diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
similarity index 78%
rename from openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
rename to 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
index 48f9f10..c08e414 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@@ -1,57 +1,83 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
---- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
-@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
- 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+From 95f4e30195382c3df7104c2ad3e5e9953f8ad554 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/50] openssh-7.8p1-role-mls
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c                       |   2 +-
+ auth-pam.h                       |   2 +-
+ auth.h                           |   3 +
+ auth2-gss.c                      |  11 +-
+ auth2-hostbased.c                |   9 +
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  11 +-
+ auth2.c                          |  14 ++
+ misc.c                           |   8 +
+ monitor.c                        |  37 ++-
+ monitor.h                        |   4 +
+ monitor_wrap.c                   |  21 ++
+ monitor_wrap.h                   |   3 +
+ openbsd-compat/Makefile.in       |   3 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  37 +--
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   3 +-
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |   3 +
+ 18 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index 13c0a792..b4100ea1 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ 	char *compound;
+diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
+index 8d801c68..9dd7ae07 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.h
++++ b/auth-pam.h
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 98bb23d4..83d07ae8 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role = NULL;
++	char		*role;
 +#endif
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
-@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
--		if (use_privsep)
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
-+		}
- 		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
-diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
-@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+ 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 75eb4e3a..f7898ab3 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
  	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
 +	char *micuser;
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
-@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	u_char *p;
+@@ -300,7 +301,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
@@ -66,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
  	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+@@ -313,6 +320,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
  	sshbuf_free(b);
@@ -74,11 +100,12 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
  	free(mic.value);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
-diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index eb21479a..a3be6e49 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -129,7 +129,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
@@ -93,12 +120,13 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
 +#endif
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
-@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index aa24fda0..267a27d2 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -206,9 +206,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  			goto done;
  		}
  		/* reconstruct packet */
@@ -117,47 +145,51 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
  		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	char		*service;
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
- 	char		*style;
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 82f6e621..5ba45c12 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char		*role;
++	char *role = NULL;
 +#endif
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
- 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
- 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
---- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
-  * during the ssh authentication process.
-  */
- int
--do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- 	int ret = 1;
- 	char *compound;
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
---- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
- void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
--int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
+@@ -284,6 +287,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +321,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
+ 		userauth_banner(ssh);
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index dd0bd032..c932f9bb 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -806,6 +806,7 @@ char *
  colon(char *cp)
  {
  	int flag = 0;
@@ -165,7 +197,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  
  	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
  		return NULL;
-@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+@@ -821,6 +822,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
  			return (cp);
  		if (*cp == '/')
  			return NULL;
@@ -179,10 +211,11 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
-@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 2179553d..02b3eaaa 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -192,7 +225,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -194,6 +197,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -202,7 +235,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
+@@ -912,6 +918,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -212,7 +245,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
+@@ -986,6 +995,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -239,16 +272,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
- {
+@@ -1358,7 +1387,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
  	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
  	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
+@@ -1389,6 +1418,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -257,7 +290,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1439,7 +1470,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -266,7 +299,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1460,6 +1491,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -275,12 +308,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
---- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 3f8a9bea..9dcd9c29 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_STATE = 51, MONITOR_ANS_STATE = 52,
  
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
@@ -289,10 +323,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
-@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index bd900b2f..ef3ab1b1 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -442,6 +442,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  
@@ -320,10 +355,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
  /* Do the password authentication */
  int
  mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 7134afee..38a280c8 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
      const char *, u_int compat);
  void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
@@ -333,10 +369,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
  struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
  char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
  int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index 1d549954..78e6fa5b 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
  	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
@@ -346,79 +383,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
  
  .c.o:
  	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- 	return sc;
- }
- 
--/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
--void
--ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
--{
--	char *user_ctx = NULL;
--
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
--		return;
--
--	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
--
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
--	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
--		switch (security_getenforce()) {
--		case -1:
--			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
--		case 0:
--			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
--			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
--			break;
--		default:
--			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
--			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
--		}
--	}
--	if (user_ctx != NULL)
--		freecon(user_ctx);
--
--	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
--}
--
- /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
- void
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- 
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 
- 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
--void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..b9fbe38b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -472,7 +442,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@@ -678,7 +647,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -752,7 +721,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@@ -840,10 +809,82 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index c1d54f38..7426f6f7 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -109,37 +109,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+@@ -152,7 +121,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 959430de..055c825e 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 4c4fe57e..1bfb4bea 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -852,10 +893,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index c64eb29f..74d2cbc7 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1328,6 +1328,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
@@ -864,4 +906,7 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 		do_pam_setcred();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32d3c64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 99d8e250514023d3b88a1c9eb724c4898aba9827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/50] openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
+ session.c                        | 16 +++++++++-------
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  4 ++++
+ sshd-session.c                   |  2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index b9fbe38b..dfafc622 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -415,6 +415,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 	debug3_f("done");
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
++		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 055c825e..498d242a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 6444c77f..e4657cef 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 
+ 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+ 
+-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+@@ -1382,6 +1382,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+ 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ 			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1417,6 +1420,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (in_chroot == 0)
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1434,9 +1442,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr,
+ 		    "You must change your password now and log in again!\n");
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		setexeccon(NULL);
+-#endif
+ #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ 		    (char *)NULL);
+@@ -1649,9 +1654,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index 30eecd8a..f957dc22 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
+ 	if ((box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (privsep_chroot) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 74d2cbc7..4a148db4 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
+ 	 * special privileges to begin with.
+ 	 */
+-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
++#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ 	skip_privdrop = 1;
+ #endif
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
similarity index 76%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
rename to 0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
index 2aa14bd..b46b378 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
- 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(127);
-+		}
-+#endif
- 		if (env != NULL)
- 			execve(av[0], av, env);
- 		else
-diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
---- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-+++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+From 5e35e18a419a5a66b6e1cb2b98beaaf4d9db0dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/50] openssh-6.6p1-keycat
+
+---
+ HOWTO.ssh-keycat                 |  12 ++
+ Makefile.in                      |   8 +-
+ configure.ac                     |   6 +
+ misc.c                           |   7 +
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c |  44 +++++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   2 +
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ ssh-keycat.c                     | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 8 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+ create mode 100644 ssh-keycat.c
+
+diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..630ec628
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@@ -31,45 +34,46 @@ diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
---- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
-+++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 4617cebc..438efc51 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
  ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
  SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
+ SSHD_AUTH=$(libexecdir)/sshd-auth
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
  SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
  LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
  LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
- AR=@AR@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@
+@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
  
  .SUFFIXES: .lo
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
  
  XMSS_OBJS=\
  	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+@@ -260,6 +262,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
  ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
  ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
-@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
+@@ -447,6 +452,7 @@ install-files:
  	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -77,26 +81,69 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index ee77a048..d546788c 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3566,6 +3566,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
  
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
  
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
-@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+@@ -3576,6 +3577,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4801,6 +4803,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5812,6 +5815,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index c932f9bb..1e31acc9 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2897,6 +2897,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(1);
+ 		}
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(127);
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
  
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@@ -115,7 +162,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  /* Send audit message */
  static int
  sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -317,7 +331,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -124,14 +171,14 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -328,16 +342,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
@@ -144,7 +191,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  
  	if (role != NULL)
  		free(role);
-@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -345,6 +359,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  	return rv;
  }
  
@@ -169,7 +216,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
  void
  sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+@@ -353,7 +385,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  	int r = 0;
  	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
  
@@ -178,7 +225,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  		return;
  
  	if (options.use_pam) {
-@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+@@ -420,7 +452,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
  {
  	security_context_t *ctx;
  
@@ -187,10 +234,26 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  		return;
  
  	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 498d242a..1b745a76 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 1bfb4bea..0d12f311 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
  {
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
@@ -199,9 +262,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
---- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
-+++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
+diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..5678be07
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh-keycat.c
 @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -444,41 +509,6 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 			PAM_MSG="yes"
- 
- 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
- 
-@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
- 					;;
- 				*)
- 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- 					;;
- 				esac
- 			fi
-@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
- 
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
- 
- echo ""
- 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
similarity index 57%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
rename to 0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
index 953d613..ef15fbf 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+From 28333f1dfe68b0ffc80c2a4799759587b4c32d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/50] openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 4a148db4..a365f26f 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -778,12 +778,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
  	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@@ -21,11 +31,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +				case 130:
 +				case 133:
 +				case 134:
-+					i += opts[i + 1];
-+					break;
++					if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
++						i += opts[i + 1];
++						break;
++					}
++					/* FALLTHROUGH */
 +				default:
 +				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
++			 	 * or incorrect source routing options. */
 +					text[0] = '\0';
 +					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
 +						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
@@ -35,5 +48,8 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
  	}
- 	return;
  #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch b/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
similarity index 54%
rename from openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
rename to 0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
index ece1a73..909b988 100644
--- a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+++ b/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
---- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
-@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+From 388be633842a9f3e4b0a76fe40cf7035912a913a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 05/50] openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man
+
+---
+ ssh.1  | 2 ++
+ sshd.8 | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 697f4e42..db92ac9a 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ manual page for more information.
  .Nm
  exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
  if an error occurred.
@@ -10,10 +21,11 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
---- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
-@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 08ebf53a..2aa73271 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -1018,6 +1018,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
  started last).
  The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
  .El
@@ -22,3 +34,6 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bf31bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 80359feb76fd8061b5ce18f73451d7b9db0c2477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/50] openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe
+
+---
+ ssh-keyscan.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
+index 3436c0b5..9f76ad22 100644
+--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
++++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
+@@ -798,6 +798,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
++ 
++	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
++
+ 	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+ 	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+ 		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch b/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
similarity index 68%
rename from openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
rename to 0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
index 0a19ecb..2f72f9a 100644
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+From cf6d48305cf6601448ea7a0d96ae825cbbbf0a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/50] openssh-7.2p2-x11
+
+---
+ channels.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -5098,11 +5098,13 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  }
  
  static int
@@ -14,8 +24,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
  	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock == -1)
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -5110,11 +5112,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+ 	}
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@@ -30,7 +42,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  	return -1;
  }
  
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+@@ -5122,8 +5125,18 @@ static int
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
@@ -51,3 +63,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  }
  
  #ifdef __APPLE__
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch b/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
similarity index 66%
rename from openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
rename to 0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
index ff609da..f7ca382 100644
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+From 6b2a33044583e892badb9ac86cd2c6252b1a532f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/50] openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index a62f9815..cb7152dc 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
@@ -9,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+@@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -27,7 +37,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  static int
  passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  {
- 	const char *failed;
+@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
  	int buttons, default_response;
@@ -36,7 +46,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
  	GdkColor fg, bg;
  	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
-@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
  	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
@@ -45,12 +55,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 +		    FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
-		entry = gtk_entry_new();
-		if (fg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
-		if (bg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
-		gtk_box_pack_start(
+ 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ 		if (fg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ 		if (bg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ 		gtk_box_pack_start(
 -		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
 -		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
 +		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
@@ -58,7 +68,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
  		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
  		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
-@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -225,6 +242,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
  			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
  		}
@@ -81,3 +91,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  	}
  
  	/* Grab focus */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch b/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
similarity index 53%
rename from openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
rename to 0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
index 120ed1b..8a7cf9e 100644
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
-@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+From 710ce53fdf1d32a0629fce2e42fb49d407e2b06c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/50] openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index cb7152dc..bbe93d83 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
  
  	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
  	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
@@ -16,3 +26,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/cont
  	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
  
  	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch b/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
similarity index 63%
rename from openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
rename to 0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
index fcda6c6..cb3d140 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
---- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
+From 5f21983f6472b26693babea4d6ca6b95a7dc7b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/50] openssh-8.7p1-redhat
+
+---
+ ssh_config            |  7 +++++++
+ ssh_config_redhat     | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config           |  8 ++++++++
+ sshd_config.0         |  6 +++---
+ sshd_config.5         |  2 +-
+ sshd_config_redhat    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config_redhat_cp |  7 +++++++
+ 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ssh_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat_cp
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index cc566356..18169187 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
++++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -44,3 +44,10 @@
  #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
  #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
  #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
@@ -12,10 +31,12 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
 +# included below. For more information, see manual page for
 +#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
---- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff --git a/ssh_config_redhat b/ssh_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..8b1b5902
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
 +Match final all
@@ -29,18 +50,35 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
 +# mode correctly we set this to yes.
 +	ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
++# rhbz#2352653 - export COLORTERM
++	SendEnv COLORTERM
 +
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
---- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 0f4a3a72..608203e4 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+ 
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
+index 2f77b4f4..49349bb3 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.0
++++ b/sshd_config.0
+@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
       SyslogFacility
               Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
@@ -53,10 +91,11 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
  
       TCPKeepAlive
               Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
---- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c0771737..035a50c8 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
  .It Cm SyslogFacility
  Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
  .Xr sshd 8 .
@@ -65,38 +104,15 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
  LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
  The default is AUTH.
  .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
---- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
-@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
-
-+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
-+
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
---- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
-+# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
-+# write it before this block or include it before this file.
-+# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
-+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat b/sshd_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..993a28d5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sshd_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 +
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
++KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
 +
 +GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
@@ -105,13 +121,26 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
 +
 +X11Forwarding yes
 +
++# rhbz#2352653 - accept COLORTERM
++	AcceptEnv COLORTERM
++
 +# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat_cp b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..1d592d13
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76ee115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 56b8d082bc9e25a77b5227d576f27088446c6fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/50] openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 4 ++++
+ sshd_config    | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a365f26f..a70b36c9 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1127,6 +1127,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			    "enabled authentication methods");
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
++	if (! options.use_pam)
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 608203e4..48af6321 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
++# problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
similarity index 65%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
rename to 0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index e26bebd..f5f54f7 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -1,28 +1,98 @@
+From 754b023b92aa68742258c55243a6ae8f30ed5a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 12/50] openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex
+
+---
+ Makefile.in     |   7 +-
+ auth.c          |   3 +-
+ auth2-gss.c     |  52 +++-
+ auth2-methods.c |   6 +
+ auth2.c         |   2 +
+ canohost.c      |  93 +++++++
+ canohost.h      |   3 +
+ clientloop.c    |  12 +
+ configure.ac    |  24 ++
+ gss-genr.c      | 302 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  97 ++++++-
+ gss-serv.c      | 200 ++++++++++++--
+ kex-names.c     |  62 ++++-
+ kex.c           |  35 ++-
+ kex.h           |  34 +++
+ kexdh.c         |  10 +
+ kexgen.c        |   2 +-
+ kexgssc.c       | 706 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kexgsss.c       | 601 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor.c       | 147 +++++++++-
+ monitor.h       |   2 +
+ monitor_wrap.c  |  57 +++-
+ monitor_wrap.h  |   4 +-
+ readconf.c      |  70 +++++
+ readconf.h      |   6 +
+ servconf.c      |  47 ++++
+ servconf.h      |   3 +
+ session.c       |  10 +-
+ ssh-gss.h       |  64 ++++-
+ ssh.1           |   8 +
+ ssh.c           |   6 +-
+ ssh_config      |   2 +
+ ssh_config.5    |  58 ++++
+ sshconnect2.c   | 154 ++++++++++-
+ sshd-auth.c     |  53 ++++
+ sshd-session.c  |   9 +-
+ sshd.c          |   3 +-
+ sshd_config     |   2 +
+ sshd_config.5   |  31 +++
+ sshkey.c        |  72 ++++-
+ sshkey.h        |   1 +
+ 41 files changed, 2984 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
+ create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
+
 diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
+index 438efc51..78f65948 100644
 --- a/Makefile.in
 +++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
  	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 +	kexgssc.o \
  	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
  	sshbuf-io.o
  
-@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ SSHD_SESSION_OBJS=sshd-session.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+ 	auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
  	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
- 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
+-	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
++	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ SSHD_AUTH_OBJS=sshd-auth.o \
+ 	serverloop.o auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o auth2-chall.o \
+ 	groupaccess.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
 -	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 +	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
-diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
---- a/auth.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth.c	2021-08-27 12:41:51.262788953 +0200
-@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
+ 	monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+@@ -563,7 +564,7 @@ regress-prep:
+ 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
+ 
+ REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
+-TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
++TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+ 
+ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index 9a6e5a31..e4578169 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
  		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
  		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
@@ -32,118 +102,19 @@ diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
  			return 1;
  		break;
  	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-@@ -730,97 +731,6 @@ fakepw(void)
- }
- 
- /*
-- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
-- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
-- * called.
-- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
-- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
-- */
--
--static char *
--remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
--{
--	struct sockaddr_storage from;
--	socklen_t fromlen;
--	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
--	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
--	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
--
--	/* Get IP address of client. */
--	fromlen = sizeof(from);
--	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
--	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
--	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
--		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
--	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
--		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
--
--	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
--	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
--	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
--	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
--		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	/*
--	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
--	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
--	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
--	 */
--	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
--	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
--	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
--	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
--		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
--		    name, ntop);
--		freeaddrinfo(ai);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
--	lowercase(name);
--
--	/*
--	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
--	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
--	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
--	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
--	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
--	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
--	 * the domain).
--	 */
--	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
--	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
--	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
--		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
--		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
--	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
--		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
--		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
--		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
--				break;
--	}
--	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
--	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
--	if (ai == NULL) {
--		/* Address not found for the host name. */
--		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
--		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--	return xstrdup(name);
--}
--
--/*
-  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
-  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
-  * several times.
 diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
+index f7898ab3..5b1b9cde 100644
 --- a/auth2-gss.c
 +++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS	2048
  
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi;
+ 
+ static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+@@ -58,6 +59,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
  static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  
@@ -151,7 +122,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 + * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
 + */
 +static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
 +{
 +	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
 +	int r, authenticated = 0;
@@ -178,10 +149,10 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 1));
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++	    &gssbuf, &mic)))
++		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw, 1);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	free(mic.value);
@@ -192,44 +163,65 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
  /*
   * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
   * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -267,7 +310,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
  
--	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+	    authctxt->pw, 1));
+-	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ 	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
-@@ -306,7 +349,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -315,7 +358,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
  
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 0));
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
+-		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0);
  	else
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
-@@ -326,6 +370,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -333,6 +376,11 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	return 0;
  }
  
 +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+	"gssapi-keyex",
++	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
 +	userauth_gsskeyex,
-+	&options.gss_authentication
 +};
 +
  Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
  	userauth_gssapi,
+diff --git a/auth2-methods.c b/auth2-methods.c
+index 99637a89..a05908cf 100644
+--- a/auth2-methods.c
++++ b/auth2-methods.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey = {
+ 	&options.pubkey_authentication
+ };
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = {
++	"gssapi-keyex",
++	NULL,
++	&options.gss_authentication
++};
+ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi = {
+ 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	NULL,
+@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ static struct authmethod_cfg *authmethod_cfgs[] = {
+ 	&methodcfg_none,
+ 	&methodcfg_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
+ 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ 	&methodcfg_passwd,
 diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
+index 5ba45c12..8ec41de2 100644
 --- a/auth2.c
 +++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
  extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
  extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -237,7 +229,7 @@ index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
  extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
  #endif
  
-@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
  	&method_none,
  	&method_pubkey,
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -246,7 +238,7 @@ index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
  #endif
  	&method_passwd,
 diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
-index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
+index 28f086e5..875805c9 100644
 --- a/canohost.c
 +++ b/canohost.c
 @@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
@@ -364,10 +356,10 @@ index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
  int		 get_peer_port(int);
  char		*get_local_ipaddr(int);
 diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
+index 916fc077..4655f91f 100644
 --- a/clientloop.c
 +++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
+@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
  
@@ -375,16 +367,12 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +#endif
 +
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
+ /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
+ #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
  
-@@ -1379,9 +1383,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
- 			break;
- 
- 		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
--		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
-+		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
- 			channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
+@@ -1591,6 +1595,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+ 		/* Do channel operations. */
+ 		channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +			if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
@@ -393,16 +381,15 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
 +				need_rekeying = 1;
 +			}
 +#endif
-+		}
 +
  		/* Buffer input from the connection.  */
- 		client_process_net_input(ssh, readset);
- 
+ 		if (conn_in_ready)
+ 			client_process_net_input(ssh);
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
+index d546788c..13c70a98 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -674,6 +674,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+@@ -786,6 +786,30 @@ int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
  	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
  	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
  	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
@@ -434,19 +421,10 @@ index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
  	AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
  	    AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
 diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
-index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
+index aa34b71c..3034370c 100644
 --- a/gss-genr.c
 +++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
+@@ -42,9 +42,33 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "log.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -480,7 +458,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
-@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -60,6 +84,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -640,7 +618,28 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+@@ -168,6 +345,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+ 	(*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ 	(*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ 	(*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++	(*ctx)->first = 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
+@@ -193,6 +371,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+ 		gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
+ 	if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ 		gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->shared_secret);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_pubkey);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_host_key_blob);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_blob);
++	explicit_bzero((*ctx)->hash, sizeof((*ctx)->hash));
++	BN_clear_free((*ctx)->dh_client_pub);
+ 
+ 	free(*ctx);
+ 	*ctx = NULL;
+@@ -216,7 +400,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
  	}
  
  	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
@@ -649,7 +648,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
  	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
  
-@@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+@@ -245,9 +429,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
  
@@ -693,7 +692,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
  	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+@@ -255,6 +473,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
  
@@ -713,7 +712,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  void
  ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
      const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
-@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+@@ -271,11 +502,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
  }
  
  int
@@ -730,8 +729,8 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		ctx = &intctx;
  
  	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
-@@ -287,6 +519,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -285,6 +521,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
  	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
  	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
  	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
@@ -740,13 +739,13 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
 +
  	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+ 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
  		    NULL);
-@@ -296,10 +532,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+@@ -294,10 +534,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
  			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
  	}
  
--	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
  		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
  
@@ -951,7 +950,7 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
+index 025a118f..a5cca797 100644
 --- a/gss-serv.c
 +++ b/gss-serv.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
@@ -963,7 +962,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -44,17 +44,19 @@
+@@ -45,17 +45,19 @@
  #include "session.h"
  #include "misc.h"
  #include "servconf.h"
@@ -986,7 +985,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  #ifdef KRB5
  extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+@@ -141,6 +143,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
  	return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
  }
  
@@ -1007,7 +1006,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
 +	int res;
 +
-+	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++	res = !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid));
 +	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
 +
 +	return (res);
@@ -1016,7 +1015,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  /* Unprivileged */
  void
  ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
-@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+@@ -151,7 +176,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
  	gss_OID_set supported;
  
  	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
@@ -1027,7 +1026,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
  		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -276,8 +303,48 @@ OM_uint32
+@@ -277,8 +304,48 @@ OM_uint32
  ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  {
  	int i = 0;
@@ -1042,15 +1041,15 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
 +			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 +		}
-+
+ 
+-	gss_buffer_desc ename;
 +		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
 +		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
 +		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
 +			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
 +			return (ctx->major);
 +		}
- 
--	gss_buffer_desc ename;
++
 +		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
 +		    new_name, &equal);
 +
@@ -1077,7 +1076,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  	client->mech = NULL;
  
-@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -293,6 +360,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	if (client->mech == NULL)
  		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
  
@@ -1091,7 +1090,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
  	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -310,6 +384,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		return (ctx->major);
  	}
  
@@ -1100,7 +1099,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
  	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
  	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -320,11 +396,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  void
  ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
  {
@@ -1126,7 +1125,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	}
  }
  
-@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+@@ -357,19 +442,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
  
  /* Privileged */
  int
@@ -1153,7 +1152,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -382,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -383,14 +472,85 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
  	return (0);
  }
  
@@ -1196,7 +1195,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
 +		return;
 +
-+	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
 +
 +	if (!ok)
 +		return;
@@ -1208,11 +1207,6 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
 +	 */
 +#ifdef USE_PAM	
-+	if (!use_privsep) {
-+		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
 +	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
 + 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
 +	if (ret)
@@ -1250,28 +1244,22 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  }
  
  /* Privileged */
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -57,11 +57,16 @@
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "monitor.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
- 
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index ec840c1f..6c0b7c2b 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +#endif
 +
- /* prototype */
- static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
- static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-@@ -115,15 +120,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ struct kexalg {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	u_int type;
+@@ -89,15 +93,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
  #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
  	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
  };
@@ -1303,7 +1291,7 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
  		if (ret != NULL)
  			ret[rlen++] = sep;
  		nlen = strlen(k->name);
-@@ -138,6 +156,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -112,6 +129,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -1322,7 +1310,7 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
  static const struct kexalg *
  kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
  {
-@@ -147,6 +177,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+@@ -121,6 +150,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
  		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
  			return k;
  	}
@@ -1333,10 +1321,11 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
  	return NULL;
  }
  
-@@ -315,6 +349,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
+@@ -334,3 +367,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
+ 	free(ret);
  	return r;
  }
- 
++ 
 +/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
 +int
 +kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names)
@@ -1359,28 +1348,83 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +	free(s);
 +	return 1;
 +}
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 6b957e5e..19a56e8e 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -297,17 +297,37 @@ static int
+ kex_compose_ext_info_server(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+ 	int r;
++	int have_key = 0;
++	int ext_count = 2;
 +
- /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
- int
- kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
-@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	/*
++	 * Currently GSS KEX don't provide host keys as optional message, so
++	 * no reasons to announce the publickey-hostbound extension
++	 */
++	if (ssh->kex->gss == NULL)
++	    have_key = 1;
++#endif
++	ext_count += have_key;
++
+ 
+ 	if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL &&
+ 	    (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 3)) != 0 ||
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ext_count)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+-	    "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0) {
++		error_fr(r, "compose");
++		return r;
++	}
++	if (have_key) {
++	    if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
++		    error_fr(r, "compose");
++		    return r;
++		}
++	}
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
+ 		error_fr(r, "compose");
+ 		return r;
+@@ -737,6 +757,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
  	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	free(kex->gss_host);
 +#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
+ 	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
  	free(kex->failed_choice);
- 	free(kex->hostkey_alg);
- 	free(kex->name);
 diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
+index d08988b3..0e080ea3 100644
 --- a/kex.h
 +++ b/kex.h
-@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
- 	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
+ #include "mac.h"
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++# include "ssh-gss.h" /* Gssctxt */
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -103,6 +107,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
  	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
  	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
+ 	KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256,
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
@@ -1393,11 +1437,12 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	KEX_MAX
  };
  
-@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex {
+@@ -165,6 +178,13 @@ struct kex {
  	u_int	flags;
  	int	hash_alg;
  	int	ec_nid;
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
++	Gssctxt *gss;
 +	int	gss_deleg_creds;
 +	int	gss_trust_dns;
 +	char    *gss_host;
@@ -1406,18 +1451,18 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	char	*failed_choice;
  	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
  	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
-@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex {
- 
+@@ -191,8 +211,10 @@ int	 kex_hash_from_name(const char *);
+ int	 kex_nid_from_name(const char *);
  int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
  char	*kex_alg_list(char);
 +char	*kex_gss_alg_list(char);
  char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
- int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
+ int	 kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *);
 +int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
- 
- int	 kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- 
-@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+ int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
+ void	 kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+     const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+@@ -226,6 +248,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
@@ -1430,7 +1475,7 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  
  int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
  int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
-@@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
+@@ -264,6 +292,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
      const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
      u_char *, size_t *);
  
@@ -1444,10 +1489,10 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
 diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
-index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
+index c1084f21..0faab21b 100644
 --- a/kexdh.c
 +++ b/kexdh.c
-@@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
+@@ -49,13 +49,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
  {
  	switch (kex->kex_type) {
  	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
@@ -1472,7 +1517,7 @@ index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
  		break;
  	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
 diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
-index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
+index 40d688d6..15df591c 100644
 --- a/kexgen.c
 +++ b/kexgen.c
 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
@@ -1486,10 +1531,10 @@ index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
      const struct sshbuf *client_version,
 diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..f6e1405e
+index 00000000..96f7b6f5
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -1539,38 +1584,206 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +
++static int input_kexgss_hostkey(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++
++static int
++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	int r;
++
++	/*
++	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++	 * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok
++	 */
++
++	/* compute shared secret */
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
++		r = kex_dh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
++		if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)] & 0x80)
++			fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!");
++		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
++		if (sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob) != 65)
++			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match "
++			      "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)",
++			      sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob));
++
++		if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
++			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04");
++
++		r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	default:
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		break;
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version,
++			 kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer,
++			 (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty),
++			 kex->client_pub, gss->server_blob, shared_secret,
++			 hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
++
++	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
++		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
++
++	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++
++	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
++		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob);
++		gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL;
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob);
++		gss->server_blob = NULL;
++	}
++out:
++	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
++	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
++	kex->client_pub = NULL;
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++kexgss_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++	gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds,
++					 token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		/* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++	}
++
++	/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++	if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr);
++
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++			fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++		/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++			fatal("Integrity check failed");
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++	 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++	 */
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		if (gss->first) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++			gss->first = 0;
++		} else {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok);
++
++		/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgss_complete);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* No data, and not complete */
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr);
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh);
++}
++
 +int
 +kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
-+	u_char *msg;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	int first = 1;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	u_char c;
 +	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
 +
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host))
 +		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
 +
 +	if (kex->gss_client &&
-+	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client))
 +		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
 +
 +	/* Step 1 */
@@ -1590,511 +1803,450 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	default:
 +		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +	}
-+	if (r != 0)
++	if (r != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		return r;
++	}
++	return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
++}
 +
-+	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++static int
++input_kexgss_hostkey(int type,
++		     u_int32_t seq,
++		     struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	u_char *tmp = NULL;
++	size_t tmp_len = 0;
++	int r;
 +
-+	do {
-+		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++	debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++	if (gss->server_host_key_blob)
++		fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if ((gss->server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
++		fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
++	return 0;
++}
 +
-+		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+		    &ret_flags);
++static int
++input_kexgss_continue(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int r;
 +
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+			/* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
-+			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
-+				        SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+		}
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
 +
-+		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if  (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
++		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++	return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++}
 +
-+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++static int
++input_kexgss_complete(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	u_char c;
++	int r;
 +
-+			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+		}
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
 +
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+		 */
-+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+			if (first) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0)
-+					fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				first = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++	if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL)
++	        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+			do {
-+				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+					if (server_host_key_blob)
-+						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
-+						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				}
-+			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++	/* Is there a token included? */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (c) {
++		if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++	} else {
++		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
 +
-+			switch (type) {
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+				if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+				if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
-+				        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &msg_tok)) != 0)
-+					fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
 +
-+				/* Is there a token included? */
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				if (c) {
-+					if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
-+					    ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
-+						fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+				} else {
-+					/* No token included */
-+					if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+				}
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
-+					fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
-+				}
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+				debug("Received Error");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
-+			default:
-+				sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+				    type);
-+			}
-+			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+		} else {
-+			/* No data, and not complete */
-+			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++	return kexgss_final(ssh);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgss_error(int type,
++		   u_int32_t seq,
++		   struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	u_char *msg;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Received Error");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->major)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->minor)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*******************************************************/
++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/
++/*******************************************************/
++
++int
++kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	int r;
++
++	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host))
++		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++	if (kex->gss_client &&
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client))
++		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++	debug("Doing group exchange");
++	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++	kex->nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
++
++	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, &input_kexgssgex_group);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
 +	 * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok
 +	 */
 +
-+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+	/* compute shared secret */
-+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
-+		r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
-+		if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80)
-+			fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!");
-+		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
-+		if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65)
-+			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match"
-+			    "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob));
-+
-+		if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
-+			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04");
-+
-+		r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+	if (r != 0)
++	/* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */
++	/* 8. C computes shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		goto out;
++	}
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	buf = NULL;
 +
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
-+	    kex->client_pub,
-+	    server_blob,
-+	    shared_secret,
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
 +
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version,
++			kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer,
++			(gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty),
++			kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, pub_key,
++			dh_server_pub, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
++			hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
 +
 +	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
 +
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
 +
 +	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss);
 +
 +	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
 +	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +
++	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 +
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob);
++		gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL;
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob);
++		gss->server_blob = NULL;
++	}
 +out:
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	DH_free(kex->dh);
++	kex->dh = NULL;
++	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
 +	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
-+	kex->client_pub = NULL;
 +	return r;
 +}
 +
-+int
-+kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
++static int
++kexgssgex_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		   gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf,
-+            msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+	u_char *msg;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	int first = 1;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
-+	u_char c;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags;
 +	int r;
 +
-+	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++	/* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */
++	debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
 +
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++	gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds,
++					 token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
 +
-+	if (kex->gss_client &&
-+	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		/* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++	}
 +
-+	debug("Doing group exchange");
-+	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
++	/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++	if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr);
 +
-+	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	kex->nbits = nbits;
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++			fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
 +
-+	if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++			fatal("Integrity check failed");
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++	 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++	 */
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		if (gss->first) {
++	                DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++			gss->first = 0;
++		} else {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok);
++
++		/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgssgex_complete);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* No data, and not complete */
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr);
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_group(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Received SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, NULL);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++	if (BN_num_bits(p) < kex->min || BN_num_bits(p) > kex->max)
 +		fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+		    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++		    kex->min, BN_num_bits(p), kex->max);
 +
 +	if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL)
 +		fatal("dn_new_group() failed");
 +	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 +
-+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
-+
-+	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+	do {
-+		/* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */
-+		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+		    &ret_flags);
-+
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+			/* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
-+			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
-+				        SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
-+
-+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+		 */
-+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+			if (first) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				first = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+			do {
-+				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+					if (server_host_key_blob)
-+						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
-+						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				}
-+			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+			switch (type) {
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+				if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+				if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
-+				        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &msg_tok)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+				/* Is there a token included? */
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				if (c) {
-+					if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
-+					        ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+					    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+				} else {
-+					/* No token included */
-+					if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+				}
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+				debug("Received Error");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
-+			default:
-+				sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+				    type);
-+			}
-+			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+		} else {
-+			/* No data, and not complete */
-+			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+	 * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+	/* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */
-+	/* 8. C computes shared secret */
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	buf = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
++	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		DH_free(kex->dh);
++		kex->dh = NULL;
++		return r;
 +	}
 +
-+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
-+ 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
-+	    dh_p, dh_g,
-+	    pub_key,
-+	    dh_server_pub,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
-+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
-+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	DH_free(kex->dh);
-+	kex->dh = NULL;
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
-+	return r;
++	return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
 +}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
++
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if  (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
++		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++	return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_complete(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	u_char c;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
++
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++	if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL)
++	        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	/* Is there a token included? */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (c) {
++		if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++	} else {
++		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh);
++}
++
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
 diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..60bc02de
+index 00000000..8362081e
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -2147,33 +2299,18 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +
++static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++
 +int
 +kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+	 */
-+
-+	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
-+	int type = 0;
 +	gss_OID oid;
 +	char *mechs;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
 +
@@ -2189,127 +2326,94 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++		fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
-+	do {
-+		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
-+		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+		switch(type) {
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (client_pubkey != NULL)
-+				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (kex->gss == NULL)
++		fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context");
 +
-+			switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
-+				r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
-+				r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
-+				r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
-+			}
-+			if (r != 0)
-+				goto out;
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgss_init);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue);
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
++	return 0;
++}
 +
-+			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+			break;
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
-+			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+			    type);
-+		}
++static inline void
++kexgss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		  gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
++		  gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		  OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	int r;
 +
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++	gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok);
 +
-+		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0)
++		fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
 +
-+		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++	if (gss->buf.value == NULL)
++		fatal("No client public key");
 +
-+		if (client_pubkey == NULL)
-+			fatal("No client public key");
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	}
++}
 +
-+		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++static inline int
++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh,
++	     gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++	     OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		if (send_tok->length > 0) {
 +			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 +				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +		}
 +		fatal("accept_ctx died");
 +	}
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    empty,
-+	    client_pubkey,
-+	    server_pubkey,
-+	    shared_secret,
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok)))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, gss->server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++	if (send_tok->length != 0) {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0)
 +			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	} else {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
@@ -2318,13 +2422,19 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok);
++
++	hashlen = gss->hashlen;
++	memcpy(hash, gss->hash, hashlen);
++	explicit_bzero(gss->hash, sizeof(gss->hash));
++	shared_secret = gss->shared_secret;
++	gss->shared_secret = NULL;
 +
 +	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
 +	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
@@ -2333,44 +2443,126 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 * just exchanged.  */
 +	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
 +		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_pubkey);
++		gss->server_pubkey = NULL;
++	}
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
 +	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_pubkey);
 +	return r;
 +}
 +
++static int
++input_kexgss_init(int type,
++		  u_int32_t seq,
++		  struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *empty;
++	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
++		r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
++		r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
++		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return r;
++	}
++
++	/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
++	 * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
++	 * buffer state->incoming_packet
++	 */
++	gss->hashlen = sizeof(gss->hash);
++	r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version,
++			 kex->peer, kex->my, empty, client_pubkey, gss->server_pubkey,
++			 gss->shared_secret, gss->hash, &gss->hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return r;
++	}
++
++	gss->buf.value = gss->hash;
++	gss->buf.length = gss->hashlen;
++
++	kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgss_continue(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++/*******************************************************/
++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/
++/*******************************************************/
++
 +int
 +kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+	 */
-+
-+	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	int type = 0;
 +	gss_OID oid;
 +	char *mechs;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+	int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
-+	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
 +
@@ -2378,29 +2570,194 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
 +	 * into life
 +	 */
-+	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+			free(mechs);
++	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
++		mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		free(mechs);
++	}
 +
 +	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++		fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
-+	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (kex->gss == NULL)
++		fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context");
++
 +	debug("Doing group exchange");
-+	ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, &input_kexgssgex_groupreq);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static inline void
++kexgssgex_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		     gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
++		     gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		     OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	int r;
++
++	gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok);
++
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0)
++		fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++	if (gss->dh_client_pub == NULL)
++		fatal("No client public key");
++
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	}
++}
++
++static inline int
++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh,
++		gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		if (send_tok->length > 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	}
++
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++	/* calculate shared secret */
++	shared_secret = sshbuf_new();
++	if (shared_secret == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, gss->dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version,
++			kex->peer, kex->my, empty, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g,
++			gss->dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret),
++			sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok)))
++		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	if (send_tok->length != 0) {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	} else {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++
++	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
++	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
++		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++	 * just exchanged.  */
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL)
++		BN_clear_free(gss->dh_client_pub);
++
++out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	DH_free(kex->dh);
++	kex->dh = NULL;
++	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++	int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
++	int r;
++
++	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, NULL);
++
 +	/* store client proposal to provide valid signature */
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
 +	kex->nbits = nbits;
 +	kex->min = cmin;
 +	kex->max = cmax;
@@ -2408,10 +2765,11 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax);
 +	nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
 +	nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
++
 +	if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+		    min, nbits, max);
-+	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", min, nbits, max);
++
++	kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
 +	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
 +		fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found");
@@ -2428,152 +2786,73 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
-+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	do {
-+		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+		switch(type) {
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+			break;
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
-+			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+			    type);
-+		}
-+
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
-+
-+		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+		if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+			fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+		}
-+		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		DH_free(kex->dh);
++		kex->dh = NULL;
++		return r;
 +	}
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+	/* calculate shared secret */
-+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    empty,
-+	    cmin, nbits, cmax,
-+	    dh_p, dh_g,
-+	    dh_client_pub,
-+	    pub_key,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
-+		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	} else {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
-+			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	}
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
-+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
-+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+
-+	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+	 * just exchanged.  */
-+	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	DH_free(kex->dh);
-+	kex->dh = NULL;
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	return r;
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgssgex_init);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue);
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
++	return 0;
 +}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_init(int type,
++		     u_int32_t seq,
++		     struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &gss->dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++	kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
 diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
+index 02b3eaaa..2ef16cc8 100644
 --- a/monitor.c
 +++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -2582,7 +2861,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+@@ -224,11 +226,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
@@ -2598,11 +2877,11 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
 +    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
 +#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_STATE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_state},
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
      {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- #endif
-@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- 	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+@@ -299,6 +308,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_STATE, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -2612,7 +2891,24 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
  	while (!authenticated) {
-@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -351,8 +364,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+ 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
+ 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+-			if (!partial && !authenticated)
++			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
++				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
++				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
++					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++#endif
+ 				authctxt->failures++;
++			}
+ 			if (authenticated || partial) {
+ 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+ 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+@@ -421,6 +441,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -2623,7 +2919,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
-@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -1890,6 +1914,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
  # endif
@@ -2641,7 +2937,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
-@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1981,8 +2016,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	u_char *p;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2652,7 +2948,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
-@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2014,8 +2049,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
  	int r;
  
@@ -2663,7 +2959,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
-@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2035,6 +2070,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
@@ -2671,7 +2967,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	}
  	return (0);
  }
-@@ -1871,8 +1900,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2046,8 +2082,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	OM_uint32 ret;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2682,7 +2978,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
-@@ -1898,13 +1927,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2073,13 +2109,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  int
  mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
@@ -2694,17 +2990,17 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 -		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
 +		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
- 
--	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0)
 +		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
+ 
+-	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
 +	authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
 +	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex);
  
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
-@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2088,7 +2128,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
  
@@ -2717,7 +3013,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
  		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2096,5 +2140,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2803,10 +3099,10 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
 diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
+index 9dcd9c29..dbc7e003 100644
 --- a/monitor.h
 +++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
  	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
  
@@ -2816,10 +3112,10 @@ index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
  
  struct ssh;
 diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
+index ef3ab1b1..b6e3b3f3 100644
 --- a/monitor_wrap.c
 +++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -993,13 +993,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+@@ -1131,13 +1131,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
  }
  
  int
@@ -2836,7 +3132,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-@@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -1150,6 +1152,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
  	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2894,11 +3190,13 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +}
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ /*
 diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
+index 38a280c8..672dce52 100644
 --- a/monitor_wrap.h
 +++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
     gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
@@ -2910,18 +3208,19 @@ index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
---- a/readconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.c	2021-08-27 12:25:42.556421509 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
- #include "uidswap.h"
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 7cbe7d2c..6c04ed43 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "version.h"
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
  
  /* Format of the configuration file:
  
-@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -165,6 +166,8 @@ typedef enum {
  	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
  	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
  	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
@@ -2930,7 +3229,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
  	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
  	oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -206,10 +209,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -212,10 +215,22 @@ static struct {
  	/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
  #if defined(GSSAPI)
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
@@ -2953,7 +3252,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-@@ -1113,10 +1128,42 @@ parse_time:
+@@ -1320,10 +1335,42 @@ parse_time:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -2996,7 +3295,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	case oBatchMode:
  		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2306,7 +2353,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2662,7 +2709,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
  	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
  	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication = -1;
@@ -3010,8 +3309,8 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -2463,8 +2516,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+@@ -2826,8 +2879,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
 +	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
@@ -3029,7 +3328,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -3246,7 +3309,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+@@ -3656,7 +3719,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
@@ -3044,9 +3343,10 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
-diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
---- a/readconf.h.gsskex	2021-08-27 12:05:29.248142431 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.h	2021-08-27 12:22:19.270679852 +0200
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index cd49139b..368523dd 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
 @@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
  	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
@@ -3061,18 +3361,19 @@ diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
  	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
---- a/servconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c	2021-08-27 12:28:15.887735189 +0200
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
- #include "auth.h"
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index f7bc9237..d4f7fd66 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "version.h"
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
  
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-     const char *, int);
-@@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+ # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		"sshd"
+@@ -138,8 +139,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
@@ -3084,7 +3385,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -356,10 +360,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -380,10 +384,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3103,15 +3404,15 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -506,6 +518,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+@@ -568,6 +580,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -587,12 +600,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -653,12 +666,22 @@ static struct {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -3134,7 +3435,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
-@@ -1576,6 +1599,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1649,6 +1672,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3145,7 +3446,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sGssCleanupCreds:
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1584,6 +1611,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1657,6 +1684,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3168,7 +3469,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2892,6 +2935,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3254,6 +3297,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
@@ -3180,10 +3481,10 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
 diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
+index 9beb90fa..c3f50140 100644
 --- a/servconf.h
 +++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -150,8 +150,11 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
@@ -3196,10 +3497,10 @@ index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
 diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
+index e4657cef..cbfbcee8 100644
 --- a/session.c
 +++ b/session.c
-@@ -2678,13 +2678,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -2670,13 +2670,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  
  #ifdef KRB5
  	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
@@ -3222,18 +3523,10 @@ index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
  
  	/* remove agent socket */
 diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
+index 7b14e74a..8ec45192 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@
+@@ -61,10 +61,36 @@
  
  #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
  
@@ -3259,6 +3552,8 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 +	KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
 +	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
++
++#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
 +
  typedef struct {
  	char *filename;
@@ -3268,7 +3563,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  	void *data;
  } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
  
-@@ -72,8 +92,11 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -72,8 +98,11 @@ typedef struct {
  	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
  	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
  	gss_cred_id_t creds;
@@ -3280,7 +3575,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  } ssh_gssapi_client;
  
  typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +107,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
  	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
  	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
  	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
@@ -3288,12 +3583,22 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  } ssh_gssapi_mech;
  
  typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +118,11 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +124,21 @@ typedef struct {
  	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
  	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
  	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
 -	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
 +	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret; /* both */
++	struct sshbuf *server_pubkey; /* server */
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob; /* client */
++	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob; /* client */
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; /* client */
++	gss_buffer_desc buf; /* both */
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; /* both */
++	size_t hashlen; /* both */
++	int first; /* client */
++	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub; /* server (gex) */
  } Gssctxt;
  
  extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
@@ -3301,7 +3606,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  
  int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
+@@ -108,6 +149,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
  
  struct sshbuf;
  int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
@@ -3309,7 +3614,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
-@@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+@@ -122,17 +164,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
      const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
@@ -3346,24 +3651,26 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  
  #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
 diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
+index db92ac9a..6a9fbdc5 100644
 --- a/ssh.1
 +++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -503,7 +503,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It GatewayPorts
- .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+@@ -539,9 +539,15 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It ForwardX11Timeout
+ .It ForwardX11Trusted
  .It GSSAPIAuthentication
 +.It GSSAPIKeyExchange
 +.It GSSAPIClientIdentity
  .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ .It GatewayPorts
+ .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
 +.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
 +.It GSSAPIServerIdentity
 +.It GSSAPITrustDns
  .It HashKnownHosts
  .It Host
- .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
-@@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag),
+ .It HostKeyAlgorithms
+@@ -636,6 +642,8 @@ flag),
  (supported message integrity codes),
  .Ar kex
  (key exchange algorithms),
@@ -3371,12 +3678,12 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
 +(GSSAPI key exchange algorithms),
  .Ar key
  (key types),
- .Ar key-cert
+ .Ar key-ca-sign
 diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
+index dc4886d0..c23d3b9e 100644
 --- a/ssh.c
 +++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -835,6 +835,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
  			    strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
  				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
@@ -3385,7 +3692,7 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
  				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
-@@ -772,8 +774,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -865,8 +867,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
  				cp = xstrdup(
  				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
@@ -3397,7 +3704,7 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
  			if (cp == NULL)
  				fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
 diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
+index 18169187..209248d6 100644
 --- a/ssh_config
 +++ b/ssh_config
 @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
@@ -3407,13 +3714,13 @@ index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
 +#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
 +#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
  #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   CheckHostIP no
  #   AddressFamily any
 diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
+index 894d7383..3a8e246c 100644
 --- a/ssh_config.5
 +++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -766,10 +766,68 @@ The default is
+@@ -976,10 +976,68 @@ The default is
  Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
@@ -3483,20 +3790,11 @@ index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
 diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
+index 1ee6000a..0af15bcc 100644
 --- a/sshconnect2.c
 +++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
- #endif
- 
- /* import */
--extern char *client_version_string;
--extern char *server_version_string;
- extern Options options;
- 
- /*
-@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	char *s, *all_key;
+@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3507,9 +3805,9 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	xxx_host = host;
  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
  	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
-@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- 	}
+@@ -255,6 +260,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+ 	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -3547,10 +3845,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +#endif
 +
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- 		    options.rekey_interval);
-@@ -224,16 +256,46 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 	free(hkalgs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+@@ -271,15 +312,45 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
  # endif
@@ -3568,7 +3866,8 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
-	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
  	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3581,10 +3880,8 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +#endif
 +
  	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
+ 	kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
  
- 	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@@ -3595,10 +3892,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		free(gss);
 +	}
 +#endif
- 	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
- 
-@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+@@ -369,6 +440,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -3606,7 +3903,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif
  
  void	userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
-@@ -346,6 +409,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+@@ -385,6 +457,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
  
  Authmethod authmethods[] = {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -3618,7 +3915,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	{"gssapi-with-mic",
  		userauth_gssapi,
  		userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
-@@ -716,12 +784,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -759,12 +836,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  	OM_uint32 min;
  	int r, ok = 0;
  	gss_OID mech = NULL;
@@ -3652,7 +3949,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  
  	/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
  	while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
-@@ -730,13 +811,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -773,13 +870,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
  		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
  		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
@@ -3669,7 +3966,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	if (!ok || mech == NULL)
  		return 0;
  
-@@ -976,6 +1059,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1013,6 +1112,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	free(lang);
  	return r;
  }
@@ -3725,34 +4022,13 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
  static int
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	}
- 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
- 	if (nkeys == 0)
--		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
--	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
-+	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- }
-@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		free(fp);
- 	}
- 	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
--	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
-+	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
-+	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
- 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
-@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index f957dc22..d51e4636 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -844,6 +844,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	{
@@ -3777,7 +4053,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +	if (gss && orig)
 +		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 +	else if (gss)
-+		newstr = gss;
++		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
 +	else if (orig)
 +		newstr = orig;
 +
@@ -3787,7 +4063,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +	 * host key algorithm we support
 +	 */
 +	if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = xstrdup("null");
 +
 +	if (newstr)
 +		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
@@ -3799,11 +4075,10 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
  		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
-@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -861,6 +903,17 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
- # endif
--#endif
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 +# ifdef GSSAPI
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 +		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
@@ -3815,15 +4090,55 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
 +	}
 +# endif
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a70b36c9..f8c8a797 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -616,8 +616,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
+ 	if (nkeys == 0)
+-		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
+-	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
++	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ }
+@@ -1159,8 +1159,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (!have_key)
+-		fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys");
++	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
++	if (!have_key && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys and GSS KEX is not configured");
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+ 	new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 4a93e29e..c9ea8e38 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1676,7 +1676,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	}
+ 	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
+-	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
++	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
++	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
+ 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
 diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
+index 48af6321..8db9f0fb 100644
 --- a/sshd_config
 +++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # GSSAPI options
  #GSSAPIAuthentication no
  #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
@@ -3833,10 +4148,10 @@ index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
 diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
+index 035a50c8..8bc6586e 100644
 --- a/sshd_config.5
 +++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+@@ -739,6 +739,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3848,7 +4163,7 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
  .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
  Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
  a client authenticates against.
-@@ -660,6 +665,32 @@ machine's default store.
+@@ -753,6 +758,32 @@ machine's default store.
  This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3882,31 +4197,107 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
  authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
+index ab80752b..4e41a78c 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
 +++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
- 	    KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+	{ "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+@@ -129,6 +129,75 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl;
+ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
+ #endif
+ 
++static int ssh_gss_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
++	enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_public(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_private(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++	    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int,
++	    struct sshkey_sig_details **)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_gss_funcs = {
++	/* .size = */		NULL,
++	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
++	/* .cleanup = */	NULL,
++	/* .equal = */		ssh_gss_equal,
++	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_gss_serialize_public,
++	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_public,
++	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_gss_serialize_private,
++	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_private,
++	/* .generate = */	NULL,
++	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_gss_copy_public,
++	/* .sign = */		NULL,
++	/* .verify = */		ssh_gss_verify,
++};
++
++/* The struct is intentionally dummy and has no gss calls */
++static const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_gss_kex_impl = {
++	/* .name = */		"null",
++	/* .shortname = */	"null",
++	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
++	/* .type = */		KEY_NULL,
++	/* .nid = */		0,
++	/* .cert = */		0,
++	/* .sigonly = */	0,
++	/* .keybits = */	0, /* FIXME */
++	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_gss_funcs,
++};
++
+ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
+ 	&sshkey_ed25519_impl,
+ 	&sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl,
+@@ -167,6 +236,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
+ 	&sshkey_xmss_impl,
+ 	&sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
+ #endif
++	&sshkey_gss_kex_impl,
+ 	NULL
  };
  
-@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
- 	const struct keytype *kt;
+@@ -336,7 +406,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
  
- 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
--		if (kt->name == NULL)
-+		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+-		if (impl->name == NULL)
++		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
  			continue;
- 		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
 diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
+index 19bbbac7..4a318d05 100644
 --- a/sshkey.h
 +++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
  	KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
@@ -3914,3 +4305,6 @@ index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
  	KEY_UNSPEC
  };
  
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch b/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
similarity index 88%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
rename to 0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
index 90f8322..74643b5 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+++ b/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
+From f5e5ee321def2a3674600714ad98fd1ca9b2cff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/50] openssh-6.6p1-force_krb
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ session.c       |  23 +++++++
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 ++
+ sshd.8          |   7 +++
+ 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 413b845..54dd383 100644
+index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
@@ -12,7 +24,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
+@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@
  
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
@@ -20,7 +32,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  extern ServerOptions options;
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+@@ -55,6 +58,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
  # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
  #endif
  
@@ -34,7 +46,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	int retval;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -42,7 +54,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  
  	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
  		return 0;
-@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -98,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		return 0;
  	}
@@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  
-@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -109,6 +132,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	return retval;
  }
  
@@ -205,10 +217,10 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
 diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
+index cbfbcee8..89b3a9cf 100644
 --- a/session.c
 +++ b/session.c
-@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -680,6 +680,29 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		command = auth_opts->force_command;
  		forced = "(key-option)";
  	}
@@ -239,7 +251,7 @@ index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
  	if (forced != NULL) {
  		s->forced = 1;
 diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 0374c88..509109a 100644
+index 8ec45192..db34d77f 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
 @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
@@ -254,10 +266,10 @@ index 0374c88..509109a 100644
  
  /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
+index 2aa73271..049d0a94 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
  The client tries to authenticate itself using
  host-based authentication,
  public key authentication,
@@ -265,7 +277,7 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  challenge-response authentication,
  or password authentication.
  .Pp
-@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+@@ -874,6 +875,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
  but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
  rlogin/rsh.
  .Pp
@@ -278,3 +290,6 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
  and authentication information.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch b/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
similarity index 77%
rename from openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
rename to 0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
index c130022..1d21839 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
+From 5fca5946aa97dce23c6824c52b070a92532752a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 14/50] openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ auth.h          |   3 +-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  42 +++-----
+ gss-serv.c      |  10 +-
+ servconf.c      |  12 ++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ session.c       |   5 +-
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 +-
+ sshd-session.c  |   2 +-
+ sshd_config.5   |   8 ++
+ 10 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index c99e4e43..77714e3d 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  #endif
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	char *client, *platform_client;
  	const char *errmsg;
  
-@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  		goto out;
  	}
  
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
-@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  		goto out;
  #endif
  
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
  
-@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  void
  krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
@@ -126,12 +125,29 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
  		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
  		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,189 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	}
  }
  
 -#ifndef HEIMDAL
-+
+-krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
+-	mode_t old_umask;
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
 +#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
 +int
 +ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
@@ -149,7 +165,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +	old = *dsc;
 +
 +	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
++	if (i == -1) {
++		*dsc = old;
 +		free(src);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
@@ -196,8 +213,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
-+	}
-+
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
 +	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
 +		goto cleanup;
 +
@@ -232,29 +250,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
++krb5_error_code
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
- 	mode_t old_umask;
++	mode_t old_umask;
 +	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
- 
--	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
--	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
--		return ENOMEM;
--
--	old_umask = umask(0177);
--	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
--	oerrno = errno;
--	umask(old_umask);
--	if (tmpfd == -1) {
--		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
--		return oerrno;
--	}
++
 +	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
@@ -269,8 +271,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
 +		if (ret < 0)
 +			return ENOMEM;
- 
--	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++
 +		old_umask = umask(0177);
 +		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
  		oerrno = errno;
@@ -337,42 +338,32 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  }
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- }
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 83d07ae8..10e88e11 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
  
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
+@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
- 	char *envstr;
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
  #endif
  
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 14502c5a..df55512d 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
  
@@ -381,7 +372,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  {
  	krb5_ccache ccache;
-@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
  	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -399,7 +390,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
  # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
  # endif
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -418,7 +409,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
  
-@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
  		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -427,7 +418,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  
  	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
-@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -436,7 +427,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  
  	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	    client->creds, ccache))) {
  		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -474,7 +465,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
  #endif
  
-@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  
  	client->store.data = krb_context;
  
@@ -483,10 +474,44 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  }
  
  int
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index a5cca797..9d5435ed 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -414,13 +414,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -500,9 +502,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index d4f7fd66..55aa5bf0 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -494,7 +519,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -382,6 +383,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
  	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@@ -503,17 +528,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
-	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
-	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
+@@ -564,7 +567,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -655,11 +658,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -527,7 +551,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1668,6 +1673,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -538,7 +562,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3293,6 +3302,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # ifdef USE_AFS
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
@@ -546,10 +570,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c3f50140..a4a38d6d 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@@ -558,10 +583,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 89b3a9cf..2620dd11 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
  	 * the child's environment as they see fit
  	 */
@@ -571,7 +597,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  #endif
  
  	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+@@ -1101,7 +1102,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -580,10 +606,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index db34d77f..a894e23c 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index f8c8a797..478381db 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
  		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@@ -592,10 +641,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
-@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 8bc6586e..1251d4d5 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1033,6 +1033,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
  file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -608,26 +658,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch b/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
similarity index 74%
rename from openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
rename to 0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
index 80e7678..5e980c8 100644
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@
+From 25540939422660b024b8832f67eab82267aa8df6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 15/50] openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ auth.h          |  2 ++
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.8          |  4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
+index 77714e3d..74f56d47 100644
 --- a/auth-krb5.c
 +++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
+@@ -465,5 +465,21 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
  		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
  	}
  }
@@ -25,10 +37,10 @@ index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
+index 10e88e11..39163035 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
  #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
  krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
@@ -38,10 +50,10 @@ index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
  
  #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
+index df55512d..820f794c 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+@@ -144,8 +144,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
  {
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
@@ -71,10 +83,10 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
+index 049d0a94..6784286d 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
  These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
  Further details are described in
  .Xr ksu 1 .
@@ -85,3 +97,6 @@ index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
  .Pp
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
similarity index 78%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
rename to 0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
index 1831f27..3724b8d 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,22 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
+From bac7a9d1a654c8c2e0c71f979195e300b25d6232 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/50] openssh-6.6p1-kuserok
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     |  20 ++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ servconf.c      |  13 +++++-
+ servconf.h      |   1 +
+ sshd_config     |   1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |   5 +++
+ 6 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 74f56d47..bae153c9 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,21 @@
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
@@ -23,7 +38,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
  static int
  krb5_init(void *context)
  {
-@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -158,8 +173,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
@@ -35,10 +50,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
  		problem = -1;
  		goto out;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 820f794c..187faf92 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
      int);
  
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
@@ -46,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
  
-@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+@@ -91,6 +92,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
   * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
   */
  
@@ -150,17 +166,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  static int
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  {
-@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -115,7 +213,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
  	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
  	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
++	if (k5login_exists &&
++	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
  		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
  	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
@@ -172,18 +188,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
  		int saved_errno = errno;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
-@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 55aa5bf0..5dd5ca21 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -399,6 +400,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
  		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
  #endif
@@ -192,16 +209,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
-	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
-	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
+@@ -567,7 +570,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -659,12 +662,14 @@ static struct {
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
  	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -216,18 +233,18 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
-		}
-		break;
-
+@@ -2441,6 +2446,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
-	case sMatch:
-		if (cmdline)
-			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2995,6 +3004,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
@@ -235,18 +252,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3303,6 +3313,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
 +	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index a4a38d6d..11de36a2 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
  						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
@@ -254,10 +272,23 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
-@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 8db9f0fb..ea5a878e 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 1251d4d5..0fcb409a 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,10 @@ The default value
  .Cm no
  can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
  user account.
@@ -266,9 +297,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+@@ -1355,6 +1359,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm IPQoS ,
  .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
  .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
@@ -276,14 +307,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
  .Cm LogLevel ,
  .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
  .Cm MaxSessions ,
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch b/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e8309d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 20aabb2c445e29d211266ce7434bb0273edf88b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 17/50] openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote
+
+---
+ scp.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 57c242ff..716ae386 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1162,7 +1162,10 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
++			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
++				addargs(&alist, "-t");
++			else
++				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
similarity index 67%
rename from openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
rename to 0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
index fa9d591..49f2119 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@
+From 6481ac7fbd0027a7038560e0f51dd0af056cc229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 18/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
+index 8c5fc1fe..646f0887 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
  #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
  #include "servconf.h"
  #include "port-linux.h"
@@ -10,7 +22,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  #include "sshkey.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
  #include "auth.h"
-@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -450,7 +451,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  void
  sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
  {
@@ -19,7 +31,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  
  	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
  		return;
-@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+@@ -469,6 +470,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
  	}
  }
  
@@ -93,24 +105,23 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  #endif
  
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
+index 7426f6f7..9a6b1d6e 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
--	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
- 	    oldctx, newctx);
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
+ 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
  	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
-		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+ 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+ 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
+index 1b745a76..7f8ba200 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
  void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
  void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
  int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
@@ -118,16 +129,19 @@ index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index d51e4636..e4a8edfd 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
+ 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
+ #endif
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
 +	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
  #endif
  
  	/* Demote the child */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
similarity index 54%
rename from openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
rename to 0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
index 426c172..3b30f98 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
+From 825018f5f2d892655f3d63167a0d1f3391cec678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 19/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot
+
+---
+ log.c              | 11 +++++++++--
+ log.h              |  1 +
+ monitor.c          | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h          |  2 +-
+ session.c          | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ sftp-server-main.c |  2 +-
+ sftp-server.c      |  6 +++---
+ sftp.h             |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c     |  7 ++++++-
+ 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index 6617f267..9782cfb0 100644
+--- a/log.c
++++ b/log.c
+@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ void
  log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
      int on_stderr)
  {
@@ -13,7 +31,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
-@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
+@@ -208,8 +213,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
  		exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -26,9 +44,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
  
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
+diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
+index 8e8dfc23..70048a8a 100644
+--- a/log.h
++++ b/log.h
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
  typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
@@ -37,43 +56,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
-@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
- 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
-+
- 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
- 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
- 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
- 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
-+
- 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
- 	/* Log it */
- 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
--	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- 	free(msg);
-@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
- 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
- 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
- 
-+	mon->m_state = "";
-+
- 	return mon;
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 2ef16cc8..43c10a4e 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -2001,9 +2001,22 @@ monitor_init(void)
  }
  
  void
@@ -98,14 +85,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
- 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
- 	pid_t			 m_pid;
-+	char		*m_state;
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index dbc7e003..d4d631dd 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct monitor {
  };
  
  struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
@@ -114,10 +98,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
  
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 2620dd11..54da09d5 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
@@ -125,7 +110,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
  static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -670,6 +671,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	int ret;
  	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
  	char session_type[1024];
@@ -133,7 +118,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
  		original_command = command;
-@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -729,6 +731,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  			tty += 5;
  	}
  
@@ -144,7 +129,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    session_type,
  	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1512,14 +1518,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
@@ -159,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1652,8 +1650,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  			exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -168,7 +153,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
  
  	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1678,9 +1674,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		argv[i] = NULL;
  		optind = optreset = 1;
  		__progname = argv[0];
@@ -187,29 +172,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	fflush(NULL);
  
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
+index 2c70f89b..bbb79f27 100644
+--- a/sftp-server-main.c
++++ b/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
  
- struct passwd;
- 
--int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index a4abb9f7..4985da38 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
  int
 -sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
  {
- 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
- 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+ 	ssize_t len, olen;
+@@ -1913,7 +1913,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
  	extern char *__progname;
  
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
@@ -218,7 +205,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
-@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -227,21 +214,23 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	/*
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
+diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
+index 2bde8bb7..ddf1a396 100644
+--- a/sftp.h
++++ b/sftp.h
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
--	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 	}
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 478381db..9342e416 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #endif
  
  	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
@@ -249,7 +238,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
  	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+@@ -456,6 +456,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  
  	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
@@ -261,3 +250,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
  	demote_sensitive_data();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch b/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94c43ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 007ee98fa9100f7241985ac2a7eed71e17d89a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 20/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 716ae386..9554b188 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1876,6 +1876,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
++			errno = ENOTDIR;
++			goto bad;
++		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
similarity index 62%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
rename to 0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
index cccb3e0..eeff02a 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,21 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
-@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+From 9c75c175e3555377328fc5fc9b06e94f129b7cd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/50] openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  3 +--
+ servconf.c      | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ servconf.h      |  1 +
+ sshd_config     |  1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |  6 ++++++
+ 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 187faf92..03188d9b 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  	FILE *fp;
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	char *line = NULL;
@@ -9,7 +23,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser
  	struct stat st;
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
  	int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -18,18 +32,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser
                  return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
                                          k5login_exists);
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
-@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5dd5ca21..c0de7110 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
  	options->use_kuserok = -1;
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  #endif
  	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
  		options->use_kuserok = 1;
@@ -38,16 +53,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+@@ -585,7 +588,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
  	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+@@ -681,6 +684,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -55,8 +70,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #else
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -689,6 +693,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -64,7 +78,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -2450,6 +2455,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -72,10 +86,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
-	case sMatch:
-		if (cmdline)
-			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -3005,6 +3014,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
@@ -83,7 +97,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3314,6 +3324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
@@ -91,21 +105,35 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
-@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
-	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 11de36a2..c08cf6a7 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
  	int	use_kuserok;
 +	int		enable_k5users;
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
-@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index ea5a878e..33713c88 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 0fcb409a..fe246fc2 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -739,6 +739,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -118,14 +146,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_conf
  .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
  doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch b/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e4766e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 05b09904f431333e19cd24528ef66d1fd15e9efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 22/50] openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output
+
+---
+ servconf.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index c0de7110..105e301d 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -3366,7 +3366,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch b/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
similarity index 72%
rename from openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
rename to 0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
index 1cfa309..1cdc0df 100644
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+From 34b196198018059bed294fa7a08e70606b4cbc36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 23/50] openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission
+
+---
+ sftp-server.8 |  7 +++++++
+ sftp-server.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+index 5311bf92..5e6e3aa4 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.8
++++ b/sftp-server.8
 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
  .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
@@ -22,10 +33,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
  .El
  .Pp
  On some systems,
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
  /* Version of client */
  static u_int version;
  
@@ -36,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
  static int init_done;
  
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -745,6 +749,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	Attrib a;
  	char *name;
  	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@@ -44,7 +56,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -754,6 +759,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
  	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
  	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@@ -55,7 +67,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
  	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
  	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -775,6 +784,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  			}
  		}
  	}
@@ -64,7 +76,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
  		send_status(id, status);
  	free(name);
-@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1894,7 +1905,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  	fprintf(stderr,
  	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
  	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
@@ -73,7 +85,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
  	    __progname, __progname);
  	exit(1);
-@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1918,7 +1929,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
  	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -82,7 +94,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'Q':
  			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1980,6 +1991,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
  				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
  			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
  			break;
@@ -98,3 +110,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  		case 'h':
  		default:
  			sftp_server_usage();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch b/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
similarity index 66%
rename from openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
rename to 0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
index 363538c..0214781 100644
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+++ b/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
@@ -1,21 +1,17 @@
-Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
-
-All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
-sshd process to handle a new client connection is
-spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
-without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
-files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
-closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
-
-Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+From 9bb31b63142adaaf949e20c2d86c97f9b787217b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 24/50] openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom
 
 ---
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index 49a4f35f..f6112458 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+@@ -140,7 +140,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
  	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
  	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
  		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
@@ -49,4 +45,6 @@ Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
  	}
  	(void) closedir(dirp);
  	return;
+-- 
+2.49.0
 
diff --git a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch b/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
similarity index 53%
rename from openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
rename to 0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
index c8a147b..68d679c 100644
--- a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
- 
- /* -- X11 forwarding */
--/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
--#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
-+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
-+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
- 
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
-@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+From 36e3430d1f81397d5f40600e075272a81f7effce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 25/50] openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays
+
+---
+ channels.c    |  9 ++++++---
+ channels.h    |  2 +-
+ servconf.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
+ servconf.h    |  2 ++
+ session.c     |  5 +++--
+ sshd_config.5 |  7 +++++++
+ 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index d46531ce..7438c1a5 100644
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -4996,7 +4996,7 @@ rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
   */
  int
  x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
@@ -21,8 +25,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
      u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
  {
  	Channel *nc = NULL;
-@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 	if (chanids == NULL)
+@@ -5009,8 +5009,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+ 	    x11_display_offset > UINT16_MAX - X11_BASE_PORT - MAX_DISPLAYS)
  		return -1;
  
 +	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
@@ -32,67 +36,35 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 -	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
 +	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
  	    display_number++) {
--		port = 6000 + display_number;
-+		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
-+		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
-+			break;
+ 		port = X11_BASE_PORT + display_number;
  		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -5065,7 +5068,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  		if (num_socks > 0)
  			break;
  	}
 -	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
-+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_BASE_PORT ) {
  		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
  		return -1;
  	}
-@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
-+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
- 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 			close(sock);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	}
- 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- 	if (!ai) {
--		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
-+		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	set_nodelay(sock);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
+index 134528d5..8a09a820 100644
+--- a/channels.h
++++ b/channels.h
+@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
  
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
  int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
 -int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
  void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
  	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
-@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ int      x11_channel_used_recently(struct ssh *ssh);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 105e301d..15c99b30 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->print_lastlog = -1;
  	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
  	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
@@ -100,7 +72,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
  	options->permit_tty = -1;
  	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
-@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -353,6 +354,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
  	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
  		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
@@ -109,16 +81,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
  		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
  	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -576,7 +579,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
  	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 -	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 +	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
  	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
  	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
  	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -714,6 +717,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -126,7 +98,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -1750,6 +1754,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  			*intptr = value;
  		break;
  
@@ -137,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	case sX11UseLocalhost:
  		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+@@ -3004,6 +3012,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
@@ -145,7 +117,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
-@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3299,6 +3308,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
  	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
@@ -153,10 +125,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
  	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c08cf6a7..7c7e5d43 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  
  #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
  #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
@@ -164,7 +137,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  
  /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
  #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
-@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
  	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
  					 * searching at */
@@ -172,13 +145,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
  	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
  	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 54da09d5..28bbb8a7 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -2611,8 +2611,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  		return 0;
  	}
-	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+ 	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
 -	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
 -	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
 +	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
@@ -187,18 +161,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
  		return 0;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index fe246fc2..26fcdc84 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1391,6 +1391,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
  .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
 +.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
  .Cm X11Forwarding
  and
  .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
-@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+@@ -2111,6 +2112,12 @@ Specifies the first display number available for
  X11 forwarding.
  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
  The default is 10.
@@ -211,3 +186,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
  .It Cm X11Forwarding
  Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
  The argument must be
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
similarity index 60%
rename from openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
rename to 0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
index f7cd50f..c4f2d15 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@@ -1,40 +1,58 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+From 43320351b6f150167190aacc84f2f87030fef3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 26/50] openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux
+
+---
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  8 ++++--
+ misc.c                           |  5 ++--
+ misc.h                           |  2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++---------------
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  4 +--
+ platform.c                       |  6 ++++-
+ sshconnect.c                     |  2 +-
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |  6 +++--
+ 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 267a27d2..0d5ae0df 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@
  
  /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
  
  static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
-@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -485,7 +487,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
+@@ -755,7 +758,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 1e31acc9..09722962 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2764,7 +2764,8 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
  pid_t
  subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
      int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
@@ -44,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
-@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+@@ -2898,7 +2899,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
  			_exit(1);
  		}
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -53,10 +71,11 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
---- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index efecdf1a..9efa9cf4 100644
+--- a/misc.h
++++ b/misc.h
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
  pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
@@ -65,36 +84,22 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
  
  typedef struct arglist arglist;
  struct arglist {
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
- 
- int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
--void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
--int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
- void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 646f0887..291b569a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #endif
  
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
--extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  int
  sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
+@@ -222,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
  }
  
  static void
@@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	*role = NULL;
  	*level = NULL;
-@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
+@@ -240,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
  
  /* Return the default security context for the given username */
  static int
@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	char *sename, *lvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -249,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  	int r = 0;
  	context_t con = NULL;
  
@@ -124,16 +129,16 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
  	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  	if (r == 0) {
  		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
  			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
  
  			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -332,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -143,7 +148,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+@@ -341,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -152,12 +157,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
--	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
-@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+@@ -361,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  }
  
  static int
@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  }
  
  static int
-@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+@@ -373,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
  }
  
  int
@@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
  				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
-@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+@@ -407,7 +409,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -213,66 +218,50 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  	if (r >= 0) {
  		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
  		if (r < 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 7f8ba200..3cd7da6a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
+ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 0d12f311..f0800b1f 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
  
- extern int use_privsep;
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
-@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+ int
+@@ -140,7 +142,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
--static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
--static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
-@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
-diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
---- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
-@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index c86182d1..04084810 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
  
  	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
@@ -281,3 +270,43 @@ diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
  		goto out;
  
  	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index e4a8edfd..897db9b4 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Saved arguments to main(). */
+ static char **saved_argv;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 9342e416..81d30152 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1359,7 +1359,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..435d029
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 35205319dd71d8e61c1596b8f9479df91aff7756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 27/50] openssh-7.5p1-sandbox
+
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index b31062c2..1fabf99d 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -277,6 +277,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -295,6 +298,21 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_gettid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+@@ -304,6 +322,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
similarity index 82%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
rename to 0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
index 8592607..73e890b 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,102 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.646699953 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2021-08-30 13:07:43.662700088 +0200
-@@ -1985,12 +1985,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+From 5d6ec35c1a0e06452a2c087decb0baf6e8063e21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 28/50] openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri
+
+---
+ Makefile.in                      |  20 +-
+ configure.ac                     |  37 ++
+ regress/Makefile                 |   8 +-
+ regress/pkcs11.sh                | 349 +++++++++++++++
+ regress/unittests/Makefile       |   2 +-
+ regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c | 346 ++++++++++++++
+ ssh-add.c                        |  48 +-
+ ssh-agent.c                      | 103 ++++-
+ ssh-keygen.c                     |   7 +-
+ ssh-pkcs11-client.c              |   3 +
+ ssh-pkcs11-uri.c                 | 437 ++++++++++++++++++
+ ssh-pkcs11-uri.h                 |  43 ++
+ ssh-pkcs11.c                     | 745 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ ssh-pkcs11.h                     |   4 +
+ ssh.c                            | 104 ++++-
+ ssh_config.5                     |  15 +
+ 16 files changed, 2024 insertions(+), 247 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 regress/pkcs11.sh
+ create mode 100644 regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+ create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
+ create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 78f65948..6c417ef7 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
+ 	ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+-	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
++	ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+ 	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
+ 	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
+ 	hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \
+@@ -339,6 +339,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT)
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation/ssh-verify-attestation$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -377,6 +379,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+@@ -558,6 +562,7 @@ regress-prep:
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
++	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation
+ 	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
+@@ -731,6 +736,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
+ 	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+ 
++UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\
++	regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o
++
++regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT): \
++    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS} \
++    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \
++	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
++	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS)
++
+ # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
+ SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
+ 	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
+@@ -776,7 +791,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
+ 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
+ 	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+ 	regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
+-	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
++	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
++	regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \
+ 
+ tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests extra-tests unit
+ 	echo all tests passed
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 13c70a98..d9bd2f51 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2172,12 +2172,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
  	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
  ])
  
@@ -16,7 +111,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
  		fi
  	]
  )
-@@ -2019,6 +2021,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
+@@ -2207,6 +2209,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
  AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
  
@@ -57,7 +152,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
  # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
  	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
-@@ -5624,6 +5660,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support
+@@ -5820,6 +5856,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
  echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
  echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
  echo "                   PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
@@ -65,87 +160,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
  echo "                  U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
  
  echo ""
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.571699324 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
- 	ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
--	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
-+	ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- 	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
- 	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
- 	hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
-@@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT)
- 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
- 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
-@@ -339,6 +341,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11
- 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
- 	if test -d pkg ; then \
- 		rm -fr pkg ; \
-@@ -513,6 +517,7 @@ regress-prep:
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
-+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
- 	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
- 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
-@@ -677,6 +682,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT
- 	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
- 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
-+UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\
-+	regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o
-+
-+regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT): \
-+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS} \
-+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \
-+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+
- # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
- SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
- 	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
-@@ -711,7 +726,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(RE
- 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
- 	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
- 	regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
--	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
-+	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
-+	regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \
- 
- tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
- 	echo all tests passed
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ else
- 	done
- 
- 	trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
--	echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
-+	${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
- 	r=$?
- 	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- 		fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
+diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
+index 7e7f95b5..f36de51e 100644
+--- a/regress/Makefile
++++ b/regress/Makefile
+@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \
  		known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
  		modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
  		pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
@@ -155,7 +174,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefil
  		rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
  		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
  		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
-@@ -252,8 +253,9 @@ unit:
+@@ -297,8 +298,9 @@ unit:
  		V="" ; \
  		test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
  		    V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
@@ -167,9 +186,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefil
  			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
  		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \
  			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
+diff --git a/regress/pkcs11.sh b/regress/pkcs11.sh
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..a91aee94
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/regress/pkcs11.sh
 @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
 +#
 +#  Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -520,21 +541,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11
 +	trace "kill agent"
 +	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
 +fi
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile b/regress/unittests/Makefile
+index e370900e..d6c89c12 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/Makefile
++++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ #	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.13 2023/09/24 08:14:13 claudio Exp $
  
- REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
  SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion
 -SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig
 +SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig pkcs11
  
  .include <bsd.subdir.mk>
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..7d4fa499
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -563,7 +587,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 +#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
 +
-+#define EMPTY_URI compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
++#define EMPTY_URI compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
 +
 +/* prototypes are not public -- specify them here internally for tests */
 +struct sshbuf *percent_encode(const char *, size_t, char *);
@@ -596,6 +620,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf);
 +	else /* both should be null */
 +		ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf);
++	if (b->serial != NULL)
++		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->serial, b->serial);
++	else /* both should be null */
++		ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->serial, b->serial);
 +}
 +
 +void
@@ -630,7 +658,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +
 +struct pkcs11_uri *
 +compose_uri(unsigned char *id, size_t id_len, char *token, char *lib_manuf,
-+    char *manuf, char *module_path, char *object, char *pin)
++    char *manuf, char *serial, char *module_path, char *object, char *pin)
 +{
 +	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
 +	if (id_len > 0) {
@@ -641,6 +669,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +	uri->token = token;
 +	uri->lib_manuf = lib_manuf;
 +	uri->manuf = manuf;
++	uri->serial = serial;
 +	uri->object = object;
 +	uri->pin = pin;
 +	return uri;
@@ -651,47 +680,49 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +{
 +	/* path arguments */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:id=%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:id=%00%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	check_parse("pkcs11:serial=IamSerial",
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "IamSerial", NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:object=SIGN%20Key",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "SIGN Key", NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "SIGN Key", NULL));
 +	/* query arguments */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:?pin-value=123456",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "123456"));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "123456"));
 +
 +	/* combinations */
 +	/* ID SHOULD be percent encoded */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Key;id=0",
-+	    compose_uri("0", 1, "SSH Key", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("0", 1, "SSH Key", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse(
 +	    "pkcs11:manufacturer=CAC?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "CAC",
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "CAC", NULL,
 +	    "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse(
 +	    "pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key?module-path=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL,
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
 +	    "/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", "RSA Key", NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so&pin-value=123456",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, "123456"));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, "123456"));
 +
 +	/* empty path component matches everything */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI);
 +
 +	/* empty string is a valid to match against (and different from NULL) */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	/* Percent character needs to be percent-encoded */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=%25",
-+	     compose_uri(NULL, 0, "%", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	     compose_uri(NULL, 0, "%", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +}
 +
 +static void
@@ -703,7 +734,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +	check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%ZZ", EMPTY_URI, -1);
 +	/* Space MUST be percent encoded -- XXX not enforced yet */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH Keys",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	/* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */
 +	check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%01;id=%02", EMPTY_URI, -1);
 +	/* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */
@@ -734,29 +765,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +{
 +	/* path arguments */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%00%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", /* space must be percent encoded */
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	/* library-manufacturer is not implmented now */
 +	/*check_gen("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));*/
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));*/
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	check_gen("pkcs11:serial=IamSerial",
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "IamSerial", NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "RSA Key", NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "RSA Key", NULL));
 +	/* query arguments */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +
 +	/* combinations */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%02;token=SSH%20Keys",
-+	    compose_uri("\x02", 1, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x02", 1, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%EE%02?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri("\xEE\x02", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\xEE\x02", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:object=Encryption%20Key;manufacturer=piv_II",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, "Encryption Key", NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, "Encryption Key", NULL));
 +
 +	/* empty path component matches everything */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI);
@@ -872,26 +905,32 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +	test_parse_invalid();
 +	test_generate_valid();
 +}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
- #include "digest.h"
+diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
+index 0035cb84..b0f47f4d 100644
+--- a/ssh-add.c
++++ b/ssh-add.c
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
  #include "ssh-sk.h"
  #include "sk-api.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
 +#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
  
  /* argv0 */
  extern char *__progname;
-@@ -229,6 +230,32 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
+@@ -242,6 +243,38 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
  	return ret;
  }
  
 +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+static int update_card(int, int, const char *, int, char *);
++static int
++update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag,
++    int key_only, int cert_only,
++    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints,
++    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin);
 +
 +int
-+update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri, int qflag)
++update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri, int qflag,
++    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
 +{
 +	char *pin = NULL;
 +	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
@@ -909,58 +948,64 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c
 +	}
 +	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
 +
-+	return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, pin);
++	return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, 1, 0,
++	           dest_constraints, ndest_constraints, NULL, 0, pin);
 +}
 +#endif
 +
  static int
- add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag,
-     const char *skprovider)
-@@ -445,12 +472,11 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
- }
- 
- static int
--update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag)
-+update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag, char *pin)
+ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int cert_only,
+     int qflag, const char *skprovider,
+@@ -462,15 +495,14 @@ static int
+ update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag,
+     int key_only, int cert_only,
+     struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints,
+-    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts)
++    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin)
  {
 -	char *pin = NULL;
  	int r, ret = -1;
  
+ 	if (key_only)
+ 		ncerts = 0;
+ 
 -	if (add) {
 +	if (add && pin == NULL) {
  		if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
  		    RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
  			return -1;
-@@ -630,6 +656,13 @@ static int
- do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag,
-     const char *skprovider)
+@@ -658,6 +690,14 @@ do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, int cert_only,
+     char *file, int qflag, const char *skprovider,
+     struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
  {
 +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 +	if (strlen(file) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
 +	    strncmp(file, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
 +	    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		return update_pkcs11_uri(agent_fd, !deleting, file, qflag);
++		return update_pkcs11_uri(agent_fd, !deleting, file, qflag,
++                   dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
 +	}
 +#endif
  	if (deleting) {
- 		if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
- 			return -1;
-@@ -813,7 +846,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 	if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+ 		if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only,
+ 		    cert_only, qflag) == -1)
+@@ -1001,7 +1041,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  		if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider,
--		    qflag) == -1)
-+		    qflag, NULL) == -1)
+ 		    qflag, key_only, cert_only,
+ 		    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints,
+-		    certs, ncerts) == -1)
++		    certs, ncerts, NULL) == -1)
  			ret = 1;
  		goto done;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -847,10 +847,72 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index c27c5a95..798bf9b6 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1569,10 +1569,74 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, char *comment, const char *provider,
+ 	idtab->nentries++;
  }
  
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 +static char *
 +sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
 +{
@@ -971,6 +1016,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
 +	if (provider == NULL)
 +		return NULL;
 +
++	memset(canonical_provider, 0, sizeof(canonical_provider));
++
 +	if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
 +	    strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
 +	    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
@@ -1031,8 +1078,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
  	char **comments = NULL;
  	int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
  	u_int seconds = 0;
-@@ -869,33 +931,28 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
- 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+@@ -1601,25 +1665,18 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 		    "providers is disabled", provider);
  		goto send;
  	}
 -	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
@@ -1043,13 +1090,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
 -	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
 -		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
 -		    "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
-+
 +	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
 +	if (sane_uri == NULL)
  		goto send;
 -	}
 -	debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
-+
  	if (lifetime && !death)
  		death = monotime() + lifetime;
  
@@ -1057,31 +1102,38 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
 +	debug_f("add %.100s", sane_uri);
 +	count = pkcs11_add_provider(sane_uri, pin, &keys, &comments);
  	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- 		k = keys[i];
- 		if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
- 			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
- 			id->key = k;
- 			keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
--			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
-+			id->provider = xstrdup(sane_uri);
- 			if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
- 				id->comment = comments[i];
- 				comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
- 			} else {
--				id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
-+				id->comment = xstrdup(sane_uri);
- 			}
- 			id->death = death;
- 			id->confirm = confirm;
-@@ -910,6 +967,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 		if (comments[i] == NULL || comments[i][0] == '\0') {
+ 			free(comments[i]);
+-			comments[i] = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
++			comments[i] = xstrdup(sane_uri);
+ 		}
+ 		for (j = 0; j < ncerts; j++) {
+ 			if (!sshkey_is_cert(certs[j]))
+@@ -1629,13 +1686,13 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 			if (pkcs11_make_cert(keys[i], certs[j], &k) != 0)
+ 				continue;
+ 			add_p11_identity(k, xstrdup(comments[i]),
+-			    canonical_provider, death, confirm,
++			    sane_uri, death, confirm,
+ 			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+ 			success = 1;
+ 		}
+ 		if (!cert_only && lookup_identity(keys[i]) == NULL) {
+ 			add_p11_identity(keys[i], comments[i],
+-			    canonical_provider, death, confirm,
++			    sane_uri, death, confirm,
+ 			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+ 			keys[i] = NULL;		/* transferred */
+ 			comments[i] = NULL;	/* transferred */
+@@ -1648,6 +1705,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
  send:
  	free(pin);
  	free(provider);
 +	free(sane_uri);
  	free(keys);
  	free(comments);
- 	send_status(e, success);
-@@ -918,7 +976,7 @@ send:
+ 	free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+@@ -1660,7 +1718,7 @@ send:
  static void
  process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
  {
@@ -1090,7 +1142,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
  	int r, success = 0;
  	Identity *id, *nxt;
  
-@@ -930,30 +988,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
+@@ -1672,30 +1730,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
  	}
  	free(pin);
  
@@ -1127,185 +1179,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
  	send_status(e, success);
  }
  #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.578699383 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -1111,6 +1111,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
- .Cm CertificateFile
- in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
- the identity.
-+.Pp
-+The authentication identity can be also specified in a form of PKCS#11 URI
-+starting with a string
-+.Cm pkcs11: .
-+There is supported a subset of the PKCS#11 URI as defined
-+in RFC 7512 (implemented path arguments
-+.Cm id ,
-+.Cm manufacturer ,
-+.Cm object ,
-+.Cm token
-+and query arguments
-+.Cm module-path
-+and
-+.Cm pin-value
-+). The URI can not be in quotes.
- .It Cm IgnoreUnknown
- Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
- encountered in configuration parsing.
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.578699383 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -826,6 +826,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
- 			break;
- 		case 'i':
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+			if (strlen(optarg) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+			    strncmp(optarg, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
-+			    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+				add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1);
-+				break;
-+			}
-+#endif
- 			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
- 			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
- 				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
-@@ -1681,6 +1689,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- 	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
- #endif
-+	pkcs11_terminate();
- 
-  skip_connect:
- 	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
-@@ -2197,6 +2206,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const stru
- 	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+static void
-+load_pkcs11_identity(char *pkcs11_uri, char *identity_files[],
-+    struct sshkey *identity_keys[], int *n_ids)
-+{
-+	int nkeys, i;
-+	struct sshkey **keys;
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+
-+	debug("identity file '%s' from pkcs#11", pkcs11_uri);
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (pkcs11_uri_parse(pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0)
-+	fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI %s", pkcs11_uri);
-+
-+	/* we need to merge URI and provider together */
-+	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && uri->module_path == NULL)
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
-+
-+	if (options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
-+	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, NULL, &keys, NULL)) > 0) {
-+		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
-+			if (*n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
-+				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+			identity_keys[*n_ids] = keys[i];
-+			identity_files[*n_ids] = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+			(*n_ids)++;
-+		}
-+		free(keys);
-+	}
-+
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
-+}
-+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-+
- /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
- static void
- load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
-@@ -2211,11 +2259,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
- 	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
- 	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
- 	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
--#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
--	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
--	char **comments = NULL;
--	int nkeys;
--#endif /* PKCS11 */
- 
- 	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
- 	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
-@@ -2228,33 +2271,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
- 	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
--	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
--	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
--	    (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
--	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
--	    &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
--		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
--			if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
--				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
--				free(comments[i]);
--				continue;
--			}
--			identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
--			identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
--			n_ids++;
--		}
--		free(keys);
--		free(comments);
-+	/* handle fallback from PKCS11Provider option */
-+	pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode);
-+
-+	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL) {
-+		struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+
-+		uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+		if (uri == NULL)
-+			fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+		/* Construct simple PKCS#11 URI to simplify access */
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
-+
-+		/* Add it as any other IdentityFile */
-+		cp = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+		add_identity_file(&options, NULL, cp, 1);
-+		free(cp);
-+
-+		pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 	}
- #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
-+		char *name = options.identity_files[i];
- 		if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
--		    strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
-+		    strcasecmp(name, "none") == 0) {
- 			free(options.identity_files[i]);
- 			options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
- 			continue;
- 		}
--		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+		if (strlen(name) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+		    strncmp(name, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
-+		    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+			load_pkcs11_identity(name, identity_files,
-+			    identity_keys, &n_ids);
-+			free(options.identity_files[i]);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid());
- 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
- 		free(cp);
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -860,8 +860,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 89c3ed28..16cff947 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -906,8 +906,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
  			free(fp);
  		} else {
  			(void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
@@ -1319,19 +1197,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		}
  		free(comments[i]);
  		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
- 	u_int nkeys, i;
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+index b8d1700f..64df695e 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+@@ -635,6 +635,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
  	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	struct helper *helper;
  
