.824719990 +0200 -@@ -196,17 +196,18 @@ option_clear_or_none(const char *o) - all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); - all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); - all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); --#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ -+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \ - do { \ -- if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \ -+ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, (FIPS_mode() \ -+ ? fips_defaults : defaults), all)) != 0) \ - fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \ - } while (0) -- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); -- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); -- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); -- ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); -- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); -- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); -+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); -+ ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac); -+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex); -+ ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key); -+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key); -+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key); - #undef ASSEMBLE - free(all_cipher); - free(all_mac); -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/ssh.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.811719881 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.825719999 +0200 -@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ - #include - #include - #endif -+#include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - -@@ -579,6 +581,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - sanitise_stdfd(); - - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) -+ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)){ -+ if (FIPS_mode()) -+ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ else -+ logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ } - - #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE - /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ -@@ -1045,7 +1055,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - host_arg = xstrdup(host); - - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); - ERR_load_crypto_strings(); - #endif - -@@ -1268,6 +1277,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - - seed_rng(); - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); -+ } -+ - if (options.user == NULL) - options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); - -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.786719670 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect2.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.825719999 +0200 -@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ - #include - #endif - -+#include -+ - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - - #include "xmalloc.h" -@@ -235,7 +237,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc - for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) - load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); - -- oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); -+ oavail = avail = xstrdup((FIPS_mode() -+ ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG)); - maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; - first = xmalloc(maxlen); - last = xmalloc(maxlen); -@@ -290,21 +293,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - - #ifdef GSSAPI - if (options.gss_keyex) { -- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this -- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ -- orig = options.kex_algorithms; -- -- if (options.gss_trust_dns) -- gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1); -- else -- gss_host = host; -- -- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, -- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); -- if (gss) { -- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); -- xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms, -- "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode"); -+ options.gss_keyex = 0; -+ } else { -+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this -+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ -+ orig = options.kex_algorithms; -+ -+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1); -+ else -+ gss_host = host; -+ -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, -+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms); -+ if (gss) { -+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); -+ xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms, -+ "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ } - } - } - #endif -@@ -322,14 +330,16 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) { - all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); - if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms, -- KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0) -+ (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), -+ all_key) != 0) - fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__); - free(all_key); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = - compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); - } else { - /* Enforce default */ -- options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); -+ options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup((FIPS_mode() -+ ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG)); - /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */ - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = - compat_pkalg_proposal( -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.818719940 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.826720007 +0200 -@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - #include - #include - #include -@@ -77,6 +78,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - #endif - -@@ -1534,6 +1537,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - #endif - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); - -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0) -+ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { -+ openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV); -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ cleanup_exit(255); -+ } -+ else -+ syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ closelog(); -+ } - /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ - saved_argc = ac; - rexec_argc = ac; -@@ -1675,7 +1690,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - else - closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); - --#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+#if 0 /* FIPS */ - OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); - #endif - -@@ -1979,6 +1994,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ - log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); -+ } -+ - /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be - unmounted if desired. */ - if (chdir("/") == -1) -@@ -2359,10 +2378,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) - orig = NULL; - -- if (options.gss_keyex) -- gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -- else -- gss = NULL; -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode"); -+ options.gss_keyex = 0; -+ } else { -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -+ } -+ } - - if (gss && orig) - xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/sshkey.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/sshkey.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.818719940 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshkey.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.826720007 +0200 -@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - #endif - - #include "crypto_api.h" -@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ - #include "sshkey.h" - #include "sshkey-xmss.h" - #include "match.h" -+#include "log.h" - - #include "xmss_fast.h" - -@@ -1526,6 +1528,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA - } - if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || - !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { -+ if (FIPS_mode()) -+ logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__); - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.7p1/ssh-keygen.c ---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2018-08-08 10:08:40.801719797 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh-keygen.c 2018-08-08 10:08:40.827720016 +0200 -@@ -229,6 +229,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na - OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS; - if (*bitsp > maxbits) - fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits); -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ if (type == KEY_DSA) -+ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); -+ if (type == KEY_ED25519) -+ fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode"); -+ } - switch (type) { - case KEY_DSA: - if (*bitsp != 1024) diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 99a4411..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config ---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config 2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200 -@@ -44,3 +44,7 @@ - # VisualHostKey no - # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com - # RekeyLimit 1G 1h -+# -+# To modify the system-wide ssh configuration, create a *.conf file under -+# /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ which will be automatically included below -+Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat ---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat 2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat 2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ -+# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined: -+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config -+ -+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain -+# Host *.local -+# CheckHostIP no -+ -+Host * -+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes -+ -+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access -+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted -+# mode correctly we set this to yes. -+ ForwardX11Trusted yes -+ -+# Send locale-related environment variables -+ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES -+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT -+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE -+ SendEnv XMODIFIERS -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 ---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2018-04-02 07:39:27.