Based on openssh-10.0p1-6.fc44

Based on openssh-10.0p1-4.fc43
Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
2025-09-01 10:25:58 +02:00 · 2025-09-01 10:19:42 +02:00 · 2025-07-24 16:39:59 +00:00 · 2025-06-16 07:43:14 +02:00 · 2025-06-16 05:31:00 +02:00 · 2025-04-20 06:13:54 +02:00
105 changed files with 37211 additions and 15936 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
 /*.tar.bz2
 /*.tar.gz
+/*.tar.gz.asc
+/*.gpg
--- a/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
+From 95f4e30195382c3df7104c2ad3e5e9953f8ad554 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/50] openssh-7.8p1-role-mls
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c                       |   2 +-
+ auth-pam.h                       |   2 +-
+ auth.h                           |   3 +
+ auth2-gss.c                      |  11 +-
+ auth2-hostbased.c                |   9 +
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  11 +-
+ auth2.c                          |  14 ++
+ misc.c                           |   8 +
+ monitor.c                        |  37 ++-
+ monitor.h                        |   4 +
+ monitor_wrap.c                   |  21 ++
+ monitor_wrap.h                   |   3 +
+ openbsd-compat/Makefile.in       |   3 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  37 +--
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   3 +-
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |   3 +
+ 18 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index 13c0a792..b4100ea1 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ 	char *compound;
+diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
+index 8d801c68..9dd7ae07 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.h
+++ b/auth-pam.h
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 98bb23d4..83d07ae8 100644
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	char		*role;
+#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+ 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 75eb4e3a..f7898ab3 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+	char *micuser;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	u_char *p;
+@@ -300,7 +301,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ 	mic.value = p;
+ 	mic.length = len;
+-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0)
+		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
+	else
+#endif
+		micuser = authctxt->user;
+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
+ 
+ 	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+@@ -313,6 +320,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
+		free(micuser);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index eb21479a..a3be6e49 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -129,7 +129,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 	/* reconstruct packet */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	    (authctxt->role
+	    ? ( (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1)) != 0 ||
+	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user))) != 0 ||
+	        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '/') != 0) ||
+	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role))) != 0)
+	    : (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0) ||
+#else
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
+#endif
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index aa24fda0..267a27d2 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -206,9 +206,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 			goto done;
+ 		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+-		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+-		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		    authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
+		    authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""
+#else
+		    "", ""
+#endif
+		    );
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 82f6e621..5ba45c12 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	char *role = NULL;
+#endif
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+@@ -284,6 +287,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+		*role++ = 0;
+#endif
+
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +321,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+#endif
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
+#endif
+ 		userauth_banner(ssh);
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index dd0bd032..c932f9bb 100644
+--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
+@@ -806,6 +806,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
+	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -821,6 +822,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp);
+ 		if (*cp == '/')
+ 			return NULL;
+		if (start) {
+		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
+			if (*cp == '/')
+				return (0);
+			if (*cp != '.')
+				start = 0;
+		}
+ 	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 2179553d..02b3eaaa 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+#endif
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+@@ -194,6 +197,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -912,6 +918,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 
+ 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+#endif
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -986,6 +995,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	return found;
+ }
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	int r;
+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
+	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
+
+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+		free(authctxt->role);
+		authctxt->role = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+ int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+@@ -1358,7 +1387,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
+ 	const u_char *p;
+-	char *userstyle, *cp;
+	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char type;
+ 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
+@@ -1389,6 +1418,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
+	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
+		*s = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+@@ -1439,7 +1470,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	const u_char *p;
+-	char *cp, *userstyle;
+	char *cp, *s, *userstyle;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	int r, fail = 0;
+ 	u_char type;
+@@ -1460,6 +1491,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+ 		fail++;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
+	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
+		*s = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 3f8a9bea..9dcd9c29 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_STATE = 51, MONITOR_ANS_STATE = 52,
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
+#endif
+
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index bd900b2f..ef3ab1b1 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -442,6 +442,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
+ 
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
+		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+#endif
+
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 7134afee..38a280c8 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
+     const char *, u_int compat);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+#endif
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index 1d549954..78e6fa5b 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+ 	port-prngd.o \
+ 	port-solaris.o \
+ 	port-net.o \
+-	port-uw.o
+	port-uw.o \
+	port-linux-sshd.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..b9fbe38b
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/context.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+
+/* Send audit message */
+static int
+sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+		       security_context_t selected_context)
+{
+	int rc=0;
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int audit_fd = audit_open();
+	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
+	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
+	rc = -1;
+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
+		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
+		return rc;
+	}
+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
+		error("Error translating default context.");
+		default_raw = NULL;
+	}
+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
+		error("Error translating selected context.");
+		selected_raw = NULL;
+	}
+	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
+		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
+		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
+		error("Error allocating memory.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
+				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
+		error("Error sending audit message.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+      out:
+	free(msg);
+	freecon(default_raw);
+	freecon(selected_raw);
+	close(audit_fd);
+#endif
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int retval;
+	access_vector_t bit;
+	security_class_t class;
+
+	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
+	class = string_to_security_class("context");
+	if (!class) {
+		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	bit = string_to_av_perm(class, "contains");
+	if (!bit) {
+		error("string_to_av_perm failed to translate av perm contains");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, class, bit, &avd);
+	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
+	security_context_t *sc) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
+	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
+	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
+#endif
+		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+			*sc = NULL;
+			return -1;
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	}
+#endif
+	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+		context_t con;
+		char *type=NULL;
+		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
+			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
+				role);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		con = context_new(*sc);
+		if (!con) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+		context_role_set(con, role);
+		context_type_set(con, type);
+		freecon(*sc);