 +	debug_f("called, name = %s", name);
 +
- 	if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
- 		return (-1);
- 
-@@ -342,6 +344,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
+ 	if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) == NULL &&
+ 	    (helper = pkcs11_start_helper(name)) == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
  		*keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
  		if (labelsp)
  			*labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *));
@@ -1339,1256 +1218,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-c
  		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
  			/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
  			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2021-08-30 13:12:27.709084157 +0200
-@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
- 	int			logged_in;
- };
- 
--struct pkcs11_provider {
--	char			*name;
-+struct pkcs11_module {
-+	char			*module_path;
- 	void			*handle;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*function_list;
- 	CK_INFO			info;
-@@ -65,6 +65,13 @@ struct pkcs11_provider {
- 	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*slotinfo;
- 	int			valid;
- 	int			refcount;
-+};
-+
-+struct pkcs11_provider {
-+	char			*name;
-+	struct pkcs11_module	*module; /* can be shared between various providers */
-+	int			refcount;
-+	int			valid;
- 	TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
- };
- 
-@@ -75,6 +82,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
- 	CK_ULONG		slotidx;
- 	char			*keyid;
- 	int			keyid_len;
-+	char			*label;
- };
- 
- int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
-@@ -106,26 +114,61 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive)
-  * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
-  */
- static void
--pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
-+pkcs11_module_finalize(struct pkcs11_module *m)
- {
- 	CK_RV rv;
- 	CK_ULONG i;
- 
--	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d",
--	    p->name, p->refcount, p->valid);
--	if (!p->valid)
-+	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid);
-+	if (!m->valid)
- 		return;
--	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
--		if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
--		    (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
--		    p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
-+	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
-+		if (m->slotinfo[i].session &&
-+		    (rv = m->function_list->C_CloseSession(
-+		    m->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
- 			error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
- 	}
--	if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
-+	if ((rv = m->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
- 		error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
-+	m->valid = 0;
-+	m->function_list = NULL;
-+	dlclose(m->handle);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * remove a reference to the pkcs11 module.
-+ * called when a provider is unregistered.
-+ */
-+static void
-+pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m)
-+{
-+	debug_f("%p refcount %d", m, m->refcount);
-+	if (--m->refcount <= 0) {
-+		pkcs11_module_finalize(m);
-+		if (m->valid)
-+			error_f("%p still valid", m);
-+		free(m->slotlist);
-+		free(m->slotinfo);
-+		free(m->module_path);
-+		free(m);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
-+ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
-+ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
-+ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
-+ */
-+static void
-+pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
-+{
-+	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid);
-+	if (!p->valid)
-+		return;
-+	pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
-+	p->module = NULL;
- 	p->valid = 0;
--	p->function_list = NULL;
--	dlclose(p->handle);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -137,11 +180,9 @@ pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_prov
- {
- 	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount);
- 	if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
--		if (p->valid)
--			error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name);
- 		free(p->name);
--		free(p->slotlist);
--		free(p->slotinfo);
-+		if (p->module)
-+			pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
- 		free(p);
- 	}
- }
-@@ -159,6 +200,20 @@ pkcs11_terminate(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+/* lookup provider by module path */
-+static struct pkcs11_module *
-+pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(char *module_path)
-+{
-+	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
-+
-+	TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
-+		debug("check %p %s (%s)", p, p->name, p->module->module_path);
-+		if (!strcmp(module_path, p->module->module_path))
-+			return (p->module);
-+	}
-+	return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- /* lookup provider by name */
- static struct pkcs11_provider *
- pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
-@@ -173,19 +228,55 @@ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id
- 	return (NULL);
- }
- 
-+int pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *);
-+
- /* unregister provider by name */
- int
- pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
- {
-+	int rv;
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+
-+	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
-+
-+      if (provider_id == NULL)
-+          return 0;
-+
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
-+			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+	} else {
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
-+	}
-+
-+	rv = pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(uri);
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+/* unregister provider by PKCS#11 URI */
-+int
-+pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
-+{
- 	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
-+	int rv = -1;
-+	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
- 
--	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
-+	debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri);
-+
-+	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) {
- 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
- 		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
- 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
--		return (0);
-+		rv = 0;
- 	}
--	return (-1);
-+	free(provider_uri);
-+	return rv;
- }
- 
- static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
-@@ -195,6 +286,55 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
- static int ec_key_idx = 0;
- #endif
- 
-+/*
-+ * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on
-+ * PKCS#11 structures in ssh-agent (using client-helper communication)
-+ */
-+int
-+pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
-+{
-+	char *p = NULL;
-+	struct pkcs11_uri uri;
-+	struct pkcs11_key *k11;
-+
-+	/* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */
-+	switch (key->type) {
-+	case KEY_RSA:
-+		k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(key->rsa, rsa_idx);
-+		break;
-+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
-+	case KEY_ECDSA:
-+		k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, ec_key_idx);
-+		break;
-+#endif
-+	default:
-+		error("Unknown key type %d", key->type);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	if (k11 == NULL) {
-+		error("Failed to get ex_data for key type %d", key->type);
-+		return (-1);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* omit type -- we are looking for private-public or private-certificate pairs */
-+	uri.id = k11->keyid;
-+	uri.id_len = k11->keyid_len;
-+	uri.token = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.label;
-+	uri.object = k11->label;
-+	uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path;
-+	uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID;
-+	uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID;
-+
-+	p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri);
-+	/* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */
-+	if (p == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	fprintf(f, " %s", p);
-+	free(p);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* release a wrapped object */
- static void
- pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
-@@ -208,6 +348,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr,
- 	if (k11->provider)
- 		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
- 	free(k11->keyid);
-+	free(k11->label);
- 	free(k11);
- }
- 
-@@ -222,8 +363,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C
- 	CK_RV			rv;
- 	int			ret = -1;
- 
--	f = p->function_list;
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
- 	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
- 		return (-1);
-@@ -262,12 +403,12 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
- 	else {
- 		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
- 		    si->token.label);
--		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
-+		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) {
- 			debug_f("no pin specified");
- 			return (-1);	/* bail out */
- 		}
- 	}
--	rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
-+	rv = provider->module->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
- 	    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
- 	if (pin != NULL)
- 		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
-@@ -297,13 +438,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
- static int
- pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
- {
--	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
-+	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid ||
-+	    k11->provider->module == NULL || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
- 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
- 	return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
--	    &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
-+	    &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -319,13 +461,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs
- 
- 	*val = 0;
- 
--	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
-+	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
-+	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
- 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 
- 	attr.type = type;
- 	attr.pValue = &flag;
-@@ -356,13 +499,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, C
- 	int			 always_auth = 0;
- 	int			 did_login = 0;
- 
--	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
-+	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
-+	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
- 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 
- 	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
- 		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
-@@ -439,8 +583,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 	tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
- 
- 	/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
-@@ -484,7 +628,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
- /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
- static int
- pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
-+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, RSA *rsa)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
- 
-@@ -502,6 +646,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *
- 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
-+		k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
-+		memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen);
-+		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
- 	RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
- 	return (0);
-@@ -532,8 +682,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 
- 	siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
- 	sig = xmalloc(siglen);
-@@ -598,7 +748,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
- 
- static int
- pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
-+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
- 
-@@ -614,6 +764,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
- 	k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
- 	memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
- 
-+	if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
-+		k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
-+		memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen);
-+		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
- 	EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
- 
-@@ -650,8 +806,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
- 	int			login_required, ret;
- 
--	f = p->function_list;
--	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
-+	si = &p->module->slotinfo[slotidx];
- 
- 	login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
- 
-@@ -661,9 +817,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
- 		error("pin required");
- 		return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
- 	}
--	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
-+	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->module->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
- 	    CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
--		error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
-+		error("C_OpenSession failed for slot %lu: %lu", slotidx, rv);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
-@@ -699,7 +855,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
- pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
-     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
- {
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
-+	int			 nattr = 4;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -713,14 +870,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 
- 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
- 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
--	key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
--	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
-+	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
-+	key_attr[3].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
- 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		return (NULL);
-@@ -731,19 +889,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
- 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
- 	 */
--	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
--	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
-+	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
- 		error("invalid attribute length");
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
- 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
- 
- 	/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -755,8 +913,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
--	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
-+	attrp = key_attr[3].pValue;
-+	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[3].ulValueLen);
- 	if (group == NULL) {
- 		ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -767,13 +925,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
-+	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen <= 2) {
- 		error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
--	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
-+	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
-+	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
- 	if (octet == NULL) {
- 		ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -790,7 +948,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec))
-+	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], ec))
- 		goto fail;
- 
- 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -806,7 +964,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 	ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
- 
- fail:
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
- 	if (ec)
- 		EC_KEY_free(ec);
-@@ -823,7 +981,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
- pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
-     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
- {
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
-+	int			 nattr = 4;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -834,14 +993,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 
- 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
- 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
--	key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
--	key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
-+	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+	key_attr[2].type = CKA_MODULUS;
-+	key_attr[3].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
- 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		return (NULL);
-@@ -852,19 +1012,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
- 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
- 	 */
--	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
--	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
-+	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
- 		error("invalid attribute length");
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
- 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
- 
- 	/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -876,8 +1036,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
--	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
-+	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
-+	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[3].pValue, key_attr[3].ulValueLen, NULL);
- 	if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
- 		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -886,7 +1046,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 		fatal_f("set key");
- 	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
-+	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], rsa))
- 		goto fail;
- 
- 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -901,7 +1061,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 	rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
- 
- fail:
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
- 	RSA_free(rsa);
- 
-@@ -912,7 +1072,8 @@ static int
- pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
-     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
- {
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[3];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[4];
-+	int			 nattr = 4;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -936,14 +1097,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 
- 	memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
- 	cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
--	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
--	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
-+	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
-+	cert_attr[3].type = CKA_VALUE;
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
- 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		return -1;
-@@ -955,18 +1117,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
- 	 */
- 	if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
--	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
-+	    cert_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
- 		error("invalid attribute length");
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
- 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
- 			cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
- 
- 	/* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto out;
-@@ -980,8 +1143,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 		subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
- 	X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
- 
--	cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
--	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
-+	cp = cert_attr[3].pValue;
-+	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[3].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
- 		error("d2i_x509 failed");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -1001,7 +1164,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 
--		if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa))
-+		if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], rsa))
- 			goto out;
- 
- 		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1031,7 +1194,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 
--		if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec))
-+		if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], ec))
- 			goto out;
- 
- 		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1051,7 +1214,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-  out:
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
- 	X509_free(x509);
- 	RSA_free(rsa);
-@@ -1102,11 +1265,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_U
-  */
- static int
- pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
-+    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
- {
- 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
- 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[1];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	int			 nattr = 1;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1123,10 +1287,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provide
- 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
- 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	if (uri->id != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
-+	if (uri->object != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
-+
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
--	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
-+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -1207,11 +1384,12 @@ fail:
-  */
- static int
- pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
-+    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
- {
- 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
- 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[2];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	int			 nattr = 1;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1227,10 +1405,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider
- 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
- 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	if (uri->id != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
-+	if (uri->object != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
- 
--	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
-+
-+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -1499,16 +1690,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct
- }
- #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
- 
--/*
-- * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
-- * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
-- */
- static int
--pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
--    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
--    struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
-+pkcs11_initialize_provider(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp)
- {
--	int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
-+	int need_finalize = 0;
- 	int ret = -1;
- 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
- 	void *handle = NULL;
-@@ -1517,164 +1702,298 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
- 	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
- 	CK_ULONG i;
-+	char *provider_module = NULL;
-+	struct pkcs11_module *m = NULL;
- 
--	if (providerp == NULL)
-+	/* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */
-+	if (uri->module_path == NULL) {
-+#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER
-+		provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER);
-+#else
-+		error_f("No module path provided");
- 		goto fail;
--	*providerp = NULL;
-+#endif
-+	} else {
-+		provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path);
-+	}
- 
--	if (keyp != NULL)
--		*keyp = NULL;
--	if (labelsp != NULL)
--		*labelsp = NULL;
-+	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
-+	p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
- 
--	if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
--		debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
--		goto fail;
-+	if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL
-+	   && m->valid) {
-+		debug_f("provider module already initialized: %s", provider_module);
-+		free(provider_module);
-+		/* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */
-+		m->refcount++;
-+		p->module = m;
-+		p->valid = 1;
-+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
-+		p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
-+		*providerp = p;
-+		return 0;
-+	} else {
-+		m = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*m));
-+		p->module = m;
-+		m->refcount++;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* open shared pkcs11-library */
--	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
--		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
-+	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_module, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
-+		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
- 		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
--	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
--	p->handle = handle;
-+
-+	p->module->handle = handle;
- 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
- 	if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p->function_list = f;
-+	m->function_list = f;
- 	if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 	need_finalize = 1;
--	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
-+	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&m->info)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
-+	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
-+	    strcmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID)) {
-+		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
-+		    m->info.manufacturerID);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
--	rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
-+	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
- 	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
- 	    " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
--	    provider_id,
--	    p->info.manufacturerID,
--	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
--	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
--	    p->info.libraryDescription,
--	    p->info.libraryVersion.major,
--	    p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
--	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
-+	    provider_module,
-+	    m->info.manufacturerID,
-+	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
-+	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
-+	    m->info.libraryDescription,
-+	    m->info.libraryVersion.major,
-+	    m->info.libraryVersion.minor);
-+
-+	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &m->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	if (p->nslots == 0) {
--		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id);
-+	if (m->nslots == 0) {
-+		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_module);
- 		ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
--	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
-+	m->slotlist = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
-+	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, m->slotlist, &m->nslots))
- 	    != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
- 	p->valid = 1;
--	nkeys = 0;
--	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
--		token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
--		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
-+	m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
-+	m->valid = 1;
-+	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
-+		token = &m->slotinfo[i].token;
-+		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token))
- 		    != CKR_OK) {
- 			error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
--			    "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv);
--			continue;
--		}
--		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
--			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
--			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i);
-+			    "failed: %lu", provider_module, (u_long)i, rv);
-+			token->flags = 0;
- 			continue;
- 		}
- 		rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
- 		rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
- 		rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
- 		rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
-+	}
-+	m->module_path = provider_module;
-+	provider_module = NULL;
-+
-+	/* insert unconditionally -- remove if there will be no keys later */
-+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
-+	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
-+	*providerp = p;
-+	return 0;
-+
-+fail:
-+	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
-+		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
-+		    provider_module, rv);
-+	free(provider_module);
-+	if (m) {
-+		free(m->slotlist);
-+		free(m);
-+	}
-+	if (p) {
-+		free(p->name);
-+		free(p);
-+	}
-+	if (handle)
-+		dlclose(handle);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
-+ * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
-+    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp,
-+    CK_ULONG user)
-+{
-+	int nkeys;
-+	int ret = -1;
-+	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
-+	CK_ULONG i;
-+	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
-+	char *provider_uri = NULL;
-+
-+	if (providerp == NULL)
-+		goto fail;
-+	*providerp = NULL;
-+
-+	if (keyp != NULL)
-+		*keyp = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((ret = pkcs11_initialize_provider(uri, &p)) != 0) {
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+	if (pin == NULL && uri->pin != NULL) {
-+		pin = uri->pin;
-+	}
-+	nkeys = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) {
-+		token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token;
-+		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
-+			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_uri, (u_long)i);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		if (uri->token != NULL &&
-+		    strcmp(token->label, uri->token) != 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%s) "
-+			    "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu",
-+			    token->label, (unsigned long)i);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		if (uri->manuf != NULL &&
-+		    strcmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf) != 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
-+			    "manufacturerID (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
-+			    "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i);
-+			continue;
-+		}
- 		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> "
- 		    "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx",
--		    provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
-+		    provider_uri, (unsigned long)i,
- 		    token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
- 		    token->serialNumber, token->flags);
- 		/*
--		 * open session, login with pin and retrieve public
--		 * keys (if keyp is provided)
-+		 * open session if not yet openend, login with pin and
-+		 * retrieve public keys (if keyp is provided)
- 		 */
--		if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
-+		if ((p->module->slotinfo[i].session != 0 ||
-+		    (ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0) && /* ??? */
- 		    keyp == NULL)
- 			continue;
--		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
--		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
--		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
-+		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->module->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
- 		    pkcs11_interactive) {
- 			/*
- 			 * Some tokens require login before they will
- 			 * expose keys.
- 			 */
--			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
-+			debug3_f("Trying to login as there were no keys found");
-+			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->module->slotinfo[i],
- 			    CKU_USER) < 0) {
- 				error("login failed");
- 				continue;
- 			}
--			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
--			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
-+			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+		}
-+		if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) {
-+			debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%s) ",
-+			    uri->object);
-+			/* Try once more without the label filter */
-+			char *label = uri->object;
-+			uri->object = NULL; /* XXX clone uri? */
-+			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+			uri->object = label;
- 		}
- 	}
-+	pin = NULL; /* Will be cleaned up with URI */
- 
- 	/* now owned by caller */
- 	*providerp = p;
- 
--	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
--	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
--
-+	free(provider_uri);
- 	return (nkeys);
- fail:
--	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
--		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
- 	if (p) {
--		free(p->name);
--		free(p->slotlist);
--		free(p->slotinfo);
--		free(p);
-+ 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
-+		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
- 	}
--	if (handle)
--		dlclose(handle);
- 	if (ret > 0)
- 		ret = -1;
- 	return (ret);
- }
- 
--/*
-- * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
-- * fails if provider already exists
-- */
-+static int
-+pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
-+    char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
-+{
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
-+
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
-+			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+	} else {
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
-+	}
-+
-+	r = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, providerp, user);
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
-+
-+	return r;
-+}
-+
- int
--pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
--    char ***labelsp)
-+pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
-+    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
- 	int nkeys;
-+	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+
-+	debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri);
- 
--	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
--	    &p, CKU_USER);
-+	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER);
- 
- 	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
- 	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
-@@ -1683,7 +2002,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, c
- 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
- 	}
- 	if (nkeys == 0)
--		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id);
-+		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_uri);
-+
-+	free(provider_uri);
-+	return nkeys;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
-+ * fails if provider already exists
-+ */
-+int
-+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
-+    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
-+{
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+	int nkeys;
-+
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
-+			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+	} else {
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
-+	}
-+
-+	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp);
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 
- 	return (nkeys);
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -22,10 +22,14 @@
- #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		4
- #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED		5
- 
-+#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
-+
- int	pkcs11_init(int);
- void	pkcs11_terminate(void);
- int	pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
-+int	pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
- int	pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
-+int	pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
- #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
- struct sshkey *
- 	pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..8bd97e9e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -2631,13 +1266,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +#define PKCS11_URI_OBJECT "object"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF "library-manufacturer"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_MANUF "manufacturer"
++#define PKCS11_URI_SERIAL "serial"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH "module-path"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE "pin-value"
 +
 +/* Keyword tokens. */
 +typedef enum {
-+	pId, pToken, pObject, pLibraryManufacturer, pManufacturer, pModulePath,
-+	pPinValue, pBadOption
++	pId, pToken, pObject, pLibraryManufacturer, pManufacturer, pSerial,
++	pModulePath, pPinValue, pBadOption
 +} pkcs11uriOpCodes;
 +
 +/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
@@ -2650,6 +1286,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, pObject },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF, pLibraryManufacturer },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_MANUF, pManufacturer },
++	{ PKCS11_URI_SERIAL, pSerial },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, pModulePath },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE, pPinValue },
 +	{ NULL, pBadOption }
@@ -2808,6 +1445,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +			goto err;
 +	}
 +
++	/* Write serial */
++	if (uri->serial) {
++		struct sshbuf *serial = percent_encode(uri->serial,
++		    strlen(uri->serial), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST);
++		path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR,
++		    PKCS11_URI_SERIAL, serial);
++		if (path == NULL)
++			goto err;
++	}
++
 +	/* Write module_path */
 +	if (uri->module_path) {
 +		struct sshbuf *module = percent_encode(uri->module_path,
@@ -2850,6 +1497,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +	free(pkcs11->object);
 +	free(pkcs11->lib_manuf);
 +	free(pkcs11->manuf);
++	free(pkcs11->serial);
 +	if (pkcs11->pin)
 +		freezero(pkcs11->pin, strlen(pkcs11->pin));
 +	free(pkcs11);
@@ -2945,6 +1593,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +			charptr = &pkcs11->manuf;
 +			goto parse_string;
 +
++		case pSerial:
++			/* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> serialNumber */
++			charptr = &pkcs11->serial;
++			goto parse_string;
++
 +		case pLibraryManufacturer:
 +			/* CK_INFO -> manufacturerID */
 +			charptr = &pkcs11->lib_manuf;
@@ -3008,10 +1661,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..29e9f732
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -3043,6 +1698,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +	char *object;
 +	char *lib_manuf;
 +	char *manuf;
++	char *serial;
 +	/* query */
 +	char *module_path;
 +	char *pin; /* Only parsed, but not printed */
@@ -3054,3 +1710,1473 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +struct	 pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init();
 +char	*pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri);
 +
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index 31b9360f..b96f5b89 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+@@ -55,8 +56,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
+ 	int			logged_in;
+ };
+ 
+-struct pkcs11_provider {
+-	char			*name;
++struct pkcs11_module {
++	char			*module_path;
+ 	void			*handle;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*function_list;
+ 	CK_INFO			info;
+@@ -65,6 +66,13 @@ struct pkcs11_provider {
+ 	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*slotinfo;
+ 	int			valid;
+ 	int			refcount;
++};
++
++struct pkcs11_provider {
++	char			*name;
++	struct pkcs11_module	*module; /* can be shared between various providers */
++	int			refcount;
++	int			valid;
+ 	TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
+ };
+ 
+@@ -75,6 +83,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
+ 	CK_ULONG		slotidx;
+ 	char			*keyid;
+ 	int			keyid_len;
++	char			*label;
+ };
+ 
+ int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
+@@ -106,26 +115,61 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+  * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
+  */
+ static void
+-pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
++pkcs11_module_finalize(struct pkcs11_module *m)
+ {
+ 	CK_RV rv;
+ 	CK_ULONG i;
+ 
+-	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d",
+-	    p->name, p->refcount, p->valid);
+-	if (!p->valid)
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid);
++	if (!m->valid)
+ 		return;
+-	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+-		if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
+-		    (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
+-		    p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
++	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
++		if (m->slotinfo[i].session &&
++		    (rv = m->function_list->C_CloseSession(
++		    m->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
+ 			error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
+ 	}
+-	if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
++	if ((rv = m->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+ 		error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
++	m->valid = 0;
++	m->function_list = NULL;
++	dlclose(m->handle);
++}
++
++/*
++ * remove a reference to the pkcs11 module.
++ * called when a provider is unregistered.
++ */
++static void
++pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m)
++{
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d", m, m->refcount);
++	if (--m->refcount <= 0) {
++		pkcs11_module_finalize(m);
++		if (m->valid)
++			error_f("%p still valid", m);
++		free(m->slotlist);
++		free(m->slotinfo);
++		free(m->module_path);
++		free(m);
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
++ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
++ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
++ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
++ */
++static void
++pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
++{
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid);
++	if (!p->valid)
++		return;
++	pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
++	p->module = NULL;
+ 	p->valid = 0;
+-	p->function_list = NULL;
+-	dlclose(p->handle);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -137,11 +181,9 @@ pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
+ {
+ 	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount);
+ 	if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
+-		if (p->valid)
+-			error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name);
+ 		free(p->name);
+-		free(p->slotlist);
+-		free(p->slotinfo);
++		if (p->module)
++			pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
+ 		free(p);
+ 	}
+ }
+@@ -159,6 +201,20 @@ pkcs11_terminate(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++/* lookup provider by module path */
++static struct pkcs11_module *
++pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(char *module_path)
++{
++	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
++
++	TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
++		debug("check %p %s (%s)", p, p->name, p->module->module_path);
++		if (!strcmp(module_path, p->module->module_path))
++			return (p->module);
++	}
++	return (NULL);
++}
++
+ /* lookup provider by name */
+ static struct pkcs11_provider *
+ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
+@@ -173,19 +229,55 @@ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
+ 	return (NULL);
+ }
+ 
++int pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *);
++
+ /* unregister provider by name */
+ int
+ pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
++{
++	int rv;
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++
++	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
++
++      if (provider_id == NULL)
++          return 0;
++
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++	} else {
++		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
++	}
++
++	rv = pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(uri);
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
++	return rv;
++}
++
++/* unregister provider by PKCS#11 URI */
++int
++pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
++	int rv = -1;
++	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
+ 
+-	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
++	debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri);
++
++	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) {
+ 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ 		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+ 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+-		return (0);
++		rv = 0;
+ 	}
+-	return (-1);
++	free(provider_uri);
++	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+ static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
+@@ -195,6 +287,60 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
+ static int ec_key_idx = 0;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ 
++/*
++ * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on
++ * PKCS#11 structures in ssh-agent (using client-helper communication)
++ */
++int
++pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
++{
++	char *p = NULL;
++	struct pkcs11_uri uri;
++	struct pkcs11_key *k11;
++
++	/* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */
++	switch (key->type) {
++	case KEY_RSA: {
++               const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key->pkey);
++		k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx);
++		break;
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++	case KEY_ECDSA: {
++               const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key->pkey);
++		k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx);
++		break;
++		}
++#endif
++	default:
++		error("Unknown key type %d", key->type);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (k11 == NULL) {
++		error("Failed to get ex_data for key type %d", key->type);
++		return (-1);
++	}
++
++	/* omit type -- we are looking for private-public or private-certificate pairs */
++	uri.id = k11->keyid;
++	uri.id_len = k11->keyid_len;
++	uri.token = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.label;
++	uri.object = k11->label;
++	uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path;
++	uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID;
++	uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID;
++	uri.serial = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.serialNumber;
++
++	p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri);
++	/* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */
++	if (p == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	fprintf(f, " %s", p);
++	free(p);
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* release a wrapped object */
+ static void
+ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
+@@ -208,6 +354,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
+ 	if (k11->provider)
+ 		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+ 	free(k11->keyid);
++	free(k11->label);
+ 	free(k11);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -222,8 +369,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
+ 	CK_RV			rv;
+ 	int			ret = -1;
+ 
+-	f = p->function_list;
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ 	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
+ 		return (-1);
+@@ -260,14 +407,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
+ 	if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+ 		verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
+ 	else {
+-		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
++		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%.32s': ",
+ 		    si->token.label);
+-		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
++		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) {
+ 			debug_f("no pin specified");
+ 			return (-1);	/* bail out */
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
++	rv = provider->module->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
+ 	    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
+ 	if (pin != NULL)
+ 		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+@@ -297,13 +444,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
+ static int
+ pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
+ {
+-	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
++	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid ||
++	    k11->provider->module == NULL || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
+ 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
+-	    &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
++	    &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -319,13 +467,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj,
+ 
+ 	*val = 0;
+ 
+-	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
++	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
++	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
+ 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	attr.type = type;
+ 	attr.pValue = &flag;
+@@ -356,13 +505,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type)
+ 	int			 always_auth = 0;
+ 	int			 did_login = 0;
+ 
+-	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
++	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
++	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
+ 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
+ 		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
+@@ -439,8 +589,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 	tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
+ 
+ 	/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+@@ -484,7 +634,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
+ /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
+ static int
+ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+-    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
++    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
+ 
+@@ -502,6 +652,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
++		k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
++		memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen);
++		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method) != 1)
+ 		fatal_f("RSA_set_method failed");
+ 	if (RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11) != 1)
+@@ -534,8 +690,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
+ 	sig = xmalloc(siglen);
+@@ -600,7 +756,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
+ 
+ static int
+ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+-    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
++    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
+ 
+@@ -617,6 +773,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
+ 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+ 	}
++	if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
++		k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
++		memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen);
++		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method) != 1)
+ 		fatal_f("EC_KEY_set_method failed");
+ 	if (EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11) != 1)
+@@ -626,7 +788,8 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ }
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ 
+-/* remove trailing spaces */
++/* remove trailing spaces. Note, that this does NOT guarantee the buffer
++ * will be null terminated if there are no trailing spaces! */
+ static char *
+ rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -658,8 +821,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
+ 	int			login_required, ret;
+ 
+-	f = p->function_list;
+-	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
++	f = p->module->function_list;
++	si = &p->module->slotinfo[slotidx];
+ 
+ 	login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
+ 
+@@ -669,9 +832,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
+ 		error("pin required");
+ 		return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
+ 	}
+-	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
++	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->module->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
+ 	    CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
+-		error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
++		error("C_OpenSession failed for slot %lu: %lu", slotidx, rv);
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 	if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
+@@ -707,7 +870,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+ {
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
++	int			 nattr = 4;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -721,14 +885,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 
+ 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+-	key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
+-	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
++	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
++	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
++	key_attr[3].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		return (NULL);
+@@ -739,19 +904,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ 	 */
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ 		error("invalid attribute length");
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+ 
+ 	/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -763,8 +928,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
+-	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
++	attrp = key_attr[3].pValue;
++	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[3].ulValueLen);
+ 	if (group == NULL) {
+ 		ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -775,13 +940,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen <= 2) {
+ 		error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
+-	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
++	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
++	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
+ 	if (octet == NULL) {
+ 		ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -798,7 +963,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec))
++	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], ec))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+@@ -817,7 +982,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ 
+ fail:
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+ 	if (ec)
+ 		EC_KEY_free(ec);
+@@ -834,7 +999,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+ {
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
++	int			 nattr = 4;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -845,14 +1011,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 
+ 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+-	key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
+-	key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
++	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
++	key_attr[2].type = CKA_MODULUS;
++	key_attr[3].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		return (NULL);
+@@ -863,19 +1030,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ 	 */
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ 		error("invalid attribute length");
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+ 
+ 	/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -887,8 +1054,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
+-	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
++	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
++	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[3].pValue, key_attr[3].ulValueLen, NULL);
+ 	if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
+ 		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -897,7 +1064,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		fatal_f("set key");
+ 	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+ 
+-	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
++	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], rsa))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+@@ -915,7 +1082,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ 
+ fail:
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+ 	RSA_free(rsa);
+ 
+@@ -926,7 +1093,8 @@ static int
+ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
+ {
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[3];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[4];
++	int			 nattr = 4;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -950,14 +1118,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 
+ 	memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
+ 	cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+-	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
+-	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
++	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
++	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
++	cert_attr[3].type = CKA_VALUE;
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -969,18 +1138,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
++	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	    cert_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ 		error("invalid attribute length");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ 			cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+ 
+ 	/* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -994,8 +1164,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
+ 	X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
+ 
+-	cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
+-	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
++	cp = cert_attr[3].pValue;
++	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[3].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("d2i_x509 failed");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -1015,7 +1185,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa))
++		if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], rsa))
+ 			goto out;
+ 
+ 		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+@@ -1048,7 +1218,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec))
++		if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], ec))
+ 			goto out;
+ 
+ 		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+@@ -1071,7 +1241,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+  out:
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
+ 	X509_free(x509);
+ 	RSA_free(rsa);
+@@ -1122,11 +1292,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, const char *context,
+  */
+ static int
+ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+-    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
++    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
+ {
+ 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+ 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[1];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	int			 nattr = 1;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -1143,10 +1314,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+ 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	if (uri->id != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
++		nattr++;
++	}
++	if (uri->object != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
++		nattr++;
++	}
++
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+-	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
++	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -1227,11 +1411,12 @@ fail:
+  */
+ static int
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+-    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
++    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
+ {
+ 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+ 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[2];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	int			 nattr = 1;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -1247,10 +1432,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+ 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	if (uri->id != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
++		nattr++;
++	}
++	if (uri->object != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
++		nattr++;
++	}
++
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+-	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
++	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -1532,16 +1730,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
+ 
+-/*
+- * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
+- * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
+- */
+ static int
+-pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+-    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
+-    struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
++pkcs11_initialize_provider(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp)
+ {
+-	int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
++	int need_finalize = 0;
+ 	int ret = -1;
+ 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ 	void *handle = NULL;
+@@ -1550,162 +1742,309 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ 	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
+ 	CK_ULONG i;
++	char *provider_module = NULL;
++	struct pkcs11_module *m = NULL;
++
++	/* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */
++	if (uri->module_path == NULL) {
++#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER
++		provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER);
++#else
++		error_f("No module path provided");
++ 		goto fail;
++#endif
++	} else {
++		provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path);
++	}
++	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
++	p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
+ 
+-	if (providerp == NULL)
+-		goto fail;
+-	*providerp = NULL;
+-
+-	if (keyp != NULL)
+-		*keyp = NULL;
+-	if (labelsp != NULL)
+-		*labelsp = NULL;
+-
+-	if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
+-		debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
++	if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_module, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) {
++		error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_module);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_id, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) {
+-		error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_id);
+-		goto fail;
++	if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL
++	   && m->valid) {
++		debug_f("provider module already initialized: %s", provider_module);
++		free(provider_module);
++		/* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */
++		m->refcount++;
++		p->module = m;
++		p->valid = 1;
++		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
++		p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
++		*providerp = p;
++		return 0;
++	} else {
++		m = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*m));
++		p->module = m;
++		m->refcount++;
+ 	}
++
+ 	/* open shared pkcs11-library */
+-	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+-		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
++	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_module, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
++		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+-	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+-	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
+-	p->handle = handle;
++	p->module->handle = handle;
+ 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
+ 	if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	p->function_list = f;
++	m->function_list = f;
+ 	if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 	need_finalize = 1;
+-	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
++	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&m->info)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
++		goto fail;
++	}
++	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
++	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
++	    strncmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID, 32)) {
++		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
++		    m->info.manufacturerID);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.*s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
+-	    " libraryDescription <%.*s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
+-	    provider_id,
+-	    RMSPACE(p->info.manufacturerID),
+-	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
+-	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
+-	    RMSPACE(p->info.libraryDescription),
+-	    p->info.libraryVersion.major,
+-	    p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
+-	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
++	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
++	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.32s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
++	    " libraryDescription <%.32s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
++	    provider_module,
++	    m->info.manufacturerID,
++	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
++	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
++	    m->info.libraryDescription,
++	    m->info.libraryVersion.major,
++	    m->info.libraryVersion.minor);
++
++	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &m->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if (p->nslots == 0) {
+-		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id);
++	if (m->nslots == 0) {
++		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_module);
+ 		ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
+-	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
++	m->slotlist = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
++	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, m->slotlist, &m->nslots))
+ 	    != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
++	m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
+ 	p->valid = 1;
+-	nkeys = 0;
+-	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+-		token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
+-		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
++	m->valid = 1;
++	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
++		token = &m->slotinfo[i].token;
++		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token))
+ 		    != CKR_OK) {
+ 			error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
+-			    "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv);
+-			continue;
+-		}
+-		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
+-			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
+-			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i);
++			    "failed: %lu", provider_module, (u_long)i, rv);
++			token->flags = 0;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.*s> "
+ 		    "manufacturerID <%.*s> model <%.*s> serial <%.*s> "
+ 		    "flags 0x%lx",
+-		    provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
++		    provider_module, (unsigned long)i,
+ 		    RMSPACE(token->label), RMSPACE(token->manufacturerID),
+ 		    RMSPACE(token->model), RMSPACE(token->serialNumber),
+ 		    token->flags);
++	}
++	m->module_path = provider_module;
++	provider_module = NULL;
++
++	/* now owned by caller */
++	*providerp = p;
++
++	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
++	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
++
++	return 0;
++fail:
++	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
++		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
++		    provider_module, rv);
++	free(provider_module);
++	if (m) {
++		free(m->slotlist);
++		free(m);
++	}
++	if (p) {
++		free(p->name);
++		free(p);
++	}
++	if (handle)
++		dlclose(handle);
++	return (ret);
++}
++
++/*
++ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
++ * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
++ */
++static int
++pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
++    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp,
++    CK_ULONG user)
++{
++	int nkeys;
++	int ret = -1;
++	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
++	CK_ULONG i;
++	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
++	char *provider_uri = NULL;
++
++	if (providerp == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++	*providerp = NULL;
++
++	if (keyp != NULL)
++		*keyp = NULL;
++
++	if ((ret = pkcs11_initialize_provider(uri, &p)) != 0) {
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++	if (pin == NULL && uri->pin != NULL) {
++		pin = uri->pin;
++	}
++	nkeys = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) {
++		token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token;
++		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
++			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_uri, (u_long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		if (uri->token != NULL &&
++		    strncmp(token->label, uri->token, 32) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%.32s) "
++			    "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu",
++			    token->label, (unsigned long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		if (uri->manuf != NULL &&
++		    strncmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf, 32) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
++			    "manufacturerID (%.32s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
++			    "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		if (uri->serial != NULL &&
++		    strncmp(token->serialNumber, uri->serial, 16) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
++			    "serialNumber (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
++			    "slot %lu", token->serialNumber, (unsigned long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.32s> manufacturerID <%.32s> "
++		    "model <%.16s> serial <%.16s> flags 0x%lx",
++		    provider_uri, (unsigned long)i,
++		    token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
++		    token->serialNumber, token->flags);
+ 		/*
+-		 * open session, login with pin and retrieve public
+-		 * keys (if keyp is provided)
++		 * open session if not yet opened, login with pin and
++		 * retrieve public keys (if keyp is provided)
+ 		 */
+-		if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
++		if ((p->module->slotinfo[i].session != 0 ||
++		    (ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0) && /* ??? */
+ 		    keyp == NULL)
+ 			continue;
+-		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+-		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+-		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
++		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->module->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
+ 		    pkcs11_interactive) {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Some tokens require login before they will
+ 			 * expose keys.
+ 			 */
+-			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
++			debug3_f("Trying to login as there were no keys found");
++			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->module->slotinfo[i],
+ 			    CKU_USER) < 0) {
+ 				error("login failed");
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
+-			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+-			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
++			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++		}
++		if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) {
++			debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%.32s) ",
++			    uri->object);
++			/* Try once more without the label filter */
++			char *label = uri->object;
++			uri->object = NULL; /* XXX clone uri? */
++			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++			uri->object = label;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	pin = NULL; /* Will be cleaned up with URI */
+ 
+ 	/* now owned by caller */
+ 	*providerp = p;
+ 
+-	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+-	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
+-
++	free(provider_uri);
+ 	return (nkeys);
+ fail:
+-	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+-		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
+ 	if (p) {
+-		free(p->name);
+-		free(p->slotlist);
+-		free(p->slotinfo);
+-		free(p);
++		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
++	      	pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+ 	}
+-	if (handle)
+-		dlclose(handle);
+ 	if (ret > 0)
+ 		ret = -1;
+ 	return (ret);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
+- * fails if provider already exists
+- */
++static int
++pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
++    char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
++{
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
++
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++	} else {
++		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
++	}
++
++	r = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, providerp, user);
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
++
++	return r;
++}
++
+ int
+-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+-    char ***labelsp)
++pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
++    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ 	int nkeys;
++	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++
++	debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri);
+ 
+-	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
+-	    &p, CKU_USER);
++	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER);
+ 
+ 	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
+ 	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
+@@ -1714,7 +2053,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+ 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+ 	}
+ 	if (nkeys == 0)
+-		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id);
++		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_uri);
++
++	free(provider_uri);
++	return nkeys;
++}
++
++/*
++ * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
++ * fails if provider already exists
++ */
++int
++pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
++    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
++{
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++	int nkeys;
++
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++	} else {
++		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
++	}
++
++	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp);
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 
+ 	return (nkeys);
+ }
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h
+index 52602231..9ce20c1f 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.h
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h
+@@ -22,10 +22,14 @@
+ #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		4
+ #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED		5
+ 
++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
++
+ int	pkcs11_init(int);
+ void	pkcs11_terminate(void);
+ int	pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
++int	pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
+ int	pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
++int	pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
+ #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
+ struct sshkey *
+ 	pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index c23d3b9e..98b103c9 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -890,6 +890,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'i':
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++			if (strlen(optarg) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++			    strncmp(optarg, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
++			    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++				add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1);
++				break;
++			}
++#endif
+ 			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
+ 			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
+ 				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
+@@ -1847,6 +1855,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
+ #endif
++	pkcs11_terminate();
+ 
+  skip_connect:
+ 	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
+@@ -2370,6 +2379,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++static void
++load_pkcs11_identity(char *pkcs11_uri, char *identity_files[],
++    struct sshkey *identity_keys[], int *n_ids)
++{
++	int nkeys, i;
++	struct sshkey **keys;
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++
++	debug("identity file '%s' from pkcs#11", pkcs11_uri);
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (pkcs11_uri_parse(pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0)
++	fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI %s", pkcs11_uri);
++
++	/* we need to merge URI and provider together */
++	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && uri->module_path == NULL)
++		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
++
++	if (options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
++	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, NULL, &keys, NULL)) > 0) {
++		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
++			if (*n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
++				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
++				continue;
++			}
++			identity_keys[*n_ids] = keys[i];
++			identity_files[*n_ids] = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++			(*n_ids)++;
++		}
++		free(keys);
++	}
++
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
++}
++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
++
+ /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
+ static void
+ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+@@ -2384,11 +2432,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+ 	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+ 	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+-	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+-	char **comments = NULL;
+-	int nkeys;
+-#endif /* PKCS11 */
+ 
+ 	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
+ 	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
+@@ -2401,33 +2444,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+-	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
+-	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+-	    (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
+-	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
+-	    &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
+-		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+-			if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
+-				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+-				free(comments[i]);
+-				continue;
+-			}
+-			identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
+-			identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
+-			n_ids++;
+-		}
+-		free(keys);
+-		free(comments);
++	/* handle fallback from PKCS11Provider option */
++	pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode);
++
++	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL) {
++		struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++
++		uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++		if (uri == NULL)
++			fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++		/* Construct simple PKCS#11 URI to simplify access */
++		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
++
++		/* Add it as any other IdentityFile */
++		cp = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++		add_identity_file(&options, NULL, cp, 1);
++		free(cp);
++
++		pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 	}
+ #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
++		char *name = options.identity_files[i];
+ 		if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
+-		    strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
++		    strcasecmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ 			free(options.identity_files[i]);
+ 			options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+-		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++		if (strlen(name) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++		    strncmp(name, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
++		    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++			load_pkcs11_identity(name, identity_files,
++			    identity_keys, &n_ids);
++			free(options.identity_files[i]);
++			continue;
++		}
++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
++		cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid());
+ 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ 		free(cp);
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 3a8e246c..8d5d0722 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1263,6 +1263,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
+ .Cm CertificateFile
+ in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
+ the identity.
++.Pp
++The authentication identity can be also specified in a form of PKCS#11 URI
++starting with a string
++.Cm pkcs11: .
++There is supported a subset of the PKCS#11 URI as defined
++in RFC 7512 (implemented path arguments
++.Cm id ,
++.Cm manufacturer ,
++.Cm object ,
++.Cm token
++and query arguments
++.Cm module-path
++and
++.Cm pin-value
++). The URI can not be in quotes.
+ .It Cm IgnoreUnknown
+ Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
+ encountered in configuration parsing.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch b/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
similarity index 51%
rename from openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
rename to 0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
index 8ae0948..dbd69aa 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
+From 507e6f245557ae7261806f7ecbd40697cb0dd389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 29/50] openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
+index 9554b188..7f9795a5 100644
 --- a/scp.c
 +++ b/scp.c
-@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -1183,7 +1183,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
@@ -13,4 +22,6 @@ index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
  			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
  			    thost, targ);
  			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+-- 
+2.49.0
 
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
similarity index 58%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
rename to 0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
index 762825e..498e3f5 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@@ -1,13 +1,24 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-08-30 13:29:00.174292872 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-08-30 13:31:32.009548808 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@ or
- .Qq *.c.example.com
- domains.
+From b436140fe3abd9f97f01f9af9f5da5cf6c5d7725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 30/50] openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5  | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ sshd_config.5 | 179 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 8d5d0722..a43b2a27 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -438,17 +438,13 @@ A single argument of
+ causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
+ This is the default behaviour.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
@@ -24,13 +35,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@ If the option is set to
+@@ -587,20 +583,25 @@ If the option is set to
  (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
@@ -54,33 +65,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -616,13 +617,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+@@ -1022,6 +1016,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -1034,10 +1033,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -92,34 +103,103 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1219,29 +1216,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1056,36 +1053,25 @@ will not be converted automatically,
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
+-to the default set instead of replacing them.
++to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+-at the head of the default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+@@ -1138,6 +1124,17 @@ to prefer their algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++The proposed
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
++.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
++would break the order given by the
++.Pa known_hosts
++file.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+ real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+@@ -1376,6 +1373,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
+ their preference order.
+ The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
+@@ -1384,29 +1386,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
+-.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@@ -127,17 +207,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@ function, and all code in the
+ .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+@@ -1522,37 +1512,33 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
@@ -178,13 +259,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1553,37 +1542,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+@@ -1741,39 +1727,31 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
@@ -214,27 +295,44 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-08-30 13:29:00.157292731 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5	2021-08-30 13:32:16.263918533 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@ If the argument is
++.Pp
++This option affects also
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be
+@@ -2497,7 +2475,9 @@ for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+ This file must be world-readable.
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+-.Xr ssh 1
++.Xr ssh 1 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 26fcdc84..583a01cd 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@ If the argument is
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
@@ -251,13 +349,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
+@@ -533,20 +529,25 @@ The default is
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the ciphers allowed.
@@ -281,27 +379,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -573,13 +574,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -685,21 +679,22 @@ For this to work
+@@ -774,53 +768,43 @@ For this to work
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
@@ -327,18 +425,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
-@@ -799,26 +794,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
- .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the host key signature algorithms
- that the server offers.
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+-the default set instead of replacing them.
++the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
+-the head of the default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@@ -349,70 +456,102 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -887,25 +871,14 @@ is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+ The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+@@ -1052,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+ The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
+@@ -1060,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -1010,15 +997,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+@@ -1106,14 +1084,6 @@ sntrup761x25519-sha512
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
--diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@ function, and all code in the
+@@ -1200,21 +1170,26 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
@@ -437,7 +576,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+@@ -1257,15 +1232,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -453,13 +592,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1548,37 +1522,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1753,36 +1719,25 @@ or equivalent.)
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
@@ -489,14 +628,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -2289,7 +2244,9 @@ This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+-.Xr sshd 8
++.Xr sshd 8 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch b/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..529940f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From 430bd33963725beb8ec01a1e581529ae6bf6bec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 31/50] openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf
+
+---
+ configure.ac |   1 +
+ kex.c        | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d9bd2f51..d92a8580 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3137,6 +3137,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 19a56e8e..8b200ff4 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
++# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -1078,6 +1083,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
++static const char *
++digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return SN_sha1;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return SN_sha256;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return SN_sha384;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return SN_sha512;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	u_char *key = NULL;
++	int r, key_len;
++
++	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
++       char keytype = (char)id;
++
++	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (md == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (param_bld == NULL) {
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
++	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
++		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
++				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
++				hash, hashlen) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
++				&keytype, 1);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
++	if (params == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
++	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
++	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
++#endif
++	*keyp = key;
++	key = NULL;
++	r = 0;
++
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	free (key);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (r < 0) {
++		return r;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1141,6 +1247,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch b/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
similarity index 62%
rename from openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
rename to 0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
index 89c35ef..c67373c 100644
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+++ b/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
+From 6aa231d9acfeca870ee87e3bf9c4a1239518706d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 32/50] openssh-8.2p1-visibility
+
+---
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
 diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+index 347b2122..344f8a8a 100644
 --- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
 +++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
  #endif
  }
  
@@ -11,7 +20,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_api_version(void)
  {
  	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
-@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -20,7 +29,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
      const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
      struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
-@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -29,7 +38,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
      const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
      uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -38,3 +47,6 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
      struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
  {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch b/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
similarity index 55%
rename from openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
rename to 0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
index 8b83bc3..32a9056 100644
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
+From cfe5a99d335eb57b8c08b4eb6b4535dd042d96e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 33/50] openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6
+
+---
+ channels.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
 diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index 7438c1a5..95836d50 100644
 --- a/channels.c
 +++ b/channels.c
-@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
- 			if (x11_use_localhost)
- 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+@@ -5055,6 +5055,16 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
  				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
@@ -23,8 +28,6 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
  				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
  					close(socks[n]);
  				num_socks = 0;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- 				break;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch b/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
similarity index 67%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
rename to 0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
index dbdbe93..15e59c2 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+++ b/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors	2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c	2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
-@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+From 8de0391e3b3eb75e23ee9f173f04a9c78f2b96c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 34/50] openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index b4100ea1..a042c3c8 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -523,7 +523,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  		goto auth_fail;
  
  	if (!do_pam_account()) {
@@ -14,7 +24,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  		goto auth_fail;
  	}
  	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+@@ -580,8 +584,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
  		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
  	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
@@ -27,18 +37,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
  		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
  	else
-@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 			plen++;
+@@ -890,9 +896,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
  			free(msg);
  			break;
-+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
-+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
 +			sshpam_account_status = 0;
 +			/* FALLTHROUGH */
  		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
 -			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -				sshpam_account_status = 0;
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
  				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
  			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch b/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
similarity index 53%
rename from openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
rename to 0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
index 6710304..58a5036 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+++ b/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,18 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h	2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
+From a68f3741fdc01bf6823a69d2442caba7de9835f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 35/50] openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch
+
+---
+ pathnames.h | 1 +
+ scp.1       | 7 +++++++
+ scp.c       | 8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
+index 1158bec9..43f0c570 100644
+--- a/pathnames.h
++++ b/pathnames.h
 @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
  #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
  #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
@@ -9,12 +21,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
  
  #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
  #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
-@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
- This is helpful in
- debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index aa2e2d8b..373d7237 100644
+--- a/scp.1
++++ b/scp.1
+@@ -331,6 +331,13 @@ during download or upload.
+ By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+ .El
  .El
 +.Pp
 +Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
@@ -26,10 +39,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
  .Sh EXIT STATUS
  .Ex -std scp
  .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
-@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 7f9795a5..7ed1a54c 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -649,6 +649,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  	if (iamremote)
  		mode = MODE_SCP;
  
@@ -44,3 +58,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
  	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
  		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
  
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch b/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..929b408
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+From 99e1e3af524376788e591ca73387f1ca37e6f5ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 36/50] openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp
+
+---
+ scp.c         |  2 +-
+ sftp-client.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ sftp-client.h |  4 ++--
+ sftp.c        |  6 +++---
+ 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 7ed1a54c..0c87dd0e 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
+ 			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 9f8ab4af..873dec04 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
++++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ 
+ /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+ static char *
+-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
++sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+-		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+-		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+-		free(errmsg);
+-		sshbuf_free(msg);
+-		return NULL;
++		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
++			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
++			if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
++			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
++					path, strlen(path));
++
++			get_msg(conn, msg);
++			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
++				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
++
++			if (id != expected_id)
++				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
++
++			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
++				free(errmsg);
++
++				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
++				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
++					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
++				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++				free(errmsg);
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++		} else {
++			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++			free(errmsg);
++			sshbuf_free(msg);
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
++sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
+ {
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@ sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+-		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
+ 	}
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@ sftp_download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
++	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2366,12 +2398,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ int
+ sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
++	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2826,7 +2858,7 @@ sftp_crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ 	char *from_path_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
++	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
+ 		    from_path);
+ 		return -1;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+index 74cdae7d..00ed6630 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.h
++++ b/sftp-client.h
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+ int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
++char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+ char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int sftp_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+ int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    int, int, int, int, int, int);
++    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index bdedd141..322e6d1f 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+ 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+ 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
+ 		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+-		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
++		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 			err = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+ 	}
+ #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+ 
+-	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
++	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("Need cwd");
+ 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch b/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59e530b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 286bc4a302b5130f732c857095ae665f7bea01dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 37/50] openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits
+
+---
+ readconf.c | 1 +
+ servconf.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 6c04ed43..f340bf50 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
++	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+ 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 15c99b30..84891544 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch b/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74dd5b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 26af04432f6404eb03780265a5cce948ecfec8dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 38/50] openssh-8.7p1-ibmca
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index f6112458..417c2048 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
similarity index 78%
rename from openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
rename to 0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
index 4473518..e4f89c7 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,57 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+From b0505837bfa2dcdf07800634fa80c5cdb78799dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 39/50] openssh-7.6p1-audit
+
+---
+ Makefile.in       |   2 +-
+ audit-bsm.c       |  45 ++++++-
+ audit-linux.c     | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ audit.c           | 129 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ audit.h           |  22 +++-
+ auditstub.c       |  52 ++++++++
+ auth.c            |   3 -
+ auth.h            |   4 +
+ auth2-hostbased.c |  16 ++-
+ auth2-pubkey.c    |  16 ++-
+ auth2.c           |   3 -
+ cipher.c          |  21 +---
+ cipher.h          |  20 ++-
+ kex.c             |  61 ++++++++--
+ kex.h             |   2 +
+ mac.c             |  14 +++
+ mac.h             |   1 +
+ monitor.c         | 194 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h         |   8 +-
+ monitor_wrap.c    | 130 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ monitor_wrap.h    |  11 +-
+ packet.c          |  98 +++++++++++++--
+ packet.h          |   1 +
+ session.c         |  83 ++++++++++++-
+ session.h         |  10 +-
+ sshd-session.c    | 104 ++++++++++++++--
+ sshd.c            |  10 ++
+ 27 files changed, 1258 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 auditstub.c
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 6c417ef7..a2942392 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexgssc.o \
+ 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+-	sshbuf-io.o
++	sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o
+ 
+ SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
+ 
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+index ccfcf6f7..a49abb92 100644
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -373,12 +373,25 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
  #endif
  }
  
@@ -19,17 +69,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
- void
++void
 +audit_count_session_open(void)
 +{
 +	/* not necessary */
 +}
 +
-+void
+ void
  audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
  {
- 	/* not implemented */
-@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
@@ -42,7 +91,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
  void
  audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
  {
-@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
+@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
  		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
  	}
  }
@@ -71,234 +120,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
 +	/* not implemented */
 +}
  #endif /* BSM */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
-@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@
-  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
-  */
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
- ssh_audit_event_t
-@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
- const char *
- audit_username(void)
- {
--	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
--	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
-+	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
- 
--	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
-+	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- 		return (unknownuser);
--	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
--		return (invaliduser);
- 	return (the_authctxt->user);
- }
- 
-@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
-+{
-+	char *fp;
-+
-+	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
-+		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	free(fp);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-@@ -138,6 +171,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
-+ * audit_session_open.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
-+	      audit_username());
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
-  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
-  *
-@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- /*
-  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
-  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
-+ * audit_end_command.
-  */
--void
--audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+int
-+audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
- {
- 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), command);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
-+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
-+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
-+	    audit_username(), command);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
-+ *
-+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
-+ */
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d",
-+		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(),
-+		fp, rv);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
-+	       uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
-+	        (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
- }
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
- # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
- 
- #include "loginrec.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- 
- struct ssh;
- 
-@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
- 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
- };
-+
-+enum ssh_audit_kex {
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER,
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC,
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION
-+};
- typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
- 
-+int	listening_for_clients(void);
-+
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
-+void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
--void	audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
-+void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-+int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
-+void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
-+void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
-+void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
-+void	audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
-+void	audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos);
-+void	audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
+diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
+index 3fcbe5c5..d484b82b 100644
+--- a/audit-linux.c
++++ b/audit-linux.c
 @@ -33,27 +33,40 @@
  
  #include "log.h"
@@ -310,11 +135,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +#include "servconf.h"
  #include "canohost.h"
  #include "packet.h"
--
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +#include "channels.h"
 +#include "session.h"
-+
+ 
 +#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256
 +
 +extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -348,7 +172,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  	saved_errno = errno;
  	close(audit_fd);
  
-@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
+@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
  		rc = 0;
  	errno = saved_errno;
  
@@ -446,7 +270,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
  
  void
-@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+@@ -76,49 +176,211 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
@@ -525,6 +349,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
 +		if (options.use_pam)
 +			break;
++	/* Fallthrough */
 +	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
@@ -564,7 +389,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +{
 +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
 +	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
++	static const char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
 +	char *s;
 +	int audit_fd;
 +
@@ -582,7 +407,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +#endif
 +}
 +
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++static const char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
 +
 +void
 +audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress,
@@ -661,7 +486,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +	}
 +	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
 +			buf, NULL,
-+			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), /*FIXME listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh) */
 +			NULL, 1);
 +	audit_close(audit_fd);
 +	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
@@ -669,9 +494,238 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +		error("cannot write into audit");
 +}
  #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
+index dd2f0355..d0433c3a 100644
+--- a/audit.c
++++ b/audit.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@
+  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
+  */
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
+ ssh_audit_event_t
+@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
+ const char *
+ audit_username(void)
+ {
+-	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
+-	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
++	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
+ 
+-	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
++	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+ 		return (unknownuser);
+-	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
+-		return (invaliduser);
+ 	return (the_authctxt->user);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
++{
++	char *fp;
++
++	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	free(fp);
++}
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++	mm_audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
++{
++	mm_audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid());
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
++{
++	mm_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid());
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+@@ -137,6 +170,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
++ * audit_session_open.
++ */
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
++	      audit_username());
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ /*
+  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
+  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
++ * audit_end_command.
+  */
+-void
+-audit_run_command(const char *command)
++int
++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ 	    audit_username(), command);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
++ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
++ */
++void
++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
++	    audit_username(), command);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
++ *
++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
++ */
++int
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d",
++		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(),
++		fp, rv);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
++ */
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
++ */
++void
++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
++	       uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
++	        (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
++ */
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
++ */
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+ }
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
+index 38cb5ad3..45d66ccf 100644
+--- a/audit.h
++++ b/audit.h
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+ 
+ #include "loginrec.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ 
+ struct ssh;
+ 
+@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+ 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+ };
++
++enum ssh_audit_kex {
++	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER,
++	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC,
++	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION
++};
+ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+ 
++int	listening_for_clients(void);
++
+ void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void	audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
++void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+-void	audit_run_command(const char *);
++int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
++void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
++int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
++void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
++void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
++void	audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
++void	audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos);
++void	audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..639a798d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/auditstub.c
 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
 +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
 +
@@ -725,32 +779,56 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
 +audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
 +{
 +}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.682061561 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		} else {
- 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
- 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index e4578169..e10e804f 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -501,9 +501,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
+ 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
+ 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+ #endif
 -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
--#endif
- 		}
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 		if (options.use_pam)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.656061361 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+-		audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
+-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 39163035..6be52d70 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,8 @@ struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+ int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
+ int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+     u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
++int	 hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+ 
+ /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
+ int	 auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
+@@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ int	 auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *,
+     char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+ int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
+     struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
++int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+ FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ 
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index a3be6e49..8cebaffd 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
- 	    chost, key)) &&
--	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
+ 	if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ 	    chost, key) &&
+-	    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++	    mm_hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
  		authenticated = 1;
  
-@@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done:
+@@ -174,6 +174,20 @@ done:
  	return authenticated;
  }
  
@@ -771,19 +849,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
  /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
  int
  hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.726061899 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 0d5ae0df..99cb810f 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  		/* test for correct signature */
  		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
--		    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 		if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
+-		    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++		    mm_user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
  		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
  		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
-@@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done:
+ 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
+@@ -328,6 +328,20 @@ done:
  	return authenticated;
  }
  
@@ -802,45 +881,26 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
 +}
 +
  static int
- match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
- {
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
- 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
- #endif
+ match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
+     struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 8ec41de2..4a8515ea 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -310,9 +310,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			authctxt->valid = 0;
+ 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
+ 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--		audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
--#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.697061676 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
- 
- char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
- char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-+int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- 
- FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
-@@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_ty
- int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
- int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
-     u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
-+int	 hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- 
- /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
- const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
+-			mm_audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
+-#endif
+ 		}
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (options.use_pam)
+diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
+index 8a18da2d..57d55325 100644
+--- a/cipher.c
++++ b/cipher.c
 @@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
  	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
  };
@@ -867,7 +927,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
  static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-@@ -422,7 +403,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *
+@@ -420,7 +401,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
  void
  cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
  {
@@ -876,9 +936,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
  		return;
  	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
  		chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
+diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
+index 6533ff2b..2e05a021 100644
+--- a/cipher.h
++++ b/cipher.h
 @@ -47,7 +47,25 @@
  #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
  #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
@@ -906,18 +967,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
  struct sshcipher_ctx;
  
  const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.743062030 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 8b200ff4..62f607d6 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "audit.h"
  
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-@@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ /* prototype */
+ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+@@ -821,12 +822,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
  }
  
  static int
@@ -936,7 +998,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
  		error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name);
  		free(name);
-@@ -842,8 +847,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
+@@ -847,8 +852,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
  {
  	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
  
@@ -950,7 +1012,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
  		error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name);
  		free(name);
-@@ -856,12 +865,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
+@@ -861,12 +870,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
  }
  
  static int
@@ -969,7 +1031,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  #ifdef WITH_ZLIB
  	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
  		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
-@@ -1002,7 +1015,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1030,7 +1043,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
  		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
  		nmac  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
  		ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
@@ -978,7 +1040,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  		    sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
  			kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
  			peer[nenc] = NULL;
-@@ -1017,7 +1030,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1045,7 +1058,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
  			peer[nmac] = NULL;
  			goto out;
  		}
@@ -987,7 +1049,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  		    sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
  			kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
  			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
-@@ -1040,6 +1053,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1068,6 +1081,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
  		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
  		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
  		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
@@ -998,7 +1060,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  	}
  	/* XXX need runden? */
  	kex->we_need = need;
-@@ -1297,6 +1314,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_cha
+@@ -1337,6 +1354,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len)
  }
  #endif
  
@@ -1035,10 +1097,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  /*
   * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
   * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.683061568 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 0e080ea3..6a55aadf 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
  #endif
  
@@ -1047,9 +1110,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
  int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
  int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
      struct sshbuf **);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
+diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
+index f3dda669..bf051baa 100644
+--- a/mac.c
++++ b/mac.c
 @@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
  	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
  }
@@ -1071,31 +1135,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
  /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
  #define	MAC_SEP	","
  int
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3
+diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h
+index 0b119d7a..5fb593b9 100644
+--- a/mac.h
++++ b/mac.h
+@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int,
  int	 mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
      const u_char *, size_t);
  void	 mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
 +void	 mac_destroy(struct sshmac *);
  
  #endif /* SSHMAC_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
- 	kexgssc.o \
- 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
--	sshbuf-io.o
-+	sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o
- 
- SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 43c10a4e..fbc35782 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
 @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
  #include "compat.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -1104,16 +1158,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #include "match.h"
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "sk-api.h"
-@@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+@@ -110,6 +111,8 @@ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ extern struct include_list includes;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
  
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
 +
  /* State exported from the child */
  static struct sshbuf *child_state;
  
-@@ -157,6 +160,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh
+@@ -154,6 +157,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -1125,7 +1179,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #endif
  
  static Authctxt *authctxt;
-@@ -215,6 +223,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -214,6 +222,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
  #endif
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
@@ -1136,7 +1190,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #endif
  #ifdef BSD_AUTH
      {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-@@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+@@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
@@ -1148,7 +1202,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #endif
      {0, 0, NULL}
  };
-@@ -1444,8 +1461,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1569,8 +1586,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
  	int encoded_ret;
  	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
@@ -1160,7 +1214,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
-@@ -1454,6 +1473,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1579,6 +1598,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
  	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
  		fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
@@ -1169,7 +1223,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  
  	/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
  	if (*sigalg == '\0') {
-@@ -1469,14 +1490,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1594,14 +1615,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	case MM_USERKEY:
  		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
  		auth_method = "publickey";
@@ -1189,16 +1243,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  		break;
  	}
  	if (!valid_data)
-@@ -1488,8 +1514,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1613,8 +1639,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
  		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
  
 -	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
 -	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
-	debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key),
-	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
-	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
-@@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
+ 	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
+ 	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
+ 	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+@@ -1702,13 +1726,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
  }
  
  static void
@@ -1219,7 +1273,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	session_unused(s->self);
  }
  
-@@ -1649,7 +1679,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+@@ -1775,7 +1805,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  
   error:
  	if (s != NULL)
@@ -1228,7 +1282,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
-@@ -1668,7 +1698,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, i
+@@ -1794,7 +1824,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
  	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
@@ -1237,16 +1291,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	free(tty);
  	return (0);
-@@ -1690,6 +1720,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+@@ -1816,6 +1846,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
  		sshpam_cleanup();
  #endif
  
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
  	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
  		if (errno != EINTR)
  			exit(1);
-@@ -1736,12 +1768,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1862,12 +1894,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
  	char *cmd;
  	int r;
@@ -1295,7 +1349,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	free(cmd);
  	return (0);
  }
-@@ -1813,6 +1880,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1940,6 +2007,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  void
  mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  {
@@ -1303,7 +1357,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
  
  	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-@@ -1820,6 +1888,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct
+@@ -1947,6 +2015,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
  	    child_state);
  	debug3_f("GOT new keys");
@@ -1323,7 +1377,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  
-@@ -2111,3 +2192,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ss
+@@ -2234,3 +2315,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) {
  
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
@@ -1426,10 +1480,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index d4d631dd..2c64f07d 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -66,7 +66,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
@@ -1444,10 +1499,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
  
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index b6e3b3f3..1a079c15 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
   */
  
  int
@@ -1456,7 +1512,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
      const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
      struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
  {
-@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
+@@ -583,7 +583,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
  		*sig_detailsp = NULL;
  	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
@@ -1466,7 +1522,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
-@@ -569,6 +570,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
+@@ -616,6 +617,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -1489,7 +1545,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  void
  mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
  {
-@@ -921,11 +938,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audi
+@@ -1032,11 +1049,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  
@@ -1504,7 +1560,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  
  	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
  
-@@ -935,6 +953,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
+@@ -1046,6 +1064,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
  		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
@@ -1535,10 +1591,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-@@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
+@@ -1294,3 +1336,83 @@ server_get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
+ 	return &ci;
  }
  
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +void
 +mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
@@ -1619,10 +1675,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +}
 +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 672dce52..661ed63b 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
      struct sshauthopt **);
  int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
      const char *, struct sshkey *);
@@ -1632,8 +1689,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
 +int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
  
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
+@@ -85,7 +87,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  #include "audit.h"
  void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
@@ -1647,9 +1704,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
  #endif
  
  struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c	2021-04-19 16:48:46.885608837 +0200
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 9dea2cfc..344b5f54 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
 @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
  #endif
  
@@ -1658,7 +1716,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  #include "compat.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
  #include "cipher.h"
-@@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh
+@@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
  	return ssh->state->connection_out;
  }
  
@@ -1672,7 +1730,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  /*
   * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
   * string must not be freed.
-@@ -583,22 +591,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
+@@ -675,22 +683,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
  {
  	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
  	u_int mode;
@@ -1700,7 +1758,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
  		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);	/* current keys */
  		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
-@@ -634,8 +639,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
+@@ -726,8 +731,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
  #endif	/* WITH_ZLIB */
  	cipher_free(state->send_context);
  	cipher_free(state->receive_context);
@@ -1719,7 +1777,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  		free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
  		ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
  		free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
-@@ -892,6 +907,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod
+@@ -984,6 +999,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
  		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
  		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
  		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
@@ -1727,7 +1785,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
  	}
  	/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
-@@ -2173,6 +2189,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2325,6 +2341,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
  	return (void *)ssh->state->output;
  }
  
@@ -1800,28 +1858,30 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
  static int
  ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
-@@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s
+diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
+index 49bb87f0..44a39a9e 100644
+--- a/packet.h
++++ b/packet.h
+@@ -223,4 +223,5 @@ const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp);
  # undef EC_POINT
  #endif
  
 +void	 packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int);
  #endif				/* PACKET_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.722061868 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
-@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 28bbb8a7..83fc9418 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
  extern int debug_flag;
  extern u_int utmp_len;
  extern int startup_pipe;
 -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
  extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
  extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
-@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
+@@ -653,6 +653,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
  	close(ttyfd);
  
@@ -1836,34 +1896,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	/* Enter interactive session. */
  	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
  	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
-@@ -736,15 +744,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -745,15 +753,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	    s->self);
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
 +		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
  	if (command != NULL)
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(command);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(command);
  	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
  		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
  
  		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
  			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(shell);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
  	}
 +	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
-+		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
++		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -1550,8 +1562,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1538,7 +1550,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+ 	/* remove keys from memory */
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
  	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 +	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 +	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@@ -1871,7 +1930,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  	/* Force a password change */
  	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -1763,6 +1778,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
+@@ -1750,6 +1766,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
  	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
  	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
  	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
@@ -1881,10 +1940,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
  	sessions_first_unused = id;
  }
-@@ -1843,6 +1861,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
+@@ -1828,6 +1847,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
+ 	return 1;
  }
  
- Session *
++Session *
 +session_by_id(int id)
 +{
 +	if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
@@ -1897,11 +1957,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
-+Session *
+ Session *
  session_by_tty(char *tty)
  {
- 	int i;
-@@ -2450,6 +2481,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se
+@@ -2445,6 +2477,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
  		chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
  }
  
@@ -1923,7 +1982,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +{
 +	if (s->command != NULL) {
 +		if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+			PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
++			mm_audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
 +		free(s->command);
 +		s->command = NULL;
 +		s->command_handle = -1;
@@ -1934,7 +1993,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  void
  session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  {
-@@ -2463,6 +2520,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
+@@ -2458,6 +2516,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		session_pty_cleanup(s);
@@ -1945,7 +2004,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	free(s->term);
  	free(s->display);
  	free(s->x11_chanids);
-@@ -2537,14 +2598,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -2534,14 +2596,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
  }
  
  void
@@ -1962,7 +2021,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  			else
  				session_close(ssh, s);
  		}
-@@ -2671,6 +2732,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc
+@@ -2668,6 +2730,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  	server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
  }
  
@@ -1978,18 +2037,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  void
  do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
-@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
+@@ -2731,7 +2802,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  	 * or if running in monitor.
  	 */
- 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ 	if (mm_is_monitor())
 -		session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
 +		session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
  }
  
  /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
+diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
+index 344a1ddf..a41c6efc 100644
+--- a/session.h
++++ b/session.h
 @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
  		char	*name;
  		char	*val;
@@ -2006,7 +2066,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
 @@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void	 session_unused(int);
  int	 session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *);
  void	 session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int);
- void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *);
+ void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
 -void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *));
 +void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *));
  void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
@@ -2017,46 +2077,65 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
  Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
  void	 session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
  void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "version.h"
-@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 81d30152..a808ac9a 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  
  /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 -void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 -void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
-+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
- static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
++void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
  
- static char *listener_proctitle;
-@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- 	num_listen_socks = -1;
+ /* XXX reduce to stub once postauth split */
+ int
+@@ -208,6 +208,41 @@ mm_is_monitor(void)
+ 	return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
  }
  
-+/*
-+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
-+ * client connection?)
-+ */
-+int listening_for_clients(void)
++static int
++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
 +{
-+	return num_listen_socks >= 0;
++      switch (k->type) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_RSA: {
++              const BIGNUM *d;
++              const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey);
++              RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
++              return d != NULL;
++          }
++      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_DSA: {
++              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
++              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
++              return priv_key != NULL;
++          }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_ECDSA: {
++              const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(k->pkey);
++              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdsa) != NULL;
++              }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++      case KEY_ED25519:
++              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
++      default:
++              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
++              return 0;
++      }
 +}
 +
- static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
-@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
- 	}
+ /*
+  * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
+  * As usual, this may only take signal-safe actions, even though it is
+@@ -236,18 +271,40 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+ 	_exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE);
  }
  
 -/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
@@ -2066,7 +2145,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 + */
  void
 -destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
++destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
  {
  	u_int i;
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -2088,12 +2167,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
 +			if (fp != NULL) {
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				if (privsep)
-+					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid));
-+				else
-+					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid);
++				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
 +#endif
 +				free(fp);
 +			}
@@ -2104,7 +2178,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
  			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
  		}
-@@ -397,20 +434,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+@@ -256,20 +313,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
  
  /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
  void
@@ -2144,43 +2218,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  		}
  		/* Certs do not need demotion */
  	}
-@@ -438,7 +493,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void)
- }
- 
- static void
--privsep_preauth_child(void)
-+privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	gid_t gidset[1];
- 
-@@ -453,7 +508,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	reseed_prngs();
- 
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
--	demote_sensitive_data();
-+	demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
-@@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- 		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
--	pid = fork();
-+	pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
- 	if (pid == -1) {
- 		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- 	} else if (pid != 0) {
-@@ -537,7 +592,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
- 		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
--		privsep_preauth_child();
-+		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- 		if (box != NULL)
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-@@ -589,7 +644,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+@@ -463,7 +538,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
@@ -2189,48 +2227,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	reseed_prngs();
  
-@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void)
-  * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
-  */
- static void
--server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
-+server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
- {
- 	fd_set *fdset;
- 	int i, j, ret, maxfd;
-@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
- 				unlink(options.pid_file);
-@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
--		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
-+		server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1387,6 +1462,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
  
  	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 +	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
  	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
  	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
  	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1432,6 +1510,14 @@ sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
  void
  cleanup_exit(int i)
  {
 +	static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+	int is_privsep_child;
 +
 +	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
 +	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
@@ -2238,77 +2249,48 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 +	if (in_cleanup)
 +		_exit(i);
 +	in_cleanup = 1;
+ 	extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */
+ 
  	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
- 		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
- 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
-@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 			}
- 		}
+@@ -1448,7 +1534,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
  	}
-+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
-+	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
-+		destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
-+	if (the_active_state != NULL)
-+		packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
--	if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+-	if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor())
 +	if (the_active_state != NULL &&
 +	    (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
++	    mm_is_monitor())
  		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
  #endif
- 	_exit(i);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
+ 	/* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index c9ea8e38..8a99f0b2 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -217,6 +217,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
+ 	num_listen_socks = 0;
  }
  
- int
-+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
++/*
++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
++ * client connection?)
++ */
++int listening_for_clients(void)
 +{
-+      switch (k->type) {
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_RSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *d;
-+              RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
-+              return d != NULL;
-+          }
-+      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_DSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-+              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
-+              return priv_key != NULL;
-+          }
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ECDSA:
-+              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ED25519:
-+              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
-+      default:
-+              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
-+              return 0;
-+      }
++	return num_listen_socks > 0;
 +}
 +
-+int
- sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
- {
- 	if (k == NULL)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int		 sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke
- int		 sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
- 
- int	 sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
-+int	 sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+ /* Allocate and initialise the children array */
+ static void
+ child_alloc(void)
+@@ -959,6 +968,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s,
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ 			    (int) received_sigterm);
++			/* destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); FIXME */
+ 			close_listen_socks();
+ 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ 				unlink(options.pid_file);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch b/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
similarity index 71%
rename from openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
rename to 0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
index b5895f7..fe732a6 100644
--- a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
-@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+From c288d4a26ad44dc481c9d18d2920c9d70474833c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 40/50] openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition
+
+---
+ monitor_wrap.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor_wrap.h |  2 ++
+ session.c      | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 1a079c15..768a59f9 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1415,4 +1415,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
@@ -52,10 +64,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
 +}
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
-@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 661ed63b..e957ba6e 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
  void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
@@ -64,10 +77,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
  #endif
  
  struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
-@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 83fc9418..b4753d93 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
  login_cap_t *lc;
  #endif
  
@@ -78,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
  static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -87,7 +101,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  #define USE_PIPES 1
  /*
   * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
-@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+@@ -513,6 +519,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		close(err[0]);
  #endif
  
@@ -96,7 +110,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
  		do_child(ssh, s, command);
  		/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+@@ -630,6 +638,9 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
  		close(ttyfd);
  
@@ -106,22 +120,22 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
  #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
  		do_login(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -766,6 +777,8 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	}
  	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -781,6 +794,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	 */
  	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
  
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++	if (ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@@ -136,7 +150,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	return ret;
  }
  
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1532,6 +1559,33 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
  }
  
@@ -147,12 +161,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	/* FIXME beldmit destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); */
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@@ -171,12 +184,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  /*
   * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
   * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1549,13 +1603,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
--	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	/* remove keys from memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@@ -185,3 +198,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	/* Force a password change */
  	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
  		do_setusercontext(pw);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e04f31b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+From 80d967a18261156573e7385f8e534a89d2767d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 41/50] openssh-9.0p1-audit-log
+
+---
+ audit-bsm.c   |  2 +-
+ audit-linux.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ audit.c       | 18 +++++++++---
+ audit.h       |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+index a49abb92..c6f56553 100644
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
+index d484b82b..dcfde3a9 100644
+--- a/audit-linux.c
++++ b/audit-linux.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char *audit_username(void);
+ 
+ static void
+-linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+ 	}
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
++	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	close(audit_fd);
+ 
+@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++	const char *rip;
++	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
+ 		else
+ 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
++	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+-		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+ 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		goto out;
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
+-		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		rip, NULL, rv);
++	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		goto out;
++
++	if (cert) {
++		char *pbuf;
++
++		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
++		if (pbuf == NULL)
++			goto out;
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
++			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
++		free(pbuf);
++		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++			goto out;
++
++		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
++			if (pbuf == NULL)
++				goto out;
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
++			free(pbuf);
++			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
+ out:
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+@@ -179,26 +211,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+ int
+ audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -211,31 +251,41 @@ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
++
+ 	switch(event) {
+ 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+ 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+@@ -255,9 +305,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 		if (user_login_count) {
+ 			while (user_login_count--)
+ 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++				    audit_hostname,
+ 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++			    audit_hostname,
+ 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ 		}
+@@ -266,12 +318,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++			audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
+index d0433c3a..28d51a14 100644
+--- a/audit.c
++++ b/audit.c
+@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ void
+ audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
+ {
+-	char *fp;
++	char *key_fp = NULL;
++	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
++	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
++		cert = key->cert;
++		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
++										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++	}
++	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
+ 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	free(fp);
++	if (key_fp)
++		free(key_fp);
++	if (issuer_fp)
++		free(issuer_fp);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
+index 45d66ccf..05ac132c 100644
+--- a/audit.h
++++ b/audit.h
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+ int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+-int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
+ void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a81cc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+From 79f9b2763d85ec592cb7e54dcf1c695d8dd138b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 14:01:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 42/54] openssh-7.7p1-fips
+
+---
+ dh.c                     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ dh.h                     |  1 +
+ kex-names.c              |  6 +++-
+ kex.c                    |  3 +-
+ kexgen.c                 | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ kexgexc.c                |  5 +++
+ myproposal.h             | 33 ++++++++++++++++++
+ readconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  3 ++
+ servconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
+ ssh-ed25519.c            |  9 +++++
+ ssh-gss.h                |  5 +++
+ ssh-keygen.c             | 22 ++++++++++--
+ ssh-rsa.c                |  3 ++
+ ssh.c                    |  5 +++
+ sshconnect2.c            |  9 ++++-
+ sshd-session.c           |  1 +
+ sshd.c                   | 13 +++++++
+ sshkey.c                 | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 19 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
+--- a/dh.c
++++ b/dh.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+ 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+ 	struct dhgroup dhg;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
++		    " Falling back to known groups.");
++		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
++	}
++
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
+@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 	return 8192;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
++ */
++int
++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
++{
++	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
++	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
++	DH *known = NULL;
++	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
++	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
++
++	if (bits <= 3072) {
++		known = dh_new_group14();
++	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
++		known = dh_new_group16();
++	} else {
++		known = dh_new_group18();
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
++
++	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
++	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
++		rv = 1;
++	}
++
++	DH_free(known);
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
+index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644
+--- a/dh.h
++++ b/dh.h
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+ 
+ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
++int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index 6c0b7c2b3..cd3902ad2 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -206,7 +207,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 62f607d6f..71fbe5cbe 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ # include <openssl/param_build.h>
+@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+ 
+ 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
+ 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
+-		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
+ 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
+ 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
+index 15df591ca..eecdceba2 100644
+--- a/kexgen.c
++++ b/kexgen.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
+index e99e0cf21..4c3feae09 100644
+--- a/kexgexc.c
++++ b/kexgexc.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+ 
+ 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
+index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
+--- a/myproposal.h
++++ b/myproposal.h
+@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256"
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256"
++
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
+@@ -79,6 +91,27 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
++	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++
+ /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+ #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index f340bf501..ea9d293c3 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+ # include <glob.h>
+ #else
+@@ -3043,11 +3044,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 1fabf99d0..ccb61586e 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 84891544b..8b708cbf4 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ #include <util.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -247,11 +248,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
+index 22d8db026..41942f4e5 100644
+--- a/ssh-ed25519.c
++++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -164,6 +165,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -221,6 +226,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..329dc9da0 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
+ 	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+ 
++#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
++	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
++
+ #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 16cff9473..792aafde0 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
+ #include "cipher.h"
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
++#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
+@@ -202,6 +204,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -259,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+ 	char *name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
++		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ 	else {
+ 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
+ #ifdef WITH_DSA
+@@ -1144,9 +1152,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+@@ -3849,7 +3865,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
++		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+ 
+ 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
+ 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 3ad1fddc4..6c2f771a3 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 98b103c9e..abc8b8439 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -1642,6 +1643,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 0af15bcc1..3e02f485d 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
++			 match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++
+ 		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ 		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ 		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++		    options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
++		free(gss_kex_filtered);
++
+ 		if (gss) {
+ 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a808ac9a6..a67a78391 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 8a99f0b29..5ff0b5ff0 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1611,6 +1613,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
++		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
++				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
++		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++		    sshkey_free(key);
++		    key = NULL;
++		    continue;
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -1830,6 +1839,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 4e41a78c7..ca1cdb642 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -408,6 +410,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+ 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 			continue;
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			switch (impl->type) {
++			case KEY_ED25519:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++			     continue;
++			     break;
++			default:
++			     break;
++			}
++		}
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
+@@ -1441,6 +1455,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ 	}
+ 
++	switch (type) {
++	case KEY_ED25519:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    sshkey_free(k);
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		break;
++	}
+ 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+ 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+ 	*ret = *k;
+@@ -2275,6 +2303,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*lenp = 0;
+ 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++	/* Fallthrough */
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+@@ -2311,6 +2344,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*detailsp = NULL;
+ 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+-- 
+2.51.0
+
diff --git a/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch b/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89c6ea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 299a602802d7c7d121306eb2aeae1502871a35cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 43/50] openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage
+
+---
+ ssh.1 | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 6a9fbdc5..755cdef2 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It BatchMode
+ .It BindAddress
+ .It BindInterface
+-.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CanonicalDomains
+ .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ .It CanonicalizeHostname
+ .It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
++.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CertificateFile
+ .It ChannelTimeout
+ .It CheckHostIP
+@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
+ .It DynamicForward
++.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
+ .It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EscapeChar
+@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RevokedHostKeys
++.It SecurityKeyProvider
+ .It RequiredRSASize
+ .It RevokedHostKeys
+ .It SecurityKeyProvider
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch b/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4c3b8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From 5c92430c08ac392b5b2ace899cc043247c923734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 44/50] openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs
+
+---
+ regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ sshconnect2.c            | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+index 28dcfe17..b9e716dc 100644
+--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
++++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
+ 
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
+ 
++PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
++    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
++echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r == 0 ]; then
++echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
++fi
++fi
++
+ trace "load hostkeys"
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
+ 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
+@@ -32,12 +45,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either
+ 
+ unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "key type $k"
++	hka=$k
++	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
++	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
++	fi
+ 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
++	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
++	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
+ 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+@@ -50,15 +67,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ done
+ 
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com' | maybe_filter_sk`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+ 
+ # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ HOSTKEYALGS=""
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
+ 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
+ done
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
+@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
+   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "cert type $k"
+ 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 14f7671a..ad3f560f 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
++	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -257,10 +257,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
+ 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ 
++	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
++		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
++				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
++		if (hkalgs)
++			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++		else
++			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	}
++
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+-	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++	    filtered_algs);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+@@ -304,6 +316,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
++	free(filtered_algs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch b/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..610cea0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+From be23afbab800c9b5ffea56b3f410a04156c08df2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 45/50] openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex
+
+---
+ dh.c      |  98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ kex.c     | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kex.h     |   6 +++
+ kexdh.c   |  52 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ kexecdh.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 5 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 8c9a29fa..ea0a0b09 100644
+--- a/dh.c
++++ b/dh.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
++
++	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
++		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed key generation");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* reuse context for key generation */
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not create or init context");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not generate keys");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
++	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* transferred */
++	pub_key = NULL;
++	priv_key = NULL;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
++	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 71fbe5cb..ce6a7b81 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -1614,3 +1614,142 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++/* 
++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
++ * The private key can be omitted.
++ */
++EVP_PKEY *
++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
++{
++  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
++  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
++  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
++  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
++  	const char *group_name;
++  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (k == NULL)
++    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
++     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
++                group_name,
++                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++	}
++  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
++    		const EC_GROUP *group;
++    		size_t len;
++
++		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
++		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
++		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
++		    pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len,
++		    bn_ctx);
++		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len) != 1) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++  	free(pub_ser);
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
++    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++
++	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (priv != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return r;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 6a55aadf..48f3bb87 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -311,6 +314,9 @@ int	kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
++int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
++    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
++int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
+diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
+index 0faab21b..32e1de51 100644
+--- a/kexdh.c
++++ b/kexdh.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@ int
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
++	/* import key */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* import peer key 
++	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
++	 */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not get key size");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
++	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
+index efb2e55a..d92ba54f 100644
+--- a/kexecdh.c
++++ b/kexecdh.c
+@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++static EC_KEY *
++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
++{
++	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	const char *group_name;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
++	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
++		goto out;
++	}
++out:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	return client_key;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
++	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@ kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
++	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
++	size_t klen = 0, publen;
++	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
++	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
++
++	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
++	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
++	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
++	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch b/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e75c8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+From e4ca3b9dba1cc832a9974493c91207d42e218a68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 46/50] openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof
+
+---
+ compat.c                               |  6 +++++
+ compat.h                               |  2 +-
+ monitor.c                              | 27 ++++++++++++++++------
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c       |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------
+ serverloop.c                           |  6 ++++-
+ ssh-rsa.c                              |  3 ++-
+ sshconnect2.c                          |  8 +++++++
+ sshd-session.c                         | 21 +++++++++++++++++
+ 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
+index b59f0bfc..4e611dc3 100644
+--- a/compat.c
++++ b/compat.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -125,16 +126,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
++	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
+index 1a19060f..2e6db5bf 100644
+--- a/compat.h
++++ b/compat.h
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index fbc35782..19cb058e 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -747,11 +747,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	struct sshkey *pubkey, *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
+-	size_t datlen, siglen;
+-	int r, is_proof = 0, keyid;
+-	u_int compat;
++	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
++	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
++	int r, is_proof = 0;
++	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
++	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -809,18 +810,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
++		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
++	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+index caf8f57f..09016aea 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
+ 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ 	if (kex != NULL)
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
++	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
++		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+index 3babe604..cc80fe97 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+index 0aff7c9b..951122e1 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+@@ -338,13 +338,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+index 5bf4b65c..6d0a35bb 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -102,8 +105,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
++	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0)
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -120,16 +124,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
++	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
++		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0) {
++		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
++		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
++		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -526,7 +536,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
++	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 40ddfb04..9c5b1567 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -699,7 +700,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
+-
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
++			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
++		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 6c2f771a..8dd4ab01 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
++		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
++			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index ad3f560f..3941e089 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1434,6 +1434,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
++		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
++			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
++
++			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
++			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
++		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a808ac9a..c3349a8a 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1316,6 +1316,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	{
++		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
++		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
++		if (rsakey == NULL)
++			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
++
++		if (rsakey != NULL) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++		    }
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch b/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..968e60a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 497de886faaddec60b7ad1013396c7d4f3145968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 47/50] openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index a042c3c8..a321e0d3 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+ 		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ 	}
+-	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
++	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
+ 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+ 		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
+ 		    sshpam_rhost);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch b/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d0f691
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From b97b1040bc0918fe9be89cdb482d046270e92d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 48/50] openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5 | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index a43b2a27..9d5da2a6 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ or
+ This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
+ See
+ .Xr ssh-keysign 8
+-for more information.
++for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly.
+ .It Cm EscapeChar
+ Sets the escape character (default:
+ .Ql ~ ) .
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch b/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e04d194
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+From 0a621a2ccb8444e4c6da906b0e112e0522658122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 49/50] openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem
+
+---
+ kex-names.c         |  20 +++
+ kexmlkem768x25519.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 311 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index cd3902ad..36a953ab 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -108,6 +108,19 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+ };
+ 
++static int is_mlkem768_available()
++{
++	static int is_fetched = -1;
++
++	if (is_fetched == -1) {
++		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
++		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
++	}
++
++	return is_fetched;
++}
++
+ static char *
+ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ {
+@@ -116,6 +129,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+ 	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++			continue;
+ 		if (ret != NULL)
+ 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
+@@ -147,6 +163,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
++	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++	return NULL;
++
+ 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+index 2b5d3960..670049dc 100644
+--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+@@ -48,10 +48,127 @@
+ #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 
+ #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++static int
++mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
++	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
++	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    ret = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
++	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
+ 	size_t need;
+@@ -86,6 +203,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	u_char *cp = NULL;
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++#endif
++	cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	kex->client_pub = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -93,6 +240,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	const u_char *client_pub;
+@@ -185,12 +333,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ 	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *client_pub;
++	u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
++
++	*server_blobp = NULL;
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
++	    client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
++	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++
++	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
++	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
++	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	/* append ECDH shared key */
++	client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:",
++	    enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
++	dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*server_blobp = server_blob;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	server_blob = NULL;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
++	explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
++	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+     const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ 	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+@@ -258,6 +491,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ 	explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
++	size_t need;
++	int r;
++
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
++	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
++	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
++	    buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
++	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+ int
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch b/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aed1c30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From fd32e753ae7f3b314712e6aa8b2bed3c1fca1ef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 14:53:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 50/51] openssh-9.9p2-error_processing
+
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 798bf9b6..dfb6ac72 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1377,6 +1377,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
+ 	    k == NULL ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
++		if (!r) /* k == NULL */
++			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 		error_fr(r, "parse");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch b/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c1aa4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 4965cdbc1ee1e6a0c665797bb8b944d96d3d411f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 15:11:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 51/53] Provide better error for non-supported private keys
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ sshkey.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ca1cdb642..aada474e0 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -3582,6 +3582,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
+ 			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		}
+ 	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
++#ifdef ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER
++	case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
++#endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 	}
+ 	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch b/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f071225
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 9ed09ef158a113e21be7b3fefa7c5f932632749b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:52:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 52/53] Ignore bad hostkeys in known_hosts file
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ hostfile.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ hostfile.h |  1 +
+ ssh.c      |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
+index c5669c703..5c402f501 100644
+--- a/hostfile.c
++++ b/hostfile.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
+ #include "hmac.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ 
++static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
++
++void
++hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
++{
++	required_rsa_size = size;
++}
++
+ /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+ 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+ 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ 		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
++		    l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
+ 	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+ 	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
+index a24a4e329..0e9b1a19a 100644
+--- a/hostfile.h
++++ b/hostfile.h
+@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
+     const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+ 
+ void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
++void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index abc8b8439..33787a8d4 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
+ 	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+ 		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch b/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..237e45d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
+
+RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
+associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
+name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
+to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
+may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
+issuance process.
+
+Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
+GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
+that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
+on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
+
+Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+---
+ configure.ac    |   1 +
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
+ sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
++		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
+ 
+ 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
+ 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
++ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
++ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
++ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
++ */
++
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
++{
++	int ret;
++	u_int i;
++
++	/* Check indicators */
++	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
++					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
++		/* negative or positive match */
++		if (ret != 0) {
++			*matched = i;
++			return ret;
++		}
++	}
++	/* No rule matched */
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+-	int retval;
++	int retval, matched;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	if (k5login_exists &&
+ 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
+ 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
+ 		name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
+-		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
+ 	} else
+ 		retval = 0;
+ 
++	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
++		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
++		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
++		retval = 0;
++		if (client->indicators) {
++			matched = -1;
++			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
++			if (retval != 0) {
++				retval = (retval == 1);
++				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
++					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
++					client->indicators[matched],
++					(char *)client->displayname.value,
++				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
++				goto cont;
++			}
++		}
++		if (retval == 0) {
++			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
++				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
++			(char *)client->displayname.value);
++		}
++	}
++cont:
++	if (retval == 1) {
++		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
++		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
++	}
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
++    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+ 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
++
++/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
++ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
++ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
++ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
++
++#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
++
++/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
++static OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
++	gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
++	size_t count, i;
++
++	ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++				      &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
++	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
++
++	if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
++		/* No indicators in the ticket */
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		count++;
++	}
++
++	if (count == 0) {
++		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
++		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		authenticated = 0;
++		complete = 0;
++		more = -1;
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		/* retrieve all indicators */
++		while (more != 0) {
++			value.value = NULL;
++			display_value.value = NULL;
++			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
++					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
++			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
++				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
++				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
++				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
++				count++;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++out:
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++	return (ctx->major);
++}
++
++
+ /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+  * be called once for a context */
+ 
+@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
++	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
++	    ctx->client, client))) {
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
++	size_t i;
+ 
+ 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
+ 
+@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
++
++			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
++				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
++				}
++				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
++			}
++
+ 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+ 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ 			return 0;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+-	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sGssIndicators:
++		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum, keyword);
++		if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
++			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
++	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   **allow_groups;
+ 	u_int num_deny_groups;
+ 	char   **deny_groups;
++	char   *gss_indicators;
+ 
+ 	u_int num_subsystems;
+ 	char   **subsystem_name;
+@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
++		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
++#include <gssapi_ext.h>
++#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
++#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ # ifndef HEIMDAL
+ #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
++	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
++mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
++authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
++.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
++When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
++will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
++indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
++.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
++policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
++access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
++rejected.
++.Pp
++By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
++indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
++to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
++preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
++authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
++(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
++indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
++inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
++.Pp
++Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
++particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
++FreeIPA environments:
++.Pp
++.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
++.It Cm hardened
++SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm pkinit
++smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm radius
++pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm otp
++TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
++.It Cm idp
++OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
++and device authorization grant flow
++.It Cm passkey
++FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
++.El
++.Pp
++The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ The default is handled system-wide by
+ .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/1000-openssh-coverity.patch b/1000-openssh-coverity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88362eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1000-openssh-coverity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+From 24c411970682dc67873c36bac05b4b460d68a628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 50/50] openssh-6.7p1-coverity
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c                   | 2 ++
+ gss-genr.c                    | 3 ++-
+ krl.c                         | 3 +++
+ loginrec.c                    | 2 ++
+ misc.c                        | 3 +++
+ monitor.c                     | 4 ++--
+ openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c  | 8 ++++----
+ readconf.c                    | 1 +
+ servconf.c                    | 5 +++--
+ serverloop.c                  | 2 +-
+ ssh-agent.c                   | 1 +
+ ssh-keygen.c                  | 3 +++
+ 13 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index bae153c9..209a3265 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -434,6 +435,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index 3034370c..c357e973 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
++++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -168,8 +168,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index 0d0f6953..d8517f12 100644
+--- a/krl.c
++++ b/krl.c
+@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1212,6 +1213,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1223,6 +1225,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
+index c4a9bd48..2583612c 100644
+--- a/loginrec.c
++++ b/loginrec.c
+@@ -683,9 +683,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 09722962..cd71c1b2 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -1556,6 +1556,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2749,6 +2751,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 19cb058e..58fbac9d 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+index 346c7fe5..f42792fd 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+index 26bdc3e0..8e2939b9 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index ea9d293c..9680c38c 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -2164,6 +2164,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 8b708cbf..e7e4ad04 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2293,8 +2293,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 9c5b1567..768ee9fa 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 798bf9b6..0e39dff7 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1593,6 +1593,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 792aafde..96b3474d 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -2424,6 +2424,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
++			freezero(blob, blen);
++			blob = NULL;
++			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch b/2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch
similarity index 80%
rename from openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch
rename to 2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch
index f19161c..4a1a329 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch
+++ b/2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.517723813 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.862876709 +0200
-@@ -277,7 +277,28 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.444264765 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.314922659 +0200
+@@ -286,7 +286,28 @@
  	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0)
  		goto out;
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
 +		debug("received empty username for %s", method);
 +		if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) {
 +			char *lname = NULL;
-+			PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname));
++			mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname);
 +			if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') {
 +				free(user);
 +				user = lname;
@@ -31,13 +31,13 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
  	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
  