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200 -@@ -872,9 +872,9 @@ DESCRIPTION - - SyslogFacility - Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from -- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, -- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The -- default is AUTH. -+ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, -+ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. -+ The default is AUTH. - - TCPKeepAlive - Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200 -@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined. - .It Cm SyslogFacility - Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from - .Xr sshd 8 . --The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, -+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, - LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. - The default is AUTH. - .It Cm TCPKeepAlive -diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat 2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config 2018-07-03 10:45:16.950782466 +0200 -@@ -10,20 +10,34 @@ - # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the - # default value. - -+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell -+# SELinux about this change. -+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER -+# - #Port 22 - #AddressFamily any - #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 - #ListenAddress :: - --#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key --#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key --#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key -+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key - - # Ciphers and keying - #RekeyLimit default none - -+# System-wide Crypto policy: -+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to -+# Ciphers, MACs, KexAlgoritms and GSSAPIKexAlgorithsm will not have any -+# effect here. They will be overridden by command-line options passed on -+# the server start up. -+# To opt out, uncomment a line with redefinition of CRYPTO_POLICY= -+# variable in /etc/sysconfig/sshd to overwrite the policy. -+# For more information, see manual page for update-crypto-policies(8). -+ - # Logging - #SyslogFacility AUTH -+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV - #LogLevel INFO - - # Authentication: -@@ -56,9 +70,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys - # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! - #PasswordAuthentication yes - #PermitEmptyPasswords no -+PasswordAuthentication yes - - # Change to no to disable s/key passwords - #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes -+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - - # Kerberos options - #KerberosAuthentication no -@@ -67,8 +83,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys - #KerberosGetAFSToken no - - # GSSAPI options --#GSSAPIAuthentication no --#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes -+GSSAPIAuthentication yes -+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will -@@ -79,16 +95,20 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys - # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without - # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication - # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. --#UsePAM no -+UsePAM yes - - #AllowAgentForwarding yes - #AllowTcpForwarding yes - #GatewayPorts no --#X11Forwarding no -+X11Forwarding yes - #X11DisplayOffset 10 - #X11UseLocalhost yes - #PermitTTY yes --#PrintMotd yes -+ -+# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/ssh instead of PrintMotd, -+# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version. -+PrintMotd no -+ - #PrintLastLog yes - #TCPKeepAlive yes - #PermitUserEnvironment no -@@ -106,6 +126,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys - # no default banner path - #Banner none - -+# Accept locale-related environment variables -+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES -+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT -+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE -+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS -+ - # override default of no subsystems - Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server - diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch deleted file mode 100644 index da39361..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, - cfg, NULL); - -+ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */ -+ if (! options.use_pam) -+ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems."); -+ - seed_rng(); - - /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ -diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config ---- a/sshd_config -+++ b/sshd_config -@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no - # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without - # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication - # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. -+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several -+# problems. - UsePAM yes - - #AllowAgentForwarding yes diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-gsskex.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-gsskex.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6a350c7..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.8p1-gsskex.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2905 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh/auth2.c.gsskex openssh/auth2.c ---- openssh/auth2.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.260216045 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth2.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.307216424 +0200 -@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; - extern Authmethod method_kbdint; - extern Authmethod method_hostbased; - #ifdef GSSAPI -+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; - extern Authmethod method_gssapi; - #endif - -@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { - &method_none, - &method_pubkey, - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ &method_gsskeyex, - &method_gssapi, - #endif - &method_passwd, -diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.260216045 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c 2018-08-22 13:00:48.722680124 +0200 -@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "sshkey.h" -@@ -54,6 +55,44 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_ - static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); - static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); - -+/* -+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. -+ */ -+static int -+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; -+ int authenticated = 0; -+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); -+ mic.length = len; -+ -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); -+ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); -+ -+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, -+ &gssbuf, &mic)))) -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); -+ -+ sshbuf_free(b); -+ free(mic.value); -+ -+ return (authenticated); -+} -+ - /* - * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know - * how to check local user kuserok and the like) -@@ -260,7 +296,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, - if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); - - if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && - (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) -@@ -313,7 +350,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); - - if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); - else - logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); - -@@ -335,6 +373,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - return 0; - } - -+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { -+ "gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ &options.gss_authentication -+}; -+ - Authmethod method_gssapi = { - "gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, -diff -up openssh/auth.c.gsskex openssh/auth.c ---- openssh/auth.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.274216158 +0200 -+++ openssh/auth.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.308216432 +0200 -@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const - case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: - if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || - strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || -+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0 || - strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) - return 1; - break; -diff -up openssh/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh/clientloop.c ---- openssh/clientloop.c.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/clientloop.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.309216441 +0200 -@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ - #include "ssherr.h" - #include "hostfile.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - /* import options */ - extern Options options; - -@@ -1357,9 +1361,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt - break; - - /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ -- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) -+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { - channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) { -+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); -+ need_rekeying = 1; -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ - /* Buffer input from the connection. */ - client_process_net_input(readset); - -diff -up openssh/configure.ac.gsskex openssh/configure.ac ---- openssh/configure.ac.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.296216335 +0200 -+++ openssh/configure.ac 2018-08-22 11:47:33.309216441 +0200 -@@ -673,6 +673,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" - [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) - AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], - [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], -+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" -+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, -+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include ], -+ [cc_context_t c; -+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], -+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, -+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) -+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then -+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) -+ fi], -+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] -+ ) - m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) - AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], - AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) -diff -up openssh/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh/gss-genr.c ---- openssh/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/gss-genr.c 2018-08-22 13:18:47.444383602 +0200 -@@ -35,18 +35,177 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "ssherr.h" - #include "sshbuf.h" - #include "log.h" - #include "ssh2.