+		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+		context_free(con);
+		if (!*sc)
+			return -1;
+	}
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
+		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
+		context_t con;
+		security_context_t obtained_raw;
+		security_context_t requested_raw;
+		con = context_new(*sc);
+		if (!con) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+		context_range_set(con, lvl);
+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
+			context_free(con);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
+			freecon(obtained_raw);
+			context_free(con);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
+			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
+		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
+			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
+			freecon(requested_raw);
+			freecon(obtained_raw);
+			freecon(*sc);
+			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+			context_free(con);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		freecon(requested_raw);
+		freecon(obtained_raw);
+		context_free(con);
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+      out:
+	freecon(*sc);
+	*sc = NULL;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+{
+	*role = NULL;
+	*level = NULL;
+	if (the_authctxt) {
+		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+			char *slash;
+			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
+			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
+				*slash = '\0';
+				*level = slash + 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static int
+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
+{
+	char *sename, *lvl;
+	char *role;
+	const char *reqlvl;
+	int r = 0;
+	context_t con = NULL;
+
+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+		sename = NULL;
+		lvl = NULL;
+	}
+#else
+	sename = pwname;
+	lvl = "";
+#endif
+
+	if (r == 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
+#else
+		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (r == 0) {
+		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+		if (inetd_flag) {
+			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+
+			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
+
+			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
+				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
+			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
+			freecon(sshdsc);
+			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
+			    /* we actually don't change level */
+			    reqlvl = "";
+
+			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
+
+		}
+
+		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
+			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
+
+			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
+				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
+						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+				}
+				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
+				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
+					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+				} else {
+					r = -1;
+					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+				}
+				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
+					freecon(default_level_sc);
+			}
+		} else {
+			*user_sc = *default_sc;
+		}
+	}
+	if (r != 0) {
+		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
+		    "context for %s", pwname);
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	free(sename);
+	free(lvl);
+#endif
+
+	if (role != NULL)
+		free(role);
+	if (con)
+		context_free(con);
+
+	return (r);
+}
+
+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+static int
+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+	const char *reqlvl;
+	char *role;
+	char *use_current;
+	int rv;
+
+	debug3_f("setting execution context");
+
+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+
+	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+
+	if (inetd_flag) {
+		use_current = "1";
+	} else {
+		use_current = "";
+		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+	}
+
+	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+
+	if (role != NULL)
+		free(role);
+
+	return rv;
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+	int r = 0;
+	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
+			switch (security_getenforce()) {
+			case -1:
+				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
+			case 0:
+				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
+			break;
+			default:
+				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
+			}
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("setting execution context");
+
+	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
+	if (r >= 0) {
+		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
+			    user_ctx, pwname);
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
+		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
+			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
+			    user_ctx, pwname);
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
+		user_ctx = default_ctx;
+	}
+	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
+		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
+		   a failure */
+		sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
+	}
+	if (r < 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
+		case 0:
+			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
+		}
+	}
+	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+	if (default_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(default_ctx);
+
+	debug3_f("done");
+}
+
+#endif
+#endif
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index c1d54f38..7426f6f7 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -109,37 +109,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+@@ -152,7 +121,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
+		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 959430de..055c825e 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+
+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 4c4fe57e..1bfb4bea 100644
+--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index c64eb29f..74d2cbc7 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1328,6 +1328,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		do_pam_setcred();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 99d8e250514023d3b88a1c9eb724c4898aba9827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/50] openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
+ session.c                        | 16 +++++++++-------
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  4 ++++
+ sshd-session.c                   |  2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index b9fbe38b..dfafc622 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -415,6 +415,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 	debug3_f("done");
+ }
+ 
+void
+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+{
+	security_context_t *ctx;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
+		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
+			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
+			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
+		freecon(ctx);
+	}
+}
+
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 055c825e..498d242a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 6444c77f..e4657cef 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 
+ 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+ 
+-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+@@ -1382,6 +1382,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+ 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ 			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
+#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1417,6 +1420,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		if (in_chroot == 0)
+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
+#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1434,9 +1442,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr,
+ 		    "You must change your password now and log in again!\n");
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		setexeccon(NULL);
+-#endif
+ #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ 		    (char *)NULL);
+@@ -1649,9 +1654,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index 30eecd8a..f957dc22 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
+++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
+ 	if ((box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
+ #endif
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
+#endif
+
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (privsep_chroot) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 74d2cbc7..4a148db4 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
+ 	 * special privileges to begin with.
+ 	 */
+-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
+#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ 	skip_privdrop = 1;
+ #endif
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@ -1,6 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
--- openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
+From 5e35e18a419a5a66b6e1cb2b98beaaf4d9db0dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/50] openssh-6.6p1-keycat
+
+---
+ HOWTO.ssh-keycat                 |  12 ++
+ Makefile.in                      |   8 +-
+ configure.ac                     |   6 +
+ misc.c                           |   7 +
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c |  44 +++++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   2 +
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ ssh-keycat.c                     | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 8 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+ create mode 100644 ssh-keycat.c
+
+diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..630ec628
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@ -14,82 +34,151 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.442566930 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 4617cebc..438efc51 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
 SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
+ SSHD_AUTH=$(libexecdir)/sshd-auth
 SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
+ LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@
+@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
 
- LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -172,6 +173,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
 
-+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -260,6 +262,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ 
+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
 
-@@ -279,6 +283,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
+@@ -447,6 +452,7 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.429566992 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
-@@ -606,6 +606,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index ee77a048..d546788c 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3566,6 +3566,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+ 
+@@ -3576,6 +3577,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4801,6 +4803,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5812,6 +5815,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
+fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index c932f9bb..1e31acc9 100644
+--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2897,6 +2897,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
 			_exit(1);
 		}
- 
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
 +			    strerror(errno));
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
-+
- 		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
- 		    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern int inetd_flag;
 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.435566964 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2013-10-10 15:32:19.946065189 +0200
-@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
+sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+	static int enabled = -1;
+
+	if (enabled == -1) {
+		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+	}
+
+	return (enabled);
+}
+
+ /* Send audit message */
+ static int
+ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+@@ -317,7 +331,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
 
 /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
 static int
-ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *))
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
 {
 	const char *reqlvl;
 	char *role;
-@@ -324,16 +324,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -328,16 +342,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 
 	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
 		use_current = "1";
 	} else {
 		use_current = "";
@ -102,35 +191,83 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-
 
 	if (role != NULL)
 		free(role);
-@@ -341,6 +341,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -345,6 +359,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 	return rv;
 }
 