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-@@ -288,17 +309,42 @@
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
+@@ -299,11 +320,33 @@
  
+ 	if (authctxt->attempt >= 1024)
+ 		auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
 -	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
 -		/* setup auth context */
--		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
+-		authctxt->pw = mm_getpwnamallow(ssh, user);
 +	/* If first time or username changed or empty username,
 +	   setup/reset authentication context. */
 +	if ((authctxt->attempt++ == 0) ||
@@ -64,11 +64,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
 +			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 +		} else {
 +#endif
-+		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
++		authctxt->pw = mm_getpwnamallow(ssh, user);
 +		if (authctxt->pw) {
  			authctxt->valid = 1;
  			debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
  		} else {
+@@ -311,6 +354,9 @@
  			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
  			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
  		}
@@ -77,16 +78,16 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  		if (options.use_pam)
- 			PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
-@@ -307,6 +353,7 @@
+ 			mm_start_pam(ssh);
+@@ -318,6 +364,7 @@
+ 		ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
  		    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
- 		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
 +		if (authctxt->attempt == 1) {
  		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
  		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-@@ -322,9 +369,10 @@
+@@ -333,9 +380,10 @@
  		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
  			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
  			    "no authentication methods enabled");
@@ -100,18 +101,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
  		    "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
  		    authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
  	}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.388723503 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.863876712 +0200
-@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-10.0p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2-gss.c	2025-06-14 08:24:54.946580198 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth2-gss.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.315696363 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi;
  
 +static void ssh_gssapi_userauth_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh);
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
  static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
  static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
-@@ -63,8 +64,8 @@
+@@ -67,8 +68,8 @@
  {
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  	u_char *p;
  	size_t len;
  
-@@ -75,6 +76,9 @@
+@@ -79,6 +80,9 @@
  	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
  
-@@ -85,13 +89,29 @@
+@@ -89,13 +93,28 @@
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
  	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
  
@@ -146,17 +147,16 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
 +	gssbuf2.length = sshbuf_len(b2);
 +
  	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
--	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
--		    authctxt->pw, 1));
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic))) ||
-+	    !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+	    &gssbuf2, &mic)))) {
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
+-	    &gssbuf, &mic)))
+-		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+-		    authctxt->pw, 1);
++	    &gssbuf, &mic)) ||
++	    !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++	    &gssbuf2, &mic))) {
 +		if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
-+			authenticated =
-+			    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+			    authctxt->pw, 1));
++			authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++			    authctxt->pw, 1);
 +		}
 +	}
  
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  	free(mic.value);
  
  	return (authenticated);
-@@ -146,7 +166,9 @@
+@@ -154,7 +173,9 @@
  		return (0);
  	}
  
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
  		free(doid);
  		return (0);
-@@ -184,7 +206,7 @@
+@@ -192,7 +213,7 @@
  	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
  	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
  	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  	u_char *p;
  	size_t len;
  	int r;
-@@ -205,6 +227,7 @@
+@@ -213,6 +234,7 @@
  	free(p);
  
  	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
  			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
  			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
-@@ -279,6 +302,34 @@
+@@ -287,6 +309,34 @@
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -204,17 +204,17 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
 +	char *lname = NULL;
 +
 +	if ((authctxt->user == NULL) || (authctxt->user[0] == '\0')) {
-+		PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname));
++		mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(&lname);
 +		if (lname && lname[0] != '\0') {
 +			if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user);
 +			authctxt->user = lname;
 +			debug("set username to %s from gssapi context", lname);
-+			authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user));
++			authctxt->pw = mm_getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user);
 +			if (authctxt->pw) {
 +				authctxt->valid = 1;
 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 +				if (options.use_pam)
-+					PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
++					mm_start_pam(ssh);
 +#endif
 +			}
 +		} else {
@@ -228,15 +228,14 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  /*
   * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
   * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
-@@ -289,12 +340,14 @@
+@@ -297,11 +347,13 @@
  input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  {
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
 -	int r, authenticated;
 +	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	const char *displayname;
  
- 	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
  		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
  
 +	gssapi_set_username(ssh);
@@ -244,35 +243,32 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  	/*
  	 * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
  	 * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
-@@ -303,8 +356,11 @@
+@@ -310,7 +362,11 @@
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
  
--	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
--	    authctxt->pw, 1));
+- 	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1);
 +	/* user should be set if valid but we double-check here */
 +	if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 1));
++		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw, 1);
 +	}
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
-@@ -356,11 +412,17 @@
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -357,10 +413,16 @@
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
  	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
  
--	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
--		    authctxt->pw, 0));
+-	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
+-		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0);
 -	else
 +	gssapi_set_username(ssh);
 +
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) {
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
 +		if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
-+			authenticated =
-+			    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+			    authctxt->pw, 0));
++			authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++			    authctxt->pw, 0);
 +		}
 +	} else {
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
@@ -280,7 +276,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
  
  	sshbuf_free(b);
  	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
-@@ -380,6 +442,26 @@
+@@ -376,6 +438,26 @@
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -289,7 +285,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
 +	OM_uint32 maj, min;
 +	int r;
 +
-+	errstr = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min));
++	errstr = mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min);
 +	if (errstr) {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
 +		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR)) != 0 ||
@@ -305,12 +301,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2-gss.c
 +}
 +
  Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
- 	"gssapi-keyex",
+ 	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
  	userauth_gsskeyex,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.c openssh-8.7p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.519723818 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.864876714 +0200
-@@ -344,7 +344,8 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.c openssh-10.0p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.443524655 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.316281495 +0200
+@@ -298,7 +298,8 @@
  	    method,
  	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
  	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
@@ -320,7 +316,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.c openssh-8.7p1/auth.c
  	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
  	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
  	    extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
-@@ -588,13 +589,18 @@
+@@ -490,13 +491,18 @@
  #endif
  
  	pw = getpwnam(user);
@@ -340,10 +336,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.c openssh-8.7p1/auth.c
  #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
  		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
  		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.h openssh-8.7p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.519723818 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.864876714 +0200
-@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.h openssh-10.0p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth.h	2025-06-14 08:24:55.443709595 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.316833592 +0200
+@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@
  	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
  	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
  	char		*krb5_ccname;
@@ -352,18 +348,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth.h openssh-8.7p1/auth.h
  	int		 krb5_set_env;
  #endif
  	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.510723796 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.865876716 +0200
-@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.609208310 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.317378775 +0200
+@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@
+ static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
  static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL;
  static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL;
- static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL;
 +static struct ssh *sshpam_ssh = NULL;
  
  /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
  #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
-@@ -301,6 +302,56 @@
+@@ -296,6 +297,56 @@
  # define pam_chauthtok(a,b)	(sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
  #endif
  
@@ -420,7 +416,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c
  static void
  sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
  {
-@@ -332,7 +383,7 @@
+@@ -327,7 +378,7 @@
  static void
  import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
  {
@@ -429,7 +425,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c
  	u_int n, i, num_env;
  	int r;
  
-@@ -348,6 +399,19 @@
+@@ -343,6 +394,19 @@
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
  		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
  	sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
@@ -477,16 +473,16 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c
  
  	/* Export any environment strings set in child */
  	for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
-@@ -738,6 +816,8 @@
- 		xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d",
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- 		    sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
+@@ -740,6 +818,8 @@
+ 		    options.use_dns));
+ 		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+ 		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
 +		/* Save so allowed_user can be called later */
 +		sshpam_ssh = ssh;
  	}
- 	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
+ 	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
  		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
-@@ -1082,6 +1162,18 @@
+@@ -1096,6 +1176,18 @@
  	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
  	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
  
@@ -505,8 +501,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c
  	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
  		sshpam_account_status = 0;
  		return (sshpam_account_status);
-@@ -1370,6 +1462,9 @@
- 		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+@@ -1384,6 +1476,9 @@
+ 	expose_authinfo(__func__);
  
  	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
 +	if (options.permit_pam_user_change) {
@@ -515,9 +511,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.c openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.c
  	sshpam_password = NULL;
  	free(fake);
  	if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.356723425 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.865876716 +0200
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth-pam.h	2025-06-14 08:24:54.755199761 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth-pam.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.318085082 +0200
 @@ -43,5 +43,6 @@
  int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void);
  void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int);
@@ -525,9 +521,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth-pam.h openssh-8.7p1/auth-pam.h
 +struct passwd *sshpam_getpw(const char *);
  
  #endif /* USE_PAM */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-8.7p1/canohost.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.388723503 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/canohost.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.866876718 +0200
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-10.0p1/canohost.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.c	2025-06-14 08:24:54.947106244 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/canohost.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.318537655 +0200
 @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  #include <sys/types.h>
  #include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -536,7 +532,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-8.7p1/canohost.c
  
  #include <netinet/in.h>
  #include <arpa/inet.h>
-@@ -295,3 +296,33 @@
+@@ -300,3 +301,33 @@
  {
  	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
  }
@@ -570,9 +566,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.c openssh-8.7p1/canohost.c
 +		}
 +	}
 +}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.h openssh-8.7p1/canohost.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.388723503 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/canohost.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.866876718 +0200
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.h openssh-10.0p1/canohost.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/canohost.h	2025-06-14 08:24:54.947234403 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/canohost.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.318980799 +0200
 @@ -26,4 +26,6 @@
  
  #endif /* _CANOHOST_H */
@@ -580,10 +576,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/canohost.h openssh-8.7p1/canohost.h
 +void		 resolve_localhost(char **host);
 +
  void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/configure.ac	2021-10-24 07:32:35.498723767 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2021-10-24 07:49:48.431180638 +0200
-@@ -4777,6 +4777,14 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac	2025-06-14 08:24:55.711190794 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac	2025-06-14 08:25:50.319884827 +0200
+@@ -4992,6 +4992,14 @@
  				AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
  						[ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
  
@@ -598,9 +594,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
  			fi
  		fi
  		if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
-@@ -4817,6 +4825,40 @@
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+@@ -5034,6 +5042,40 @@
  AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([CHANNELLIBS])
  
 +# Check whether the user wants GSI (Globus) support
 +gsi="no"
@@ -636,13 +632,13 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
 +	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize)
 +fi
 +
- # Check whether user wants systemd support
- SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
- AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-genr.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.551723895 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-genr.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.870876728 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-genr.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.730946369 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-genr.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.321274952 +0200
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "log.h"
@@ -650,7 +646,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-genr.c
  #include "ssh2.h"
  #include "cipher.h"
  #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -408,9 +409,18 @@
+@@ -416,9 +417,18 @@
  ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
  {
  	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
@@ -670,7 +666,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-genr.c
  	gssbuf.value = val;
  	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
  
-@@ -418,6 +428,7 @@
+@@ -426,6 +436,7 @@
  	    &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
  
@@ -678,10 +674,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-genr.c
  	free(gssbuf.value);
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.410723555 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.870876728 +0200
-@@ -50,10 +50,12 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.712377680 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv.c	2025-06-14 14:29:38.679799497 +0200
+@@ -51,10 +51,12 @@
  #include "monitor_wrap.h"
  
  extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -689,14 +685,14 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  
  static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
 -    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
--    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
 +    { {0, NULL}, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
 +      GSS_C_NO_NAME, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL},
-+      GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, 0, 0};
++      GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, 0, 0, NULL};
  
  ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
      { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-@@ -61,14 +63,26 @@
+@@ -62,14 +64,26 @@
  #ifdef KRB5
  extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
  #endif
@@ -723,7 +719,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  /*
   * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
   * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
-@@ -229,6 +243,10 @@
+@@ -230,6 +244,10 @@
  	    (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
  		if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
  			fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
@@ -734,7 +730,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  	}
  
  	return (status);
-@@ -248,6 +266,20 @@
+@@ -249,6 +267,20 @@
  
  	tok = ename->value;
  
@@ -755,7 +751,23 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  	/*
  	 * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
  	 * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
-@@ -308,21 +340,24 @@
+@@ -297,6 +329,7 @@
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef KRB5
+ /* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
+  * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
+  * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
+@@ -380,6 +413,7 @@
+ 	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
+ 	return (ctx->major);
+ }
++#endif
+ 
+ 
+ /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+@@ -395,21 +429,24 @@
  	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
  
  	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
@@ -785,7 +797,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  		    new_name, &equal);
  
  		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-@@ -337,9 +372,9 @@
+@@ -424,9 +461,9 @@
  
  		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
  
@@ -797,7 +809,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
  		ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
  		client->updated = 1;
-@@ -356,12 +391,17 @@
+@@ -443,12 +480,17 @@
  		i++;
  	}
  
@@ -817,7 +829,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
  		return (ctx->major);
  	}
-@@ -378,16 +418,25 @@
+@@ -465,22 +507,33 @@
  		return (ctx->major);
  	}
  
@@ -833,6 +845,14 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
 +		return ctx->major;
 +
  	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++#ifdef KRB5
+ 	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
+ 	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
+ 	    ctx->client, client))) {
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ 		return (ctx->major);
+ 	}
++#endif
  
  	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
  	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
@@ -844,7 +864,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
  
-@@ -395,6 +444,7 @@
+@@ -488,6 +541,7 @@
  void
  ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
  {
@@ -852,7 +872,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  
-@@ -410,6 +460,14 @@
+@@ -503,6 +557,14 @@
  			gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
  		}
  	}
@@ -867,7 +887,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  }
  
  /* As user */
-@@ -417,6 +475,11 @@
+@@ -510,6 +572,11 @@
  ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
  {
  	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
@@ -879,7 +899,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
  	} else
  		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-@@ -449,11 +512,13 @@
+@@ -543,11 +610,13 @@
  
  	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
  
@@ -896,15 +916,15 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
  		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
  			gssapi_client.used = 1;
-@@ -464,6 +529,7 @@
+@@ -558,6 +627,7 @@
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
  			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
 +			gss_release_name(&lmin, &gssapi_client.ctx_name);
- 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
- 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
- 			return 0;
-@@ -473,6 +539,24 @@
+ 
+ 			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
+ 				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
+@@ -575,6 +645,24 @@
  	return (0);
  }
  
@@ -929,7 +949,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  /* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
   * as the user, the monitor is root.
   *
-@@ -499,9 +583,11 @@
+@@ -601,9 +689,11 @@
  	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
  	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
  	char *envstr;
@@ -941,8 +961,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
 +	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
  		return;
  
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-@@ -526,6 +612,18 @@
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
+@@ -623,6 +713,18 @@
  	if (ret)
  		return;
  
@@ -961,9 +981,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv.c
  	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
  	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
  
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-gsi.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-gsi.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.871876730 +0200
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-gsi.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-gsi.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.323228698 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -1293,10 +1313,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-gsi.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-gsi.c
 +
 +#endif /* GSI */
 +#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.440723628 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.871876730 +0200
-@@ -379,6 +379,34 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.712149299 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.323586985 +0200
+@@ -431,6 +431,34 @@
  	return found_principal;
  }
   
@@ -1331,7 +1351,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-@@ -473,7 +501,7 @@
+@@ -525,7 +553,7 @@
  	return set_env;
  }
  
@@ -1340,7 +1360,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
      ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  {
-@@ -544,7 +572,7 @@
+@@ -596,7 +624,7 @@
  	{9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
  	NULL,
  	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
@@ -1349,9 +1369,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-8.7p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
  	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
  };
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-8.7p1/kexgsss.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/kexgsss.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.567723933 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgsss.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.871876730 +0200
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-10.0p1/kexgsss.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/kexgsss.c	2025-06-14 08:24:54.950961355 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/kexgsss.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.324355451 +0200
 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
  #include "digest.h"
  #include "ssherr.h"
@@ -1359,27 +1379,27 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-8.7p1/kexgsss.c
 +static void kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh);
  extern ServerOptions options;
  
- int
-@@ -96,8 +97,10 @@
+ static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -81,8 +82,10 @@
  
  	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
  
--	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) {
-+		kex_gss_send_error(ctxt, ssh);
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid)))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) {
++		kex_gss_send_error(kex->gss, ssh);
  		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +	}
  
- 	do {
- 		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
-@@ -195,13 +198,14 @@
- 	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+ 	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
+ 	if (kex->gss == NULL)
+@@ -139,13 +142,14 @@
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
  
- 	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		kex_gss_send_error(ctxt, ssh);
- 		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+ 	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		kex_gss_send_error(kex->gss, ssh);
+ 		if (send_tok->length > 0) {
  			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
- 			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
  			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
  				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
  		}
@@ -1387,19 +1407,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-8.7p1/kexgsss.c
 +		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "GSSAPI Key Exchange handshake failed");
  	}
  
- 	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-@@ -479,4 +483,26 @@
- 	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
- 	return r;
+ 	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+@@ -598,4 +602,26 @@
+ 	return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
  }
-+
+ 
 +static void
 +kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, struct ssh *ssh) {
 +	char *errstr;
 +	OM_uint32 maj, min;
 +	int r;
 +
-+	errstr = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min));
++	errstr = mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, &maj, &min);
 +	if (errstr) {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR)) != 0 ||
 +		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, maj)) != 0 ||
@@ -1414,22 +1433,33 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-8.7p1/kexgsss.c
 +		free(errstr);
 +	}
 +}
++
  #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:32:35.522723825 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:33:38.872876733 +0200
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
- 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
- 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
-+	gss-serv-gsi.o \
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.c openssh-8.7p1/misc.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.553723900 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/misc.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.873876735 +0200
-@@ -393,11 +393,14 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in	2025-06-14 08:24:55.442297261 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in	2025-06-14 14:49:48.752490751 +0200
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
+ 	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
+ 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-gsi.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	uidswap.o platform-listen.o $(SKOBJS)
+@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
+ 	serverloop.o auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o auth2-chall.o \
+ 	groupaccess.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
+-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
++	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-gsi.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c openssh-10.0p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.731834474 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.325895875 +0200
+@@ -440,11 +440,14 @@
  #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
  #define QUOTE	"\""
  
@@ -1445,7 +1475,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.c openssh-8.7p1/misc.c
  	int wspace = 0;
  
  	if (*s == NULL)
-@@ -405,6 +408,21 @@
+@@ -452,6 +455,21 @@
  
  	old = *s;
  
@@ -1467,7 +1497,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.c openssh-8.7p1/misc.c
  	*s = strpbrk(*s,
  	    split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE);
  	if (*s == NULL)
-@@ -480,6 +498,20 @@
+@@ -527,6 +545,20 @@
  	return copy;
  }
  
@@ -1488,10 +1518,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.c openssh-8.7p1/misc.c
  /*
   * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
   * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.h openssh-8.7p1/misc.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.466723690 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/misc.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.874876737 +0200
-@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h openssh-10.0p1/misc.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h	2025-06-14 08:24:55.216960866 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.326898660 +0200
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
  void	 sock_set_v6only(int);
  
  struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
@@ -1499,10 +1529,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/misc.h openssh-8.7p1/misc.h
  const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
  
  typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.554723902 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.875876740 +0200
-@@ -152,6 +152,9 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-10.0p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.732232011 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.327682491 +0200
+@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@
  int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -1512,7 +1542,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  #endif
  
-@@ -204,7 +207,7 @@
+@@ -205,7 +208,7 @@
      {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
  #endif
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
@@ -1521,7 +1551,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
-@@ -212,7 +215,7 @@
+@@ -213,7 +216,7 @@
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -1530,7 +1560,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
-@@ -236,8 +239,11 @@
+@@ -237,8 +240,11 @@
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
@@ -1543,7 +1573,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
  #endif
      {0, 0, NULL}
  };
-@@ -247,6 +253,8 @@
+@@ -248,6 +254,8 @@
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
@@ -1551,8 +1581,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
 +    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 0, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
  #endif
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-@@ -327,6 +335,8 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_STATE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_state},
+@@ -328,6 +336,8 @@
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
@@ -1561,7 +1591,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
  #endif
  
  	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
-@@ -444,6 +454,8 @@
+@@ -461,6 +471,8 @@
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
@@ -1570,29 +1600,28 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
  #endif
  
  	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
-@@ -760,15 +772,18 @@
+@@ -895,14 +907,17 @@
  
  	debug3_f("entering");
  
 -	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
 -		fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
 -
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
++	if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->user, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
  
- 	pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
+ 	pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user);
  
-+	if (authctxt->user) free(authctxt->user);
- 	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 +	if (options.permit_pam_user_change)
 +		setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? "[pam]" : "unknown");
 +	else
 +#endif
- 	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
- 	free(username);
+ 	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? authctxt->user : "unknown");
  
-@@ -2109,6 +2124,79 @@
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+@@ -2249,6 +2264,79 @@
  }
  
  int
@@ -1672,10 +1701,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
  mm_answer_gss_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
  	gss_buffer_desc data;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-8.7p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.523723828 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.876876743 +0200
-@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-10.0p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor.h	2025-06-14 08:24:55.446043209 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.328788501 +0200
+@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@
  
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
@@ -1686,10 +1715,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-8.7p1/monitor.h
  };
  
  struct ssh;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.555723904 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.876876743 +0200
-@@ -1084,6 +1084,94 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.468434323 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.329256997 +0200
+@@ -1195,6 +1195,94 @@
  	return (authenticated);
  }
  
@@ -1784,10 +1813,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.c
  OM_uint32
  mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
  {
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.533723852 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.877876745 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h	2025-06-14 08:24:55.468730870 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/monitor_wrap.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.329790028 +0200
+@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@
  int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *, int kex);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
@@ -1798,12 +1827,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-8.7p1/monitor_wrap.h
  int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
  #endif
  
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.557723909 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.878876747 +0200
-@@ -2516,11 +2516,11 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.733023595 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.330266207 +0200
+@@ -2881,11 +2881,11 @@
  	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
- 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ 		options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
 -		options->gss_authentication = 0;
 +		options->gss_authentication = 1;
@@ -1816,10 +1845,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c
  	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
  		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
  	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.395723519 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.879876750 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h	2025-06-14 08:24:54.953487731 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.330993746 +0200
+@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
  	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
  	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
  	char   *user;		/* User to log in as. */
@@ -1828,18 +1857,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h
  	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
  
  	u_int	num_system_hostfiles;	/* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.558723912 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.880876752 +0200
-@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
- 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.733579673 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.331610935 +0200
+@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@
  	/* Portable-specific options */
  	options->use_pam = -1;
+ 	options->pam_service_name = NULL;
 +	options->permit_pam_user_change = -1;
  
  	/* Standard Options */
  	options->num_ports = 0;
-@@ -139,9 +140,11 @@
+@@ -142,9 +143,11 @@
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
  	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
@@ -1850,17 +1879,17 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
 +	options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = -1;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
-@@ -291,6 +294,8 @@
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+ 	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
+@@ -317,6 +320,8 @@
  		options->use_pam = 0;
+ 	if (options->pam_service_name == NULL)
+ 		options->pam_service_name = xstrdup(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE);
 +	if (options->permit_pam_user_change == -1)
 +		options->permit_pam_user_change = 0;
  
  	/* Standard Options */
  	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
-@@ -372,13 +377,17 @@
+@@ -398,13 +403,17 @@
  	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
  		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
@@ -1880,37 +1909,38 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
  		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -514,7 +523,7 @@
+@@ -578,7 +587,7 @@
  typedef enum {
  	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
  	/* Portable-specific options */
--	sUsePAM,
-+	sUsePAM, sPermitPAMUserChange,
+-	sUsePAM, sPAMServiceName,
++	sUsePAM, sPAMServiceName, sPermitPAMUserChange,
  	/* Standard Options */
  	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
  	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-@@ -535,6 +544,9 @@
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+@@ -598,6 +607,9 @@
  	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 +	sGssDelegateCreds,
 +	sGssCredsPath,
 +	sGsiAllowLimitedProxy,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-@@ -567,8 +579,10 @@
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
+@@ -633,9 +645,11 @@
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "pamservicename", sPAMServiceName, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "permitpamuserchange", sPermitPAMUserChange, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #else
  	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "pamservicename", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "permitpamuserchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
  	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	/* Standard Options */
-@@ -621,8 +635,15 @@
+@@ -688,8 +702,15 @@
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1926,8 +1956,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -630,8 +651,11 @@
- 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -698,8 +719,11 @@
+ 	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
  #else
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1938,7 +1968,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -703,6 +727,8 @@
+@@ -774,6 +798,8 @@
  	{ "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1947,9 +1977,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -1381,6 +1407,10 @@
- 		intptr = &options->use_pam;
- 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1454,6 +1480,10 @@
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
  
 +	case sPermitPAMUserChange:
 +		intptr = &options->permit_pam_user_change;
@@ -1958,7 +1988,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	/* Standard Options */
  	case sBadOption:
  		goto out;
-@@ -1628,6 +1658,10 @@
+@@ -1705,6 +1735,10 @@
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -1969,7 +1999,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssKeyEx:
  		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1636,6 +1670,10 @@
+@@ -1713,6 +1747,10 @@
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -1980,8 +2010,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1656,6 +1694,12 @@
- 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+@@ -1742,6 +1780,12 @@
+ 			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
  		break;
  
 +#ifdef GSI
@@ -1993,7 +2023,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2661,6 +2705,7 @@
+@@ -3012,6 +3056,7 @@
  
  	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
@@ -2001,10 +2031,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.456723666 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.881876754 +0200
-@@ -146,9 +146,12 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h	2025-06-14 08:24:55.713201111 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.332635999 +0200
+@@ -155,9 +155,12 @@
  						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
  	int	use_kuserok;
  	int		enable_k5users;
@@ -2017,18 +2047,18 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
  	int 	gss_store_rekey;
  	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
-@@ -209,6 +212,7 @@
- 	char   *adm_forced_command;
+@@ -222,6 +225,7 @@
  
  	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
+ 	char   *pam_service_name;
 +	int	permit_pam_user_change;	/* Allow PAM to change user name */
  
  	int	permit_tun;
  
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-8.7p1/ssh.1
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.1	2021-10-24 07:32:35.397723524 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.1	2021-10-24 07:33:38.882876757 +0200
-@@ -1492,6 +1492,18 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1	2025-06-14 08:24:55.527924262 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1	2025-06-14 08:25:50.333158134 +0200
+@@ -1528,6 +1528,18 @@
  on to new connections).
  .It Ev USER
  Set to the name of the user logging in.
@@ -2047,10 +2077,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-8.7p1/ssh.1
  .El
  .Pp
  Additionally,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.562723921 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.883876759 +0200
-@@ -558,6 +558,38 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.693276450 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c	2025-06-14 13:58:47.186170059 +0200
+@@ -578,6 +578,38 @@
  			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
  			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
  	} else {
@@ -2066,14 +2096,14 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
 +		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gssapi", pw->pw_dir,
 +		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
 +		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
++			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, cmd,
 +			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
 +			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
 +#ifdef GSI
 +		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gsi", pw->pw_dir,
 +		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
 +		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
++			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, cmd,
 +			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
 +			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
 +#endif
@@ -2081,7 +2111,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
 +		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.krb", pw->pw_dir,
 +		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
 +		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
++			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, cmd,
 +			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
 +			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
 +#endif
@@ -2089,7 +2119,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
  		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
  		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
  		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
-@@ -1236,8 +1268,12 @@
+@@ -1313,8 +1345,12 @@
  	if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
  		cleanup_exit(255);
  
@@ -2103,9 +2133,9 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
  
  	/*
  	 * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config	2021-10-24 07:32:35.398723526 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config	2021-10-24 07:33:38.884876762 +0200
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config	2025-06-14 08:24:54.955694862 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config	2025-06-14 08:25:50.334427503 +0200
 @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
  #   ForwardX11 no
  #   PasswordAuthentication yes
@@ -2118,10 +2148,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config
 +#   GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
  #   GSSAPITrustDNS no
  #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5	2021-10-24 07:32:35.489723746 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-10-24 07:33:38.885876764 +0200
+ #   CheckHostIP no
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5	2025-06-14 08:24:55.625225410 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5	2025-06-14 08:25:50.334845923 +0200
 @@ -52,6 +52,12 @@
  user's configuration file
  .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
@@ -2135,7 +2165,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  system-wide configuration file
  .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
  .El
-@@ -821,7 +827,7 @@
+@@ -969,7 +975,7 @@
  .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
  Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
  The default is
@@ -2144,7 +2174,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
  If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
  connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-@@ -829,12 +835,12 @@
+@@ -977,12 +983,12 @@
  .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
  Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
  The default is
@@ -2159,7 +2189,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
  If set to
  .Dq yes
-@@ -1458,7 +1464,7 @@
+@@ -1645,7 +1651,7 @@
  .Cm password ) .
  The default is:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
@@ -2168,10 +2198,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  keyboard-interactive,password
  .Ed
  .It Cm ProxyCommand
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.542723873 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.886876767 +0200
-@@ -860,6 +860,11 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.591449573 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.335562288 +0200
+@@ -858,6 +858,11 @@
  	gss_OID mech = NULL;
  	char *gss_host = NULL;
  
@@ -2183,7 +2213,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
  	if (options.gss_server_identity) {
  		gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
  	} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-@@ -971,7 +976,8 @@
+@@ -966,7 +971,8 @@
  
  	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
  		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
@@ -2193,7 +2223,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
  			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
  			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
  			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-@@ -1142,6 +1148,20 @@
+@@ -1133,6 +1139,20 @@
  	return r;
  }
  
@@ -2214,7 +2244,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
  int
  userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
  {
-@@ -1164,6 +1184,12 @@
+@@ -1155,6 +1175,12 @@
  	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  
@@ -2227,7 +2257,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
  	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
  	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
-@@ -1177,7 +1203,9 @@
+@@ -1168,7 +1194,9 @@
  	}
  
  	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
@@ -2238,10 +2268,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-8.7p1/sshd.8
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.8	2021-10-24 07:32:35.418723575 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.8	2021-10-24 07:33:38.887876769 +0200
-@@ -818,6 +818,29 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8	2025-06-14 08:24:55.024336971 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8	2025-06-14 08:25:50.336280328 +0200
+@@ -840,6 +840,29 @@
  # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
  @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
  .Ed
@@ -2271,22 +2301,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-8.7p1/sshd.8
  .Sh FILES
  .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
  .It Pa ~/.hushlogin
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c	2021-10-24 07:32:35.563723924 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2021-10-24 07:33:38.888876772 +0200
-@@ -2380,7 +2380,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
--	if (options.gss_authentication) {
-+	if (options.gss_authentication && options.gss_deleg_creds) {
- 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
- 		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
- 		restore_uid();
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:32:35.443723635 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:33:38.889876774 +0200
-@@ -76,10 +76,11 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config	2025-06-14 08:24:55.129477337 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config	2025-06-14 08:25:50.336709644 +0200
+@@ -78,10 +78,11 @@
  #KerberosUseKuserok yes
  
  # GSSAPI options
@@ -2300,7 +2318,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config
  #GSSAPIEnablek5users no
  
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
-@@ -95,6 +96,10 @@
+@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@
  # problems.
  #UsePAM no
  
@@ -2311,10 +2329,10 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config
  #AllowAgentForwarding yes
  #AllowTcpForwarding yes
  #GatewayPorts no
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5	2021-10-24 07:32:35.490723748 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5	2021-10-24 07:33:38.890876776 +0200
-@@ -635,15 +635,34 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5	2025-06-14 08:24:55.713605773 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5	2025-06-14 08:25:50.337207823 +0200
+@@ -724,15 +724,34 @@
  to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
@@ -2350,7 +2368,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  .It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
  Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
  access control. Further details are described in
-@@ -654,7 +673,7 @@
+@@ -743,7 +762,7 @@
  Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
  doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
  The default is
@@ -2359,7 +2377,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
  Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
  a client authenticates against.
-@@ -1788,6 +1807,12 @@
+@@ -2100,6 +2119,12 @@
  as a non-root user.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
@@ -2372,12 +2390,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  .It Cm VersionAddendum
  Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
  sent by the server upon connection.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config_redhat
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat	2021-10-24 07:32:35.382723488 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config_redhat	2021-10-24 07:33:38.891876779 +0200
-@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat	2025-06-14 08:24:54.911947266 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config_redhat	2025-06-14 08:25:50.337806574 +0200
+@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@
  
- ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
  
 -GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 -GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
@@ -2385,10 +2403,22 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config_redhat openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config_redhat
  UsePAM yes
  
  X11Forwarding yes
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-8.7p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh-gss.h	2021-10-24 07:32:35.415723567 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.891876779 +0200
-@@ -97,12 +97,14 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c	2025-06-14 08:24:55.591819733 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c	2025-06-14 08:25:50.338154455 +0200
+@@ -1448,7 +1448,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+-	if (options.gss_authentication) {
++	if (options.gss_authentication && options.gss_deleg_creds) {
+ 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ 		restore_uid();
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-10.0p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh-gss.h	2025-06-14 08:24:55.713368522 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh-gss.h	2025-06-14 08:25:50.338720590 +0200
+@@ -105,12 +105,14 @@
  } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
  
  typedef struct {
@@ -2403,8 +2433,8 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-8.7p1/ssh-gss.h
 +	gss_ctx_id_t context; /* needed for globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() */
  	int used;
  	int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@
+ 	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
+@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@
  	OM_uint32	minor; /* both */
  	gss_ctx_id_t	context; /* both */
  	gss_name_t	name; /* both */
@@ -2413,7 +2443,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-8.7p1/ssh-gss.h
  	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
  	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
  	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
-@@ -161,6 +163,9 @@
+@@ -179,6 +181,9 @@
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
  int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
  
@@ -2423,12 +2453,12 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-8.7p1/ssh-gss.h
  /* In the server */
  typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
      const char *);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h openssh-8.7p1/version.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/version.h	2021-10-24 07:33:38.891876779 +0200
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h openssh-10.0p1/version.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/version.h	2025-06-14 08:41:29.417798618 +0200
 @@ -2,5 +2,19 @@
  
- #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_8.7"
+ #define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_10.0"
  