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "sshkey.h" -+#include "kex.h" - - #include "ssh-gss.h" - - extern u_char *session_id2; - extern u_int session_id2_len; - -+typedef struct { -+ char *encoded; -+ gss_OID oid; -+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; -+ -+/* -+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the -+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines -+ */ -+ -+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; -+ -+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { -+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program -+ * -+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting -+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism -+ */ -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { -+ gss_OID_set gss_supported; -+ OM_uint32 min_status; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, -+ host, client)); -+} -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, -+ const char *host, const char *client) { -+ struct sshbuf *buf; -+ size_t i; -+ int oidpos, enclen, r; -+ char *mechs, *encoded; -+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ char deroid[2]; -+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); -+ EVP_MD_CTX md; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { -+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) -+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); -+ free(gss_enc2oid); -+ } -+ -+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * -+ (gss_supported->count + 1)); -+ -+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); -+ -+ oidpos = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { -+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && -+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { -+ -+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; -+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; -+ -+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].length); -+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); -+ -+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), -+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ -+ if (oidpos != 0) -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; -+ oidpos++; -+ } -+ } -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '\0')) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ mechs = xmalloc(sshbuf_len(buf)); -+ sshbuf_get(buf, mechs, sshbuf_len(buf)); -+ sshbuf_free(buf); -+ -+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { -+ free(mechs); -+ mechs = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (mechs); -+} -+ -+gss_OID -+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ switch (kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ } -+ -+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && -+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) -+ i++; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) -+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); -+ -+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; -+} -+ - /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */ - int - ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) -@@ -218,7 +373,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de - } - - ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, -+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, - GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, - 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); - -@@ -248,8 +403,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con - } - - OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_name_t gssname; -+ OM_uint32 status; -+ gss_OID_set oidset; -+ -+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; -+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); -+ -+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, -+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); -+ -+ if (!ctx->major) -+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, -+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ -+ if (ctx->major) -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ -+ return(ctx->major); -+} -+ -+OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) - { -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, - GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -257,6 +446,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer - return (ctx->major); - } - -+/* Priviledged when used by server */ -+OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+{ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ -+ return (ctx->major); -+} -+ - void - ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, - const char *context) -@@ -273,11 +475,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, co - } - - int --ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) -+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, -+ const char *client) - { - gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - OM_uint32 major, minor; - gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; -+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; -+ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ ctx = &intctx; - - /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ - if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && -@@ -287,6 +494,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); - ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); - major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) -+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); -+ - if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { - major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, - NULL); -@@ -296,10 +507,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); - } - -- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) - ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); - - return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { -+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; -+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ static gss_name_t name; -+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; -+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; -+ int equal; -+ -+ now = time(NULL); -+ -+ if (ctxt) { -+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); -+ -+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { -+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; -+ saved_lifetime+= now; -+ } else { -+ /* Handle the error */ -+ } -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if (now - last_call < 10) -+ return 0; -+ -+ last_call = now; -+ -+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) -+ return 0; -+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) -+ return 1; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh/gss-serv.c ---- openssh/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/gss-serv.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.310216448 +0200 -@@ -44,17 +44,19 @@ - #include "session.h" - #include "misc.h" - #include "servconf.h" -+#include "uidswap.h" - - #include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" - - extern ServerOptions options; - - static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = -- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; -+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; - - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = -- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; -+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; - - #ifdef KRB5 - extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; -@@ -141,6 +143,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss - } - - /* Unprivileged */ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { -+ if (supported_oids == NULL) -+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); -+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids, -+ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL)); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, -+ const char *dummy) { -+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; -+ int res; -+ -+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); -+ -+ return (res); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ - void - ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) - { -@@ -150,7 +174,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o - gss_OID_set supported; - - gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) -+ return; - - while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { - if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, -@@ -276,8 +302,48 @@ OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) - { - int i = 0; -+ int equal = 0; -+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { -+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || -+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, -+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, -+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, -+ new_name, &equal); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if (!equal) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); - -- gss_buffer_desc ename; -+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); -+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); -+ client->name = new_name; -+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; -+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -+ client->updated = 1; -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } - - client->mech = NULL; - -@@ -292,6 +358,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - if (client->mech == NULL) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - -+ if (ctx->client_creds && -+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, - &client->displayname, NULL))) { - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -309,6 +382,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - return (ctx->major); - } - -+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); -+ - /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ - client->creds = ctx->client_creds; - ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -@@ -319,11 +394,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - void - ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) - { -- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { -- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ -- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", -- gssapi_client.store.filename); -- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); -+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; -+ krb5_error_code problem; -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) { -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) { -+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, -+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); -+ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) { -+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__, -+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem)); -+ } else { -+ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data); -+ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL; -+ } - } - } - -@@ -356,7 +440,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int - - /* Privileged */ - int --ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - OM_uint32 lmin; - -@@ -366,9 +450,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return 0; - } - if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) -- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) -+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { -+ gssapi_client.used = 1; -+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; - return 1; -- else { -+ } else { - /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); -@@ -382,14 +468,89 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return (0); - } - --/* Privileged */ --OM_uint32 --ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running -+ * as the user, the monitor is root. -+ * -+ * In the child, we want to : -+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify -+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update -+ */ -+ -+/* Stuff for PAM */ -+ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, -+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) - { -- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); -+} -+#endif - -- return (ctx->major); -+void -+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { -+ int ok; -+ int ret; -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; -+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; -+ char *envstr; -+#endif -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); -+ -+ if (!ok) -+ return; -+ -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); -+ -+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will -+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options -+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) -+ */ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ if (!use_privsep) { -+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, -+ &pamconv, &pamh); -+ if (ret) -+ return; -+ -+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, -+ gssapi_client.store.envval); -+ -+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); -+ if (!ret) -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); -+#endif -+} -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { -+ int ok = 0; -+ -+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ -+ if (!gssapi_client.updated) -+ return 0; -+ -+ gssapi_client.updated = 0; -+ -+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); -+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) -+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); -+ else -+ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); -+ -+ restore_uid(); -+ -+ return ok; - } - - /* Privileged */ -diff -up openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.311216457 +0200 -@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - krb5_error_code problem; - krb5_principal princ; - OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -- int len; -+ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; - const char *errmsg; - - if (client->creds == NULL) { -@@ -180,11 +180,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - return; - } - -- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); -+ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); -+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); -+ - client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; -- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; -- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); -- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); -+#else -+ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') -+ new_ccname++; -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); -+ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { -+ char *p; -+ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); -+ if (p) -+ *p = '\0'; -+ } -+#endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -@@ -193,9 +205,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - - krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); - -+ client->store.data = krb_context; -+ - return; - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, -+ ssh_gssapi_client *client) -+{ -+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; -+ krb5_principal principal = NULL; -+ char *name = NULL; -+ krb5_error_code problem; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, -+ &principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { -+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ -+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { -+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ -+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ -+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, -+ ccache))) { -+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", - "Kerberos", -@@ -203,7 +282,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - NULL, - &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, - NULL, -- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds - }; - - #endif /* KRB5 */ -diff -up openssh/kex.c.gsskex openssh/kex.c ---- openssh/kex.c.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/kex.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.311216457 +0200 -@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ - #include "sshbuf.h" - #include "digest.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - /* prototype */ - static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); - static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -@@ -103,6 +107,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { - { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, - { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, - #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, -+#endif - { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, - }; - -@@ -136,6 +145,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) - for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { - if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) - return k; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (strncmp(name, "gss-", 4) == 0) { -+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) -+ return k; -+ } -+#endif - } - return NULL; - } -diff -up openssh/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh/kexgssc.c ---- openssh/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.311216457 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexgssc.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.311216457 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "sshbuf.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "sshkey.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+#include "digest.h" -+ -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+ -+int -+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) { -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen; -+ DH *dh; -+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *g = NULL; -+ u_char *kbuf; -+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; -+ u_char *empty = ""; -+ char *msg; -+ char *lang; -+ int type = 0; -+ int first = 1; -+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ -+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type) -+ == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); -+ -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host)) -+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); -+ -+ if (ssh->kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client)) -+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); -+ -+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); -+ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ packet_put_int(min); -+ packet_put_int(nbits); -+ packet_put_int(max); -+ -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ -+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(p); -+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(g); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) -+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); -+ -+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ -+ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); -+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -+ -+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -+ &ret_flags); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ free(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (first) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ first = 0; -+ } else { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ do { -+ type = packet_read(); -+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ serverhostkey = -+ packet_get_string(&slen); -+ } -+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -+ -+ switch (type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); -+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ msg_tok.length = strlen; -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if (packet_get_char()) { -+ recv_tok.value= -+ packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ /* No token included */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ maj_status = packet_get_int(); -+ min_status = packet_get_int(); -+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ token_ptr = &recv_tok; -+ } else { -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ /* -+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the -+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok -+ */ -+ -+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ -+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); -+ -+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); -+ if ((int)kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ free(kbuf); -+ -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg, ssh->kex->client_version_string, -+ ssh->kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ dh->pub_key, /* e */ -+ dh_server_pub, /* f */ -+ shared_secret, /* K */ -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ ssh->kex->hash_alg, -+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, -+ ssh->kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ min, nbits, max, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ dh_server_pub, -+ shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); -+ -+ free(msg_tok.value); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ free(serverhostkey); -+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); -+ -+ /* save session id */ -+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds) -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh); -+} -+ -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh/kexgsss.c ---- openssh/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.311216457 +0200 -+++ openssh/kexgsss.c 2018-08-22 11:47:33.311216457 +0200 -@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "sshbuf.