 +static int
-+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
 +}
 +
 +static int
-+do_setenv(char *name, char *value)
+do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
 +{
 +	return setenv(name, value, 1);
 +}
 +
 +int
-+ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
 +}
 +
 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
 void
- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c	2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -353,7 +385,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+@@ -420,7 +452,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t *ctx;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 498d242a..1b745a76 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 1bfb4bea..0d12f311 100644
+--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+-	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
+	(void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..5678be07
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keycat.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@ -180,6 +317,9 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c
 +#include <pwd.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
 +
 +#include <security/pam_appl.h>
 +
@ -369,3 +509,6 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 28333f1dfe68b0ffc80c2a4799759587b4c32d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/50] openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 4a148db4..a365f26f 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -778,12 +778,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+-		text[0] = '\0';
+-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+-			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+-		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+		i = 0;
+		do {
+			switch (opts[i]) {
+				case 0:
+				case 1:
+					++i;
+					break;
+				case 130:
+				case 133:
+				case 134:
+					if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
+						i += opts[i + 1];
+						break;
+					}
+					/* FALLTHROUGH */
+				default:
+				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
+			 	 * or incorrect source routing options. */
+					text[0] = '\0';
+					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+							" %2.2x", opts[i]);
+					fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
+						ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+			}
+		} while (i < option_size);
+ 	}
+ #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+++ b/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
-@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+From 388be633842a9f3e4b0a76fe40cf7035912a913a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 05/50] openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man
+
+---
+ ssh.1  | 2 ++
+ sshd.8 | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 697f4e42..db92ac9a 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ manual page for more information.
 .Nm
 exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
 if an error occurred.
@ -10,10 +21,11 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr scp 1 ,
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
-@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 08ebf53a..2aa73271 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -1018,6 +1018,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
 started last).
 The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
 .El
@ -22,3 +34,6 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr scp 1 ,
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ b/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 80359feb76fd8061b5ce18f73451d7b9db0c2477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/50] openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe
+
+---
+ ssh-keyscan.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
+index 3436c0b5..9f76ad22 100644
+--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
+@@ -798,6 +798,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+ 
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ 	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+ 	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+ 		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
--- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935	2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c	2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200
-@@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+From cf6d48305cf6601448ea7a0d96ae825cbbbf0a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/50] openssh-7.2p2-x11
+
+---
+ channels.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644
+--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
+@@ -5098,11 +5098,13 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
 }
 
 static int
@ -10,14 +20,18 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
 {
 	int sock;
 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
-@@ -3195,11 +3195,14 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *p
+ 
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return -1;
+ 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -5110,11 +5112,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+ 	}
 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
 -	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
-+	if (len <= 0)
-+		return -1;
 +	if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
 +		len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
 +	memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
@ -28,16 +42,13 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
 	return -1;
 }
 
-@@ -3207,8 +3210,21 @@ static int
+@@ -5122,8 +5125,18 @@ static int
 connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 {
 	char buf[1024];
 -	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 -	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
-+	int len;
-+#ifdef linux
-+	int ret;
-+#endif
+	int len, ret;
 +	len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 +#ifdef linux
 +	/* try abstract socket first */
@ -51,4 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
 +	return -1;
 }
 
- int
+ #ifdef __APPLE__
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+From 6b2a33044583e892badb9ac86cd2c6252b1a532f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/50] openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index a62f9815..cb7152dc 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <glib.h>
+ #include <gtk/gtk.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
+@@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+static void
+move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
+{
+	gdouble step;
+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
+	
+	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
+	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
+	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
+}
+
+ static int
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ {
+@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ 	char *passphrase, *local;
+ 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ 	int buttons, default_response;
+-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+ 	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 	GdkColor fg, bg;
+ 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ 
+ 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+		    FALSE, 0);
+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
+ 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ 		if (fg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ 		if (bg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ 		gtk_box_pack_start(
+-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
+		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+@@ -225,6 +242,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ 			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ 		}
+
+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
+		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
+		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
+
+		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
+		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
+		    TRUE, 5);
+		gtk_widget_show(progress);
+		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
+				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
+
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Grab focus */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 710ce53fdf1d32a0629fce2e42fb49d407e2b06c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/50] openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index cb7152dc..bbe93d83 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
+ 
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+ 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+-	    "on your session.", what);
+	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
+	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
+	    "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
+	    "on your session.\n"
+	    "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
+	    "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
+ 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 
+ 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+From 5f21983f6472b26693babea4d6ca6b95a7dc7b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/50] openssh-8.7p1-redhat
+
+---
+ ssh_config            |  7 +++++++
+ ssh_config_redhat     | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config           |  8 ++++++++
+ sshd_config.0         |  6 +++---
+ sshd_config.5         |  2 +-
+ sshd_config_redhat    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config_redhat_cp |  7 +++++++
+ 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ssh_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat_cp
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index cc566356..18169187 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -44,3 +44,10 @@
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+ #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
+#
+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
+# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
+#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
+# included below. For more information, see manual page for
+#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
+Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
+diff --git a/ssh_config_redhat b/ssh_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..8b1b5902
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
+# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
+Match final all
+	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
+	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
+
+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+
+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
+
+# rhbz#2352653 - export COLORTERM
+	SendEnv COLORTERM
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
+# Host *.local
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 0f4a3a72..608203e4 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+ 
+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
+
+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
+# SELinux about this change.
+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
+#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
+index 2f77b4f4..49349bb3 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.0
+++ b/sshd_config.0
+@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c0771737..035a50c8 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat b/sshd_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..993a28d5
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+
+KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
+
+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+
+UsePAM yes
+
+X11Forwarding yes
+
+# rhbz#2352653 - accept COLORTERM
+	AcceptEnv COLORTERM
+
+# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
+# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
+PrintMotd no
+
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat_cp b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..1d592d13
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
+# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
+# write it before this block or include it before this file.
+# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
+
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 56b8d082bc9e25a77b5227d576f27088446c6fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/50] openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 4 ++++
+ sshd_config    | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a365f26f..a70b36c9 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1127,6 +1127,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			    "enabled authentication methods");
+ 	}
+ 
+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
+	if (! options.use_pam)
+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
+
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 608203e4..48af6321 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
+# problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
--- a/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+++ b/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
@ -1,6 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.553948159 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2013-10-11 21:40:49.972337025 +0200
+From f5e5ee321def2a3674600714ad98fd1ca9b2cff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/50] openssh-6.6p1-force_krb
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ session.c       |  23 +++++++
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 ++
+ sshd.8          |   7 +++
+ 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
@ -10,21 +23,16 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "key.h"
-@@ -40,10 +42,12 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@
 