 +#ifdef GSI
 +#define GSI_VERSION	" GSI"
@@ -2442,7 +2472,7 @@ diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h openssh-8.7p1/version.h
 +#define KRB5_VERSION	""
 +#endif
 +
- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p2"
 -#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
 +#define GSI_PORTABLE	"c-GSI"
 +#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \
diff --git a/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch b/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8349a52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,14980 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/auth2.c	2025-06-14 10:53:02.012331859 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/auth2.c	2025-06-14 11:42:37.929224784 +0200
+@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
+ #include "dispatch.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "canohost.h"
++
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -75,6 +77,8 @@
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ 
++static int log_flag = 0;
++
+ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ 	&method_none,
+ 	&method_pubkey,
+@@ -104,6 +108,9 @@
+ #define MATCH_PARTIAL	3	/* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
+ static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
++/* read the user banner from the path in sshd_config
++ * this isn't to read it on the client side but to read
++ * it into what we are going to send on the server side */
+ char *
+ auth2_read_banner(void)
+ {
+@@ -308,6 +315,11 @@
+ 
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s",
+ 	    user[0] ? user : "<implicit>", service, method);
++	if (!log_flag) {
++		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Authname;Remote: %s-%d;Name: %s",
++		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), user);
++		log_flag = 1;
++	}
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.c openssh-10.0p1/binn.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/binn.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.301771902 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,3541 @@
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdint.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <memory.h>
++#include "binn.h"
++
++#define UNUSED(x) (void)(x)
++#define roundval(dbl) dbl >= 0.0 ? (int)(dbl + 0.5) : ((dbl - (double)(int)dbl) <= -0.5 ? (int)dbl : (int)(dbl - 0.5))
++
++// magic number:  0x1F 0xb1 0x22 0x1F  =>  0x1FB1221F or 0x1F22B11F
++// because the BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES (binary 000) may not have so many sub-types (BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE = 0x10)
++#define BINN_MAGIC            0x1F22B11F
++
++#define MAX_BINN_HEADER       9  // [1:type][4:size][4:count]
++#define MIN_BINN_SIZE         3  // [1:type][1:size][1:count]
++#define CHUNK_SIZE            256  // 1024
++
++#define BINN_STRUCT        1
++#define BINN_BUFFER        2
++
++void* (*malloc_fn)(size_t len) = 0;
++void* (*realloc_fn)(void *ptr, size_t len) = 0;
++void  (*free_fn)(void *ptr) = 0;
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++#if defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__mips__) || defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__sparc__)
++#define BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS
++#elif ( defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__) ) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED)
++#define BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS
++#endif
++
++#if defined(_WIN32)
++#define BIG_ENDIAN      0x1000
++#define LITTLE_ENDIAN   0x0001
++#define BYTE_ORDER      LITTLE_ENDIAN
++#elif defined(__APPLE__)
++/* macros already defined */
++#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__)
++#include <sys/endian.h>
++#elif defined(_AIX)
++#include <sys/machine.h>
++#else
++#include <endian.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
++#error "BYTE_ORDER not defined"
++#endif
++#ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
++#error "BIG_ENDIAN not defined"
++#endif
++#ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
++#error "LITTLE_ENDIAN not defined"
++#endif
++#if BIG_ENDIAN == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++#error "BIG_ENDIAN == LITTLE_ENDIAN"
++#endif
++#if BYTE_ORDER!=BIG_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER!=LITTLE_ENDIAN
++#error "BYTE_ORDER not supported"
++#endif
++
++typedef unsigned short int     u16;
++typedef unsigned int           u32;
++typedef unsigned long long int u64;
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void copy_be16(u16 *pdest, u16 *psource) {
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource;
++  unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest;
++  dest[0] = source[1];
++  dest[1] = source[0];
++#else // if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
++#ifdef BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS
++  if ((uintptr_t)psource % 2 == 0){  // address aligned to 16 bit
++    *pdest = *psource;
++  } else {
++    unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource;
++    unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest;
++    dest[0] = source[0];  // indexes are the same
++    dest[1] = source[1];
++  }
++#else
++  *pdest = *psource;
++#endif
++#endif
++}
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void copy_be32(u32 *pdest, u32 *psource) {
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource;
++  unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest;
++  dest[0] = source[3];
++  dest[1] = source[2];
++  dest[2] = source[1];
++  dest[3] = source[0];
++#else // if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
++#ifdef BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS
++  if ((uintptr_t)psource % 4 == 0){  // address aligned to 32 bit
++    *pdest = *psource;
++  } else {
++    unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource;
++    unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest;
++    dest[0] = source[0];  // indexes are the same
++    dest[1] = source[1];
++    dest[2] = source[2];
++    dest[3] = source[3];
++  }
++#else
++  *pdest = *psource;
++#endif
++#endif
++}
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void copy_be64(u64 *pdest, u64 *psource) {
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource;
++  unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest;
++  int i;
++  for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
++    dest[i] = source[7-i];
++  }
++#else // if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
++#ifdef BINN_ONLY_ALIGNED_ACCESS
++  if ((uintptr_t)psource % 8 == 0){  // address aligned to 64 bit
++    *pdest = *psource;
++  } else {
++    unsigned char *source = (unsigned char *) psource;
++    unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *) pdest;
++    int i;
++    for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
++      dest[i] = source[i];  // indexes are the same
++    }
++  }
++#else
++  *pdest = *psource;
++#endif
++#endif
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++#ifndef _MSC_VER
++#define stricmp strcasecmp
++#define strnicmp strncasecmp
++#endif
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL IsValidBinnHeader(const void *pbuf, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize, int *pheadersize);
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++char * APIENTRY binn_version() {
++  return BINN_VERSION;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void APIENTRY binn_set_alloc_functions(void* (*new_malloc)(size_t), void* (*new_realloc)(void*,size_t), void (*new_free)(void*)) {
++
++  malloc_fn = new_malloc;
++  realloc_fn = new_realloc;
++  free_fn = new_free;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void check_alloc_functions() {
++
++  if (malloc_fn == 0) malloc_fn = &malloc;
++  if (realloc_fn == 0) realloc_fn = &realloc;
++  if (free_fn == 0) free_fn = &free;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void * binn_malloc(int size) {
++  check_alloc_functions();
++  return malloc_fn(size);
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void * binn_memdup(const void *src, int size) {
++  void *dest;
++
++  if (src == NULL || size <= 0) return NULL;
++  dest = binn_malloc(size);
++  if (dest == NULL) return NULL;
++  memcpy(dest, src, size);
++  return dest;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE size_t strlen2(char *str) {
++
++  if (str == NULL) return 0;
++  return strlen(str);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++int APIENTRY binn_create_type(int storage_type, int data_type_index) {
++  if (data_type_index < 0) return -1;
++  if (storage_type < BINN_STORAGE_MIN || storage_type > BINN_STORAGE_MAX) return -1;
++  if (data_type_index < 16)
++    return storage_type | data_type_index;
++  else if (data_type_index < 4096) {
++    storage_type |= BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE;
++    storage_type <<= 8;
++    data_type_index >>= 4;
++    return storage_type | data_type_index;
++  } else
++    return -1;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_type_info(int long_type, int *pstorage_type, int *pextra_type) {
++  int storage_type, extra_type;
++  BOOL retval=TRUE;
++
++again:
++
++  if (long_type < 0) {
++    goto loc_invalid;
++  } else if (long_type <= 0xff) {
++    storage_type = long_type & BINN_STORAGE_MASK;
++    extra_type = long_type & BINN_TYPE_MASK;
++  } else if (long_type <= 0xffff) {
++    storage_type = long_type & BINN_STORAGE_MASK16;
++    storage_type >>= 8;
++    extra_type = long_type & BINN_TYPE_MASK16;
++    extra_type >>= 4;
++  } else if (long_type & BINN_STORAGE_VIRTUAL) {
++    //storage_type = BINN_STORAGE_VIRTUAL;
++    //extra_type = xxx;
++    long_type &= 0xffff;
++    goto again;
++  } else {
++loc_invalid:
++    storage_type = -1;
++    extra_type = -1;
++    retval = FALSE;
++  }
++
++  if (pstorage_type) *pstorage_type = storage_type;
++  if (pextra_type) *pextra_type = extra_type;
++
++  return retval;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create(binn *item, int type, int size, void *pointer) {
++  BOOL retval=FALSE;
++
++  switch (type) {
++    case BINN_LIST:
++    case BINN_MAP:
++    case BINN_OBJECT:
++      break;
++    default:
++      goto loc_exit;
++  }
++
++  if (item == NULL || size < 0) goto loc_exit;
++  if (size < MIN_BINN_SIZE) {
++    if (pointer) goto loc_exit;
++    else size = 0;
++  }
++
++  memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (pointer) {
++    item->pre_allocated = TRUE;
++  } else {
++    item->pre_allocated = FALSE;
++    if (size == 0) size = CHUNK_SIZE;
++    pointer = binn_malloc(size);
++    if (pointer == 0) return INVALID_BINN;
++  }
++
++  item->pbuf = pointer;
++  item->alloc_size = size;
++
++  item->header = BINN_MAGIC;
++  //item->allocated = FALSE;   -- already zeroed
++  item->writable = TRUE;
++  item->used_size = MAX_BINN_HEADER;  // save space for the header
++  item->type = type;
++  //item->count = 0;           -- already zeroed
++  item->dirty = TRUE;          // the header is not written to the buffer
++
++  retval = TRUE;
++
++loc_exit:
++  return retval;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_new(int type, int size, void *pointer) {
++  binn *item;
++
++  item = (binn*) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_create(item, type, size, pointer) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(item);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  item->allocated = TRUE;
++  return item;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_list(binn *list) {
++
++  return binn_create(list, BINN_LIST, 0, NULL);
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_map(binn *map) {
++
++  return binn_create(map, BINN_MAP, 0, NULL);
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_object(binn *object) {
++
++  return binn_create(object, BINN_OBJECT, 0, NULL);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_list() {
++  return binn_new(BINN_LIST, 0, 0);
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map() {
++  return binn_new(BINN_MAP, 0, 0);
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object() {
++  return binn_new(BINN_OBJECT, 0, 0);
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_copy(const void *old) {
++  int type, count, size, header_size;
++  unsigned char *old_ptr = binn_ptr(old);
++  binn *item;
++
++  size = 0;
++  if (!IsValidBinnHeader(old_ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size)) return NULL;
++
++  item = binn_new(type, size - header_size + MAX_BINN_HEADER, NULL);
++  if( item ){
++    unsigned char *dest;
++    dest = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + MAX_BINN_HEADER;
++    memcpy(dest, old_ptr + header_size, size - header_size);
++    item->used_size = MAX_BINN_HEADER + size - header_size;
++    item->count = count;
++  }
++  return item;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++// deprecated: unsecure. the size can be corrupted accidentally or intentionally
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_load(const void *data, binn *value) {
++
++  if (data == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE;
++  memset(value, 0, sizeof(binn));
++  value->header = BINN_MAGIC;
++  //value->allocated = FALSE;  --  already zeroed
++  //value->writable = FALSE;
++
++  if (binn_is_valid(data, &value->type, &value->count, &value->size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++  value->ptr = (void*) data;
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_load_ex(const void *data, int size, binn *value) {
++
++  if (data == NULL || value == NULL || size <= 0) return FALSE;
++  memset(value, 0, sizeof(binn));
++  value->header = BINN_MAGIC;
++  //value->allocated = FALSE;  --  already zeroed
++  //value->writable = FALSE;
++
++  if (binn_is_valid_ex(data, &value->type, &value->count, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++  value->ptr = (void*) data;
++  value->size = size;
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_open(const void *data) {
++  binn *item;
++
++  item = (binn*) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_load(data, item) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(item);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  item->allocated = TRUE;
++  return item;
++
++}
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_open_ex(const void *data, int size) {
++  binn *item;
++
++  item = (binn*) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_load_ex(data, size, item) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(item);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  item->allocated = TRUE;
++  return item;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_get_ptr_type(const void *ptr) {
++
++  if (ptr == NULL) return 0;
++
++  switch (*(unsigned int *)ptr) {
++  case BINN_MAGIC:
++    return BINN_STRUCT;
++  default:
++    return BINN_BUFFER;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_struct(const void *ptr) {
++
++  if (ptr == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if ((*(unsigned int *)ptr) == BINN_MAGIC) {
++    return TRUE;
++  } else {
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int CalcAllocation(int needed_size, int alloc_size) {
++  int calc_size;
++
++  calc_size = alloc_size;
++  while (calc_size < needed_size) {
++    calc_size <<= 1;  // same as *= 2
++    //calc_size += CHUNK_SIZE;  -- this is slower than the above line, because there are more reallocations
++  }
++  return calc_size;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL CheckAllocation(binn *item, int add_size) {
++  int  alloc_size;
++  void *ptr;
++
++  if (item->used_size + add_size > item->alloc_size) {
++    if (item->pre_allocated) return FALSE;
++    alloc_size = CalcAllocation(item->used_size + add_size, item->alloc_size);
++    ptr = realloc_fn(item->pbuf, alloc_size);
++    if (ptr == NULL) return FALSE;
++    item->pbuf = ptr;
++    item->alloc_size = alloc_size;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int get_storage_size(int storage_type) {
++
++  switch (storage_type) {
++  case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++    return 0;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE:
++    return 1;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++    return 2;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++    return 4;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++    return 8;
++  default:
++    return 0;
++  }
++
++}
++
++#endif
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE unsigned char * AdvanceDataPos(unsigned char *p, unsigned char *plimit) {
++  unsigned char byte;
++  int  storage_type, DataSize;
++
++  if (p > plimit) return 0;
++
++  byte = *p; p++;
++  storage_type = byte & BINN_STORAGE_MASK;
++  if (byte & BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE) p++;
++
++  switch (storage_type) {
++  case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++    //p += 0;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE:
++    p ++;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++    p += 2;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++    p += 4;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++    p += 8;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++    if (p > plimit) return 0;
++    DataSize = *((unsigned char*)p);
++    if (DataSize & 0x80) {
++      if (p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return 0;
++      copy_be32((u32*)&DataSize, (u32*)p);
++      DataSize &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
++      p+=4;
++    } else {
++      p++;
++    }
++    p += DataSize;
++    if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_STRING) {
++      p++;  // null terminator.
++    }
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER:
++    if (p > plimit) return 0;
++    DataSize = *((unsigned char*)p);
++    if (DataSize & 0x80) {
++      if (p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return 0;
++      copy_be32((u32*)&DataSize, (u32*)p);
++      DataSize &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
++    }
++    DataSize--;  // remove the type byte already added before
++    p += DataSize;
++    break;
++  default:
++    return 0;
++  }
++
++  return p;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++/*
++
++The id can be stored with 1 to 5 bytes
++
++S = signal bit
++X = bit part of id
++
++  0SXX XXXX
++  100S XXXX + 1 byte
++  101S XXXX + 2 bytes
++  110S XXXX + 3 bytes
++  1110 0000 + 4 bytes
++
++*/
++BINN_PRIVATE int read_map_id(unsigned char **pp, unsigned char *plimit) {
++  unsigned char *p, c, sign, type;
++  int id, extra_bytes;
++
++  p = *pp;
++  if (p > plimit) return 0;
++
++  c = *p++;
++
++  if (c & 0x80) {
++    extra_bytes = ((c & 0x60) >> 5) + 1;
++    if (p + extra_bytes > plimit ) {
++      *pp = p + extra_bytes;
++      return 0;
++    }
++  }
++
++  type = c & 0xE0;
++  sign = c & 0x10;
++
++  if ((c & 0x80) == 0) {
++    sign = c & 0x40;
++    id = c & 0x3F;
++  } else if (type == 0x80) {
++    id = c & 0x0F;
++    id = (id << 8) | *p++;
++  } else if (type == 0xA0) {
++    id = c & 0x0F;
++    id = (id << 8) | *p++;
++    id = (id << 8) | *p++;
++  } else if (type == 0xC0) {
++    id = c & 0x0F;
++    id = (id << 8) | *p++;
++    id = (id << 8) | *p++;
++    id = (id << 8) | *p++;
++  } else if (type == 0xE0) {
++    copy_be32((u32*)&id, (u32*)p);
++    p += 4;
++  } else {
++    *pp = plimit + 2;
++    return 0;
++  }
++
++  if (sign) id = -id;
++
++  *pp = p;
++
++  return id;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE unsigned char * SearchForID(unsigned char *p, int header_size, int size, int numitems, int id) {
++  unsigned char *plimit, *base;
++  int  i, int32;
++
++  base = p;
++  plimit = p + size - 1;
++  p += header_size;
++
++  // search for the ID in all the arguments.
++  for (i = 0; i < numitems; i++) {
++    int32 = read_map_id(&p, plimit);
++    if (p > plimit) break;
++    // Compare if the IDs are equal.
++    if (int32 == id) return p;
++    // xxx
++    p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit);
++    if (p == 0 || p < base) break;
++  }
++
++  return NULL;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE unsigned char * SearchForKey(unsigned char *p, int header_size, int size, int numitems, const char *key) {
++  unsigned char len, *plimit, *base;
++  int  i, keylen;
++
++  base = p;
++  plimit = p + size - 1;
++  p += header_size;
++
++  keylen = strlen(key);
++
++  // search for the key in all the arguments.
++  for (i = 0; i < numitems; i++) {
++    if (p > plimit) break;
++    len = *((unsigned char *)p);
++    p++;
++    if (p + len > plimit) break;
++    // Compare if the strings are equal.
++    if (len > 0) {
++      if (strnicmp((char*)p, key, len) == 0) {   // note that there is no null terminator here
++        if (keylen == len) {
++          p += len;
++          return p;
++        }
++      }
++      p += len;
++    } else if (len == keylen) {   // in the case of empty string: ""
++      return p;
++    }
++    // xxx
++    p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit);
++    if (p == 0 || p < base) break;
++  }
++
++  return NULL;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL AddValue(binn *item, int type, void *pvalue, int size);
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_list_add_raw(binn *item, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++
++  if (item == NULL || item->type != BINN_LIST || item->writable == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  //if (CheckAllocation(item, 4) == FALSE) return FALSE;  // 4 bytes used for data_store and data_format.
++
++  if (AddValue(item, type, pvalue, size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  item->count++;
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_object_set_raw(binn *item, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++  unsigned char *p, len;
++  int int32;
++
++  if (item == NULL || item->type != BINN_OBJECT || item->writable == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (key == NULL) return FALSE;
++  int32 = strlen(key);
++  if (int32 > 255) return FALSE;
++
++  // is the key already in it?
++  p = SearchForKey(item->pbuf, MAX_BINN_HEADER, item->used_size, item->count, key);
++  if (p) return FALSE;
++
++  // start adding it
++
++  if (CheckAllocation(item, 1 + int32) == FALSE) return FALSE;  // bytes used for the key size and the key itself.
++
++  p = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + item->used_size;
++  len = int32;
++  *p = len;
++  p++;
++  memcpy(p, key, int32);
++  int32++;  // now contains the strlen + 1 byte for the len
++  item->used_size += int32;
++
++  if (AddValue(item, type, pvalue, size) == FALSE) {
++    item->used_size -= int32;
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  item->count++;
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_map_set_raw(binn *item, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++  unsigned char *base, *p, sign;
++  int id_size;
++
++  if (item == NULL || item->type != BINN_MAP || item->writable == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  // is the ID already in it?
++  p = SearchForID(item->pbuf, MAX_BINN_HEADER, item->used_size, item->count, id);
++  if (p) return FALSE;
++
++  // start adding it
++
++  if (CheckAllocation(item, 5) == FALSE) return FALSE;  // max 5 bytes used for the id.
++
++  p = base = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + item->used_size;
++
++  sign = (id < 0);
++  if (sign) id = -id;
++
++  if (id <= 0x3F) {
++    *p++ = (sign << 6) | id;
++  } else if (id <= 0xFFF) {
++    *p++ = 0x80 | (sign << 4) | ((id & 0xF00) >> 8);
++    *p++ = id & 0xFF;
++  } else if (id <= 0xFFFFF) {
++    *p++ = 0xA0 | (sign << 4) | ((id & 0xF0000) >> 16);
++    *p++ = (id & 0xFF00) >> 8;
++    *p++ = id & 0xFF;
++  } else if (id <= 0xFFFFFFF) {
++    *p++ = 0xC0 | (sign << 4) | ((id & 0xF000000) >> 24);
++    *p++ = (id & 0xFF0000) >> 16;
++    *p++ = (id & 0xFF00) >> 8;
++    *p++ = id & 0xFF;
++  } else {
++    *p++ = 0xE0;
++    if (sign) id = -id;
++    copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&id);
++    p += 4;
++  }
++
++  id_size = (p - base);
++  item->used_size += id_size;
++
++  if (AddValue(item, type, pvalue, size) == FALSE) {
++    item->used_size -= id_size;
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  item->count++;
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void * compress_int(int *pstorage_type, int *ptype, void *psource) {
++  int storage_type, storage_type2, type, type2=0;
++  int64  vint = 0;
++  uint64 vuint;
++  char *pvalue;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
++  int size1, size2;
++#endif
++
++  storage_type = *pstorage_type;
++  if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_BYTE) return psource;
++
++  type = *ptype;
++
++  switch (type) {
++  case BINN_INT64:
++    vint = *(int64*)psource;
++    goto loc_signed;
++  case BINN_INT32:
++    vint = *(int*)psource;
++    goto loc_signed;
++  case BINN_INT16:
++    vint = *(short*)psource;
++    goto loc_signed;
++  case BINN_UINT64:
++    vuint = *(uint64*)psource;
++    goto loc_positive;
++  case BINN_UINT32:
++    vuint = *(unsigned int*)psource;
++    goto loc_positive;
++  case BINN_UINT16:
++    vuint = *(unsigned short*)psource;
++    goto loc_positive;
++  }
++
++loc_signed:
++
++  if (vint >= 0) {
++    vuint = vint;
++    goto loc_positive;
++  }
++
++//loc_negative:
++
++  if (vint >= INT8_MIN) {
++    type2 = BINN_INT8;
++  } else
++  if (vint >= INT16_MIN) {
++    type2 = BINN_INT16;
++  } else
++  if (vint >= INT32_MIN) {
++    type2 = BINN_INT32;
++  }
++  goto loc_exit;
++
++loc_positive:
++
++  if (vuint <= UINT8_MAX) {
++    type2 = BINN_UINT8;
++  } else
++  if (vuint <= UINT16_MAX) {
++    type2 = BINN_UINT16;
++  } else
++  if (vuint <= UINT32_MAX) {
++    type2 = BINN_UINT32;
++  }
++
++loc_exit:
++
++  pvalue = (char *) psource;
++
++  if (type2 && type2 != type) {
++    *ptype = type2;
++    storage_type2 = binn_get_write_storage(type2);
++    *pstorage_type = storage_type2;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
++    size1 = get_storage_size(storage_type);
++    size2 = get_storage_size(storage_type2);
++    pvalue += (size1 - size2);
++#endif
++  }
++
++  return pvalue;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int type_family(int type);
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL AddValue(binn *item, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++  int int32, ArgSize, storage_type, extra_type;
++  unsigned char *p;
++
++  binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, &extra_type);
++
++  if (pvalue == NULL) {
++    switch (storage_type) {
++      case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++        break;
++      case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++      case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++        if (size == 0) break; // the 2 above are allowed to have 0 length
++	/* fall through */
++      default:
++        return FALSE;
++    }
++  }
++
++  if (type_family(type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT && item->disable_int_compression == FALSE)
++    pvalue = compress_int(&storage_type, &type, pvalue);
++
++  switch (storage_type) {
++    case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++      size = 0;
++      ArgSize = size;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE:
++      size = 1;
++      ArgSize = size;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++      size = 2;
++      ArgSize = size;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++      size = 4;
++      ArgSize = size;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++      size = 8;
++      ArgSize = size;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++      if (size < 0) return FALSE;
++      //if (size == 0) ...
++      ArgSize = size + 4; // at least this size
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++      if (size < 0) return FALSE;
++      if (size == 0) size = strlen2( (char *) pvalue);
++      ArgSize = size + 5; // at least this size
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER:
++      if (size <= 0) return FALSE;
++      ArgSize = size;
++      break;
++    default:
++      return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  ArgSize += 2;  // at least 2 bytes used for data_type.
++  if (CheckAllocation(item, ArgSize) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  // Gets the pointer to the next place in buffer
++  p = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + item->used_size;
++
++  // If the data is not a container, store the data type
++  if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER) {
++    if (type > 255) {
++      u16 type16 = type;
++      copy_be16((u16*)p, (u16*)&type16);
++      p += 2;
++      item->used_size += 2;
++    } else {
++      *p = type;
++      p++;
++      item->used_size++;
++    }
++  }
++
++  switch (storage_type) {
++    case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++      // Nothing to do.
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE:
++      *((char *) p) = *((char *) pvalue);
++      item->used_size += 1;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++      copy_be16((u16*)p, (u16*)pvalue);
++      item->used_size += 2;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++      copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)pvalue);
++      item->used_size += 4;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++      copy_be64((u64*)p, (u64*)pvalue);
++      item->used_size += 8;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++    case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++      if (size > 127) {
++        int32 = size | 0x80000000;
++        copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32);
++        p += 4;
++        item->used_size += 4;
++      } else {
++        *((unsigned char *) p) = size;
++        p++;
++        item->used_size++;
++      }
++      memcpy(p, pvalue, size);
++      if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_STRING) {
++        p += size;
++        *((char *) p) = (char) 0;
++        size++;  // null terminator
++      }
++      item->used_size += size;
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER:
++      memcpy(p, pvalue, size);
++      item->used_size += size;
++      break;
++  }
++
++  item->dirty = TRUE;
++
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_save_header(binn *item) {
++  unsigned char byte, *p;
++  int int32, size;
++
++  if (item == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++#ifndef BINN_DISABLE_SMALL_HEADER
++
++  p = ((unsigned char *) item->pbuf) + MAX_BINN_HEADER;
++  size = item->used_size - MAX_BINN_HEADER + 3;  // at least 3 bytes for the header
++
++  // write the count
++  if (item->count > 127) {
++    p -= 4;
++    size += 3;
++    int32 = item->count | 0x80000000;
++    copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32);
++  } else {
++    p--;
++    *p = (unsigned char) item->count;
++  }
++
++  // write the size
++  if (size > 127) {
++    p -= 4;
++    size += 3;
++    int32 = size | 0x80000000;
++    copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32);
++  } else {
++    p--;
++    *p = (unsigned char) size;
++  }
++
++  // write the type.
++  p--;
++  *p = (unsigned char) item->type;
++
++  // set the values
++  item->ptr = p;
++  item->size = size;
++
++  UNUSED(byte);
++
++#else
++
++  p = (unsigned char *) item->pbuf;
++
++  // write the type.
++  byte = item->type;
++  *p = byte; p++;
++  // write the size
++  int32 = item->used_size | 0x80000000;
++  copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32);
++  p+=4;
++  // write the count
++  int32 = item->count | 0x80000000;
++  copy_be32((u32*)p, (u32*)&int32);
++
++  item->ptr = item->pbuf;
++  item->size = item->used_size;
++
++#endif
++
++  item->dirty = FALSE;
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void APIENTRY binn_free(binn *item) {
++
++  if (item == NULL) return;
++
++  if (item->writable && item->pre_allocated == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(item->pbuf);
++  }
++
++  if (item->freefn) item->freefn(item->ptr);
++
++  if (item->allocated) {
++    free_fn(item);
++  } else {
++    memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn));
++    item->header = BINN_MAGIC;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++// free the binn structure but keeps the binn buffer allocated, returning a pointer to it. use the free function to release the buffer later
++void * APIENTRY binn_release(binn *item) {
++  void *data;
++
++  if (item == NULL) return NULL;
++
++  data = binn_ptr(item);
++
++  if (data > item->pbuf) {
++    memmove(item->pbuf, data, item->size);
++    data = item->pbuf;
++  }
++
++  if (item->allocated) {
++    free_fn(item);
++  } else {
++    memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn));
++    item->header = BINN_MAGIC;
++  }
++
++  return data;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL IsValidBinnHeader(const void *pbuf, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize, int *pheadersize) {
++  unsigned char byte, *p, *plimit=0;
++  int int32, type, size, count;
++
++  if (pbuf == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  p = (unsigned char *) pbuf;
++
++  if (psize && *psize > 0) {
++    if (*psize < MIN_BINN_SIZE) return FALSE;
++    plimit = p + *psize - 1;
++  }
++
++  // get the type
++  byte = *p; p++;
++  if ((byte & BINN_STORAGE_MASK) != BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER) return FALSE;
++  if (byte & BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE) return FALSE;
++  type = byte;
++
++  switch (type) {
++    case BINN_LIST:
++    case BINN_MAP:
++    case BINN_OBJECT:
++      break;
++    default:
++      return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  // get the size
++  if (plimit && p > plimit) return FALSE;
++  int32 = *((unsigned char*)p);
++  if (int32 & 0x80) {
++    if (plimit && p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return FALSE;
++    copy_be32((u32*)&int32, (u32*)p);
++    int32 &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
++    p+=4;
++  } else {
++    p++;
++  }
++  size = int32;
++
++  // get the count
++  if (plimit && p > plimit) return FALSE;
++  int32 = *((unsigned char*)p);
++  if (int32 & 0x80) {
++    if (plimit && p + sizeof(int) - 1 > plimit) return FALSE;
++    copy_be32((u32*)&int32, (u32*)p);
++    int32 &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
++    p+=4;
++  } else {
++    p++;
++  }
++  count = int32;
++
++  if (size < MIN_BINN_SIZE || count < 0) return FALSE;
++
++  // return the values
++  if (ptype)  *ptype  = type;
++  if (pcount) *pcount = count;
++  if (psize)  *psize  = size;
++  if (pheadersize) *pheadersize = (int) (p - (unsigned char*)pbuf);
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_buf_type(const void *pbuf) {
++  int  type;
++
++  if (!IsValidBinnHeader(pbuf, &type, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return INVALID_BINN;
++
++  return type;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_buf_count(const void *pbuf) {
++  int  nitems;
++
++  if (!IsValidBinnHeader(pbuf, NULL, &nitems, NULL, NULL)) return 0;
++
++  return nitems;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int binn_buf_size(const void *pbuf) {
++  int  size=0;
++
++  if (!IsValidBinnHeader(pbuf, NULL, NULL, &size, NULL)) return 0;
++
++  return size;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_ptr(const void *ptr) {
++  binn *item;
++
++  switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) {
++  case BINN_STRUCT:
++    item = (binn*) ptr;
++    if (item->writable && item->dirty) {
++      binn_save_header(item);
++    }
++    return item->ptr;
++  case BINN_BUFFER:
++    return (void*)ptr;
++  default:
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++int APIENTRY binn_size(const void *ptr) {
++  binn *item;
++
++  switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) {
++  case BINN_STRUCT:
++    item = (binn*) ptr;
++    if (item->writable && item->dirty) {
++      binn_save_header(item);
++    }
++    return item->size;
++  case BINN_BUFFER:
++    return binn_buf_size(ptr);
++  default:
++    return 0;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++int APIENTRY binn_type(const void *ptr) {
++  binn *item;
++
++  switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) {
++  case BINN_STRUCT:
++    item = (binn*) ptr;
++    return item->type;
++  case BINN_BUFFER:
++    return binn_buf_type(ptr);
++  default:
++    return -1;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++int APIENTRY binn_count(const void *ptr) {
++  binn *item;
++
++  switch (binn_get_ptr_type(ptr)) {
++  case BINN_STRUCT:
++    item = (binn*) ptr;
++    return item->count;
++  case BINN_BUFFER:
++    return binn_buf_count(ptr);
++  default:
++    return -1;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++// the container can be smaller than the informed size
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_is_valid_ex2(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize) {
++  int  i, type, count, size, header_size;
++  unsigned char *p, *plimit, *base, len;
++
++  if (ptr == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  // is there an informed size?
++  if (psize && *psize > 0) {
++    size = *psize;
++  } else {
++    size = 0;
++  }
++
++  if (!IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size)) return FALSE;
++
++  // is there an informed size?
++  if (psize && *psize > 0) {
++    // is it bigger than the buffer?
++    if (size > *psize) return FALSE;
++  }
++  // is there an informed count?
++  if (pcount && *pcount > 0) {
++    // is it the same as the one in the buffer?
++    if (count != *pcount) return FALSE;
++  }
++  // is there an informed type?
++  if (ptype && *ptype != 0) {
++    // is it the same as the one in the buffer?
++    if (type != *ptype) return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  p = (unsigned char *)ptr;
++  base = p;
++  plimit = p + size - 1;
++
++  p += header_size;
++
++  // process each (key and) value
++  for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
++    switch (type) {
++      case BINN_OBJECT:
++        if (p > plimit) goto Invalid;
++        // get the key (string) size
++        len = *p;
++        p++;
++        //if (len == 0) goto Invalid;
++        // advance over the key
++        p += len;
++        break;
++      case BINN_MAP:
++        // advance over the key
++        read_map_id(&p, plimit);
++        break;
++      case BINN_LIST:
++        // no key
++        break;
++      default:
++        goto Invalid;
++    }
++    // check the value
++    if (p > plimit) goto Invalid;
++    if ((*p & BINN_STORAGE_MASK) == BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER) {
++      // recursively check the internal container
++      int size2 = plimit - p + 1;  // maximum container size
++      if (binn_is_valid_ex2(p, NULL, NULL, &size2) == FALSE) goto Invalid;
++      p += size2;
++    } else {
++      // advance over the value
++      p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit);
++      if (p == 0 || p < base) goto Invalid;
++    }
++  }
++
++  if (ptype  && *ptype==0) *ptype = type;
++  if (pcount && *pcount==0) *pcount = count;
++  if (psize) *psize = size;
++  return TRUE;
++
++Invalid:
++  return FALSE;
++
++}
++
++// the container must have the informed size, if informed
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_valid_ex(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize) {
++  int size;
++
++  if (psize && *psize > 0) {
++    size = *psize;
++  } else {
++    size = 0;
++  }
++
++  if (binn_is_valid_ex2(ptr, ptype, pcount, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (psize) {
++    if (*psize > 0) {
++      if (size != *psize) return FALSE;
++    } else if (*psize==0) {
++      *psize = size;
++    }
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_valid(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize) {
++
++  if (ptype)  *ptype  = 0;
++  if (pcount) *pcount = 0;
++  if (psize)  *psize  = 0;
++
++  return binn_is_valid_ex(ptr, ptype, pcount, psize);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/*** INTERNAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL GetValue(unsigned char *p, unsigned char *plimit, binn *value) {
++  unsigned char byte;
++  int   data_type, storage_type;  //, extra_type;
++  int   DataSize;
++  void *p2;
++
++  if (value == NULL) return FALSE;
++  memset(value, 0, sizeof(binn));
++  value->header = BINN_MAGIC;
++  //value->allocated = FALSE;  --  already zeroed
++  //value->writable = FALSE;
++
++  // saves for use with BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER
++  p2 = p;
++
++  // read the data type
++  if (p > plimit) return FALSE;
++  byte = *p; p++;
++  storage_type = byte & BINN_STORAGE_MASK;
++  if (byte & BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE) {
++    data_type = byte << 8;
++    if (p > plimit) return FALSE;
++    byte = *p; p++;
++    data_type |= byte;
++    //extra_type = data_type & BINN_TYPE_MASK16;
++  } else {
++    data_type = byte;
++    //extra_type = byte & BINN_TYPE_MASK;
++  }
++
++  //value->storage_type = storage_type;
++  value->type = data_type;
++
++  switch (storage_type) {
++  case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE:
++    if (p > plimit) return FALSE;
++    value->vuint8 = *((unsigned char *) p);
++    value->ptr = p;   //value->ptr = &value->vuint8;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++    if (p + 1 > plimit) return FALSE;
++    copy_be16((u16*)&value->vint16, (u16*)p);
++    value->ptr = &value->vint16;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++    if (p + 3 > plimit) return FALSE;
++    copy_be32((u32*)&value->vint32, (u32*)p);
++    value->ptr = &value->vint32;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++    if (p + 7 > plimit) return FALSE;
++    copy_be64((u64*)&value->vint64, (u64*)p);
++    value->ptr = &value->vint64;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++    if (p > plimit) return FALSE;
++    DataSize = *((unsigned char*)p);
++    if (DataSize & 0x80) {
++      if (p + 3 > plimit) return FALSE;
++      copy_be32((u32*)&DataSize, (u32*)p);
++      DataSize &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
++      p+=4;
++    } else {
++      p++;
++    }
++    if (p + DataSize - 1 > plimit) return FALSE;
++    value->size = DataSize;
++    value->ptr = p;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER:
++    value->ptr = p2;  // <-- it returns the pointer to the container, not the data
++    if (IsValidBinnHeader(p2, NULL, &value->count, &value->size, NULL) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++    break;
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  // convert the returned value, if needed
++
++  switch (value->type) {
++    case BINN_TRUE:
++      value->type = BINN_BOOL;
++      value->vbool = TRUE;
++      value->ptr = &value->vbool;
++      break;
++    case BINN_FALSE:
++      value->type = BINN_BOOL;
++      value->vbool = FALSE;
++      value->ptr = &value->vbool;
++      break;
++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED
++    case BINN_SINGLE_STR:
++      value->type = BINN_SINGLE;
++      value->vfloat = (float) atof((const char*)value->ptr);  // converts from string to double, and then to float
++      value->ptr = &value->vfloat;
++      break;
++    case BINN_DOUBLE_STR:
++      value->type = BINN_DOUBLE;
++      value->vdouble = atof((const char*)value->ptr);  // converts from string to double
++      value->ptr = &value->vdouble;
++      break;
++#endif
++    /*
++    case BINN_DECIMAL:
++    case BINN_CURRENCYSTR:
++    case BINN_DATE:
++    case BINN_DATETIME:
++    case BINN_TIME:
++    */
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++
++// on little-endian devices we store the value so we can return a pointer to integers.
++// it's valid only for single-threaded apps. multi-threaded apps must use the _get_ functions instead.
++
++binn local_value;
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void * store_value(binn *value) {
++
++  memcpy(&local_value, value, sizeof(binn));
++
++  switch (binn_get_read_storage(value->type)) {
++  case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++    // return a valid pointer
++  case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++    return &local_value.vint32;  // returns the pointer to the converted value, from big-endian to little-endian
++  }
++
++  return value->ptr;   // returns from the on stack value to be thread-safe (for list, map, object, string and blob)
++
++}
++
++#endif
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/*** READ FUNCTIONS ********************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_value(const void *ptr, const char *key, binn *value) {
++  int type, count, size=0, header_size;
++  unsigned char *p, *plimit;
++
++  ptr = binn_ptr(ptr);
++  if (ptr == NULL || key == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  // check the header
++  if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type != BINN_OBJECT) return FALSE;
++  if (count == 0) return FALSE;
++
++  p = (unsigned char *) ptr;
++  plimit = p + size - 1;
++
++  p = SearchForKey(p, header_size, size, count, key);
++  if (p == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  return GetValue(p, plimit, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_value(const void *ptr, int id, binn *value) {
++  int type, count, size=0, header_size;
++  unsigned char *p, *plimit;
++
++  ptr = binn_ptr(ptr);
++  if (ptr == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  // check the header
++  if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type != BINN_MAP) return FALSE;
++  if (count == 0) return FALSE;
++
++  p = (unsigned char *) ptr;
++  plimit = p + size - 1;
++
++  p = SearchForID(p, header_size, size, count, id);
++  if (p == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  return GetValue(p, plimit, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get_value(const void *ptr, int pos, binn *value) {
++  int  i, type, count, size=0, header_size;
++  unsigned char *p, *plimit, *base;
++
++  ptr = binn_ptr(ptr);
++  if (ptr == NULL || value == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  // check the header
++  if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type != BINN_LIST) return FALSE;
++  if (count == 0) return FALSE;
++  if (pos <= 0 || pos > count) return FALSE;
++  pos--;  // convert from base 1 to base 0
++
++  p = (unsigned char *) ptr;
++  base = p;
++  plimit = p + size - 1;
++  p += header_size;
++
++  for (i = 0; i < pos; i++) {
++    p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit);
++    if (p == 0 || p < base) return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return GetValue(p, plimit, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/*** READ PAIR BY POSITION *************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_read_pair(int expected_type, const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, char *pkey, binn *value) {
++  int  type, count, size=0, header_size;
++  int  i, int32, id = 0, counter=0;
++  unsigned char *p, *plimit, *base, *key = NULL, len = 0;
++
++  ptr = binn_ptr(ptr);
++
++  // check the header
++  if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type != expected_type || count == 0 || pos < 1 || pos > count) return FALSE;
++
++  p = (unsigned char *) ptr;
++  base = p;
++  plimit = p + size - 1;
++  p += header_size;
++
++  for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
++    switch (type) {
++      case BINN_MAP:
++        int32 = read_map_id(&p, plimit);
++        if (p > plimit) return FALSE;
++        id = int32;
++        break;
++      case BINN_OBJECT:
++        len = *((unsigned char *)p); p++;
++        if (p > plimit) return FALSE;
++        key = p;
++        p += len;
++        if (p > plimit) return FALSE;
++        break;
++    }
++    counter++;
++    if (counter == pos) goto found;
++    //
++    p = AdvanceDataPos(p, plimit);
++    if (p == 0 || p < base) return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return FALSE;
++
++found:
++
++  switch (type) {
++    case BINN_MAP:
++      if (pid) *pid = id;
++      break;
++    case BINN_OBJECT:
++      if (pkey) {
++        memcpy(pkey, key, len);
++        pkey[len] = 0;
++      }
++      break;
++  }
++
++  return GetValue(p, plimit, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, binn *value) {
++
++  return binn_read_pair(BINN_MAP, ptr, pos, pid, NULL, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, char *pkey, binn *value) {
++
++  return binn_read_pair(BINN_OBJECT, ptr, pos, NULL, pkey, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_pair(const void *map, int pos, int *pid) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_read_pair(BINN_MAP, map, pos, pid, NULL, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_pair(const void *obj, int pos, char *pkey) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_read_pair(BINN_OBJECT, obj, pos, NULL, pkey, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_map_get_pair(ptr, pos, pid, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_object_get_pair(ptr, pos, pkey, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/*** SEQUENTIAL READ FUNCTIONS *********************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_iter_init(binn_iter *iter, const void *ptr, int expected_type) {
++  int  type, count, size=0, header_size;
++
++  ptr = binn_ptr(ptr);
++  if (ptr == NULL || iter == NULL) return FALSE;
++  memset(iter, 0, sizeof(binn_iter));
++
++  // check the header
++  if (IsValidBinnHeader(ptr, &type, &count, &size, &header_size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type != expected_type) return FALSE;
++  //if (count == 0) return FALSE;  -- should not be used
++
++  iter->plimit = (unsigned char *)ptr + size - 1;
++  iter->pnext = (unsigned char *)ptr + header_size;
++  iter->count = count;
++  iter->current = 0;
++  iter->type = type;
++
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_next(binn_iter *iter, binn *value) {
++  unsigned char *pnow;
++
++  if (iter == NULL || iter->pnext == NULL || iter->pnext > iter->plimit || iter->current > iter->count || iter->type != BINN_LIST) return FALSE;
++
++  iter->current++;
++  if (iter->current > iter->count) return FALSE;
++
++  pnow = iter->pnext;
++  iter->pnext = AdvanceDataPos(pnow, iter->plimit);
++  if (iter->pnext != 0 && iter->pnext < pnow) return FALSE;
++
++  return GetValue(pnow, iter->plimit, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL binn_read_next_pair(int expected_type, binn_iter *iter, int *pid, char *pkey, binn *value) {
++  int  int32, id;
++  unsigned char *p, *key;
++  unsigned short len;
++
++  if (iter == NULL || iter->pnext == NULL || iter->pnext > iter->plimit || iter->current > iter->count || iter->type != expected_type) return FALSE;
++
++  iter->current++;
++  if (iter->current > iter->count) return FALSE;
++
++  p = iter->pnext;
++
++  switch (expected_type) {
++    case BINN_MAP:
++      int32 = read_map_id(&p, iter->plimit);
++      if (p > iter->plimit) return FALSE;
++      id = int32;
++      if (pid) *pid = id;
++      break;
++    case BINN_OBJECT:
++      len = *((unsigned char *)p); p++;
++      key = p;
++      p += len;
++      if (p > iter->plimit) return FALSE;
++      if (pkey) {
++        memcpy(pkey, key, len);
++        pkey[len] = 0;
++      }
++      break;
++  }
++
++  iter->pnext = AdvanceDataPos(p, iter->plimit);
++  if (iter->pnext != 0 && iter->pnext < p) return FALSE;
++
++  return GetValue(p, iter->plimit, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, binn *value) {
++
++  return binn_read_next_pair(BINN_MAP, iter, pid, NULL, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, binn *value) {
++
++  return binn_read_next_pair(BINN_OBJECT, iter, NULL, pkey, value);
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_next_value(binn_iter *iter) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_list_next(iter, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_next_value(binn_iter *iter, int *pid) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_map_next(iter, pid, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_next_value(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_object_next(iter, pkey, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_list_next(iter, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_map_next(iter, pid, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_object_next(iter, pkey, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/****** EXTENDED INTERFACE ***********************************************************/
++/****** none of the functions above call the functions below *************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++int APIENTRY binn_get_write_storage(int type) {
++  int storage_type;
++
++  switch (type) {
++    case BINN_SINGLE_STR:
++    case BINN_DOUBLE_STR:
++      return BINN_STORAGE_STRING;
++
++    case BINN_BOOL:
++      return BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES;
++
++    default:
++      binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, NULL);
++      return storage_type;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++int APIENTRY binn_get_read_storage(int type) {
++  int storage_type;
++
++  switch (type) {
++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED
++    case BINN_SINGLE_STR:
++      return BINN_STORAGE_DWORD;
++    case BINN_DOUBLE_STR:
++      return BINN_STORAGE_QWORD;
++#endif
++    case BINN_BOOL:
++    case BINN_TRUE:
++    case BINN_FALSE:
++      return BINN_STORAGE_DWORD;
++    default:
++      binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, NULL);
++      return storage_type;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL GetWriteConvertedData(int *ptype, void **ppvalue, int *psize) {
++  int  type;
++  float  f1;
++  double d1;
++  char pstr[128];
++
++  UNUSED(pstr);
++  UNUSED(d1);
++  UNUSED(f1);
++
++  type = *ptype;
++
++  if (*ppvalue == NULL) {
++    switch (type) {
++      case BINN_NULL:
++      case BINN_TRUE:
++      case BINN_FALSE:
++        break;
++      case BINN_STRING:
++      case BINN_BLOB:
++        if (*psize == 0) break;
++	/* fall through */
++      default:
++        return FALSE;
++    }
++  }
++
++  switch (type) {
++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED
++    case BINN_SINGLE:
++      f1 = **(float**)ppvalue;
++      d1 = f1;  // convert from float (32bits) to double (64bits)
++      type = BINN_SINGLE_STR;
++      goto conv_double;
++    case BINN_DOUBLE:
++      d1 = **(double**)ppvalue;
++      type = BINN_DOUBLE_STR;
++conv_double:
++      // the '%.17e' is more precise than the '%g'
++      snprintf(pstr, 127, "%.17e", d1);
++      *ppvalue = pstr;
++      *ptype = type;
++      break;
++#endif
++    case BINN_DECIMAL:
++    case BINN_CURRENCYSTR:
++      /*
++      if (binn_malloc_extptr(128) == NULL) return FALSE;
++      snprintf(sptr, 127, "%E", **ppvalue);
++      *ppvalue = sptr;
++      */
++      return TRUE;  //! temporary
++      break;
++
++    case BINN_DATE:
++    case BINN_DATETIME:
++    case BINN_TIME:
++      return TRUE;  //! temporary
++      break;
++
++    case BINN_BOOL:
++      if (**((BOOL**)ppvalue) == FALSE) {
++        type = BINN_FALSE;
++      } else {
++        type = BINN_TRUE;
++      }
++      *ptype = type;
++      break;
++
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int type_family(int type)  {
++
++  switch (type) {
++    case BINN_LIST:
++    case BINN_MAP:
++    case BINN_OBJECT:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_BINN;
++
++    case BINN_INT8:
++    case BINN_INT16:
++    case BINN_INT32:
++    case BINN_INT64:
++    case BINN_UINT8:
++    case BINN_UINT16:
++    case BINN_UINT32:
++    case BINN_UINT64:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_INT;
++
++    case BINN_FLOAT32:
++    case BINN_FLOAT64:
++    //case BINN_SINGLE:
++    case BINN_SINGLE_STR:
++    //case BINN_DOUBLE:
++    case BINN_DOUBLE_STR:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_FLOAT;
++
++    case BINN_STRING:
++    case BINN_HTML:
++    case BINN_CSS:
++    case BINN_XML:
++    case BINN_JSON:
++    case BINN_JAVASCRIPT:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_STRING;
++
++    case BINN_BLOB:
++    case BINN_JPEG:
++    case BINN_GIF:
++    case BINN_PNG:
++    case BINN_BMP:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_BLOB;
++
++    case BINN_DECIMAL:
++    case BINN_CURRENCY:
++    case BINN_DATE:
++    case BINN_TIME:
++    case BINN_DATETIME:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_STRING;
++
++    case BINN_BOOL:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_BOOL;
++
++    case BINN_NULL:
++      return BINN_FAMILY_NULL;
++
++    default:
++      // if it wasn't found
++      return BINN_FAMILY_NONE;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE int int_type(int type)  {
++
++  switch (type) {
++  case BINN_INT8:
++  case BINN_INT16:
++  case BINN_INT32:
++  case BINN_INT64:
++    return BINN_SIGNED_INT;
++
++  case BINN_UINT8:
++  case BINN_UINT16:
++  case BINN_UINT32:
++  case BINN_UINT64:
++    return BINN_UNSIGNED_INT;
++
++  default:
++    return 0;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_raw_value(const void *psource, void *pdest, int data_store) {
++
++  switch (data_store) {
++  case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE:
++    *((char *) pdest) = *(char *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++    *((short *) pdest) = *(short *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++    *((int *) pdest) = *(int *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++    *((uint64 *) pdest) = *(uint64 *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER:
++    *((char **) pdest) = (char *)psource;
++    break;
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_int_value(const void *psource, void *pdest, int source_type, int dest_type) {
++  uint64 vuint64 = 0; int64 vint64 = 0;
++
++  switch (source_type) {
++  case BINN_INT8:
++    vint64 = *(signed char *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_INT16:
++    vint64 = *(short *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_INT32:
++    vint64 = *(int *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_INT64:
++    vint64 = *(int64 *)psource;
++    break;
++
++  case BINN_UINT8:
++    vuint64 = *(unsigned char *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_UINT16:
++    vuint64 = *(unsigned short *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_UINT32:
++    vuint64 = *(unsigned int *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_UINT64:
++    vuint64 = *(uint64 *)psource;
++    break;
++
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++
++  // copy from int64 to uint64, if possible
++
++  if (int_type(source_type) == BINN_UNSIGNED_INT && int_type(dest_type) == BINN_SIGNED_INT) {
++    if (vuint64 > INT64_MAX) return FALSE;
++    vint64 = vuint64;
++  } else if (int_type(source_type) == BINN_SIGNED_INT && int_type(dest_type) == BINN_UNSIGNED_INT) {
++    if (vint64 < 0) return FALSE;
++    vuint64 = vint64;
++  }
++
++
++  switch (dest_type) {
++  case BINN_INT8:
++    if (vint64 < INT8_MIN || vint64 > INT8_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *(signed char *)pdest = (signed char) vint64;
++    break;
++  case BINN_INT16:
++    if (vint64 < INT16_MIN || vint64 > INT16_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *(short *)pdest = (short) vint64;
++    break;
++  case BINN_INT32:
++    if (vint64 < INT32_MIN || vint64 > INT32_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *(int *)pdest = (int) vint64;
++    break;
++  case BINN_INT64:
++    *(int64 *)pdest = vint64;
++    break;
++
++  case BINN_UINT8:
++    if (vuint64 > UINT8_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *(unsigned char *)pdest = (unsigned char) vuint64;
++    break;
++  case BINN_UINT16:
++    if (vuint64 > UINT16_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *(unsigned short *)pdest = (unsigned short) vuint64;
++    break;
++  case BINN_UINT32:
++    if (vuint64 > UINT32_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *(unsigned int *)pdest = (unsigned int) vuint64;
++    break;
++  case BINN_UINT64:
++    *(uint64 *)pdest = vuint64;
++    break;
++
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_float_value(const void *psource, void *pdest, int source_type, int dest_type) {
++
++  switch (source_type) {
++  case BINN_FLOAT32:
++    *(double *)pdest = *(float *)psource;
++    break;
++  case BINN_FLOAT64:
++    *(float *)pdest = (float) *(double *)psource;
++    break;
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE void zero_value(const void *pvalue, int type) {
++  //int size=0;
++
++  switch (binn_get_read_storage(type)) {
++  case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BYTE:
++    *((char *) pvalue) = 0;
++    //size=1;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_WORD:
++    *((short *) pvalue) = 0;
++    //size=2;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_DWORD:
++    *((int *) pvalue) = 0;
++    //size=4;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_QWORD:
++    *((uint64 *) pvalue) = 0;
++    //size=8;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++  case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER:
++    *(char **)pvalue = NULL;
++    break;
++  }
++
++  //if (size>0) memset(pvalue, 0, size);
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL copy_value(void *psource, void *pdest, int source_type, int dest_type, int data_store) {
++
++  if (type_family(source_type) != type_family(dest_type)) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type_family(source_type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT && source_type != dest_type) {
++    return copy_int_value(psource, pdest, source_type, dest_type);
++  } else if (type_family(source_type) == BINN_FAMILY_FLOAT && source_type != dest_type) {
++    return copy_float_value(psource, pdest, source_type, dest_type);
++  } else {
++    return copy_raw_value(psource, pdest, data_store);
++  }
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*** WRITE FUNCTIONS *****************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_add(binn *list, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++
++  if (GetWriteConvertedData(&type, &pvalue, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  return binn_list_add_raw(list, type, pvalue, size);
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_set(binn *map, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++
++  if (GetWriteConvertedData(&type, &pvalue, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  return binn_map_set_raw(map, id, type, pvalue, size);
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_set(binn *obj, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++
++  if (GetWriteConvertedData(&type, &pvalue, &size) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  return binn_object_set_raw(obj, key, type, pvalue, size);
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++// this function is used by the wrappers
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_add_value(binn *item, int binn_type, int id, char *name, int type, void *pvalue, int size) {
++
++  switch (binn_type) {
++    case BINN_LIST:
++      return binn_list_add(item, type, pvalue, size);
++    case BINN_MAP:
++      return binn_map_set(item, id, type, pvalue, size);
++    case BINN_OBJECT:
++      return binn_object_set(item, name, type, pvalue, size);
++    default:
++      return FALSE;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_add_new(binn *list, binn *value) {
++  BOOL retval;
++
++  retval = binn_list_add_value(list, value);
++  if (value) free_fn(value);
++  return retval;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_set_new(binn *map, int id, binn *value) {
++  BOOL retval;
++
++  retval = binn_map_set_value(map, id, value);
++  if (value) free_fn(value);
++  return retval;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_set_new(binn *obj, const char *key, binn *value) {
++  BOOL retval;
++
++  retval = binn_object_set_value(obj, key, value);
++  if (value) free_fn(value);
++  return retval;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*** READ FUNCTIONS ******************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_value(const void *ptr, int pos) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_list_get_value(ptr, pos, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_value(const void *ptr, int id) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_map_get_value(ptr, id, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_value(const void *ptr, const char *key) {
++  binn *value;
++
++  value = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++
++  if (binn_object_get_value(ptr, key, value) == FALSE) {
++    free_fn(value);
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  value->allocated = TRUE;
++  return value;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read(const void *list, int pos, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_list_get_value(list, pos, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read(const void *map, int id, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_map_get_value(map, id, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read(const void *obj, const char *key, int *ptype, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++
++  if (binn_object_get_value(obj, key, &value) == FALSE) return NULL;
++  if (ptype) *ptype = value.type;
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
++  return store_value(&value);
++#else
++  return value.ptr;
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get(const void *ptr, int pos, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++  int storage_type;
++
++  storage_type = binn_get_read_storage(type);
++  if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES && pvalue == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  zero_value(pvalue, type);
++
++  if (binn_list_get_value(ptr, pos, &value) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (copy_value(value.ptr, pvalue, value.type, type, storage_type) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get(const void *ptr, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++  int storage_type;
++
++  storage_type = binn_get_read_storage(type);
++  if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES && pvalue == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  zero_value(pvalue, type);
++
++  if (binn_map_get_value(ptr, id, &value) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (copy_value(value.ptr, pvalue, value.type, type, storage_type) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++//   if (binn_object_get(obj, "multiplier", BINN_INT32, &multiplier, NULL) == FALSE) xxx;
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get(const void *ptr, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize) {
++  binn value;
++  int storage_type;
++
++  storage_type = binn_get_read_storage(type);
++  if (storage_type != BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES && pvalue == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  zero_value(pvalue, type);
++
++  if (binn_object_get_value(ptr, key, &value) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (copy_value(value.ptr, pvalue, value.type, type, storage_type) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++
++  if (psize) *psize = value.size;
++
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++// these functions below may not be implemented as inline functions, because
++// they use a lot of space, even for the variable. so they will be exported.
++
++// but what about using as static?
++//    is there any problem with wrappers? can these wrappers implement these functions using the header?
++//    if as static, will they be present even on modules that don't use the functions?
++
++signed char APIENTRY binn_list_int8(const void *list, int pos) {
++  signed char value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT8, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++short APIENTRY binn_list_int16(const void *list, int pos) {
++  short value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT16, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++int APIENTRY binn_list_int32(const void *list, int pos) {
++  int value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++int64 APIENTRY binn_list_int64(const void *list, int pos) {
++  int64 value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_list_uint8(const void *list, int pos) {
++  unsigned char value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT8, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_list_uint16(const void *list, int pos) {
++  unsigned short value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT16, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_list_uint32(const void *list, int pos) {
++  unsigned int value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++uint64 APIENTRY binn_list_uint64(const void *list, int pos) {
++  uint64 value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++float APIENTRY binn_list_float(const void *list, int pos) {
++  float value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++double APIENTRY binn_list_double(const void *list, int pos) {
++  double value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_bool(const void *list, int pos) {
++  BOOL value = TRUE;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BOOL, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_null(const void *list, int pos) {
++
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++}
++
++char * APIENTRY binn_list_str(const void *list, int pos) {
++  char *value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_STRING, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_blob(const void *list, int pos, int *psize) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BLOB, &value, psize);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_list(const void *list, int pos) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_LIST, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_map(const void *list, int pos) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_MAP, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_object(const void *list, int pos) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_OBJECT, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++signed char APIENTRY binn_map_int8(const void *map, int id) {
++  signed char value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT8, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++short APIENTRY binn_map_int16(const void *map, int id) {
++  short value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT16, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++int APIENTRY binn_map_int32(const void *map, int id) {
++  int value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++int64 APIENTRY binn_map_int64(const void *map, int id) {
++  int64 value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_map_uint8(const void *map, int id) {
++  unsigned char value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT8, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_map_uint16(const void *map, int id) {
++  unsigned short value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT16, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_map_uint32(const void *map, int id) {
++  unsigned int value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++uint64 APIENTRY binn_map_uint64(const void *map, int id) {
++  uint64 value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++float APIENTRY binn_map_float(const void *map, int id) {
++  float value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++double APIENTRY binn_map_double(const void *map, int id) {
++  double value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_bool(const void *map, int id) {
++  BOOL value = TRUE;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BOOL, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_null(const void *map, int id) {
++
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++}
++
++char * APIENTRY binn_map_str(const void *map, int id) {
++  char *value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_STRING, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_blob(const void *map, int id, int *psize) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BLOB, &value, psize);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_list(const void *map, int id) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_LIST, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_map(const void *map, int id) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_MAP, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_object(const void *map, int id) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_OBJECT, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++signed char APIENTRY binn_object_int8(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  signed char value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT8, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++short APIENTRY binn_object_int16(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  short value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT16, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++int APIENTRY binn_object_int32(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  int value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++int64 APIENTRY binn_object_int64(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  int64 value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned char APIENTRY binn_object_uint8(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  unsigned char value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT8, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_object_uint16(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  unsigned short value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT16, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++unsigned int APIENTRY binn_object_uint32(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  unsigned int value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++uint64 APIENTRY binn_object_uint64(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  uint64 value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++float APIENTRY binn_object_float(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  float value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++double APIENTRY binn_object_double(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  double value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_bool(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  BOOL value = TRUE;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BOOL, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_null(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++}
++
++char * APIENTRY binn_object_str(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  char *value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_STRING, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_blob(const void *obj, const char *key, int *psize) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BLOB, &value, psize);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_list(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_LIST, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_map(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_MAP, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_object(const void *obj, const char *key) {
++  void *value;
++
++  binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_OBJECT, &value, NULL);
++
++  return value;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE binn * binn_alloc_item() {
++  binn *item;
++  item = (binn *) binn_malloc(sizeof(binn));
++  if (item) {
++    memset(item, 0, sizeof(binn));
++    item->header = BINN_MAGIC;
++    item->allocated = TRUE;
++    //item->writable = FALSE;  -- already zeroed
++  }
++  return item;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_value(int type, void *pvalue, int size, binn_mem_free freefn) {
++  int storage_type;
++  binn *item = binn_alloc_item();
++  if (item) {
++    item->type = type;
++    binn_get_type_info(type, &storage_type, NULL);
++    switch (storage_type) {
++    case BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES:
++      break;
++    case BINN_STORAGE_STRING:
++      if (size == 0) size = strlen((char*)pvalue) + 1;
++      /* fall through */
++    case BINN_STORAGE_BLOB:
++    case BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER:
++      if (freefn == BINN_TRANSIENT) {
++        item->ptr = binn_memdup(pvalue, size);
++        if (item->ptr == NULL) {
++          free_fn(item);
++          return NULL;
++        }
++        item->freefn = free_fn;
++        if (storage_type == BINN_STORAGE_STRING) size--;
++      } else {
++        item->ptr = pvalue;
++        item->freefn = freefn;
++      }
++      item->size = size;
++      break;
++    default:
++      item->ptr = &item->vint32;
++      copy_raw_value(pvalue, item->ptr, storage_type);
++    }
++  }
++  return item;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_string(binn *item, char *str, binn_mem_free pfree) {
++
++  if (item == NULL || str == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if (pfree == BINN_TRANSIENT) {
++    item->ptr = binn_memdup(str, strlen(str) + 1);
++    if (item->ptr == NULL) return FALSE;
++    item->freefn = free_fn;
++  } else {
++    item->ptr = str;
++    item->freefn = pfree;
++  }
++
++  item->type = BINN_STRING;
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_blob(binn *item, void *ptr, int size, binn_mem_free pfree) {
++
++  if (item == NULL || ptr == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if (pfree == BINN_TRANSIENT) {
++    item->ptr = binn_memdup(ptr, size);
++    if (item->ptr == NULL) return FALSE;
++    item->freefn = free_fn;
++  } else {
++    item->ptr = ptr;
++    item->freefn = pfree;
++  }
++
++  item->type = BINN_BLOB;
++  item->size = size;
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*** READ CONVERTED VALUE ************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++#ifdef _MSC_VER
++#define atoi64 _atoi64
++#else
++int64 atoi64(char *str) {
++  int64 retval;
++  int is_negative=0;
++
++  if (*str == '-') {
++    is_negative = 1;
++    str++;
++  }
++  retval = 0;
++  for (; *str; str++) {
++    retval = 10 * retval + (*str - '0');
++  }
++  if (is_negative) retval *= -1;
++  return retval;
++}
++#endif
++
++/*****************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL is_integer(char *p) {
++  BOOL retval;
++
++  if (p == NULL) return FALSE;
++  if (*p == '-') p++;
++  if (*p == 0) return FALSE;
++
++  retval = TRUE;
++
++  for (; *p; p++) {
++    if ( (*p < '0' || *p > '9') ) {
++      retval = FALSE;
++    }
++  }
++
++  return retval;
++}
++
++/*****************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL is_float(char *p) {
++  BOOL retval, number_found=FALSE;
++
++  if (p == NULL) return FALSE;
++  if (*p == '-') p++;
++  if (*p == 0) return FALSE;
++
++  retval = TRUE;
++
++  for (; *p; p++) {
++    if (*p == '.' || *p == ',') {
++      if (!number_found) retval = FALSE;
++    } else if ( *p >= '0' && *p <= '9' ) {
++      number_found = TRUE;
++    } else {
++      return FALSE;
++    }
++  }
++
++  return retval;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BINN_PRIVATE BOOL is_bool_str(char *str, BOOL *pbool) {
++  int64  vint;
++  double vdouble;
++
++  if (str == NULL || pbool == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if (stricmp(str, "true") == 0) goto loc_true;
++  if (stricmp(str, "yes") == 0) goto loc_true;
++  if (stricmp(str, "on") == 0) goto loc_true;
++  //if (stricmp(str, "1") == 0) goto loc_true;
++
++  if (stricmp(str, "false") == 0) goto loc_false;
++  if (stricmp(str, "no") == 0) goto loc_false;
++  if (stricmp(str, "off") == 0) goto loc_false;
++  //if (stricmp(str, "0") == 0) goto loc_false;
++
++  if (is_integer(str)) {
++    vint = atoi64(str);
++    *pbool = (vint != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE;
++    return TRUE;
++  } else if (is_float(str)) {
++    vdouble = atof(str);
++    *pbool = (vdouble != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE;
++    return TRUE;
++  }
++
++  return FALSE;
++
++loc_true:
++  *pbool = TRUE;
++  return TRUE;
++
++loc_false:
++  *pbool = FALSE;
++  return TRUE;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_int32(binn *value, int *pint) {
++
++  if (value == NULL || pint == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) {
++    return copy_int_value(value->ptr, pint, value->type, BINN_INT32);
++  }
++
++  switch (value->type) {
++  case BINN_FLOAT:
++    if (value->vfloat < (float)INT32_MIN || value->vfloat > (float)INT32_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *pint = roundval(value->vfloat);
++    break;
++  case BINN_DOUBLE:
++    if (value->vdouble < (double)INT32_MIN || value->vdouble > (double)INT32_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *pint = roundval(value->vdouble);
++    break;
++  case BINN_STRING:
++    if (is_integer((char*)value->ptr))
++      *pint = atoi((char*)value->ptr);
++    else if (is_float((char*)value->ptr))
++      *pint = roundval(atof((char*)value->ptr));
++    else
++      return FALSE;
++    break;
++  case BINN_BOOL:
++    *pint = value->vbool;
++    break;
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_int64(binn *value, int64 *pint) {
++
++  if (value == NULL || pint == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) {
++    return copy_int_value(value->ptr, pint, value->type, BINN_INT64);
++  }
++
++  switch (value->type) {
++  case BINN_FLOAT:
++    if (value->vfloat < (float)INT64_MIN || value->vfloat > (float)INT64_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *pint = roundval(value->vfloat);
++    break;
++  case BINN_DOUBLE:
++    if (value->vdouble < (double)INT64_MIN || value->vdouble > (double)INT64_MAX) return FALSE;
++    *pint = roundval(value->vdouble);
++    break;
++  case BINN_STRING:
++    if (is_integer((char*)value->ptr))
++      *pint = atoi64((char*)value->ptr);
++    else if (is_float((char*)value->ptr))
++      *pint = roundval(atof((char*)value->ptr));
++    else
++      return FALSE;
++    break;
++  case BINN_BOOL:
++    *pint = value->vbool;
++    break;
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_double(binn *value, double *pfloat) {
++  int64 vint;
++
++  if (value == NULL || pfloat == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) {
++    if (copy_int_value(value->ptr, &vint, value->type, BINN_INT64) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++    *pfloat = (double) vint;
++    return TRUE;
++  }
++
++  switch (value->type) {
++  case BINN_FLOAT:
++    *pfloat = value->vfloat;
++    break;
++  case BINN_DOUBLE:
++    *pfloat = value->vdouble;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STRING:
++    if (is_integer((char*)value->ptr))
++      *pfloat = (double) atoi64((char*)value->ptr);
++    else if (is_float((char*)value->ptr))
++      *pfloat = atof((char*)value->ptr);
++    else
++      return FALSE;
++    break;
++  case BINN_BOOL:
++    *pfloat = value->vbool;
++    break;
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_get_bool(binn *value, BOOL *pbool) {
++  int64 vint;
++
++  if (value == NULL || pbool == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) {
++    if (copy_int_value(value->ptr, &vint, value->type, BINN_INT64) == FALSE) return FALSE;
++    *pbool = (vint != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE;
++    return TRUE;
++  }
++
++  switch (value->type) {
++  case BINN_BOOL:
++    *pbool = value->vbool;
++    break;
++  case BINN_FLOAT:
++    *pbool = (value->vfloat != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE;
++    break;
++  case BINN_DOUBLE:
++    *pbool = (value->vdouble != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE;
++    break;
++  case BINN_STRING:
++    return is_bool_str((char*)value->ptr, pbool);
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++  return TRUE;
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++char * APIENTRY binn_get_str(binn *value) {
++  int64 vint;
++  char buf[128];
++
++  if (value == NULL) return NULL;
++
++  if (type_family(value->type) == BINN_FAMILY_INT) {
++    if (copy_int_value(value->ptr, &vint, value->type, BINN_INT64) == FALSE) return NULL;
++    snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%" INT64_FORMAT, vint);
++    goto loc_convert_value;
++  }
++
++  switch (value->type) {
++  case BINN_FLOAT:
++    value->vdouble = value->vfloat;
++    /* fall through */
++  case BINN_DOUBLE:
++    snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%g", value->vdouble);
++    goto loc_convert_value;
++  case BINN_STRING:
++    return (char*) value->ptr;
++  case BINN_BOOL:
++    if (value->vbool)
++      strcpy(buf, "true");
++    else
++      strcpy(buf, "false");
++    goto loc_convert_value;
++  }
++
++  return NULL;
++
++loc_convert_value:
++
++  //value->vint64 = 0;
++  value->ptr = strdup(buf);
++  if (value->ptr == NULL) return NULL;
++  value->freefn = free;
++  value->type = BINN_STRING;
++  return (char*) value->ptr;
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*** GENERAL FUNCTIONS ***************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_is_container(binn *item) {
++
++  if (item == NULL) return FALSE;
++
++  switch (item->type) {
++  case BINN_LIST:
++  case BINN_MAP:
++  case BINN_OBJECT:
++    return TRUE;
++  default:
++    return FALSE;
++  }
++
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.h openssh-10.0p1/binn.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/binn.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/binn.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.303905629 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,945 @@
++
++// TO ENABLE INLINE FUNCTIONS:
++//   ON MSVC: enable the 'Inline Function Expansion' (/Ob2) compiler option, and maybe the
++//            'Whole Program Optimitazion' (/GL), that requires the
++//            'Link Time Code Generation' (/LTCG) linker option to be enabled too
++
++#ifndef BINN_H
++#define BINN_H
++
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++#define BINN_VERSION "3.0.0"  /* using semantic versioning */
++
++#ifndef NULL
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++#define NULL    0
++#else
++#define NULL    ((void *)0)
++#endif
++#endif
++
++#ifndef TRUE
++#define TRUE  1
++#endif
++
++#ifndef FALSE
++#define FALSE 0
++#endif
++
++#ifndef BOOL
++typedef int BOOL;
++#endif
++
++#ifndef APIENTRY
++ #ifdef _WIN32
++  #define APIENTRY __stdcall
++ #else
++  //#define APIENTRY __attribute__((stdcall))
++  #define APIENTRY 
++ #endif
++#endif
++
++#ifndef BINN_PRIVATE
++ #ifdef DEBUG
++  #define BINN_PRIVATE
++ #else
++  #define BINN_PRIVATE  static
++ #endif
++#endif
++
++#ifdef _MSC_VER
++  #define INLINE         __inline
++  #define ALWAYS_INLINE  __forceinline
++#else
++  // you can change to 'extern inline' if using the gcc option -flto
++  #define INLINE         static inline
++  #define ALWAYS_INLINE  static inline __attribute__((always_inline))
++#endif
++
++#ifndef int64
++#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__BORLANDC__)
++  typedef __int64 int64;
++  typedef unsigned __int64 uint64;
++#else
++  typedef long long int int64;
++  typedef unsigned long long int uint64;
++#endif
++#endif
++
++#ifdef _WIN32
++#define INT64_FORMAT  "I64i"
++#define UINT64_FORMAT "I64u"
++#define INT64_HEX_FORMAT  "I64x"
++#else
++#define INT64_FORMAT  "lli"
++#define UINT64_FORMAT "llu"
++#define INT64_HEX_FORMAT  "llx"
++#endif
++
++
++// BINN CONSTANTS  ----------------------------------------
++
++#define INVALID_BINN         0
++
++// Storage Data Types  ------------------------------------
++
++#define BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES   0x00
++#define BINN_STORAGE_BYTE      0x20  //  8 bits
++#define BINN_STORAGE_WORD      0x40  // 16 bits -- the endianess (byte order) is automatically corrected
++#define BINN_STORAGE_DWORD     0x60  // 32 bits -- the endianess (byte order) is automatically corrected
++#define BINN_STORAGE_QWORD     0x80  // 64 bits -- the endianess (byte order) is automatically corrected
++#define BINN_STORAGE_STRING    0xA0  // Are stored with null termination
++#define BINN_STORAGE_BLOB      0xC0
++#define BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER 0xE0
++#define BINN_STORAGE_VIRTUAL   0x80000
++
++#define BINN_STORAGE_MIN       BINN_STORAGE_NOBYTES
++#define BINN_STORAGE_MAX       BINN_STORAGE_CONTAINER
++
++#define BINN_STORAGE_MASK      0xE0
++#define BINN_STORAGE_MASK16    0xE000
++#define BINN_STORAGE_HAS_MORE  0x10
++#define BINN_TYPE_MASK         0x0F
++#define BINN_TYPE_MASK16       0x0FFF
++
++#define BINN_MAX_VALUE_MASK    0xFFFFF
++
++
++// Data Formats  ------------------------------------------
++
++#define BINN_LIST      0xE0
++#define BINN_MAP       0xE1
++#define BINN_OBJECT    0xE2
++
++#define BINN_NULL      0x00
++#define BINN_TRUE      0x01
++#define BINN_FALSE     0x02
++
++#define BINN_UINT8     0x20  // (BYTE) (unsigned byte) Is the default format for the BYTE type
++#define BINN_INT8      0x21  // (BYTE) (signed byte, from -128 to +127. The 0x80 is the sign bit, so the range in hex is from 0x80 [-128] to 0x7F [127], being 0x00 = 0 and 0xFF = -1)
++#define BINN_UINT16    0x40  // (WORD) (unsigned integer) Is the default format for the WORD type
++#define BINN_INT16     0x41  // (WORD) (signed integer)
++#define BINN_UINT32    0x60  // (DWORD) (unsigned integer) Is the default format for the DWORD type
++#define BINN_INT32     0x61  // (DWORD) (signed integer)
++#define BINN_UINT64    0x80  // (QWORD) (unsigned integer) Is the default format for the QWORD type
++#define BINN_INT64     0x81  // (QWORD) (signed integer)
++
++#define BINN_SCHAR     BINN_INT8
++#define BINN_UCHAR     BINN_UINT8
++
++#define BINN_STRING    0xA0  // (STRING) Raw String
++#define BINN_DATETIME  0xA1  // (STRING) iso8601 format -- YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS
++#define BINN_DATE      0xA2  // (STRING) iso8601 format -- YYYY-MM-DD
++#define BINN_TIME      0xA3  // (STRING) iso8601 format -- HH:MM:SS
++#define BINN_DECIMAL   0xA4  // (STRING) High precision number - used for generic decimal values and for those ones that cannot be represented in the float64 format.
++#define BINN_CURRENCYSTR  0xA5  // (STRING) With currency unit/symbol - check for some iso standard format
++#define BINN_SINGLE_STR   0xA6  // (STRING) Can be restored to float32
++#define BINN_DOUBLE_STR   0xA7  // (STRING) May be restored to float64
++
++#define BINN_FLOAT32   0x62  // (DWORD) 
++#define BINN_FLOAT64   0x82  // (QWORD) 
++#define BINN_FLOAT     BINN_FLOAT32
++#define BINN_SINGLE    BINN_FLOAT32
++#define BINN_DOUBLE    BINN_FLOAT64
++
++#define BINN_CURRENCY  0x83  // (QWORD)
++
++#define BINN_BLOB      0xC0  // (BLOB) Raw Blob
++
++
++// virtual types:
++
++#define BINN_BOOL      0x80061  // (DWORD) The value may be 0 or 1
++
++#ifdef BINN_EXTENDED
++//#define BINN_SINGLE    0x800A1  // (STRING) Can be restored to float32
++//#define BINN_DOUBLE    0x800A2  // (STRING) May be restored to float64
++#endif
++
++//#define BINN_BINN      0x800E1  // (CONTAINER)
++//#define BINN_BINN_BUFFER  0x800C1  // (BLOB) user binn. it's not open by the parser
++
++
++// extended content types:
++
++// strings:
++
++#define BINN_HTML      0xB001
++#define BINN_XML       0xB002
++#define BINN_JSON      0xB003
++#define BINN_JAVASCRIPT 0xB004
++#define BINN_CSS       0xB005
++
++// blobs:
++
++#define BINN_JPEG      0xD001
++#define BINN_GIF       0xD002
++#define BINN_PNG       0xD003
++#define BINN_BMP       0xD004
++
++
++// type families
++#define BINN_FAMILY_NONE   0x00
++#define BINN_FAMILY_NULL   0xf1
++#define BINN_FAMILY_INT    0xf2
++#define BINN_FAMILY_FLOAT  0xf3
++#define BINN_FAMILY_STRING 0xf4
++#define BINN_FAMILY_BLOB   0xf5
++#define BINN_FAMILY_BOOL   0xf6
++#define BINN_FAMILY_BINN   0xf7
++
++// integer types related to signal
++#define BINN_SIGNED_INT     11
++#define BINN_UNSIGNED_INT   22
++
++
++typedef void (*binn_mem_free)(void*);
++#define BINN_STATIC      ((binn_mem_free)0)
++#define BINN_TRANSIENT   ((binn_mem_free)-1)
++
++
++// --- BINN STRUCTURE --------------------------------------------------------------
++
++
++struct binn_struct {
++  int    header;     // this struct header holds the magic number (BINN_MAGIC) that identifies this memory block as a binn structure
++  BOOL   allocated;  // the struct can be allocated using malloc_fn() or can be on the stack
++  BOOL   writable;   // did it was create for writing? it can use the pbuf if not unified with ptr
++  BOOL   dirty;      // the container header is not written to the buffer
++  //
++  void  *pbuf;       // use *ptr below?
++  BOOL   pre_allocated;
++  int    alloc_size;
++  int    used_size;
++  //
++  int    type;
++  void  *ptr;
++  int    size;
++  int    count;
++  //
++  binn_mem_free freefn;  // used only when type == BINN_STRING or BINN_BLOB
++  //
++  union {
++    signed char    vint8;
++    signed short   vint16;
++    signed int     vint32;
++    int64          vint64;
++    unsigned char  vuint8;
++    unsigned short vuint16;
++    unsigned int   vuint32;
++    uint64         vuint64;
++    //
++    signed char    vchar;
++    unsigned char  vuchar;
++    signed short   vshort;
++    unsigned short vushort;
++    signed int     vint;
++    unsigned int   vuint;
++    //
++    float          vfloat;
++    double         vdouble;
++    //
++    BOOL           vbool;
++  };
++  //
++  BOOL   disable_int_compression;
++};
++
++typedef struct binn_struct binn;
++
++
++
++// --- GENERAL FUNCTIONS  ----------------------------------------------------------
++
++char * APIENTRY binn_version();
++
++void   APIENTRY binn_set_alloc_functions(void* (*new_malloc)(size_t), void* (*new_realloc)(void*,size_t), void (*new_free)(void*));
++
++int    APIENTRY binn_create_type(int storage_type, int data_type_index);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_get_type_info(int long_type, int *pstorage_type, int *pextra_type);
++
++int    APIENTRY binn_get_write_storage(int type);
++int    APIENTRY binn_get_read_storage(int type);
++
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_is_container(binn *item);
++
++
++// --- WRITE FUNCTIONS  ------------------------------------------------------------
++
++// create a new binn allocating memory for the structure
++binn * APIENTRY binn_new(int type, int size, void *buffer);
++binn * APIENTRY binn_list();
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map();
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object();
++
++// create a new binn storing the structure on the stack
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create(binn *item, int type, int size, void *buffer);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_list(binn *list);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_map(binn *map);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_create_object(binn *object);
++
++// create a new binn as a copy from another
++binn * APIENTRY binn_copy(const void *old);
++
++
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_add_new(binn *list, binn *value);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_set_new(binn *map, int id, binn *value);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_set_new(binn *obj, const char *key, binn *value);
++
++
++// extended interface
++
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_list_add(binn *list, int type, void *pvalue, int size);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_map_set(binn *map, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int size);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_object_set(binn *obj, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int size);
++
++
++// release memory
++
++void   APIENTRY binn_free(binn *item);
++void * APIENTRY binn_release(binn *item); // free the binn structure but keeps the binn buffer allocated, returning a pointer to it. use the free function to release the buffer later
++
++
++// --- CREATING VALUES ---------------------------------------------------
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_value(int type, void *pvalue, int size, binn_mem_free freefn);
++
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int8(signed char value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_INT8, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int16(short value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_INT16, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int32(int value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_INT32, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_int64(int64 value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_INT64, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint8(unsigned char value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_UINT8, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint16(unsigned short value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_UINT16, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint32(unsigned int value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_UINT32, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_uint64(uint64 value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_UINT64, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_float(float value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_FLOAT, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_double(double value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_DOUBLE, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_bool(BOOL value) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_BOOL, &value, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_null() {
++  return binn_value(BINN_NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_string(char *str, binn_mem_free freefn) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_STRING, str, 0, freefn);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE binn * binn_blob(void *ptr, int size, binn_mem_free freefn) {
++  return binn_value(BINN_BLOB, ptr, size, freefn);
++}
++
++
++// --- READ FUNCTIONS  -------------------------------------------------------------
++
++// these functions accept pointer to the binn structure and pointer to the binn buffer
++void * APIENTRY binn_ptr(const void *ptr);
++int    APIENTRY binn_size(const void *ptr);
++int    APIENTRY binn_type(const void *ptr);
++int    APIENTRY binn_count(const void *ptr);
++
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_is_valid(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize);
++/* the function returns the values (type, count and size) and they don't need to be
++   initialized. these values are read from the buffer. example:
++
++   int type, count, size;
++   result = binn_is_valid(ptr, &type, &count, &size);
++*/
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_is_valid_ex(const void *ptr, int *ptype, int *pcount, int *psize);
++/* if some value is informed (type, count or size) then the function will check if 
++   the value returned from the serialized data matches the informed value. otherwise
++   the values must be initialized to zero. example:
++
++   int type=0, count=0, size = known_size;
++   result = binn_is_valid_ex(ptr, &type, &count, &size);
++*/
++
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_is_struct(const void *ptr);
++
++
++// Loading a binn buffer into a binn value - this is optional
++
++binn * APIENTRY binn_open(const void *data);              // allocated - unsecure
++binn * APIENTRY binn_open_ex(const void *data, int size); // allocated - secure
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_load(const void *data, binn *item);  // on stack - unsecure
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_load_ex(const void *data, int size, binn *value); // secure
++
++
++// easiest interface to use, but don't check if the value is there
++
++signed char    APIENTRY binn_list_int8(const void *list, int pos);
++short          APIENTRY binn_list_int16(const void *list, int pos);
++int            APIENTRY binn_list_int32(const void *list, int pos);
++int64          APIENTRY binn_list_int64(const void *list, int pos);
++unsigned char  APIENTRY binn_list_uint8(const void *list, int pos);
++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_list_uint16(const void *list, int pos);
++unsigned int   APIENTRY binn_list_uint32(const void *list, int pos);
++uint64         APIENTRY binn_list_uint64(const void *list, int pos);
++float          APIENTRY binn_list_float(const void *list, int pos);
++double         APIENTRY binn_list_double(const void *list, int pos);
++BOOL           APIENTRY binn_list_bool(const void *list, int pos);
++BOOL           APIENTRY binn_list_null(const void *list, int pos);
++char *         APIENTRY binn_list_str(const void *list, int pos);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_list_blob(const void *list, int pos, int *psize);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_list_list(const void *list, int pos);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_list_map(const void *list, int pos);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_list_object(const void *list, int pos);
++
++signed char    APIENTRY binn_map_int8(const void *map, int id);
++short          APIENTRY binn_map_int16(const void *map, int id);
++int            APIENTRY binn_map_int32(const void *map, int id);
++int64          APIENTRY binn_map_int64(const void *map, int id);
++unsigned char  APIENTRY binn_map_uint8(const void *map, int id);
++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_map_uint16(const void *map, int id);
++unsigned int   APIENTRY binn_map_uint32(const void *map, int id);
++uint64         APIENTRY binn_map_uint64(const void *map, int id);
++float          APIENTRY binn_map_float(const void *map, int id);
++double         APIENTRY binn_map_double(const void *map, int id);
++BOOL           APIENTRY binn_map_bool(const void *map, int id);
++BOOL           APIENTRY binn_map_null(const void *map, int id);
++char *         APIENTRY binn_map_str(const void *map, int id);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_map_blob(const void *map, int id, int *psize);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_map_list(const void *map, int id);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_map_map(const void *map, int id);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_map_object(const void *map, int id);
++
++signed char    APIENTRY binn_object_int8(const void *obj, const char *key);
++short          APIENTRY binn_object_int16(const void *obj, const char *key);
++int            APIENTRY binn_object_int32(const void *obj, const char *key);
++int64          APIENTRY binn_object_int64(const void *obj, const char *key);
++unsigned char  APIENTRY binn_object_uint8(const void *obj, const char *key);
++unsigned short APIENTRY binn_object_uint16(const void *obj, const char *key);
++unsigned int   APIENTRY binn_object_uint32(const void *obj, const char *key);
++uint64         APIENTRY binn_object_uint64(const void *obj, const char *key);
++float          APIENTRY binn_object_float(const void *obj, const char *key);
++double         APIENTRY binn_object_double(const void *obj, const char *key);
++BOOL           APIENTRY binn_object_bool(const void *obj, const char *key);
++BOOL           APIENTRY binn_object_null(const void *obj, const char *key);
++char *         APIENTRY binn_object_str(const void *obj, const char *key);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_object_blob(const void *obj, const char *key, int *psize);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_object_list(const void *obj, const char *key);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_object_map(const void *obj, const char *key);
++void *         APIENTRY binn_object_object(const void *obj, const char *key);
++
++
++// return a pointer to an allocated binn structure - must be released with the free() function or equivalent set in binn_set_alloc_functions()
++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_value(const void *list, int pos);
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_value(const void *map, int id);
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_value(const void *obj, const char *key);
++
++// read the value to a binn structure on the stack
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get_value(const void *list, int pos, binn *value);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_value(const void *map, int id, binn *value);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_value(const void *obj, const char *key, binn *value);
++
++// single interface - these functions check the data type
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_list_get(const void *list, int pos, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get(const void *map, int id, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get(const void *obj, const char *key, int type, void *pvalue, int *psize);
++
++// these 3 functions return a pointer to the value and the data type
++// they are thread-safe on big-endian devices
++// on little-endian devices they are thread-safe only to return pointers to list, map, object, blob and strings
++// the returned pointer to 16, 32 and 64 bits values must be used only by single-threaded applications
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read(const void *list, int pos, int *ptype, int *psize);
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read(const void *map, int id, int *ptype, int *psize);
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read(const void *obj, const char *key, int *ptype, int *psize);
++
++
++// READ PAIR FUNCTIONS
++
++// these functions use base 1 in the 'pos' argument
++
++// on stack
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_map_get_pair(const void *map, int pos, int *pid, binn *value);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_object_get_pair(const void *obj, int pos, char *pkey, binn *value);  // the key must be declared as: char key[256];
++
++// allocated
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_pair(const void *map, int pos, int *pid);
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_pair(const void *obj, int pos, char *pkey);  // the key must be declared as: char key[256];
++
++// these 2 functions return a pointer to the value and the data type
++// they are thread-safe on big-endian devices
++// on little-endian devices they are thread-safe only to return pointers to list, map, object, blob and strings
++// the returned pointer to 16, 32 and 64 bits values must be used only by single-threaded applications
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize);
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_pair(const void *ptr, int pos, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize);
++
++
++// SEQUENTIAL READ FUNCTIONS
++
++typedef struct binn_iter_struct {
++    unsigned char *pnext;
++    unsigned char *plimit;
++    int   type;
++    int   count;
++    int   current;
++} binn_iter;
++
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_iter_init(binn_iter *iter, const void *pbuf, int type);
++
++// allocated
++binn * APIENTRY binn_list_next_value(binn_iter *iter);
++binn * APIENTRY binn_map_next_value(binn_iter *iter, int *pid);
++binn * APIENTRY binn_object_next_value(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey);  // the key must be declared as: char key[256];
++
++// on stack
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_list_next(binn_iter *iter, binn *value);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_map_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, binn *value);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_object_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, binn *value);  // the key must be declared as: char key[256];
++
++// these 3 functions return a pointer to the value and the data type
++// they are thread-safe on big-endian devices
++// on little-endian devices they are thread-safe only to return pointers to list, map, object, blob and strings
++// the returned pointer to 16, 32 and 64 bits values must be used only by single-threaded applications
++void * APIENTRY binn_list_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *ptype, int *psize);
++void * APIENTRY binn_map_read_next(binn_iter *iter, int *pid, int *ptype, int *psize);
++void * APIENTRY binn_object_read_next(binn_iter *iter, char *pkey, int *ptype, int *psize);  // the key must be declared as: char key[256];
++
++
++// --- MACROS ------------------------------------------------------------
++
++
++#define binn_is_writable(item) (item)->writable;
++
++
++// set values on stack allocated binn structures
++
++#define binn_set_null(item)         do { (item)->type = BINN_NULL; } while (0)
++
++#define binn_set_bool(item,value)   do { (item)->type = BINN_BOOL; (item)->vbool = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vbool); } while (0)
++
++#define binn_set_int(item,value)    do { (item)->type = BINN_INT32; (item)->vint32 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vint32); } while (0)
++#define binn_set_int64(item,value)  do { (item)->type = BINN_INT64; (item)->vint64 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vint64); } while (0)
++
++#define binn_set_uint(item,value)   do { (item)->type = BINN_UINT32; (item)->vuint32 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vuint32); } while (0)
++#define binn_set_uint64(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_UINT64; (item)->vuint64 = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vuint64); } while (0)
++
++#define binn_set_float(item,value)  do { (item)->type = BINN_FLOAT;  (item)->vfloat  = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vfloat); } while (0)
++#define binn_set_double(item,value) do { (item)->type = BINN_DOUBLE; (item)->vdouble = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vdouble); } while (0)
++
++//#define binn_set_string(item,str,pfree)    do { (item)->type = BINN_STRING; (item)->ptr = str; (item)->freefn = pfree; } while (0)
++//#define binn_set_blob(item,ptr,size,pfree) do { (item)->type = BINN_BLOB;   (item)->ptr = ptr; (item)->freefn = pfree; (item)->size = size; } while (0)
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_string(binn *item, char *str, binn_mem_free pfree);
++BOOL APIENTRY binn_set_blob(binn *item, void *ptr, int size, binn_mem_free pfree);
++
++
++//#define binn_double(value) {       (item)->type = BINN_DOUBLE; (item)->vdouble = value; (item)->ptr = &((item)->vdouble) }
++
++
++
++// FOREACH MACROS
++// --------------
++//
++// We must use these declarations inside the functions that will use the macros:
++//
++//  binn_iter iter;
++//  binn value;
++//  char key[256];  // only for objects
++//  int  id;        // only for maps
++
++#define binn_object_foreach(object, key, value)   \
++    binn_iter_init(&iter, object, BINN_OBJECT);   \
++    while (binn_object_next(&iter, key, &value))
++
++#define binn_map_foreach(map, id, value)          \
++    binn_iter_init(&iter, map, BINN_MAP);         \
++    while (binn_map_next(&iter, &id, &value))
++
++#define binn_list_foreach(list, value)            \
++    binn_iter_init(&iter, list, BINN_LIST);       \
++    while (binn_list_next(&iter, &value))
++
++// If you need nested foreach loops, use the macros below for the nested loop
++// Also we need to add an additional declaration on the function to hold the iterator
++// We can add in the same line as the first iterator:
++//
++//  binn_iter iter, iter2;
++
++#define binn_object_foreach2(object, key, value)   \
++    binn_iter_init(&iter2, object, BINN_OBJECT);   \
++    while (binn_object_next(&iter2, key, &value))
++
++#define binn_map_foreach2(map, id, value)          \
++    binn_iter_init(&iter2, map, BINN_MAP);         \
++    while (binn_map_next(&iter2, &id, &value))
++
++#define binn_list_foreach2(list, value)            \
++    binn_iter_init(&iter2, list, BINN_LIST);       \
++    while (binn_list_next(&iter2, &value))
++
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*** SET FUNCTIONS *******************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int8(binn *list, signed char value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT8, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int16(binn *list, short value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT16, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int32(binn *list, int value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_int64(binn *list, int64 value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_INT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint8(binn *list, unsigned char value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT8, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint16(binn *list, unsigned short value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT16, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint32(binn *list, unsigned int value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_uint64(binn *list, uint64 value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_UINT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_float(binn *list, float value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_double(binn *list, double value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_bool(binn *list, BOOL value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_BOOL, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_null(binn *list) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_NULL, NULL, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_str(binn *list, char *str) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_STRING, str, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_blob(binn *list, void *ptr, int size) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_BLOB, ptr, size);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_list(binn *list, void *list2) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_LIST, binn_ptr(list2), binn_size(list2));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_map(binn *list, void *map) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_MAP, binn_ptr(map), binn_size(map));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_object(binn *list, void *obj) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, BINN_OBJECT, binn_ptr(obj), binn_size(obj));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_add_value(binn *list, binn *value) {
++  return binn_list_add(list, value->type, binn_ptr(value), binn_size(value));
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int8(binn *map, int id, signed char value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT8, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int16(binn *map, int id, short value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT16, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int32(binn *map, int id, int value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_int64(binn *map, int id, int64 value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_INT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint8(binn *map, int id, unsigned char value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT8, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint16(binn *map, int id, unsigned short value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT16, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint32(binn *map, int id, unsigned int value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_uint64(binn *map, int id, uint64 value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_UINT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_float(binn *map, int id, float value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_double(binn *map, int id, double value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_bool(binn *map, int id, BOOL value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_BOOL, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_null(binn *map, int id) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_NULL, NULL, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_str(binn *map, int id, char *str) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_STRING, str, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_blob(binn *map, int id, void *ptr, int size) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_BLOB, ptr, size);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_list(binn *map, int id, void *list) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_LIST, binn_ptr(list), binn_size(list));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_map(binn *map, int id, void *map2) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_MAP, binn_ptr(map2), binn_size(map2));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_object(binn *map, int id, void *obj) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, BINN_OBJECT, binn_ptr(obj), binn_size(obj));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_set_value(binn *map, int id, binn *value) {
++  return binn_map_set(map, id, value->type, binn_ptr(value), binn_size(value));
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int8(binn *obj, const char *key, signed char value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT8, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int16(binn *obj, const char *key, short value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT16, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int32(binn *obj, const char *key, int value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_int64(binn *obj, const char *key, int64 value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_INT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint8(binn *obj, const char *key, unsigned char value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT8, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint16(binn *obj, const char *key, unsigned short value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT16, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint32(binn *obj, const char *key, unsigned int value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_uint64(binn *obj, const char *key, uint64 value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_UINT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_float(binn *obj, const char *key, float value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT32, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_double(binn *obj, const char *key, double value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT64, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_bool(binn *obj, const char *key, BOOL value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_BOOL, &value, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_null(binn *obj, const char *key) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_NULL, NULL, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_str(binn *obj, const char *key, char *str) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_STRING, str, 0);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_blob(binn *obj, const char *key, void *ptr, int size) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_BLOB, ptr, size);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_list(binn *obj, const char *key, void *list) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_LIST, binn_ptr(list), binn_size(list));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_map(binn *obj, const char *key, void *map) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_MAP, binn_ptr(map), binn_size(map));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_object(binn *obj, const char *key, void *obj2) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, BINN_OBJECT, binn_ptr(obj2), binn_size(obj2));
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_set_value(binn *obj, const char *key, binn *value) {
++  return binn_object_set(obj, key, value->type, binn_ptr(value), binn_size(value));
++}
++
++/*************************************************************************************/
++/*** GET FUNCTIONS *******************************************************************/
++/*************************************************************************************/
++
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int8(const void *list, int pos, signed char *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT8, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int16(const void *list, int pos, short *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT16, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int32(const void *list, int pos, int *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_int64(const void *list, int pos, int64 *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_INT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint8(const void *list, int pos, unsigned char *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT8, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint16(const void *list, int pos, unsigned short *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT16, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint32(const void *list, int pos, unsigned int *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_uint64(const void *list, int pos, uint64 *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_UINT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_float(const void *list, int pos, float *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_double(const void *list, int pos, double *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_FLOAT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_bool(const void *list, int pos, BOOL *pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BOOL, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_str(const void *list, int pos, char **pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_STRING, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_blob(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue, int *psize) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_BLOB, pvalue, psize);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_list(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_LIST, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_map(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_MAP, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_list_get_object(const void *list, int pos, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_list_get(list, pos, BINN_OBJECT, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int8(const void *map, int id, signed char *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT8, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int16(const void *map, int id, short *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT16, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int32(const void *map, int id, int *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_int64(const void *map, int id, int64 *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_INT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint8(const void *map, int id, unsigned char *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT8, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint16(const void *map, int id, unsigned short *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT16, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint32(const void *map, int id, unsigned int *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_uint64(const void *map, int id, uint64 *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_UINT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_float(const void *map, int id, float *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_double(const void *map, int id, double *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_FLOAT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_bool(const void *map, int id, BOOL *pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BOOL, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_str(const void *map, int id, char **pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_STRING, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_blob(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue, int *psize) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_BLOB, pvalue, psize);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_list(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_LIST, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_map(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_MAP, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_map_get_object(const void *map, int id, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_map_get(map, id, BINN_OBJECT, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++// usage:
++//   if (binn_object_get_int32(obj, "key", &value) == FALSE) xxx;
++
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int8(const void *obj, const char *key, signed char *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT8, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int16(const void *obj, const char *key, short *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT16, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int32(const void *obj, const char *key, int *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_int64(const void *obj, const char *key, int64 *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_INT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint8(const void *obj, const char *key, unsigned char *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT8, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint16(const void *obj, const char *key, unsigned short *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT16, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint32(const void *obj, const char *key, unsigned int *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_uint64(const void *obj, const char *key, uint64 *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_UINT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_float(const void *obj, const char *key, float *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT32, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_double(const void *obj, const char *key, double *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_FLOAT64, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_bool(const void *obj, const char *key, BOOL *pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BOOL, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_str(const void *obj, const char *key, char **pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_STRING, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_blob(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue, int *psize) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_BLOB, pvalue, psize);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_list(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_LIST, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_map(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_MAP, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++ALWAYS_INLINE BOOL binn_object_get_object(const void *obj, const char *key, void **pvalue) {
++  return binn_object_get(obj, key, BINN_OBJECT, pvalue, NULL);
++}
++
++/***************************************************************************/
++
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_get_int32(binn *value, int *pint);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_get_int64(binn *value, int64 *pint);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_get_double(binn *value, double *pfloat);
++BOOL   APIENTRY binn_get_bool(binn *value, BOOL *pbool);
++char * APIENTRY binn_get_str(binn *value);
++
++// boolean string values:
++// 1, true, yes, on
++// 0, false, no, off
++
++// boolean number values:
++// !=0 [true]
++// ==0 [false]
++
++
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++#endif
++
++#endif //BINN_H
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.c openssh-10.0p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.614387370 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/channels.c	2025-06-14 11:44:14.886309096 +0200
+@@ -99,6 +99,11 @@
+ /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+ #define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
+ 
++/* in version of OpenSSH later than 8.8 if we advertise a window
++ * 16MB or larger is causes a pathological behaviour that reduces
++ * throughput. This is not a great solution. */
++#define NON_HPN_WINDOW_MAX (15 * 1024 * 1024)
++
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
+ 
+@@ -227,6 +232,9 @@
+ /* Setup helper */
+ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
+ 
++/* default values to enable hpn and the initial buffer size */
++static int hpn_disabled = 0;
++
+ /* -- channel core */
+ 
+ void
+@@ -521,6 +529,16 @@
+ 	    (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ 	    (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++
++	/* these buffers are important in terms of tracking channel
++	 * buffer usage so label and type them with descriptive names */
++	sshbuf_relabel(c->input, "channel input");
++	sshbuf_type(c->input, BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT);
++	sshbuf_relabel(c->output, "channel output");
++	sshbuf_type(c->output, BUF_CHANNEL_OUTPUT);
++	sshbuf_relabel(c->extended, "channel extended");
++	sshbuf_type(c->extended, BUF_CHANNEL_EXTENDED);
++
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_set_max_size");
+ 	c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
+@@ -532,6 +550,7 @@
+ 	c->local_window = window;
+ 	c->local_window_max = window;
+ 	c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
++	c->dynamic_window = 0;
+ 	c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
+ 	c->ctl_chan = -1;
+ 	c->delayed = 1;		/* prevent call to channel_post handler */
+@@ -1259,6 +1278,33 @@
+ 	c->io_want = SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W;
+ }
+ 
++static int
++channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
++	socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
++	int ret = -1;
++
++	/* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */
++	if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
++		return 128 * 1024;
++
++	ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
++	/* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
++	if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
++		tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
++	/* if the remote side is OpenSSH after version 8.8 we need to restrict
++	 * the size of the advertised window. Now this means that any HPN to non-HPN
++	 * connection will be window limited to 15MB of receive space. This is a
++	 * non-optimal solution.
++	 */
++
++	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW) && (tcpwinsz > NON_HPN_WINDOW_MAX))
++		tcpwinsz = NON_HPN_WINDOW_MAX;
++	return (tcpwinsz);
++}
++
+ static void
+ channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+ {
+@@ -2366,18 +2412,29 @@
+ 	    c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+ 	    c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
+ 	    c->local_consumed > 0) {
++		int addition = 0;
++		u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh);
++		/* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment
++		 * and the tcp receive buffer is larger than the ssh window */
++		if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) {
++			/* aggressively grow the window */
++			addition = tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max;
++			c->local_window_max += addition;
++			debug_f("Channel %d: Window growth to %d by %d bytes",c->self,
++			      c->local_window_max, addition);
++		}
+ 		if (!c->have_remote_id)
+ 			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ 		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+-		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed + addition)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+ 		}
+ 		debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self,
+-		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed);
+-		c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
++		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed + addition);
++		c->local_window += c->local_consumed + addition;
+ 		c->local_consumed = 0;
+ 	}
+ 	return 1;
+@@ -2963,9 +3020,7 @@
+ 			 * in use.
+ 			 */
+ 			if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+-				debug2("channel %d: "
+-				    "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)",
+-				    c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
++				{}
+ 			else
+ 				chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
+ 		}
+@@ -3674,7 +3729,7 @@
+ 		error_fr(r, "parse adjust");
+ 		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message");
+ 	}
+-	debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust);
++	debug3_f("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust);
+ 	if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) {
+ 		fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u",
+ 		    c->self, adjust, c->remote_window);
+@@ -3789,6 +3844,13 @@
+ 	return addr;
+ }
+ 
++void
++channel_set_hpn_disabled(int external_hpn_disabled)
++{
++	hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled;
++	debug("HPN Disabled: %d", hpn_disabled);
++}
++
+ static int
+ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
+     struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.h openssh-10.0p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/channels.h	2025-06-14 10:53:01.467785388 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/channels.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.306120024 +0200
+@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@
+ 	u_int	local_window_max;
+ 	u_int	local_consumed;
+ 	u_int	local_maxpacket;
++	int	dynamic_window;
+ 	int     extended_usage;
+ 	int	single_connection;
+ 
+@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@
+ #define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK		(SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R|SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W)
+ 
+ /* Read buffer size */
+-#define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
++#define CHAN_RBUF	CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT
+ 
+ /* Maximum size for direct reads to buffers */
+ #define CHANNEL_MAX_READ	CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT
+@@ -399,4 +400,6 @@
+ void	 chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+ void	 chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+ 
++/* hpn handler */
++void     channel_set_hpn_disabled(int);
+ #endif
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.716919856 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher.c	2025-06-14 12:01:51.076334585 +0200
+@@ -48,23 +48,39 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
++/* for provider functions */
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/params.h>
++#include <openssl/provider.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
++#define EVP_CIPHER void
++#else
++/* for multi-threaded aes-ctr cipher */
++extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct sshcipher_ctx {
+ 	int	plaintext;
+ 	int	encrypt;
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;
++	const EVP_CIPHER *meth_ptr; /*used to free memory in aes_ctr_mt */
+ 	struct chachapoly_ctx *cp_ctx;
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cp_ctx_mt;
++#endif
+ 	struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+ 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ };
+ 
+-static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
++static struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+ 	{ "3des-cbc",		8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+@@ -86,6 +102,10 @@
+ #endif
+ 	{ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com",
+ 				8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	{ "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org",
++				8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY|CFLAG_MT, NULL },
++#endif
+ 	{ "none",		8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
+ 
+ 	{ NULL,			0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+@@ -131,12 +151,63 @@
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++/* used to get the cipher name when we are testing to
++ * see if we can move from a serial to parallel cipher
++ * only called in cipher-switch.c
++ */
++const char *
++cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
++{
++	return cc->cipher->name;
++}
++
+ u_int
+ cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
+ {
+ 	return (c->block_size);
+ }
+ 
++uint64_t
++cipher_rekey_blocks(const struct sshcipher *c)
++{
++	/*
++	 * Chacha20-Poly1305 does not benefit from data-based rekeying,
++	 * per "The Security of ChaCha20-Poly1305 in the Multi-user Setting",
++	 * Degabriele, J. P., Govinden, J, Gunther, F. and Paterson K.
++	 * ACM CCS 2021; https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/085.pdf
++	 *
++	 * Cryptanalysis aside, we do still want do need to prevent the SSH
++	 * sequence number wrapping and also to rekey to provide some
++	 * protection for long lived sessions against key disclosure at the
++	 * endpoints, so arrange for rekeying every 2**32 blocks as the
++	 * 128-bit block ciphers do (i.e. every 32GB data).
++	 */
++	if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
++		return (uint64_t)1 << 32;
++
++	/* there is no actual need to rekey the NULL cipher but
++	 * rekeying is a necessary step. In part, as mentioned above,
++	 * to keep the seqnr from wrapping. So we set it to the
++	 * maximum possible -cjr 4/10/23 */
++	if ((c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
++		return (uint64_t)1 << 32;
++
++	/*
++	 * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
++	 * so enforce a 1GB data limit for small blocksizes.
++	 * See discussion in RFC4344 section 3.2.
++	 */
++	if (c->block_size < 16)
++		return ((uint64_t)1 << 30) / c->block_size;
++	/*
++	 * Otherwise, use the RFC4344 s3.2 recommendation of 2**(L/4) blocks
++	 * before rekeying where L is the blocksize in bits.
++	 * Most other ciphers have a 128 bit blocksize, so this equates to
++	 * 2**32 blocks / 64GB data.
++	 */
++	return (uint64_t)1 << (c->block_size * 2);
++}
++
+ u_int
+ cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+ {
+@@ -180,10 +251,10 @@
+ 	return cc->plaintext;
+ }
+ 
+-const struct sshcipher *
++struct sshcipher *
+ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+-	const struct sshcipher *c;
++	struct sshcipher *c;
+ 	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c;
+@@ -205,7 +276,8 @@
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+ 		c = cipher_by_name(p);
+-		if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
++		if (c == NULL || ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0 &&
++				  (c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)) {
+ 			free(cipher_list);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+@@ -226,7 +298,7 @@
+ int
+ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
+     const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
+-    int do_encrypt)
++    u_int seqnr, int do_encrypt, int enable_threads)
+ {
+ 	struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+@@ -241,6 +313,7 @@
+ 
+ 	cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0;
+ 	cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
++	cc->meth_ptr = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (keylen < cipher->key_len ||
+ 	    (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) {
+@@ -250,8 +323,19 @@
+ 
+ 	cc->cipher = cipher;
+ 	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++		if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) {
++			cc->cp_ctx_mt = chachapoly_new_mt(seqnr, key, keylen);
++			ret = cc->cp_ctx_mt != NULL ? 0 :
++			    SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++			cc->cp_ctx = chachapoly_new(key, keylen);
++			ret = cc->cp_ctx != NULL ? 0 : SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++#else
+ 		cc->cp_ctx = chachapoly_new(key, keylen);
+ 		ret = cc->cp_ctx != NULL ? 0 : SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++#endif
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
+@@ -273,6 +357,53 @@
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	/* the following block is for AES-CTR-MT cipher switching
++	 * if we are using the ctr cipher and we are post-auth then
++	 * start the threaded cipher. If OSSL supports providers (OSSL 3.0+) then
++	 * we load our hpnssh provider. If it doesn't (OSSL < 1.1) then we use the
++	 * _meth_new process found in cipher-ctr-mt.c */
++	if (strstr(cc->cipher->name, "ctr") && enable_threads) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++		/* this version of openssl uses providers */
++		OSSL_LIB_CTX *aes_lib = NULL; /* probably not needed */
++		OSSL_PROVIDER *aes_mt_provider = NULL;
++		type = NULL;
++
++		if (OSSL_PROVIDER_add_builtin(aes_lib, "hpnssh",
++					      OSSL_provider_init) != 1) {
++			fatal("Failed to add HPNSSH provider for AES-CTR");
++		}
++		aes_mt_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(aes_lib, "hpnssh");
++
++		if (aes_mt_provider != NULL) {
++			/* use the previous key length to determine which cipher to load */
++			if (cipher->key_len == 32)
++				type = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(aes_lib, "aes_ctr_mt_256", NULL);
++			if (cipher->key_len == 24)
++				type = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(aes_lib, "aes_ctr_mt_192", NULL);
++			if (cipher->key_len == 16)
++				type = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(aes_lib, "aes_ctr_mt_128", NULL);
++			if (type == NULL) {
++				ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++				fatal("FAILED TO LOAD aes_ctr_mt");
++			} else {
++				debug("LOADED aes_ctr_mt");
++			}
++		}
++		else {
++			ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++			fatal("Failed to load HPN-SSH AES-CTR-MT provider.");
++		}
++#else
++		type = (*evp_aes_ctr_mt)(); /* see cipher-ctr-mt.c */
++		/* we need to free this later if using aes_ctr_mt
++		 * under OSSL 1.1. Honestly, we could avoid this by making
++		 * it a global in cipher-ctr_mt.c and exporting it here
++		 * then we'd only have to call EVP_CIPHER_meth once but this
++		 * works for now. TODO: This. cjr 02.22.2023 */
++		cc->meth_ptr = type;
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */
++	} /* if (strstr()) */
+ 	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
+ 	    (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+@@ -327,6 +458,12 @@
+    const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
+ {
+ 	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++		if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) {
++			return chachapoly_crypt_mt(cc->cp_ctx_mt, seqnr, dest,
++			    src, len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
++		}
++#endif
+ 		return chachapoly_crypt(cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
+ 		    len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
+ 	}
+@@ -389,9 +526,16 @@
+ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
+     const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+ {
+-	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
++	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++		if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) {
++			return chachapoly_get_length_mt(cc->cp_ctx_mt, plenp,
++			    seqnr, cp, len);
++		}
++#endif
+ 		return chachapoly_get_length(cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
+ 		    cp, len);
++	}
+ 	if (len < 4)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 	*plenp = PEEK_U32(cp);
+@@ -404,13 +548,33 @@
+ 	if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++		if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_MT) != 0) {
++			chachapoly_free_mt(cc->cp_ctx_mt);
++			cc->cp_ctx_mt = NULL;
++		} else {
++			chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
++			cc->cp_ctx = NULL;
++		}
++#else
+ 		chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
+ 		cc->cp_ctx = NULL;
++#endif
+ 	} else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
+ 		explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx));
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
+ 	cc->evp = NULL;
++	/* if meth_ptr isn't null then we are using the aes_ctr_mt
++	 * evp_cipher_meth_new() in cipher-ctr-mt.c under OSSL 1.1
++	 * if we don't explicitly free it then, even though we free
++	 * the ctx it is a part of it doesn't get freed. So...
++	 * cjr 2/7/2023
++	 */
++	if (cc->meth_ptr != NULL) {
++		EVP_CIPHER_meth_free((void *)(EVP_CIPHER *)cc->meth_ptr);
++		cc->meth_ptr = NULL;
++	}
+ #endif
+ 	freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+ }
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.307925846 +0200
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
+ 	if (!do_encrypt) {
+ 		const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
+ 
+-		poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
++		poly1305_auth(NULL, expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
+ 		if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
+ 	if (do_encrypt) {
+-		poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
++		poly1305_auth(NULL, dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
+ 		    poly_key);
+ 	}
+ 	r = 0;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.308400139 +0200
+@@ -34,8 +34,18 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
+ 
++
++/* using the EVP_MAC interface for poly1305 is significantly
++ * faster than the version bundled with OpenSSH. However,
++ * this interface is only available in OpenSSL 3.0+
++ * -cjr 10/21/2022 */
+ struct chachapoly_ctx {
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *main_evp, *header_evp;
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++	EVP_MAC_CTX    *poly_ctx;
++#else
++	char           *poly_ctx;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ struct chachapoly_ctx *
+@@ -56,6 +66,15 @@
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx->header_evp) != 16)
+ 		goto fail;
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++	EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
++	if ((mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "POLY1305", NULL)) == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++	if ((ctx->poly_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++#else
++	ctx->poly_ctx = NULL;
++#endif
+ 	return ctx;
+  fail:
+ 	chachapoly_free(ctx);
+@@ -69,6 +88,9 @@
+ 		return;
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->main_evp);
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->header_evp);
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++	EVP_MAC_CTX_free(cpctx->poly_ctx);
++#endif
+ 	freezero(cpctx, sizeof(*cpctx));
+ }
+ 
+@@ -107,7 +129,7 @@
+ 	if (!do_encrypt) {
+ 		const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
+ 
+-		poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
++		poly1305_auth(ctx->poly_ctx, expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
+ 		if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -133,7 +155,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
+ 	if (do_encrypt) {
+-		poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
++		poly1305_auth(ctx->poly_ctx, dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
+ 		    poly_key);
+ 	}
+ 	r = 0;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.309077322 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,695 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2023 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University.
++ *
++ *  Author: Mitchell Dorrell <mwd@psc.edu>
++ *  Author: Chris Rapier  <rapier@psc.edu>
++ *
++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the MIT License.
++ *
++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the MIT License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library;
++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
++ *
++ */
++
++/* TODO: audit includes */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++#endif
++
++#if defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20)
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <unistd.h> /* needed for getpid under C99 */
++#include <stdarg.h> /* needed for log.h */
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>  /* needed for misc.h */
++#include <pthread.h>
++
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++
++#include "defines.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
++#include "cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h"
++
++#ifndef likely
++# define likely(x)   __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1)
++#endif
++#ifndef unlikely
++# define unlikely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0)
++#endif
++
++/* Size of keystream to pregenerate, measured in bytes
++ * we want to round up to the nearest chacha block and have
++ * 128 bytes for overhead */
++#define ROUND_UP(x,y) (((((x)-1)/(y))+1)*(y))
++#define KEYSTREAMLEN (ROUND_UP((SSH_IOBUFSZ) + 128, (CHACHA_BLOCKLEN)))
++
++/* BEGIN TUNABLES */
++
++/* Number of worker threads to spawn. */
++/* the goal is to ensure that main is never
++ * waiting on the worker threads for keystream data */
++#define NUMTHREADS 1
++
++/* 64 seems to be a pretty blance between memory and performance
++ * 128 is another option with somewhat higher memory consumption */
++#define NUMSTREAMS 64
++
++/* END TUNABLES */
++
++struct mt_keystream {
++	u_char poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];     /* POLY1305_KEYLEN == 32 */
++	u_char headerStream[CHACHA_BLOCKLEN]; /* CHACHA_BLOCKLEN == 64 */
++	u_char mainStream[KEYSTREAMLEN];      /* KEYSTREAMLEN == 32768 */
++};
++
++struct threadData {
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX * main_evp;
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX * header_evp;
++	u_char seqbuf[16];
++};
++
++struct mt_keystream_batch {
++	u_int batchID;
++	struct threadData tds[NUMTHREADS];
++	struct mt_keystream streams[NUMSTREAMS];
++};
++
++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt {
++	u_int seqnr;
++	u_int batchID;
++
++	struct mt_keystream_batch batches[2];
++
++	pthread_t manager_tid[2];
++	pthread_t self_tid;
++
++	pid_t mainpid;
++	u_char zeros[KEYSTREAMLEN]; /* KEYSTREAMLEN == 32768 */
++
++  /* if OpenSSL has support for Poly1305 in the MAC EVPs
++   * use that (OSSL >= 3.0) if not then it's OSSL 1.1 so
++   * use the Poly1305 digest methods. Failing that use the
++   * internal poly1305 methods */
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++	EVP_MAC_CTX    *poly_ctx;
++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305)
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX   *poly_ctx;
++	EVP_MD_CTX     *md_ctx;
++	EVP_PKEY       *pkey;
++	size_t         ptaglen;
++#else
++	char           *poly_ctx;
++#endif
++};
++
++struct manager_thread_args {
++	struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt;
++	u_int oldBatchID;
++	int retval;
++};
++
++struct worker_thread_args {
++	u_int batchID;
++	struct mt_keystream_batch * batch;
++	int threadIndex;
++	u_char * zeros;
++	int retval;
++};
++
++/* generate the keystream and header
++ * we use nulls for the "data" (the zeros variable) in order to
++ * get the raw keystream
++ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */
++int
++generate_keystream(struct mt_keystream * ks, u_int seqnr,
++    struct threadData * td, u_char * zeros)
++{
++	/* generate poly1305 key */
++	memset(td->seqbuf, 0, sizeof(td->seqbuf));
++	POKE_U64(td->seqbuf + 8, seqnr);
++	memset(ks->poly_key , 0, sizeof(ks->poly_key));
++	if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->main_evp, NULL, NULL, td->seqbuf, 1) ||
++	    EVP_Cipher(td->main_evp, ks->poly_key, ks->poly_key,
++	    sizeof(ks->poly_key)) < 0)
++		return -1;
++
++	/* generate header keystream for encrypting payload length */
++	if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->header_evp, NULL, NULL, td->seqbuf, 1) ||
++	    EVP_Cipher(td->header_evp, ks->headerStream, zeros, CHACHA_BLOCKLEN)
++	    < 0 )
++		return -1;
++
++	/* generate main keystream for encrypting payload */
++	td->seqbuf[0] = 1;
++	if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->main_evp, NULL, NULL, td->seqbuf, 1) ||
++	    EVP_Cipher(td->main_evp, ks->mainStream, zeros, KEYSTREAMLEN) < 0)
++		return -1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/* free the EVP contexts associated with the give thread */
++void
++free_threadData(struct threadData * td)
++{
++	if (td == NULL)
++		return;
++	if (td->main_evp) /* false if initialization didn't get this far */
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(td->main_evp);
++	if (td->header_evp) /* false if initialization didn't get this far */
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(td->header_evp);
++	explicit_bzero(td, sizeof(*td));
++}
++
++/* initialize the EVPs used by the worker thread
++   Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */
++int
++initialize_threadData(struct threadData * td, const u_char *key)
++{
++	memset(td,0,sizeof(*td));
++	if ((td->main_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (td->header_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++	if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->main_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key, NULL, 1))
++		goto fail;
++	if (!EVP_CipherInit(td->header_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key + 32, NULL, 1))
++		goto fail;
++	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(td->header_evp) != 16)
++		goto fail;
++	return 0;
++ fail:
++	free_threadData(td);
++	return -1;
++}
++
++struct worker_thread_args *
++worker_thread(struct worker_thread_args * args)
++{
++	/* check first */
++	if (args == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++	if (args->batch == NULL || args->zeros == NULL) {
++		args->retval = 1;
++		return args;
++	}
++
++	int threadIndex = args->threadIndex;
++	struct threadData * td = &(args->batch->tds[threadIndex]);
++	u_int refseqnr = args->batchID * NUMSTREAMS;
++
++	for (int i = threadIndex; i < NUMSTREAMS; i += NUMTHREADS) {
++		if (generate_keystream(&(args->batch->streams[i]), refseqnr + i,
++		    td, args->zeros) == -1) {
++			args->retval = 1;
++			return args;
++		}
++	}
++
++	args->retval = 0;
++	return args;
++}
++
++int
++join_manager_thread(pthread_t manager_tid)
++{
++	struct manager_thread_args * args;
++	if (pthread_join(manager_tid, (void **) &args) == 0) {
++		if (args == NULL) {
++			debug_f("Manager thread returned NULL!");
++			return 1;
++		} else if (args == PTHREAD_CANCELED) {
++			debug_f("Manager thread canceled!");
++			return 1;
++		} else if (args->retval != 0) {
++			debug_f("Manager thread error (%d)", args->retval);
++			free(args);
++			return 1;
++		} else {
++			free(args);
++			return 0;
++		}
++	} else {
++		debug_f("pthread_join error!");
++		return 1;
++	}
++}
++
++void
++chachapoly_free_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt)
++{
++	if (ctx_mt == NULL)
++		return;
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++	if (ctx_mt->poly_ctx != NULL) {
++		EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_mt->poly_ctx);
++		ctx_mt->poly_ctx = NULL;
++	}
++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305)
++	if (ctx_mt->md_ctx != NULL) {
++		EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_mt->md_ctx);
++		ctx_mt->md_ctx = NULL;
++	}
++	if (ctx_mt->pkey != NULL) {
++		EVP_PKEY_free(ctx_mt->pkey);
++		ctx_mt->pkey = NULL;
++	}
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * Only cleanup the manager threads if we are the PID that initialized
++	 * them! If we're a fork, the threads don't really exist.
++	 */
++
++	if (getpid() == ctx_mt->mainpid) {
++		if (ctx_mt->manager_tid[0] != ctx_mt->self_tid) {
++			join_manager_thread(ctx_mt->manager_tid[0]);
++			ctx_mt->manager_tid[0] = ctx_mt->self_tid;
++		}
++		if (ctx_mt->manager_tid[1] != ctx_mt->self_tid) {
++			join_manager_thread(ctx_mt->manager_tid[1]);
++			ctx_mt->manager_tid[1] = ctx_mt->self_tid;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* Cleanup thread data structures. */
++	for (int i=0; i<2; i++)
++		for (int j=0; j<NUMTHREADS; j++)
++			free_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[i].tds[j]));
++
++	/* Zero and free the whole multithreaded cipher context. */
++	freezero(ctx_mt, sizeof(*ctx_mt));
++
++	return;
++}
++
++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *
++chachapoly_new_mt(u_int startseqnr, const u_char * key, u_int keylen)
++{
++	struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt = xmalloc(sizeof(*ctx_mt));
++	memset(ctx_mt, 0, sizeof(*ctx_mt));
++	/* Initialize the sequence number. When rekeying, this won't be zero. */
++	ctx_mt->seqnr = startseqnr;
++	ctx_mt->batchID = startseqnr / NUMSTREAMS;
++	struct threadData mainData;
++	int tDataI;
++	int genKSfailed = 0;
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++	EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
++	if ((mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "POLY1305", NULL)) == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++	if ((ctx_mt->poly_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305)
++	if ((ctx_mt->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++	if ((ctx_mt->pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305, NULL,
++	    ctx_mt->zeros, POLY1305_KEYLEN)) == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_mt->md_ctx, &ctx_mt->poly_ctx, NULL, NULL,
++	    ctx_mt->pkey) == 0)
++		goto fail;
++#else
++	ctx_mt->poly_ctx = NULL;
++#endif
++
++	ctx_mt->batches[ctx_mt->batchID % 2].batchID = ctx_mt->batchID;
++	ctx_mt->batches[(ctx_mt->batchID + 1) % 2].batchID =
++	    ctx_mt->batchID + 1;
++
++	/* initialize batches[0] tds */
++	for (tDataI = 0; tDataI < NUMTHREADS; tDataI++) {
++		if (initialize_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[0].tds[tDataI]),
++		    key) != 0)
++			break;
++	}
++	if (tDataI < NUMTHREADS) {
++		/* Backtrack starting with 'tDataI - 1' */
++		for (tDataI--; tDataI >= 0; tDataI--)
++			free_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[0].tds[tDataI]));
++		goto fail;
++	}
++	/* initialize batches[1] tds */
++	for (tDataI = 0; tDataI < NUMTHREADS; tDataI++) {
++		if (initialize_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[1].tds[tDataI]),
++		    key) != 0)
++			break;
++	}
++	if (tDataI < NUMTHREADS) {
++		/* Backtrack starting with 'tDataI - 1' */
++		for (tDataI--; tDataI >= 0; tDataI--)
++			free_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[1].tds[tDataI]));
++		/* Free the batches[0] tds too */
++		for (tDataI = NUMTHREADS; tDataI >= 0; tDataI--)
++			free_threadData(&(ctx_mt->batches[0].tds[tDataI]));
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (initialize_threadData(&mainData, key) != 0) {
++		chachapoly_free_mt(ctx_mt);
++		explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr));
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	for (int i=0; i<2; i++) {
++		u_int refseqnr = ctx_mt->batches[i].batchID * NUMSTREAMS;
++		for (int j = startseqnr > refseqnr ? startseqnr - refseqnr : 0;
++		     j<NUMSTREAMS; j++) {
++			if (generate_keystream(&(ctx_mt->batches[i].streams[j]),
++			    refseqnr + j, &mainData, ctx_mt->zeros) == -1) {
++				debug_f("generate_keystream failed in "
++				    "chacha20-poly1305@hpnssh.org");
++				genKSfailed = 1;
++				break; /* imperfect, but it helps */
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++	free_threadData(&mainData);
++
++	if (genKSfailed != 0) {
++		chachapoly_free_mt(ctx_mt);
++		explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr));
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	/* Store the PID so that in the future, we can tell if we're a fork */
++	ctx_mt->mainpid = getpid();
++	ctx_mt->self_tid = pthread_self();
++	ctx_mt->manager_tid[0] = ctx_mt->self_tid;
++	ctx_mt->manager_tid[1] = ctx_mt->self_tid;
++	/* was reporting the TID using gettid() but it's not portable */
++	debug2_f("<main thread: pid=%u, ptid=0x%lx>", getpid(), pthread_self());
++
++	/* Success! */
++	explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr));
++	return ctx_mt;
++
++ fail:
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++	if (ctx_mt->poly_ctx != NULL) {
++		EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_mt->poly_ctx);
++		ctx_mt->poly_ctx = NULL;
++	}
++#elif !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305)
++	if (ctx_mt->md_ctx != NULL) {
++		EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_mt->md_ctx);
++		ctx_mt->md_ctx = NULL;
++	}
++	if (ctx_mt->pkey != NULL) {
++		EVP_PKEY_free(ctx_mt->pkey);
++		ctx_mt->pkey = NULL;
++	}
++#endif
++	freezero(ctx_mt, sizeof(*ctx_mt));
++	explicit_bzero(&startseqnr, sizeof(startseqnr));
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/* a fast method to XOR the keystream against the data */
++static inline void
++fastXOR(u_char *dest, const u_char *src, const u_char *keystream, u_int len)
++{
++
++	/* XXX: this was __uint128_t but that was causing unaligned load errors.
++	 * this works but we need to explore it more. */
++	typedef uint32_t chunk;
++	size_t i;
++
++	for (i=0; i < (len / sizeof(chunk)); i++)
++		((chunk *)dest)[i]=((chunk *)src)[i]^((chunk *)keystream)[i];
++	for (i=i*(sizeof(chunk) / sizeof(char)); i < len; i++)
++		dest[i]=src[i]^keystream[i];
++}
++
++struct manager_thread_args *
++manager_thread(struct manager_thread_args * margs) {
++	/* make sure we have valid data before proceeding */
++	if (margs == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++
++	struct chachapoly_ctx_mt * ctx_mt = margs->ctx_mt;
++	if (ctx_mt == NULL) {
++		margs->retval = 1;
++		return margs;
++	}
++
++	u_int oldBatchID = margs->oldBatchID;
++
++	struct mt_keystream_batch * batch = &(ctx_mt->batches[oldBatchID % 2]);
++	if (batch->batchID != oldBatchID) {
++		debug_f("Post-crypt batch miss! Seeking %u, found %u. Failing.",
++		    oldBatchID, batch->batchID);
++		margs->retval = 1;
++		return margs;
++	}
++
++	margs->retval = 0;
++	u_int batchID = oldBatchID + 2;
++
++	pthread_t tid[NUMTHREADS];
++	struct worker_thread_args * wargs = malloc(NUMTHREADS * sizeof(*wargs));
++	int ti;
++
++	for (ti = 0; ti < NUMTHREADS; ti++) {
++		wargs[ti].batchID = batchID;
++		wargs[ti].batch = batch;
++		wargs[ti].threadIndex = ti;
++		wargs[ti].zeros = ctx_mt->zeros;
++		if (pthread_create(&(tid[ti]), NULL, (void *) worker_thread,
++		    &(wargs[ti])) != 0) {
++			margs->retval = 1;
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++	for (; ti < NUMTHREADS; ti++) /* for error condition */
++		tid[ti] = pthread_self();
++
++	struct worker_thread_args * retwargs;
++
++	for (ti = 0; ti < NUMTHREADS; ti++) {
++		if (tid[ti] == pthread_self()) {
++			margs->retval = 1; /* redundant, but harmless */
++			continue;
++		}
++		if (pthread_join(tid[ti], (void **) &retwargs) == 0) {
++			if (retwargs == NULL) {
++				debug_f("Worker thread returned NULL!");
++				margs->retval = 1;
++			} else if (retwargs == PTHREAD_CANCELED) {
++				debug_f("Worker thread canceled!");
++				margs->retval = 1;
++			} else {
++				if (retwargs->retval != 0) {
++					debug_f("Worker thread error (%d)",
++					    retwargs->retval);
++					margs->retval = 1;
++				}
++				if (retwargs != &(wargs[ti])) {
++					debug_f("Worker thread didn't return "
++					    "expected structure!");
++					margs->retval = 1;
++				}
++			}
++		} else {
++			debug_f("pthread_join error!");
++			margs->retval = 1;
++		}
++	}
++	free(wargs);
++
++	if (margs->retval == 0) {
++		batch->batchID = batchID;
++	}
++
++	return margs;
++}
++
++int
++chachapoly_crypt_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *ctx_mt, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
++    const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt)
++{
++#ifdef SAFETY
++	if (ctx_mt->mainpid != getpid()) { /* we're a fork */
++		/*
++		 * TODO: this is EXTREMELY RARE, may never happen at all (only
++		 * if the fork calls crypt), so we should tell the compiler.
++		 */
++		/* The worker threads don't exist, we could spawn them? */
++		debug_f("Fork called crypt without workers!");
++		chachapoly_free_mt(ctx_mt);
++		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
++#endif
++
++	pthread_t * manager_tid = &(ctx_mt->manager_tid[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]);
++	if (unlikely(*manager_tid != ctx_mt->self_tid)) {
++		int ret = join_manager_thread(*manager_tid);
++		*manager_tid = ctx_mt->self_tid;
++		if (ret != 0)
++			return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
++
++	struct mt_keystream_batch * batch =
++	    &(ctx_mt->batches[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]);
++
++	struct mt_keystream * ks = &(batch->streams[seqnr % NUMSTREAMS]);
++
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++#ifdef SAFETY
++	if (batch->batchID == ctx_mt->batchID) { /* Safety check */
++#endif
++		/* check tag before anything else */
++		if (!do_encrypt) {
++			const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
++			u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN];
++#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305)
++			if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, -1,
++			    EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY,
++			    POLY1305_KEYLEN, ks->poly_key) <= 0) ||
++			    (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx_mt->md_ctx, src, aadlen + len) == 0)) {
++				debug_f("SSL error while decrypting poly1305 tag");
++				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			}
++			ctx_mt->ptaglen = POLY1305_TAGLEN;
++			if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_mt->md_ctx, expected_tag,
++			    &ctx_mt->ptaglen) == 0) {
++				debug_f("SSL error while finalizing decyrpted poly1305");
++				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			}
++#else
++			poly1305_auth(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, expected_tag, src,
++			    aadlen + len, ks->poly_key);
++#endif
++			if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN)
++			    != 0)
++				r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
++			explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
++		}
++		if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) {
++			/* Crypt additional data (i.e., packet length) */
++			/* TODO: is aadlen always four bytes? */
++			/* TODO: do we always have an aadlen? */
++			if (aadlen)
++				for (u_int i=0; i<aadlen; i++)
++					dest[i] = ks->headerStream[i] ^ src[i];
++			/* Crypt payload */
++			fastXOR(dest+aadlen,src+aadlen,ks->mainStream,len);
++			/* calculate and append tag */
++#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3) && defined(EVP_PKEY_POLY1305)
++			if (do_encrypt) {
++				if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, -1,
++				    EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY,
++				    POLY1305_KEYLEN, ks->poly_key) <=0) ||
++				    (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx_mt->md_ctx, dest, aadlen + len) == 0)) {
++					debug_f ("SSL error while encrypting poly1305 tag");
++					return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++				}
++				ctx_mt->ptaglen = POLY1305_TAGLEN;
++				if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_mt->md_ctx, dest+aadlen+len,
++				    &ctx_mt->ptaglen) == 0) {
++					debug_f("SSL error while finalizing decyrpted poly1305");
++					return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++				}
++			}
++#else
++			if (do_encrypt)
++				poly1305_auth(ctx_mt->poly_ctx, dest+aadlen+len,
++				    dest, aadlen+len, ks->poly_key);
++#endif
++			r=0; /* Success! */
++		}
++		if (r) /* Anything nonzero is an error. */
++			return r;
++
++		ctx_mt->seqnr = seqnr + 1;
++
++		if (unlikely(ctx_mt->seqnr / NUMSTREAMS > ctx_mt->batchID)) {
++			struct manager_thread_args * args =
++			    malloc(sizeof(*args));
++			if (args == NULL) {
++				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			}
++			args->ctx_mt = ctx_mt;
++			args->oldBatchID = ctx_mt->batchID;
++			if (pthread_create(&(ctx_mt->manager_tid[ctx_mt->batchID
++			    % 2]), NULL, (void *) manager_thread, args) != 0) {
++				free(args);
++				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			}
++			ctx_mt->batchID = ctx_mt->seqnr / NUMSTREAMS;
++		}
++
++		/* TODO: Nothing we need to sanitize here? */
++
++		return 0;
++#ifdef SAFETY
++	} else { /* Bad, it's the wrong batch. */
++		debug_f( "Pre-crypt batch miss! Seeking %u, found %u. Failing.",
++		    ctx_mt->batchID, batch->batchID);
++		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++chachapoly_get_length_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *ctx_mt, u_int *plenp,
++    u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
++{
++	/* TODO: add compiler hints */
++#ifdef SAFETY
++	if (ctx_mt->mainpid != getpid()) { /* Use serial mode if we're a fork */
++		debug_f("We're a fork. Failing.");
++		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
++#endif
++
++	if (len < 4)
++		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++
++	pthread_t * manager_tid = &(ctx_mt->manager_tid[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]);
++	if (unlikely(*manager_tid != ctx_mt->self_tid)) {
++		int ret = join_manager_thread(*manager_tid);
++		*manager_tid = ctx_mt->self_tid;
++		if (ret != 0)
++			return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
++
++	u_char buf[4];
++#ifdef SAFETY
++	u_int sought_batchID = seqnr / NUMSTREAMS;
++#endif
++	struct mt_keystream_batch * batch =
++	    &(ctx_mt->batches[ctx_mt->batchID % 2]);
++	struct mt_keystream * ks = &(batch->streams[seqnr % NUMSTREAMS]);
++#ifdef SAFETY
++	if (batch->batchID == sought_batchID) {
++#endif
++		for (u_int i=0; i < sizeof(buf); i++)
++			buf[i]=ks->headerStream[i] ^ cp[i];
++		*plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
++		return 0;
++#ifdef SAFETY
++	} else {
++		debug_f("Batch miss! Seeking %u, found %u. Failing.",
++		    sought_batchID, batch->batchID);
++		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	}
++#endif
++}
++#endif /* defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20) */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.309455724 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2023 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University.
++ *
++ *  Author: Mitchell Dorrell <mwd@psc.edu>
++ *  Author: Chris Rapier  <rapier@psc.edu>
++ *
++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the MIT License.
++ *
++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the MIT License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library;
++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
++ *
++ */
++
++#ifndef CHACHA_POLY_LIBCRYPTO_MT_H
++#define CHACHA_POLY_LIBCRYPTO_MT_H
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include "chacha.h"
++#include "poly1305.h"
++
++#ifndef CHACHA_KEYLEN
++#define CHACHA_KEYLEN	32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */
++#endif
++
++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt; /* defined in cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.c */
++
++struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *chachapoly_new_mt(u_int startseqnr, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
++                                            __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
++
++void   chachapoly_free_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cpctx);
++
++int    chachapoly_crypt_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cpctx, u_int seqnr,
++			   u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen,
++			   u_int authlen, int do_encrypt);
++
++int    chachapoly_get_length_mt(struct chachapoly_ctx_mt *cpctx,
++				u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
++                                __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
++
++#endif /* CHACHA_POLY_LIBCRYPTO_MT_H */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.309949084 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
++/*
++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher
++ *
++ * Author: Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>
++ * Author: Mike Tasota <tasota@gmail.com>
++ * Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ * Copyright (c) 2008-2021 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged,
++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(WITH_OPENSSL3)
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include "uthash.h"
++
++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++
++#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
++#include <openssl/aes.h>
++#endif
++
++#include <pthread.h>
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/sysctl.h>
++#endif
++
++/* note regarding threads and queues */
++/* initially this cipher was written in a way that
++ * the key stream was generated in a per cipher block
++ * loop. For example, if the key stream queue length was
++ * 16k and the cipher block size was 16 bytes it would
++ * fill the queue 16 bytes at a time. Mitch Dorrell pointed
++ * out that we could fill the queue in once call eliminating
++ * loop and multiple calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate. Doing so
++ * dramatically reduced CPU load in the threads and indicated
++ * that we could also eliminate most of the threads and queues
++ * as it would take far less time for a queue to ebter KQ_FULL
++ * state. As such, we've reduced the default number of threads
++ * and queues from 2 and 8 (respectively) to 1 and 2. We've also
++ * elimnated the need to determine the physical number of cores on
++ * the system and, if the user desires, can spin up more threads
++ * using an environment variable. Additionally, queues is now fixed
++ * at thread_count + 1.
++ * cjr 10/19/2022 */
++
++/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/
++/* maximum number of threads and queues */
++#define MAX_THREADS      4
++#define MAX_NUMKQ        (MAX_THREADS + 1)
++
++/* Number of pregen threads to use */
++/* this is a default value. The actual number is
++ * determined during init as a function of the number
++ * of available cores */
++int cipher_threads = 1;
++
++/* Number of keystream queues */
++/* ideally this should be large enough so that there is
++ * always a key queue for a thread to work on
++ * so maybe double of the number of threads. Again this
++ * is a default and the actual value is determined in init*/
++int numkq = 2;
++
++/* Length of a keystream queue */
++/* one queue holds 512KB (1024 * 32 * 16) of key data
++ * being that the queues are destroyed after a rekey
++ * and at leats one has to be fully filled prior to
++ * enciphering data we don't want this to be too large */
++#define KQLEN (1024 * 32)
++
++/* Processor cacheline length */
++#define CACHELINE_LEN	64
++
++/* Can the system do unaligned loads natively? */
++#if defined(__aarch64__) || \
++    defined(__i386__)    || \
++    defined(__powerpc__) || \
++    defined(__x86_64__)
++# define CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
++#endif
++#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__)
++# define CIPHER_INT128_OK
++#endif
++/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/
++
++#define HAVE_NONE       0
++#define HAVE_KEY        1
++#define HAVE_IV         2
++int X = 0;
++
++const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
++
++/* Keystream Queue state */
++enum {
++	KQINIT,
++	KQEMPTY,
++	KQFILLING,
++	KQFULL,
++	KQDRAINING
++};
++
++/* Keystream Queue struct */
++struct kq {
++	u_char		keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* [32768][16B] */
++	u_char		ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */
++	u_char          pad0[CACHELINE_LEN];
++	pthread_mutex_t	lock;
++	pthread_cond_t	cond;
++	int             qstate;
++	u_char          pad1[CACHELINE_LEN];
++};
++
++/* Context struct */
++struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt
++{
++	long unsigned int struct_id;
++	int               keylen;
++	int		  state;
++	int		  qidx;
++	int		  ridx;
++	int               id[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */
++	AES_KEY           aes_key;
++	const u_char     *orig_key;
++	u_char		  aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */
++	pthread_t	  tid[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */
++	pthread_rwlock_t  tid_lock;
++	struct kq	  q[MAX_NUMKQ]; /* 33 */
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	pthread_rwlock_t  stop_lock;
++	int		  exit_flag;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++};
++
++/* this defines the hash and elements of evp context pointers
++ * that are created in thread_loop. We use this to clear and
++ * free the contexts in stop_and_prejoin
++ */
++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs {
++	pthread_t       tid;
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *pointer; /* 32 */
++	UT_hash_handle hh;
++};
++
++/* globals */
++/* how we increment the id the structs we create */
++long unsigned int global_struct_id = 0;
++
++/* keep a copy of the pointers created in thread_loop to free later */
++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *evp_ptrs = NULL;
++
++/*
++ * Add num to counter 'ctr'
++ */
++static void
++ssh_ctr_add(u_char *ctr, uint32_t num, u_int len)
++{
++	int i;
++	uint16_t n;
++
++	for (n = 0, i = len - 1; i >= 0 && (num || n); i--) {
++		n = ctr[i] + (num & 0xff) + n;
++		num >>= 8;
++		ctr[i] = n & 0xff;
++		n >>= 8;
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Threads may be cancelled in a pthread_cond_wait, we must free the mutex
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_cleanup(void *x)
++{
++	pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x);
++}
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition
++ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have
++ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang
++ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread.
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_check_exit(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
++{
++	int exit_flag;
++
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->stop_lock);
++	exit_flag = c->exit_flag;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
++
++	if (exit_flag)
++		pthread_exit(NULL);
++}
++#else
++# define thread_loop_check_exit(s)
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++/*
++ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads
++ */
++static void
++stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
++{
++	int i;
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	/* notify threads that they should exit */
++	pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->stop_lock);
++	c->exit_flag = TRUE;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++	/* Cancel pregen threads */
++	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++		debug ("Canceled %lu (%lu,%d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
++		pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
++	}
++        for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
++                pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[i].lock);
++                pthread_cond_broadcast(&c->q[i].cond);
++                pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[i].lock);
++        }
++	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++		if (pthread_kill(c->tid[i], 0) != 0)
++			debug3("AES-CTR MT pthread_join failure: Invalid thread id %lu in %s",
++			       c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__);
++		else {
++			debug ("Joining %lu (%lu, %d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
++			pthread_mutex_destroy(&c->q[i].lock);
++                        pthread_cond_destroy(&c->q[i].cond);
++                        pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
++			/* this finds the entry in the hash that corresponding to the
++			 * thread id. That's used to find the pointer to the cipher struct
++			 * created in thread_loop. */
++			struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr;
++			HASH_FIND_INT(evp_ptrs, &c->tid[i], ptr);
++			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ptr->pointer);
++			HASH_DEL(evp_ptrs, ptr);
++			free(ptr);              }
++        }
++	pthread_rwlock_destroy(&c->tid_lock);
++}
++
++/*
++ * The life of a pregen thread:
++ *    Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter.
++ *    When done, update counter for the next fill.
++ */
++/* previously this used the low level interface which is, sadly,
++ * slower than the EVP interface by a long shot. The original ctx (from the
++ * body of the code) isn't passed in here but we have the key and the counter
++ * which means we should be able to create the exact same ctx and use that to
++ * fill the keystream queues. I'm concerned about additional overhead but the
++ * additional speed from AESNI should make up for it.  */
++/* The above comment was made when I thought I needed to do a new EVP init for
++ * each counter increment. Turns out not to be the case -cjr 10/15/21*/
++
++static void *
++thread_loop(void *x)
++{
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *aesni_ctx;
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c = x;
++	struct kq *q;
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr;
++	int qidx;
++	pthread_t first_tid;
++	int outlen;
++	u_char mynull[KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	memset(&mynull, 0, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++
++	/* get the thread id to see if this is the first one */
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->tid_lock);
++	first_tid = c->tid[0];
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
++
++	/* create the context for this thread */
++	aesni_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++
++	/* keep track of the pointer for the evp in this struct
++	 * so we can free it later. So we place it in a hash indexed on the
++	 * thread id, which is available to us in the free function.