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "sshkey.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ -+#include "servconf.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "digest.h" -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; -+ -+int -+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ /* -+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -+ * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ */ -+ -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -+ u_int slen, klen, kout; -+ u_char *kbuf; -+ DH *dh; -+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; -+ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; -+ int type = 0; -+ gss_OID oid; -+ char *mechs; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ -+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ -+ -+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures -+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back -+ * into life -+ */ -+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) -+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) -+ free(mechs); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name); -+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type); -+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) -+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); -+ -+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */ -+ cmin = packet_get_int(); -+ nbits = packet_get_int(); -+ cmax = packet_get_int(); -+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin); -+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) -+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, nbits, max); -+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); -+ if (dh == NULL) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_write_wait(); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); -+ type = packet_read(); -+ switch(type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) -+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ -+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ break; -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect( -+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ -+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -+ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); -+ -+ free(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ -+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); -+ -+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ } -+ fatal("accept_ctx died"); -+ } -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); -+ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); -+ if ((int)kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ free(kbuf); -+ -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg, -+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ -+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ ssh->kex->hash_alg, -+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string, -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer), -+ sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, -+ cmin, nbits, cmax, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh_client_pub, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) -+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); -+ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ } else { -+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ kex_send_newkeys(ssh); -+ -+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we -+ * just exchanged. */ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey) -+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh/kex.h.gsskex openssh/kex.h ---- openssh/kex.h.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/kex.h 2018-08-22 11:47:33.311216457 +0200 -@@ -100,6 +100,11 @@ enum kex_exchange { - KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, - KEX_ECDH_SHA2, - KEX_C25519_SHA256, -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, -+#endif - KEX_MAX - }; - -@@ -148,6 +153,12 @@ struct kex { - u_int flags; - int hash_alg; - int ec_nid; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ int gss_deleg_creds; -+ int gss_trust_dns; -+ char *gss_host; -+ char *gss_client; -+#endif - char *client_version_string; - char *server_version_string; - char *failed_choice; -@@ -197,6 +208,10 @@ int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *); - int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *); - int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *); - int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); -+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); -+#endif - - int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *, - const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, -diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh/Makefile.in ---- openssh/Makefile.in.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.312216465 +0200 -+++ openssh/Makefile.in 2018-08-22 13:19:54.955928277 +0200 -@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ - readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ - atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \ - monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ -+ kexgssc.o \ - msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ - ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ - poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ -@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw - auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ - auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ - monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ -- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ -+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ - loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ - sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ - sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ -diff -up openssh/monitor.c.gsskex openssh/monitor.c ---- openssh/monitor.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.263216069 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor.c 2018-08-22 13:22:19.589095240 +0200 -@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, struct - int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, struct sshbuf *); - int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, struct sshbuf *); -+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, struct sshbuf *); - #endif - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -@@ -219,11 +221,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, - #endif - {0, 0, NULL} - }; - - struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, -+#endif - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, - #endif -@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx - /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - - /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ - while (!authenticated) { -@@ -405,6 +418,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - - if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); -@@ -1695,6 +1712,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p - # endif - #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; - kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; - kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; -@@ -1785,7 +1809,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, struct - u_char *p; - int r; - -- if (!options.gss_authentication) -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); - - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) -@@ -1818,7 +1842,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, struc - OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ - int r; - -- if (!options.gss_authentication) -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); - - if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) -@@ -1839,6 +1863,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, struc - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); - } - return (0); - } -@@ -1850,7 +1875,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, struct - OM_uint32 ret; - int r; - -- if (!options.gss_authentication) -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); - - if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || -@@ -1880,10 +1905,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, struct ss - int r, authenticated; - const char *displayname; - -- if (!options.gss_authentication) -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) - fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); - -- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); -+ authenticated = authctxt->valid && -+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); - - sshbuf_reset(m); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) -@@ -1900,5 +1926,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, struct ss - /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc data; -+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 major, minor; -+ int r; -+ -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&data.value, &data.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ if (data.length != 20) -+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, -+ (int) data.length); -+ -+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ -+ if (session_id2_len == 0) { -+ session_id2_len = data.length; -+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); -+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); -+ } -+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); -+ -+ free(data.value); -+ -+ sshbuf_reset(m); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); -+ -+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); -+ -+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) { -+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int ok, r; -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.envval, NULL)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); -+ -+ free(store.envvar); -+ free(store.envval); -+ -+ sshbuf_reset(m); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); -+ -+ return(0); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - -diff -up openssh/monitor.h.gsskex openssh/monitor.h ---- openssh/monitor.h.