- #include "buffer.h"
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
 #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -55,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+@@ -55,6 +58,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
 #endif
 
@ -38,7 +46,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
 
 /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
 	krb5_principal princ;
 	int retval;
 	const char *errmsg;
@ -46,7 +54,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 
 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
 		return 0;
-@@ -98,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -98,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
 		return 0;
 	}
@ -70,7 +78,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 	} else
 		retval = 0;
 
-@@ -109,6 +133,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -109,6 +132,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
 	return retval;
 }
 
@ -101,13 +109,14 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +{
 +	FILE *fp;
 +	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char line[BUFSIZ];
+	char *line = NULL;
 +	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
 +	struct stat st;
 +	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
 +	int found_principal = 0;
 +	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
-+	u_long linenum;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
 +
 +	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
 +	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@ -151,9 +160,9 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
 +	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +
-+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines.  We don't. */
-+	while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line),
-+	    &linenum) != -1) {
+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
+	while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
 +		char *token;
 +
 +		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
@ -167,7 +176,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
+				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				break;
 +			}
@ -180,12 +189,13 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(token);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
+				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
 +			}
 +		}
 +       }
+	free(line);
 +	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		/* terminate vector */
 +		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
@ -206,19 +216,20 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 
 /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/session.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.487948468 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c	2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200
-@@ -823,6 +823,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 		debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index cbfbcee8..89b3a9cf 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -680,6 +680,29 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		command = auth_opts->force_command;
+ 		forced = "(key-option)";
 	}
- 
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
 +	else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		const char *match = command;
 +		int allowed = 0, i = 0;
-+ 
+
 +		if (!match)
 +			match = s->pw->pw_shell;
 +		while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
@ -236,12 +247,13 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/session.c
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
- 		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.558948136 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h	2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200
+ 	s->forced = 0;
+ 	if (forced != NULL) {
+ 		s->forced = 1;
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 8ec45192..db34d77f 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
 #  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
 
@ -253,10 +265,11 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h
 #endif /* KRB5 */
 