++	 * Note, the thread id isn't necessary unique across rekeys but
++	 * that's okay as they are unique during a key. */
++	ptr = malloc(sizeof *ptr); /*freed in stop & prejoin */
++	ptr->tid = pthread_self(); /* index for hash */
++	ptr->pointer = aesni_ctx;
++	HASH_ADD_INT(evp_ptrs, tid, ptr);
++
++	/* initialize the cipher ctx with the key provided
++	 * determine which cipher to use based on the key size */
++	if (c->keylen == 256)
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr(), NULL, c->orig_key, NULL);
++	else if (c->keylen == 128)
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), NULL, c->orig_key, NULL);
++	else if (c->keylen == 192)
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, EVP_aes_192_ctr(), NULL, c->orig_key, NULL);
++	else {
++		logit("Invalid key length of %d in AES CTR MT. Exiting", c->keylen);
++		exit(1);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill
++	 * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout.
++	 */
++
++	if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) {
++		/* get the first element of the keyque struct */
++		q = &c->q[0];
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		/* if we are in the INIT state then fill the queue */
++		if (q->qstate == KQINIT) {
++			/* set the initial counter */
++			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr);
++
++			/* encypher a block sized null string (mynull) with the key. This
++			 * returns the keystream because xoring the keystream
++			 * against null returns the keystream. Store that in the appropriate queue */
++			EVP_EncryptUpdate(aesni_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++
++			/* add the number of blocks creates to the aes counter */
++			ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		}
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over
++	 * queues already filled by other threads and stopping to wait for
++	 * a draining queue to become empty.
++	 *
++	 * Multiple threads may be waiting on a draining queue and awoken
++	 * when empty.  The first thread to wake will mark it as filling,
++	 * others will move on to fill, skip, or wait on the next queue.
++	 */
++	for (qidx = 1;; qidx = (qidx + 1) % numkq) {
++		/* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */
++		pthread_testcancel();
++
++		/* Check if we should exit as well */
++		thread_loop_check_exit(c);
++
++		/* Lock queue and block if its draining */
++		q = &c->q[qidx];
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock);
++		while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) {
++			thread_loop_check_exit(c);
++			pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
++		}
++		pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
++
++		/* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */
++		if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) {
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Empty, let's fill it.
++		 * Queue lock is relinquished while we do this so others
++		 * can see that it's being filled.
++		 */
++		q->qstate = KQFILLING;
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++
++		/* set the initial counter */
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesni_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr);
++
++		/* see coresponding block above for useful comments */
++		EVP_EncryptUpdate(aesni_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++
++		/* Re-lock, mark full and signal consumer */
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		q->qstate = KQFULL;
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++	}
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/* this is where the data is actually enciphered and deciphered */
++/* this may also benefit from upgrading to the EVP API */
++static int
++ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
++    size_t len)
++{
++	typedef union {
++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
++		__uint128_t *u128;
++#endif
++		uint64_t *u64;
++		uint32_t *u32;
++		uint8_t *u8;
++		const uint8_t *cu8;
++		uintptr_t u;
++	} ptrs_t;
++	ptrs_t destp, srcp, bufp;
++	uintptr_t align;
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++	struct kq *q, *oldq;
++	int ridx;
++	u_char *buf;
++
++	if (len == 0)
++		return 1;
++	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	q = &c->q[c->qidx];
++	ridx = c->ridx;
++
++	/* src already padded to block multiple */
++	srcp.cu8 = src;
++	destp.u8 = dest;
++	do { /* do until len is 0 */
++		buf = q->keys[ridx];
++		bufp.u8 = buf;
++
++		/* figure out the alignment on the fly */
++#ifdef CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
++		align = 0;
++#else
++		align = destp.u | srcp.u | bufp.u;
++#endif
++
++		/* xor the src against the key (buf)
++		 * different systems can do all 16 bytes at once or
++		 * may need to do it in 8 or 4 bytes chunks
++		 * worst case is doing it as a loop */
++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
++		/* with GCC 13 we have having consistent seg faults
++		 * in this section of code. Since this is a critical
++		 * code path we are removing this until we have a solution
++		 * in place -cjr 02/22/24
++		 * TODO: FIX THIS
++		 */
++		/* if ((align & 0xf) == 0) { */
++		/* 	destp.u128[0] = srcp.u128[0] ^ bufp.u128[0]; */
++		/* } else */
++#endif
++		/* 64 bits */
++		if ((align & 0x7) == 0) {
++			destp.u64[0] = srcp.u64[0] ^ bufp.u64[0];
++			destp.u64[1] = srcp.u64[1] ^ bufp.u64[1];
++		/* 32 bits */
++		} else if ((align & 0x3) == 0) {
++			destp.u32[0] = srcp.u32[0] ^ bufp.u32[0];
++			destp.u32[1] = srcp.u32[1] ^ bufp.u32[1];
++			destp.u32[2] = srcp.u32[2] ^ bufp.u32[2];
++			destp.u32[3] = srcp.u32[3] ^ bufp.u32[3];
++		} else {
++			/*1 byte at a time*/
++			size_t i;
++			for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
++				dest[i] = src[i] ^ buf[i];
++		}
++
++		/* inc/decrement the pointers by the block size (16)*/
++		destp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++		srcp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++		/* Increment read index, switch queues on rollover */
++		if ((ridx = (ridx + 1) % KQLEN) == 0) {
++			oldq = q;
++
++			/* Mark next queue draining, may need to wait */
++			c->qidx = (c->qidx + 1) % numkq;
++			q = &c->q[c->qidx];
++			pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++			while (q->qstate != KQFULL) {
++				pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
++			}
++			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++
++			/* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */
++			pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock);
++			oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond);
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock);
++		}
++	} while (len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	c->ridx = ridx;
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
++    int enc)
++{
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++	int i;
++
++	char *aes_threads = getenv("SSH_CIPHER_THREADS");
++        if (aes_threads != NULL && strlen(aes_threads) != 0)
++		cipher_threads = atoi(aes_threads);
++	else
++		cipher_threads = 1;
++
++	if (cipher_threads < 1)
++ 		cipher_threads = 1;
++
++	if (cipher_threads > MAX_THREADS)
++		cipher_threads = MAX_THREADS;
++
++	numkq = cipher_threads + 1;
++
++	if (numkq > MAX_NUMKQ)
++		numkq = MAX_NUMKQ;
++
++	debug("Starting %d threads and %d queues\n", cipher_threads, numkq);
++
++	/* set up the initial state of c (our cipher stream struct) */
++ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
++		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->tid_lock, NULL);
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->stop_lock, NULL);
++		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
++
++		/* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */
++		for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
++			pthread_mutex_init(&c->q[i].lock, NULL);
++			pthread_cond_init(&c->q[i].cond, NULL);
++		}
++
++		/* attach our struct to the context */
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
++	}
++
++	/* we are initializing but the current structure already
++	   has an IV and key so we want to kill the existing key data
++	   and start over. This is important when we need to rekey the data stream */
++	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
++		/* tell the pregen threads to exit */
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		/* reset the exit flag */
++		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		/* Start over getting key & iv */
++		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
++	}
++
++	/* set the initial key for this key stream queue */
++	if (key != NULL) {
++		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
++		   &c->aes_key);
++		c->orig_key = key;
++		c->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
++		c->state |= HAVE_KEY;
++	}
++
++	/* set the IV */
++	if (iv != NULL) {
++		/* init the counter this is just a 16byte uchar */
++		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		c->state |= HAVE_IV;
++	}
++
++	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
++		/* Clear queues */
++		/* set the first key in the key queue to the current counter */
++		memcpy(c->q[0].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		/* indicate that it needs to be initialized */
++		c->q[0].qstate = KQINIT;
++		/* for each of the remaining queues set the first counter to the
++		 * counter and then add the size of the queue to the counter */
++		for (i = 1; i < numkq; i++) {
++			memcpy(c->q[i].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			ssh_ctr_add(c->q[i].ctr, i * KQLEN, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			c->q[i].qstate = KQEMPTY;
++		}
++		c->qidx = 0;
++		c->ridx = 0;
++		c->struct_id = global_struct_id++;
++
++
++		/* Start threads */
++#define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
++		pthread_attr_t attr;
++		pthread_attr_init(&attr);
++		pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, STACK_SIZE);
++		for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++			pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
++			if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], &attr, thread_loop, c) != 0)
++				fatal ("AES-CTR MT Could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__);
++                                /*should die here */
++			else {
++				c->id[i] = i;
++				debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%lu, %d)",
++				       c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
++			}
++			pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
++		}
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[0].lock);
++		// wait for all of the threads to be initialized
++		while (c->q[0].qstate == KQINIT)
++			pthread_cond_wait(&c->q[0].cond, &c->q[0].lock);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[0].lock);
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++{
++	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
++
++	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
++
++		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
++		free(c);
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/* <friedl> */
++const EVP_CIPHER *
++evp_aes_ctr_mt(void)
++{
++	static EVP_CIPHER *aes_ctr;
++	aes_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 16/*block*/, 16/*key*/);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(aes_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_init);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup);
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr);
++#  ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
++	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(aes_ctr, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
++				      | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH
++				      | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
++				      | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV);
++#  endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/
++	return aes_ctr;
++}
++#endif /* OSSL Check */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.310535264 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
++/*
++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher Provider for OpenSSL 3
++ *
++ * Author: Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>
++ * Author: Mike Tasota <tasota@gmail.com>
++ * Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ * Copyright (c) 2008-2022 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged,
++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++/* only for systems with OSSL 3 */
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include "cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h"
++#include "log.h"
++
++/* for provider error struct */
++#include "ossl3-provider-err.h"
++#include "num.h"
++
++/* note regarding threads and queues */
++/* initially this cipher was written in a way that
++ * the key stream was generated in a per cipher block
++ * loop. For example, if the key stream queue length was
++ * 16k and the cipher block size was 16 bytes it would
++ * fill the queue 16 bytes at a time. Mitch Dorrell pointed
++ * out that we could fill the queue in once call eliminating
++ * loop and multiple calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate. Doing so
++ * dramatically reduced CPU load in the threads and indicated
++ * that we could also eliminate most of the threads and queues
++ * as it would take far less time for a queue to ebter KQ_FULL
++ * state. As such, we've reduced the default number of threads
++ * and queues from 2 and 8 (respectively) to 1 and 2. We've also
++ * elimnated the need to determine the physical number of cores on
++ * the system and, if the user desires, can spin up more threads
++ * using an environment variable. Additionally, queues is now fixed
++ * at thread_count + 1.
++ * cjr 10/19/2022 */
++
++/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/
++/* Number of pregen threads to use */
++/* this is a default value. The actual number is
++ * determined during init as a function of the number
++ * of available cores */
++int cipher_threads = 1;
++
++/* Number of keystream queues */
++/* ideally this should be large enough so that there is
++ * always a key queue for a thread to work on
++ * so maybe double of the number of threads. Again this
++ * is a default and the actual value is determined in init*/
++int numkq = 2;
++/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/
++
++/* globals */
++/* how we increment the id the structs we create */
++long unsigned int global_struct_id = 0;
++
++/* keep a copy of the pointers created in thread_loop to free later */
++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *evp_ptrs = NULL;
++
++/* private functions */
++
++/*
++ * Add num to counter 'ctr'
++ */
++static void
++ssh_ctr_add(u_char *ctr, uint32_t num, u_int len)
++{
++	int i;
++	uint16_t n;
++
++	for (n = 0, i = len - 1; i >= 0 && (num || n); i--) {
++		n = ctr[i] + (num & 0xff) + n;
++		num >>= 8;
++		ctr[i] = n & 0xff;
++		n >>= 8;
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Threads may be cancelled in a pthread_cond_wait, we must free the mutex
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_cleanup(void *x)
++{
++	pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x);
++}
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition
++ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have
++ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang
++ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread.
++ */
++static void
++thread_loop_check_exit(struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx)
++{
++	int exit_flag;
++
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock);
++	exit_flag = aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock);
++
++	if (exit_flag)
++		pthread_exit(NULL);
++}
++#else
++# define thread_loop_check_exit(s)
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++/*
++ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads
++ */
++static void
++stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx)
++{
++	int i;
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	/* notify threads that they should exit */
++	pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock);
++	aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = TRUE;
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock);
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++	/* Cancel pregen threads */
++	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++		debug_f ("Canceled %lu (%lu,%d)", aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], aes_mt_ctx->struct_id,
++		       aes_mt_ctx->id[i]);
++		pthread_cancel(aes_mt_ctx->tid[i]);
++	}
++	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++		if (pthread_kill(aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], 0) != 0)
++			debug3("AES-CTR MT pthread_join failure: Invalid thread id %lu in %s",
++			       aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], __func__);
++		else {
++			debug_f ("Joining %lu (%lu, %d)", aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], aes_mt_ctx->struct_id,
++				 aes_mt_ctx->id[i]);
++			pthread_join(aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], NULL);
++			/* this finds the entry in the hash that corresponding to the
++			 * thread id. That's used to find the pointer to the cipher struct
++			 * created in thread_loop. */
++			struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr;
++			HASH_FIND_INT(evp_ptrs, &aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], ptr);
++			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ptr->pointer);
++			HASH_DEL(evp_ptrs, ptr);
++			free(ptr);
++                }
++        }
++	pthread_rwlock_destroy(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock);
++}
++
++/* determine the number of threads to use
++ * Testing indicates that in most all situations the optimal number of
++ * threads is 1 meaning 1 for inbound and 1 for outbound. The optimal
++ * queue count has also been determined to be thread_count + 1.
++ * note this function updates two globals - numkq and cipher_threads
++ * it returns the value of cipher_threads but it doesn't need to */
++static int get_thread_count() {
++
++	char * aes_threads = getenv("SSH_CIPHER_THREADS");
++	debug_f ("SSH thread count is %s", aes_threads);
++        if (aes_threads != NULL && strlen(aes_threads) != 0)
++		cipher_threads = atoi(aes_threads);
++	else
++		cipher_threads = 1;
++
++	if (cipher_threads < 1)
++ 		cipher_threads = 1;
++
++	if (cipher_threads > MAX_THREADS)
++		cipher_threads = MAX_THREADS;
++
++	numkq = cipher_threads + 1;
++
++	if (numkq > MAX_NUMKQ)
++		numkq = MAX_NUMKQ;
++
++	debug_f ("Starting %d threads and %d queues\n", cipher_threads, numkq);
++
++	return (cipher_threads);
++}
++
++
++/*
++ * The life of a pregen thread:
++ *    Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter.
++ *    When done, update counter for the next fill.
++ */
++static void *
++thread_loop(void *job)
++{
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx;
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = job;
++	struct kq *q;
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs *ptr;
++	pthread_t first_tid;
++	int outlen;
++	u_char mynull[KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	memset(&mynull, 0, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++
++	/* get the thread id to see if this is the first one */
++	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock);
++	first_tid = aes_mt_ctx->tid[0];
++	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock);
++
++	/* create the context for this thread */
++	evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++
++	/* keep track of the pointer for the evp in this struct
++	 * so we can free it later. So we place it in a hash indexed on the
++	 * thread id, which is available to us in the free function.
++	 * Note, the thread id isn't necessary unique across rekeys but
++	 * that's okay as they are unique during a key. */
++	ptr = malloc(sizeof *ptr); /*freed in stop & prejoin */
++	ptr->tid = pthread_self(); /* index for hash */
++	ptr->pointer = evp_ctx;
++	HASH_ADD_INT(evp_ptrs, tid, ptr);
++
++	/* initialize the cipher ctx with the key provided
++	 * determinbe which cipher to use based on the key size */
++	if (aes_mt_ctx->keylen == 256)
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr(), NULL, aes_mt_ctx->orig_key, NULL);
++	else if (aes_mt_ctx->keylen == 128)
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), NULL, aes_mt_ctx->orig_key, NULL);
++	else if (aes_mt_ctx->keylen == 192)
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_192_ctr(), NULL, aes_mt_ctx->orig_key, NULL);
++	else
++		fatal("Invalid key length of %d in AES CTR MT. Exiting", aes_mt_ctx->keylen);
++
++	/*
++	 * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill
++	 * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout.
++	 */
++	if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) {
++		/* get the first element of the key queue struct */
++		q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[0];
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		/* if we are in the INIT state then fill the queue */
++		if (q->qstate == KQINIT) {
++			/* set the initial counter */
++			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr);
++			/* encypher a block sized null string (mynull) with the key. This
++			 * returns the keystream because xoring the keystream
++			 * against null returns the keystream. Store that in the appropriate queue */
++			EVP_EncryptUpdate(evp_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			/* Update the aes counter */
++			ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			/* since this is the first thread set it to draining */
++			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		}
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over
++	 * queues already filled by other threads and stopping to wait for
++	 * a draining queue to become empty.
++	 *
++	 * Multiple threads may be waiting on a draining queue and awoken
++	 * when empty. The first thread to wake will mark it as filling,
++	 * others will move on to fill, skip, or wait on the next queue.
++	 * We init qidx here because if we do it at the top of the function
++	 * we get a warning about it possibly being clobbered. The exact reason
++	 * doesn't make a lot of sense but it has to happen after the
++	 * first pthread_rwlock_rdlock(). Might have something to do with
++	 * incorrect compiler optimizations.
++	 */
++	int qidx;
++	for (qidx = 1;; qidx = (qidx + 1) % numkq) {
++		/* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */
++		pthread_testcancel();
++
++		/* Check if we should exit as well */
++		thread_loop_check_exit(aes_mt_ctx);
++
++		/* Lock queue and block if its draining */
++		q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[qidx];
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock);
++		while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) {
++			thread_loop_check_exit(aes_mt_ctx);
++			pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
++		}
++		pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
++
++		/* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */
++		if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) {
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Empty, let's fill it.
++		 * Queue lock is relinquished while we do this so others
++		 * can see that it's being filled.
++		 */
++		q->qstate = KQFILLING;
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++
++		/* set the initial counter */
++		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, q->ctr);
++
++		/* see coresponding block above for useful comments */
++		EVP_EncryptUpdate(evp_ctx, q->keys[0], &outlen, mynull, KQLEN * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++
++		/* Re-lock, mark full and signal consumer */
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++		ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * numkq, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		q->qstate = KQFULL;
++		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++	}
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++
++/* Our version of the EVP functions
++ * these are public as they are used by the provider */
++
++/* instantiate the cipher context.
++ * in this we create the EVP ctx and the AES ctx, setup the AES ctx
++ * initialize the EVP and then attach the AES ctx to the EVP ctx.
++ * The *only* difference between aes_mt_newctx_256|192|128 is the
++ * keylength of the cipher used in EVP_CipherInit
++ * parameters: provider context
++ * returns: EVP context
++ */
++/* honestly the way this works makes me think that there has to be
++ * a better way of doing this however, I've yet to find one that doesn't
++ * involve more madness. I think that's mostly becase I don't understand
++ * how params work properly. I feel like I shoudl be able to use them
++ * to specify the key length but... also, I'd think I'd be able to
++ * set aes_mt_ctx_st->keylen to the keylength but that doesn't seem to
++ * work either. That said, this does work even if it's a bit clunky.
++ * -cjr 09/08/2022 */
++void *aes_mt_newctx_256(void *provctx)
++{
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx));
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++
++	if ((aes_mt_ctx != NULL) && (evp_ctx != NULL)) {
++		get_thread_count(); /* update cipher_threads and numkq */
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock, NULL);
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock, NULL);
++		aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE;
++
++		/* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */
++		for (int i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
++			pthread_mutex_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].lock, NULL);
++			pthread_cond_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].cond, NULL);
++		}
++		aes_mt_ctx->provctx = provctx;
++		EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr(), NULL, NULL, 0);
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, aes_mt_ctx);
++		return evp_ctx;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++void *aes_mt_newctx_192(void *provctx)
++{
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx));
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++
++	if ((aes_mt_ctx != NULL) && (evp_ctx != NULL)) {
++		get_thread_count(); /* update cipher_threads and numkq */
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock, NULL);
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock, NULL);
++		aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE;
++
++		/* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */
++		for (int i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
++			pthread_mutex_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].lock, NULL);
++			pthread_cond_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].cond, NULL);
++		}
++		aes_mt_ctx->provctx = provctx;
++		EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_192_ctr(), NULL, NULL, 0);
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, aes_mt_ctx);
++		return evp_ctx;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++void *aes_mt_newctx_128(void *provctx)
++{
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx));
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++
++	if ((aes_mt_ctx != NULL) && (evp_ctx != NULL)) {
++		get_thread_count(); /* update cipher_threads and numkq */
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock, NULL);
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		pthread_rwlock_init(&aes_mt_ctx->stop_lock, NULL);
++		aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE;
++
++		/* initialize the mutexs and conditions for each lock in our struct */
++		for (int i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
++			pthread_mutex_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].lock, NULL);
++			pthread_cond_init(&aes_mt_ctx->q[i].cond, NULL);
++		}
++		aes_mt_ctx->provctx = provctx;
++		EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_128_ctr(), NULL, NULL, 0);
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, aes_mt_ctx);
++		return evp_ctx;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/* this function expects a void but we need the actual context
++ * to get the app_data.
++ */
++void aes_mt_freectx(void *vevp_ctx)
++{
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = vevp_ctx;
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx;
++
++	if ((aes_mt_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp_ctx)) != NULL) {
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(aes_mt_ctx);
++
++		memset(aes_mt_ctx, 0, sizeof(*aes_mt_ctx));
++		free(aes_mt_ctx);
++		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(evp_ctx, NULL);
++	}
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
++}
++
++/* this function takes the EVP context, gets the AES context
++ * and starts the various threads we need */
++int aes_mt_start_threads(void *vevp_ctx, const u_char *key,
++			 size_t keylen, const u_char *iv,
++			 size_t ivlen, const OSSL_PARAM *ossl_params)
++{
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = vevp_ctx;
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx;
++
++
++	/* get the initial state of aes_mt_ctx (our cipher stream struct) */
++ 	if ((aes_mt_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp_ctx)) == NULL) {
++		fatal("Missing AES MT context data!");
++	}
++
++	/* we are initializing but the current structure already
++	 * has an IV and key so we want to kill the existing key data
++	 * and start over. This is important when we need to rekey the data stream */
++	if (aes_mt_ctx->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
++		/* tell the pregen threads to exit */
++		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(aes_mt_ctx);
++
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++		/* reset the exit flag */
++		aes_mt_ctx->exit_flag = FALSE;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++
++		/* Start over getting key & iv */
++		aes_mt_ctx->state = HAVE_NONE;
++	}
++
++	/* set the initial key for this key stream queue */
++	if (key != NULL) {
++		aes_mt_ctx->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx) * 8;
++		aes_mt_ctx->orig_key = key;
++		aes_mt_ctx->state |= HAVE_KEY;
++	}
++
++	/* set the IV */
++	if (iv != NULL) {
++		/* init the counter this is just a 16byte uchar */
++		memcpy(aes_mt_ctx->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		aes_mt_ctx->state |= HAVE_IV;
++	}
++
++	if (aes_mt_ctx->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
++		/* Clear queues */
++		/* set the first key in the key queue to the current counter */
++		memcpy(aes_mt_ctx->q[0].ctr, aes_mt_ctx->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		/* indicate that it needs to be initialized */
++		aes_mt_ctx->q[0].qstate = KQINIT;
++		/* for each of the remaining queues set the first counter to the
++		 * counter and then add the size of the queue to the counter */
++		for (int i = 1; i < numkq; i++) {
++			memcpy(aes_mt_ctx->q[i].ctr, aes_mt_ctx->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			ssh_ctr_add(aes_mt_ctx->q[i].ctr, i * KQLEN, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++			aes_mt_ctx->q[i].qstate = KQEMPTY;
++		}
++		aes_mt_ctx->qidx = 0;
++		aes_mt_ctx->ridx = 0;
++		aes_mt_ctx->struct_id = global_struct_id++;
++
++		/* Start threads. Make sure we have enough stack space (under alpine)
++		* and aren't using more than we need (linux). This can be as low as
++		* 512KB but that's a minimum. 1024KB gives us a little headroom if we
++		* need it */
++#define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
++                pthread_attr_t attr;
++                pthread_attr_init(&attr);
++                pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, STACK_SIZE);
++		for (int i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
++			pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock);
++			if (pthread_create(&aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], &attr, thread_loop, aes_mt_ctx) != 0)
++				fatal ("AES-CTR MT Could not create thread in %s", __func__);
++			else {
++				aes_mt_ctx->id[i] = i;
++				debug_f ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu (%lu, %d)",
++					 aes_mt_ctx->tid[i], aes_mt_ctx->struct_id,
++					 aes_mt_ctx->id[i]);
++			}
++			pthread_rwlock_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->tid_lock);
++		}
++		pthread_mutex_lock(&aes_mt_ctx->q[0].lock);
++		// wait for all of the threads to be initialized
++		while (aes_mt_ctx->q[0].qstate == KQINIT)
++			pthread_cond_wait(&aes_mt_ctx->q[0].cond, &aes_mt_ctx->q[0].lock);
++		pthread_mutex_unlock(&aes_mt_ctx->q[0].lock);
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/* this should correspond to ssh_aes_ctr
++ * OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, cipher_cipher,
++ *                     (void *cctx,
++ *                     unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize,
++ *                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inl))
++ */
++
++int aes_mt_do_cipher(void *vevp_ctx,
++			    u_char *dest, size_t *destlen, size_t destsize,
++			    const u_char *src, size_t len)
++{
++	typedef union {
++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
++		__uint128_t *u128;
++#endif
++		uint64_t *u64;
++		uint32_t *u32;
++		uint8_t *u8;
++		const uint8_t *cu8;
++		uintptr_t u;
++	} ptrs_t;
++	ptrs_t destp, srcp, bufp;
++	uintptr_t align;
++	struct aes_mt_ctx_st *aes_mt_ctx;
++	struct kq *q, *oldq;
++	int ridx;
++	u_char *buf;
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = vevp_ctx;
++
++	if (len == 0)
++		return 1;
++
++	if ((aes_mt_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp_ctx)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[aes_mt_ctx->qidx];
++	ridx = aes_mt_ctx->ridx;
++
++	/* src already padded to block multiple */
++	srcp.cu8 = src;
++	destp.u8 = dest;
++	do { /* do until len is 0 */
++		buf = q->keys[ridx];
++		bufp.u8 = buf;
++
++		/* figure out the alignment on the fly */
++#ifdef CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
++		align = 0;
++#else
++		align = destp.u | srcp.u | bufp.u;
++#endif
++
++		/* xor the src against the key (buf)
++		 * different systems can do all 16 bytes at once or
++		 * may need to do it in 8 or 4 bytes chunks
++		 * worst case is doing it as a loop */
++#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
++		/* with GCC 13 we have having consistent seg faults
++		 * in this section of code. Since this is a critical
++		 * code path we are removing this until we have a solution
++		 * in place -cjr 02/22/24
++		 * TODO: FIX THIS
++		 */
++		/* if ((align & 0xf) == 0) { */
++		/* 	destp.u128[0] = srcp.u128[0] ^ bufp.u128[0]; */
++		/* } else */
++#endif
++		/* 64 bits */
++		if ((align & 0x7) == 0) {
++			destp.u64[0] = srcp.u64[0] ^ bufp.u64[0];
++			destp.u64[1] = srcp.u64[1] ^ bufp.u64[1];
++		/* 32 bits */
++		} else if ((align & 0x3) == 0) {
++			destp.u32[0] = srcp.u32[0] ^ bufp.u32[0];
++			destp.u32[1] = srcp.u32[1] ^ bufp.u32[1];
++			destp.u32[2] = srcp.u32[2] ^ bufp.u32[2];
++			destp.u32[3] = srcp.u32[3] ^ bufp.u32[3];
++		} else {
++			/*1 byte at a time*/
++			size_t i;
++			for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
++				dest[i] = src[i] ^ buf[i];
++		}
++
++		/* inc/decrement the pointers by the block size (16)*/
++		destp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++		srcp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++		/* Increment read index, switch queues on rollover */
++		if ((ridx = (ridx + 1) % KQLEN) == 0) {
++			oldq = q;
++
++			/* Mark next queue draining, may need to wait */
++			aes_mt_ctx->qidx = (aes_mt_ctx->qidx + 1) % numkq;
++			q = &aes_mt_ctx->q[aes_mt_ctx->qidx];
++			pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
++			while (q->qstate != KQFULL) {
++				pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
++			}
++			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
++
++			/* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */
++			pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock);
++			oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY;
++			pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond);
++			pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock);
++		}
++	} while (len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	aes_mt_ctx->ridx = ridx;
++	return 1;
++}
++
++#endif /*WITH_OPENSSL3*/
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.310937760 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
++/*
++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher Provider for OpenSSL 3
++ *
++ * Author: Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>
++ * Author: Mike Tasota <tasota@gmail.com>
++ * Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ * Copyright (c) 2008-2022 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged,
++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++#ifndef CTR_MT_FUNCS
++#define CTR_MT_FUNCS
++
++/* includes */
++#include "includes.h" /* needed to get version number */
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <pthread.h>
++#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
++#include "uthash.h"
++
++#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
++#include <openssl/aes.h>
++#endif
++
++/* only for systems with OSSL 3 */
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++
++/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/
++/* maximum number of threads and queues */
++#define MAX_THREADS      32
++#define MAX_NUMKQ        (MAX_THREADS + 1)
++
++/* one queue holds 8192 * 4 * 16B (512KB)  of key data 
++ * being that the queues are destroyed after a rekey
++ * and at leats one has to be fully filled prior to
++ * enciphering data we don't want this to be too large */
++#define KQLEN (8192 * 4)
++
++/* Processor cacheline length */
++#define CACHELINE_LEN	64
++
++/* Can the system do unaligned loads natively? */
++#if defined(__aarch64__) || \
++    defined(__i386__)    || \
++    defined(__powerpc__) || \
++    defined(__x86_64__)
++# define CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
++#endif
++#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__)
++# define CIPHER_INT128_OK
++#endif
++
++/* context states */
++#define HAVE_NONE       0
++#define HAVE_KEY        1
++#define HAVE_IV         2
++
++/* Keystream Queue state */
++enum {
++	KQINIT,
++	KQEMPTY,
++	KQFILLING,
++	KQFULL,
++	KQDRAINING
++};
++
++/* structs */
++
++/* provider struct */
++struct provider_ctx_st {
++	const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core_handle;
++	struct proverr_functions_st *proverr_handle;
++};
++
++/* Keystream Queue struct */
++struct kq {
++	u_char		keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* [32768][16B] */
++	u_char		ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */
++	u_char          pad0[CACHELINE_LEN];
++	pthread_mutex_t	lock;
++	pthread_cond_t	cond;
++	int             qstate;
++	u_char          pad1[CACHELINE_LEN];
++};
++
++/* AES MT context struct */
++struct aes_mt_ctx_st {
++	struct provider_ctx_st *provctx;
++	long unsigned int       struct_id;
++	int                     keylen;
++	int		        state;
++	int		        qidx;
++	int		        ridx;
++	int                     id[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */
++	AES_KEY                 aes_key;
++	const u_char           *orig_key;
++	u_char		        aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* 16B */
++	pthread_t	        tid[MAX_THREADS]; /* 32 */
++	pthread_rwlock_t        tid_lock;
++	struct kq	        q[MAX_NUMKQ]; /* 33 */
++#ifdef __APPLE__
++	pthread_rwlock_t        stop_lock;
++	int		        exit_flag;
++#endif /* __APPLE__ */
++	int                     ongoing; /* possibly not needed */
++};
++
++/* this holds an array of evp context pointers that are
++ * created in thread_loop. Since we can't effectively free those
++ * contexts in thread_loop we keep a copy of those pointers here
++ * and then free them in stop_and_join_pregenthreads
++ * cjr 2/2/2023
++ */
++struct aes_mt_ctx_ptrs {
++	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *pointer;
++        pthread_t       tid;
++	UT_hash_handle  hh;
++};
++
++int aes_mt_do_cipher(void *, u_char *, size_t *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t);
++int aes_mt_start_threads(void *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const OSSL_PARAM *);
++void aes_mt_freectx(void *);
++void *aes_mt_newctx_256(void *);
++void *aes_mt_newctx_192(void *);
++void *aes_mt_newctx_128(void *);
++
++#endif /* WITH OPENSSL */
++#endif /* CTR_MT_FUNCS */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-ctr-mt-provider.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.311329711 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
++/*
++ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher Provider for OpenSSL 3
++ *
++ * Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ * Copyright (c) 2022 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/* based on vienere.c from https://github.com/provider-corner/vigenere by
++ * Richard Levitte provided under a CC0 Public License. */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++/* only for systems with OSSL 3.0+ */
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <openssl/core.h>
++#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "ossl3-provider-err.h"
++#include "num.h"
++#include "cipher-ctr-mt-functions.h"
++
++#define ERR_HANDLE(ctx) ((ctx)->provctx->proverr_handle)
++
++/* forward declartion of cipher functions */
++/* cipher context functions */
++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_newctx_fn aes_mt_newctx_256;
++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_newctx_fn aes_mt_newctx_192;
++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_newctx_fn aes_mt_newctx_128;
++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_freectx_fn aes_mt_freectx;
++
++/* param related function*/
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_params_fn aes_mt_get_params_256;
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_params_fn aes_mt_get_params_192;
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_params_fn aes_mt_get_params_128;
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_gettable_params_fn aes_mt_gettable_params;
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_set_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_set_ctx_params;
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_get_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_get_ctx_params;
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_settable_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_settable_ctx_params;
++static OSSL_FUNC_cipher_gettable_ctx_params_fn aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params;
++
++/* en/decipher functions */
++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_encrypt_init_fn aes_mt_start_threads;
++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_decrypt_init_fn aes_mt_start_threads;
++OSSL_FUNC_cipher_update_fn aes_mt_do_cipher;
++
++/* provider context */
++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_query_operation_fn aes_mt_prov_query;
++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_get_reason_strings_fn aes_mt_prov_reasons;
++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_teardown_fn aes_mt_prov_teardown;
++static OSSL_FUNC_provider_get_params_fn aes_mt_prov_get_params; 
++OSSL_provider_init_fn OSSL_provider_init; /* need this? */
++
++/* error functions */
++OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error_fn *c_new_error;
++OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug_fn *c_set_error_debug;
++OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *c_vset_error;
++OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_mark_fn *c_set_error_mark;
++OSSL_FUNC_core_clear_last_error_mark_fn *c_clear_last_error_mark;
++OSSL_FUNC_core_pop_error_to_mark_fn *c_pop_error_to_mark;
++
++/* Errors used in this provider */
++#define AES_MT_E_MALLOC           1
++#define AES_MT_ONGOING_OPERATION  2
++#define AES_MT_BAD_KEYLEN         3
++
++/* typedef for function pointers */
++typedef void(*fptr_t)(void);
++
++/* all of the various arrays we need */
++
++/* BAD_KEYLEN isn't being used at the moment */
++const OSSL_ITEM reasons[] = {
++	{ AES_MT_E_MALLOC, "Memory allocation failure" },
++	{ AES_MT_ONGOING_OPERATION, "Operation underway" },
++	{ AES_MT_BAD_KEYLEN, "Only 256, 192, and 128 Key lengths are supported" },
++	{ 0, NULL } /* Termination */
++};
++
++/* function mapping for 256|192|128 key lengths */
++const OSSL_DISPATCH aes_mt_funcs_256[] = {
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_newctx_256 } ,
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_freectx },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (fptr_t)aes_mt_do_cipher },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_params_256 },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
++	  (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_set_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
++	  (fptr_t)aes_mt_settable_ctx_params },
++	{ 0, NULL }
++};
++
++const OSSL_DISPATCH aes_mt_funcs_192[] = {
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_newctx_192 } ,
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_freectx },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (fptr_t)aes_mt_do_cipher },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_params_192 },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
++	  (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_set_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
++	  (fptr_t)aes_mt_settable_ctx_params },
++	{ 0, NULL }
++};
++
++const OSSL_DISPATCH aes_mt_funcs_128[] = {
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_newctx_128 } ,
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (fptr_t)aes_mt_freectx },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (fptr_t)aes_mt_start_threads },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (fptr_t)aes_mt_do_cipher },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_params_128 },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_get_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
++	  (fptr_t)aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_set_ctx_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
++	  (fptr_t)aes_mt_settable_ctx_params },
++	{ 0, NULL }
++};
++
++/* the ciphers found in this provider */
++const OSSL_ALGORITHM aes_mt_ciphers[] = {
++	{ "aes_ctr_mt_256", "provider=hpnssh", aes_mt_funcs_256, NULL },
++	{ "aes_ctr_mt_192", "provider=hpnssh", aes_mt_funcs_192, NULL },
++	{ "aes_ctr_mt_128", "provider=hpnssh", aes_mt_funcs_128, NULL },
++	{ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
++};
++
++/* function mapping for provider methods */
++const OSSL_DISPATCH provider_functions[] = {
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_TEARDOWN, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_teardown },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_QUERY_OPERATION, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_query },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_GET_PARAMS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_get_params },
++	{ OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_GET_REASON_STRINGS, (fptr_t)aes_mt_prov_reasons },
++	{ 0, NULL }
++};
++
++static const OSSL_PARAM ctx_get_param_table[] = {
++        { "keylen", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 },
++        { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0 },
++};
++
++static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_get_param_table[] = {
++        { "blocksize", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 },
++        { "keylen", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 },
++        { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0 },
++};
++
++static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_set_param_table[] = {
++	{ "keylen", OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, NULL, sizeof(size_t), 0 },
++	{ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0 },
++};
++
++
++/* provider functions start here */
++
++static void provider_ctx_free(struct provider_ctx_st *ctx)
++{
++    if (ctx != NULL)
++        proverr_free_handle(ctx->proverr_handle);
++    free(ctx);
++}
++
++static struct provider_ctx_st *provider_ctx_new(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core,
++                                                const OSSL_DISPATCH *in)
++{
++    struct provider_ctx_st *ctx;
++
++    if ((ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx))) != NULL
++        && (ctx->proverr_handle = proverr_new_handle(core, in)) != NULL) {
++        ctx->core_handle = core;
++    } else {
++        provider_ctx_free(ctx);
++        ctx = NULL;
++    }
++    return ctx;
++}
++
++
++/* returns the appropriate algo table for the requested function
++ * in this case we should only be working with OP_CIPHER */
++const OSSL_ALGORITHM *aes_mt_prov_query(void *provctx, int operation_id,
++				     int *no_store)
++{
++	switch (operation_id) {
++	case OSSL_OP_CIPHER:
++		return aes_mt_ciphers;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++const OSSL_ITEM *aes_mt_prov_reasons(void *provctx)
++{
++	return reasons;
++}
++
++static int aes_mt_prov_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM *p;
++	int ok = 1;
++
++	char *VERSION="1.0";
++	char *BUILDTYPE="aes_ctr_mt@hpnssh.org";
++	
++	for(p = params; p->key != NULL; p++)
++		if (strcasecmp(p->key, "version") == 0) {
++			*(const void **)p->data = VERSION;
++			p->return_size = strlen(VERSION);
++		} else if (strcasecmp(p->key, "buildinfo") == 0
++			   && BUILDTYPE[0] != '\0') {
++			*(const void **)p->data = BUILDTYPE;
++			p->return_size = strlen(BUILDTYPE);
++		}
++	return ok;
++}
++
++/* The function that tears down this provider */
++static void aes_mt_prov_teardown(void *vprovctx)
++{
++    provider_ctx_free(vprovctx);
++}
++
++int OSSL_provider_init(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core,
++		       const OSSL_DISPATCH *in,
++		       const OSSL_DISPATCH **out,
++		       void **vprovctx)
++{
++    if ((*vprovctx = provider_ctx_new(core, in)) == NULL)
++	    return 0;
++    *out = provider_functions;
++    return 1;
++}
++
++/* parameter functions for 256|192|128 bit key lengths */
++static int aes_mt_get_params_256(OSSL_PARAM params[])
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM *p;
++	int ok = 1;
++	
++	for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) {
++		if (strcasecmp(p->key, "blocksize") == 0)
++			if (provnum_set_size_t(p, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) {
++				ok = 0;
++				continue;
++			}
++		if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) {
++			size_t keyl = 32;
++			
++			if (provnum_set_size_t(p, keyl) < 0) {
++				ok = 0;
++				continue;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++	return ok;
++}
++
++static int aes_mt_get_params_192(OSSL_PARAM params[])
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM *p;
++	int ok = 1;
++	
++	for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) {
++		if (strcasecmp(p->key, "blocksize") == 0)
++			if (provnum_set_size_t(p, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) {
++				ok = 0;
++				continue;
++			}
++		if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) {
++			size_t keyl = 24;
++			
++			if (provnum_set_size_t(p, keyl) < 0) {
++				ok = 0;
++				continue;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++	return ok;
++}
++
++static int aes_mt_get_params_128(OSSL_PARAM params[])
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM *p;
++	int ok = 1;
++	
++	for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++) {
++		if (strcasecmp(p->key, "blocksize") == 0)
++			if (provnum_set_size_t(p, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) {
++				ok = 0;
++				continue;
++			}
++		if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) {
++			size_t keyl = 16;
++			
++			if (provnum_set_size_t(p, keyl) < 0) {
++				ok = 0;
++				continue;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++	return ok;
++}
++
++/* Parameters that libcrypto can get from this implementation */
++static const OSSL_PARAM *aes_mt_gettable_params(void *provctx)
++{
++	return cipher_get_param_table;
++}
++
++static const OSSL_PARAM *aes_mt_gettable_ctx_params(void *cctx, void *provctx)
++{
++	return ctx_get_param_table;
++}
++
++static int aes_mt_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
++{
++    struct aes_mt_ctx_st *ctx = vctx;
++    int ok = 1;
++
++    if (ctx->keylen > 0) {
++        OSSL_PARAM *p;
++
++        for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++)
++            if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0
++                && provnum_set_size_t(p, ctx->keylen) < 0) {
++                ok = 0;
++                continue;
++            }
++    }
++    return ok;
++}
++
++/* Parameters that libcrypto can send to this implementation */
++static const OSSL_PARAM *aes_mt_settable_ctx_params(void *cctx, void *provctx)
++{
++    return cipher_set_param_table;
++}
++
++static int aes_mt_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
++{
++    struct aes_mt_ctx_st *ctx = vctx;
++    const OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int ok = 1;
++
++    if (ctx->ongoing) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_HANDLE(ctx), AES_MT_ONGOING_OPERATION);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    for (p = params; p->key != NULL; p++)
++        if (strcasecmp(p->key, "keylen") == 0) {
++            size_t keyl = 0;
++
++            if (provnum_get_size_t(&keyl, p) < 0) {
++                ok = 0;
++                continue;
++            }
++            ctx->keylen = keyl;
++        }
++    return ok;
++}
++
++#endif /*WITH_OPENSSL3*/
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher.h	2025-06-14 10:53:01.717078466 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher.h	2025-06-14 13:45:10.880862884 +0200
+@@ -42,11 +42,17 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ #include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#include "cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.h"
++#endif
+ #include "cipher-aesctr.h"
+ 
+ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
+ #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
+ 
++#define CIPHER_MULTITHREAD	1
++#define CIPHER_SERIAL		0
++
+ struct sshcipher {
+ 	char	*name;
+ 	u_int	block_size;
+@@ -60,6 +66,7 @@
+ #define CFLAG_NONE		(1<<3)
+ #define CFLAG_INTERNAL		CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#define CFLAG_MT		(1<<4)
+ 	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
+ #else
+ 	void	*ignored;
+@@ -68,24 +75,27 @@
+ 
+ struct sshcipher_ctx;
+ 
+-const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
++struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
+ const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
+ char	*cipher_alg_list(char, int);
+ const char *compression_alg_list(int);
+ int	 cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *,
+-    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
++    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, u_int, int, int);
+ int	 cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
+     u_int, u_int, u_int);
+ int	 cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int,
+     const u_char *, u_int);
+ void	 cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *);
++uint64_t cipher_rekey_blocks(const struct sshcipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
++void	 cipher_reset_multithreaded(void);
++const char *cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ 
+ u_int	 cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.c openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.312566045 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2023 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University.
++ *
++ *  Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ *
++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the MIT License.
++ *
++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the MIT License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library;
++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
++ *
++ */
++
++/* This provides the function to switch from a serial to parallel
++ * cipher. This has been moved into it's own file in order to make it
++ * available to both the client and server without having to clutter
++ * up other files.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++
++
++/* if we are using a parallel cipher there can be issues in either
++ * a fork or sandbox. Essentially, if we switch too early the
++ * threads get lost and the application hangs. So what we do is
++ * test if either the send or receive context cipher name
++ * matches the known available parallel ciphers. If it does
++ * then we force a rekey which automatically loads the parallel
++ * cipher. */
++
++void
++cipher_switch(struct ssh *ssh) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* get the send and receive context and extract the cipher name */
++	const void *send_cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh);
++	const void *recv_cc = ssh_packet_get_receive_context(ssh);
++	const char *send = cipher_ctx_name(send_cc);
++	const char *recv = cipher_ctx_name(recv_cc);
++
++	debug_f("Send: %s Recv: %s", send, recv);
++	
++	/* if the name of the cipher matches then we set the context
++	 * to authenticated (it likely already is though) and then
++	 * force the rekey. Either side can do this. One downside of
++	 * this method is that both sides can request a rekey so you
++	 * can end up duplicating work. This is annoying but the
++	 * performance gains make it worthwhile. Also I
++	 * use strstr here because strcmp would require a 6 part
++	 * if statement */
++	if (strstr(send, "ctr") || strstr(recv, "ctr")) {
++		debug("Serial to parallel AES-CTR cipher swap");
++		/* cipher_reset_multithreaded(); */
++		ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
++		packet_request_rekeying();
++	}
++	/* do the same for multithreaded chacha20 but with strcmp */
++	if ((strcmp(send, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com") == 0) ||
++	    (strcmp(recv, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com") == 0)) {
++		debug("Serial to parallel Chacha20-poly1305 cipher swap");
++		ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
++		packet_request_rekeying();
++	}
++#endif
++}
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.h openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/cipher-switch.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/cipher-switch.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.312822014 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2015 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University.
++ *
++ *  Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ *
++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the MIT License.
++ *
++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the MIT License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library;
++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
++ *
++ */
++
++void cipher_switch (struct ssh *);
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/clientloop.c openssh-10.0p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/clientloop.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.223339310 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/clientloop.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.313407565 +0200
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
++#include "metrics.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+@@ -171,6 +172,10 @@
+ 
+ static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh);
+ int	session_ident = -1;
++int     metrics_hdr_remote_flag = 0;
++int     metrics_hdr_local_flag = 0;
++int     remote_no_poll_flag = 0;
++int     local_no_poll_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Track escape per proto2 channel */
+ struct escape_filter_ctx {
+@@ -197,6 +202,8 @@
+ static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
+     TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
+ 
++void client_request_metrics(struct ssh *);
++
+ static void quit_message(const char *fmt, ...)
+     __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)));
+ 
+@@ -1453,6 +1460,7 @@
+ 	double start_time, total_time;
+ 	int channel_did_enqueue = 0, r;
+ 	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
++	time_t previous_time;
+ 	int conn_in_ready, conn_out_ready;
+ 	sigset_t bsigset, osigset;
+ 
+@@ -1494,6 +1502,7 @@
+ 	client_repledge();
+ 
+ 	start_time = monotime_double();
++	previous_time = time(NULL); /* for metrics polling */
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize variables. */
+ 	last_was_cr = 1;
+@@ -1535,6 +1544,8 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	schedule_server_alive_check();
++	if (options.metrics)
++		client_request_metrics(ssh); /* initial metrics polling */
+ 
+ 	if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 ||
+ 	    sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGHUP) == -1 ||
+@@ -1545,6 +1556,12 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
+ 	while (!quit_pending) {
++		if (options.metrics) {
++			if ((time(NULL) - previous_time) >= options.metrics_interval) {
++				client_request_metrics(ssh);
++				previous_time = time(NULL);
++			}
++		}
+ 		channel_did_enqueue = 0;
+ 
+ 		/* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
+@@ -1637,6 +1654,10 @@
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	if (options.metrics)
++		client_request_metrics(ssh); /* final metrics polling */
++
+ 	free(pfd);
+ 
+ 	/* Terminate the session. */
+@@ -2648,6 +2669,167 @@
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* take the response from the server and parse out the data.
++ * the _ctx should be null. It's just here because the format
++ * of the callback handler expects it. Likewise, seq is
++ * not used. */
++static void
++client_process_request_metrics (struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) {
++	struct tcp_info local_tcp_info;
++	const u_char *blob;
++	FILE *remfptr;
++	FILE *localfptr;
++	char remfilename[1024];
++	char localfilename[1024];
++	time_t now;
++	struct tm *info;
++	char timestamp[40];
++	char *metricsstring = NULL;
++	size_t tcpi_len, len = 0;
++	binn *metricsobj = NULL;
++	int r, kernel_version = 0;
++
++	time(&now);
++	info = localtime(&now);
++	strftime(timestamp, 40, "%d-%m-%Y %H:%M:%S", info);
++
++	/* malloc the string 1KB should be large enough */
++	metricsstring = malloc(1024);
++
++	/* get the local socket information */
++	int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
++
++	/* the user can specify a name/path with options.metrics_path
++	 * but if it's not defined we'll use a default name. In either case
++	 * the name will have a suffix of local for the local data and remote for
++	 * the remote data */
++	if (options.metrics_path == NULL) {
++		snprintf(remfilename, 1024, "%s", "./ssh_stack_metrics.remote");
++		snprintf(localfilename, 1024, "%s", "./ssh_stack_metrics.local");
++	} else {
++		snprintf(remfilename, 1024, "%s.%s", options.metrics_path, "remote");
++		snprintf(localfilename, 1024, "%s.%s", options.metrics_path, "local");
++	}
++
++	/* should be type 81 and if it's not then its likley that
++	* the remote does not support polling. We can still get local data though
++	*/
++	if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
++		if (remote_no_poll_flag == 0) {
++			error("Remote does not support stack metric polling. Local data only.");
++			remote_no_poll_flag = 1;
++		}
++		goto localonly;
++	}
++
++	/* open the file handle to write the remote data*/
++	remfptr = fopen(remfilename, "a");
++	if (remfptr == NULL)
++		fatal("Error opening %s: %s", remfilename, strerror(errno));
++
++	/* read the entire packet string into blob
++	 * blob has to be a const uchar as that's what string_direct expects
++	 * we cast it as a void for the binn functions */
++	sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len);
++	if (len == 0) {
++		/* received no data. which is weird */
++		error("Received no remote metrics data. Continuing.");
++	}
++
++	/* get the kernel version printing the header */
++	kernel_version = binn_object_int32((void *)blob, "kernel_version");
++
++	/* create a string of the data from the binn object blob */
++	metrics_read_binn_object((void *)blob, metricsstring);
++
++	/* have we printed the header? */
++	if (metrics_hdr_remote_flag == 0) {
++		metrics_print_header(remfptr, "REMOTE CONNECTION", kernel_version);
++		metrics_hdr_remote_flag = 1;
++	}
++	fprintf(remfptr, "%s, ", timestamp);
++	fprintf(remfptr, "%s\n", metricsstring);
++
++	/* close remote file pointer*/
++	fclose(remfptr);
++
++	/* got the remote data, now get the local */
++localonly:
++/* TCP_INFO is defined in metrics.h*/
++#if !defined TCP_INFO
++	if (local_no_poll_flag == 0) {
++		error("Local host does not support metric polling. Remote data only.");
++		local_no_poll_flag = 1;
++	}
++#else
++	/* open file handle for local data */
++	localfptr = fopen(localfilename, "a");
++	if(localfptr == NULL)
++		fatal("Error opening %s: %s", localfilename, strerror(errno));
++
++	/* create the binn object*/
++	metricsobj = binn_object();
++	if (metricsobj == NULL) {
++		fatal("Could not create metrics object");
++	}
++
++	tcpi_len = (size_t)sizeof(local_tcp_info);
++	if ((r = getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_INFO, (void *)&local_tcp_info,
++			    (socklen_t *)&tcpi_len)) != 0){
++		error("Could not read tcp_info from socket");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* we write and read to a binn object because it lets us
++	 * format the data consistently */
++	metrics_write_binn_object(&local_tcp_info, metricsobj);
++
++	/* create a string of the data from the binn object metricsobj */
++	metrics_read_binn_object((void *)metricsobj, metricsstring);
++
++	/* get the kernel version printing the header */
++	kernel_version = binn_object_int32(metricsobj, "kernel_version");
++
++	if (metrics_hdr_local_flag == 0) {
++		metrics_print_header(localfptr, "LOCAL CONNECTION", kernel_version);
++		metrics_hdr_local_flag = 1;
++	}
++
++	fprintf(localfptr, "%s, ", timestamp);
++	fprintf(localfptr, "%s\n", metricsstring);
++	fclose (localfptr);
++#endif /* TCP_INFO */
++out:
++	free(metricsstring);
++}
++
++/* Use the SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST protocol to
++ * ask the server to send metrics back to the client.
++ * we use the non-canonical string stack-metrics@hpnssh.org
++ * to indicate the type of request we want. If the receiver doesn't
++ * understand it then the response indiactes a failure.
++ * I can probably do this by using clint_input_global_request but
++ * I need to understand that better.
++ */
++void client_request_metrics(struct ssh *ssh) {
++	int r;
++
++	debug_f("Asking server for TCP stack metrics");
++	/* create a pakcet of GLOBAL_REQUEST type */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
++	    /* define the type of GLOBAL_REQUEST message */
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
++	    "stack-metrics@hpnssh.org")) != 0 ||
++	    /* indicate if we want a response. 1 for yes 0 for no */
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "prepare stack request failure");
++	/* send the packet */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal_fr(r, "send stack request");
++	/* i believe this indicates what we are to use for a callback */
++	client_register_global_confirm(client_process_request_metrics, NULL);
++}
++
+ static int
+ client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+@@ -2773,6 +2955,43 @@
+ 
+ 	len = sshbuf_len(cmd);
+ 	if (len > 0) {
++		/* we may be connecting to a server that has hpn prefixed
++		 * binaries installed. In that case we need to rewrite any
++		 * scp commands to look for hpnscp instead.
++		 */
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_HPNSSH_PREFIX) {
++			char *new_cmd;
++			new_cmd = malloc(len+4);
++			/* read the existing command into a temp buffer */
++			sprintf(new_cmd, "%s", (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
++			const char *pos;
++			/* see if the command starts with scp */
++			pos = strstr(new_cmd, "scp");
++			/* by substracting the pointer new_cmd from the pointer
++			 * pos we end up with the position of the needle in the
++			 * haystack. If it's 0 then we can mess with it
++			 */
++			if (pos - new_cmd == 0) {
++				debug_f("Rewriting scp command for hpnscp.");
++				sprintf(new_cmd, "hpn%s", (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
++				debug_f("Command was: %s and is now %s",
++				      (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd), new_cmd);
++				/* free the existing sshbuf 'cmd'
++				 * recreate it and then write our new_cmd into
++				 * the sshbuf struct
++				 */
++				sshbuf_free(cmd);
++				if ((cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++					fatal("sshbuf_new failed in scp rewrite");
++				sshbuf_putf(cmd, "%s", new_cmd);
++				/* we use len later on so don't forget to
++				 * increment it by the number of new chars in the
++				 * command
++				 */
++				len += 3;
++				free(new_cmd);
++			}
++		}
+ 		if (len > 900)
+ 			len = 900;
+ 		if (want_subsystem) {
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.c openssh-10.0p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.849953032 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/compat.c	2025-06-14 12:24:07.747714342 +0200
+@@ -135,6 +135,35 @@
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
+ 	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
+ 		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++			/* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */
++			/* TODO: See if we can work this into the new method for bug checks */
++			if (strstr(version, "OpenSSH") != NULL) {
++				if (strstr(version, "hpn")) {
++					ssh->compat |= SSH_HPNSSH;
++					debug("Remote is HPN enabled");
++					/* this checks to see if the remote
++					 * version string indicates that we
++					 * have access to hpn prefixed binaries
++					 * You'll need to change this to include
++					 * new major version numbers. Which is
++					 * why we should figure out how to make
++					 * the match pattern list work
++					 */
++					if ((strstr(version, "hpn16") != NULL) ||
++					    (strstr(version, "hpn17") != NULL) ||
++					    (strstr(version, "hpn18") != NULL)) {
++						ssh->compat |= SSH_HPNSSH_PREFIX;
++						debug("Remote uses HPNSSH prefixes.");
++					}
++				}
++				/* if it's openssh and not hpn */
++				else if ((strstr(version, "OpenSSH_8.9") != NULL) ||
++				    (strstr(version, "OpenSSH_9") != NULL)) {
++					ssh->compat |= SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW;
++					debug("Restricting advertised window size.");
++				}
++			}
++			debug("ssh->compat is %u", ssh->compat);
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.h openssh-10.0p1/compat.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/compat.h	2025-06-14 10:53:01.850139160 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/compat.h	2025-06-14 12:25:55.470697341 +0200
+@@ -46,17 +46,18 @@
+ /* #define unused		0x00010000 */
+ /* #define unused		0x00020000 */
+ /* #define unused		0x00040000 */
+-/* #define unused		0x00100000 */
++#define SSH_HPNSSH		0x00100000 /* basically a notice that this is HPN aware */
+ #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF		0x00200000
+ #define SSH_BUG_PROBE		0x00400000
+-/* #define unused		0x00800000 */
++#define SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW	0x00800000 /* restrict advertised window to OpenSSH clients */
+ #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR	0x01000000
+-/* #define unused		0x02000000 */
++#define SSH_HPNSSH_PREFIX	0x02000000 /* indicates that we have hpn prefixes binaries */
+ #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH		0x04000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT	0x08000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS	0x20000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE	0x40000000
++/* #define unused		0x80000000 */
+ 
+ struct ssh;
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/configure.ac	2025-06-14 10:53:02.015907743 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/configure.ac	2025-06-14 10:54:01.316233073 +0200
+@@ -2621,6 +2621,39 @@
+ 	)
+ fi
+ 
++
++# Testing MPTCP Support
++# Does the OS support MPTCP?
++# We don't use this at the moment
++# but I am holding it in resrve -cjr 04/04/2025
++	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether the OS supports MPTCP])
++	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
++		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
++		#include <stdio.h>
++		#include <stdlib.h>
++		#include <unistd.h>
++		#include <sys/types.h>
++		#include <sys/socket.h>
++		#include <stdbool.h>
++		#include <netinet/in.h>
++
++		]], [[
++		int sock = -1;
++		sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_MPTCP);
++		if (sock < 0) {
++		   exit(1);
++		   }
++		]])],
++		[
++			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MPTCP], [1],
++			    [OS Supports MPTCP])
++		],
++		[
++			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++		]
++	)
++
+ if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+     test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
+@@ -3029,8 +3062,8 @@
+ 			200*)   # LibreSSL
+ 				lver=`echo "$sslver" | sed 's/.*libressl-//'`
+ 				case "$lver" in
+-				2*|300*) # 2.x, 3.0.0
+-					AC_MSG_ERROR([LibreSSL >= 3.1.0 required (have "$ssl_showver")])
++				2*|300*|301*|302*|303*|304*|306*) # 2.x, 3.0.0
++					AC_MSG_ERROR([LibreSSL >= 3.7.0 required (have "$ssl_showver")])
+ 					;;
+ 				*) ;;	# Assume all other versions are good.
+ 				esac
+@@ -3039,6 +3072,7 @@
+ 				# OpenSSL 3; we use the 1.1x API
+ 				# https://openssl.org/policies/general/versioning-policy.html
+ 				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L"
++				AC_DEFINE([WITH_OPENSSL3], [1], [With OpenSSL3])
+ 				;;
+ 		        *)
+ 				AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_showver")])
+@@ -3158,6 +3192,29 @@
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \
+ 	])
+ 
++	# OpenSSL 3.0 API
++	# Does OpenSSL support the EVP_MAC functions for Poly1305?
++	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL supports Poly1305 MAC EVP])
++	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
++		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
++	#include <stdlib.h>
++	#include <stdio.h>
++	#include <openssl/evp.h>
++		]], [[
++		EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "poly1305", NULL);
++		if (mac == NULL)
++		   exit(1);
++		]])],
++		[
++			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++			AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP], [1],
++			    [Libcrypto supports Poly1305 MAC EVP])
++		],
++		[
++			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++		]
++	)
++
+ 	if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support])
+ 		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/defines.h openssh-10.0p1/defines.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/defines.h	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/defines.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.317208898 +0200
+@@ -931,7 +931,11 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+-# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
++# define SSH_IOBUFSZ (32*1024)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef IPPROTO_MPTCP
++#define IPPROTO_MPTCP 262
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -987,3 +991,12 @@
+ # define USE_MLKEM768X25519	1
+ #endif
+ #endif /* _DEFINES_H */
++
++/* used to enable checking linux kernel versions */
++#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(__alpine__)
++#include <linux/version.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef KERNEL_VERSION /* shouldn't be necessary to define this */
++#define KERNEL_VERSION(a,b,c) (((a) <<16) + ((b) << 8) +(c))
++#endif
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest.h openssh-10.0p1/digest.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest.h	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/digest.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.317584436 +0200
+@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
+ #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256	2
+ #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384	3
+ #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512	4
+-#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		5
++#define SSH_DIGEST_NULL		5
++#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		6
+ 
+ struct sshbuf;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest-openssl.c openssh-10.0p1/digest-openssl.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/digest-openssl.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/digest-openssl.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.317859402 +0200
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,	"SHA256",	32,	EVP_sha256 },
+ 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,	"SHA384",	48,	EVP_sha384 },
+ 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,	"SHA512",	64,	EVP_sha512 },
++	{ SSH_DIGEST_NULL,	"NONEMAC",	0,	EVP_md_null},
+ 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
+ };
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/FUNDING.yml openssh-10.0p1/FUNDING.yml
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/FUNDING.yml	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/FUNDING.yml	2025-06-14 10:54:01.318133600 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++# These are supported funding model platforms
++
++github:rapier1 # Replace with up to 4 GitHub Sponsors-enabled usernames e.g., [user1, user2]
++#patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username
++#open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username
++#ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username
++#tidelift: # Replace with a single Tidelift platform-name/package-name e.g., npm/babel
++#community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
++#liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username
++#issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username
++#otechie: # Replace with a single Otechie username
++#custom: # Replace with up to 4 custom sponsorship URLs e.g., ['link1', 'link2']
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPN-README openssh-10.0p1/HPN-README
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPN-README	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/HPN-README	2025-06-14 10:54:01.318366032 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
++Notes:
++
++MPTCP Support in 18.7.0:
++Multipath TCP is now available as a runtime option for HPN-SSH. MPTCP
++is available only on Linux and Mac OSX operating systems. Using MPTCP on a system that
++doesn't support it will result in a notice and failure. The use cases for MPTCP include
++seamless handovers when changing networks and aggregating multiple interfaces to improve
++available bandwidth. As of 18.7.0 this options should be considered somewhat experimental.
++
++Usage:
++-oUseMPTCP=[Yes|No] will enable MPTCP. The default is no.
++
++LibreSSL Support:
++Changes in LibreSSL version 3.5 and 3.6 prevent the use of the threaded AES CTR cipher.
++In those cases HPNSSH will fallback to the serial version of the AES CTR cipher. A warning
++is printed to stderr.
++
++Automatic Port Fallback (in version 17v3)
++The hpnssh client now uses TCP port 2222 to connect automatically as this is the
++default hpnsshd port. However, we understand that many users will be end up connecting
++standard SSH servers on port 22. To make the easier for users the client will fall back to
++port 22 in the event that there is no hpnssh server running on port 2222. The behaviour can
++be modifed as follows:
++-oFallback=[yes|no] will enable or disable port fallback. Default is yes.
++-oFallbackPort=[N] where N is the port number that should be used for fall back.
++    Default is 22.
++
++TCP_INFO Metrics
++This features allows the client to request tcp networking information from the
++TCP_INFO struct. This includes data on retransmits, round trip time, lost packets,
++data transferred, and the like. The metrics are polled periodically through the
++life of the connection. By default this is every 5 seconds but users can pick different
++polling periods. The resulting data is stored in two distinct files; one for local
++metrics and one for remote metrics. Remote metrics are only available if the remote
++supports this feature. This feature will *not* diagnose a poorly performing connection
++but may provide insight into what is happening during the connection.
++
++Usage:
++-oMetrics=[yes|no] will enable metrics polling. Default: No.
++-oMetricsInterval=[N] where N is the polling period in seconds. Default: 5 seconds.
++-oMetricsPath=[/filepath/filename] is the name of the file where the remote and
++    local data will be stored. Default: ./ssh_stack_metrics.[local|remote].
++    Any other option chosen by the user will have a .local or .remote suffix appended to it.
++
++The number of instruments polled by this features is dependent on the kernel of the host.
++This means that a remote host with an older kernel may report fewer instruments than a client
++host running a current kernel or vice versa. If there is a discrepency in the number of instruments
++in the ssh_stack_metrics.local and .remote file this is the most likely reason.
++
++Additionally, determining which file represents sender side versus receiver side is dependent
++on the nature of the connection. Therfore, it's up to the user to make that determination.
++
++Linux Note: Currently this is only supported on Linux kernel versions 3.7 and greater. Newer kernels
++may have more instruments available to poll than older kernels.
++
++FreeBSD Note: This is supported on Release 6 and higher. However, FreeBSD has fewer available
++instruments than new Linux kernels.
++
++Multiplexing Note: The metrics are reported from the TCP socket which means that gathering
++metrics from multiplexed sessions will report on the activity of all sessions on that socket.
++This will likely result in less clear results and, as such, we suggest only gathering metrics
++from non-multiplexed session.
++
++HPNSCP with Resume functionality
++This feature allows hpnscp to resume failed transfers. In the event of a failed transfer
++issues the same scp command with the '-R' option. For example - if you issued:
++'hpnscp myhugefile me@host:~'
++and it dies halfway through the transfer issuing
++'hpnscp -Z myhugefile me@host:~'
++will resume the transfer at the point where it left off.
++
++This is implemented by having the source host send a hash (blake2b512) of the file to the
++target host. The target host then computes it's own hash of the target file. If the hashes match
++then the file is skipped as this indicates a successful transfer. However, if the hashes do not
++match then the target sends the source its hash along with the size of the file. The source then
++computes the hash of the file *up to* the size of the target file. If those hashes match then
++the source only send the necessary bytes to complete the transfer. If the hashes do not match then
++the entire file is resent. If the target file is larger then the source file then the entire
++source file is sent and any existing target file is overwritten.
++
++
++MULTI-THREADED AES CIPHER:
++The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations
++on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption.
++Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up
++to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to
++achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this
++more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single
++thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal
++performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection.
++The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same
++nomenclature.
++Usage examples:
++		ssh -caes128-ctr you@host.com
++		scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you@host.com:~/file
++
++MULTI-THREADED ChaCha20-Poly1305 CIPHER:
++The default cipher used by HPN-SSH is now a threaded implementation of the
++ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher. In tests this cipher results in an approximately 90% gain in
++throughput performance in comparison to the serial implementation found in OpenSSH.
++This cipher is fully compatible with all known existing implementations of ChaCha20-Poly1305.
++
++Internally this cipher is referred to as chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org (CC20-MT)
++similar to how the OpenSSH implementation is known as chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
++(CC20-S (for serial)). No changes are required on the part of the user to make use of CC20-MT.
++However, if the users doesn't want to make use of this cipher they can explicitly load CC20-S using
++'-cchach20-poly1305@openssh.com` on the command line.
++
++NONE CIPHER:
++To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and
++you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE
++feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not
++spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will
++be disabled.
++
++The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning
++on the reciever side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need
++at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The
++HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail.
++
++http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh
++
++NONE MAC:
++Starting with HPN 15v1 users will have the option to disable HMAC (message
++authentication ciphers) when using the NONE cipher. You must enable the following:
++NoneEnabled, NoneSwitch, and NoneMacEnabled. If all three are not enabled the None MAC
++will be automatically disabled. In tests the use of the None MAC improved throuput by
++more than 30%.
++
++ex: scp -oNoneSwitch=yes -oNoneEnabled=yes -oNoneMacEnabled=yes file host:~
++
++HPN Specific Configuration options
++
++TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server
++      Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life
++of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled
++for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista)
++default is yes.
++
++NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
++      Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
++even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default.
++
++NoneMacEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
++      Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh
++will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use
++with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and
++protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication
++remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is no.
++
++NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client
++     Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after
++authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client
++and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE
++cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an
++error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly
++have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in
++interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default.
++
++HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server
++     In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no.
++
++Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier@psc.edu)
++         The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed
++         by Michael Stevens (mstevens@andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was
++         implemented by Ben Bennet (ben@psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota
++         (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013.
++	 Allan Jude provided the code for the NoneMac and buffer normalization.
++         This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National
++         Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation.
++
++Sponsors: Thanks to Niklas Hambuchen for being the first sponsor of HPN-SSH
++	  via github's sponsor program!
++
++
++Edited: October 11, 2023
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPNSSHInstallation.txt openssh-10.0p1/HPNSSHInstallation.txt
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/HPNSSHInstallation.txt	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/HPNSSHInstallation.txt	2025-06-14 10:54:01.318659925 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
++HPN-SSH Installation
++
++The process of installing HPN-SSH from source is a relatively painless process
++but does have some nuances. This document will go through the process step by
++step to help you get the most from your installation. If you find any errors
++please contact us at hpnssh@psc.edu.
++
++
++Step 1: Get the source code.
++
++The official repository for HPN-SSH is found at
++https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh. Get a copy with
++"git clone https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh”.
++
++
++Step 2: Install dependencies.
++
++What you need to install is dependent on your distribution but will include:
++* OpenSSL development package
++   * Debian: libssl-dev
++   * Fedora: openssl-devel
++* Alternatively you can use LIbreSSL
++   * However, in this case we suggest compiling and installing libressl manually as
++     there are few maintained linux packages for LibreSSL.
++   * Also, LibreSSL v3.5 and v3.6 do not support the threaded AES-CTR cipher.
++     If that’s important to you then you should use OpenSSL.
++* Z compression library
++   * Debian: zlib1g-dev
++   * Fedora: zlib-devel
++* Autoconf
++* Automake
++
++
++Step 3: Install optional dependencies.
++
++This optional libraries will extend the functionality of HPN-SSH to allow the use of PAM
++authentication, Kerberos, graphical password tools, etc.
++* PAM
++* Kerberos
++* GTK
++
++
++Step 4: Build the configure file
++
++generate ./configure with “autoreconf -f -i”
++
++
++Step 5: Configuration
++
++Configure the installation. You can get detailed information on how to do this by
++issuing “./configure --help”. However, commonly you will want to change the default installation
++location of the binaries. This can be done with “--prefix=/[desired_path]”. For example,
++if you want the binaries installed into /usr/bin as opposed to the default of
++/usr/local/bin you’d use “./configure --prefix=/usr”. Other common options would be to
++incorporate pam, kerberos, alternative SSL libraries, and so forth. However, for most users
++either no additional configuration options or modifying the prefix will suffice.
++
++
++Step 6: Make
++
++Make the application with “make -j[num cores]”. So if you have an 8 core system
++you’d use “make -j8”
++
++
++Step 7: Set up the hpnsshd user. 
++
++This user is part of the privilege separation routines used in the 
++pre-authentication sandbox. I suggest using the following command: 
++
++sudo useradd --system --shell /usr/sbin/nologin --comment="Privilege separated HPNSSH User" \ 
++--home=/run/hpnsshd hpnsshd
++
++Alternatively, you can use vipw to add the user manually. 
++
++
++Step 8: Installation
++
++After HPN-SSH successfully builds, install it with “sudo make install”. This will install the
++binaries, configuration files, and generate the unique host keys used. At this point you can
++make changes to the ssh client and server default configuration. These files are
++found, generally, in /etc/hpnssh/ssh_config and sshd_config respectively. You may want to
++change the default port from 2222 to some other value. You may also want to enable the
++NoneCipher and NoneMac options. For more information use “man hpnsshd_config” and
++“man hpnssh_config”. Note: The hpnssh client expects the server to be on port 2222 but will
++fallback to 22 if it’s not found there. So if you do change the default port you’ll need to
++make sure the clients point at the correct port.
++
++Step 9: Finishing up.
++
++At this point you can start hpnsshd manually by running “sudo /usr/sbin/hpnsshd”
++or whatever the full path to the hpnsshd binary might be. However, this won’t
++restart automatically on reboot. To do this you’ll need to install an appropriate
++systemd configuration file. If that seems like a good idea to you then following steps may be
++of help. Otherwise, you are done. Enjoy!
++
++
++Step 10: Installing a systemd startup file.
++
++The correct systemd startup file depends on the distribution you are using. For system
++using systemd (you start a service with systemctl) create a file at /lib/systemd/system/hpnsshd.service
++with the following contents NB: you may need to update the paths to match your installation:
++
++[Unit]
++Description=HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server
++Documentation=man:hpnsshd(8) man:hpnsshd_config(5)
++After=network.target auditd.service
++ConditionPathExists=!/etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run
++
++[Service]
++EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/hpnssh
++ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/hpnsshd -t
++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/hpnsshd -D $SSHD_OPTS
++ExecReload=/usr/sbin/hpnsshd -t
++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
++KillMode=process
++Restart=on-failure
++RestartPreventExitStatus=255
++Type=notify
++RuntimeDirectory=hpnsshd
++RuntimeDirectoryMode=0755
++
++[Install]
++WantedBy=multi-user.target
++Alias=hpnsshd.service
++
++Alternatively, the ./configure command will generate a hpnsshd.service file from
++hpnsshd.service.in. You can use this file by copying it to
++/libsystemd/system/hpnsshd.service instead of copying the above text.
++
++Then create the defaults file at /etc/default/hpnsshd with the following content:
++# Default settings for openssh-server.
++# Options to pass to sshd
++SSHD_OPTS=
++
++Enter any runtime options you want on the SSHD_OPTS line. If you can’t think of any, simply
++leave it blank. A sample /etc/defauls/hpnssh file may be found in defaults.hpnsshd.
++
++You must then reload the systemd service to make it aware of this new service with
++sudo systemctl daemon-reload
++
++If you are using an init.d (you start a service with ‘system’) then you need to install an
++init.d. Create the file /etc/init.d/hpnssh and copy the following into it. NB: The following is
++for where hpnsshd is found at /usr/sbin/hpnsshd. If it is not in that location you’ll need to
++update the paths.
++
++Alternatively, you may use the hpnsshd.init file created during configure. This will be
++prepopulated with the correct paths by the configure script.
++
++#! /bin/sh
++
++### BEGIN INIT INFO
++# Provides:                hpnsshd
++# Required-Start:        $remote_fs $syslog
++# Required-Stop:        $remote_fs $syslog
++# Default-Start:        2 3 4 5
++# Default-Stop:
++# Short-Description:        OpenBSD Secure Shell server with HPN
++### END INIT INFO
++
++set -e
++
++# /etc/init.d/hpnssh: start and stop the OpenBSD "secure shell(tm)" daemon
++
++test -x /usr/sbin/hpnsshd || exit 0
++( /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -\? 2>&1 | grep -q OpenSSH ) 2>/dev/null || exit 0
++
++umask 022
++
++if test -f /etc/default/hpnssh; then
++    . /etc/default/hpnssh
++fi
++
++. /lib/lsb/init-functions
++
++
++if [ -n "$2" ]; then
++    SSHD_OPTS="$SSHD_OPTS $2"
++fi
++
++# Are we running from init?
++run_by_init() {
++    ([ "$previous" ] && [ "$runlevel" ]) || [ "$runlevel" = S ]
++}
++
++check_for_no_start() {
++    # forget it if we're trying to start, and /etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run exists
++    if [ -e /etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run ]; then
++        if [ "$1" = log_end_msg ]; then
++            log_end_msg 0 || true
++        fi
++        if ! run_by_init; then
++            log_action_msg "HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server not in use (/etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run)" || true
++        fi
++        exit 0
++    fi
++}
++
++check_dev_null() {
++    if [ ! -c /dev/null ]; then
++        if [ "$1" = log_end_msg ]; then
++            log_end_msg 1 || true
++        fi
++        if ! run_by_init; then
++            log_action_msg "/dev/null is not a character device!" || true
++        fi
++        exit 1
++    fi
++}
++
++check_privsep_dir() {
++    # Create the PrivSep empty dir if necessary
++    if [ ! -d /run/hpnsshd ]; then
++        mkdir /run/hpnsshd
++        chmod 0755 /run/hpnsshd
++    fi
++}
++
++check_config() {
++    if [ ! -e /etc/hpnssh/sshd_not_to_be_run ]; then
++        # shellcheck disable=SC2086
++        /usr/sbin/hpnsshd $SSHD_OPTS -t || exit 1
++    fi
++}
++
++export PATH="${PATH:+$PATH:}/usr/sbin:/sbin"
++
++case "$1" in
++  start)
++        check_privsep_dir
++        check_for_no_start
++        check_dev_null
++        log_daemon_msg "Starting HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true
++        # shellcheck disable=SC2086
++        if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --chuid 0:0 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then
++            log_end_msg 0 || true
++        else
++            log_end_msg 1 || true
++        fi
++        ;;
++  stop)
++        log_daemon_msg "Stopping HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true
++        if start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd; then
++            log_end_msg 0 || true
++        else
++            log_end_msg 1 || true
++        fi
++        ;;
++
++
++  reload|force-reload)
++        check_for_no_start
++        check_config
++        log_daemon_msg "Reloading HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server's configuration" "hpnsshd" || true
++        if start-stop-daemon --stop --signal 1 --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd; then
++            log_end_msg 0 || true
++        else
++            log_end_msg 1 || true
++        fi
++        ;;
++
++
++  restart)
++        check_privsep_dir
++        check_config
++        log_daemon_msg "Restarting HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true
++        start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --oknodo --retry 30 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd
++        check_for_no_start log_end_msg
++        check_dev_null log_end_msg
++        # shellcheck disable=SC2086
++        if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --chuid 0:0 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then
++            log_end_msg 0 || true
++        else
++            log_end_msg 1 || true
++        fi
++        ;;
++
++
++  try-restart)
++        check_privsep_dir
++        check_config
++        log_daemon_msg "Restarting HPN/OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "hpnsshd" || true
++        RET=0
++        start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --retry 30 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd || RET="$?"
++        case $RET in
++            0)
++                # old daemon stopped
++                check_for_no_start log_end_msg
++                check_dev_null log_end_msg
++                # shellcheck disable=SC2086
++                if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --chuid 0:0 --pidfile /run/hpnsshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/hpnsshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then
++                    log_end_msg 0 || true
++                else
++                    log_end_msg 1 || true
++                fi
++                ;;
++            1)
++                # daemon not running
++                log_progress_msg "(not running)" || true
++                log_end_msg 0 || true
++                ;;
++            *)
++                # failed to stop
++                log_progress_msg "(failed to stop)" || true
++                log_end_msg 1 || true
++                ;;
++        esac
++        ;;
++
++
++  status)
++        status_of_proc -p /run/hpnsshd.pid /usr/sbin/hpnsshd hpnsshd && exit 0 || exit $?
++        ;;
++
++
++  *)
++        log_action_msg "Usage: /etc/init.d/hpnssh {start|stop|reload|force-reload|restart|try-restart|status}" || true
++        exit 1
++esac
++
++exit 0
++
++
++Step 10: Working with SELinux.
++
++If you are using SELinux you’ll need to run a few more commands in order to grant hpnssh the
++necessary exceptions to open sockets, files, read keys, and so forth. Run the following commands
++to allow this. Note, I’m not sure every single one of these is needed so if someone knows better
++please let me know. Again, double check the paths of the files being updated.
++
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t  /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t  /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t  /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t  /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t  /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_key_t  /etc/hpnssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_exec_t /usr/sbin/hpnsshd
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t sshd_keygen_exec_t /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsshd-keygen
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t bin_t /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsftp-server
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t ssh_exec_t /usr/bin/hpnssh
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t ssh_agent_exec_t /usr/bin/hpnssh-agent
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t ssh_keygen_exec_t /usr/bin/hpnssh-keygen
++semanage fcontext -a -f f -t etc_t /etc/pam.d/hpnsshd
++semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222
++restorecon /usr/sbin/hpnsshd
++restorecon /etc/hpnssh/ssh*_key
++restorecon /etc/hpnssh/ssh*_key\.pub
++restorecon /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsshd-keygen
++restorecon /usr/libexec/hpnssh/hpnsftp-server
++restorecon /usr/bin/hpnssh
++restorecon /usr/bin/hpnssh-agent
++restorecon /usr/bin/hpnssh-keygen
++restorecon /etc/pam.d/hpnsshd
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/kex.c openssh-10.0p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/kex.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.833082539 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/kex.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.319010460 +0200
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "canohost.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
+@@ -775,17 +776,83 @@
+ 	free(kex);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * This function seeks through a comma-separated list and checks for instances
++ * of the multithreaded CC20 cipher. If found, it then ensures that the serial
++ * CC20 cipher is also in the list, adding it if necessary.
++ */
++char *
++patch_list(char * orig)
++{
++	char * adj = xstrdup(orig);
++	char * match;
++	u_int next;
++
++	const char * ccpstr = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com";
++	const char * ccpmtstr = "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org";
++
++	match = match_list(ccpmtstr, orig, &next);
++	if (match != NULL) { /* CC20-MT found in the list */
++		free(match);
++		match = match_list(ccpstr, orig, NULL);
++		if (match == NULL) { /* CC20-Serial NOT found in the list */
++			adj = xreallocarray(adj,
++			    strlen(adj) /* original string length */
++			    + 1 /* for the original null-terminator */
++			    + strlen(ccpstr) /* make room for ccpstr */
++			    + 1 /* make room for the comma delimiter */
++			    , sizeof(char));
++			/*
++			 * adj[next] points to the character after the CC20-MT
++			 * string. adj[next] might be ',' or '\0' at this point.
++			 */
++			adj[next] = ',';
++			/* adj + next + 1 is the character after that comma */
++			memcpy(adj + next + 1, ccpstr, strlen(ccpstr));
++			/* rewrite the rest of the original list */
++			memcpy(adj + next + 1 + strlen(ccpstr), orig + next,
++			    strlen(orig + next) + 1);
++		} else { /* CC20-Serial found in the list, nothing to do */
++			free(match);
++		}
++	}
++
++	return adj;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ {
+-	int r;
++	int r = 0;
++
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	char * orig_ctos = proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS];
++	char * orig_stoc = proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC];
++	proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++	    patch_list(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
++	proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
++	    patch_list(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
++
++	/*
++	 * TODO: Likely memory leak here. The original contents of
++	 * proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] are no longer accessible or
++	 * freeable.
++	 */
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
+-		return r;
++		goto restoreProposal;
+ 	ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL;
+ 	kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+-	return 0;
++ restoreProposal:
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	free(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
++	free(proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
++	proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = orig_ctos;
++	proposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = orig_stoc;
++#endif
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -974,6 +1041,11 @@
+ 	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+ 	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
+ 	int r, first_kex_follows;
++	int auth_flag = 0;
++	int log_flag = 0;
++
++	auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh);
++	debug("AUTH STATE IS %d", auth_flag);
+ 
+ 	debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
+ 	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
+@@ -1050,6 +1122,31 @@
+ 			peer[nenc] = NULL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++		if ((strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com")
++		    == 0) && (match_list("chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org",
++		    my[nenc], NULL) != NULL)) {
++			/*
++			 * if we're using the serial CC20 cipher while the
++			 * multithreaded implementation is an option...
++			 */
++			free(newkeys->enc.name);
++			newkeys->enc.cipher = cipher_by_name(
++			    "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org");
++			if (newkeys->enc.cipher == NULL) {
++				error_f("%s cipher not found.",
++				    "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org");
++				r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++				kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
++				peer[nenc] = NULL;
++				goto out;
++			} else {
++				newkeys->enc.name = xstrdup(
++				    "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org");
++			}
++			/* we promote to the multithreaded implementation */
++		}
++#endif
+ 		authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
+ 		/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
+ 		if (authlen == 0 &&
+@@ -1065,11 +1162,43 @@
+ 			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
++		debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name);
++		debug("REQUESTED MAC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->mac.name);
++		if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) {
++			if (auth_flag == 1) {
++				debug("None requested post authentication.");
++				ssh->none = 1;
++			}
++			else
++				fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed.");
++
++			if (newkeys->mac.name != NULL && strcmp(newkeys->mac.name, "none") == 0) {
++				debug("Requesting: NONEMAC. Authflag is %d", auth_flag);
++				ssh->none_mac = 1;
++			}
++		}
++
+ 		debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
+ 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+ 		    newkeys->enc.name,
+ 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
+ 		    newkeys->comp.name);
++		/*
++		 * client starts with ctos = 0 && log flag = 0 and no log.
++		 * 2nd client pass ctos = 1 and flag = 1 so no log.
++		 * server starts with ctos = 1 && log_flag = 0 so log.
++		 * 2nd sever pass ctos = 1 && log flag = 1 so no log.
++		 * -cjr
++		 */
++		if (ctos && !log_flag) {
++			logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Kex;Remote: %s-%d;Enc: %s;MAC: %s;Comp: %s",
++			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
++			    newkeys->enc.name,
++			    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
++			    newkeys->comp.name);
++		}
++		log_flag = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	need = dh_need = 0;
+ 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+@@ -1429,7 +1558,7 @@
+ 	if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
+ 		version_addendum = NULL;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%s%s%s\r\n",
+-	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
++	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+ 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
+ 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+@@ -1565,9 +1694,24 @@
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
++	/* report the version information to syslog if this is the server */
++        if (timeout_ms == -1) { /* only the server uses this value */
++		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Version;Remote: %s-%d;Protocol: %d.%d;Client: %.100s",
++		      ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
++		      remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
++	}
++
+ 	debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+ 	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+ 	compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
++	if (ssh->compat & SSH_HPNSSH)
++		debug("HPN to HPN Connection.");
++	else
++		debug("Non-HPN to HPN Connection.");
++
++	if(ssh->compat & SSH_RESTRICT_WINDOW)
++		debug ("Window size restricted.");
+ 
+ 	mismatch = 0;
+ 	switch (remote_major) {
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/log.c openssh-10.0p1/log.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/log.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.364646329 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/log.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.319781160 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@
+ #include <syslog.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include "packet.h" /* needed for host and port look ups */
++#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
++# include <sys/time.h> /* to get current time */
++#endif
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+ # include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -67,6 +71,8 @@
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
++extern struct ssh *active_state;
++
+ #define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS	(VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
+ #define LOG_STDERR_VIS	(VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/mac.c openssh-10.0p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/mac.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.717727014 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/mac.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.320122336 +0200
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
+ 	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ "none",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ 	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
+ 	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/Makefile.in	2025-06-14 14:54:57.417594122 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/Makefile.in	2025-06-14 14:54:42.451734455 +0200
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
+ CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
+ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
+-LIBS=@LIBS@
++LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
+ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
+ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	authfd.o authfile.o \
+ 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
+-	cleanup.o \
++	cleanup.o cipher-ctr-mt.o \
+ 	compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+ 	log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+ 	readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
+ 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+ 	ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+ 	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
++	cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto-mt.o \
+ 	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
+ 	hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \
+ 	kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+@@ -119,12 +120,13 @@
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexgssc.o \
+ 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+-	sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o
++	sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o metrics.o binn.o cipher-ctr-mt-provider.o \
++	cipher-ctr-mt-functions.o ossl3-provider-err.o num.o
+ 
+ SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+-	sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS)
++	sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o cipher-switch.o $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o \
+ 	platform-listen.o \
+@@ -143,7 +145,7 @@
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-gsi.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+-	uidswap.o platform-listen.o $(SKOBJS)
++	uidswap.o platform-listen.o cipher-switch.o $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+ SSHD_AUTH_OBJS=sshd-auth.o \
+ 	auth2-methods.o \
+@@ -158,7 +160,7 @@
+ 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+ 	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o  sandbox-solaris.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+-	uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
++	uidswap.o cipher-switch.o $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+ SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-client.o sftp-glob.o
+ 
+@@ -243,7 +245,7 @@
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHD_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(LIBWTMPDB)
+ 
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.c openssh-10.0p1/metrics.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/metrics.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.321376410 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2022 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University.
++ *
++ *  Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ *
++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the MIT License.
++ *
++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the MIT License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library;
++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
++ *
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++#include "metrics.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++/* kernel version macro moved to defines.h */
++
++/* add the information from the tcp_info struct to the
++ * serialized binary object
++ */
++void
++metrics_write_binn_object(struct tcp_info *data, struct binn_struct *binnobj) {
++#if !defined TCP_INFO
++	/*tcp info isn't supported on this system */
++	return;
++#else
++
++/* the base set of tcpi_ measurements starting from kernel 3.7.0
++ * these measurements existed in previous kernels but the oldest this
++ * is going to support is 3.7.0. We do need to store the kernel version as well */
++
++/* obvioulsy the version code macro only exists under linux so
++ * on non linux systems we set the kernel version to 0
++ * which will get us the base set of metrics from netinet/tcp.h
++ */
++#if (defined __linux__) && !defined(__alpine__)
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "kernel_version", LINUX_VERSION_CODE);
++#else
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "kernel_version", 0);
++#endif
++
++	/* the following are common under both linux and BSD */
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wscale",
++			      data->tcpi_snd_wscale);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_wscale",
++			      data->tcpi_rcv_wscale);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_state",
++			      data->tcpi_state);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_options",
++			      data->tcpi_options);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_ssthresh",
++			       data->tcpi_snd_ssthresh);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rtt",
++			       data->tcpi_rtt);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_recv",
++			       data->tcpi_last_data_recv);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rttvar",
++			       data->tcpi_rttvar);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_cwnd",
++			       data->tcpi_snd_cwnd);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_mss",
++			       data->tcpi_rcv_mss);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rto",
++			       data->tcpi_rto);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_mss",
++			       data->tcpi_snd_mss);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_space",
++			       data->tcpi_rcv_space);
++
++/* the following exist under both but with different names */
++#ifdef __linux__
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_ca_state",
++			      data->tcpi_ca_state);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_probes",
++			      data->tcpi_probes);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_backoff",
++			      data->tcpi_backoff);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_retransmits",
++			      data->tcpi_retransmits);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ssthresh",
++			       data->tcpi_rcv_ssthresh);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_sacked",
++			       data->tcpi_sacked);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_pmtu",
++			       data->tcpi_pmtu);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_fackets",
++			       data->tcpi_fackets);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_lost",
++			       data->tcpi_lost);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_sent",
++			       data->tcpi_last_ack_sent);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_unacked",
++			       data->tcpi_unacked);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_sent",
++			       data->tcpi_last_data_sent);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_recv",
++			       data->tcpi_last_ack_recv);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reordering",
++			       data->tcpi_reordering);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_advmss",
++			       data->tcpi_advmss);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_retrans",
++			       data->tcpi_retrans);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_ato",
++			       data->tcpi_ato);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_rtt",
++			       data->tcpi_rcv_rtt);
++#else
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_backoff",
++			      data->__tcpi_backoff);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_ca_state",
++			      data->__tcpi_ca_state);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_probes",
++			      data->__tcpi_probes);
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_retransmits",
++			      data->__tcpi_retransmits);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ssthresh",
++			       data->__tcpi_rcv_ssthresh);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_sacked",
++			       data->__tcpi_sacked);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_pmtu",
++			       data->__tcpi_pmtu);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_fackets",
++			       data->__tcpi_fackets);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_lost",
++			       data->__tcpi_lost);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_sent",
++			       data->__tcpi_last_ack_sent);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_unacked",
++			       data->__tcpi_unacked);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_sent",
++			       data->__tcpi_last_data_sent);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_recv",
++			       data->__tcpi_last_ack_recv);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reordering",
++			       data->__tcpi_reordering);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_advmss",
++			       data->__tcpi_advmss);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_retrans",
++			       data->__tcpi_retrans);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_ato",
++			       data->__tcpi_ato);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_rtt",
++			       data->__tcpi_rcv_rtt);
++#endif
++
++/* Under BSD snd_rexmitpack is the same as linux total_retrans*/
++#ifdef __linux__
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_total_retrans",
++			       data->tcpi_total_retrans);
++#else
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_total_retrans",
++			       data->tcpi_snd_rexmitpack);
++#endif
++
++/* The last section are for kernel specific metrics in linux */
++#ifdef __linux__
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(3,15,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_max_pacing_rate",
++			       data->tcpi_max_pacing_rate);
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_pacing_rate",
++			       data->tcpi_pacing_rate);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,1,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_acked",
++			       data->tcpi_bytes_acked);
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_received",
++			       data->tcpi_bytes_received);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,2,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_in",
++			       data->tcpi_segs_in);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_out",
++			       data->tcpi_segs_out);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,6,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_notsent_bytes",
++			       data->tcpi_notsent_bytes);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_min_rtt",
++			       data->tcpi_min_rtt);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_in",
++			       data->tcpi_data_segs_in);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_out",
++			       data->tcpi_data_segs_out);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,9,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate_app_limited",
++			      data->tcpi_delivery_rate_app_limited);
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate",
++			       data->tcpi_delivery_rate);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,10,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_busy_time",
++			       data->tcpi_busy_time);
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_sndbuf_limited",
++			       data->tcpi_sndbuf_limited);
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_rwnd_limited",
++			       data->tcpi_rwnd_limited);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,18,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered",
++			       data->tcpi_delivered);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered_ce",
++			       data->tcpi_delivered_ce);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,19,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_sent",
++			       data->tcpi_bytes_sent);
++	binn_object_set_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_retrans",
++			       data->tcpi_bytes_retrans);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_dsack_dups",
++			       data->tcpi_dsack_dups);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reord_seen",
++			       data->tcpi_reord_seen);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,4,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wnd",
++			       data->tcpi_snd_wnd);
++	binn_object_set_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ooopack",
++			       data->tcpi_rcv_ooopack);
++#endif
++
++#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,5,0)
++	binn_object_set_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_fastopen_client_fail",
++			      data->tcpi_fastopen_client_fail);
++#endif
++#endif /*endif for #ifdef __linux__ */
++#endif /*endif for TCP_INFO */
++}
++
++/* this reads out the tcp_info binn object and formats it into a single line
++ * the object will not necessarily have all of the elements. If it's empty it
++ * current just spits out 0. This isn't optimal as 0 can also be a valid value */
++void
++metrics_read_binn_object (void *binnobj, char *output) {
++	int len = 0;
++	int buflen = 1023;
++	int kernel_version = 0;
++	if (binnobj == NULL) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Metric polling returned bad data.\n");
++		return;
++	}
++	kernel_version = binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "kernel_version");
++
++	/* base set of metrics */
++	len = snprintf(output, buflen, "%d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d, %d",
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_state"),
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_ca_state"),
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_retransmits"),
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_probes"),
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_backoff"),
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_options"),
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wscale"),
++		       binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_wscale"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rto"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_ato"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_mss"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_mss"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_unacked"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_sacked"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_lost"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_retrans"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_fackets"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_sent"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_sent"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_data_recv"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_last_ack_recv"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_pmtu"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ssthresh"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rtt"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rttvar"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_ssthresh"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_cwnd"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_advmss"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reordering"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_rtt"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_space"),
++		       binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_total_retrans")
++		);
++
++	/* compare the received kernel version to the version that supports
++	 * any given metric. This means that a remote host that has a different
++	 * kernel that the local host will be able to process the data in terms of
++	 * the remote kernel version. Only necessary under linux*/
++#ifdef __linux__
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(3,15,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu",
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_max_pacing_rate"),
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_pacing_rate")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,1,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu",
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_acked"),
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_received")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,2,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d",
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_in"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_segs_out")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,6,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d, %d, %d",
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_notsent_bytes"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_min_rtt"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_in"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_data_segs_out")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,9,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %llu",
++				binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate_app_limited"),
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_delivery_rate")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,10,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu, %llu",
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_busy_time"),
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_sndbuf_limited"),
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_rwnd_limited")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,18,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d",
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_delivered_ce")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,19,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %llu, %llu, %d, %d",
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_sent"),
++				binn_object_uint64(binnobj, "tcpi_bytes_retrans"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_dsack_dups"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_reord_seen")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,4,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d, %d",
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_snd_wnd"),
++				binn_object_uint32(binnobj, "tcpi_rcv_ooopack")
++			);
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,5,0)) {
++		len += snprintf(output+len, (buflen-len), ", %d",
++				binn_object_uint8(binnobj, "tcpi_fastopen_client_fail")
++			);
++	}
++#endif /* ifdef __linux__ */
++}
++
++/* Print out the header to the file so that the column header matches the
++ * data in the metrics object. That varies by kernel version so we have to
++ * do tests for each possible version where they added new values to tcp_info
++ * NOTE: This doesn't put the values/headers in the most useful order but the
++ * resulting file is probably going to get processed by something */
++void
++metrics_print_header(FILE *fptr, char *extra_text, int kernel_version) {
++	if (extra_text != NULL) {
++		fprintf(fptr, "%s\n", extra_text);
++	}
++	fprintf(fptr, "timestamp, state, ca_state, retransmits, probes, backoff, options, ");
++	fprintf(fptr, "snd_wscale, rcv_wscale, rto, ato, snd_mss, rcv_mss, unacked, sacked, lost, retrans, ");
++	fprintf(fptr, "fackets, last_data_sent, last_ack_sent, last_data_recv, ");
++	fprintf(fptr, "last_ack_recv, pmtu, rcv_ssthresh, rtt, rttvar, snd_ssthresh, ");
++	fprintf(fptr, "snd_cwnd, advmss, reordering, rcv_rtt, rcv_space, total_retrans");
++
++	/* compare the received kernel version to the version that supports
++	 * any given metric. This way we can print consistent headers.
++	 * Only necessary under linux*/
++#ifdef __linux__
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(3,15,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", max_pacing_rate, pacing_rate");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,1,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", bytes_acked, bytes_received");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,2,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", segs_in, segs_out");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,6,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", notsent_bytes, min_rtt, data_segs_in, data_seg_out");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,9,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", delivery_rate_app_limited, delivery_rate");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,10,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", busy_time, sndbuf_limited, rwnd_limited");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,18,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", delivered, delivered_ce");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,19,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", bytes_sent, bytes_retrans, dsack_dups, reord_seen");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,4,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", snd_wnd, rcv_ooopack");
++	}
++
++	if (kernel_version >= KERNEL_VERSION(5,5,0)) {
++		fprintf(fptr, ", fastopen_client_fail");
++	}
++#endif /* ifdef __linux__ */
++	fprintf(fptr, "\n\n");
++}
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.h openssh-10.0p1/metrics.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/metrics.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/metrics.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.321618830 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2022 The Board of Trustees of Carnegie Mellon University.
++ *
++ *  Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
++ *
++ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the MIT License.
++ *
++ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
++ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
++ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the MIT License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the MIT License along with this library;
++ * if not, see http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
++ *
++ */
++
++#ifndef METRICS_H
++#define METRICS_H
++
++#include "binn.h"
++
++/* linux, freebsd, and netbsd have tcp_info structs.
++ * I don't know about other systems so we disable this
++ * functionality for them */
++#if defined __linux__ || defined __FreeBSD__ || defined __NetBSD__ && !defined(__alpine__)
++#define TCP_INFO 1
++#if defined __linux__ && !defined(__alpine__)
++#include <linux/tcp.h>
++#else
++#include <netinet/tcp.h>
++#endif
++#else
++/* make a null struct for tcp_info on systems that don't support it*/
++typedef struct tcp_info {
++	void     *dummy;
++} tcp_info;
++#endif
++
++void metrics_write_binn_object(struct tcp_info *, struct binn_struct *);
++void metrics_read_binn_object(void *, char *);
++void metrics_print_header(FILE *, char *, int);
++
++
++#endif /* define metrics_h */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c openssh-10.0p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.c	2025-06-14 10:53:02.019076801 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.321922850 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,29 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "platform.h"
+ 
++void
++read_mem_stats(statm_t *result, int post_auth)
++{
++	if (!post_auth)
++		return;
++
++	const char* statm_path = "/proc/self/statm";
++
++	FILE *f = fopen(statm_path,"r");
++	if(!f){
++		perror(statm_path);
++		abort();
++	}
++	if(7 != fscanf(f,"%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu",
++		       &result->size, &result->resident, &result->share, &result->text, &result->lib,
++		       &result->data, &result->dt))
++	{
++		perror(statm_path);
++		abort();
++	}
++	fclose(f);
++}
++
+ /* remove newline at end of string */
+ char *
+ chop(char *s)
+@@ -1670,20 +1693,6 @@
+ 	return (v);
+ }
+ 
+-u_int32_t
+-get_u32_le(const void *vp)
+-{
+-	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+-	u_int32_t v;
+-
+-	v  = (u_int32_t)p[0];
+-	v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
+-	v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
+-	v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
+-
+-	return (v);
+-}
+-
+ u_int16_t
+ get_u16(const void *vp)
+ {
+@@ -1723,17 +1732,6 @@
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+-{
+-	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+-
+-	p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+-	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+-	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+-	p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+-}
+-
+-void
+ put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
+ {
+ 	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h openssh-10.0p1/misc.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/misc.h	2025-06-14 10:53:02.019622613 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/misc.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.322621684 +0200
+@@ -167,12 +167,6 @@
+ void		put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
+     __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+ 
+-/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */
+-u_int32_t	get_u32_le(const void *)
+-    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+-void		put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t)
+-    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+-
+ struct bwlimit {
+ 	size_t buflen;
+ 	u_int64_t rate;		/* desired rate in kbit/s */
+@@ -259,4 +253,16 @@
+ /* On OpenBSD time_t is int64_t which is long long. */
+ /* #define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX */
+ 
++typedef struct statm_t {
++  unsigned long size;
++  unsigned long resident;
++  unsigned long share;
++  unsigned long text;
++  unsigned long lib;
++  unsigned long data;
++  unsigned long dt;
++} statm_t;
++
++void read_mem_stats(struct statm_t *, int);
++
+ #endif /* _MISC_H */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/myproposal.h openssh-10.0p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/myproposal.h	2025-06-14 10:53:01.775906378 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/myproposal.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.323105546 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256"
+ 
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
++	"chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org,"  \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.c openssh-10.0p1/num.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/num.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.323584938 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */
++
++#include <string.h>
++#include "num.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++
++typedef enum { BIG = 1, LITTLE = -1 }  endian_t;
++typedef enum { NEGATIVE = 0xff, POSITIVE = 0x00 } sign_t;
++
++static endian_t nativeendian(void)
++{
++    const int endiantest = 1;
++
++    return *((char *)&endiantest) == 1 ? LITTLE : BIG;
++}
++
++static sign_t paramsign(const OSSL_PARAM *param)
++{
++    size_t srcmsb = nativeendian() == BIG ? 0 : param->data_size - 1;
++
++    return
++        param->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER
++        ? POSITIVE
++        : (((unsigned char *)param->data)[srcmsb] & 0x80
++           ? NEGATIVE
++           : POSITIVE);
++}
++
++struct numdesc {
++    void *data;
++    unsigned int data_type;     /* The OSSL_PARAM data type */
++
++    /* These fields concern the whole number */
++    size_t size;
++    endian_t endian;
++    sign_t sign;
++
++    /* These fields concern the limbs of the number */
++    size_t limbsize;
++    endian_t limbendian;
++    /* This is for odd archs. */
++    /* see the manual for mpz_import() for an in depth explanation. */
++    size_t limbnailbits;
++};
++
++struct resultdesc {
++    size_t size;
++    int result;                 /* 1 or (negative) error */
++};
++
++static struct resultdesc provnum_copy(struct numdesc dest, struct numdesc src)
++{
++    struct resultdesc result = { dest.size, 1, };
++
++    if (src.data_type != OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER
++        && src.data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER) {
++        result.result = PROVNUM_E_WRONG_TYPE;
++        return result;
++    }
++
++    if (src.size == 0) {
++        memset(dest.data, 0, dest.size);
++        return result;
++    }
++
++    /* Extra data */
++    size_t srcmsb = src.endian == BIG ? 0 : src.size - 1;
++    int srcmsb2lsb = src.endian == BIG ? 1 : -1;
++
++    /*
++     * If the source is bigger than the destination, analyse to see if the
++     * most significant byte is just padding that can be ignored.
++     * The rules to determine if the most significant byte is just padding
++     * are:
++     *
++     * 1. the most significant byte equals srcsigned, which just so happens
++     *    to have the 2's complement padding value.
++     * 2. The most significant bit of the next to most significant byte
++     *    equals the most significant bit of srcsigned.
++     */
++    size_t end = dest.data == NULL ? 1 : dest.size;
++    for (; src.size > end; srcmsb += srcmsb2lsb, src.size--)
++        if (((unsigned char *)src.data)[srcmsb] != src.sign
++            || ((((unsigned char *)src.data)[srcmsb + srcmsb2lsb] & 0x80)
++                != (src.sign & 0x80)))
++            break;
++
++    if (src.size > dest.size) {
++        result.result = PROVNUM_E_TOOBIG;
++        return result;
++    }
++
++    size_t srclsb = srcmsb + srcmsb2lsb * (src.size - 1);
++
++    /* Simple case, all significant details match */
++    if (dest.endian == src.endian
++        && dest.limbsize == 1
++        && dest.limbnailbits == 0
++        && (dest.data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER || src.sign == POSITIVE)) {
++
++        if (src.size < dest.size) {
++            size_t padstart = dest.endian == BIG ? 0 : dest.size - src.size;
++
++            memset((unsigned char *)dest.data + padstart, src.sign,
++                   dest.size - src.size);
++        }
++
++        size_t deststart = dest.endian == BIG ? dest.size - src.size : 0;
++        size_t srcstart = src.endian == BIG ? srcmsb : srclsb;
++
++        memcpy((unsigned char *)dest.data + deststart,
++               (unsigned char *)src.data + srcstart,
++               src.size);
++        return result;
++    }
++
++    /* Complex case, for sign or limb conversion.  Currently unsupported */
++    result.result = PROVNUM_E_UNSUPPORTED;
++    return result;
++}
++
++#define implement_provnum(T, DT)                                \
++    int provnum_get_##T(T *dest, const OSSL_PARAM *param)       \
++    {                                                           \
++        endian_t endian = nativeendian();                       \
++        struct numdesc destnd = {                               \
++            dest, DT, sizeof(T), endian, POSITIVE, 1, endian, 0 \
++        };                                                      \
++        struct numdesc srcnd = {                                \
++            param->data, param->data_type, param->data_size,    \
++            endian, paramsign(param), 1, endian, 0              \
++        };                                                      \
++                                                                \
++        struct resultdesc result = provnum_copy(destnd, srcnd); \
++        return result.result;                                   \
++    }                                                           \
++    int provnum_set_##T(OSSL_PARAM *param, T src)         \
++    {                                                           \
++        endian_t endian = nativeendian();                       \
++        struct numdesc destnd = {                               \
++            param->data, param->data_type, param->data_size,    \
++            endian, POSITIVE, 1, endian, 0                      \
++        };                                                      \
++        struct numdesc srcnd = {                                \
++            &src, DT, sizeof(T), endian, POSITIVE, 1, endian, 0 \
++        };                                                      \
++                                                                \
++        struct resultdesc result = provnum_copy(destnd, srcnd); \
++        param->return_size = result.size;                       \
++        return result.result;                                   \
++    }
++
++implement_provnum(size_t, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER)
++
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.h openssh-10.0p1/num.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/num.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/num.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.323769040 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++
++#include <openssl/core.h>
++
++/* Convert between OSSL_PARAM and size_t */
++int provnum_get_size_t(size_t *dest, const OSSL_PARAM *param);
++int provnum_set_size_t(OSSL_PARAM *param, size_t src);
++
++#define PROVNUM_E_WRONG_TYPE    -1
++#define PROVNUM_E_TOOBIG        -2
++#define PROVNUM_E_UNSUPPORTED   -3
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.c openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.323964806 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */
++
++#include <assert.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include "ossl3-provider-err.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++
++struct proverr_functions_st {
++  const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core;
++  OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error_fn *core_new_error;
++  OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug_fn *core_set_error_debug;
++  OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *core_vset_error;
++};
++
++struct proverr_functions_st *
++proverr_new_handle(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core, const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch)
++{
++  /*
++   * libcrypto gives providers the tools to create error routines similar
++   * to the ones defined in <openssl/err.h>
++   */
++  OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error_fn *c_new_error = NULL;
++  OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug_fn *c_set_error_debug = NULL;
++  OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *c_vset_error = NULL;
++  struct proverr_functions_st *handle = NULL;
++
++  assert(core != NULL);
++  assert(dispatch != NULL);
++
++#ifndef DEBUG
++  if (core == NULL || dispatch == NULL)
++    return NULL;
++#endif
++
++  for (; dispatch->function_id != 0; dispatch++)
++    switch (dispatch->function_id) {
++    case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_NEW_ERROR:
++      c_new_error = OSSL_FUNC_core_new_error(dispatch);
++      break;
++    case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_SET_ERROR_DEBUG:
++      c_set_error_debug = OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_debug(dispatch);
++      break;
++    case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_VSET_ERROR:
++      c_vset_error = OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error(dispatch);
++      break;
++    }
++
++  assert(c_new_error != NULL);
++  assert(c_set_error_debug != NULL);
++  assert(c_vset_error != NULL);
++
++#ifdef NDEBUG
++  if (c_new_error == NULL || c_set_error_debug == NULL || c_vset_error == NULL)
++    return NULL;
++#endif
++
++  if ((handle = malloc(sizeof(*handle))) != NULL) {
++    handle->core = core;
++    handle->core_new_error = c_new_error;
++    handle->core_set_error_debug = c_set_error_debug;
++    handle->core_vset_error = c_vset_error;
++  }
++  return handle;
++}
++
++struct proverr_functions_st *
++proverr_dup_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *src)
++{
++  struct proverr_functions_st *dst = NULL;
++
++  if (src != NULL
++      && (dst = malloc(sizeof(*dst))) != NULL) {
++    dst->core = src->core;
++    dst->core_new_error = src->core_new_error;
++    dst->core_set_error_debug = src->core_set_error_debug;
++    dst->core_vset_error = src->core_vset_error;
++  }
++  return dst;
++}
++
++void proverr_free_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *handle)
++{
++  free(handle);
++}
++
++void proverr_new_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle)
++{
++  handle->core_new_error(handle->core);
++}
++
++void proverr_set_error_debug(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle,
++                             const char *file, int line, const char *func)
++{
++  handle->core_set_error_debug(handle->core, file, line, func);
++}
++
++void proverr_set_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle,
++                       uint32_t reason, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++  va_list ap;
++
++  va_start(ap, fmt);
++  handle->core_vset_error(handle->core, reason, fmt, ap);
++  va_end(ap);
++}
++
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.h openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ossl3-provider-err.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ossl3-provider-err.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.324153727 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
++/* CC0 license applied, see LICENCE.md */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL3
++#include <stdint.h>
++#include <openssl/core.h>
++#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
++
++/*
++ * The idea with this library is to replace OpenSSL's ERR_raise() and
++ * ERR_raise_data() with variants that are more suitable for providers that
++ * have their own error reason table.
++ *
++ * This assumes variadic function-like macros, i.e. C99 or newer.
++ *
++ * A minimal amount of preparation is needed on provider initialization and
++ * takedown:
++ *
++ * 1.  The provider's outgoing OSSL_DISPATCH table must include an entry
++ *     got OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_GET_REASON_STRINGS, with a function that returns
++ *     the provider's table of reasons.
++ *     That table of reasons is a simple OSSL_ITEM array, where each element
++ *     contains a numeric reason identity for the reason, and the description
++ *     text string for that reason.
++ *     Each numeric reason identity MUST be unique within this array.
++ *
++ * 2.  On provider initialization, an error handle must be created using
++ *     proverr_new_handle().  The returned pointer is passed as first argument
++ *     to ERR_raise() and ERR_raise_data().
++ *
++ * 3.  On provider takedown, the error handle must be freed, using
++ *     proverr_free_handle().
++ *
++ * With this preparation, the provider code can use ERR_raise() and
++ * ERR_raise_data() "as usual", with the exception that the first argument is
++ * the error handle instead of one of the OpenSSL ERR_LIB_ macros.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * In case <openssl/err.h> was included, we throw away its error recording
++ * macros.
++ * Note that ERR_put_error() is NOT recreated.  It's deprecated and should not
++ * be used any more.
++ */
++#undef ERR_put_error
++#undef ERR_raise
++#undef ERR_raise_data
++
++#define ERR_raise(handle, reason) ERR_raise_data((handle),(reason),NULL)
++
++#define ERR_raise_data(handle, reason, ...)                                 \
++  (proverr_new_error(handle),                                               \
++   proverr_set_error_debug(handle, OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE,OPENSSL_FUNC), \
++   proverr_set_error(handle, reason, __VA_ARGS__))
++
++/*
++ * The structure where the libcrypto core handle and core functions are
++ * captured.
++ */
++struct proverr_functions_st;
++
++struct proverr_functions_st *
++proverr_new_handle(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *core, const OSSL_DISPATCH *in);
++struct proverr_functions_st *
++proverr_dup_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *src);
++void proverr_free_handle(struct proverr_functions_st *handle);
++
++void proverr_new_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle);
++void proverr_set_error_debug(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle,
++                             const char *file, int line, const char *func);
++void proverr_set_error(const struct proverr_functions_st *handle,
++                       uint32_t reason, const char *fmt, ...);
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL3 */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.c openssh-10.0p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.719334626 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/packet.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.324483728 +0200
+@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@
+ #endif
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <time.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
++# include <util.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have
+@@ -104,7 +107,20 @@
+ #define DBG(x)
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
++/* OpenSSH usings 256KB packet size max but that consumes a
++ * lot of memory with the buffers we are using. However, we need
++ * a large packet size if the banner that's being sent is large.
++ * So we need a 256KB packet pre authentication and a smaller one
++ * in this case SSH_IOBUFSZ + 1KB, afterwards. So we change
++ * PACKET_MAX_SIZE from a #define to a global. Then, in the function
++ * ssh_packet_set_authentcated we reduce the size to something
++ * more memory efficient. -cjr 04/07/23
++ */
++u_int packet_max_size = 256 * 1024;
++
++/* global to support forced rekeying */
++int rekey_requested = 0;
++
+ 
+ struct packet_state {
+ 	u_int32_t seqnr;
+@@ -241,12 +257,23 @@
+ 	    (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ 	    (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		goto fail;
++	/* these buffers are important in terms of tracking buffer usage
++	 * so we explicitly label and type them with descriptive names */
++	sshbuf_relabel(state->input, "input");
++	sshbuf_type(state->input, BUF_PACKET_INPUT);
++	sshbuf_relabel(state->incoming_packet, "inpacket");
++	sshbuf_type(state->incoming_packet, BUF_PACKET_INCOMING);
++	sshbuf_relabel(state->output, "output");
++	sshbuf_type(state->output, BUF_PACKET_OUTPUT);
++	sshbuf_relabel(state->outgoing_packet, "outpacket");
++	sshbuf_type(state->outgoing_packet, BUF_PACKET_OUTGOING);
++
+ 	TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
+ 	TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
+ 	TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
+ 	state->connection_in = -1;
+ 	state->connection_out = -1;
+-	state->max_packet_size = 32768;
++	state->max_packet_size = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ 	state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+ 	state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
+ 	state->initialized = 1;
+@@ -294,7 +321,7 @@
+ ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
+ {
+ 	struct session_state *state;
+-	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
++	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+ 	int r;
+ 
+ 	if (none == NULL) {
+@@ -311,9 +338,11 @@
+ 	state->connection_in = fd_in;
+ 	state->connection_out = fd_out;
+ 	if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
+-	    (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
++	    (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT,
++	    state->after_authentication)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
+-	    (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
++	    (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT,
++	    state->after_authentication)) != 0) {
+ 		error_fr(r, "cipher_init failed");
+ 		free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -384,7 +413,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
+ 		char buf[1024];
+-		size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
++		size_t dlen = packet_max_size;
+ 
+ 		if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already)
+ 			dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already;
+@@ -977,6 +1006,7 @@
+ 	const char *wmsg;
+ 	int r, crypt_type;
+ 	const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in";
++	char blocks_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], bytes_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+ 
+ 	debug2_f("mode %d", mode);
+ 
+@@ -1015,12 +1045,32 @@
+ 		if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+ 	}
+-	mac->enabled = 1;
++
++	/* if we are using NONE MAC then we don't need to enable the
++	 * mac routines. This disables them and we can claw back some cycles
++	 * from the CPU -cjr 3/21/2023 */
++	if (ssh->none_mac != 1)
++		mac->enabled = 1;
++
+ 	DBG(debug_f("cipher_init: %s", dir));
+ 	cipher_free(*ccp);
+ 	*ccp = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (strcmp(enc->name, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") == 0) {
++		if (state->after_authentication)
++			enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(
++			    "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org");
++		else
++			enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(
++			    "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com");
++		if (enc->cipher == NULL)
++			return r;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
+-	    enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
++	    enc->iv, enc->iv_len,
++	    crypt_type ? state->p_send.seqnr : state->p_read.seqnr,
++	    crypt_type, state->after_authentication)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
+ 	    (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) {
+@@ -1044,23 +1094,45 @@
+ 		}
+ 		comp->enabled = 1;
+ 	}
+-	/*
+-	 * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
+-	 * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
+-	 * See RFC4344 section 3.2.
+-	 */
+-	if (enc->block_size >= 16)
+-		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
+-	else
+-		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
++
++	/* get the maximum number of blocks the cipher can
++	 * handle safely */
++	*max_blocks = cipher_rekey_blocks(enc->cipher);
++
++	/* if we have a custom oRekeyLimit use that. */
+ 	if (state->rekey_limit)
+ 		*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
+ 		    state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+-	debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir,
+-	    (unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
++
++	/* these lines support the debug */
++	strlcpy(blocks_s, "?", sizeof(blocks_s));
++	strlcpy(bytes_s, "?", sizeof(bytes_s));
++	if (*max_blocks * enc->block_size < LLONG_MAX) {
++		fmt_scaled((long long)*max_blocks, blocks_s);
++		fmt_scaled((long long)*max_blocks * enc->block_size, bytes_s);
++	}
++	debug("rekey %s after %s blocks / %sB data", dir, blocks_s, bytes_s);
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
++void
++packet_request_rekeying(void)
++{
++	rekey_requested = 1;
++}
++
++/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
++ * and none cipher switch */
++int
++packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
++
++	return state->after_authentication;
++}
++
+ #define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
+ static int
+ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+@@ -1087,6 +1159,14 @@
+ 	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++        /* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
++         * cipher switch and aes-mt-ctr methods -cjr */
++        if (rekey_requested == 1) {
++		debug_f("Got the rekey request");
++		rekey_requested = 0;
++                return 1;
++        }
++
+ 	/* Time-based rekeying */
+ 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
+ 	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+@@ -1445,7 +1525,7 @@
+ 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ 	int len, r, ms_remain = 0;
+ 	struct pollfd pfd;
+-	char buf[8192];
++	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
+ 	struct timeval start;
+ 	struct timespec timespec, *timespecp = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -1549,7 +1629,7 @@
+ 			return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
+ 		state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp);
+ 		if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 ||
+-		    state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
++		    state->packlen > packet_max_size)
+ 			return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 	}
+ 	need = state->packlen + 4;
+@@ -1608,7 +1688,7 @@
+ 		    sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+-		    state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
++		    state->packlen > packet_max_size) {
+ #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ 			sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+ #endif
+@@ -1635,7 +1715,7 @@
+ 			goto out;
+ 		state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
+ 		if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+-		    state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
++		    state->packlen > packet_max_size) {
+ #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ 			fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
+ 			sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+@@ -1644,7 +1724,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 			logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
+ 			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
+-			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
++			    packet_max_size);
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -1667,7 +1747,7 @@
+ 		logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
+ 		    need, block_size, need % block_size);
+ 		return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
+-		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
++		    packet_max_size - block_size);
+ 	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
+@@ -1711,11 +1791,11 @@
+ 			if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ 				goto out;
+ 			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+-			if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
++			if (need + block_size > packet_max_size)
+ 				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
+ 			    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+-			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
++			    packet_max_size - need - block_size);
+ 		}
+ 		/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
+ 		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
+@@ -1938,7 +2018,7 @@
+ 	int r;
+ 	size_t rlen;
+ 
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_read(fd, state->input, PACKET_MAX_SIZE, &rlen)) != 0)
++	if ((r = sshbuf_read(fd, state->input, packet_max_size, &rlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	if (state->packet_discard) {
+@@ -2017,17 +2097,21 @@
+ 	switch (r) {
+ 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
+ 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 		logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
+ 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
+ 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 		logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
+ 		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
+ 	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+ 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 		logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
+ 	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+ 		if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
+ 			ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++			sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
+ 			logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
+ 		}
+ 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+@@ -2069,6 +2153,24 @@
+ 	logdie_f("should have exited");
+ }
+ 
++/* this prints out the final log entry */
++void
++sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *ssh) {
++	double total_time;
++
++	if (ssh->start_time < 1)
++		/* this will produce a NaN in the output. -cjr */
++		total_time = 0;
++	else
++		total_time = monotime_double() - ssh->start_time;
++
++	logit("SSH: Server;LType: Throughput;Remote: %s-%d;IN: %lu;OUT: %lu;Duration: %.1f;tPut_in: %.1f;tPut_out: %.1f",
++	      ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
++	      ssh->stdin_bytes, ssh->fdout_bytes, total_time,
++	      ssh->stdin_bytes / total_time,
++	      ssh->fdout_bytes / total_time);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
+  * connection, and exits.  This function never returns. The error message
+@@ -2323,10 +2425,19 @@
+ 	ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */
+ }
+ 
++/* Set the state of the connection to post auth
++ * While we are here also decrease the size of
++ * packet_max_size to something more reasonable.
++ * In this case thats 33k. Which is the size of
++ * the largest packet we expect to see and some space
++ * for overhead. This reduces memory usage in high
++ * BDP environments without impacting performance
++ * -cjr 4/11/23 */
+ void
+ ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
++	packet_max_size = SSH_IOBUFSZ + 1024;
+ }
+ 
+ void *
+@@ -2949,3 +3060,17 @@
+ 	ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++
++/* used for cipher switching
++ * only called in cipher-swtich.c */
++void *
++ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++        return ssh->state->send_context;
++}
++
++void *
++ssh_packet_get_receive_context(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++        return ssh->state->receive_context;
++}
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.h openssh-10.0p1/packet.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/packet.h	2025-06-14 10:53:01.719644792 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/packet.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.325502017 +0200
+@@ -88,6 +88,17 @@
+ 
+ 	/* APP data */
+ 	void *app_data;
++
++	/* logging data for ServerLogging patch*/
++	double start_time;
++	u_long fdout_bytes;
++	u_long stdin_bytes;
++
++	/* track that we are in a none cipher state */
++	int none;
++
++	/* track if we have disabled the mac as well */
++	int none_mac;
+ };
+ 
+ typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *,
+@@ -157,6 +168,8 @@
+ int	 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ u_int	 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
+ 
++int	 packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *);
++
+ int	 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+ int	 ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+ 
+@@ -172,6 +185,13 @@
+ 
+ void	*ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
+ void	*ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *);
++void	*ssh_packet_get_receive_context(struct ssh *);
++void    *ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *);
++
++/* for forced packet rekeying post auth */
++void	 packet_request_rekeying(void);
++/* final log entry support */
++void    sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *);
+ 
+ /* new API */
+ int	sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type);
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.c openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.325842914 +0200
+@@ -13,6 +13,16 @@
+ 
+ #include "poly1305.h"
+ 
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++void
++poly1305_auth(EVP_MAC_CTX *poly_ctx, unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) {
++	size_t poly_out_len;
++	EVP_MAC_init(poly_ctx, (const u_char *)key, POLY1305_KEYLEN, NULL);
++	EVP_MAC_update(poly_ctx, m, inlen);
++	EVP_MAC_final(poly_ctx, out, &poly_out_len, (size_t)POLY1305_TAGLEN);
++}
++#else
++
+ #define mul32x32_64(a,b) ((uint64_t)(a) * (b))
+ 
+ #define U8TO32_LE(p) \
+@@ -30,7 +40,7 @@
+ 	} while (0)
+ 
+ void
+-poly1305_auth(unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) {
++poly1305_auth(char *unused, unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) {
+ 	uint32_t t0,t1,t2,t3;
+ 	uint32_t h0,h1,h2,h3,h4;
+ 	uint32_t r0,r1,r2,r3,r4;
+@@ -157,3 +167,4 @@
+ 	U32TO8_LE(&out[ 8], f2); f3 += (f2 >> 32);
+ 	U32TO8_LE(&out[12], f3);
+ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.h openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/poly1305.h	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/poly1305.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.326132826 +0200
+@@ -13,8 +13,15 @@
+ #define POLY1305_KEYLEN		32
+ #define POLY1305_TAGLEN		16
+ 
+-void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen,
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_POLY_EVP
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++
++void poly1305_auth(EVP_MAC_CTX *poly_key, u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen,
++    const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN])
++#else
++void poly1305_auth(char *unused, u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen,
+     const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN])
++#endif
+     __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN)))
+     __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
+     __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN)));
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/progressmeter.c openssh-10.0p1/progressmeter.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/progressmeter.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/progressmeter.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.326416661 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@
+ static off_t start_pos;		/* initial position of transfer */
+ static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
+ static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
++static off_t last_pos;
++static off_t max_delta_pos = 0;
+ static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
+ static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
+ static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
+@@ -131,6 +133,7 @@
+ 	int cur_speed;
+ 	int hours, minutes, seconds;
+ 	int file_len, cols;
++	off_t delta_pos;
+ 
+ 	if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+ 		return;
+@@ -146,6 +149,10 @@
+ 	now = monotime_double();
+ 	bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
+ 
++	delta_pos = cur_pos - last_pos;
++	if (delta_pos > max_delta_pos)
++		max_delta_pos = delta_pos;
++
+ 	if (bytes_left > 0)
+ 		elapsed = now - last_update;
+ 	else {
+@@ -175,7 +182,7 @@
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	/* filename */
+-	file_len = cols = win_size - 36;
++	file_len = cols = win_size - 45;
+ 	if (file_len > 0) {
+ 		asmprintf(&buf, INT_MAX, &cols, "%-*s", file_len, file);
+ 		/* If we used fewer columns than expected then pad */
+@@ -192,6 +199,12 @@
+ 	xextendf(&buf, NULL, " %3d%% %s %s/s ", percent, format_size(cur_pos),
+ 	    format_rate((off_t)bytes_per_second));
+ 
++	/* instantaneous rate */
++	if (bytes_left > 0)
++		xextendf(&buf, NULL, "%s/s", format_rate((off_t)delta_pos));
++	else
++		xextendf(&buf, NULL, "%s/s", format_rate((off_t)max_delta_pos));
++
+ 	/* ETA */
+ 	if (!transferred)
+ 		stalled += elapsed;
+@@ -234,6 +247,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 	free(buf);
+ 	free(obuf);
++	last_pos = cur_pos;
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.c	2025-06-14 10:53:02.021809909 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.327045863 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+@@ -174,6 +175,10 @@
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+ 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
+ 	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
++	oTcpRcvBufPoll, oHPNDisabled,
++	oNoneEnabled, oNoneMacEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
++	oDisableMTAES, oUseMPTCP,
++	oMetrics, oMetricsPath, oMetricsInterval, oFallback, oFallbackPort,
+ 	oVisualHostKey,
+ 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull,
+ 	oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+@@ -321,6 +326,16 @@
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+ 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
+ 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
++	{ "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
++	{ "nonemacenabled", oNoneMacEnabled },
++	{ "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
++	{ "usemptcp", oUseMPTCP},
++	{ "disablemtaes", oDisableMTAES },
++	{ "metrics", oMetrics },
++	{ "metricspath", oMetricsPath },
++	{ "metricsinterval", oMetricsInterval },
++	{ "fallback", oFallback },
++	{ "fallbackport", oFallbackPort },
+ 	{ "sessiontype", oSessionType },
+ 	{ "stdinnull", oStdinNull },
+ 	{ "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication },
+@@ -343,6 +358,8 @@
+ 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
++	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
++	{ "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+ 	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+@@ -542,7 +559,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if (port == 0) {
+ 		sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
+-		port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
++		port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : HPNSSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ 	}
+ 	return port;
+ }
+@@ -1381,6 +1398,67 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oHPNDisabled:
++		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oTcpRcvBufPoll:
++		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oNoneEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oNoneMacEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oUseMPTCP:
++		intptr = &options->use_mptcp;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oDisableMTAES:
++		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oMetrics:
++		intptr = &options->metrics;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oMetricsInterval:
++		intptr = &options->metrics_interval;
++		goto parse_int;
++
++	case oMetricsPath:
++		charptr = &options->metrics_path;
++		options->metrics = 1;
++		goto parse_string;
++
++	case oFallback:
++		intptr = &options->fallback;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case oFallbackPort:
++		intptr = &options->fallback_port;
++		goto parse_int;
++
++	/*
++	 * We check to see if the command comes from the command
++	 * line or not. If it does then enable it otherwise fail.
++	 *  NONE should never be a default configuration.
++	 */
++	case oNoneSwitch:
++		if (strcmp(filename, "command-line") == 0) {
++			intptr = &options->none_switch;
++			goto parse_flag;
++		} else {
++			error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename);
++			error("Continuing...");
++			debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename);
++			return 0;
++		}
++
+ 	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+ 		intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+@@ -2798,6 +2876,18 @@
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->request_tty = -1;
++	options->none_switch = -1;
++	options->none_enabled = -1;
++	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
++	options->use_mptcp = -1;
++	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
++	options->metrics = -1;
++	options->metrics_path = NULL;
++	options->metrics_interval = -1;
++	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++	options->fallback = -1;
++	options->fallback_port = -1;
++	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
+ 	options->session_type = -1;
+ 	options->stdin_null = -1;
+ 	options->fork_after_authentication = -1;
+@@ -2982,8 +3072,39 @@
+ 		options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+ 	if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+ 		options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
++	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1)
++		options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1;
++	if (options->none_switch == -1)
++		options->none_switch = 0;
++	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++		options->none_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->none_enabled == 0 && options->none_switch > 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "NoneEnabled must be enabled to use the None Switch option. None cipher disabled.\n");
++		options->none_enabled = 0;
++	}
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && (options->none_enabled == 0 ||
++					     options->none_switch == 0)) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "None MAC can only be used with the None cipher. None MAC disabled.\n");
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	}
++	if (options->use_mptcp == -1)
++		options->use_mptcp = 0;
++	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
++		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
++	if (options->metrics == -1)
++		options->metrics = 0;
++	if (options->metrics_interval == -1)
++		options->metrics_interval = 5;
+ 	if (options->control_master == -1)
+ 		options->control_master = 0;
++	if (options->fallback == -1)
++		options->fallback = 1;
++	if (options->fallback_port == -1)
++		options->fallback_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ 	if (options->control_persist == -1) {
+ 		options->control_persist = 0;
+ 		options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
+@@ -3757,6 +3878,14 @@
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableEscapeCommandline, o->enable_escape_commandline);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(oTcpRcvBufPoll, o->tcp_rcv_buf_poll);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHPNDisabled, o->hpn_disabled);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoneSwitch, o->none_switch);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoneEnabled, o->none_enabled);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoneMacEnabled, o->nonemac_enabled);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(oFallback, o->fallback);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(oMetrics, o->metrics);
++
+ 
+ 	/* Integer options */
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
+@@ -3768,6 +3897,8 @@
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oObscureKeystrokeTiming,
+ 	    o->obscure_keystroke_timing_interval);
++	dump_cfg_int(oMetricsInterval, o->metrics_interval);
++	dump_cfg_int(oFallbackPort, o->fallback_port);
+ 
+ 	/* String options */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
+@@ -3796,6 +3927,7 @@
+ 	dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(oKnownHostsCommand, o->known_hosts_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(oTag, o->tag);
++	dump_cfg_string(oMetricsPath, o->metrics_path);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(oVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
+ 
+ 	/* Forwards */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/readconf.h	2025-06-14 10:53:02.022395739 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/readconf.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.328092159 +0200
+@@ -128,6 +128,21 @@
+ 	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+ 	int64_t rekey_limit;
+ 	int	rekey_interval;
++
++	/* hpnssh options */
++	int     tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */
++	int     hpn_disabled;     /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */
++	int     none_switch;    /* Use none cipher */
++	int     none_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */
++	int     nonemac_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */
++	int     disable_multithreaded; /* Disable multithreaded aes-ctr */
++	int     metrics; /* enable metrics */
++	int     metrics_interval; /* time in seconds between polls */
++	char   *metrics_path; /* path for the metrics files */
++	int     fallback; /* en|disable fallback port (def: true) */
++	int     fallback_port; /* port to fallback to (def: 22) */
++	int     use_mptcp;
++
+ 	int	no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+ 	int	identities_only;
+ 	int	server_alive_interval;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/README.md openssh-10.0p1/README.md
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/README.md	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/README.md	2025-06-14 10:54:01.328596415 +0200
+@@ -1,16 +1,22 @@
+-# Portable OpenSSH
++# HPNSSH: Based on Portable OpenSSH
+ 
+-[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml)
+-[![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh)
+-[![Coverity Status](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/21341/badge.svg)](https://scan.coverity.com/projects/openssh-portable)
++HPN-SSH is a high performance soft fork of OpenSSH that can provide significnatly faster throughput for bulk data transfers over a wide range of network paths. In some situations we've seen throughput rates more than 100 times faster than OpenSSH. HPN-SSH is able to do this by optimizing the application layer receive buffer to match the TCP receive buffer. Notably, to see performance improvements HPN-SSH only needs to be the data receiver so users can see notable improvements with many other SSH implementations. HPN-SSH also incorporate two parallelized ciphers, AES-CTR and Chacha20 (the default). When using these ciphers a throughput performance increase of 30% is typical. More information on how we do this work and other features of HPN-SSH is available from [https://hpnssh.org](https://hpnssh.org). 
+ 
+-OpenSSH is a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``ssh`` and server ``sshd``, file transfer utilities ``scp`` and ``sftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``ssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``ssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs.
++Starting with version HPN17v0 there will be significant changes to the naming convention used for executables and installation locations. The last version that does not include these changes is HPN16v1 corresponding to the HPN-8_8_P1 tag on the master branch.
+ 
+-This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM).