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.263216069 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor.h 2018-08-22 11:47:33.313216473 +0200 -@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX - MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80, - #endif -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 82, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 83, -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 84, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 85, - - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, -diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.313216473 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c 2018-08-22 13:27:38.665669643 +0200 -@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss - } - - int --mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - struct sshbuf *m; - int r, authenticated = 0; -@@ -1023,4 +1023,52 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+OM_uint32 -+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) -+{ -+ struct sshbuf *m; -+ OM_uint32 major; -+ int r; -+ -+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&hash->value, &hash->length)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ sshbuf_free(m); -+ -+ return(major); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) -+{ -+ struct sshbuf *m; -+ int ok, r; -+ -+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); -+ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ sshbuf_free(m); -+ -+ return (ok); -+} - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.263216069 +0200 -+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h 2018-08-22 11:47:33.313216473 +0200 -@@ -63,8 +63,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, - gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); --int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); - #endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM -diff -up openssh/readconf.c.gsskex openssh/readconf.c ---- openssh/readconf.c.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/readconf.c 2018-08-22 13:28:17.487982869 +0200 -@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ typedef enum { - oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, - oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, - oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, -+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, -+ oGssServerIdentity, - oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, - oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, - oHashKnownHosts, -@@ -201,10 +203,19 @@ static struct { - /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ - #if defined(GSSAPI) - { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, -+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, - # else - { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, - #endif - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, -@@ -973,10 +984,30 @@ parse_time: - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oGssDelegateCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssTrustDns: -+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case oGssClientIdentity: -+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case oGssServerIdentity: -+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case oGssRenewalRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oBatchMode: - intptr = &options->batch_mode; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1817,7 +1848,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) - options->pubkey_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; - options->gss_authentication = -1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; -+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; -+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; -@@ -1962,8 +1998,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) - options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; -+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) -+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; -+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -diff -up openssh/readconf.h.gsskex openssh/readconf.h ---- openssh/readconf.h.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/readconf.h 2018-08-22 11:47:33.314216481 +0200 -@@ -40,7 +40,12 @@ typedef struct { - int challenge_response_authentication; - /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ - int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ - int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ -+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ -+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ -+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ -+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ - int password_authentication; /* Try password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ -diff -up openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh.gsskex openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh ---- openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/regress/cert-hostkey.sh 2018-08-22 11:47:33.314216481 +0200 -@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain - touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert - cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca - --PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'` -+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'` - - if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then - PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512" -diff -up openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh.gsskex openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh ---- openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2018-08-22 11:47:33.314216481 +0200 -@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us - cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak - cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak - --PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` -+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` - EXTRA_TYPES="" - - if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then -diff -up openssh/regress/kextype.sh.gsskex openssh/regress/kextype.sh ---- openssh/regress/kextype.sh.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/regress/kextype.sh 2018-08-22 11:47:33.315216489 +0200 -@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/ssh - - tries="1 2 3 4" - for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -+ if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then -+ continue -+ fi - verbose "kex $k" - for i in $tries; do - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true -diff -up openssh/regress/rekey.sh.gsskex openssh/regress/rekey.sh ---- openssh/regress/rekey.sh.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/regress/rekey.sh 2018-08-22 11:47:33.315216489 +0200 -@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ increase_datafile_size 300 - - opts="" - for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -+ if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then -+ continue -+ fi - opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" - done - for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do -@@ -56,6 +59,9 @@ done - if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then - for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do - for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do -+ if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then -+ continue -+ fi - verbose "client rekey $c $kex" - ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c - done -diff -up openssh/servconf.c.gsskex openssh/servconf.c ---- openssh/servconf.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.296216335 +0200 -+++ openssh/servconf.c 2018-08-22 13:28:41.905179879 +0200 -@@ -124,8 +124,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; - options->gss_authentication=-1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; - options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; -+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; -@@ -334,10 +336,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) - options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; - if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) - options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; -+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -484,7 +490,7 @@ typedef enum { - sHostKeyAlgorithms, - sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, - sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, -- sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, -+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, - sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, - sHostCertificate, -@@ -559,11 +565,17 @@ static struct { - { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #endif -+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -1463,6 +1475,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sGssCleanupCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1471,6 +1487,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssStoreRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sPasswordAuthentication: - intptr = &options->password_authentication; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -2560,6 +2580,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - #ifdef GSSAPI - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); - #endif - dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, -diff -up openssh/servconf.h.gsskex openssh/servconf.h ---- openssh/servconf.h.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.296216335 +0200 -+++ openssh/servconf.h 2018-08-22 11:47:33.316216497 +0200 -@@ -124,8 +124,10 @@ typedef struct { - int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if - * authenticated with Kerberos. */ - int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ - int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ - int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ -+ int gss_store_rekey; - int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ -diff -up openssh/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh/ssh_config.5 ---- openssh/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh_config.5 2018-08-22 11:47:33.316216497 +0200 -@@ -718,10 +718,40 @@ The default is - Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. - The default is - .Cm no . -+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity -+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when -+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default -+identity will be used. - .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials - Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. - The default is - .Cm no . -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using -+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey -+If set to -+.Dq yes -+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the -+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed -+credentials to a session on the server. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity -+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when -+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the -+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target -+hostname. -+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns -+Set to -+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize -+the name of the host being connected to. If -+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the -+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. -+The default is -+.Dq no . - .It Cm HashKnownHosts - Indicates that - .Xr ssh 1 -diff -up openssh/ssh_config.gsskex openssh/ssh_config ---- openssh/ssh_config.