 /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.537948234 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8	2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200
-@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 2aa73271..049d0a94 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
 The client tries to authenticate itself using
 host-based authentication,
 public key authentication,
@ -264,7 +277,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8
 challenge-response authentication,
 or password authentication.
 .Pp
-@@ -797,6 +798,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same wa
+@@ -874,6 +875,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
 but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
 rlogin/rsh.
 .Pp
@ -277,3 +290,6 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8
 .It Pa ~/.ssh/
 This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
 and authentication information.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@ -0,0 +1,665 @@
+From 5fca5946aa97dce23c6824c52b070a92532752a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 14/50] openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ auth.h          |   3 +-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  42 +++-----
+ gss-serv.c      |  10 +-
+ servconf.c      |  12 ++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ session.c       |   5 +-
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 +-
+ sshd-session.c  |   2 +-
+ sshd_config.5   |   8 ++
+ 10 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index c99e4e43..77714e3d 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <krb5.h>
+#include <profile.h>
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ #endif
+ 	krb5_error_code problem;
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+-	int len;
+	char *ticket_name = NULL;
+ 	char *client, *platform_client;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 		goto out;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
+ 
+-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+-	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+-	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
+	krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
+	if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ void
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
+	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
+
+ 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+		krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
+		krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
+		krb5_ccache ccache;
+		int ret;
+
+		krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
+
+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
+		if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
+			/* There is at least one other ccache in collection
+			 * we can switch to */
+			krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
+		} else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
+			/* Clean up the collection too */
+			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
+			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
+			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
+			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
+
+				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
+
+				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
+					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
+						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
+						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
+						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
+							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
+							    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
+					}
+					else
+						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
+						    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
+ 	}
+out:
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+@@ -238,36 +281,189 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-#ifndef HEIMDAL
+-krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
+-	mode_t old_umask;
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
+#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
+int
+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
+	char *src, *old;
+	va_list ap;
+	int i;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	old = *dsc;
+
+	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
+	if (i == -1) {
+		*dsc = old;
+		free(src);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	free(old);
+	free(src);
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
+	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
+
+	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
+	if (template == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
+	r = xstrdup("");
+
+	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
+
+		*p_n++ = '\0';
+		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
+			goto cleanup;
+
+		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
+			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
+				goto cleanup;
+			continue;
+		}
+		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
+				goto cleanup;
+			continue;
+		} else {
+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+			*p_o = '\0';
+			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
+			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	*result = r;
+	free(tmp_template);
+	return 0;
+
+cleanup:
+	free(r);
+	free(tmp_template);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
+	profile_t p;
+	int ret = 0;
+	char *value = NULL;
+
+	debug3_f("called");
+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
+	if (ret || !value)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
+
+	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
+	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
+	char *ccname = NULL;
+	mode_t old_umask;
+	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
+
+	debug3_f("called");
+	if (need_environment)
+		*need_environment = 0;
+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
+	if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
+		/* Otherwise, go with the old method */
+		if (ccname)
+			free(ccname);
+		ccname = NULL;
+
+		ret = asprintf(&ccname,
+		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ENOMEM;
+
+		old_umask = umask(0177);
+		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+		umask(old_umask);
+		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+			return oerrno;
+		}
+
+		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+			close(tmpfd);
+			return oerrno;
+		}
+		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+		if (need_environment)
+			*need_environment = 1;
+ 		close(tmpfd);
+-		return oerrno;
+ 	}
+-	close(tmpfd);
+ 
+-	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
+	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
+	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
+		type_len = colon - ccname;
+		type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
+		if (type == NULL)
+			return ENOMEM;
+		strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
+		type[type_len] = 0;
+	} else {
+		type = strdup(ccname);
+	}
+
+	/* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
+	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
+	 */
+	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
+		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
+		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
+		free(type);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
+		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
+	} else {
+		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
+		 * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
+		 * collections
+		 */
+		free(type);
+		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
+		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+	}
+ }
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 83d07ae8..10e88e11 100644
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
+	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 14502c5a..df55512d 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+ /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+ 
+-static void
+static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache;
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ 	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+	int set_env = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ 		debug("No credentials stored");
+-		return;
+		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+-		return;
+		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef HEIMDAL
+ # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ # endif
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
+		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #else
+-	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
+	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+-		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
+		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
+		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
+		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
+		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	    client->creds, ccache))) {
+ 		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
+		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
+ 	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+-
+-	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+-	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+-	client->store.filename = NULL;
+-#else
+-	if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
+-		new_ccname++;
+ 	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
+-	if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
+-		char *p;
+-		p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
+-		if (p)
+-			*p = '\0';
+
+	if (set_env) {
+		client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+ 	}
+ 	if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
+ 		client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+-#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
+	if (options.use_pam && set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 
+ 	client->store.data = krb_context;
+ 
+-	return;
+	return set_env;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index a5cca797..9d5435ed 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -414,13 +414,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+-void
+int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
+
+	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -500,9 +502,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index d4f7fd66..55aa5bf0 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+@@ -382,6 +383,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+ 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+ 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
+		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+@@ -564,7 +567,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -655,11 +658,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1668,6 +1673,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+	case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+ 	case sGssAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3293,6 +3302,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # ifdef USE_AFS
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c3f50140..a4a38d6d 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * file on logout. */
+ 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 89b3a9cf..2620dd11 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+ 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+ 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