++HPNSSH is a variant of OpenSSH. It a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``hpnssh`` and server ``hpnsshd``, file transfer utilities ``hpnscp`` and ``hpnsftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``hpnssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``hpnssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs. It includes numerous performance and functionality enhancements focused on high performance networks and computing envrironments. Complete information can be found in the HPN-README file.
++
++It is fully compatible with all compliant implementations of the SSH protocol and OpenSSH in particular.
++
++This version of HPNSSH is significant departure in terms of naming executables and installation locations. Specifically, all executables are now prefixed with ``hpn``. So ``ssh`` becomes ``hpnssh`` and ``scp`` is now ``hpnscp``. Configuation files and host keys can now be found in ``/etc/hpnssh``. By default ``hpnsshd`` now runs on port 2222 but this is configurable. This change was made in order to prevent installations of hpnssh, particularly from package distributions, from interfering with default installations of OpenSSH. HPNSSH is backwards compatible with all versions of OpenSSH including configuration files, keys, and run time options. Additionally, the client will, by default attempt to connect to port 2222 but will automatically fall back to port 22. This is also user configurable.
++
++HPNSSH is based on OpenSSH portable. This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM).
++
++This document will be changing over time to reflect new changes and features. This document is built off of the OpenSSH README.md
+ 
+ ## Documentation
+ 
+-The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool:
++The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool. 
+ 
+ * [ssh(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1)
+ * [sshd(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8)
+@@ -21,15 +27,15 @@
+ * [ssh-keyscan(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keyscan.8)
+ * [sftp-server(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8)
+ 
+-## Stable Releases
++All options in OpenSSH are respected by HPN-SSH. The man pages for HPN-SSH tools are the same as the name of the tool.
+ 
+-Stable release tarballs are available from a number of [download mirrors](https://www.openssh.com/portable.html#downloads). We recommend the use of a stable release for most users. Please read the [release notes](https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html) for details of recent changes and potential incompatibilities.
++## Building HPNSSH
+ 
+-## Building Portable OpenSSH
++Detailed step by step instructions can be found at https://psc.edu/hpn-ssh-home/
+ 
+ ### Dependencies
+ 
+-Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers.
++HPNSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers.
+ 
+ ``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) may also be used.  OpenSSH may be built without either of these, but the resulting binaries will have only a subset of the cryptographic algorithms normally available.
+ 
+@@ -44,8 +50,9 @@
+ Release tarballs and release branches in git include a pre-built copy of the ``configure`` script and may be built using:
+ 
+ ```
+-tar zxvf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz
+-cd openssh
++tar zxvf hpnssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz
++cd hpn-ssh
++autoreconf -f -i
+ ./configure # [options]
+ make && make tests
+ ```
+@@ -57,9 +64,9 @@
+ If building from the git master branch, you'll need [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/) installed to build the ``configure`` script. The following commands will check out and build portable OpenSSH from git:
+ 
+ ```
+-git clone https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable # or https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
+-cd openssh-portable
+-autoreconf
++git clone https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh
++cd hpn-ssh
++autoreconf -f -i
+ ./configure
+ make && make tests
+ ```
+@@ -76,6 +83,7 @@
+ ``--with-libedit`` | Enable [libedit](https://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/) support for sftp.
+ ``--with-kerberos5`` | Enable Kerberos/GSSAPI support. Both [Heimdal](https://www.h5l.org/) and [MIT](https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/) Kerberos implementations are supported.
+ ``--with-selinux`` | Enable [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) support.
++``--with-security-key-builtin`` | Include built-in support for U2F/FIDO2 security keys. This requires [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) be installed.
+ 
+ ## Development
+ 
+@@ -84,3 +92,4 @@
+ ## Reporting bugs
+ 
+ _Non-security_ bugs may be reported to the developers via [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/) or via the mailing list above. Security bugs should be reported to [openssh@openssh.com](mailto:openssh.openssh.com).
++
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c openssh-10.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.776677219 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.328916358 +0200
+@@ -295,6 +295,9 @@
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getpeername /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpeername),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getpgid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
+ #endif
+@@ -413,6 +416,9 @@
+ #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socketcall
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_socketcall),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_time
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
+ #endif
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.1 openssh-10.0p1/scp.1
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.1	2025-06-14 10:53:01.646933368 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/scp.1	2025-06-14 10:54:01.329403433 +0200
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm scp
+-.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
++.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTvZ
+ .Op Fl c Ar cipher
+ .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+ .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ .Nm
+ copies files between hosts on a network.
++It is binary compatible with OpenSSH's scp including
++the use of the same directives and configuration options except where noted. 
+ .Pp
+ .Nm
+ uses the SFTP protocol over a
+@@ -257,6 +259,7 @@
+ .It Tunnel
+ .It TunnelDevice
+ .It UpdateHostKeys
++.It UseMPTCP
+ .It User
+ .It UserKnownHostsFile
+ .It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+@@ -291,6 +294,10 @@
+ Note that
+ .Nm
+ follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
++.It Fl Z
++Resume failed or interrupted transfer. Identical files will be skipped. Remote must have resume option.
++.Nm
++only option.
+ .It Fl S Ar program
+ Name of
+ .Ar program
+@@ -298,6 +305,14 @@
+ The program must understand
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ options.
++.It Fl z Ar program
++Path to hpnscp on remote system. Useful if remote has multiple scp installs.
++For example, using the resume option but the default remote scp does not have the resume option.
++Use -z to point the version that does - e.g. -z /opt/hpnssh/bin/hpnscp.
++.Nm
++only option. 
++.It Fl s
++Use the SFTP protocol for transfers rather than the original scp protocol.
+ .It Fl T
+ Disable strict filename checking.
+ By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
+@@ -324,10 +339,13 @@
+ .It Cm nrequests Ns = Ns Ar value
+ Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests may be in progress
+ at any point in time during a download or upload.
+-By default 64 requests may be active concurrently.
++This value must be between 1 and 8192.
++By default 1024 requests may be active concurrently.
+ .It Cm buffer Ns = Ns Ar value
+ Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP read/write operation used
+ during download or upload.
++This value must be between 1B and 255KB. You may use
++the K unit for the size. E.g. 32768 or 32K.
+ By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+ .El
+ .El
+@@ -361,6 +379,7 @@
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
+ .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
++.An Chris Rapier Aq Mt rapier@psc.edu
+ .Sh CAVEATS
+ The legacy SCP protocol (selected by the
+ .Fl O
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.c openssh-10.0p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/scp.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.663335155 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/scp.c	2025-06-14 12:35:32.946245567 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+  * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2021 Chris Rapier. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -133,6 +134,12 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "progressmeter.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
++/* libressl doesn't support the blake2b512 digest so
++ * we need to prevent libressl from using the resume feature
++ * cjr 7/18/2023 */
++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#endif
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ 
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
+@@ -175,6 +182,10 @@
+ /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
+ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
+ 
++/* this is path to the remote scp program allowing the user to specify
++ * a non-default scp */
++char *remote_path;
++
+ /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
+ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
+ pid_t do_cmd_pid2 = -1;
+@@ -189,6 +200,17 @@
+ int sftp_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+     int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+ 
++/* Flag to indicate that this is a file resume */
++int resume_flag = 0; /* 0 is off, 1 is on */
++
++/* we want the host name for debugging purposes */
++char hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1];
++
++/* defines for the resume function. Need them even if not supported */
++#define HASH_LEN 128               /*40 sha1, 64 blake2s256 128 blake2b512*/
++#define BUF_AND_HASH HASH_LEN + 64 /* length of the hash and other data to get size of buffer */
++#define HASH_BUFLEN 8192	   /* 8192 seems to be a good balance between freads
++				    * and the digest func*/
+ static void
+ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+@@ -236,6 +258,9 @@
+ 	int status;
+ 	pid_t pid;
+ 
++#ifdef DEBUG
++	fprintf(stderr, "In do_local_cmd\n");
++#endif
+ 	if (a->num == 0)
+ 		fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
+ 
+@@ -462,6 +487,8 @@
+ void tolocal(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct);
+ void toremote(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct);
+ void usage(void);
++void calculate_hash(char *, char *, off_t); /*get the hash of file to length*/
++void rand_str(char *, size_t); /*gen randome char string */
+ 
+ void source_sftp(int, char *, char *, struct sftp_conn *);
+ void sink_sftp(int, char *, const char *, struct sftp_conn *);
+@@ -480,11 +507,18 @@
+ 	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
+ 	long long llv;
+ 
++	/* we use this to prepend the debugging statements
++	 * so we know which side is saying what */
++	gethostname(hostname, HOST_NAME_MAX + 1);
++
+ 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	msetlocale();
+ 
++	/* for use with rand function when resume option is used*/
++	srand(time(NULL));
++
+ 	/* Copy argv, because we modify it */
+ 	argv0 = argv[0];
+ 	newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
+@@ -509,7 +543,7 @@
+ 
+ 	fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
+ 	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:X:")) != -1) {
++	    "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvZD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:X:")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		/* User-visible flags. */
+ 		case '1':
+@@ -590,24 +624,36 @@
+ 			addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
+ 			showprogress = 0;
+ 			break;
++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++		case 'Z':
++			/* currently resume only works in SCP mode */
++			resume_flag = 1;
++			mode = MODE_SCP;
++			break;
++#endif
+ 		case 'X':
+ 			/* Please keep in sync with sftp.c -X */
+ 			if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) {
+ 				r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv);
+-				if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) {
++				/* don't ask for a buffer larger than the maximum
++				 * size that SFTP can handle */
++				if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > (SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024))) {
+ 					r = -1;
+ 					errno = EINVAL;
+ 				}
+ 				if (r == -1) {
+-					fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s",
+-					     optarg + 7, strerror(errno));
++					fatal("Invalid buffer size. Must be between 1B and 255KB."
++					      "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 7, strerror(errno));
+ 				}
+ 				sftp_copy_buflen = (size_t)llv;
+ 			} else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) {
+-				llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024,
++				/* more than 10k to 15k requests starts stalling the connection
++				 * 8192 * default buffer size is 256MB of outstanding data.
++				 * if users need more then they need to up the buffer size */
++				llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 8 * 1024,
+ 				    &errstr);
+ 				if (errstr != NULL) {
+-					fatal("Invalid number of requests "
++					fatal("Invalid number of requests. Must be between 1 and 8192. "
+ 					    "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr);
+ 				}
+ 				sftp_nrequests = (size_t)llv;
+@@ -695,11 +741,20 @@
+ 	remin = remout = -1;
+ 	do_cmd_pid = -1;
+ 	/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
+-	(void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
+-	    verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+-	    iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
+-	    targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
++	/* In the event of an hpn to hpn connection the scp
++	 * command is rewritten to hpnscp. This happens in
++	 * clientloop.c -cjr 12/12/2022 */
+ 
++	(void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s%s%s%s%s%s",
++	    remote_path ? remote_path : "scp",
++	    verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
++	    iamrecursive ? " -r" : "",
++	    pflag ? " -p" : "",
++	    targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "",
++	    resume_flag ? " -Z" : "");
++#ifdef DEBUG
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: Sending cmd %s\n", hostname, cmd);
++#endif
+ 	(void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+ 
+ 	if (colon(argv[argc - 1]))	/* Dest is remote host. */
+@@ -1324,6 +1379,74 @@
+ 	free(src);
+ }
+ 
++/* calculate the hash of a file up to length bytes
++ * this is used to determine if remote and local file
++ * fragments match. There may be a more efficient process for the hashing
++ * Note: LibreSSL doesn't support blake2b512 so we can't offer them
++ * the resume feature cjr 7/18/2023 */
++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++void calculate_hash(char *filename, char *output, off_t length)
++{
++	int n, md_len;
++	EVP_MD_CTX *c;
++	const EVP_MD *md;
++	char buf[HASH_BUFLEN];
++	ssize_t bytes;
++	unsigned char out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++	char tmp[3];
++	FILE *file_ptr;
++	*output = '\0';
++
++	/* open file for calculating hash */
++	file_ptr = fopen(filename, "r");
++	if (file_ptr==NULL)
++	{
++		if (verbose_mode) {
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: error opening file %s\n", hostname, filename);
++			/* file the expected output with spaces */
++			snprintf(output, HASH_LEN, "%s",  " ");
++		}
++		return;
++	}
++
++	md = EVP_get_digestbyname("blake2b512");
++	c = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++	EVP_DigestInit_ex(c, md, NULL);
++
++	while (length > 0) {
++		if (length > HASH_BUFLEN)
++			/* fread returns the number of elements read.
++			 * in this case 1. Multiply by the length to get the bytes */
++			bytes=fread(buf, HASH_BUFLEN, 1, file_ptr) * HASH_BUFLEN;
++		else
++			bytes=fread(buf, length, 1, file_ptr) * length;
++		EVP_DigestUpdate(c, buf, bytes);
++		length -= HASH_BUFLEN;
++	}
++	EVP_DigestFinal(c, out, &md_len);
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(c);
++	/* convert the hash into a string */
++	for(n=0; n < md_len; n++) {
++		snprintf(tmp, 3, "%02x", out[n]);
++		strncat(output, tmp, 3);
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: HASH IS '%s' of length %ld\n", hostname, output, strlen(output));
++#endif
++	fclose(file_ptr);
++}
++#else
++void calculate_hash(char *filename, char *output, off_t length)
++{
++  /* empty function for builds without openssl or are using libressl */
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++
++#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \
++	((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \
++	 (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \
++	 (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
++
+ /* Prepare remote path, handling ~ by assuming cwd is the homedir */
+ static char *
+ prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+@@ -1407,14 +1530,23 @@
+ 	struct stat stb;
+ 	static BUF buffer;
+ 	BUF *bp;
+-	off_t i, statbytes;
++	off_t i, statbytes, xfer_size;
+ 	size_t amt, nr;
+ 	int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
+-	char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX];
++	char *cp, *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + BUF_AND_HASH], encname[PATH_MAX];
+ 	int len;
++	char hashsum[HASH_LEN+1], test_hashsum[HASH_LEN+1];
++	char inbuf[PATH_MAX + BUF_AND_HASH];
++	size_t insize;
++	unsigned long long ull;
++	char *match; /* used to communicate fragment match */
++	match = "\0"; /*default is to fail the match. NULL and F both indicate fail*/
+ 
+ 	for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+ 		name = argv[indx];
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s index is %d, name is %s\n", hostname, indx, name);
++#endif
+ 		statbytes = 0;
+ 		len = strlen(name);
+ 		while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
+@@ -1436,6 +1568,14 @@
+ 		unset_nonblock(fd);
+ 		switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
+ 		case S_IFREG:
++			/* only calculate hash if we are in resume mode and a file*/
++			if (resume_flag) {
++				calculate_hash(name, hashsum, stb.st_size);
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Name is '%s' and hash '%s'\n", hostname, name, hashsum);
++				fprintf (stderr,"%s: size of %s is %ld\n", hostname, name, stb.st_size);
++#endif
++			}
+ 			break;
+ 		case S_IFDIR:
+ 			if (iamrecursive) {
+@@ -1457,14 +1597,133 @@
+ 				goto next;
+ 		}
+ #define	FILEMODEMASK	(S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
+-		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
+-		    (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
+-		    (long long)stb.st_size, last);
+-		if (verbose_mode)
+-			fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
++		/* Add a hash of the file along with the filemode if in resume */
++		if (resume_flag)
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s %s\n",
++			    (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
++			    (long long)stb.st_size, hashsum, last);
++		else
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
++			    (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
++			    (long long)stb.st_size, last);
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: Sending file modes: %s", hostname, buf);
++#endif
+ 		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+-		if (response() < 0)
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: inbuf length %ld buf length %ld\n", hostname, strlen(inbuf), strlen(buf));
++#endif
++		if (resume_flag) { /* get the hash response from the remote */
++			(void) atomicio(read, remin, inbuf, BUF_AND_HASH - 1);
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: we got '%s' in inbuf length %ld buf was %ld\n",
++					hostname, inbuf, strlen(inbuf), strlen(buf));
++#endif
++		}
++		if (response() < 0) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: response is less than 0\n", hostname);
++#endif
+ 			goto next;
++		}
++		xfer_size = stb.st_size;
++
++		/* we only do the following in resume mode because we have a
++		 * new buf from the remote to parse */
++		if (resume_flag) {
++			cp = inbuf;
++			if (*cp == 'R') { /* resume file transfer*/
++				char *in_hashsum; /* where to hold the incoming hash */
++				in_hashsum = calloc(HASH_LEN+1, sizeof(char));
++				for (++cp; cp < inbuf + 5; cp++) {
++					/* skip over the mode */
++				}
++				if (*cp++ != ' ') {
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: mode not delineated!\n", hostname);
++				}
++
++				if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: size not present\n", hostname);
++				ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
++				if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: size not delimited\n", hostname);
++				if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull))
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: size out of range\n", hostname);
++				insize = (off_t)ull;
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf (stderr, "%s: received size of %ld\n", hostname, insize);
++#endif
++
++				/* copy the cp pointer byte by byte */
++				int i;
++				for (i = 0; i < HASH_LEN; i++) {
++					strncat(in_hashsum, cp++, 1);
++				}
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf (stderr, "%s: in_hashsum '%s'\n", hostname, in_hashsum);
++#endif
++
++				/*get the hash of the source file to the byte length we just got*/
++				calculate_hash(name, test_hashsum, insize);
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: calculated hashsum of local %s to %ld is %s\n",
++					hostname, last, insize, test_hashsum);
++#endif
++				/* compare the incoming hash to the hash of the local file*/
++				if (strcmp(in_hashsum, test_hashsum) == 0) {
++					/* the fragments match so we should seek to the appropriate place in the
++					 * local file and set the remote file to append */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: File fragments match\n", hostname);
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: seeking to %ld\n", hostname, insize);
++#endif
++					xfer_size = stb.st_size - insize;
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: xfer_size: %ld, stb.st_size: %ld insize: %ld\n",
++						hostname, xfer_size, stb.st_size, insize);
++#endif
++					if (lseek(fd, insize, SEEK_CUR) != (off_t)insize) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++						fprintf(stderr, "%s: lseek did not return %ld\n", hostname, insize) ;
++#endif
++						goto next;
++					}
++					match = "M";
++				} else {
++					/* the fragments don't match so we should start over from the begining */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: File fragments do not match '%s'(in) '%s'(local)\n",
++				       		hostname, in_hashsum, test_hashsum);
++#endif
++					match = "F";
++					xfer_size = stb.st_size;
++				}
++				free(in_hashsum);
++			}
++			if (*cp == 'S') { /* skip file */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Should be skipping this file\n", hostname);
++#endif
++				goto next;
++			}
++			if (*cp == 'C') { /*transfer entire file*/
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Resending entire file\n", hostname);
++#endif
++				xfer_size = stb.st_size;
++			}
++			/* need to send the match status
++			 * We always send the match status or we get out of sync
++			 */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: sending match %s\n", hostname, match);
++#endif
++			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, match, 1);
++		}
++
+ 		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+ next:			if (fd != -1) {
+ 				(void) close(fd);
+@@ -1472,13 +1731,17 @@
+ 			}
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: going to xfer %ld\n", hostname, xfer_size);
++#endif
+ 		if (showprogress)
+-			start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
++			start_progress_meter(curfile, xfer_size, &statbytes);
+ 		set_nonblock(remout);
+-		for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
++		for (haderr = i = 0; i < xfer_size; i += bp->cnt) {
+ 			amt = bp->cnt;
+-			if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
+-				amt = stb.st_size - i;
++			if (i + (off_t)amt > xfer_size)
++				amt = xfer_size - i;
+ 			if (!haderr) {
+ 				if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd,
+ 				    bp->buf, amt)) != amt) {
+@@ -1675,24 +1938,35 @@
+ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ {
+ 	static BUF buffer;
+-	struct stat stb;
++	struct stat stb, cpstat, npstat;
+ 	BUF *bp;
+ 	off_t i;
+ 	size_t j, count;
+ 	int amt, exists, first, ofd;
+ 	mode_t mode, omode, mask;
+-	off_t size, statbytes;
++	off_t size, statbytes, xfer_size;
+ 	unsigned long long ull;
+ 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerr;
+-	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
++	char ch, *cp, *np, *np_tmp, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384], visbuf[16384];
+ 	char **patterns = NULL;
+ 	size_t n, npatterns = 0;
+ 	struct timeval tv[2];
++	char remote_hashsum[HASH_LEN+1];
++	char local_hashsum[HASH_LEN+1];
++	char tmpbuf[BUF_AND_HASH];
++	char outbuf[BUF_AND_HASH];
++	char match;
++	int bad_match_flag = 0;
++	np = NULL; /* this was originally '/0' but that's wrong */
++	np_tmp = NULL;
+ 
+ #define	atime	tv[0]
+ #define	mtime	tv[1]
+ #define	SCREWUP(str)	{ why = str; goto screwup; }
+ 
++#ifdef DEBUG
++	fprintf (stderr, "%s: LOCAL In sink with %s\n", hostname, src);
++#endif
+ 	if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0))
+ 		SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size");
+ 
+@@ -1708,9 +1982,16 @@
+ 	if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+ 		verifydir(targ);
+ 
++#ifdef DEBUG
++	fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n",hostname);
++#endif
+ 	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ 	if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+ 		targisdir = 1;
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: Target is %s with a size of %ld\n", hostname, targ, stb.st_size);
++#endif
+ 	if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
+@@ -1720,6 +2001,10 @@
+ 			fatal_f("could not expand pattern");
+ 	}
+ 	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
++		bad_match_flag = 0; /* used in resume mode. */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: At start of loop buf is %s\n", hostname, buf);
++#endif
+ 		cp = buf;
+ 		if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+ 			goto done;
+@@ -1747,6 +2032,9 @@
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		if (buf[0] == 'E') {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname);
++#endif
+ 			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ 			goto done;
+ 		}
+@@ -1754,6 +2042,9 @@
+ 			*--cp = 0;
+ 
+ 		cp = buf;
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: buf is %s\n", hostname, buf);
++#endif
+ 		if (*cp == 'T') {
+ 			setimes++;
+ 			cp++;
+@@ -1781,9 +2072,19 @@
+ 			if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 ||
+ 			    atime.tv_usec > 999999)
+ 				SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname);
++#endif
+ 			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (*cp == 'R') { /*resume file transfer (dont' think I need this here)*/
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: Received a RESUME request with %s\n", hostname, cp);
++#endif
++			resume_flag = 1;
++		}
+ 		if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
+@@ -1799,6 +2100,18 @@
+ 			SCREWUP("expected control record");
+ 		}
+ 		mode = 0;
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: buf is %s\n", hostname, buf);
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp);
++#endif
++		/* we need to track if this object is a directory
++		 * before we move the pointer. If we are in resume mode
++		 * we might end up trying to get an mdsum on a directory
++		 * and that doesn't work */
++		int dir_flag = 0;
++		if (*cp == 'D')
++			dir_flag = 1;
++
+ 		for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
+ 			if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
+ 				SCREWUP("bad mode");
+@@ -1809,6 +2122,10 @@
+ 		if (*cp++ != ' ')
+ 			SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
+ 
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp);
++#endif
++
+ 		if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
+ 			SCREWUP("size not present");
+ 		ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
+@@ -1818,11 +2135,32 @@
+ 			SCREWUP("size out of range");
+ 		size = (off_t)ull;
+ 
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp);
++#endif
++		if (resume_flag && !dir_flag) {
++			*remote_hashsum = '\0';
++			int i;
++			for (i = 0; i < HASH_LEN; i++) {
++				strncat (remote_hashsum, cp++, 1);
++			}
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: '%s'\n", hostname, remote_hashsum);
++#endif
++			if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
++				SCREWUP("hash not delimited");
++		}
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: cp is %s\n", hostname, cp);
++#endif
+ 		if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
+ 		    strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
+ 			run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+ 			exit(1);
+ 		}
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s cp is %s\n", hostname, cp);
++#endif
+ 		if (npatterns > 0) {
+ 			for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) {
+ 				if (strcmp(patterns[n], cp) == 0 ||
+@@ -1892,11 +2230,195 @@
+ 		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
++		stat(cp, &cpstat);
++		xfer_size = size;
++		if (resume_flag) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: np is %s\n", hostname, np);
++#endif
++			/* does the file exist and if it does it writable? */
++			if (stat(np, &npstat) == -1) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s Local file does not exist size is %ld!\n",
++					hostname, npstat.st_size);
++#endif
++				npstat.st_size = 0;
++			} else {
++				/* check to see if the file is writeable
++				 * if it isn't then we need to skip it but
++				 * before we skip it we need to send the remote
++				 * what they are expecting so BUF_AND_HASH bytes and then
++				 * a null.
++				 * NOTE!!! The format in the snprintf needs the actual numeric
++				 * because using a define isn't working */
++				if (access (np, W_OK) != 0) {
++					fprintf(stderr, "scp: %s: Permission denied on %s\n", np, hostname);
++					snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "S%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-2, " ");
++					(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf));
++					(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
++					continue;
++				}
++			}
++			/* this file is already here do we need to move it?
++			 * Check to make sure npstat.st_size > 0. If it is 0 then we
++			 * may trying to be moving a zero byte file in which case this
++			 * following block fails. See on 0 byte files the hashes will
++			 * always match and the file won't be created even though it should
++			 */
++			if (xfer_size == npstat.st_size && (npstat.st_size > 0)) {
++				calculate_hash(np, local_hashsum, npstat.st_size);
++				if (strcmp(local_hashsum,remote_hashsum) == 0) {
++					/* we can skip this file if we want to. */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: Files are the same\n", hostname);
++#endif
++					/* the remote is expecting something so we need to send them something*/
++					snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "S%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-2, " ");
++					(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf));
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr,"%s: sent '%s' to remote\n", hostname, outbuf);
++#endif
++					/* the remote is waiting on an ack so send a null */
++					(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
++					if (showprogress)
++						fprintf (stderr, "Skipping identical file: %s\n", np);
++					continue;
++				} else {
++					/* file sizes are the same but they don't match */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: target(%ld) is different than source(%ld)!\n",
++						hostname, npstat.st_size, size);
++#endif
++					snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof outbuf, "C%04o %lld %s",
++						 (u_int) (npstat.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
++						 (long long)npstat.st_size, local_hashsum);
++					snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-1, tmpbuf);
++					(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf));
++					bad_match_flag = 1;
++				}
++			}
++			/* if npstat.st_size is 0 then the local file doesn't exist and
++			 * we have to move it. Since we are in resume mode treat it as a resume */
++			if (npstat.st_size < xfer_size || (npstat.st_size == 0)) {
++				char rand_string[9];
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s is smaller than %s\n", hostname, np, cp);
++#endif
++				calculate_hash(np, local_hashsum, npstat.st_size);
++#define	FILEMODEMASK	(S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
++				snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof outbuf, "R%04o %lld %s",
++					 (u_int) (npstat.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
++					 (long long)npstat.st_size, local_hashsum);
++				snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-1, tmpbuf);
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf (stderr, "%s: new buf is %s of length %ld\n",
++					 hostname, outbuf, strlen(outbuf));
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Sending new file (%s) modes: %s\n",
++					hostname, np, outbuf);
++#endif
++				/*now we have to send np's length and hash to the other end
++				 * if the computed hashes match then we seek to np's length in
++				 * file and append to np starting from there */
++				(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf));
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: New size: %ld, size: %ld, st_size: %ld\n",
++					hostname, size - npstat.st_size, size, npstat.st_size);
++#endif
++				xfer_size = size - npstat.st_size;
++				resume_flag = 1;
++				np_tmp = xstrdup(np);
++				/* We should have a random component to avoid clobbering a
++				 * local file */
++				rand_str(rand_string, 8);
++				strcat(np, rand_string);
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Will concat %s to %s after xfer\n",
++					hostname, np, np_tmp);
++#endif
++			} else if (npstat.st_size > size) {
++			/* the target file is larger than the source.
++			 * so we need to overwrite it. We don't need to send the hash though. */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: target(%ld) is larger than source(%ld)!\n",
++					hostname, npstat.st_size, size);
++#endif
++				snprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof outbuf, "C%04o %lld",
++					 (u_int) (npstat.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
++					 (long long)npstat.st_size);
++				snprintf(outbuf, BUF_AND_HASH, "%-*s", BUF_AND_HASH-1, tmpbuf);
++				(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, outbuf, strlen(outbuf));
++				bad_match_flag = 1;
++			}
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: CP is %s(%ld) NP is %s(%ld)\n",
++				 hostname, cp, size, np, npstat.st_size);
++#endif
++			/* we are in resume mode so we need this *here* and not later
++			 * because we need to get the file match information from the remote
++			 * outside of resume mode we don't get that so we get out of sync
++			 * so we have a test for the resume_flag after this block */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname);
++#endif
++			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
++
++			/* the remote is always going to send a match status
++			 * so we need to read it so we don't get out of sync */
++			(void) atomicio(read, remin, &match, 1);
++			if (match != 'M') {/*fragments do not match*/
++				/* expected response of F, M and NULL *but*
++				 * anything other than M is a failure
++				 * if it's a NULL then we reset xfer_size but
++				 * we retain the file pointers */
++				xfer_size = size;
++				bad_match_flag = 1;
++				if (match == 'F') {
++					/* got an F for failure and not NULL
++					 * so we want to swap over the filename from
++					 * the temp back to the original */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: match status is F\n", hostname);
++#endif
++					if (np_tmp != NULL)
++						np = np_tmp;
++					else {
++						continue;
++					}
++				} else {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++					fprintf(stderr, "%s: match received is NULL\n", hostname);
++#endif
++				}
++			} else {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s match status is M\n", hostname);
++#endif
++				bad_match_flag = 0; /* while this is set at the beginning of the
++						     * loop I'm setting it here explicitly as well */
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: Creating file. mode is %d for %s\n",
++			hostname, mode, np);
++#endif
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+ bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+-		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
++
++		/* in the case of not using the resume function we need this vwrite here
++		 * in the case of using the resume flag it comes in the above if (resume_flag) block
++		 * why? because scp is weird and depends on an intricate and silly dance of
++		 * call and response at just the right time. That's why */
++		if (!resume_flag) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname);
++#endif
++			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
++		}
++
+ 		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+ 			(void) close(ofd);
+ 			continue;
+@@ -1911,13 +2433,17 @@
+ 		 */
+ 		statbytes = 0;
+ 		if (showprogress)
+-			start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
++			start_progress_meter(curfile, xfer_size, &statbytes);
+ 		set_nonblock(remin);
+-		for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: xfer_size is %ld\n", hostname, xfer_size);
++#endif
++		for (count = i = 0; i < xfer_size; i += bp->cnt) {
+ 			amt = bp->cnt;
+-			if (i + amt > size)
+-				amt = size - i;
++			if (i + amt > xfer_size)
++				amt = xfer_size - i;
+ 			count += amt;
++			/* read the data from the socket*/
+ 			do {
+ 				j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt,
+ 				    scpio, &statbytes);
+@@ -1952,8 +2478,78 @@
+ 			wrerr = 1;
+ 		}
+ 		if (!wrerr && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
+-		    ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0)
++		    ftruncate(ofd, xfer_size) != 0)
+ 			note_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
++
++		/* if np_tmp isn't set then we don't have a resume file to cat */
++		/* likewise, bad match flag means no resume flag */
++#ifdef DEBUG
++		fprintf (stderr, "%s: resume_flag: %d, np_tmp: %s, bad_match_flag: %d\n",
++			 hostname, resume_flag, np_tmp, bad_match_flag);
++#endif
++		if (resume_flag && np_tmp && !bad_match_flag) {
++			FILE *orig, *resume;
++			char res_buf[512]; /* set at 512 just because, might want to increase*/
++			ssize_t res_bytes = 0;
++			off_t sum = 0;
++			struct stat res_stat;
++			*res_buf = '\0';
++			orig = NULL; /*supress warnings*/
++			resume = NULL; /*supress warnings*/
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: Resume flag is set. Going to concat %s to %s  now\n",
++				hostname, np, np_tmp);
++#endif
++			/* np/ofd is the resume file so open np_tmp for appending
++			 * close ofd because we are going to be shifting it
++			 * and I don't wnat the same file open in multiple descriptors */
++			if (close(ofd) == -1)
++				note_err("%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno));
++			/* orig is the target file, resume is the temp file */
++			orig = fopen(np_tmp, "a"); /*open for appending*/
++			if (orig == NULL) {
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Could not open %s for appending.", hostname, np_tmp);
++				goto stopcat;
++			}
++			resume = fopen(np, "r"); /*open for reading only*/
++			if (resume == NULL) {
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Could not open %s for reading.", hostname, np);
++				goto stopcat;
++			}
++			/* get the number of bytes in the temp file*/
++			if (fstat(fileno(resume), &res_stat) == -1) {
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: Could not stat %s", hostname, np);
++				goto stopcat;
++			}
++			/* while the number of bytes read from the temp file
++			 * is less than the size of the file read in a chunk and
++			 * write it to the target file */
++			do {
++				res_bytes = fread(res_buf, 1, 512, resume);
++				fwrite(res_buf, 1, res_bytes, orig);
++				sum += res_bytes;
++			} while (sum < res_stat.st_size);
++
++stopcat:		if (orig)
++				fclose(orig);
++			if (resume)
++				fclose(resume);
++			/* delete the resume file */
++			remove(np);
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: np(%s) and np_tmp(%s)\n", hostname, np, np_tmp);
++#endif
++			np = np_tmp;
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s np(%s) and np_tmp(%s)\n", hostname, np, np_tmp);
++#endif
++			/* reset ofd to the original np */
++			if ((ofd = open(np_tmp, O_WRONLY)) == -1) {
++				fprintf(stderr, "%s: couldn't open %s in append function\n", hostname, np_tmp);
++				atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
++				goto bad;
++			}
++		}
+ 		if (pflag) {
+ 			if (exists || omode != mode)
+ #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+@@ -1988,8 +2584,17 @@
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 		/* If no error was noted then signal success for this file */
+-		if (note_err(NULL) == 0)
++		if (note_err(NULL) == 0) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++			fprintf (stderr, "%s: Sending null to remout.\n", hostname);
++#endif
+ 			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
++		}
++		/* we are in resume mode and we have allocated memory for np_tmp */
++		if (resume_flag && np_tmp != NULL) {
++			free(np_tmp);
++			np_tmp = NULL;
++		}
+ 	}
+ done:
+ 	for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
+@@ -2133,11 +2738,20 @@
+ void
+ usage(void)
+ {
++#if (defined WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
++	(void) fprintf(stderr,
++	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTvZ] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
++	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option]\n"
++	    "           [-P port] [-S program] [-X sftp_option] source ... target\n");
++	exit(1);
++#else
+ 	(void) fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
+ 	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option]\n"
+ 	    "           [-P port] [-S program] [-X sftp_option] source ... target\n");
+ 	exit(1);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -2276,6 +2890,18 @@
+ 		exit(1);
+ }
+ 
++void rand_str(char *dest, size_t length) {
++	char charset[] = "0123456789"
++		"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
++		"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
++
++	while (length-- > 0) {
++		size_t index = (double) rand() / RAND_MAX * (sizeof charset - 1);
++		*dest++ = charset[index];
++	}
++	*dest = '\0';
++}
++
+ void
+ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ {
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.c	2025-06-14 10:53:02.022835252 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.c	2025-06-14 12:36:43.529579310 +0200
+@@ -217,6 +217,12 @@
+ 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+ 	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+ 	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
++	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
++	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++	options->none_enabled = -1;
++	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
++	options->use_mptcp = -1;
++	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
+@@ -511,6 +517,22 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+ 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
++	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++		options->none_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && options->none_enabled == 0) {
++		debug ("Attempted to enabled None MAC without setting None Enabled to true. None MAC disabled.");
++		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
++	}
++	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1)
++		options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1;
++	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
++		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
++	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++	if (options->use_mptcp == -1)
++		options->use_mptcp = 0;
+ 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+ 		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
+ 	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+@@ -595,6 +617,8 @@
+ 	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
++	sNoneEnabled, sNoneMacEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled,
++	sDisableMTAES, sUseMPTCP,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+@@ -804,6 +828,12 @@
+ 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "nonemacenabled", sNoneMacEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "usemptcp", sUseMPTCP, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "disableMTAES", sDisableMTAES, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -869,6 +899,7 @@
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+ 		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
++			debug("Config token is %s", keywords[i].name);
+ 			*flags = keywords[i].flags;
+ 			return keywords[i].opcode;
+ 		}
+@@ -1640,6 +1671,30 @@
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
++	case sTcpRcvBufPoll:
++		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sHPNDisabled:
++		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sNoneEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sNoneMacEnabled:
++		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sDisableMTAES:
++		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
++	case sUseMPTCP:
++		intptr = &options->use_mptcp;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
+ 		intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+  parse_flag:
+@@ -3434,6 +3489,11 @@
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHPNDisabled, o->hpn_disabled);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sTcpRcvBufPoll, o->tcp_rcv_buf_poll);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sNoneEnabled, o->none_enabled);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sNoneMacEnabled, o->nonemac_enabled);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseMPTCP, o->use_mptcp);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sRefuseConnection, o->refuse_connection);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/servconf.h	2025-06-14 10:53:02.023331755 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/servconf.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.332534777 +0200
+@@ -227,6 +227,13 @@
+ 	char   *pam_service_name;
+ 	int	permit_pam_user_change;	/* Allow PAM to change user name */
+ 
++	/* hpnssh options */
++	int	tcp_rcv_buf_poll;	/* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/
++	int	hpn_disabled;		/* disable hpn functionality. false by default */
++	int	none_enabled;		/* Enable NONE cipher switch */
++	int     nonemac_enabled;        /* Enable NONE MAC switch */
++	int	use_mptcp;		/* Use MPTCP - Linux only */
++	int	disable_multithreaded;	/* Disable multithreaded aes-ctr cipher */
+ 	int	permit_tun;
+ 
+ 	char   **permitted_opens;	/* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/serverloop.c openssh-10.0p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/serverloop.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.992010916 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/serverloop.c	2025-06-14 12:39:09.690199658 +0200
+@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
++#include "metrics.h"
++#include "cipher-switch.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -326,6 +328,7 @@
+ 	sigset_t bsigset, osigset;
+ 
+ 	debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
++	ssh->start_time = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGCHLD) == -1)
+ 		error_f("bsigset setup: %s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -370,9 +373,15 @@
+ 	collect_children(ssh);
+ 	free(pfd);
+ 
++	/* write final log entry (do we need this here? -cjr)*/
++	sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
++
+ 	/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
+ 	channel_free_all(ssh);
+ 
++	/* final entry must come after channels close -cjr */
++	sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
++
+ 	/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
+ 	session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -574,6 +583,8 @@
+ 	c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+ 	    -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 	    0, "server-session", 1);
++	if ((options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll) && (!options.hpn_disabled))
++		c->dynamic_window = 1;
+ 	if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+ 		debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+ 		channel_free(ssh, c);
+@@ -642,6 +653,67 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/* we need to get the actual socket in use and from there
++ * read the values in the TCP_INFO struct.
++ * shout out to Rene Pfiffer for the article https://linuxgazette.net/136/pfeiffer.html
++ * for getting me started. This only works on systems that support the tcp_info
++ * struct; linux, freebsd, netbsd as of now. Apple has one but it's completely different
++ * than any of the others.
++ */
++static int
++server_input_metrics_request(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
++{
++	int success = 0;
++	/* TCP_INFO is defined in metrics.h
++	 * if it's not defined then we don't support tcp_info
++	 * so just return a failure code */
++#if !defined TCP_INFO
++	return success;
++#else
++        struct tcp_info tcp_info;
++	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
++	int tcp_info_len;
++	/* this is the socket of the current connection */
++	int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
++	int r;
++	binn *metricsobj;
++
++	tcp_info_len = sizeof(tcp_info); /*expect around 330 bytes */
++	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
++
++	/* create the binn object to hold the serialized metrics */
++	metricsobj = binn_object();
++	if (metricsobj == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create metrics object");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	debug("Stack metrics request for connection %d", sock_in);
++	if ((r = getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_INFO, (void *)&tcp_info,
++			   (socklen_t *)&tcp_info_len)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not read tcp_info from socket");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* write the tcp_info data to the binn object */
++	metrics_write_binn_object(&tcp_info, metricsobj);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, binn_ptr(metricsobj),
++				   binn_size(metricsobj))) != 0) {
++		error_fr(r, "Failed to build tcp_info object");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* copy the pointer of the response to the passed in response pointer */
++	*respp = resp;
++	resp = NULL; /* don't free it */
++	/* everything worked so set success to true */
++	success = 1;
++out:
++	sshbuf_free(resp);
++	binn_free(metricsobj);
++	return success;
++#endif /* TCP_INFO */
++}
++
+ static int
+ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
+ {
+@@ -818,6 +890,10 @@
+ 		success = 1;
+ 	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ 		success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp);
++	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "stack-metrics@hpnssh.org") == 0) {
++		/* resp is the response (sshbuf struct) from the function which is
++		 * handled below in the want_reply stanza */
++		success = server_input_metrics_request(ssh, &resp);
+ 	}
+ 	/* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */
+ 	if (want_reply) {
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/session.c openssh-10.0p1/session.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/session.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.741334418 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/session.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.333888095 +0200
+@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "atomicio.h"
++#include "cipher-switch.h"
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+ #include <kafs.h>
+@@ -237,6 +238,7 @@
+ 		goto authsock_err;
+ 
+ 	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
++	/* this shouldn't matter if its hpn or not - cjr */
+ 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth-listener",
+ 	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+ 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+@@ -564,6 +566,9 @@
+ 	session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
+ 	    s->is_subsystem, 0);
+ #endif
++	/* switch to the parallel ciphers if necessary */
++	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0)
++		cipher_switch(ssh);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -677,6 +682,9 @@
+ 	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
+ 	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
++	/* switch to the parallel cipher if appropriate */
++	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0)
++		cipher_switch(ssh);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.1 openssh-10.0p1/sftp.1
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.1	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sftp.1	2025-06-14 10:54:01.334573170 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
+ transport.
+ It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
+ compression.
++.Nm
++is binary compatible with OpenSSH's sftp and uses the same directive and configuration
++options except where noted.
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Ar destination
+@@ -338,7 +341,8 @@
+ Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+ Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+ but will increase memory usage.
+-The default is 64 outstanding requests.
++The default is 1024 outstanding requests providing for 32MB
++of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer.
+ .It Fl r
+ Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
+ Note that
+@@ -367,10 +371,13 @@
+ .It Cm nrequests Ns = Ns Ar value
+ Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests may be in progress
+ at any point in time during a download or upload.
+-By default 64 requests may be active concurrently.
++This value must be between 1 and 8192.
++By default 1024 requests may be active concurrently.
+ .It Cm buffer Ns = Ns Ar value
+ Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP read/write operation used
+ during download or upload.
++This value must be between 1B and 255KB. You may use
++the K unit for the size. E.g. 32768 or 32K.
+ By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+ .El
+ .El
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.c openssh-10.0p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.664429990 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sftp.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.335020156 +0200
+@@ -2570,20 +2570,25 @@
+ 			/* Please keep in sync with ssh.c -X */
+ 			if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) {
+ 				r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv);
+-				if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) {
++				/* don't ask for a buffer larger than the maximum
++				 * size that SFTP can handle */
++				if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > (SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024))) {
+ 					r = -1;
+ 					errno = EINVAL;
+ 				}
+ 				if (r == -1) {
+-					fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s",
+-					     optarg + 7, strerror(errno));
++					fatal("Invalid buffer size. Must be between 1B and 255KB."
++					    "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 7, strerror(errno));
+ 				}
+ 				copy_buffer_len = (size_t)llv;
+ 			} else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) {
+-				llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024,
++				/* more than 10k to 15k requests starts stalling the connection
++				 * 8192 * default buffer size is 256MB of outstanding data.
++				 * if users need more then they need to up the buffer size */
++				llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 8 * 1024,
+ 				    &errstr);
+ 				if (errstr != NULL) {
+-					fatal("Invalid number of requests "
++					fatal("Invalid number of requests. Must be between 1 and 8192. "
+ 					    "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr);
+ 				}
+ 				num_requests = (size_t)llv;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp-client.c openssh-10.0p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sftp-client.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.663814268 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sftp-client.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.335625123 +0200
+@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@
+ #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN	32768
+ 
+ /* Default number of concurrent xfer requests (fix sftp.1 scp.1 if changed) */
+-#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	64
++/* 1024 xfer requests gives us 32MB of receive buffer space */
++#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	1024
+ 
+ /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
+ #define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1 openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.1	2025-06-14 10:53:02.023904385 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.1	2025-06-14 11:29:03.370919913 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@
+ X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
++.Nm
++is binary compatible with the more well known OpenSSH and uses the same configuration
++directives, methods, and keywords except where noted with the exception of the default port.
++HPN-SSH servers, by default, use port 2222 for connection, and as such,
++.Nm
++clients
++attempt to connect on that port. If the connection attempt on port 2222 fails it will fallback to
++port 22. Please see the -p switch for more information.
+ .Pp
+ .Nm
+ connects and logs into the specified
+@@ -527,12 +535,14 @@
+ .It ControlMaster
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
++.It DisableMTAES*
+ .It DynamicForward
+ .It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
+ .It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EscapeChar
+ .It ExitOnForwardFailure
++.It FallbackPort
+ .It FingerprintHash
+ .It ForkAfterAuthentication
+ .It ForwardAgent
+@@ -556,6 +566,7 @@
+ .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ .It HostbasedAuthentication
+ .It Hostname
++.It HPNDisabled*
+ .It IPQoS
+ .It IdentitiesOnly
+ .It IdentityAgent
+@@ -571,7 +582,13 @@
+ .It LogLevel
+ .It LogVerbose
+ .It MACs
++.It Metrics
++.It MetricsInterval
++.It MetricsPath
+ .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
++.It NoneCipherEnabled*
++.It NoneEnabled*
++.It NoneMacEnabled*
+ .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ .It ObscureKeystrokeTiming
+ .It PKCS11Provider
+@@ -605,15 +622,19 @@
+ .It StrictHostKeyChecking
+ .It SyslogFacility
+ .It TCPKeepAlive
++.It TcpRcvBufPoll*
+ .It Tag
+ .It Tunnel
+ .It TunnelDevice
+ .It UpdateHostKeys
++.It UseMPTCP
+ .It User
+ .It UserKnownHostsFile
+ .It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+ .It VisualHostKey
+ .It XAuthLocation
++.Pp
++.It * Hpnssh specific configuration option.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ .It Fl P Ar tag
+@@ -630,6 +651,13 @@
+ Port to connect to on the remote host.
+ This can be specified on a
+ per-host basis in the configuration file.
++HPN-SSH uses a default port of 2222. It will automatically
++fallback to use the SSH standard port 22 if it cannot connect
++on port 2222. This fallback behaviour can be modified with the
++FallbackPort option. Note: if outbound port 2222 is
++blocked it may appear that the hpnssh client is non-responsive. In that event,
++either specify the correct port or use the ConnectTimeout option
++to trigger the port fallback more quickly.
+ .Pp
+ .It Fl Q Ar query_option
+ Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the following features:
+@@ -1821,3 +1849,7 @@
+ created OpenSSH.
+ Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+ protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
++Chris Rapier, Michael Stevens, Ben Bennet, and Mike Tasota developed
++the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center with grants
++from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and the National Science
++Foundation.
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_api.c openssh-10.0p1/ssh_api.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_api.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_api.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.337078874 +0200
+@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
++	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_RELEASE)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.c openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.337433040 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
+ #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++/* #include "log.h" */
++
++#define BUF_WATERSHED 256*1024
+ 
+ #ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG
+ # define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \
+@@ -49,8 +52,29 @@
+ 	int readonly;		/* Refers to external, const data */
+ 	u_int refcount;		/* Tracks self and number of child buffers */
+ 	struct sshbuf *parent;	/* If child, pointer to parent */
++	char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN];   /* String for buffer label - debugging use */
++	int type;               /* type of buffer enum (sshbuf_types)*/
+ };
+ 
++/* update the label string for a given sshbuf. Useful
++ * for debugging */
++void
++sshbuf_relabel(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *label)
++{
++	if (label != NULL)
++		strncpy(buf->label, label, MAX_LABEL_LEN-1);
++}
++
++/* set the type (from enum sshbuf_type) of the given sshbuf.
++ * The purpose is to allow different classes of buffers to
++ * follow different code paths if necessary */
++void
++sshbuf_type(struct sshbuf *buf, int type)
++{
++	if (type < BUF_MAX_TYPE)
++		buf->type = type;
++}
++
+ static inline int
+ sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+ {
+@@ -90,7 +114,7 @@
+ }
+ 
+ struct sshbuf *
+-sshbuf_new(void)
++sshbuf_new_label (const char *label)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *ret;
+ 
+@@ -101,6 +125,8 @@
+ 	ret->readonly = 0;
+ 	ret->refcount = 1;
+ 	ret->parent = NULL;
++	if (label != NULL)
++		strncpy(ret->label, label, MAX_LABEL_LEN-1);
+ 	if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) {
+ 		free(ret);
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -290,7 +316,18 @@
+ {
+ 	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+ 		return 0;
+-	return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off);
++	/* we need to reserve a small amount of overhead on the input buffer
++	 * or we can enter into a pathological state during bulk
++	 * data transfers. We use a fraction of the max size as we want it to scale
++	 * with the size of the input buffer. If we do it for all of the buffers
++	 * we fail the regression unit tests. This seems like a reasonable
++	 * solution. Of course, I still need to figure out *why* this is
++	 * happening and come up with an actual fix. TODO
++	 * cjr 4/19/2024 */
++	if (buf->type == BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT)
++		return buf->max_size / 1.05 - (buf->size - buf->off);
++	else
++		return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off);
+ }
+ 
+ const u_char *
+@@ -350,9 +387,36 @@
+ 	 */
+ 	need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
+ 	rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
++	/* With the changes in 8.9 the output buffer end up growing pretty
++	 * slowly. It's knows that it needs to grow but it only does so 32K
++	 * at a time. This means a lot of calls to realloc and memcpy which
++	 * kills performance until the buffer reaches some maximum size.
++	 * So we explicitly test for a buffer that's trying to grow and
++	 * if it is then we push the growth by 4MB at a time. This can result in
++	 * the buffer being over allocated (in terms of actual needs) but the
++	 * process is fast. This significantly reduces overhead
++	 * and improves performance. In this case we look for a buffer that is trying
++	 * to grow larger than BUF_WATERSHED (256*1024 taken from PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
++	 * and explcitly check that the buffer is being used for inbound outbound
++	 * channel buffering.
++	 * Updated for 18.4.1 -cjr 04/20/24
++	 */
++	if (rlen > BUF_WATERSHED && (buf->type == BUF_CHANNEL_OUTPUT || buf->type == BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT)) {
++		/* debug_f ("Prior: label: %s, %p, rlen is %zu need is %zu max_size is %zu",
++		   buf->label, buf, rlen, need, buf->max_size); */
++		/* easiest thing to do is grow the nuffer by 4MB each time. It might end
++		 * up being somewhat overallocated but works quickly */
++		need = (4*1024*1024);
++		rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
++		/* debug_f ("Post: label: %s, %p, rlen is %zu need is %zu max_size is %zu", */
++		/* 	 buf->label, buf, rlen, need, buf->max_size); */
++	}
+ 	SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
++
++	/* rlen might be above the max allocation */
+ 	if (rlen > buf->max_size)
+-		rlen = buf->alloc + need;
++		rlen = buf->max_size;
++
+ 	SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
+ 	if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) {
+ 		SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.h openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshbuf.h	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshbuf.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.337808997 +0200
+@@ -29,18 +29,49 @@
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 
+-#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0x8000000	/* Hard maximum size */
++#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0x8000000	/* Hard maximum size 128MB */
+ #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX		0x100000	/* Max child buffers */
+ #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM	(16384 / 8)	/* Max bignum *bytes* */
+ #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT	((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
++#define MAX_LABEL_LEN		64 /*maximum size of sshbuf label */
++#define sshbuf_new() sshbuf_new_label(__func__)
+ 
+ struct sshbuf;
+ 
++enum buffer_types {
++	BUF_CHANNEL_OUTPUT,
++	BUF_CHANNEL_INPUT,
++	BUF_CHANNEL_EXTENDED,
++	BUF_PACKET_INPUT,
++	BUF_PACKET_INCOMING,
++	BUF_PACKET_OUTPUT,
++	BUF_PACKET_OUTGOING,
++	BUF_MAX_TYPE
++};
++
+ /*
+  * Create a new sshbuf buffer.
+  * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+  */
+-struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);
++/* struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);*/
++
++/*
++ * Create a new labeled sshbuf buffer.
++ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
++ */
++struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new_label(const char *);
++
++/*
++ * relabel the sshbuf struct
++ */
++void sshbuf_relabel(struct sshbuf *, const char *);
++
++/*
++ * assign a type (from the buffer_types enum) to
++ * the buffer. Used to quickly identify the purpose of
++ * the buffer.
++ */
++void sshbuf_type(struct sshbuf *, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data.
+@@ -76,12 +107,13 @@
+ void	sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf);
+ 
+ /*
+- * Return the maximum size of buf
++ * Return the maximum usable size of buf
+  */
+ size_t	sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+ 
+ /*
+- * Set the maximum size of buf
++ * Set the maximum usable size of buf. Note that the buffer may consume up
++ * to 2x this memory plus bookkeeping overhead.
+  * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+  */
+ int	sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size);
+@@ -346,6 +378,9 @@
+ 		((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \
+ 	} while (0)
+ 
++
++void sshbuf_set_window_max(struct sshbuf *buf , size_t len);
++
+ /* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */
+ #ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+ 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.c	2025-06-14 10:53:02.024428197 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.c	2025-06-14 11:26:41.535259834 +0200
+@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
++#include "cipher-switch.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1122,6 +1123,10 @@
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'T':
+ 			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
++			/* ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a */
++			/* null cipher switch on an interactive session */
++			/* so explicitly disable it no matter what */
++			options.none_switch=0;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'o':
+ 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+@@ -1743,10 +1748,36 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
++	/* we try initially on the default hpnssh port returned by
++	 * default_ssh_port() which now returns HPNSSH_DEFAULT_PORT
++	 * if that fails we reset the port to SSH_DEFAULT_PORT
++	 * -cjr 8/17/2022
++	 */
++tryagain:
+ 	if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, options.host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr,
+ 	    options.port, options.connection_attempts,
+-	    &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
++	    &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) {
++		/* could not connect. If the port requested is the same as
++		 * hpnssh default port then fallback. Otherwise, exit */
++		if ((options.port == default_ssh_port()) && options.fallback) {
++			int port = options.fallback_port;
++			options.port = port;
++			fprintf(stderr, "HPNSSH server not available on default port %d\n",
++				default_ssh_port());
++			if (port == 22)
++				fprintf(stderr, "Falling back to OpenSSH default port %d\n",
++					port);
++			else
++				fprintf(stderr, "Falling back to user defined port %d\n",
++					port);
++			addrs = resolve_host(host, port, 1,
++					     cname, sizeof(cname));
++			goto tryagain;
++		} else {
++			exit(255);
++		}
+ 		exit(255);
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (addrs != NULL)
+ 		freeaddrinfo(addrs);
+@@ -1957,7 +1988,7 @@
+ 
+ /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
+ static void
+-fork_postauth(void)
++fork_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	if (need_controlpersist_detach)
+ 		control_persist_detach();
+@@ -1967,17 +1998,21 @@
+ 		fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+ 	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1)
+ 		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
++	/* we do the cipher switch here in the event that the client
++	   is forking or has a delayed fork */
++	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0)
++		cipher_switch(ssh);
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-forwarding_success(void)
++forwarding_success(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	if (forward_confirms_pending == -1)
+ 		return;
+ 	if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) {
+ 		debug_f("all expected forwarding replies received");
+ 		if (options.fork_after_authentication)
+-			fork_postauth();
++			fork_postauth(ssh);
+ 	} else {
+ 		debug2_f("%d expected forwarding replies remaining",
+ 		    forward_confirms_pending);
+@@ -2044,7 +2079,7 @@
+ 				    "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	forwarding_success();
++	forwarding_success(ssh);
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -2071,7 +2106,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	debug_f("tunnel forward established, id=%d", id);
+-	forwarding_success();
++	forwarding_success(ssh);
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -2272,6 +2307,15 @@
+ 	    NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
+ }
+ 
++/* this used to do a lot more but now it just checks to see
++ * if we are disabling hpn */
++static void
++hpn_options_init(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	channel_set_hpn_disabled(options.hpn_disabled);
++	debug_f("HPN disabled: %d", options.hpn_disabled);
++}
++
+ /* open new channel for a session */
+ static int
+ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2293,6 +2337,7 @@
+ 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ 	if (tty_flag) {
++		window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ 		window >>= 1;
+ 		packetmax >>= 1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2301,6 +2346,12 @@
+ 	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+ 	    "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
+ 
++	/* TODO: Is this the right place for these options? */
++	if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) {
++		c->dynamic_window = 1;
++		debug("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling");
++	}
++
+ 	debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
+ 
+ 	channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
+@@ -2317,6 +2368,13 @@
+ 	int r, interactive, id = -1;
+ 	char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * We need to initialize this early because the forwarding logic below
++	 * might open channels that use the hpn buffer sizes.  We can't send a
++	 * window of -1 (the default) to the server as it breaks things.
++	 */
++	hpn_options_init(ssh);
++
+ 	/* XXX should be pre-session */
+ 	if (!options.control_persist)
+ 		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
+@@ -2415,7 +2473,14 @@
+ 			debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
+ 			    "confirmation received");
+ 		} else
+-			fork_postauth();
++			fork_postauth(ssh);
++	} else {
++		/* check to see if we are switching ciphers to
++		 * one of our parallel versions. If the client is
++		 * forking then we handle it in fork_postauth()
++		 */
++		if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0)
++			cipher_switch(ssh);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ?
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config	2025-06-14 10:53:02.024947608 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config	2025-06-14 11:01:39.412445292 +0200
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+ #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
++#   UseMPTCP no
+ #
+ # This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
+ # To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh_config.5	2025-06-14 10:53:02.025331736 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh_config.5	2025-06-14 10:54:01.339955855 +0200
+@@ -62,6 +62,19 @@
+ .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ .El
+ .Pp
++.Xr hpnssh 1
++is fully compatible with OpenSSH's ssh and uses the same configuration format, directives, and options.
++.Xr hpnssh 1
++can use the same configuration file as
++.Xr ssh 1
++though the inverse is not necessarily true. This is because
++.Xr hpnssh 1
++has some additional options which are discussed below. As such users should either not
++use
++.Xr hpnssh 1
++specific directives in their default ssh_config files or ensure that they always use a
++custom config file.
++.Pp
+ Unless noted otherwise, for each parameter, the first obtained value
+ will be used.
+ The configuration files contain sections separated by
+@@ -833,6 +846,9 @@
+ or
+ .Cm no
+ (the default).
++.It Cm FallbackPort
++Specifies the port hpnssh should try to connect to if it fails connecting to the 
++default hpnsshd port of 2222. The default is port 22. HPN-SSH only. 
+ .It Cm FingerprintHash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+ Valid options are:
+@@ -1159,6 +1175,11 @@
+ .Cm Hostname
+ specifications).
+ The default is the name given on the command line.
++.It Cm HPNDisabled
++In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to 
++.Cm no. HPNSSH only.
+ .It Cm IdentitiesOnly
+ Specifies that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+@@ -1547,6 +1568,63 @@
+ .Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
++.It Cm Metrics
++Indicate that the ssh client should gather and write TCP stack metrics from the
++TCP_INFO socket structure on compliant operating systems to a text file. 
++These metrics will be collected from both the local and remote hosts if metrics 
++are supported by the version of SSH and TCP_INFO is supported by the 
++operating system. Currently operating system support is limited to Linux 
++version 3.7 and greater, NetBSD, and FreeBSD (version 6 or greater). 
++
++If one of the hosts does not support the Metrics option then only data
++from the the host that does will be reported. See the HPN-README file 
++for more detail.  
++
++The argument to the keyword must be 
++.Cm yes
++or 
++.Cm no
++(the default). 
++
++See 
++.Cm MetricsInterval 
++and 
++.Cm MetricsPath 
++for more metrics options.
++.Cm HPNSSH only. 
++.It Cm MetricsInterval
++The frequency, in seconds, with which the TCP_INFO struct will be polled. The 
++default value is 5 seconds.
++
++.Cm Metrics 
++must be set to 
++.Cm yes
++fot this option to have any effect.
++.Cm HPNSSH only.
++.It Cm MetricsPath
++The file path where
++.Cm Metrics
++should write the TCP stack metrics. 
++
++The default is 
++.Sm off
++.Ar ./ssh_stack_metrics.local  
++ and 
++.Ar ./ssh_stack_metrics.remote 
++.Sm on
++
++The user may specify any other filepath and filename that they have write 
++access to. E.g. MetricsPath=/tmp/my_metrics. The suffix of .local
++and .remote will be appended to this path. Files are 
++.Cm not 
++overwritten by subsequent metrics sessions. Instead, data from new sessions
++will be appended if the file already exists. 
++
++.Cm Metrics 
++must be set to 
++.Cm yes
++fot this option to have any effect.
++.Cm HPNSSH only.
+ .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+ Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
+ The argument to this keyword must be
+@@ -1554,6 +1632,36 @@
+ or
+ .Cm no
+ (the default).
++.It Cm NoneEnabled
++Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
++even if this option is enabled. Default is 
++.Cm no. HPNSSH only.
++.It Cm NoneMacEnabled
++Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh
++will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use
++with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and
++protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication
++remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is 
++.Cm no. HPNSSH only.
++.It Cm NoneSwitch
++Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after
++authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client
++and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE
++cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an
++error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly
++have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in
++interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to 
++.Cm no 
++by default. 
++.Cm HPNSSH only.
++.Pp
++.Cm Note: 
++this options cannot actualy be set in the ssh_config file. It must be
++set on the command line use -oNoneEnabled. This is to prevent it from being 
++used accidentally. It is included here for completeness as neither NoneMacEnabled
++or NoneCipherEnabled have any effect without this option. 
+ .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
+ The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
+@@ -2124,6 +2232,12 @@
+ Specify a configuration tag name that may be later used by a
+ .Cm Match
+ directive to select a block of configuration.
++.It Cm TcpRcvBufPoll
++Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life
++of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled
++for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista).
++Default is 
++.Cm yes. HPNSSH only.
+ .It Cm Tunnel
+ Request
+ .Xr tun 4
+@@ -2209,6 +2323,12 @@
+ from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
+ .Qq hostkeys@openssh.com
+ protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys.
++.It Cm UseMPTCP
++If set to
++.Cm yes ,
++this will enable Multipath TCP (MPTCP) instead of TCP (this only works on Linux).
++The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm User
+ Specifies the user to log in as.
+ This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
+@@ -2497,3 +2617,11 @@
+ created OpenSSH.
+ .An Markus Friedl
+ contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
++.An Chris Rapier, 
++.An Michael Stevens, 
++.An Ben Bennet, 
++and 
++.An Mike Tasota 
++developed the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center 
++with grants from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and 
++the National Science Foundation.
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2025-06-14 10:53:02.025925109 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.340908632 +0200
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
+ #include "utf8.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ #include "sk-api.h"
++#include "cipher-switch.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+@@ -85,6 +86,13 @@
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+ /*
++ * tty_flag is set in ssh.c. Use this in ssh_userauth2:
++ * if it is set, then prevent the switch to the null cipher.
++ */
++
++extern int tty_flag;
++
++/*
+  * SSH2 key exchange
+  */
+ 
+@@ -574,6 +582,42 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!authctxt.success)
+ 		fatal("Authentication failed.");
++
++	/*
++	 * If the user wants to use the none cipher and/or none mac, do it post authentication
++	 * and only if the right conditions are met -- both of the NONE commands
++	 * must be true and there must be no tty allocated.
++	 */
++	if (options.none_switch == 1 && options.none_enabled == 1) {
++		char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
++		char *s = NULL;
++		const char *none_cipher = "none";
++		if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */
++			debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
++			kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, none_cipher,
++						      options.macs,
++						      compression_alg_list(options.compression),
++						      options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER!!!\n");
++
++			/* NONEMAC can only be used in context of the NONE CIPHER */
++			if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
++				const char *none_mac = "none";
++				kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, none_cipher,
++							      none_mac,
++							      compression_alg_list(options.compression),
++							      options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++				fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE MAC\n");
++			}
++			kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal);
++			packet_request_rekeying();
++		} else {
++			/* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */
++			debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated");
++			fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ 		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect.c openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshconnect.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.488393170 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshconnect.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.341617244 +0200
+@@ -359,9 +359,14 @@
+ #endif
+ 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 
+-	sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
++	if (options.use_mptcp)
++		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, IPPROTO_MPTCP);
++	else
++		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
+ 		error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
++		if (options.use_mptcp)
++			error ("You asked to use MPTCP. Please ensure it is enabled.");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	(void)fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8 openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.8	2025-06-14 10:53:02.026331727 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd.8	2025-06-14 10:54:01.342080852 +0200
+@@ -1079,3 +1079,7 @@
+ protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+ Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+ for privilege separation.
++Chris Rapier, Michael Stevens, Ben Bennet, and Mike Tasota developed
++the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center with grants
++from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and the National Science
++Foundation. 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-auth.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd-auth.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-auth.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.779184668 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd-auth.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.342636371 +0200
+@@ -832,6 +832,25 @@
+ 	struct kex *kex;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* this used to be in sshd.c when we read the configuration file
++	 * but needed to be moved here as do_ssh2_kex in sshd-auth wasn't
++	 * picking up the none options. CJR 4/10/2025
++	 */
++	if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
++		debug("WARNING: None cipher enabled");
++		char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers;
++		xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers);
++		free(old_ciphers);
++
++		/* only enable the none MAC in context of the none cipher -cjr */
++		if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
++			debug("WARNING: None MAC enabled");
++			char *old_macs = options.macs;
++			xasprintf(&options.macs, "%s,none", old_macs);
++			free(old_macs);
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ 		    options.rekey_interval);
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.779446364 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.343195243 +0200
+@@ -822,6 +822,8 @@
+ 	int ret, listen_sock;
+ 	struct addrinfo *ai;
+ 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
++	int socksize;
++	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
+ 
+ 	for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ 		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+@@ -837,11 +839,17 @@
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		/* Create socket for listening. */
+-		listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+-		    ai->ai_protocol);
++		if (options.use_mptcp)
++			listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
++			    IPPROTO_MPTCP);
++		else
++			listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
++			    ai->ai_protocol);
+ 		if (listen_sock == -1) {
+ 			/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
+ 			verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++			if (options.use_mptcp)
++				verbose("MPTCP requested but may not be available.");
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
+@@ -867,6 +875,10 @@
+ 
+ 		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+ 
++		getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++				   &socksize, &socksizelen);
++		debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize);
++
+ 		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+ 		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config	2025-06-14 10:53:02.026903728 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config	2025-06-14 11:00:18.384210561 +0200
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ # SELinux about this change.
+ # semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
+ #
+-#Port 22
++Port 2222
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+ #ListenAddress ::
+@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
+ #PermitTunnel no
+ #ChrootDirectory none
+ #VersionAddendum none
++#UseMPTCP no
+ 
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+@@ -129,6 +130,19 @@
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 
++# the following are HPN related configuration options
++# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels
++#TcpRcvBufPoll yes
++
++# disable hpn performance boosts
++#HPNDisabled no
++
++# allow the use of the none cipher
++#NoneEnabled no
++
++# allow the use of the none MAC
++#NoneMacEnabled no
++
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+ #	X11Forwarding no
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd_config.5	2025-06-14 10:53:02.027286949 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd_config.5	2025-06-14 10:54:01.344536060 +0200
+@@ -56,6 +56,16 @@
+ .Pq \&"
+ in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+ .Pp
++.Xr hpnsshd 8
++is fully compatible with OpenSSH's sshd and uses the same configuration format, directives, and options.
++.Xr hpnsshd 8
++can use the same configuration file as
++.Xr sshd 8
++though the inverse is not necessarily true. This is because
++.Xr hpnssh 8
++has some additional options which are discussed below. As such administrators should maintain
++seperate configuration files for each.
++.Pp
+ The possible
+ keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+ keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+@@ -667,6 +677,10 @@
+ TCP and StreamLocal.
+ This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may
+ simplify restricted configurations.
++.It Cm DisableMTAES
++Switch the encryption cipher being used from the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher
++back to the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher. Default is 
++.Cm no. HPNSSH only. 
+ .It Cm ExposeAuthInfo
+ Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and
+ public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user.
+@@ -944,6 +958,11 @@
+ The default for this option is:
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
++.It Cm HPNDisabled
++In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to 
++.CM no.
+ .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+ Specifies whether to ignore per-user
+ .Pa .rhosts
+@@ -1467,6 +1486,19 @@
+ key exchange methods.
+ The default is
+ .Pa /etc/moduli .
++.It Cm NoneEnabled
++Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
++even if this option is enabled. Default is 
++.Cm no
++.It Cm NoneMacEnabled
++Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh
++will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use
++with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and
++protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication
++remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is 
++.Cm no.
+ .It Cm PAMServiceName
+ Specifies the service name used for Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
+ authentication, authorisation and session controls when
+@@ -2035,6 +2067,13 @@
+ .Pp
+ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+ .Cm no .
++.IT Cm TcpRcvBufPoll
++Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer throughout the life
++of the connection. Make sure that this option is enabled for systems making 
++use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista) in order to
++maximize throughput on high performance networks. 
++Default is 
++.Cm yes.
+ .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
+ Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
+ trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
+@@ -2095,6 +2134,12 @@
+ .Cm Match
+ .Cm Host
+ directives.
++.It Cm UseMPTCP
++If set to
++.Cm yes ,
++this will enable Multipath TCP (MPTCP) instead of TCP (this only works on Linux).
++The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm UsePAM
+ Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
+ If set to
+@@ -2333,3 +2378,11 @@
+ and
+ .An Markus Friedl
+ contributed support for privilege separation.
++.An Chris Rapier, 
++.An Michael Stevens, 
++.An Ben Bennet, 
++and 
++.An Mike Tasota 
++developed the HPN extensions at the Pittsburgh Supercomuting Center 
++with grants from Cisco, the National Library of Medicine, and 
++the National Science Foundation. 
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshd-session.c	2025-06-14 10:53:02.028087821 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshd-session.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.345322405 +0200
+@@ -1164,6 +1164,20 @@
+ 	}
+ 	endpwent();
+ 
++	/* get NONE options */
++	if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
++		char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers;
++		xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers);
++		free(old_ciphers);
++
++		/* only enable the none MAC in context of the none cipher -cjr */
++		if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
++			char *old_macs = options.macs;
++			xasprintf(&options.macs, "%s,none", old_macs);
++			free(old_macs);
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag) {
+ 		if ((startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD)) == -1)
+ 			fatal("internal error: no startup pipe");
+@@ -1375,6 +1389,9 @@
+ 	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
+ 	free(laddr);
+ 
++	/* set the HPN options for the child */
++	channel_set_hpn_disabled(options.hpn_disabled);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ 	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.h openssh-10.0p1/ssh.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/ssh.h	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/ssh.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.345905093 +0200
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ 
+ /* Default port number. */
+ #define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT	22
++#define HPNSSH_DEFAULT_PORT    2222
+ 
+ /*
+  * Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified
+@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@
+  * Name for the service.  The port named by this service overrides the
+  * default port if present.
+  */
+-#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME	"ssh"
++#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME	"hpnssh"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey.c openssh-10.0p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey.c	2025-06-14 10:53:01.935152884 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshkey.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.346333152 +0200
+@@ -1775,7 +1775,8 @@
+ 	    stderr);
+ #endif
+ 	if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+-	    keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0)
++	    keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0,
++	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	/* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */
+@@ -1910,7 +1911,8 @@
+ 	    keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+-	    keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0)
++	    keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0,
++	    CIPHER_DECRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ #ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
+@@ -2965,6 +2967,13 @@
+ 		kdfname = "none";
+ 	} else if (ciphername == NULL)
+ 		ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
++	/*
++	 * NOTE: Without OpenSSL, this string comparison is still safe, even
++	 * though it will never match because the multithreaded cipher is not
++	 * enabled.
++	 */
++	else if (strcmp(ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") == 0)
++		ciphername = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com";
+ 	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -3000,7 +3009,7 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+-	    key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0)
++	    key + keylen, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+@@ -3187,6 +3196,8 @@
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (strcmp(ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org") == 0)
++		strcpy(ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com");
+ 	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -3242,7 +3253,7 @@
+ 	/* decrypt private portion of key */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+-	    key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
++	    key + keylen, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
+ 	    encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey-xmss.c openssh-10.0p1/sshkey-xmss.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/sshkey-xmss.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/sshkey-xmss.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.347175650 +0200
+@@ -903,9 +903,29 @@
+ 	    state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
+ 	    state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-		goto out;
++	/*
++	 * chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
++	 * represent different implementations of the same cipher. For key
++	 * encryption purposes, they're equivalent, and the multithreaded
++	 * implementation is excessive. It can be assumed that references to the
++	 * multithreaded implementation in this context are unintentional, so
++	 * these checks should look for the serial implementation instead.
++	 *
++	 * Additionally, the following code is safe regardless of whether the
++	 * multithreaded implementation is enabled, so no #ifdefs are necessary.
++	 */
++	if (strcmp(state->enc_ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org")
++	    == 0) {
++		if ((cipher = cipher_by_name("chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"))
++		    == NULL) {
++			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	} else {
++		if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
++			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+ 	keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+@@ -956,7 +976,7 @@
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted,
+ 	    encrypted_len + aadlen + authlen, &cp)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+-	    iv, ivlen, 1)) != 0 ||
++	    iv, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encoded),
+ 	    encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -995,9 +1015,29 @@
+ 	    state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
+ 	    state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-		goto out;
++	/*
++	 * chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org and chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
++	 * represent different implementations of the same cipher. For key
++	 * encryption purposes, they're equivalent, and the multithreaded
++	 * implementation is excessive. It can be assumed that references to the
++	 * multithreaded implementation in this context are unintentional, so
++	 * these checks should look for the serial implementation instead.
++	 *
++	 * Additionally, the following code is safe regardless of whether the
++	 * multithreaded implementation is enabled, so no #ifdefs are necessary.
++	 */
++	if (strcmp(state->enc_ciphername, "chacha20-poly1305-mt@hpnssh.org")
++	    == 0) {
++		if ((cipher = cipher_by_name("chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"))
++		    == NULL) {
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	} else {
++		if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+ 	keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+@@ -1049,7 +1089,7 @@
+ 	/* decrypt private state of key */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, aadlen + encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+-	    iv, ivlen, 0)) != 0 ||
++	    iv, ivlen, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT, CIPHER_SERIAL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(copy),
+ 	    encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/umac.c openssh-10.0p1/umac.c
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/umac.c	2025-04-09 09:02:43.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/umac.c	2025-06-14 10:54:01.347637721 +0200
+@@ -134,15 +134,48 @@
+ /* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms           */
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+ 
++
++/* Using local statically defined versions of the get/put functions
++ * found in misc.c allows them to be inlined. This improves throughput
++ * performance by 10% to 15% on well connected (10Gb/s+) systems. 
++ * Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu> 2022-03-09 */
++
++static  __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)))
++u_int32_t umac_get_u32_le(const void *vp)
++{
++        const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
++        u_int32_t v;
++
++        v  = (u_int32_t)p[0];
++        v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
++        v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
++        v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
++
++        return (v);
++}
++
++#if 0 /* compile time warning thrown otherwise */
++static __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
++void umac_put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
++{
++        u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
++
++        p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
++        p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
++        p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
++        p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
++}
++#endif
++
+ #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+ #define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p)		get_u32(p)
+ #define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v)	put_u32(p,v)
+ #else
+-#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p)		get_u32_le(p)
+-#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v)	put_u32_le(p,v)
++#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p)		umac_get_u32_le(p)
++#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v)	umac_put_u32_le(p,v)
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p)		(get_u32_le(p))
++#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p)		(umac_get_u32_le(p))
+ #define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v)		put_u32(p, v)
+ 
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/uthash.h openssh-10.0p1/uthash.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/uthash.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-10.0p1/uthash.h	2025-06-14 10:54:01.348457241 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,1140 @@
++/*
++Copyright (c) 2003-2022, Troy D. Hanson  https://troydhanson.github.io/uthash/
++All rights reserved.
++
++Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
++
++    * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++
++THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS
++IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
++TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
++PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER
++OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
++EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
++PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
++PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
++LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
++NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
++SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++*/
++
++#ifndef UTHASH_H
++#define UTHASH_H
++
++#define UTHASH_VERSION 2.3.0
++
++#include <string.h>   /* memcmp, memset, strlen */
++#include <stddef.h>   /* ptrdiff_t */
++#include <stdlib.h>   /* exit */
++
++#if defined(HASH_DEFINE_OWN_STDINT) && HASH_DEFINE_OWN_STDINT
++/* This codepath is provided for backward compatibility, but I plan to remove it. */
++#warning "HASH_DEFINE_OWN_STDINT is deprecated; please use HASH_NO_STDINT instead"
++typedef unsigned int uint32_t;
++typedef unsigned char uint8_t;
++#elif defined(HASH_NO_STDINT) && HASH_NO_STDINT
++#else
++#include <stdint.h>   /* uint8_t, uint32_t */
++#endif
++
++/* These macros use decltype or the earlier __typeof GNU extension.
++   As decltype is only available in newer compilers (VS2010 or gcc 4.3+
++   when compiling c++ source) this code uses whatever method is needed
++   or, for VS2008 where neither is available, uses casting workarounds. */
++#if !defined(DECLTYPE) && !defined(NO_DECLTYPE)
++#if defined(_MSC_VER)   /* MS compiler */
++#if _MSC_VER >= 1600 && defined(__cplusplus)  /* VS2010 or newer in C++ mode */
++#define DECLTYPE(x) (decltype(x))
++#else                   /* VS2008 or older (or VS2010 in C mode) */
++#define NO_DECLTYPE
++#endif
++#elif defined(__MCST__)  /* Elbrus C Compiler */
++#define DECLTYPE(x) (__typeof(x))
++#elif defined(__BORLANDC__) || defined(__ICCARM__) || defined(__LCC__) || defined(__WATCOMC__)
++#define NO_DECLTYPE
++#else                   /* GNU, Sun and other compilers */
++#define DECLTYPE(x) (__typeof(x))
++#endif
++#endif
++
++#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE
++#define DECLTYPE(x)
++#define DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst,src)                                                 \
++do {                                                                             \
++  char **_da_dst = (char**)(&(dst));                                             \
++  *_da_dst = (char*)(src);                                                       \
++} while (0)
++#else
++#define DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst,src)                                                 \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (dst) = DECLTYPE(dst)(src);                                                    \
++} while (0)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef uthash_malloc
++#define uthash_malloc(sz) malloc(sz)      /* malloc fcn                      */
++#endif
++#ifndef uthash_free
++#define uthash_free(ptr,sz) free(ptr)     /* free fcn                        */
++#endif
++#ifndef uthash_bzero
++#define uthash_bzero(a,n) memset(a,'\0',n)
++#endif
++#ifndef uthash_strlen
++#define uthash_strlen(s) strlen(s)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef HASH_FUNCTION
++#define HASH_FUNCTION(keyptr,keylen,hashv) HASH_JEN(keyptr, keylen, hashv)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef HASH_KEYCMP
++#define HASH_KEYCMP(a,b,n) memcmp(a,b,n)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef uthash_noexpand_fyi
++#define uthash_noexpand_fyi(tbl)          /* can be defined to log noexpand  */
++#endif
++#ifndef uthash_expand_fyi
++#define uthash_expand_fyi(tbl)            /* can be defined to log expands   */
++#endif
++
++#ifndef HASH_NONFATAL_OOM
++#define HASH_NONFATAL_OOM 0
++#endif
++
++#if HASH_NONFATAL_OOM
++/* malloc failures can be recovered from */
++
++#ifndef uthash_nonfatal_oom
++#define uthash_nonfatal_oom(obj) do {} while (0)    /* non-fatal OOM error */
++#endif
++
++#define HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed) do { (oomed) = 1; } while (0)
++#define IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(x) x
++
++#else
++/* malloc failures result in lost memory, hash tables are unusable */
++
++#ifndef uthash_fatal
++#define uthash_fatal(msg) exit(-1)        /* fatal OOM error */
++#endif
++
++#define HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed) uthash_fatal("out of memory")
++#define IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(x)
++
++#endif
++
++/* initial number of buckets */
++#define HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS 32U     /* initial number of buckets        */
++#define HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS_LOG2 5U /* lg2 of initial number of buckets */
++#define HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH 10U     /* expand when bucket count reaches */
++
++/* calculate the element whose hash handle address is hhp */
++#define ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl,hhp) ((void*)(((char*)(hhp)) - ((tbl)->hho)))
++/* calculate the hash handle from element address elp */
++#define HH_FROM_ELMT(tbl,elp) ((UT_hash_handle*)(void*)(((char*)(elp)) + ((tbl)->hho)))
++
++#define HASH_ROLLBACK_BKT(hh, head, itemptrhh)                                   \
++do {                                                                             \
++  struct UT_hash_handle *_hd_hh_item = (itemptrhh);                              \
++  unsigned _hd_bkt;                                                              \
++  HASH_TO_BKT(_hd_hh_item->hashv, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hd_bkt);         \
++  (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_hd_bkt].count++;                                      \
++  _hd_hh_item->hh_next = NULL;                                                   \
++  _hd_hh_item->hh_prev = NULL;                                                   \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_VALUE(keyptr,keylen,hashv)                                          \
++do {                                                                             \
++  HASH_FUNCTION(keyptr, keylen, hashv);                                          \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen,hashval,out)                 \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (out) = NULL;                                                                  \
++  if (head) {                                                                    \
++    unsigned _hf_bkt;                                                            \
++    HASH_TO_BKT(hashval, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hf_bkt);                  \
++    if (HASH_BLOOM_TEST((head)->hh.tbl, hashval) != 0) {                         \
++      HASH_FIND_IN_BKT((head)->hh.tbl, hh, (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[ _hf_bkt ], keyptr, keylen, hashval, out); \
++    }                                                                            \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_FIND(hh,head,keyptr,keylen,out)                                     \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (out) = NULL;                                                                  \
++  if (head) {                                                                    \
++    unsigned _hf_hashv;                                                          \
++    HASH_VALUE(keyptr, keylen, _hf_hashv);                                       \
++    HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen, _hf_hashv, out);             \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#ifdef HASH_BLOOM
++#define HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN (1UL << HASH_BLOOM)
++#define HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN (HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN/8UL) + (((HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN%8UL)!=0UL) ? 1UL : 0UL)
++#define HASH_BLOOM_MAKE(tbl,oomed)                                               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (tbl)->bloom_nbits = HASH_BLOOM;                                               \
++  (tbl)->bloom_bv = (uint8_t*)uthash_malloc(HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN);                 \
++  if (!(tbl)->bloom_bv) {                                                        \
++    HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed);                                                      \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    uthash_bzero((tbl)->bloom_bv, HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN);                           \
++    (tbl)->bloom_sig = HASH_BLOOM_SIGNATURE;                                     \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_BLOOM_FREE(tbl)                                                     \
++do {                                                                             \
++  uthash_free((tbl)->bloom_bv, HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN);                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_BLOOM_BITSET(bv,idx) (bv[(idx)/8U] |= (1U << ((idx)%8U)))
++#define HASH_BLOOM_BITTEST(bv,idx) (bv[(idx)/8U] & (1U << ((idx)%8U)))
++
++#define HASH_BLOOM_ADD(tbl,hashv)                                                \
++  HASH_BLOOM_BITSET((tbl)->bloom_bv, ((hashv) & (uint32_t)((1UL << (tbl)->bloom_nbits) - 1U)))
++
++#define HASH_BLOOM_TEST(tbl,hashv)                                               \
++  HASH_BLOOM_BITTEST((tbl)->bloom_bv, ((hashv) & (uint32_t)((1UL << (tbl)->bloom_nbits) - 1U)))
++
++#else
++#define HASH_BLOOM_MAKE(tbl,oomed)
++#define HASH_BLOOM_FREE(tbl)
++#define HASH_BLOOM_ADD(tbl,hashv)
++#define HASH_BLOOM_TEST(tbl,hashv) (1)
++#define HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN 0U
++#endif
++
++#define HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh,head,oomed)                                           \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (head)->hh.tbl = (UT_hash_table*)uthash_malloc(sizeof(UT_hash_table));         \
++  if (!(head)->hh.tbl) {                                                         \
++    HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed);                                                      \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    uthash_bzero((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table));                         \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->tail = &((head)->hh);                                        \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets = HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS;                      \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->log2_num_buckets = HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS_LOG2;            \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->hho = (char*)(&(head)->hh) - (char*)(head);                  \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->buckets = (UT_hash_bucket*)uthash_malloc(                    \
++        HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket));               \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->signature = HASH_SIGNATURE;                                  \
++    if (!(head)->hh.tbl->buckets) {                                              \
++      HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed);                                                    \
++      uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table));                        \
++    } else {                                                                     \
++      uthash_bzero((head)->hh.tbl->buckets,                                      \
++          HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket));             \
++      HASH_BLOOM_MAKE((head)->hh.tbl, oomed);                                    \
++      IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(                                                      \
++        if (oomed) {                                                             \
++          uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets,                                   \
++              HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket));           \
++          uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table));                    \
++        }                                                                        \
++      )                                                                          \
++    }                                                                            \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add,replaced,cmpfcn) \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (replaced) = NULL;                                                             \
++  HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, replaced); \
++  if (replaced) {                                                                \
++    HASH_DELETE(hh, head, replaced);                                             \
++  }                                                                              \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add, cmpfcn); \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add,replaced) \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (replaced) = NULL;                                                             \
++  HASH_FIND_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, replaced); \
++  if (replaced) {                                                                \
++    HASH_DELETE(hh, head, replaced);                                             \
++  }                                                                              \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add); \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add,replaced)                   \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _hr_hashv;                                                            \
++  HASH_VALUE(&((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, _hr_hashv);                         \
++  HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, fieldname, keylen_in, _hr_hashv, add, replaced); \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_REPLACE_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add,replaced,cmpfcn)    \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _hr_hashv;                                                            \
++  HASH_VALUE(&((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, _hr_hashv);                         \
++  HASH_REPLACE_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, fieldname, keylen_in, _hr_hashv, add, replaced, cmpfcn); \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_APPEND_LIST(hh, head, add)                                          \
++do {                                                                             \
++  (add)->hh.next = NULL;                                                         \
++  (add)->hh.prev = ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, (head)->hh.tbl->tail);           \
++  (head)->hh.tbl->tail->next = (add);                                            \
++  (head)->hh.tbl->tail = &((add)->hh);                                           \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP(hh,head,add,cmpfcn)                                 \
++do {                                                                             \
++  do {                                                                           \
++    if (cmpfcn(DECLTYPE(head)(_hs_iter), add) > 0) {                             \
++      break;                                                                     \
++    }                                                                            \
++  } while ((_hs_iter = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->next));           \
++} while (0)
++
++#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE
++#undef HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP
++#define HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP(hh,head,add,cmpfcn)                                 \
++do {                                                                             \
++  char *_hs_saved_head = (char*)(head);                                          \
++  do {                                                                           \
++    DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hs_iter);                                             \
++    if (cmpfcn(head, add) > 0) {                                                 \
++      DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hs_saved_head);                                     \
++      break;                                                                     \
++    }                                                                            \
++    DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hs_saved_head);                                       \
++  } while ((_hs_iter = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->next));           \
++} while (0)
++#endif
++
++#if HASH_NONFATAL_OOM
++
++#define HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add,oomed)            \
++do {                                                                             \
++  if (!(oomed)) {                                                                \
++    unsigned _ha_bkt;                                                            \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->num_items++;                                                 \
++    HASH_TO_BKT(hashval, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _ha_bkt);                  \
++    HASH_ADD_TO_BKT((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_ha_bkt], hh, &(add)->hh, oomed);    \
++    if (oomed) {                                                                 \
++      HASH_ROLLBACK_BKT(hh, head, &(add)->hh);                                   \
++      HASH_DELETE_HH(hh, head, &(add)->hh);                                      \
++      (add)->hh.tbl = NULL;                                                      \
++      uthash_nonfatal_oom(add);                                                  \
++    } else {                                                                     \
++      HASH_BLOOM_ADD((head)->hh.tbl, hashval);                                   \
++      HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in);                                \
++    }                                                                            \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    (add)->hh.tbl = NULL;                                                        \
++    uthash_nonfatal_oom(add);                                                    \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#else
++
++#define HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add,oomed)            \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _ha_bkt;                                                              \
++  (head)->hh.tbl->num_items++;                                                   \
++  HASH_TO_BKT(hashval, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _ha_bkt);                    \
++  HASH_ADD_TO_BKT((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_ha_bkt], hh, &(add)->hh, oomed);      \
++  HASH_BLOOM_ADD((head)->hh.tbl, hashval);                                       \
++  HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in);                                    \
++} while (0)
++
++#endif
++
++
++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add,cmpfcn) \
++do {                                                                             \
++  IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( int _ha_oomed = 0; )                                     \
++  (add)->hh.hashv = (hashval);                                                   \
++  (add)->hh.key = (char*) (keyptr);                                              \
++  (add)->hh.keylen = (unsigned) (keylen_in);                                     \
++  if (!(head)) {                                                                 \
++    (add)->hh.next = NULL;                                                       \
++    (add)->hh.prev = NULL;                                                       \
++    HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh, add, _ha_oomed);                                         \
++    IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( if (!_ha_oomed) { )                                    \
++      (head) = (add);                                                            \
++    IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( } )                                                    \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    void *_hs_iter = (head);                                                     \
++    (add)->hh.tbl = (head)->hh.tbl;                                              \
++    HASH_AKBI_INNER_LOOP(hh, head, add, cmpfcn);                                 \
++    if (_hs_iter) {                                                              \
++      (add)->hh.next = _hs_iter;                                                 \
++      if (((add)->hh.prev = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->prev)) {     \
++        HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, (add)->hh.prev)->next = (add);              \
++      } else {                                                                   \
++        (head) = (add);                                                          \
++      }                                                                          \
++      HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_iter)->prev = (add);                      \
++    } else {                                                                     \
++      HASH_APPEND_LIST(hh, head, add);                                           \
++    }                                                                            \
++  }                                                                              \
++  HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, hashval, add, _ha_oomed);       \
++  HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER");                    \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_INORDER(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,add,cmpfcn)             \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _hs_hashv;                                                            \
++  HASH_VALUE(keyptr, keylen_in, _hs_hashv);                                      \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, _hs_hashv, add, cmpfcn); \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_ADD_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add,cmpfcn) \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE_INORDER(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add, cmpfcn)
++
++#define HASH_ADD_INORDER(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add,cmpfcn)                 \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_INORDER(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, add, cmpfcn)
++
++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,add)        \
++do {                                                                             \
++  IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( int _ha_oomed = 0; )                                     \
++  (add)->hh.hashv = (hashval);                                                   \
++  (add)->hh.key = (const void*) (keyptr);                                        \
++  (add)->hh.keylen = (unsigned) (keylen_in);                                     \
++  if (!(head)) {                                                                 \
++    (add)->hh.next = NULL;                                                       \
++    (add)->hh.prev = NULL;                                                       \
++    HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh, add, _ha_oomed);                                         \
++    IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( if (!_ha_oomed) { )                                    \
++      (head) = (add);                                                            \
++    IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( } )                                                    \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    (add)->hh.tbl = (head)->hh.tbl;                                              \
++    HASH_APPEND_LIST(hh, head, add);                                             \
++  }                                                                              \
++  HASH_ADD_TO_TABLE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, hashval, add, _ha_oomed);       \
++  HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE");                            \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,add)                            \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _ha_hashv;                                                            \
++  HASH_VALUE(keyptr, keylen_in, _ha_hashv);                                      \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, keyptr, keylen_in, _ha_hashv, add);      \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_ADD_BYHASHVALUE(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,hashval,add)            \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR_BYHASHVALUE(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, hashval, add)
++
++#define HASH_ADD(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add)                                \
++  HASH_ADD_KEYPTR(hh, head, &((add)->fieldname), keylen_in, add)
++
++#define HASH_TO_BKT(hashv,num_bkts,bkt)                                          \
++do {                                                                             \
++  bkt = ((hashv) & ((num_bkts) - 1U));                                           \
++} while (0)
++
++/* delete "delptr" from the hash table.
++ * "the usual" patch-up process for the app-order doubly-linked-list.
++ * The use of _hd_hh_del below deserves special explanation.
++ * These used to be expressed using (delptr) but that led to a bug
++ * if someone used the same symbol for the head and deletee, like
++ *  HASH_DELETE(hh,users,users);
++ * We want that to work, but by changing the head (users) below
++ * we were forfeiting our ability to further refer to the deletee (users)
++ * in the patch-up process. Solution: use scratch space to
++ * copy the deletee pointer, then the latter references are via that
++ * scratch pointer rather than through the repointed (users) symbol.
++ */
++#define HASH_DELETE(hh,head,delptr)                                              \
++    HASH_DELETE_HH(hh, head, &(delptr)->hh)
++
++#define HASH_DELETE_HH(hh,head,delptrhh)                                         \
++do {                                                                             \
++  const struct UT_hash_handle *_hd_hh_del = (delptrhh);                          \
++  if ((_hd_hh_del->prev == NULL) && (_hd_hh_del->next == NULL)) {                \
++    HASH_BLOOM_FREE((head)->hh.tbl);                                             \
++    uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets,                                         \
++                (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket));    \
++    uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table));                          \
++    (head) = NULL;                                                               \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    unsigned _hd_bkt;                                                            \
++    if (_hd_hh_del == (head)->hh.tbl->tail) {                                    \
++      (head)->hh.tbl->tail = HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hd_hh_del->prev);     \
++    }                                                                            \
++    if (_hd_hh_del->prev != NULL) {                                              \
++      HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hd_hh_del->prev)->next = _hd_hh_del->next;   \
++    } else {                                                                     \
++      DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, _hd_hh_del->next);                                   \
++    }                                                                            \
++    if (_hd_hh_del->next != NULL) {                                              \
++      HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hd_hh_del->next)->prev = _hd_hh_del->prev;   \
++    }                                                                            \
++    HASH_TO_BKT(_hd_hh_del->hashv, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hd_bkt);        \
++    HASH_DEL_IN_BKT((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_hd_bkt], _hd_hh_del);               \
++    (head)->hh.tbl->num_items--;                                                 \
++  }                                                                              \
++  HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_DELETE_HH");                                         \
++} while (0)
++
++/* convenience forms of HASH_FIND/HASH_ADD/HASH_DEL */
++#define HASH_FIND_STR(head,findstr,out)                                          \
++do {                                                                             \
++    unsigned _uthash_hfstr_keylen = (unsigned)uthash_strlen(findstr);            \
++    HASH_FIND(hh, head, findstr, _uthash_hfstr_keylen, out);                     \
++} while (0)
++#define HASH_ADD_STR(head,strfield,add)                                          \
++do {                                                                             \
++    unsigned _uthash_hastr_keylen = (unsigned)uthash_strlen((add)->strfield);    \
++    HASH_ADD(hh, head, strfield[0], _uthash_hastr_keylen, add);                  \
++} while (0)
++#define HASH_REPLACE_STR(head,strfield,add,replaced)                             \
++do {                                                                             \
++    unsigned _uthash_hrstr_keylen = (unsigned)uthash_strlen((add)->strfield);    \
++    HASH_REPLACE(hh, head, strfield[0], _uthash_hrstr_keylen, add, replaced);    \
++} while (0)
++#define HASH_FIND_INT(head,findint,out)                                          \
++    HASH_FIND(hh,head,findint,sizeof(int),out)
++#define HASH_ADD_INT(head,intfield,add)                                          \
++    HASH_ADD(hh,head,intfield,sizeof(int),add)
++#define HASH_REPLACE_INT(head,intfield,add,replaced)                             \
++    HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,intfield,sizeof(int),add,replaced)
++#define HASH_FIND_PTR(head,findptr,out)                                          \
++    HASH_FIND(hh,head,findptr,sizeof(void *),out)
++#define HASH_ADD_PTR(head,ptrfield,add)                                          \
++    HASH_ADD(hh,head,ptrfield,sizeof(void *),add)
++#define HASH_REPLACE_PTR(head,ptrfield,add,replaced)                             \
++    HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,ptrfield,sizeof(void *),add,replaced)
++#define HASH_DEL(head,delptr)                                                    \
++    HASH_DELETE(hh,head,delptr)
++
++/* HASH_FSCK checks hash integrity on every add/delete when HASH_DEBUG is defined.
++ * This is for uthash developer only; it compiles away if HASH_DEBUG isn't defined.
++ */
++#ifdef HASH_DEBUG
++#include <stdio.h>   /* fprintf, stderr */
++#define HASH_OOPS(...) do { fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__); exit(-1); } while (0)
++#define HASH_FSCK(hh,head,where)                                                 \
++do {                                                                             \
++  struct UT_hash_handle *_thh;                                                   \
++  if (head) {                                                                    \
++    unsigned _bkt_i;                                                             \
++    unsigned _count = 0;                                                         \
++    char *_prev;                                                                 \
++    for (_bkt_i = 0; _bkt_i < (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets; ++_bkt_i) {           \
++      unsigned _bkt_count = 0;                                                   \
++      _thh = (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].hh_head;                            \
++      _prev = NULL;                                                              \
++      while (_thh) {                                                             \
++        if (_prev != (char*)(_thh->hh_prev)) {                                   \
++          HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid hh_prev %p, actual %p\n",                       \
++              (where), (void*)_thh->hh_prev, (void*)_prev);                      \
++        }                                                                        \
++        _bkt_count++;                                                            \
++        _prev = (char*)(_thh);                                                   \
++        _thh = _thh->hh_next;                                                    \
++      }                                                                          \
++      _count += _bkt_count;                                                      \
++      if ((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].count !=  _bkt_count) {                \
++        HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid bucket count %u, actual %u\n",                    \
++            (where), (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].count, _bkt_count);         \
++      }                                                                          \
++    }                                                                            \
++    if (_count != (head)->hh.tbl->num_items) {                                   \
++      HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid hh item count %u, actual %u\n",                     \
++          (where), (head)->hh.tbl->num_items, _count);                           \
++    }                                                                            \
++    _count = 0;                                                                  \
++    _prev = NULL;                                                                \
++    _thh =  &(head)->hh;                                                         \
++    while (_thh) {                                                               \
++      _count++;                                                                  \
++      if (_prev != (char*)_thh->prev) {                                          \
++        HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid prev %p, actual %p\n",                            \
++            (where), (void*)_thh->prev, (void*)_prev);                           \
++      }                                                                          \
++      _prev = (char*)ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _thh);                         \
++      _thh = (_thh->next ? HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _thh->next) : NULL);     \
++    }                                                                            \
++    if (_count != (head)->hh.tbl->num_items) {                                   \
++      HASH_OOPS("%s: invalid app item count %u, actual %u\n",                    \
++          (where), (head)->hh.tbl->num_items, _count);                           \
++    }                                                                            \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++#else
++#define HASH_FSCK(hh,head,where)
++#endif
++
++/* When compiled with -DHASH_EMIT_KEYS, length-prefixed keys are emitted to
++ * the descriptor to which this macro is defined for tuning the hash function.
++ * The app can #include <unistd.h> to get the prototype for write(2). */
++#ifdef HASH_EMIT_KEYS
++#define HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh,head,keyptr,fieldlen)                                   \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _klen = fieldlen;                                                     \
++  write(HASH_EMIT_KEYS, &_klen, sizeof(_klen));                                  \
++  write(HASH_EMIT_KEYS, keyptr, (unsigned long)fieldlen);                        \
++} while (0)
++#else
++#define HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh,head,keyptr,fieldlen)
++#endif
++
++/* The Bernstein hash function, used in Perl prior to v5.6. Note (x<<5+x)=x*33. */
++#define HASH_BER(key,keylen,hashv)                                               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _hb_keylen = (unsigned)keylen;                                        \
++  const unsigned char *_hb_key = (const unsigned char*)(key);                    \
++  (hashv) = 0;                                                                   \
++  while (_hb_keylen-- != 0U) {                                                   \
++    (hashv) = (((hashv) << 5) + (hashv)) + *_hb_key++;                           \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++
++/* SAX/FNV/OAT/JEN hash functions are macro variants of those listed at
++ * http://eternallyconfuzzled.com/tuts/algorithms/jsw_tut_hashing.aspx
++ * (archive link: https://archive.is/Ivcan )
++ */
++#define HASH_SAX(key,keylen,hashv)                                               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _sx_i;                                                                \
++  const unsigned char *_hs_key = (const unsigned char*)(key);                    \
++  hashv = 0;                                                                     \
++  for (_sx_i=0; _sx_i < keylen; _sx_i++) {                                       \
++    hashv ^= (hashv << 5) + (hashv >> 2) + _hs_key[_sx_i];                       \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++/* FNV-1a variation */
++#define HASH_FNV(key,keylen,hashv)                                               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _fn_i;                                                                \
++  const unsigned char *_hf_key = (const unsigned char*)(key);                    \
++  (hashv) = 2166136261U;                                                         \
++  for (_fn_i=0; _fn_i < keylen; _fn_i++) {                                       \
++    hashv = hashv ^ _hf_key[_fn_i];                                              \
++    hashv = hashv * 16777619U;                                                   \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_OAT(key,keylen,hashv)                                               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _ho_i;                                                                \
++  const unsigned char *_ho_key=(const unsigned char*)(key);                      \
++  hashv = 0;                                                                     \
++  for(_ho_i=0; _ho_i < keylen; _ho_i++) {                                        \
++      hashv += _ho_key[_ho_i];                                                   \
++      hashv += (hashv << 10);                                                    \
++      hashv ^= (hashv >> 6);                                                     \
++  }                                                                              \
++  hashv += (hashv << 3);                                                         \
++  hashv ^= (hashv >> 11);                                                        \
++  hashv += (hashv << 15);                                                        \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_JEN_MIX(a,b,c)                                                      \
++do {                                                                             \
++  a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 13 );                                              \
++  b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 8 );                                               \
++  c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 13 );                                              \
++  a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 12 );                                              \
++  b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 16 );                                              \
++  c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 5 );                                               \
++  a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 3 );                                               \
++  b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 10 );                                              \
++  c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 15 );                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_JEN(key,keylen,hashv)                                               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _hj_i,_hj_j,_hj_k;                                                    \
++  unsigned const char *_hj_key=(unsigned const char*)(key);                      \
++  hashv = 0xfeedbeefu;                                                           \
++  _hj_i = _hj_j = 0x9e3779b9u;                                                   \
++  _hj_k = (unsigned)(keylen);                                                    \
++  while (_hj_k >= 12U) {                                                         \
++    _hj_i +=    (_hj_key[0] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[1] << 8 )                      \
++        + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[2] << 16 )                                         \
++        + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[3] << 24 ) );                                      \
++    _hj_j +=    (_hj_key[4] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[5] << 8 )                      \
++        + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[6] << 16 )                                         \
++        + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[7] << 24 ) );                                      \
++    hashv += (_hj_key[8] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[9] << 8 )                         \
++        + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[10] << 16 )                                        \
++        + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[11] << 24 ) );                                     \
++                                                                                 \
++     HASH_JEN_MIX(_hj_i, _hj_j, hashv);                                          \
++                                                                                 \
++     _hj_key += 12;                                                              \
++     _hj_k -= 12U;                                                               \
++  }                                                                              \
++  hashv += (unsigned)(keylen);                                                   \
++  switch ( _hj_k ) {                                                             \
++    case 11: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[10] << 24 ); /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 10: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[9] << 16 );  /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 9:  hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[8] << 8 );   /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 8:  _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[7] << 24 );  /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 7:  _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[6] << 16 );  /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 6:  _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[5] << 8 );   /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 5:  _hj_j += _hj_key[4];                      /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 4:  _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[3] << 24 );  /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 3:  _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[2] << 16 );  /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 2:  _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[1] << 8 );   /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    case 1:  _hj_i += _hj_key[0];                      /* FALLTHROUGH */         \
++    default: ;                                                                   \
++  }                                                                              \
++  HASH_JEN_MIX(_hj_i, _hj_j, hashv);                                             \
++} while (0)
++
++/* The Paul Hsieh hash function */
++#undef get16bits
++#if (defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__)) || defined(__WATCOMC__)             \
++  || defined(_MSC_VER) || defined (__BORLANDC__) || defined (__TURBOC__)
++#define get16bits(d) (*((const uint16_t *) (d)))
++#endif
++
++#if !defined (get16bits)
++#define get16bits(d) ((((uint32_t)(((const uint8_t *)(d))[1])) << 8)             \
++                       +(uint32_t)(((const uint8_t *)(d))[0]) )
++#endif
++#define HASH_SFH(key,keylen,hashv)                                               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned const char *_sfh_key=(unsigned const char*)(key);                     \
++  uint32_t _sfh_tmp, _sfh_len = (uint32_t)keylen;                                \
++                                                                                 \
++  unsigned _sfh_rem = _sfh_len & 3U;                                             \
++  _sfh_len >>= 2;                                                                \
++  hashv = 0xcafebabeu;                                                           \
++                                                                                 \
++  /* Main loop */                                                                \
++  for (;_sfh_len > 0U; _sfh_len--) {                                             \
++    hashv    += get16bits (_sfh_key);                                            \
++    _sfh_tmp  = ((uint32_t)(get16bits (_sfh_key+2)) << 11) ^ hashv;              \
++    hashv     = (hashv << 16) ^ _sfh_tmp;                                        \
++    _sfh_key += 2U*sizeof (uint16_t);                                            \
++    hashv    += hashv >> 11;                                                     \
++  }                                                                              \
++                                                                                 \
++  /* Handle end cases */                                                         \
++  switch (_sfh_rem) {                                                            \
++    case 3: hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key);                                       \
++            hashv ^= hashv << 16;                                                \
++            hashv ^= (uint32_t)(_sfh_key[sizeof (uint16_t)]) << 18;              \
++            hashv += hashv >> 11;                                                \
++            break;                                                               \
++    case 2: hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key);                                       \
++            hashv ^= hashv << 11;                                                \
++            hashv += hashv >> 17;                                                \
++            break;                                                               \
++    case 1: hashv += *_sfh_key;                                                  \
++            hashv ^= hashv << 10;                                                \
++            hashv += hashv >> 1;                                                 \
++            break;                                                               \
++    default: ;                                                                   \
++  }                                                                              \
++                                                                                 \
++  /* Force "avalanching" of final 127 bits */                                    \
++  hashv ^= hashv << 3;                                                           \
++  hashv += hashv >> 5;                                                           \
++  hashv ^= hashv << 4;                                                           \
++  hashv += hashv >> 17;                                                          \
++  hashv ^= hashv << 25;                                                          \
++  hashv += hashv >> 6;                                                           \
++} while (0)
++
++/* iterate over items in a known bucket to find desired item */
++#define HASH_FIND_IN_BKT(tbl,hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,hashval,out)               \
++do {                                                                             \
++  if ((head).hh_head != NULL) {                                                  \
++    DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(out, ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl, (head).hh_head));                     \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    (out) = NULL;                                                                \
++  }                                                                              \
++  while ((out) != NULL) {                                                        \
++    if ((out)->hh.hashv == (hashval) && (out)->hh.keylen == (keylen_in)) {       \
++      if (HASH_KEYCMP((out)->hh.key, keyptr, keylen_in) == 0) {                  \
++        break;                                                                   \
++      }                                                                          \
++    }                                                                            \
++    if ((out)->hh.hh_next != NULL) {                                             \
++      DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(out, ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl, (out)->hh.hh_next));                \
++    } else {                                                                     \
++      (out) = NULL;                                                              \
++    }                                                                            \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++/* add an item to a bucket  */
++#define HASH_ADD_TO_BKT(head,hh,addhh,oomed)                                     \
++do {                                                                             \
++  UT_hash_bucket *_ha_head = &(head);                                            \
++  _ha_head->count++;                                                             \
++  (addhh)->hh_next = _ha_head->hh_head;                                          \
++  (addhh)->hh_prev = NULL;                                                       \
++  if (_ha_head->hh_head != NULL) {                                               \
++    _ha_head->hh_head->hh_prev = (addhh);                                        \
++  }                                                                              \
++  _ha_head->hh_head = (addhh);                                                   \
++  if ((_ha_head->count >= ((_ha_head->expand_mult + 1U) * HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH)) \
++      && !(addhh)->tbl->noexpand) {                                              \
++    HASH_EXPAND_BUCKETS(addhh,(addhh)->tbl, oomed);                              \
++    IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(                                                        \
++      if (oomed) {                                                               \
++        HASH_DEL_IN_BKT(head,addhh);                                             \
++      }                                                                          \
++    )                                                                            \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++/* remove an item from a given bucket */
++#define HASH_DEL_IN_BKT(head,delhh)                                              \
++do {                                                                             \
++  UT_hash_bucket *_hd_head = &(head);                                            \
++  _hd_head->count--;                                                             \
++  if (_hd_head->hh_head == (delhh)) {                                            \
++    _hd_head->hh_head = (delhh)->hh_next;                                        \
++  }                                                                              \
++  if ((delhh)->hh_prev) {                                                        \
++    (delhh)->hh_prev->hh_next = (delhh)->hh_next;                                \
++  }                                                                              \
++  if ((delhh)->hh_next) {                                                        \
++    (delhh)->hh_next->hh_prev = (delhh)->hh_prev;                                \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++/* Bucket expansion has the effect of doubling the number of buckets
++ * and redistributing the items into the new buckets. Ideally the
++ * items will distribute more or less evenly into the new buckets
++ * (the extent to which this is true is a measure of the quality of
++ * the hash function as it applies to the key domain).
++ *
++ * With the items distributed into more buckets, the chain length
++ * (item count) in each bucket is reduced. Thus by expanding buckets
++ * the hash keeps a bound on the chain length. This bounded chain
++ * length is the essence of how a hash provides constant time lookup.
++ *
++ * The calculation of tbl->ideal_chain_maxlen below deserves some
++ * explanation. First, keep in mind that we're calculating the ideal
++ * maximum chain length based on the *new* (doubled) bucket count.
++ * In fractions this is just n/b (n=number of items,b=new num buckets).
++ * Since the ideal chain length is an integer, we want to calculate
++ * ceil(n/b). We don't depend on floating point arithmetic in this
++ * hash, so to calculate ceil(n/b) with integers we could write
++ *
++ *      ceil(n/b) = (n/b) + ((n%b)?1:0)
++ *
++ * and in fact a previous version of this hash did just that.
++ * But now we have improved things a bit by recognizing that b is
++ * always a power of two. We keep its base 2 log handy (call it lb),
++ * so now we can write this with a bit shift and logical AND:
++ *
++ *      ceil(n/b) = (n>>lb) + ( (n & (b-1)) ? 1:0)
++ *
++ */
++#define HASH_EXPAND_BUCKETS(hh,tbl,oomed)                                        \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _he_bkt;                                                              \
++  unsigned _he_bkt_i;                                                            \
++  struct UT_hash_handle *_he_thh, *_he_hh_nxt;                                   \
++  UT_hash_bucket *_he_new_buckets, *_he_newbkt;                                  \
++  _he_new_buckets = (UT_hash_bucket*)uthash_malloc(                              \
++           sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket) * (tbl)->num_buckets * 2U);             \
++  if (!_he_new_buckets) {                                                        \
++    HASH_RECORD_OOM(oomed);                                                      \
++  } else {                                                                       \
++    uthash_bzero(_he_new_buckets,                                                \
++        sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket) * (tbl)->num_buckets * 2U);                \
++    (tbl)->ideal_chain_maxlen =                                                  \
++       ((tbl)->num_items >> ((tbl)->log2_num_buckets+1U)) +                      \
++       ((((tbl)->num_items & (((tbl)->num_buckets*2U)-1U)) != 0U) ? 1U : 0U);    \
++    (tbl)->nonideal_items = 0;                                                   \
++    for (_he_bkt_i = 0; _he_bkt_i < (tbl)->num_buckets; _he_bkt_i++) {           \
++      _he_thh = (tbl)->buckets[ _he_bkt_i ].hh_head;                             \
++      while (_he_thh != NULL) {                                                  \
++        _he_hh_nxt = _he_thh->hh_next;                                           \
++        HASH_TO_BKT(_he_thh->hashv, (tbl)->num_buckets * 2U, _he_bkt);           \
++        _he_newbkt = &(_he_new_buckets[_he_bkt]);                                \
++        if (++(_he_newbkt->count) > (tbl)->ideal_chain_maxlen) {                 \
++          (tbl)->nonideal_items++;                                               \
++          if (_he_newbkt->count > _he_newbkt->expand_mult * (tbl)->ideal_chain_maxlen) { \
++            _he_newbkt->expand_mult++;                                           \
++          }                                                                      \
++        }                                                                        \
++        _he_thh->hh_prev = NULL;                                                 \
++        _he_thh->hh_next = _he_newbkt->hh_head;                                  \
++        if (_he_newbkt->hh_head != NULL) {                                       \
++          _he_newbkt->hh_head->hh_prev = _he_thh;                                \
++        }                                                                        \
++        _he_newbkt->hh_head = _he_thh;                                           \
++        _he_thh = _he_hh_nxt;                                                    \
++      }                                                                          \
++    }                                                                            \
++    uthash_free((tbl)->buckets, (tbl)->num_buckets * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \
++    (tbl)->num_buckets *= 2U;                                                    \
++    (tbl)->log2_num_buckets++;                                                   \
++    (tbl)->buckets = _he_new_buckets;                                            \
++    (tbl)->ineff_expands = ((tbl)->nonideal_items > ((tbl)->num_items >> 1)) ?   \
++        ((tbl)->ineff_expands+1U) : 0U;                                          \
++    if ((tbl)->ineff_expands > 1U) {                                             \
++      (tbl)->noexpand = 1;                                                       \
++      uthash_noexpand_fyi(tbl);                                                  \
++    }                                                                            \
++    uthash_expand_fyi(tbl);                                                      \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++
++/* This is an adaptation of Simon Tatham's O(n log(n)) mergesort */
++/* Note that HASH_SORT assumes the hash handle name to be hh.
++ * HASH_SRT was added to allow the hash handle name to be passed in. */
++#define HASH_SORT(head,cmpfcn) HASH_SRT(hh,head,cmpfcn)
++#define HASH_SRT(hh,head,cmpfcn)                                                 \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _hs_i;                                                                \
++  unsigned _hs_looping,_hs_nmerges,_hs_insize,_hs_psize,_hs_qsize;               \
++  struct UT_hash_handle *_hs_p, *_hs_q, *_hs_e, *_hs_list, *_hs_tail;            \
++  if (head != NULL) {                                                            \
++    _hs_insize = 1;                                                              \
++    _hs_looping = 1;                                                             \
++    _hs_list = &((head)->hh);                                                    \
++    while (_hs_looping != 0U) {                                                  \
++      _hs_p = _hs_list;                                                          \
++      _hs_list = NULL;                                                           \
++      _hs_tail = NULL;                                                           \
++      _hs_nmerges = 0;                                                           \
++      while (_hs_p != NULL) {                                                    \
++        _hs_nmerges++;                                                           \
++        _hs_q = _hs_p;                                                           \
++        _hs_psize = 0;                                                           \
++        for (_hs_i = 0; _hs_i < _hs_insize; ++_hs_i) {                           \
++          _hs_psize++;                                                           \
++          _hs_q = ((_hs_q->next != NULL) ?                                       \
++            HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q->next) : NULL);                   \
++          if (_hs_q == NULL) {                                                   \
++            break;                                                               \
++          }                                                                      \
++        }                                                                        \
++        _hs_qsize = _hs_insize;                                                  \
++        while ((_hs_psize != 0U) || ((_hs_qsize != 0U) && (_hs_q != NULL))) {    \
++          if (_hs_psize == 0U) {                                                 \
++            _hs_e = _hs_q;                                                       \
++            _hs_q = ((_hs_q->next != NULL) ?                                     \
++              HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q->next) : NULL);                 \
++            _hs_qsize--;                                                         \
++          } else if ((_hs_qsize == 0U) || (_hs_q == NULL)) {                     \
++            _hs_e = _hs_p;                                                       \
++            if (_hs_p != NULL) {                                                 \
++              _hs_p = ((_hs_p->next != NULL) ?                                   \
++                HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_p->next) : NULL);               \
++            }                                                                    \
++            _hs_psize--;                                                         \
++          } else if ((cmpfcn(                                                    \
++                DECLTYPE(head)(ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_p)),             \
++                DECLTYPE(head)(ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q))              \
++                )) <= 0) {                                                       \
++            _hs_e = _hs_p;                                                       \
++            if (_hs_p != NULL) {                                                 \
++              _hs_p = ((_hs_p->next != NULL) ?                                   \
++                HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_p->next) : NULL);               \
++            }                                                                    \
++            _hs_psize--;                                                         \
++          } else {                                                               \
++            _hs_e = _hs_q;                                                       \
++            _hs_q = ((_hs_q->next != NULL) ?                                     \
++              HH_FROM_ELMT((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_q->next) : NULL);                 \
++            _hs_qsize--;                                                         \
++          }                                                                      \
++          if ( _hs_tail != NULL ) {                                              \
++            _hs_tail->next = ((_hs_e != NULL) ?                                  \
++              ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_e) : NULL);                       \
++          } else {                                                               \
++            _hs_list = _hs_e;                                                    \
++          }                                                                      \
++          if (_hs_e != NULL) {                                                   \
++            _hs_e->prev = ((_hs_tail != NULL) ?                                  \
++              ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_tail) : NULL);                    \
++          }                                                                      \
++          _hs_tail = _hs_e;                                                      \
++        }                                                                        \
++        _hs_p = _hs_q;                                                           \
++      }                                                                          \
++      if (_hs_tail != NULL) {                                                    \
++        _hs_tail->next = NULL;                                                   \
++      }                                                                          \
++      if (_hs_nmerges <= 1U) {                                                   \
++        _hs_looping = 0;                                                         \
++        (head)->hh.tbl->tail = _hs_tail;                                         \
++        DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head, ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_list));           \
++      }                                                                          \
++      _hs_insize *= 2U;                                                          \
++    }                                                                            \
++    HASH_FSCK(hh, head, "HASH_SRT");                                             \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++/* This function selects items from one hash into another hash.
++ * The end result is that the selected items have dual presence
++ * in both hashes. There is no copy of the items made; rather
++ * they are added into the new hash through a secondary hash
++ * hash handle that must be present in the structure. */
++#define HASH_SELECT(hh_dst, dst, hh_src, src, cond)                              \
++do {                                                                             \
++  unsigned _src_bkt, _dst_bkt;                                                   \
++  void *_last_elt = NULL, *_elt;                                                 \
++  UT_hash_handle *_src_hh, *_dst_hh, *_last_elt_hh=NULL;                         \
++  ptrdiff_t _dst_hho = ((char*)(&(dst)->hh_dst) - (char*)(dst));                 \
++  if ((src) != NULL) {                                                           \
++    for (_src_bkt=0; _src_bkt < (src)->hh_src.tbl->num_buckets; _src_bkt++) {    \
++      for (_src_hh = (src)->hh_src.tbl->buckets[_src_bkt].hh_head;               \
++        _src_hh != NULL;                                                         \
++        _src_hh = _src_hh->hh_next) {                                            \
++        _elt = ELMT_FROM_HH((src)->hh_src.tbl, _src_hh);                         \
++        if (cond(_elt)) {                                                        \
++          IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM( int _hs_oomed = 0; )                             \
++          _dst_hh = (UT_hash_handle*)(void*)(((char*)_elt) + _dst_hho);          \
++          _dst_hh->key = _src_hh->key;                                           \
++          _dst_hh->keylen = _src_hh->keylen;                                     \
++          _dst_hh->hashv = _src_hh->hashv;                                       \
++          _dst_hh->prev = _last_elt;                                             \
++          _dst_hh->next = NULL;                                                  \
++          if (_last_elt_hh != NULL) {                                            \
++            _last_elt_hh->next = _elt;                                           \
++          }                                                                      \
++          if ((dst) == NULL) {                                                   \
++            DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst, _elt);                                          \
++            HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh_dst, dst, _hs_oomed);                             \
++            IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(                                                \
++              if (_hs_oomed) {                                                   \
++                uthash_nonfatal_oom(_elt);                                       \
++                (dst) = NULL;                                                    \
++                continue;                                                        \
++              }                                                                  \
++            )                                                                    \
++          } else {                                                               \
++            _dst_hh->tbl = (dst)->hh_dst.tbl;                                    \
++          }                                                                      \
++          HASH_TO_BKT(_dst_hh->hashv, _dst_hh->tbl->num_buckets, _dst_bkt);      \
++          HASH_ADD_TO_BKT(_dst_hh->tbl->buckets[_dst_bkt], hh_dst, _dst_hh, _hs_oomed); \
++          (dst)->hh_dst.tbl->num_items++;                                        \
++          IF_HASH_NONFATAL_OOM(                                                  \
++            if (_hs_oomed) {                                                     \
++              HASH_ROLLBACK_BKT(hh_dst, dst, _dst_hh);                           \
++              HASH_DELETE_HH(hh_dst, dst, _dst_hh);                              \
++              _dst_hh->tbl = NULL;                                               \
++              uthash_nonfatal_oom(_elt);                                         \
++              continue;                                                          \
++            }                                                                    \
++          )                                                                      \
++          HASH_BLOOM_ADD(_dst_hh->tbl, _dst_hh->hashv);                          \
++          _last_elt = _elt;                                                      \
++          _last_elt_hh = _dst_hh;                                                \
++        }                                                                        \
++      }                                                                          \
++    }                                                                            \
++  }                                                                              \
++  HASH_FSCK(hh_dst, dst, "HASH_SELECT");                                         \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_CLEAR(hh,head)                                                      \
++do {                                                                             \
++  if ((head) != NULL) {                                                          \
++    HASH_BLOOM_FREE((head)->hh.tbl);                                             \
++    uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets,                                         \
++                (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket));      \
++    uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table));                          \
++    (head) = NULL;                                                               \
++  }                                                                              \
++} while (0)
++
++#define HASH_OVERHEAD(hh,head)                                                   \
++ (((head) != NULL) ? (                                                           \
++ (size_t)(((head)->hh.tbl->num_items   * sizeof(UT_hash_handle))   +             \
++          ((head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets * sizeof(UT_hash_bucket))   +             \
++           sizeof(UT_hash_table)                                   +             \
++           (HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN))) : 0U)
++
++#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE
++#define HASH_ITER(hh,head,el,tmp)                                                \
++for(((el)=(head)), ((*(char**)(&(tmp)))=(char*)((head!=NULL)?(head)->hh.next:NULL)); \
++  (el) != NULL; ((el)=(tmp)), ((*(char**)(&(tmp)))=(char*)((tmp!=NULL)?(tmp)->hh.next:NULL)))
++#else
++#define HASH_ITER(hh,head,el,tmp)                                                \
++for(((el)=(head)), ((tmp)=DECLTYPE(el)((head!=NULL)?(head)->hh.next:NULL));      \
++  (el) != NULL; ((el)=(tmp)), ((tmp)=DECLTYPE(el)((tmp!=NULL)?(tmp)->hh.next:NULL)))
++#endif
++
++/* obtain a count of items in the hash */
++#define HASH_COUNT(head) HASH_CNT(hh,head)
++#define HASH_CNT(hh,head) ((head != NULL)?((head)->hh.tbl->num_items):0U)
++
++typedef struct UT_hash_bucket {
++   struct UT_hash_handle *hh_head;
++   unsigned count;
++
++   /* expand_mult is normally set to 0. In this situation, the max chain length
++    * threshold is enforced at its default value, HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH. (If
++    * the bucket's chain exceeds this length, bucket expansion is triggered).
++    * However, setting expand_mult to a non-zero value delays bucket expansion
++    * (that would be triggered by additions to this particular bucket)
++    * until its chain length reaches a *multiple* of HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH.
++    * (The multiplier is simply expand_mult+1). The whole idea of this
++    * multiplier is to reduce bucket expansions, since they are expensive, in
++    * situations where we know that a particular bucket tends to be overused.
++    * It is better to let its chain length grow to a longer yet-still-bounded
++    * value, than to do an O(n) bucket expansion too often.
++    */
++   unsigned expand_mult;
++
++} UT_hash_bucket;
++
++/* random signature used only to find hash tables in external analysis */
++#define HASH_SIGNATURE 0xa0111fe1u
++#define HASH_BLOOM_SIGNATURE 0xb12220f2u
++
++typedef struct UT_hash_table {
++   UT_hash_bucket *buckets;
++   unsigned num_buckets, log2_num_buckets;
++   unsigned num_items;
++   struct UT_hash_handle *tail; /* tail hh in app order, for fast append    */
++   ptrdiff_t hho; /* hash handle offset (byte pos of hash handle in element */
++
++   /* in an ideal situation (all buckets used equally), no bucket would have
++    * more than ceil(#items/#buckets) items. that's the ideal chain length. */
++   unsigned ideal_chain_maxlen;
++
++   /* nonideal_items is the number of items in the hash whose chain position
++    * exceeds the ideal chain maxlen. these items pay the penalty for an uneven
++    * hash distribution; reaching them in a chain traversal takes >ideal steps */
++   unsigned nonideal_items;
++
++   /* ineffective expands occur when a bucket doubling was performed, but
++    * afterward, more than half the items in the hash had nonideal chain
++    * positions. If this happens on two consecutive expansions we inhibit any
++    * further expansion, as it's not helping; this happens when the hash
++    * function isn't a good fit for the key domain. When expansion is inhibited
++    * the hash will still work, albeit no longer in constant time. */
++   unsigned ineff_expands, noexpand;
++
++   uint32_t signature; /* used only to find hash tables in external analysis */
++#ifdef HASH_BLOOM
++   uint32_t bloom_sig; /* used only to test bloom exists in external analysis */
++   uint8_t *bloom_bv;
++   uint8_t bloom_nbits;
++#endif
++
++} UT_hash_table;
++
++typedef struct UT_hash_handle {
++   struct UT_hash_table *tbl;
++   void *prev;                       /* prev element in app order      */
++   void *next;                       /* next element in app order      */
++   struct UT_hash_handle *hh_prev;   /* previous hh in bucket order    */
++   struct UT_hash_handle *hh_next;   /* next hh in bucket order        */
++   const void *key;                  /* ptr to enclosing struct's key  */
++   unsigned keylen;                  /* enclosing struct's key len     */
++   unsigned hashv;                   /* result of hash-fcn(key)        */
++} UT_hash_handle;
++
++#endif /* UTHASH_H */
+diff -Nur openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h openssh-10.0p1/version.h
+--- openssh-10.0p1.orig/version.h	2025-06-14 10:53:02.028786585 +0200
++++ openssh-10.0p1/version.h	2025-06-14 11:34:35.359783615 +0200
+@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p2"
+ #define GSI_PORTABLE	"c-GSI"
+-#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \
++#define SSH_HPN		"_hpn18.7.0"
++#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE SSH_HPN \
+ 			GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION
diff --git a/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf b/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..419c529
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#Type Name ID  GECOS                     Home directory        Shell
+u     sshd 74  "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd -
diff --git a/gsi-openssh.spec b/gsi-openssh.spec
index 7e7ccf0..ef847b1 100644
--- a/gsi-openssh.spec
+++ b/gsi-openssh.spec
@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@
 