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.289216279 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh_config 2018-08-22 11:47:33.316216497 +0200 -@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ - # HostbasedAuthentication no - # GSSAPIAuthentication no - # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no -+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no -+# GSSAPITrustDNS no - # BatchMode no - # CheckHostIP yes - # AddressFamily any -diff -up openssh/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshconnect2.c 2018-08-22 13:33:01.674275795 +0200 -@@ -82,6 +82,124 @@ extern char *client_version_string; - extern char *server_version_string; - extern Options options; - -+/* XXX from auth.h -- refactoring move these useful functions away of client context*/ -+ -+/* -+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not -+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is -+ * called. -+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some -+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. -+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? -+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) -+ */ -+ -+static char * -+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ struct sockaddr_storage from; -+ socklen_t fromlen; -+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; -+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; -+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); -+ -+ /* Get IP address of client. */ -+ fromlen = sizeof(from); -+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); -+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), -+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { -+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ -+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); -+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) -+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); -+ -+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); -+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ -+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), -+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { -+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, -+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: -+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 -+ */ -+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); -+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ -+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; -+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { -+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", -+ name, ntop); -+ freeaddrinfo(ai); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ -+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ -+ lowercase(name); -+ -+ /* -+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given -+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is -+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can -+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from -+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be -+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of -+ * the domain). -+ */ -+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); -+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; -+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; -+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { -+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " -+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ -+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { -+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, -+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && -+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) -+ break; -+ } -+ freeaddrinfo(aitop); -+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ -+ if (ai == NULL) { -+ /* Address not found for the host name. */ -+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " -+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name); -+ return strdup(ntop); -+ } -+ return strdup(name); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current -+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this -+ * several times. -+ */ -+ -+const char * -+get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) -+{ -+ static char *dnsname; -+ -+ if (!use_dns) -+ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); -+ else if (dnsname != NULL) -+ return dnsname; -+ else { -+ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); -+ return dnsname; -+ } -+} -+ -+ -+ - /* - * SSH2 key exchange - */ -@@ -162,9 +280,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - struct kex *kex; - int r; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; -+ char *gss_host = NULL; -+#endif -+ - xxx_host = host; - xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this -+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ -+ orig = options.kex_algorithms; -+ -+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1); -+ else -+ gss_host = host; -+ -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); -+ if (gss) { -+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); -+ xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms, -+ "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) - fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s); -@@ -194,6 +337,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); - } - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the -+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ -+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], -+ "%s,null", orig); -+ free(gss); -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit, - options.rekey_interval); -@@ -214,11 +368,31 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; - # endif - #endif -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ } -+#endif - kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; - kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; -+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; -+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; -+ if (options.gss_server_identity) { -+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; -+ } else { -+ kex->gss_host = gss_host; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); - - /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ -@@ -314,6 +488,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32 - int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); - int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); - int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); - #endif - - void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); -@@ -330,6 +505,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); - - Authmethod authmethods[] = { - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ {"gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ NULL, -+ &options.gss_authentication, -+ NULL}, - {"gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, - NULL, -@@ -657,19 +837,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) - static u_int mech = 0; - OM_uint32 min; - int r, ok = 0; -+ const char *gss_host; -+ -+ if (options.gss_server_identity) -+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; -+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1); -+ else -+ gss_host = authctxt->host; - - /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at - * once. */ - - if (gss_supported == NULL) -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { -+ gss_supported = NULL; -+ return 0; -+ } - - /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ - while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { - /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ - if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && - ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, -- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { -+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, -+ options.gss_client_identity)) { - ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ - } else { - mech++; -@@ -906,6 +1098,51 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p - free(lang); - return r; - } -+ -+int -+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) -+{ -+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ms; -+ -+ static int attempt = 0; -+ if (attempt++ >= 1) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { -+ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); -+ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { -+ sshbuf_free(b); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); -+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ sshbuf_free(b); -+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); -+ -+ return (1); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - int -diff -up openssh/sshd.c.gsskex openssh/sshd.c ---- openssh/sshd.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.299216360 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshd.c 2018-08-22 13:34:28.455975954 +0200 -@@ -537,8 +537,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) - - #ifdef GSSAPI - /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ -- if (options.gss_authentication) -- ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); -+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); - #endif - - reseed_prngs(); -@@ -887,8 +887,9 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) - } - debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys); - if (nkeys == 0) -- fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); -- packet_send(); -+ debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); -+ else -+ packet_send(); - sshbuf_free(buf); - } - -@@ -1841,7 +1842,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - free(fp); - } - accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); -- if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { -+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ -+ if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) { - logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); - exit(1); - } -@@ -2321,6 +2323,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( - list_hostkey_types()); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ { -+ char *orig; -+ char *gss = NULL; -+ char *newstr = NULL; -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising -+ * the other key exchange algorithms -+ */ -+ -+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) -+ orig = NULL; -+ -+ if (options.gss_keyex) -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -+ else -+ gss = NULL; -+ -+ if (gss && orig) -+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ else if (gss) -+ newstr = gss; -+ else if (orig) -+ newstr = orig; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host -+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only -+ * host key algorithm we support -+ */ -+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; -+ -+ if (newstr) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; -+ else -+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* start key exchange */ - if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) - fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); -@@ -2338,6 +2382,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - # endif - #endif - kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->server = 1; - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; -diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.297216344 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshd_config.5 2018-08-22 13:35:05.531275099 +0200 -@@ -642,6 +642,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr - on logout. - The default is - .Cm yes . -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange -+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. -+The default is -+.Dq no . - .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck - Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor - a client authenticates against. -@@ -656,6 +661,11 @@ machine's default store. - This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. - The default is - .Cm yes . -+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey -+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a -+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed -+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is -+.Dq no . - .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes - Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication - as a list of comma-separated patterns. -diff -up openssh/sshd_config.gsskex openssh/sshd_config ---- openssh/sshd_config.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.299216360 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshd_config 2018-08-22 11:47:33.318216513 +0200 -@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - # GSSAPI options - GSSAPIAuthentication yes - GSSAPICleanupCredentials no -+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes -+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will -diff -up openssh/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh/ssh-gss.h ---- openssh/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/ssh-gss.h 2018-08-22 13:36:44.773075793 +0200 -@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */ - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@ - - #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 - -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" -+ - typedef struct { - char *filename; - char *envvar; - char *envval; -+ struct passwd *owner; - void *data; - } ssh_gssapi_ccache; - -@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_buffer_desc displayname; - gss_buffer_desc exportedname; - gss_cred_id_t creds; -+ gss_name_t name; - struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; - ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int used; -+ int updated; - } ssh_gssapi_client; - - typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { -@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { - int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); - int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); - void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); -+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); - } ssh_gssapi_mech; - - typedef struct { -@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_OID oid; /* client */ - gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ - gss_name_t client; /* server */ -- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ -+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ - } Gssctxt; - - extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; -+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; - - int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); - void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); -@@ -123,17 +140,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, - const char *, const char *); --int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); -+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); - - /* In the server */ -+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, -+ const char *); -+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); -+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); --int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); -+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); - void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); - void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); - const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); - -+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); -+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); -+ -+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); -+ -+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void); - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ -diff -up openssh/sshkey.c.gsskex openssh/sshkey.c ---- openssh/sshkey.c.gsskex 2018-08-22 11:47:33.319216521 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshkey.c 2018-08-22 13:37:18.979351804 +0200 -@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = - # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ - # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -+ { "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 1 }, - { NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 } - }; - -diff -up openssh/sshkey.h.gsskex openssh/sshkey.h ---- openssh/sshkey.h.gsskex 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/sshkey.h 2018-08-22 11:47:33.320216529 +0200 -@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum sshkey_types { - KEY_ED25519_CERT, - KEY_XMSS, - KEY_XMSS_CERT, -+ KEY_NULL, - KEY_UNSPEC - }; - ---- openssh/sshconnect2.c.orig 2017-01-04 19:47:10.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh/sshconnect2.c 2017-01-05 04:13:08.977425272 +0100 -@@ -344,7 +344,6 @@ - orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; - xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], - "%s,null", orig); -- free(gss); - } - #endif - -@@ -398,6 +397,16 @@ - /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = - compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */ -+ /* ext-info removal above */ -+ if (gss) { -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], -+ "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ free(gss); -+ } -+#endif - if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) - fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r)); - diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-ip-port-config-parser.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-ip-port-config-parser.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6ca0cf5..0000000 --- a/openssh-7.8p1-ip-port-config-parser.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh/misc.c.config openssh/misc.c ---- openssh/misc.c.config 2018-08-22 13:58:54.922807799 +0200 -+++ openssh/misc.c 2018-08-22 13:58:55.000808428 +0200 -@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ put_host_port(const char *host, u_short - * The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim. - * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL. - */ --static char * -+char * - hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim) - { - char *s, *old; -diff -up openssh/misc.h.config openssh/misc.h ---- openssh/misc.h.config 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh/misc.h 2018-08-22 13:58:55.001808436 +0200 -@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int set_rdomain(int, const char *); - int a2port(const char *); - int a2tun(const char *, int *); - char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short); -+char *hpdelim2(char **, char *); - char *hpdelim(char **); - char *cleanhostname(char *); - char *colon(char *); -diff -up openssh/servconf.c.config openssh/servconf.c ---- openssh/servconf.c.config 2018-08-22 13:58:54.989808340 +0200 -+++ openssh/servconf.c 2018-08-22 14:18:49.235443937 +0200 -@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, - { - u_int i; - int port; -- char *host, *arg, *oarg; -+ char *host, *arg, *oarg, ch; - int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE; - const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode); - -@@ -904,8 +904,8 @@ process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, - /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ - for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) { - oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]); -- host = hpdelim(&arg); -- if (host == NULL) -+ host = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); -+ if (host == NULL || ch == '/') - fatal("%s: missing host in %s", __func__, what); - host = cleanhostname(host); - if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) -@@ -1323,8 +1323,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - port = 0; - p = arg; - } else { -- p = hpdelim(&arg); -- if (p == NULL) -+ char ch; -+ arg2 = NULL; -+ p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); -+ if (p == NULL || ch == '/') - fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", - filename, linenum); - p = cleanhostname(p); -@@ -1965,9 +1967,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - */ - xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg); - } else { -+ char ch; - arg2 = xstrdup(arg); -- p = hpdelim(&arg); -- if (p == NULL) { -+ p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch); -+ if (p == NULL || ch == '/') { - fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s", - filename, linenum, - lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); diff --git a/sources b/sources index c629991..10b461b 100644 --- a/sources +++ b/sources @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ -SHA512 (openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz) = 8e5b0c8682a9243e4e8b7c374ec989dccd1a752eb6f84e593b67141e8b23dcc8b9a7322b1f7525d18e2ce8830a767d0d9793f997486339db201a57986b910705 -SHA512 (openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc) = 3a7bef84df3c07aa78965a11a6bbd6ca6e5d1e9265ac08871b3e5d304646be651b74f5302a195e86a56e6a83b19d79292e5599c9a9cf6f003a513d4354e8ad2f -SHA512 (DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg) = db1191ed9b6495999e05eed2ef863fb5179bdb63e94850f192dad68eed8579836f88fbcfffd9f28524fe1457aff8cd248ee3e0afc112c8f609b99a34b80ecc0d +SHA512 (openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz) = 2daa1fcf95793b23810142077e68ddfabdf3732b207ef4f033a027f72d733d0e9bcdb6f757e7f3a5934b972de05bfaae3baae381cfc7a400cd8ab4d4e277a0ed +SHA512 (openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz.asc) = 6ab9deb4233ff159e55a18c9fc07d5ff8a41723dad74aa3d803e1476b585f5662aba34f8a7a1f5fe1d248f3ff3cd663f2c2fb8e399c6a4723b6215b0eb423d13 +SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21