 %global _hardened_build 1
 
-# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
-%global sshd_uid    74
-%global sshd_gid    74
-
 # Build position-independent executables (requires toolchain support)?
 %global pie 1
 
@@ -27,13 +23,12 @@
 # Do we want libedit support
 %global libedit 1
 
-%global openssh_ver 8.7p1
-%global openssh_rel 2
+%global openssh_ver 10.0p1
 
 Summary: An implementation of the SSH protocol with GSI authentication
 Name: gsi-openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
+Release: 4%{?dist}
 Provides: gsissh = %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes: gsissh < 5.8p2-2
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
@@ -48,138 +43,155 @@ Source11: gsisshd.service
 Source12: gsisshd-keygen@.service
 Source13: gsisshd-keygen
 Source15: gsisshd-keygen.target
+Source19: %{name}-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
+Source20: gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
+Source21: gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
 Source99: README.sshd-and-gsisshd
 
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
-Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
-
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
-# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
-Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
-# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
-Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
-
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX)
-Patch400: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+Patch0001: 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
 #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634
-Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
-#?
-Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
-
+Patch0002: 0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+Patch0003: 0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644
-Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1893 (WONTFIX)
-Patch604: openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+Patch0004: 0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
 #(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925
-Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
-#?
-Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+Patch0005: 0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+Patch0006: 0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789
-Patch609: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
-
-#?
-Patch700: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
-#?
-Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+Patch0007: 0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+Patch0008: 0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
 #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332
-Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+Patch0009: 0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX)
-Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+Patch0010: 0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
 # warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
-Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
-# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
-Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
-
+Patch0011: 0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
 # GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
 # from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
-Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+# and
+# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
+# upstream MR:
+# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
+Patch0012: 0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
 #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
-Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
-# CVE-2014-9278
-Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+Patch0013: 0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
 # Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494)
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775
-Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+Patch0014: 0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
 # Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
-Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
-
+Patch0015: 0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
-Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+Patch0016: 0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
 # Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650)
-Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+Patch0017: 0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
 # privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580)
-Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+Patch0018: 0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
 # log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681)
-Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+Patch0019: 0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
 # scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223)
-Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+Patch0020: 0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
+# CVE-2014-9278
+Patch0021: 0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
 # apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521)
-Patch922: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+Patch0022: 0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
 # Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055)
-Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+Patch0023: 0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
 # make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom
-Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+Patch0024: 0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
 # Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
-Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-# Help systemd to track the running service
-Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+Patch0025: 0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
 # Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
-Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+Patch0026: 0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
 # Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
-Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+Patch0027: 0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
 # PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration)
 # https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11
 # git show > ~/devel/fedora/openssh/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
-Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+Patch0028: 0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
 # Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
-Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+Patch0029: 0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
-Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
-# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
-Patch963: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
+# clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
+Patch0030: 0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
 # Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
-Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+Patch0031: 0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 # sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
-Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+Patch0032: 0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
-Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
-Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+Patch0033: 0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
 # sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
-Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
-# Use SFTP protocol by default for scp command
-Patch976: openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
+Patch0034: 0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
 # Implement kill switch for SCP protocol
-Patch977: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
-# CVE-2021-41617
-Patch978: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
+Patch0035: 0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+# Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299
+# downstream only
+Patch0036: 0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+# Downstream alias for MinRSABits
+Patch0037: 0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+# downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix
+# From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14
+Patch0038: 0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
+# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
+Patch0039: 0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
+Patch0040: 0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
+Patch0041: 0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+Patch0042: 0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+# Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage
+# upstream bug:
+# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455
+Patch0043: 0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+# Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation
+# upstream MR:
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
+Patch0044: 0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+Patch0045: 0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
+Patch0046: 0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+Patch0047: 0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
+Patch0048: 0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
+Patch0049: 0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
+# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/02/22/1
+Patch0050: 0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/564
+Patch0051: 0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/567
+Patch0052: 0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500
+Patch0053: 0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
+Patch1000: 1000-openssh-coverity.patch
 
-# Fix issue with read-only ssh buffer during gssapi key exchange (#1938224)
-# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/19
-Patch97: openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch
 # This is the patch that adds GSI support
 # Based on hpn_isshd-gsi.7.5p1b.patch from Globus upstream
-Patch98: openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch
+Patch2000: 2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch
 
 # This is the HPN patch
-# Based on https://sourceforge.net/projects/hpnssh/files/Patches/HPN-SSH%2015v2%208.5p1/
-Patch99: openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
+# Based on https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh/ tag: hpn-18.7.0
+Patch2001: 2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
 
-License: BSD
+License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
+Requires: openssl-libs >= 3.5.0
 
 BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl-interpreter, perl-generators, zlib-devel
 BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5
 BuildRequires: util-linux, groff
 BuildRequires: pam-devel
-BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 3.5.0
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
 BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 BuildRequires: gcc make
 BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
 BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
+BuildRequires: libxcrypt-devel
 Recommends: p11-kit
 
 %if %{kerberos5}
@@ -212,7 +224,11 @@ Summary: SSH client applications with GSI authentication
 Provides: gsissh-clients = %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes: gsissh-clients < 5.8p2-2
 Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
-Requires: crypto-policies >= 20200610-1
+Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
+
+%package keysign
+Summary: A helper program used for host-based authentication
+Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 
 %package server
 Summary: SSH server daemon with GSI authentication
@@ -221,8 +237,10 @@ Obsoletes: gsissh-server < 5.8p2-2
 Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/useradd
 Requires: pam >= 1.0.1-3
-Requires: crypto-policies >= 20200610-1
+Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
 %{?systemd_requires}
+Requires(pre): policycoreutils-python-utils
+Requires(postun): policycoreutils-python-utils
 
 %description
 SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
@@ -247,6 +265,11 @@ the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
 
 This version of OpenSSH has been modified to support GSI authentication.
 
+%description keysign
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. ssh-keysign is a
+helper program used for host-based authentication disabled by default.
+
 %description server
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
@@ -257,70 +280,11 @@ This version of OpenSSH has been modified to support GSI authentication.
 
 %prep
 gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
-%setup -q -n openssh-%{version}
-
-%patch400 -p1 -b .role-mls
-%patch404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux
-
-%patch502 -p1 -b .keycat
-
-%patch601 -p1 -b .ip-opts
-%patch604 -p1 -b .keyperm
-%patch606 -p1 -b .ipv6man
-%patch607 -p1 -b .sigpipe
-%patch609 -p1 -b .x11
-
-%patch702 -p1 -b .progress
-%patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info
-%patch707 -p1 -b .redhat
-%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
-%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
-
-%patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex
-%patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb
-%patch804 -p1 -b .ccache_name
-%patch805 -p1 -b .k5login
-
-%patch901 -p1 -b .kuserok
-%patch906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
-%patch916 -p1 -b .contexts
-%patch918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot
-%patch919 -p1 -b .scp
-%patch802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users
-%patch922 -p1 -b .sshdt
-%patch926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
-%patch939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
-%patch944 -p1 -b .x11max
-%patch948 -p1 -b .systemd
-%patch949 -p1 -b .refactor
-%patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
-%patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
-%patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
-%patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
-%patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
-%patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
-%patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
-%patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
-%patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
-%patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
-%patch976 -p1 -b .sftp-by-default
-%patch977 -p1 -b .kill-scp
-%patch978 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
-
-%patch200 -p1 -b .audit
-%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
-%patch700 -p1 -b .fips
-
-%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity
-
-%patch97 -p1 -b .sshbuf-ro
-%patch98 -p1 -b .gsi
-%patch99 -p1 -b .hpn
+%autosetup -T -b 0 -p1 -n openssh-%{version}
 
 sed 's/sshd.pid/gsisshd.pid/' -i pathnames.h
 sed 's!$(piddir)/sshd.pid!$(piddir)/gsisshd.pid!' -i Makefile.in
-sed 's!/etc/sysconfig/sshd!/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config
-sed 's!/etc/pam.d/sshd!/etc/pam.d/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config
+sed 's!/etc/pam.d/sshd!/etc/pam.d/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config_redhat
 
 cp -p %{SOURCE99} .
 
@@ -328,7 +292,6 @@ autoreconf
 
 %build
 %set_build_flags
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"; export CFLAGS
 %if %{pie}
 %ifarch s390 s390x sparc sparcv9 sparc64
 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
@@ -361,12 +324,11 @@ fi
 	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh \
 	--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh \
 	--datadir=%{_datadir}/gsissh \
-	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin \
-	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-default-path=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-superuser-path=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
 	--with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \
 	--disable-strip \
 	--without-zlib-version-check \
-	--with-ssl-engine \
 	--with-ipaddr-display \
 	--with-pie=no \
 	--without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \
@@ -374,6 +336,7 @@ fi
 	--with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \
 	--with-security-key-builtin=yes \
 	--with-pam \
+	--with-pam-service=gsisshd \
 %if %{WITH_SELINUX}
 	--with-selinux --with-audit=linux \
 	--with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
@@ -410,8 +373,9 @@ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/
 install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh
 install -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/gsisshd
 install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
-install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
-install -m644 sshd_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+install -m644 sshd_config_redhat_cp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf
+install -m644 sshd_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
 install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}
 install -m644 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd@.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd.socket
@@ -420,37 +384,55 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen@.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen.target
 install -m755 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-keygen
 install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd
+install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE19} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysusersdir}/%{name}-server.conf
+# Migration service/script for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+install -m744 %{SOURCE20} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+# Pulled-in via a `Wants=` in `gsisshd.service` & `gsisshd@.service`
+install -m644 %{SOURCE21} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib
+touch $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
 
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-add
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-agent
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keycat
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-sk-helper
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
 
 for f in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/* \
+%if "%{_sbindir}" != "%{_bindir}"
 	 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/* \
+%endif
 	 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* ; do
     mv $f `dirname $f`/gsi`basename $f`
 done
 
+# Add scp and hpnscp symlinks in gsisshd's path
+mkdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin
+ln -nrs $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/gsiscp \
+	$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/scp
+ln -nrs $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/gsiscp \
+	$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/hpnscp
+
 perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
 
-%pre
-getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || :
-
 %pre server
-getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || :
-getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
-  useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \
-  -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /usr/share/empty.sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE19}
+semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222 2>/dev/null || :
 
 %post server
+if [ $1 -gt 1 ]; then
+    # In the case of an upgrade (never true on OSTree systems) run the migration
+    # script for Fedora 38 to remove group ownership for host keys.
+    %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+    # Prevent the systemd unit that performs the same service (useful for
+    # OSTree systems) from running.
+    touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+fi
 %systemd_post gsisshd.service gsisshd.socket
 
 %preun server
@@ -458,6 +440,9 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 
 %postun server
 %systemd_postun_with_restart gsisshd.service
+if [ $1 -eq 0 ]; then
+    semanage port -d -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222 2>/dev/null || :
+fi
 
 %files
 %license LICENCE
@@ -467,8 +452,6 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsissh-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsissh-keygen.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/gsissh
-%attr(2755,root,ssh_keys) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keysign
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-keysign.8*
 
 %files clients
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsissh
@@ -480,11 +463,22 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/gsissh_config.5*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsisftp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-sk-helper
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsisftp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-sk-helper.8*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin
+%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/scp
+%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/hpnscp
+
+%files keysign
+%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-keysign.8*
 
 %files server
 %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/gsisshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-session
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-auth
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/gsisshd_config.5*
@@ -493,6 +487,7 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsisftp-server.8*
 %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config
 %dir %attr(0700,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf
 %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/gsisshd
 %attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
@@ -501,8 +496,135 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd.socket
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen@.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen.target
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/%{name}-server.conf
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+%attr(0744,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+%ghost %attr(0644,root,root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Sep 01 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 10.0p1-4
+- Based on openssh-10.0p1-6.fc44
+
+* Mon Sep 01 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 10.0p1-3
+- Based on openssh-10.0p1-4.fc43
+
+* Thu Jul 24 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 10.0p1-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jun 16 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 10.0p1-1
+- Based on openssh-10.0p1-3.fc43
+
+* Sun Apr 20 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-6
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-15.fc43
+
+* Wed Mar 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-5
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-11.fc43
+
+* Wed Mar 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-4
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-9.fc42
+
+* Wed Feb 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-3
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-8.fc42
+
+* Wed Feb 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-7.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-2.fc41
+
+* Sat Feb 01 2025 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 9.9p1-1.1
+- Add explicit BR: libxcrypt-devel
+
+* Mon Jan 20 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-5.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-1.fc41
+
+* Fri Jan 17 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.8p1-2.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Oct 02 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.8p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.8p1-4.fc42
+
+* Fri Sep 27 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.8p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.8p1-3.fc41.1
+
+* Thu Jul 18 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-3.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jul 12 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.6p1-3
+- Add scp and hpnscp symlinks in gsisshd's path
+
+* Sat Jul 06 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.6p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc41.13
+
+* Sat Jul 06 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.6p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc40.4
+
+* Wed Jan 24 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.3p1-7.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jan 20 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-7
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40.1
+
+* Sat Jan 20 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.3p1-6.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Oct 24 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-6
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40
+- Drop patch openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch (now included in
+  openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch)
+
+* Tue Oct 17 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-5
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-12.fc40
+
+* Tue Oct 17 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-4
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-9.fc39
+
+* Fri Aug 11 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-3
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-8.fc39
+
+* Sun Jul 23 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-5.fc39.1
+
+* Wed Jul 19 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-3.fc39
+- Fix keyex patch
+
+* Sun Apr 16 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-6
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-17.fc39
+
+* Wed Apr 12 2023 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 9.0p1-5.1
+- C99 compatiblity fixes
+
+* Sat Mar 11 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-5
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-12.fc38
+
+* Thu Jan 19 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.0p1-4.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jan 10 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-4
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-9.fc38
+
+* Wed Nov 09 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-3
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-7.fc38
+
+* Tue Oct 04 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-5.fc38
+
+* Tue Aug 30 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-3.fc38
+
+* Tue Aug 30 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.8p1-3
+- Based on openssh-8.8p1-6.fc37
+
+* Thu Jul 21 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 8.8p1-2.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sun May 08 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.8p1-2
+- Based on openssh-8.8p1-2.fc37
+
+* Thu Jan 20 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 8.8p1-1.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Dec 01 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.8p1-1
+- Based on openssh-8.8p1-1.fc36
+
 * Sun Oct 24 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.7p1-2
 - Based on openssh-8.7p1-3.fc36
 
diff --git a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db91516
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Update gsissh host key permissions
+Documentation=https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Before=gsisshd.service
+After=gsissh-keygen.target
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=-/usr/libexec/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+ExecStart=touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=gsisshd.service
diff --git a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..775cf39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash
+set -eu -o pipefail
+# Detect existing non-conforming host keys and perform the permissions migration
+# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+#
+# Example output looks like:
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# gsisshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.
+#
+output="$(gsisshd -T 2>&1 || true)" # expected to fail
+while read line; do
+    if [[ $line =~ ^Permissions\ [0-9]+\ for\ \'(.*)\'\ are\ too\ open. ]]; then
+        keyfile=${BASH_REMATCH[1]}
+        echo $line
+        echo -e "\t-> changing permissions on $keyfile"
+        chmod --verbose g-r $keyfile
+        chown --verbose root:root $keyfile
+    fi
+done <<< "$output"
diff --git a/gsisshd-keygen b/gsisshd-keygen
index af0a740..c49da87 100644
--- a/gsisshd-keygen
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen
@@ -9,8 +9,14 @@ case $KEYTYPE in
 		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
 			exit 0
 		fi ;;
-	"rsa") ;; # always ok
-	"ecdsa") ;;
+	"rsa")
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_RSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_RSA_BITS"
+		fi ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa")
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_ECDSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_ECDSA_BITS"
+		fi ;;
 	*) # wrong argument
 		exit 12 ;;
 esac
@@ -25,13 +31,12 @@ fi
 rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
 
 # create new keys
-if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE $SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
 	exit 1
 fi
 
 # sanitize permissions
-/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY
-/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 600 $KEY
 /usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
 if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
 	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
diff --git a/gsisshd-keygen@.service b/gsisshd-keygen@.service
index 6b2898b..62a1898 100644
--- a/gsisshd-keygen@.service
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen@.service
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_%i_key
 
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=/usr/libexec/gsissh/sshd-keygen %i
 
diff --git a/gsisshd.service b/gsisshd.service
index afe165d..55dd115 100644
--- a/gsisshd.service
+++ b/gsisshd.service
@@ -3,9 +3,15 @@ Description=gsissh server daemon
 Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
 After=network.target gsisshd-keygen.target
 Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=notify
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
diff --git a/gsisshd.sysconfig b/gsisshd.sysconfig
index 904d8c1..e968b50 100644
--- a/gsisshd.sysconfig
+++ b/gsisshd.sysconfig
@@ -5,3 +5,7 @@
 # example using  systemctl enable gsisshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
 # of DSA key or  systemctl mask gsisshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
 # creation.
+
+#SSH_RSA_BITS=3072
+#SSH_ECDSA_BITS=256
+OPTIONS=""
diff --git a/gsisshd@.service b/gsisshd@.service
index 3f5ecbd..093931e 100644
--- a/gsisshd@.service
+++ b/gsisshd@.service
@@ -3,8 +3,16 @@ Description=gsissh per-connection server daemon
 Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
 Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
 After=gsisshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys"
 StandardInput=socket
+ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all
diff --git a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 56af045..0000000
--- a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
---- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
- 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-+
- 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- 
diff --git a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch b/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ddcb7f1..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
- 
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
- {
--	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
- 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- };
- 
-@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
- {
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 	size_t n = 0;
--	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
-+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
- 
- 	if (len == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- 		return (0);
- 
--	while ((len--) > 0) {
-+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
-+		u_int r,a,b;
-+
- 		if (n == 0) {
--			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
--			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			int outl, i, buflen;
-+
-+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+
-+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+
-+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
-+				ctrbuf, buflen);
- 		}
--		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
--		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
-+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
-+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
-+		r = a ^ b;
-+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
-+		src += sizeof(a);
-+		dest += sizeof(r);
-+
-+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
- 	}
-+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
- 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- 	}
--	if (key != NULL)
--		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
--		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
-+			case 128:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 192:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 256:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
-+		}
-+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
-+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
-+	}
- 	if (iv != NULL)
- 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- 	return (1);
-@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
- 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
diff --git a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch b/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a7d849..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
- 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
--			addargs(&alist, "-n");
-+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
-+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
-+			else
-+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
- 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
- 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bb55c0b..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
---- a/scp.c	
-+++ a/scp.c	
-@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- 			free(vect[0]);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
-+			errno = ENOTDIR;
-+			goto bad;
-+		}
- 		omode = mode;
- 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
--- 
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5e06940..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
-+		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+			struct group *gr;
-+
-+			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
-+				/* The only additional bit is read
-+				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
-+				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
-+					return 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8047fc3..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3_f("done");
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
-+		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
- 
--	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
- 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
-@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
-			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
-			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
-			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (in_chroot == 0)
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		fprintf(stderr,
- 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		setexeccon(NULL);
--#endif
- #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
- 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
- 		    (char *)NULL);
-@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
--#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
-@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Demote the child */
- 	if (privsep_chroot) {
- 		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
- #endif
diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 930de69..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,571 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
- 	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
-+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
-+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
- 	    n) == -1) {
-@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
- 	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
-+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
-+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (sa != NULL) {
--		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
-+		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
-+			freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 			return -1;
-+		}
- 		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
- 		umask(old_umask);
- 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
- 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 
-@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- 			close(tmpfd);
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
- 		return r;
- 	}
- 	/* success */
-+	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
-@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
- 		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
- 		    c->self, strerror(err));
- 		/* Try next address, if any */
--		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
-+		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
- 			close(c->sock);
- 			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
- 			channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
-@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ int
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
- {
- 	int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
--	char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
-+	char *host_to_connect = NULL, *listen_host = NULL, *listen_path = NULL;
- 	int port_to_connect, listen_port;
- 
- 	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
-@@ -3832,7 +3832,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
- 	success = 1;
- 	if (success) {
- 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
--		host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
- 		port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
- 		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
- 			host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
-@@ -3853,6 +3852,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
- 		    host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
- 		    listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
- 	}
-+	free(host_to_connect);
-+	free(listen_host);
-+	free(listen_path);
- 	return idx;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/compat.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.768968062 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/compat.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -191,10 +191,12 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, cha
- 		return p;
- 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
-		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
-			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
-			freerrset(fingerprints);
-+				free(dnskey_digest);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
-@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
- 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
--
-+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
- 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+#pragma pop
- 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.711967665 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -98,8 +98,10 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	default:
- 		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
- 	}
--	if (r != 0)
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
- 		return r;
-+	}
- 
- 	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
- 	sshkey_free(key);
- 	sshbuf_free(copy);
- 	sshbuf_free(sect);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
-@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
- 	 */
- 
- 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
- # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
- # endif
-@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 
- 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
- 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
- 
-@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
- 
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
- 
- 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
-@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
- 	}
- 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(nullfd);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- }
- 
- char *
-@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
- 	}
- 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(devnull);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
-@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
- 	else
- 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
- 		    strerror(errno));
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- }
- 
- static unsigned long
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
-@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
- 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- 
- 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
--
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
- 	return (0);
- 
-  error:
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
-@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
- static void
- pselect_notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2_f("reading");
- 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
-@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
- 			} else if (r != 0) {
- 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
- 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
-+				free(arg2);
- 				goto out;
- 			}
- 			free(arg2);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
-@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
-@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		debug_f("invalid tun");
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
- 	/* Environment specified by admin */
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
- 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
- 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
- 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
- 		}
- 		*value++ = '\0';
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
-+		free(cp);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- 	pid = sshpid;
- 	if (pid > 1) {
- 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-@@ -762,6 +762,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
-+		free(abs_dst);
-+		abs_dst = NULL;
- 	}
- 
- out:
-@@ -985,6 +987,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
- 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
- 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
- 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
-+				free(fname);
- 				continue;
- 			}
- 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
- 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
- 	}
- 	free(rks);
-+	free(device);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
- 
- 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
- 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 			return NULL;
- 		}
- 		/* validate also provider from URI */
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
- 		close(muxserver_sock);
- 		muxserver_sock = -1;
- 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
-+		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
- 		muxclient(options.control_path);
- 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
- 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
-@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
--		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -2474,7 +2479,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- 		    options.rekey_interval);
--
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE]*/
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
- 
-@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (newstr)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
--	else
-+	else {
- 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+		free(gss);
-+	     }
-+	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
- 	}
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
-@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
- 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
- 			if (r != 0)
- 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
-+			freezero(blob, blen);
-+			blob = NULL;
-+			blen = 0;
- 		} else {
- 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
- 				cp += 4;
-@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
- 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
-+			free(checkpoint);
- 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
- 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
-@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+	free(checkpoint);
-+	if (in != stdin)
-+		fclose(in);
- }
- 
- static char *
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
-@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
- 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
-+			ctx = NULL;
- 			errno = oerrno;
- 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- 			goto out;
diff --git a/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch b/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 156e66d..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
---- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
-+++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
-@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
--	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
- 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
diff --git a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch b/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4f9e58a..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7217c64..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
-and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
-implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
-crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
-this is only need on s390 architecture.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
- #endif
-@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
--- 
-1.9.1
-
-getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
-crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
-Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
--- 1.9.1
-1.9.1
-diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
-@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_gettid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d2c5592..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,454 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.994577324 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-04-19 16:58:47.750263410 +0200
-@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
- 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
- 	struct dhgroup dhg;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
-+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
-+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
- 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
- 	return 8192;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
-+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
-+ */
-+int
-+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
-+{
-+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
-+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
-+	DH *known = NULL;
-+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
-+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-+
-+	if (bits <= 3072) {
-+		known = dh_new_group14();
-+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
-+		known = dh_new_group16();
-+	} else {
-+		known = dh_new_group18();
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
-+
-+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
-+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
-+		rv = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_free(known);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-04-19 16:59:31.951616078 +0200
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
- 
- int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.058577815 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
--			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
- 
- 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,20 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
- 	"ssh-rsa"
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256," \
-+	"ssh-rsa"
-+
- #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
- 
- #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
-+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+
- /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
- #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.999577362 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.034577631 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_open
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socket
-+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.027577577 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
- 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
- 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.055577792 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
--		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
--		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
--		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
--		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
--		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
--			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
--			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
--			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
--			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				free(gss_host);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					free(gss_host);
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
- 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- 			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
- 
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.060577831 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:57:45.827769340 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #include <grp.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- 		orig = NULL;
- 
--	if (options.gss_keyex)
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
--	else
--		gss = NULL;
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.061577838 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.067577885 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
- #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- #include "ssh-sk.h"
- 
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	}
- 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
- 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.068577892 +0200
-@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8560c9f..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
-@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
-+
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
-+# problems.
- #UsePAM no
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3117a7a..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol	2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
-@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
- 		lnum++;
- 		cp = line;
--		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
-+		cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
- 		/* Trim leading space and comments */
- 		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
- 		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ade0bbb..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
-From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
-
----
- digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
- digest.h         |   6 ++
- ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
- ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
- ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
- sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
- sshkey.h         |   4 +
- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
-index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
---- a/digest-openssl.c
-+++ b/digest-openssl.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-+const EVP_MD *
-+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static const struct ssh_digest *
- ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
- {
-diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
-index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
---- a/digest.h
-+++ b/digest.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
-index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
---- a/ssh-dss.c
-+++ b/ssh-dss.c
-@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
- ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
--	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-+	size_t rlen, slen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const u_char *psig = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
-+	    data, datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	free(sigb);
-+	sigb = NULL;
- 
- 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
- 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
--	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
-+	size_t len, slen;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
-@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	/* sha1 the data */
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
--
--	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-+	    sigb, slen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
---- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
- ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const unsigned char *psig;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- 	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t len, dlen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--
- 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t dlen;
-+	int hash_alg, len;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
-+		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
--static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
-+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
- 
- static const char *
- rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
-@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
--static int
--rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
--{
--	switch (type) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		return NID_sha1;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		return NID_sha256;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		return NID_sha512;
--	default:
--		return -1;
--	}
--}
--
- int
- ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
- {
-@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
- ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
--	size_t slen = 0;
--	u_int dlen, len;
--	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int len, slen = 0;
-+	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- 	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
-+
- 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
--		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
--	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--
--	/* hash the data */
--	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto out;
--	}
- 	if (len < slen) {
- 		size_t diff = slen - len;
- 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* encode signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- 	freezero(sig, slen);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	char *sigtype = NULL;
- 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
-+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
- 
-@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
--	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
--	    key->rsa);
-  out:
- 	freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * See:
-- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
-- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
-- */
--
--/*
-- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
--	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
--	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
--	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
--	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(1) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
--	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(3) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
--	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
--};
--
- static int
--rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
-+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
--	switch (hash_alg) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		*oidp = id_sha1;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		*oidp = id_sha256;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		*oidp = id_sha512;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
--		break;
--	default:
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	}
--	return 0;
--}
-+	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	const RSA *rsa;
-+	int ret;
- 
--static int
--openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
--    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
--{
--	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
--	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
--	const u_char *oid = NULL;
--	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
--
--	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
--		return ret;
--	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
--	if (hashlen != hlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--		goto done;
--	}
-+	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
--	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
--	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
--	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
-+	    sigbuf, siglen);
-+
- done:
--	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
- 	return ret;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
- }
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen, len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d76a4f..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
-
-    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 		HMAC_CTX_init \
- 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
- 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
- 	])
- 
- 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+static const EVP_MD *
-+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-+{
-+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *key = NULL;
-+	int r, key_len;
-+
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
-+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
-+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
-+#endif
-+	*keyp = key;
-+	key = NULL;
-+	r = 0;
-+
-+out:
-+	free (key);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else
- static int
- derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- 	return r;
- }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
- 
- #define NKEYS	6
- int
-
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index edc8bec..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From 063e1a255b53abde1147522f9aceccfd2a7ceb9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 19:45:25 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Unbreak gsi-openssh by not holding the sshbuf structures
- originated from incoming packet buffer
-
-Keeping buffers from sshpkt_getb_froms() for breaks further packet
-processing because the "derived" buffer keeps a "link" to te parent
-buffer, which is then considered readonly.
-
-This addresses the visible issue in the kexgss_server(), which
-demonstrated with GSI (requiring more round trips than GSSAPI
-with kerberos).
-
-The additional two places in the client were never hit, because the host
-keys are never sent as part of the gssapi key exchange but in case we
-would have different server or we would start sending hostkeys as the
-code is ready for that, we would hit it anyway.
-
-Fixes #18
----
- kexgssc.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
- kexgsss.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
-index 1c62740e..29b8b031 100644
---- a/kexgssc.c
-+++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -162,11 +162,16 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			do {
- 				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
- 				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
- 					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
- 					if (server_host_key_blob)
- 						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
--					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
- 						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
- 				}
- 			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
- 
-@@ -453,11 +458,16 @@ kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			do {
- 				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
- 				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
- 					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
- 					if (server_host_key_blob)
- 						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
--					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
- 						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
- 				}
- 			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
- 
-diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
-index a2c02148..c8b7d652 100644
---- a/kexgsss.c
-+++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	 */
- 
- 	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
--	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
- 	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- 	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
- 	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
- 		switch(type) {
- 		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
--			if (client_pubkey != NULL)
-+			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
- 				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
- 			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
- 			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-@@ -135,6 +135,31 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 				goto out;
- 
- 			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+
-+			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
-+			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
-+			* buffer state->incoming_packet
-+			*/
-+			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+			    kex->hash_alg,
-+			    kex->client_version,
-+			    kex->server_version,
-+			    kex->peer,
-+			    kex->my,
-+			    empty,
-+			    client_pubkey,
-+			    server_pubkey,
-+			    shared_secret,
-+			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+				goto out;
-+
-+			gssbuf.value = hash;
-+			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+			client_pubkey = NULL;
-+
- 			break;
- 		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
- 			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-@@ -156,7 +181,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
- 			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
- 
--		if (client_pubkey == NULL)
-+		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
- 			fatal("No client public key");
- 
- 		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-@@ -185,23 +210,6 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
- 		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
- 
--	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
--	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
--	    kex->hash_alg,
--	    kex->client_version,
--	    kex->server_version,
--	    kex->peer,
--	    kex->my,
--	    empty,
--	    client_pubkey,
--	    server_pubkey,
--	    shared_secret,
--	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
--		goto out;
--
--	gssbuf.value = hash;
--	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
--
- 	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
- 		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
- 
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 75a4908..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2593 +0,0 @@
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.863834186 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.844029990 +0200
-@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "canohost.h"
-+
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
-@@ -75,6 +77,8 @@
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
- 
-+static int log_flag = 0;
-+
- Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- 	&method_none,
- 	&method_pubkey,
-@@ -299,6 +303,11 @@
- 
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s",
- 	    user[0] ? user : "<implicit>", service, method);
-+	if (!log_flag) {
-+		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Authname;Remote: %s-%d;Name: %s",
-+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), user);
-+		log_flag = 1;
-+	}
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.c openssh-8.7p1/channels.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.849834155 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/channels.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.845029992 +0200
-@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@
- /* Setup helper */
- static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
- 
-+static int hpn_disabled = 0;
-+static int hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
-+
- /* -- channel core */
- 
- void
-@@ -415,6 +418,7 @@
- 	c->local_window = window;
- 	c->local_window_max = window;
- 	c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
-+	c->dynamic_window = 0;
- 	c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
- 	c->ctl_chan = -1;
- 	c->delayed = 1;		/* prevent call to channel_post handler */
-@@ -1108,6 +1112,28 @@
- 	FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
- }
- 
-+static int
-+channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
-+	socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
-+	int ret = -1;
-+
-+	/* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */
-+	if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
-+		return 128 * 1024;
-+
-+	ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
-+	    SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
-+	/* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
-+	if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
-+		tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
-+
-+	debug2("tcpwinsz: tcp connection %d, Receive window: %d",
-+	    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), tcpwinsz);
-+	return tcpwinsz;
-+}
-+
- static void
- channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
-     fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-@@ -2147,22 +2173,31 @@
- 
- 	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
- 	    !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
--	    ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
--	    c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
-+	    ((ssh_packet_is_interactive(ssh) &&
-+	    c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
- 	    c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
- 	    c->local_consumed > 0) {
-+		u_int addition = 0;
-+		u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh);
-+		/* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */
-+		if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) {
-+			/* grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain pressure */
-+			addition = 1.5 * (tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max);
-+			c->local_window_max += addition;
-+			debug("Channel: Window growth to %d by %d bytes", c->local_window_max, addition);
-+		}
- 		if (!c->have_remote_id)
- 			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
- 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
- 		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
--		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed + addition)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
- 			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
- 		}
- 		debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self,
--		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed);
--		c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
-+		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed + addition);
-+		c->local_window += c->local_consumed + addition;
- 		c->local_consumed = 0;
- 	}
- 	return 1;
-@@ -3329,6 +3364,14 @@
- 	return addr;
- }
- 
-+void
-+channel_set_hpn(int external_hpn_disabled, int external_hpn_buffer_size)
-+{
-+	hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled;
-+	hpn_buffer_size = external_hpn_buffer_size;
-+	debug("HPN Disabled: %d, HPN Buffer Size: %d", hpn_disabled, hpn_buffer_size);
-+}
-+
- static int
- channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
-     struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
-@@ -3468,8 +3511,10 @@
- 		}
- 
- 		/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
-+		/* explicitly test for hpn disabled option. if true use smaller window size */
- 		c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
--		    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-+		    hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : hpn_buffer_size,
-+		    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 		    0, "port listener", 1);
- 		c->path = xstrdup(host);
- 		c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
-@@ -4655,7 +4700,8 @@
- 		sock = socks[n];
- 		nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener",
- 		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
--		    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-+		    hpn_disabled ? CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT : hpn_buffer_size,
-+		    CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 		    0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
- 		nc->single_connection = single_connection;
- 		(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.h openssh-8.7p1/channels.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/channels.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.785834012 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/channels.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.846029995 +0200
-@@ -169,8 +169,10 @@
- 	u_int	local_window_max;
- 	u_int	local_consumed;
- 	u_int	local_maxpacket;
-+	int	dynamic_window;
- 	int     extended_usage;
- 	int	single_connection;
-+	u_int	tcpwinsz;
- 
- 	char   *ctype;		/* type */
- 
-@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@
- #define CHAN_LOCAL			0x10
- 
- /* Read buffer size */
--#define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
-+#define CHAN_RBUF	CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT
- 
- /* Maximum channel input buffer size */
- #define CHAN_INPUT_MAX	(16*1024*1024)
-@@ -363,4 +365,7 @@
- void	 chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
- void	 chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
- 
-+/* hpn handler */
-+void	 channel_set_hpn(int, int);
-+
- #endif
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.c openssh-8.7p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.828834108 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/cipher.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.847029997 +0200
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
-@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@
- #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
- #endif
- 
-+/* for multi-threaded aes-ctr cipher */
-+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
-+
- struct sshcipher_ctx {
- 	int	plaintext;
- 	int	encrypt;
-@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@
- 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
- };
- 
--static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
-+static struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
- 	{ "3des-cbc",		8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-@@ -133,6 +137,29 @@
- #endif
- }
- 
-+/* used to get the cipher name so when force rekeying to handle the
-+ * single to multithreaded ctr cipher swap we only rekey when appropriate
-+ */
-+const char *
-+cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
-+{
-+	return cc->cipher->name;
-+}
-+
-+/* in order to get around sandbox and forking issues with a threaded cipher
-+ * we set the initial pre-auth aes-ctr cipher to the default OpenSSH cipher
-+ * post auth we set them to the new evp as defined by cipher-ctr-mt
-+ */
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+void
-+cipher_reset_multithreaded(void)
-+{
-+	cipher_by_name("aes128-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
-+	cipher_by_name("aes192-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
-+	cipher_by_name("aes256-ctr")->evptype = evp_aes_ctr_mt;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- u_int
- cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
- {
-@@ -182,10 +209,10 @@
- 	return cc->plaintext;
- }
- 
--const struct sshcipher *
-+struct sshcipher *
- cipher_by_name(const char *name)
- {
--	const struct sshcipher *c;
-+	struct sshcipher *c;
- 	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c;
-@@ -207,7 +234,8 @@
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
- 		c = cipher_by_name(p);
--		if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
-+		if (c == NULL || ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0 &&
-+				  (c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)) {
- 			free(cipher_list);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c openssh-8.7p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher-ctr-mt.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/cipher-ctr-mt.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.848029999 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
-+/*
-+ * OpenSSH Multi-threaded AES-CTR Cipher
-+ *
-+ * Author: Benjamin Bennett <ben@psc.edu>
-+ * Author: Mike Tasota <tasota@gmail.com>
-+ * Author: Chris Rapier <rapier@psc.edu>
-+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2013 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Based on original OpenSSH AES-CTR cipher. Small portions remain unchanged,
-+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+
-+/*-------------------- TUNABLES --------------------*/
-+/* maximum number of threads and queues */
-+#define MAX_THREADS	32
-+#define MAX_NUMKQ	(MAX_THREADS * 2)
-+
-+/* Number of pregen threads to use */
-+int cipher_threads = 2;
-+
-+/* Number of keystream queues */
-+int numkq = 4;
-+
-+/* Length of a keystream queue */
-+#define KQLEN		4096
-+
-+/* Processor cacheline length */
-+#define CACHELINE_LEN	64
-+
-+/* Collect thread stats and print at cancellation when in debug mode */
-+#define CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+
-+/* Can the system do unaligned loads natively? */
-+#if defined(__aarch64__) || \
-+    defined(__i386__)    || \
-+    defined(__powerpc__) || \
-+    defined(__x86_64__)
-+# define CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
-+#endif
-+#if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__)
-+# define CIPHER_INT128_OK
-+#endif
-+/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/
-+
-+
-+const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
-+
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+/*
-+ * Struct to collect thread stats
-+ */
-+struct thread_stats {
-+	u_int	fills;
-+	u_int	skips;
-+	u_int	waits;
-+	u_int	drains;
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Debug print the thread stats
-+ * Use with pthread_cleanup_push for displaying at thread cancellation
-+ */
-+static void
-+thread_loop_stats(void *x)
-+{
-+	struct thread_stats *s = x;
-+	debug("AES-CTR MT tid %lu - %u fills, %u skips, %u waits", pthread_self(),
-+			s->fills, s->skips, s->waits);
-+}
-+
-+# define STATS_STRUCT(s)	struct thread_stats s
-+# define STATS_INIT(s)		{ memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); }
-+# define STATS_FILL(s)		{ s.fills++; }
-+# define STATS_SKIP(s)		{ s.skips++; }
-+# define STATS_WAIT(s)		{ s.waits++; }
-+# define STATS_DRAIN(s)		{ s.drains++; }
-+#else
-+# define STATS_STRUCT(s)
-+# define STATS_INIT(s)
-+# define STATS_FILL(s)
-+# define STATS_SKIP(s)
-+# define STATS_WAIT(s)
-+# define STATS_DRAIN(s)
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Keystream Queue state */
-+enum {
-+	KQINIT,
-+	KQEMPTY,
-+	KQFILLING,
-+	KQFULL,
-+	KQDRAINING
-+};
-+
-+/* Keystream Queue struct */
-+struct kq {
-+	u_char		keys[KQLEN][AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char		ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char		pad0[CACHELINE_LEN];
-+	int		qstate;
-+	pthread_mutex_t	lock;
-+	pthread_cond_t	cond;
-+	u_char		pad1[CACHELINE_LEN];
-+};
-+
-+/* Context struct */
-+struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt
-+{
-+	int		struct_id;
-+	struct kq	q[MAX_NUMKQ];
-+	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	STATS_STRUCT(stats);
-+	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	pthread_t	tid[MAX_THREADS];
-+	int		id[MAX_THREADS];
-+	pthread_rwlock_t tid_lock;
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+	pthread_rwlock_t stop_lock;
-+	int		exit_flag;
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+	int		state;
-+	int		qidx;
-+	int		ridx;
-+};
-+
-+/* <friedl>
-+ * increment counter 'ctr',
-+ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
-+ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
-+ */
-+static void
-+ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+
-+	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+		if (++ctr[i])	/* continue on overflow */
-+			return;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Add num to counter 'ctr'
-+ */
-+static void
-+ssh_ctr_add(u_char *ctr, uint32_t num, u_int len)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+	uint16_t n;
-+
-+	for (n = 0, i = len - 1; i >= 0 && (num || n); i--) {
-+		n = ctr[i] + (num & 0xff) + n;
-+		num >>= 8;
-+		ctr[i] = n & 0xff;
-+		n >>= 8;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Threads may be cancelled in a pthread_cond_wait, we must free the mutex
-+ */
-+static void
-+thread_loop_cleanup(void *x)
-+{
-+	pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)x);
-+}
-+
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+/* Check if we should exit, we are doing both cancel and exit condition
-+ * since on OSX threads seem to occasionally fail to notice when they have
-+ * been cancelled. We want to have a backup to make sure that we won't hang
-+ * when the main process join()-s the cancelled thread.
-+ */
-+static void
-+thread_loop_check_exit(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
-+{
-+	int exit_flag;
-+
-+	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+	exit_flag = c->exit_flag;
-+	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+
-+	if (exit_flag)
-+		pthread_exit(NULL);
-+}
-+#else
-+# define thread_loop_check_exit(s)
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Helper function to terminate the helper threads
-+ */
-+static void
-+stop_and_join_pregen_threads(struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+	/* notify threads that they should exit */
-+	pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+	c->exit_flag = TRUE;
-+	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->stop_lock);
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+	/* Cancel pregen threads */
-+	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+		debug ("Canceled %lu (%d,%d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+		pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
-+	}
-+	/* shouldn't need this - see commit logs for hpn-7_7_P1 -cjr 11/7/19*/
-+	/* for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) { */
-+	/* 	pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[i].lock); */
-+	/* 	pthread_cond_broadcast(&c->q[i].cond); */
-+	/* 	pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[i].lock); */
-+	/* } */
-+	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+		if (pthread_kill(c->tid[i], 0) != 0)
-+			debug3("AES-CTR MT pthread_join failure: Invalid thread id %lu in %s", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__);
-+		else {
-+			debug ("Joining %lu (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+			pthread_join(c->tid[i], NULL);
-+		}
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * The life of a pregen thread:
-+ *    Find empty keystream queues and fill them using their counter.
-+ *    When done, update counter for the next fill.
-+ */
-+static void *
-+thread_loop(void *x)
-+{
-+	AES_KEY key;
-+	STATS_STRUCT(stats);
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c = x;
-+	struct kq *q;
-+	int i;
-+	int qidx;
-+	pthread_t first_tid;
-+
-+	/* Threads stats on cancellation */
-+	STATS_INIT(stats);
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+	pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_stats, &stats);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* Thread local copy of AES key */
-+	memcpy(&key, &c->aes_ctx, sizeof(key));
-+
-+	pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+	first_tid = c->tid[0];
-+	pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Handle the special case of startup, one thread must fill
-+	 * the first KQ then mark it as draining. Lock held throughout.
-+	 */
-+	if (pthread_equal(pthread_self(), first_tid)) {
-+		q = &c->q[0];
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+		if (q->qstate == KQINIT) {
-+			for (i = 0; i < KQLEN; i++) {
-+				AES_encrypt(q->ctr, q->keys[i], &key);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(q->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+			ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (numkq - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
-+			STATS_FILL(stats);
-+			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+		}
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+	} else
-+		STATS_SKIP(stats);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over
-+	 * queues already filled by other threads and stopping to wait for
-+	 * a draining queue to become empty.
-+	 *
-+	 * Multiple threads may be waiting on a draining queue and awoken
-+	 * when empty.  The first thread to wake will mark it as filling,
-+	 * others will move on to fill, skip, or wait on the next queue.
-+	 */
-+	for (qidx = 1;; qidx = (qidx + 1) % numkq) {
-+		/* Check if I was cancelled, also checked in cond_wait */
-+		pthread_testcancel();
-+
-+		/* Check if we should exit as well */
-+		thread_loop_check_exit(c);
-+
-+		/* Lock queue and block if its draining */
-+		q = &c->q[qidx];
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+		pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock);
-+		while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) {
-+			STATS_WAIT(stats);
-+			thread_loop_check_exit(c);
-+			pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
-+		}
-+		pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
-+
-+		/* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */
-+		if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) {
-+			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+			STATS_SKIP(stats);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Empty, let's fill it.
-+		 * Queue lock is relinquished while we do this so others
-+		 * can see that it's being filled.
-+		 */
-+		q->qstate = KQFILLING;
-+		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+		for (i = 0; i < KQLEN; i++) {
-+			AES_encrypt(q->ctr, q->keys[i], &key);
-+			ssh_ctr_inc(q->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		}
-+
-+		/* Re-lock, mark full and signal consumer */
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+		ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (numkq - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		q->qstate = KQFULL;
-+		STATS_FILL(stats);
-+		pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+	/* Stats */
-+	pthread_cleanup_pop(1);
-+#endif
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
-+    LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
-+{
-+	typedef union {
-+#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
-+		__uint128_t *u128;
-+#endif
-+		uint64_t *u64;
-+		uint32_t *u32;
-+		uint8_t *u8;
-+		const uint8_t *cu8;
-+		uintptr_t u;
-+	} ptrs_t;
-+	ptrs_t destp, srcp, bufp;
-+	uintptr_t align;
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+	struct kq *q, *oldq;
-+	int ridx;
-+	u_char *buf;
-+
-+	if (len == 0)
-+		return 1;
-+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	q = &c->q[c->qidx];
-+	ridx = c->ridx;
-+
-+	/* src already padded to block multiple */
-+	srcp.cu8 = src;
-+	destp.u8 = dest;
-+	while (len > 0) {
-+		buf = q->keys[ridx];
-+		bufp.u8 = buf;
-+
-+		/* figure out the alignment on the fly */
-+#ifdef CIPHER_UNALIGNED_OK
-+		align = 0;
-+#else
-+		align = destp.u | srcp.u | bufp.u;
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef CIPHER_INT128_OK
-+		if ((align & 0xf) == 0) {
-+			destp.u128[0] = srcp.u128[0] ^ bufp.u128[0];
-+		} else
-+#endif
-+		if ((align & 0x7) == 0) {
-+			destp.u64[0] = srcp.u64[0] ^ bufp.u64[0];
-+			destp.u64[1] = srcp.u64[1] ^ bufp.u64[1];
-+		} else if ((align & 0x3) == 0) {
-+			destp.u32[0] = srcp.u32[0] ^ bufp.u32[0];
-+			destp.u32[1] = srcp.u32[1] ^ bufp.u32[1];
-+			destp.u32[2] = srcp.u32[2] ^ bufp.u32[2];
-+			destp.u32[3] = srcp.u32[3] ^ bufp.u32[3];
-+		} else {
-+			size_t i;
-+			for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
-+				dest[i] = src[i] ^ buf[i];
-+		}
-+
-+		destp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+		srcp.u += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+		len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+		ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+
-+		/* Increment read index, switch queues on rollover */
-+		if ((ridx = (ridx + 1) % KQLEN) == 0) {
-+			oldq = q;
-+
-+			/* Mark next queue draining, may need to wait */
-+			c->qidx = (c->qidx + 1) % numkq;
-+			q = &c->q[c->qidx];
-+			pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
-+			while (q->qstate != KQFULL) {
-+				STATS_WAIT(c->stats);
-+				pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
-+			}
-+			q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
-+			pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
-+			pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
-+
-+			/* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */
-+			pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock);
-+			oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY;
-+			STATS_DRAIN(c->stats);
-+			pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond);
-+			pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	c->ridx = ridx;
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+#define HAVE_NONE	0
-+#define HAVE_KEY	1
-+#define HAVE_IV		2
-+
-+int X = 0;
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
-+    int enc)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	/* get the number of cores in the system */
-+	/* if it's not linux it currently defaults to 2 */
-+	/* divide by 2 to get threads for each direction (MODE_IN||MODE_OUT) */
-+#ifdef __linux__
-+	cipher_threads = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) / 2;
-+#endif /*__linux__*/
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+	cipher_threads = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) / 2;
-+#endif /*__APPLE__*/
-+#ifdef __FREEBSD__
-+	int req[2];
-+	size_t len;
-+
-+	req[0] = CTL_HW;
-+	req[1] = HW_NCPU;
-+
-+	len = sizeof(ncpu);
-+	sysctl(req, 2, &cipher_threads, &len, NULL, 0);
-+	cipher_threads = cipher_threads / 2;
-+#endif /*__FREEBSD__*/
-+
-+	/* if they have less than 4 cores spin up 4 threads anyway */
-+	if (cipher_threads < 2)
-+		cipher_threads = 2;
-+
-+	/* assure that we aren't trying to create more threads */
-+	/* than we have in the struct. cipher_threads is half the */
-+	/* total of allowable threads hence the odd looking math here */
-+	if (cipher_threads * 2 > MAX_THREADS)
-+		cipher_threads = MAX_THREADS / 2;
-+
-+	/* set the number of keystream queues */
-+	numkq = cipher_threads * 2;
-+
-+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
-+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
-+		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->tid_lock, NULL);
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+		pthread_rwlock_init(&c->stop_lock, NULL);
-+		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
-+		for (i = 0; i < numkq; i++) {
-+			pthread_mutex_init(&c->q[i].lock, NULL);
-+			pthread_cond_init(&c->q[i].cond, NULL);
-+		}
-+
-+		STATS_INIT(c->stats);
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
-+		/* tell the pregen threads to exit */
-+		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
-+
-+#ifdef __APPLE__
-+		/* reset the exit flag */
-+		c->exit_flag = FALSE;
-+#endif /* __APPLE__ */
-+
-+		/* Start over getting key & iv */
-+		c->state = HAVE_NONE;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
-+		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+		c->state |= HAVE_KEY;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (iv != NULL) {
-+		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		c->state |= HAVE_IV;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (c->state == (HAVE_KEY | HAVE_IV)) {
-+		/* Clear queues */
-+		memcpy(c->q[0].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		c->q[0].qstate = KQINIT;
-+		for (i = 1; i < numkq; i++) {
-+			memcpy(c->q[i].ctr, c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			ssh_ctr_add(c->q[i].ctr, i * KQLEN, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			c->q[i].qstate = KQEMPTY;
-+		}
-+		c->qidx = 0;
-+		c->ridx = 0;
-+
-+		/* Start threads */
-+		for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+			pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+			if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c) != 0)
-+				debug ("AES-CTR MT Could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__); /*should die here */
-+			else {
-+				if (!c->struct_id)
-+					c->struct_id = X++;
-+				c->id[i] = i;
-+				debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+			}
-+			pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+		}
-+		pthread_mutex_lock(&c->q[0].lock);
-+		while (c->q[0].qstate == KQINIT)
-+			pthread_cond_wait(&c->q[0].cond, &c->q[0].lock);
-+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->q[0].lock);
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* this function is no longer used but might prove handy in the future
-+ * this comment also applies to ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction
-+ */
-+void
-+ssh_aes_ctr_thread_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+
-+	c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
-+	stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+	int i;
-+	c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
-+	/* reconstruct threads */
-+	for (i = 0; i < cipher_threads; i++) {
-+		pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+		if (pthread_create(&c->tid[i], NULL, thread_loop, c) !=0 )
-+			debug("AES-CTR MT could not create thread in %s", __FUNCTION__);
-+		else {
-+			c->struct_id = X++;
-+			c->id[i] = i;
-+			debug ("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s (%d, %d)", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__, c->struct_id, c->id[i]);
-+			debug("AES-CTR MT spawned a thread with id %lu in %s", c->tid[i], __FUNCTION__);
-+		}
-+		pthread_rwlock_unlock(&c->tid_lock);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx_mt *c;
-+
-+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
-+		debug("AES-CTR MT main thread: %u drains, %u waits", c->stats.drains,
-+		    c->stats.waits);
-+#endif
-+		stop_and_join_pregen_threads(c);
-+
-+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
-+		free(c);
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* <friedl> */
-+const EVP_CIPHER *
-+evp_aes_ctr_mt(void)
-+{
-+# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000UL
-+	static EVP_CIPHER *aes_ctr;
-+	aes_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 16/*block*/, 16/*key*/);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(aes_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_init);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup);
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(aes_ctr, ssh_aes_ctr);
-+#  ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
-+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(aes_ctr, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
-+				      | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH
-+				      | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
-+				      | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV);
-+#  endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/
-+	return (aes_ctr);
-+# else /*earlier versions of openssl*/
-+	static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr;
-+	memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-+	aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef;
-+	aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+	aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+	aes_ctr.key_len = 16;
-+	aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init;
-+	aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup;
-+	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
-+#  ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
-+	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
-+		EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+#  endif /*SSH_OLD_EVP*/
-+	return &aes_ctr;
-+# endif /*OPENSSH_VERSION_NUMBER*/
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.h openssh-8.7p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/cipher.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.829834110 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/cipher.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.848029999 +0200
-@@ -68,7 +68,9 @@
- 
- struct sshcipher_ctx;
- 
--const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
-+void ssh_aes_ctr_thread_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); // defined in cipher-ctr-mt.c
-+void ssh_aes_ctr_thread_reconstruction(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
- const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
- int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
- char	*cipher_alg_list(char, int);
-@@ -86,6 +88,8 @@
- u_int	 cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
-+void	 cipher_reset_multithreaded(void);
-+const char *cipher_ctx_name(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
- 
- u_int	 cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/clientloop.c openssh-8.7p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/clientloop.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.738833908 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/clientloop.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.849030001 +0200
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,9 @@
- 		return NULL;
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
- 	    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
--	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
-+	    /* again is this really necessary for X11? */
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
- 	c->force_drain = 1;
- 	return c;
- }
-@@ -1611,7 +1613,8 @@
- 	}
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
- 	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
--	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
- 	    "authentication agent connection", 1);
- 	c->force_drain = 1;
- 	return c;
-@@ -1638,7 +1641,8 @@
- 	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
- 
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
--	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
- 	c->datagram = 1;
- 
- #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.c openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.849834155 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.850030003 +0200
-@@ -151,6 +151,17 @@
- 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
- 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
- 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
-+			/* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */
-+			/* TODO: See if we can work this into the new method for bug checks */
-+			if (strstr(version, "OpenSSH") != NULL) {
-+				if (strstr(version, "hpn") == NULL) {
-+					ssh->compat |= SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW;
-+					debug("Remote is NOT HPN enabled");
-+				} else {
-+					debug("Remote is HPN Enabled");
-+				}
-+			}
-+			debug("ssh->compat is %u", ssh->compat);
- 			return;
- 		}
- 	}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.h openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/compat.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.850030003 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
- #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
- #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS	0x20000000
- #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE	0x40000000
-+#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW	0x80000000
- 
- struct ssh;
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/defines.h openssh-8.7p1/defines.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/defines.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/defines.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.851030005 +0200
-@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
--# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
-+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 32*1024
- #endif
- 
- /*
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest.h openssh-8.7p1/digest.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.811834070 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/digest.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.852030007 +0200
-@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
- #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256	2
- #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384	3
- #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512	4
--#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		5
-+#define SSH_DIGEST_NULL		5
-+#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		6
- 
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest-openssl.c openssh-8.7p1/digest-openssl.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/digest-openssl.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.810834068 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/digest-openssl.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.852030007 +0200
-@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
- 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,	"SHA256",	32,	EVP_sha256 },
- 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,	"SHA384",	48,	EVP_sha384 },
- 	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,	"SHA512",	64,	EVP_sha512 },
-+	{ SSH_DIGEST_NULL,	"NONEMAC",	0,	EVP_md_null},
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/HPN-README openssh-8.7p1/HPN-README
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/HPN-README	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/HPN-README	2021-10-24 07:56:04.852030007 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+Notes:
-+
-+MULTI-THREADED CIPHER:
-+The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations
-+on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption.
-+Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up
-+to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to
-+achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this
-+more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single
-+thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal
-+performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection.
-+The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same
-+nomenclature.
-+Use examples:
-+		ssh -caes128-ctr you@host.com
-+		scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you@host.com:~/file
-+
-+NONE CIPHER:
-+To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and
-+you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE
-+feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not
-+spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will
-+be disabled.
-+
-+The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning
-+on the reciever side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need
-+at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The
-+HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail.
-+
-+http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh
-+
-+NONE MAC:
-+Starting with HPN 15v1 users will have the option to disable HMAC (message
-+authentication ciphers) when using the NONE cipher. You must enable the following:
-+NoneEnabled, NoneSwitch, and NoneMacEnabled. If all three are not enabled the None MAC
-+will be automatically disabled. In tests the use of the None MAC improved throuput by
-+more than 30%.
-+
-+ex: scp -oNoneSwitch=yes -oNoneEnabled=yes -oNoneMacEnabled=yes file host:~
-+
-+BUFFER SIZES:
-+
-+If HPN is disabled the receive buffer size will be set to the
-+OpenSSH default of 2MB (for OpenSSH versions before 4.7: 64KB).
-+
-+If an HPN system connects to a nonHPN system the receive buffer will
-+be set to the HPNBufferSize value. The default is 2MB but user adjustable.
-+
-+If an HPN to HPN connection is established a number of different things might
-+happen based on the user options and conditions.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = up to 64MB
-+This is the default state. The HPN buffer size will grow to a maximum of 64MB
-+as the TCP receive buffer grows. The maximum HPN Buffer size of 64MB is
-+geared towards 10GigE transcontinental connections.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = TCP receive buffer value.
-+Users on non-autotuning systems should disable TCPRcvBufPoll in the
-+ssh_config and sshd_config
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCP receive buffer and HPNBufferSize.
-+This would be the system defined TCP receive buffer (RWIN).
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
-+HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
-+Generally there is no need to set both.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
-+HPN Buffer Size = grows to HPNBufferSize
-+The buffer will grow up to the maximum size specified here.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
-+HPN Buffer Size = minimum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
-+Generally there is no need to set both of these, especially on autotuning
-+systems. However, if the users wishes to override the autotuning this would be
-+one way to do it.
-+
-+Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
-+HPN Buffer Size = TCPRcvBuf.
-+This will override autotuning and set the TCP recieve buffer to the user defined
-+value.
-+
-+
-+HPN Specific Configuration options
-+
-+TcpRcvBuf=[int]KB client
-+      Set the TCP socket receive buffer to n Kilobytes. It can be set up to the
-+maximum socket size allowed by the system. This is useful in situations where
-+the tcp receive window is set low but the maximum buffer size is set
-+higher (as is typical). This works on a per TCP connection basis. You can also
-+use this to artifically limit the transfer rate of the connection. In these
-+cases the throughput will be no more than n/RTT. The minimum buffer size is 1KB.
-+Default is the current system wide tcp receive buffer size.
-+
-+TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server
-+      Enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life
-+of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled
-+for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista)
-+default is yes.
-+
-+NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
-+      Enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
-+when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
-+it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
-+even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default.
-+
-+NoneMacEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
-+      Enable or disable the use of the None MAC. When this is enabled ssh
-+will *not* provide data integrity of any data being transmitted between hosts. Use
-+with caution as it, unlike just using NoneEnabled, doesn't provide data integrity and
-+protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As with NoneEnabled all authentication
-+remains encrypted and integrity is ensured. Default is no.
-+
-+NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client
-+     Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after
-+authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client
-+and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE
-+cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an
-+error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly
-+have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in
-+interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default.
-+
-+HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server
-+     In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
-+of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
-+helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no.
-+
-+HPNBufferSize=[int]KB client/server
-+     This is the default buffer size the HPN functionality uses when interacting
-+with nonHPN SSH installations. Conceptually this is similar to the TcpRcvBuf
-+option as applied to the internal SSH flow control. This value can range from
-+1KB to 64MB (1-65536). Use of oversized or undersized buffers can cause performance
-+problems depending on the length of the network path. The default size of this buffer
-+is 2MB.
-+
-+DisableMTAES=[yes/no] client/server
-+     Switch the encryption cipher being used from the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher
-+back to the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher. Useful on modern processors with
-+AES-NI instructions which make the stock single-threaded AES-CTR cipher faster than
-+the multithreaded MT-AES-CTR cipher. Set to no by default.
-+
-+
-+Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier@psc.edu)
-+         The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed
-+         by Michael Stevens (mstevens@andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was
-+         implemented by Ben Bennet (ben@psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota
-+         (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013.
-+         Allan Jude provided the code for the NoneMac and buffer normalization.
-+         This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National
-+         Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation.
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/kex.c openssh-8.7p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/kex.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.841834137 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/kex.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.853030010 +0200
-@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
- 
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "canohost.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "audit.h"
- 
-@@ -969,6 +970,11 @@
- 	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
- 	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
- 	int r, first_kex_follows;
-+	int auth_flag = 0;
-+	int log_flag = 0;
-+
-+	auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh);
-+	debug("AUTH STATE IS %d", auth_flag);
- 
- 	debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
- 	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
-@@ -1039,11 +1045,40 @@
- 			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
-+		debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name);
-+		debug("REQUESTED MAC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->mac.name);
-+		if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) {
-+			if (auth_flag == 1) {
-+				debug("None requested post authentication.");
-+				ssh->none = 1;
-+			}
-+			else
-+				fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed.");
-+			if (newkeys->mac.name != NULL && strcmp(newkeys->mac.name, "none") == 0)
-+				debug("Requesting: NONEMAC. Authflag is %d", auth_flag);
-+		}
-+
- 		debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
- 		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
- 		    newkeys->enc.name,
- 		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
- 		    newkeys->comp.name);
-+		/*
-+		 * client starts with ctos = 0 && log flag = 0 and no log.
-+		 * 2nd client pass ctos = 1 and flag = 1 so no log.
-+		 * server starts with ctos = 1 && log_flag = 0 so log.
-+		 * 2nd sever pass ctos = 1 && log flag = 1 so no log.
-+		 * -cjr
-+		 */
-+		if (ctos && !log_flag) {
-+			logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Kex;Remote: %s-%d;Enc: %s;MAC: %s;Comp: %s",
-+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-+			    newkeys->enc.name,
-+			    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
-+			    newkeys->comp.name);
-+		}
-+		log_flag = 1;
- 	}
- 	need = dh_need = 0;
- 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
-@@ -1391,7 +1426,7 @@
- 	if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
- 		version_addendum = NULL;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
--	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
-+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
- 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
- 	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
- 		oerrno = errno;
-@@ -1527,6 +1562,14 @@
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
-+	/* report the version information to syslog if this is the server */
-+	if (timeout_ms == -1) { /* only the server uses this value */
-+		logit("SSH: Server;Ltype: Version;Remote: %s-%d;Protocol: %d.%d;Client: %.100s",
-+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-+		    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
-+	}
-+
- 	debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
- 	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
- 	compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/log.c openssh-8.7p1/log.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/log.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.769833977 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/log.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.853030010 +0200
-@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@
- #include <syslog.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-+#include "packet.h" /* needed for host and port look ups */
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-+# include <sys/time.h> /* to get current time */
-+#endif
-+
- #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
- # include <vis.h>
- #endif
-@@ -65,6 +70,8 @@
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-+extern struct ssh *active_state;
-+
- #define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS	(VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
- #define LOG_STDERR_VIS	(VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/mac.c openssh-8.7p1/mac.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/mac.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.830834112 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/mac.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.854030012 +0200
-@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
- 	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "none",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
- 	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
- 
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:54:36.867834195 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in	2021-10-24 07:56:04.854030012 +0200
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
- CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
- PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
--LIBS=@LIBS@
-+LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread
- K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
- LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	authfd.o authfile.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
--	cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
-+	cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o cipher-ctr-mt.o \
- 	compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- 	log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
- 	readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.c openssh-8.7p1/packet.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.832834117 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/packet.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.855030014 +0200
-@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
- 	TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
- 	state->connection_in = -1;
- 	state->connection_out = -1;
--	state->max_packet_size = 32768;
-+	state->max_packet_size = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
- 	state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
- 	state->initialized = 1;
-@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
- ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
- {
- 	struct session_state *state;
--	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
-+	struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
- 	int r;
- 
- 	if (none == NULL) {
-@@ -958,10 +958,19 @@
- 	 * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
- 	 * See RFC4344 section 3.2.
- 	 */
--	if (enc->block_size >= 16)
--		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
--	else
--		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
-+
-+	/* we really don't need to rekey if we are using the none cipher
-+	 * but there isn't a good way to disable it entirely that I can find
-+	 * and using a blocksize larger that 16 doesn't work (dunno why)
-+	 * so this seems to be a good limit for now - CJR 10/16/2020*/
-+	if (ssh->none == 1) {
-+		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (16*2);
-+	} else {
-+		if (enc->block_size >= 16)
-+			*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
-+		else
-+			*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
-+	}
- 	if (state->rekey_limit)
- 		*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
- 		    state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
-@@ -970,6 +979,24 @@
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
-+int rekey_requested = 0;
-+void
-+packet_request_rekeying(void)
-+{
-+	rekey_requested = 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
-+ * and none cipher switch */
-+int
-+packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
-+
-+	return state->after_authentication;
-+}
-+
- #define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
- static int
- ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
-@@ -996,6 +1023,13 @@
- 	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	/* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
-+	 * cipher switch and aes-mt-ctr methods -cjr */
-+	if (rekey_requested == 1) {
-+		rekey_requested = 0;
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Time-based rekeying */
- 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
- 	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
-@@ -1342,7 +1376,7 @@
- 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
- 	int len, r, ms_remain;
- 	fd_set *setp;
--	char buf[8192];
-+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
- 	struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
- 
- 	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
-@@ -1870,17 +1904,21 @@
- 	switch (r) {
- 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
- 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 		logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
- 	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
- 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 		logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
- 		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
- 	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
- 		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+		sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 		logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
- 	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
- 		if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
- 			ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+			sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 			logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
- 		}
- 		/* FALLTHROUGH */
-@@ -1922,6 +1960,24 @@
- 	logdie_f("should have exited");
- }
- 
-+/* this prints out the final log entry */
-+void
-+sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *ssh) {
-+	double total_time;
-+
-+	if (ssh->start_time < 1)
-+		/* this will produce a NaN in the output. -cjr */
-+		total_time = 0;
-+	else
-+		total_time = monotime_double() - ssh->start_time;
-+
-+	logit("SSH: Server;LType: Throughput;Remote: %s-%d;IN: %lu;OUT: %lu;Duration: %.1f;tPut_in: %.1f;tPut_out: %.1f",
-+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-+	    ssh->stdin_bytes, ssh->fdout_bytes, total_time,
-+	    ssh->stdin_bytes / total_time,
-+	    ssh->fdout_bytes / total_time);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
-  * connection, and exits.  This function never returns. The error message
-@@ -2794,3 +2850,10 @@
- 	ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
- 	return 0;
- }
-+
-+/* need this for the moment for the aes-ctr cipher */
-+void *
-+ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	return ssh->state->send_context;
-+}
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.h openssh-8.7p1/packet.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/packet.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.833834119 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/packet.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.856030016 +0200
-@@ -86,6 +86,14 @@
- 
- 	/* APP data */
- 	void *app_data;
-+
-+	/* logging data for ServerLogging patch*/
-+	double start_time;
-+	u_long fdout_bytes;
-+	u_long stdin_bytes;
-+
-+	/* track that we are in a none cipher/mac state */
-+	int none;
- };
- 
- typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *,
-@@ -156,6 +164,8 @@
- int	 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
- u_int	 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
- 
-+int	 packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *);
-+
- int	 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
- int	 ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
- 
-@@ -170,6 +180,13 @@
- 
- void	*ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
- void	*ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *);
-+void	*ssh_packet_get_receive_context(struct ssh *);
-+void	*ssh_packet_get_send_context(struct ssh *);
-+
-+/* for forced packet rekeying post auth */
-+void	 packet_request_rekeying(void);
-+/* final log entry support */
-+void	 sshpkt_final_log_entry (struct ssh *);
- 
- /* new API */
- int	sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/progressmeter.c openssh-8.7p1/progressmeter.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/progressmeter.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/progressmeter.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.857030018 +0200
-@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
- static off_t start_pos;		/* initial position of transfer */
- static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
- static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
-+static off_t last_pos;
-+static off_t max_delta_pos = 0;
- static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
- static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
- static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
-@@ -127,6 +129,7 @@
- 	int cur_speed;
- 	int hours, minutes, seconds;
- 	int file_len;
-+	off_t delta_pos;
- 
- 	if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
- 		return;
-@@ -142,6 +145,10 @@
- 	now = monotime_double();
- 	bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
- 
-+	delta_pos = cur_pos - last_pos;
-+	if (delta_pos > max_delta_pos)
-+		max_delta_pos = delta_pos;
-+
- 	if (bytes_left > 0)
- 		elapsed = now - last_update;
- 	else {
-@@ -166,7 +173,7 @@
- 
- 	/* filename */
- 	buf[0] = '\0';
--	file_len = win_size - 36;
-+	file_len = win_size - 45;
- 	if (file_len > 0) {
- 		buf[0] = '\r';
- 		snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s",
-@@ -191,6 +198,15 @@
- 	    (off_t)bytes_per_second);
- 	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
- 
-+	/* instantaneous rate */
-+	if (bytes_left > 0)
-+		format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
-+		    delta_pos);
-+	else
-+		format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
-+		    max_delta_pos);
-+	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
-+
- 	/* ETA */
- 	if (!transferred)
- 		stalled += elapsed;
-@@ -227,6 +243,7 @@
- 
- 	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
- 	last_update = now;
-+	last_pos = cur_pos;
- }
- 
- /*ARGSUSED*/
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.870834202 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.c	2021-10-24 08:13:34.654331392 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
- #include "uidswap.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
- /* Format of the configuration file:
-@@ -169,6 +170,9 @@
- 	oHashKnownHosts,
- 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
- 	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
-+	oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize,
-+	oNoneEnabled, oNoneMacEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
-+	oDisableMTAES,
- 	oVisualHostKey,
- 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull,
- 	oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
-@@ -313,6 +317,10 @@
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
- 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
- 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
-+	{ "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
-+	{ "nonemacenabled", oNoneMacEnabled },
-+	{ "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
-+	{ "disablemtaes", oDisableMTAES },
- 	{ "sessiontype", oSessionType },
- 	{ "stdinnull", oStdinNull },
- 	{ "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication },
-@@ -336,6 +344,11 @@
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
- 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
- 
-+	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
-+	{ "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
-+	{ "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
-+	{ "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
-+
- 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
- };
- 
-@@ -1172,6 +1185,46 @@
- 		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case oHPNDisabled:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oHPNBufferSize:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
-+	case oTcpRcvBufPoll:
-+		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oNoneEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oNoneMacEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oDisableMTAES:
-+		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * We check to see if the command comes from the command
-+	 * line or not. If it does then enable it otherwise fail.
-+	 *  NONE should never be a default configuration.
-+	 */
-+	case oNoneSwitch:
-+		if (strcmp(filename, "command-line") == 0) {
-+			intptr = &options->none_switch;
-+			goto parse_flag;
-+		} else {
-+			error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename);
-+			error("Continuing...");
-+			debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename);
-+			return 0;
-+		}
-+
- 	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
- 		intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
-@@ -1426,6 +1479,10 @@
- 			*intptr = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case oTcpRcvBuf:
-+		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case oCiphers:
- 		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-@@ -2440,6 +2497,14 @@
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- 	options->request_tty = -1;
-+	options->none_switch = -1;
-+	options->none_enabled = -1;
-+	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
-+	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
-+	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
-+	options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
-+	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
-+	options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
- 	options->session_type = -1;
- 	options->stdin_null = -1;
- 	options->fork_after_authentication = -1;
-@@ -2615,6 +2680,43 @@
- 		options->server_alive_interval = 0;
- 	if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
- 		options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
-+	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
-+		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
-+	if (options->hpn_buffer_size > -1) {
-+		/* if a user tries to set the size to 0 set it to 1KB */
-+		if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
-+		/* limit the buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
-+		if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) {
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
-+			debug("User requested buffer larger than 256MB. Request reverted to 256MB");
-+		} else
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
-+		debug("hpn_buffer_size set to %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
-+	}
-+	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf == 0)
-+		options->tcp_rcv_buf = 1;
-+	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf > -1)
-+		options->tcp_rcv_buf *=1024;
-+	if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1)
-+		options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1;
-+	if (options->none_switch == -1)
-+		options->none_switch = 0;
-+	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
-+		options->none_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->none_enabled == 0 && options->none_switch > 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "NoneEnabled must be enabled to use the None Switch option. None cipher disabled.\n");
-+		options->none_enabled = 0;
-+	}
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && (options->none_enabled == 0 ||
-+					     options->none_switch == 0)) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "None MAC can only be used with the None cipher. None MAC disabled.\n");
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	}
-+	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
-+		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
- 	if (options->control_master == -1)
- 		options->control_master = 0;
- 	if (options->control_persist == -1) {
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.870834202 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/readconf.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.860030025 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
- 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
- 	int     compression;	/* Compress packets in both directions. */
- 	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
-+	int     tcp_rcv_buf; /* user switch to set tcp recv buffer */
-+	int     tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */
-+	int     hpn_disabled;    /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */
-+	int     hpn_buffer_size; /* User definable size for HPN buffer window */
- 	int	ip_qos_interactive;	/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
- 	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
- 	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
-@@ -126,7 +130,12 @@
- 
- 	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
- 	int64_t rekey_limit;
-+	int     none_switch;    /* Use none cipher */
-+	int     none_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */
-+	int     nonemac_enabled;   /* Allow none to be used */	
-+	int     disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/
- 	int	rekey_interval;
-+
- 	int	no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
- 	int	identities_only;
- 	int	server_alive_interval;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/regress/integrity.sh openssh-8.7p1/regress/integrity.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/regress/integrity.sh	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/integrity.sh	2021-10-24 07:56:04.860030025 +0200
-@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@
- cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
- 
- for m in $macs; do
-+	# the none mac is now valid but tests against it will succeed when we expect it to
-+	# fail. so we need to explicity remove it from the list of macs returned.
-+	if [ "$m" = "none" ]; then
-+		continue
-+	fi
-+
- 	trace "test $tid: mac $m"
- 	elen=0
- 	epad=0
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c openssh-8.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.842834139 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.861030027 +0200
-@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getpeername /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpeername),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpgid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
- #endif
-@@ -318,6 +321,9 @@
- #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_socketcall),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_time
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
- #endif
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/scp.c openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/scp.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.854834166 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.861030027 +0200
-@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@
- 	off_t size, statbytes;
- 	unsigned long long ull;
- 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerr;
--	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
-+	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384], visbuf[16384];
- 	char **patterns = NULL;
- 	size_t n, npatterns = 0;
- 	struct timeval tv[2];
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.871834204 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.863030032 +0200
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-@@ -200,6 +201,12 @@
- 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
- 	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
- 	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
-+	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
-+	options->hpn_disabled = -1;
-+	options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
-+	options->none_enabled = -1;
-+	options->nonemac_enabled = -1;
-+	options->disable_multithreaded = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
-@@ -290,6 +297,10 @@
- fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- {
- 	u_int i;
-+	/* needed for hpn socket tests */
-+	int sock;
-+	int socksize;
-+	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
- 
- 	/* Portable-specific options */
- 	if (options->use_pam == -1)
-@@ -461,6 +472,51 @@
- 	}
- 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
- 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
-+	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
-+		options->none_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	if (options->nonemac_enabled > 0 && options->none_enabled == 0) {
-+		debug ("Attempted to enabled None MAC without setting None Enabled to true. None MAC disabled.");
-+		options->nonemac_enabled = 0;
-+	}
-+	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
-+		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
-+	if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
-+		options->hpn_disabled = 0;
-+
-+	if (options->hpn_buffer_size == -1) {
-+		/* option not explicitly set. Now we have to figure out */
-+		/* what value to use */
-+		if (options->hpn_disabled == 1) {
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+		} else {
-+			/* get the current RCV size and set it to that */
-+			/*create a socket but don't connect it */
-+			/* we use that the get the rcv socket size */
-+			sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+			getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+				   &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+			close(sock);
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
-+			debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
-+		}
-+	} else {
-+		/* we have to do this in case the user sets both values in a contradictory */
-+		/* manner. hpn_disabled overrrides hpn_buffer_size*/
-+		if (options->hpn_disabled <= 0) {
-+			if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
-+				options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
-+			/* limit the maximum buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
-+			if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) {
-+				options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
-+			} else {
-+				options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
-+			}
-+		} else
-+			options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
- 		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
- 	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
-@@ -533,6 +589,9 @@
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-+	sNoneEnabled, sNoneMacEnabled,
-+	sDisableMTAES,
-+	sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
- 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
- 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
- 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
-@@ -733,6 +792,12 @@
- 	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "hpnbuffersize", sHPNBufferSize, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "disableMTAES", sDisableMTAES, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "nonemacenabled", sNoneMacEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -791,6 +856,7 @@
- 
- 	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
- 		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
-+			debug("Config token is %s", keywords[i].name);
- 			*flags = keywords[i].flags;
- 			return keywords[i].opcode;
- 		}
-@@ -1568,12 +1634,36 @@
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
-+	case sTcpRcvBufPoll:
-+		intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sHPNDisabled:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sHPNBufferSize:
-+		intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
- 		intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
-  parse_flag:
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
-+	case sNoneEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->none_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sNoneMacEnabled:
-+		intptr = &options->nonemac_enabled;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sDisableMTAES:
-+		intptr = &options->disable_multithreaded;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sHostbasedAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.871834204 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/servconf.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.864030034 +0200
-@@ -214,6 +214,13 @@
- 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
- 	int	permit_pam_user_change;	/* Allow PAM to change user name */
- 
-+	int     tcp_rcv_buf_poll;       /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/
-+	int	hpn_disabled;		/* disable hpn functionality. false by default */
-+	int	hpn_buffer_size;	/* set the hpn buffer size - default 3MB */
-+	int	none_enabled;		/* Enable NONE cipher switch */
-+	int     disable_multithreaded;  /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr cipher */
-+	int     nonemac_enabled;        /* Enable NONE MAC switch */
-+
- 	int	permit_tun;
- 
- 	char   **permitted_opens;	/* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/serverloop.c openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/serverloop.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.855834168 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.865030036 +0200
-@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@
- process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
- {
- 	int r, len;
--	char buf[16384];
-+	char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
- 
- 	/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
- 	if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
-@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@
- 		/* Buffer any received data. */
- 		if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "ssh_packet_process_incoming");
-+		ssh->fdout_bytes += len;
- 	}
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -340,6 +341,7 @@
- 	sigset_t bsigset, osigset;
- 
- 	debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
-+	ssh->start_time = monotime_double();
- 
- 	if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGCHLD) == -1)
- 		error_f("bsigset setup: %s", strerror(errno));
-@@ -388,6 +390,7 @@
- 
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
-+			sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
- 			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
- 			cleanup_exit(255);
- 		}
-@@ -409,6 +412,9 @@
- 	/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
- 	channel_free_all(ssh);
- 
-+	/* final entry must come after channels close -cjr */
-+	sshpkt_final_log_entry(ssh);
-+
- 	/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
- 	session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
- }
-@@ -559,7 +565,8 @@
- 	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
- 
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
--	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size,
-+	    CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
- 	c->datagram = 1;
- #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
- 	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
-@@ -610,6 +617,8 @@
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
- 	    -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 	    0, "server-session", 1);
-+	if ((options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll) && (!options.hpn_disabled))
-+		c->dynamic_window = 1;
- 	if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
- 		debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
- 		channel_free(ssh, c);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/session.c openssh-8.7p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/session.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.855834168 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/session.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.866030038 +0200
-@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
- 		goto authsock_err;
- 
- 	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
-+	/* this shouldn't matter if its hpn or not - cjr */
- 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket",
- 	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
- 	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-@@ -2363,7 +2364,8 @@
- 	channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
- 	    fdout, fdin, fderr,
- 	    ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
--	    1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
-+	    1, is_tty,
-+	    options.hpn_disabled ? CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT : options.hpn_buffer_size);
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp.1 openssh-8.7p1/sftp.1
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp.1	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp.1	2021-10-24 07:56:04.867030041 +0200
-@@ -295,7 +295,8 @@
- Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
- Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
- but will increase memory usage.
--The default is 64 outstanding requests.
-+The default is 256 outstanding requests providing for 8MB
-+of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer.
- .It Fl r
- Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
- Note that
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp-client.c openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sftp-client.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.868030043 +0200
-@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
- #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN	32768
- 
- /* Default number of concurrent outstanding requests */
--#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	64
-+#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	256
- 
- /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
- #define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_api.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh_api.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh_api.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_api.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.869030045 +0200
-@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@
- 	char *cp;
- 	int r;
- 
--	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_RELEASE)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
- 		return r;
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshbuf.h openssh-8.7p1/sshbuf.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshbuf.h	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshbuf.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.870030047 +0200
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 
--#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0x8000000	/* Hard maximum size */
-+#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0xF000000	/* Hard maximum size 256MB */
- #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX		0x100000	/* Max child buffers */
- #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM	(16384 / 8)	/* Max bignum *bytes* */
- #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT	((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.872834206 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.871030049 +0200
-@@ -1056,6 +1056,10 @@
- 			break;
- 		case 'T':
- 			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
-+			/* ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a */
-+			/* null cipher switch on an interactive session */
-+			/* so explicitly disable it no matter what */
-+			options.none_switch=0;
- 			break;
- 		case 'o':
- 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
-@@ -1784,6 +1788,8 @@
- 	setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
- }
- 
-+extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
-+
- /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
- static void
- fork_postauth(void)
-@@ -2101,6 +2107,79 @@
- 	    NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+hpn_options_init(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+	/*
-+	 * We need to check to see if what they want to do about buffer
-+	 * sizes here. In a hpn to nonhpn connection we want to limit
-+	 * the window size to something reasonable in case the far side
-+	 * has the large window bug. In hpn to hpn connection we want to
-+	 * use the max window size but allow the user to override it
-+	 * lastly if they disabled hpn then use the ssh std window size.
-+	 *
-+	 * So why don't we just do a getsockopt() here and set the
-+	 * ssh window to that? In the case of a autotuning receive
-+	 * window the window would get stuck at the initial buffer
-+	 * size generally less than 96k. Therefore we need to set the
-+	 * maximum ssh window size to the maximum hpn buffer size
-+	 * unless the user has specifically set the tcprcvbufpoll
-+	 * to no. In which case we *can* just set the window to the
-+	 * minimum of the hpn buffer size and tcp receive buffer size.
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (tty_flag)
-+		options.hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+	else
-+		options.hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
-+
-+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW) {
-+		debug("HPN to Non-HPN connection");
-+	} else {
-+		debug("HPN to HPN connection");
-+		int sock, socksize;
-+		socklen_t socksizelen;
-+		if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll <= 0) {
-+			sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+			socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
-+			getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+				   &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+			close(sock);
-+			debug("socksize %d", socksize);
-+			options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
-+			debug("HPNBufferSize set to TCP RWIN: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+		} else {
-+			if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0) {
-+				/*
-+				 * Create a socket but don't connect it:
-+				 * we use that the get the rcv socket size
-+				 */
-+				sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+				/*
-+				 * If they are using the tcp_rcv_buf option,
-+				 * attempt to set the buffer size to that.
-+				 */
-+				if (options.tcp_rcv_buf) {
-+					socksizelen = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
-+					setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+						   &options.tcp_rcv_buf, socksizelen);
-+				}
-+				socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
-+				getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+					   &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+				close(sock);
-+				debug("socksize %d", socksize);
-+				options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
-+				debug("HPNBufferSize set to user TCPRcvBuf: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	debug("Final hpn_buffer_size = %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+
-+	channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+}
-+
- /* open new channel for a session */
- static int
- ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
-@@ -2119,9 +2198,11 @@
- 	if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
- 		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
- 
--	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
-+	window = options.hpn_buffer_size;
-+
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (tty_flag) {
-+		window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 		window >>= 1;
- 		packetmax >>= 1;
- 	}
-@@ -2132,6 +2213,11 @@
- 
- 	debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
- 
-+	if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) {
-+		c->dynamic_window = 1;
-+		debug("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling");
-+	}
-+
- 	channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
- 	if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
- 		channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
-@@ -2146,6 +2232,13 @@
- 	int r, id = -1;
- 	char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * We need to initialize this early because the forwarding logic below
-+	 * might open channels that use the hpn buffer sizes.  We can't send a
-+	 * window of -1 (the default) to the server as it breaks things.
-+	 */
-+	hpn_options_init(ssh);
-+
- 	/* XXX should be pre-session */
- 	if (!options.control_persist)
- 		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.873834208 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-10-24 08:06:47.586411958 +0200
-@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@
- extern Options options;
- 
- /*
-+ * tty_flag is set in ssh.c. Use this in ssh_userauth2:
-+ * if it is set, then prevent the switch to the null cipher.
-+ */
-+
-+extern int tty_flag;
-+
-+/*
-  * SSH2 key exchange
-  */
- 
-@@ -212,6 +219,8 @@
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
-+static const char *myproposal_default[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- void
- ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
-     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
-@@ -225,6 +234,10 @@
- 	char *gss_host = NULL;
- #endif
- 
-+	memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
-+
-+	memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
-+
- 	xxx_host = host;
- 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- 	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
-@@ -569,6 +582,53 @@
- 
- 	if (!authctxt.success)
- 		fatal("Authentication failed.");
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If the user wants to use the none cipher and/or none mac, do it post authentication
-+	 * and only if the right conditions are met -- both of the NONE commands
-+	 * must be true and there must be no tty allocated.
-+	 */
-+	if (options.none_switch == 1 && options.none_enabled == 1) {
-+		if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */
-+			debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
-+			memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
-+			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
-+			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
-+			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER!!!\n");
-+			/* NONEMAC can only be used in context of the NONE CIPHER */
-+			if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
-+				myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
-+				myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
-+				fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE MAC\n");
-+			}
-+			kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal);
-+			packet_request_rekeying();
-+		} else {
-+			/* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */
-+			debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated");
-+			fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
-+		/* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox
-+		 * so the initial aes-ctr is defined to point to the original single process
-+		 * evp. After authentication we'll be past the fork and the sandboxed privsep
-+		 * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
-+		 * then force a rekey
-+		 */
-+		const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh);
-+
-+		/* only do this for the ctr cipher. otherwise gcm mode breaks. Don't know why though */
-+		if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
-+			debug("Single to Multithread CTR cipher swap - client request");
-+			cipher_reset_multithreaded();
-+			packet_request_rekeying();
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
- 		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host,
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect.c openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshconnect.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.794834032 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect.c	2021-10-24 07:56:04.873030054 +0200
-@@ -345,6 +345,30 @@
- #endif
- 
- /*
-+ * Set TCP receive buffer if requested.
-+ * Note: tuning needs to happen after the socket is
-+ * created but before the connection happens
-+ * so winscale is negotiated properly -cjr
-+ */
-+static void
-+ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(int sock)
-+{
-+	void *buf = (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf;
-+	int sz = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
-+	int socksize;
-+	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
-+
-+	debug("setsockopt Attempting to set SO_RCVBUF to %d", options.tcp_rcv_buf);
-+	if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, buf, sz) >= 0) {
-+		getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+		debug("setsockopt SO_RCVBUF: %.100s %d", strerror(errno), socksize);
-+	}
-+	else
-+		error("Couldn't set socket receive buffer to %d: %.100s",
-+		    options.tcp_rcv_buf, strerror(errno));
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection.
-  */
- static int
-@@ -366,6 +390,9 @@
- 	}
- 	fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- 
-+	if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0)
-+		ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(sock);
-+
- 	/* Use interactive QOS (if specified) until authentication completed */
- 	if (options.ip_qos_interactive != INT_MAX)
- 		set_sock_tos(sock, options.ip_qos_interactive);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd.c	2021-10-24 07:54:36.874834211 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2021-10-24 08:00:18.185586742 +0200
-@@ -1110,6 +1110,8 @@
- 	int ret, listen_sock;
- 	struct addrinfo *ai;
- 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-+	int socksize;
-+	int socksizelen = sizeof(int);
- 
- 	for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- 		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
-@@ -1155,6 +1157,11 @@
- 
- 		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
- 
-+		getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
-+		    &socksize, &socksizelen);
-+		debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize);
-+		debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+
- 		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
- 		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
-@@ -1854,6 +1861,19 @@
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
- 
-+	if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
-+		char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers;
-+		xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers);
-+		free(old_ciphers);
-+
-+		/* only enable the none MAC in context of the none cipher -cjr */
-+		if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1) {
-+			char *old_macs = options.macs;
-+			xasprintf(&options.macs, "%s,none", old_macs);
-+			free(old_macs);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Check that options are sensible */
- 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
- 	    (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
-@@ -2301,6 +2321,9 @@
- 	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
- 	free(laddr);
- 
-+	/* set the HPN options for the child */
-+	channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- 	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2413,6 +2436,25 @@
- 	/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
- 	notify_hostkeys(ssh);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
-+		/* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox
-+		 * so the initial aes-ctr is defined to point ot the original single process
-+		 * evp. After authentication we'll be past the fork and the sandboxed privsep
-+		 * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
-+		 * then force a rekey
-+		 */
-+		const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(the_active_state);
-+
-+		/* only rekey if necessary. If we don't do this gcm mode cipher breaks */
-+		if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
-+			debug("Single to Multithreaded CTR cipher swap - server request");
-+			cipher_reset_multithreaded();
-+			packet_request_rekeying();
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Start session. */
- 	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
- 
-@@ -2486,6 +2528,11 @@
- 	struct kex *kex;
- 	int r;
- 
-+	if (options.none_enabled == 1)
-+		debug("WARNING: None cipher enabled");
-+	if (options.nonemac_enabled == 1)
-+		debug("WARNING: None MAC enabled");
-+
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
- 	    options.kex_algorithms);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:54:36.874834211 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config	2021-10-24 07:56:04.875030058 +0200
-@@ -127,6 +127,28 @@
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 
-+# the following are HPN related configuration options
-+# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels
-+#TcpRcvBufPoll yes
-+
-+# disable hpn performance boosts
-+#HPNDisabled no
-+
-+# buffer size for hpn to non-hpn connections
-+#HPNBufferSize 2048
-+
-+# allow the use of the none cipher
-+#NoneEnabled no
-+
-+# allow the use of the none MAC
-+#NoneMacEnabled no
-+
-+# Disable MT-AES-CTR cipher on server
-+# * needed for GSI-OpenSSH 7.4p1 because it's broken on the server side there
-+# * useful for modern processors with AES-NI instructions making the stock
-+#   AES-CTR cipher faster than the MT-AES-CTR cipher
-+DisableMTAES yes
-+
- # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
- #Match User anoncvs
- #	X11Forwarding no
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h openssh-8.7p1/version.h
---- openssh-8.7p1.orig/version.h	2021-10-24 07:54:36.876834215 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/version.h	2021-10-24 07:56:04.876030061 +0200
-@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@
- 
- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
- #define GSI_PORTABLE	"c-GSI"
-+#define SSH_HPN		"-hpn15v2"
- #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE GSI_PORTABLE \
--			GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION
-+			GSI_VERSION SSH_HPN KRB5_VERSION
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ec25944..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index 68aac04b..a96e95ad 100644
---- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
- .\"
- .\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
- .\"
--.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $
-+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.101 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $
- .\"
--.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
-+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 8 2021 $
- .Dt SCP 1
- .Os
- .Sh NAME
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
- .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
- .Sh SYNOPSIS
- .Nm scp
--.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
-+.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrTv
- .Op Fl c Ar cipher
- .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
- .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
-@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ It uses
- .Xr ssh 1
- for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
- same security as a login session.
--The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
--.Xr glob 3
--pattern matching.
- .Pp
- .Nm
- will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
-@@ -79,7 +76,9 @@ The options are as follows:
- Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
- Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
- hosts.
--Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option
-+Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (via the
-+.Fl O
-+flag), this option
- selects batch mode for the second host as
- .Nm
- cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
-@@ -146,9 +145,10 @@ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
- .It Fl O
- Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
- Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
--not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
--wildcard patterns.
--This mode is the default.
-+not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
-+wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
-+.Sq ~
-+prefix for older SFTP servers.
- .It Fl o Ar ssh_option
- Can be used to pass options to
- .Nm ssh
-@@ -258,16 +258,6 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
- The program must understand
- .Xr ssh 1
- options.
--.It Fl s
--Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol.
--Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides
--more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol
--relied on the remote shell for expanding
--.Xr glob 3
--wildcards.
--.Pp
--A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default.
--This option will be deleted before the end of 2022.
- .It Fl T
- Disable strict filename checking.
- By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
-@@ -299,11 +289,23 @@ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
- .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
- .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
-+.Sh CAVEATS
-+The original scp protocol (selected by the
-+.Fl O
-+flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
-+.Xr glob 3
-+pattern matching.
-+This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
-+the remote shell, such as quote characters.
- .Sh HISTORY
- .Nm
- is based on the rcp program in
- .Bx
- source code from the Regents of the University of California.
-+.Pp
-+Since OpenSSH 8.8 (8.7 in Red Hat/Fedora builds),
-+.Nm
-+has use the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
- .Sh AUTHORS
- .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
- .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index e039350c..c7cf7529 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.233 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
-  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
-@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	const char *errstr;
- 	extern char *optarg;
- 	extern int optind;
--	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
-+	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
- 	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
- 
- 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
-@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ void
- usage(void)
- {
- 	(void) fprintf(stderr,
--	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
-+	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
- 	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
- 	    "           [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
- 	exit(1);
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0bca544..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.169 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.170 2021/09/26 14:01:03 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
-  * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
-@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
- # include <paths.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
- #include <net/if.h>
-@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
- 		}
- 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- 
-+		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
-+		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
-+			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
-+			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
- 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
- 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- 			    strerror(errno));
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index d393884..10b461b 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz) = 08c81024d9e1248abfda6cc874886ff5ae916669b93cd6aff640e0614ee8cbcbc3fe87a9ce47136b6443ddbb1168b114367c74e117551905994e1a7e3fa2c0c2
-SHA512 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc) = 08b4bda855ca3ef202c271f1c0e3486082b93d1009a794d020e7ba223978bc87bf34b1fbccaae3379a47639bd849935fdaaf63bdb781d0a44625066ccf00fbfc
+SHA512 (openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz) = 2daa1fcf95793b23810142077e68ddfabdf3732b207ef4f033a027f72d733d0e9bcdb6f757e7f3a5934b972de05bfaae3baae381cfc7a400cd8ab4d4e277a0ed
+SHA512 (openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz.asc) = 6ab9deb4233ff159e55a18c9fc07d5ff8a41723dad74aa3d803e1476b585f5662aba34f8a7a1f5fe1d248f3ff3cd663f2c2fb8e399c6a4723b6215b0eb423d13
 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21