+ 	 */
+-	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+		ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Set basic environment. */
+@@ -1101,7 +1102,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef KRB5
+-	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index db34d77f..a894e23c 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index f8c8a797..478381db 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+ 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+-		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 8bc6586e..1251d4d5 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1033,6 +1033,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
+Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
+cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
+.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
+The default value
+.Cm no
+can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
+user account.
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 25540939422660b024b8832f67eab82267aa8df6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 15/50] openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ auth.h          |  2 ++
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.8          |  4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 77714e3d..74f56d47 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -465,5 +465,21 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ 	}
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
+ */
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
+	profile_t p;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
+		k5login_directory);
+}
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 10e88e11..39163035 100644
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
+	char **k5login_directory);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index df55512d..820f794c 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -144,8 +144,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+ {
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+	char *k5login_directory = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
+	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
+	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
+		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
+		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
+		 */
+		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+	} else {
+		/* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
+		 * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
+		 * local username.
+		 */
+		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, 
+			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
+			pw->pw_name);
+	}
+	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
+ 
+-	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 049d0a94..6784286d 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+ These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
+ Further details are described in
+ .Xr ksu 1 .
+The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
+.Cm k5login_directory
+in the
+.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+From bac7a9d1a654c8c2e0c71f979195e300b25d6232 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/50] openssh-6.6p1-kuserok
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     |  20 ++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ servconf.c      |  13 +++++-
+ servconf.h      |   1 +
+ sshd_config     |   1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |   5 +++
+ 6 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 74f56d47..bae153c9 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,21 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
+int
+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
+                 int k5login_exists)
+{
+	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
+		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
+	else {
+		char kuser[65];
+
+		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
+			return 0;
+		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
+	}
+}
+
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -158,8 +173,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
+	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
+	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
+	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
+ 		problem = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 820f794c..187faf92 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
+     int);
+ 
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+ 
+@@ -91,6 +92,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+  */
+ 
+/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
+ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
+ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
+ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
+ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
+ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
+ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
+ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
+ *
+ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
+ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
+ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
+ *
+ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
+ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
+ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
+ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
+ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
+ * not.
+ *
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
+ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
+ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
+ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
+ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
+ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
+ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
+ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
+ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
+ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
+ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
+ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
+ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
+ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
+ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
+ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
+ * given environment.
+ *
+ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
+ * access control behavior:
+ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+ *
+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
+ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
+ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
+ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
+ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
+ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
+ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
+ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
+ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
+ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
+ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
+ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
+ * restrictions mentioned above.
+ *
+ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
+ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
+ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
+ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
+ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
+ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
+ *
+ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
+ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
+ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
+ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
+ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
+ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
+ *
+ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
+ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
+ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
+ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
+ *
+ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
+ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
+ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
+ * during upgrade:
+ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
+ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
+ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
+ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
+ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
+ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
+ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
+ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
+ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
+
+ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+@@ -115,7 +213,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
+	if (k5login_exists &&
+	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+-		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+-		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+-		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
+                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+                                        k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+ 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		int saved_errno = errno;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 55aa5bf0..5dd5ca21 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -399,6 +400,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+ #endif
+	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -567,7 +570,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -659,12 +662,14 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -2441,6 +2446,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
+		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2995,6 +3004,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -3303,6 +3313,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index a4a38d6d..11de36a2 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 8db9f0fb..ea5a878e 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 1251d4d5..0fcb409a 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,10 @@ The default value
+ .Cm no
+ can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
+ user account.
+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+@@ -1355,6 +1359,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm IPQoS ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm LogLevel ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ b/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 20aabb2c445e29d211266ce7434bb0273edf88b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 17/50] openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote
+
+---
+ scp.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 57c242ff..716ae386 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1162,7 +1162,10 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
+			else
+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+From 6481ac7fbd0027a7038560e0f51dd0af056cc229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 18/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 8c5fc1fe..646f0887 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+@@ -450,7 +451,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ void
+ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+-	security_context_t *ctx;
+	char *ctx;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+@@ -469,6 +470,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+void
+sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
+{
+	int len;
+	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
+	const char *contexts_path;
+	FILE *contexts_file;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
+	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
+		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
+		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
+	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
+		    " and not writable by anyone else");
+		fclose(contexts_file);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
+		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
+		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
+			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
+				break;
+			line[len] = '\0';
+		}
+
+		if (line[0] == '\0')
+			continue;
+
+		cp = line;
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
+
+		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
+			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
+				fclose(contexts_file);
+				return;
+			}
+			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+	}
+	fclose(contexts_file);
+
+	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
+		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
+		    " SELinux context file");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
+	free(preauth_context);
+}
+
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 7426f6f7..9a6b1d6e 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
+ 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
+ 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+ 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+ 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 1b745a76..7f8ba200 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index d51e4636..e4a8edfd 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
+++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
+ 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
+	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+From 825018f5f2d892655f3d63167a0d1f3391cec678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 19/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot
+
+---
+ log.c              | 11 +++++++++--
+ log.h              |  1 +
+ monitor.c          | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h          |  2 +-
+ session.c          | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ sftp-server-main.c |  2 +-
+ sftp-server.c      |  6 +++---
+ sftp.h             |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c     |  7 ++++++-
+ 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index 6617f267..9782cfb0 100644
+--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
+@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ void
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+     int on_stderr)
+ {
+	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
+}
+
+void
+log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+@@ -208,8 +213,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_handler = NULL;
+-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
+	if (reset_handler) {
+		log_handler = NULL;
+		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+ 
+ 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ 	if (on_stderr)
+diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
+index 8e8dfc23..70048a8a 100644
+--- a/log.h
+++ b/log.h
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
+ 
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ LogLevel log_level_get(void);
+ int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
+ int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 2ef16cc8..43c10a4e 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -2001,9 +2001,22 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
+ {
+-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
+	char *dev_log_path;
+	int do_logfds = 0;
+
+	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
+		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
+
+		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
+			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
+			do_logfds = 1;
+		}
+		free(dev_log_path);
+	}
+	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index dbc7e003..d4d631dd 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct monitor {
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
+ 
+ struct Authctxt;
+ void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 2620dd11..54da09d5 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+ 
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+static int have_dev_log = 1;
+ 
+ /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
+ static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
+@@ -670,6 +671,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	int ret;
+ 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ 	char session_type[1024];
+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
+ 
+ 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ 		original_command = command;
+@@ -729,6 +731,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
+		have_dev_log = 0;
+	}
+
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+@@ -1512,14 +1518,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+-	 * descriptors open.
+-	 */
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1652,8 +1650,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 			exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+-
+ 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
+ 
+ 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+@@ -1678,9 +1674,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
+ 	}
+ 
+	/*
+	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+	 * descriptors open.
+	 */
+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ 	fflush(NULL);
+ 
+ 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
+index 2c70f89b..bbb79f27 100644
+--- a/sftp-server-main.c
+++ b/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index a4abb9f7..4985da38 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
+++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
+ {
+ 	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+ 	ssize_t len, olen;
+@@ -1913,7 +1913,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
+index 2bde8bb7..ddf1a396 100644
+--- a/sftp.h
+++ b/sftp.h
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+ 
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 478381db..9342e416 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* New socket pair */
+-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
+ 
+ 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+@@ -456,6 +456,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+
+	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
+		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+++ b/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 007ee98fa9100f7241985ac2a7eed71e17d89a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 20/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 716ae386..9554b188 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1876,6 +1876,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
+			errno = ENOTDIR;
+			goto bad;
+		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+From 9c75c175e3555377328fc5fc9b06e94f129b7cd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/50] openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  3 +--
+ servconf.c      | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ servconf.h      |  1 +
+ sshd_config     |  1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |  6 ++++++
+ 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 187faf92..03188d9b 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+ 	FILE *fp;
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	char *line = NULL;
+-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ 	int found_principal = 0;
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+ 
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
+                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+                                         k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5dd5ca21..c0de7110 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ #endif
+ 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+ 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
+		options->enable_k5users = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -585,7 +588,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+@@ -681,6 +684,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -689,6 +693,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -2450,6 +2455,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+	case sGssEnablek5users:
+		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -3005,6 +3014,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -3314,6 +3324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 11de36a2..c08cf6a7 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int	use_kuserok;
+	int		enable_k5users;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index ea5a878e..33713c88 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 0fcb409a..fe246fc2 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -739,6 +739,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
+Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
+access control. Further details are described in
+.Xr ksu 1 .
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+++ b/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 05b09904f431333e19cd24528ef66d1fd15e9efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 22/50] openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output
+
+---
+ servconf.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index c0de7110..105e301d 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -3366,7 +3366,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From 34b196198018059bed294fa7a08e70606b4cbc36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 23/50] openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission
+
+---
+ sftp-server.8 |  7 +++++++
+ sftp-server.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+index 5311bf92..5e6e3aa4 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.8
+++ b/sftp-server.8
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
+.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
+of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
+umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
+for newly created files.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
+++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+ /* Version of client */
+ static u_int version;
+ 
+/* Force file permissions */
+int permforce = 0;
+long permforcemode;
+
+ /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+@@ -745,6 +749,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	Attrib a;
+ 	char *name;
+ 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	mode_t old_umask = 0;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+@@ -754,6 +759,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
+		mode = permforcemode;
+		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
+	}	
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+@@ -775,6 +784,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+	if (permforce == 1)
+		(void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
+ 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ 		send_status(id, status);
+ 	free(name);
+@@ -1894,7 +1905,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+@@ -1918,7 +1929,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+@@ -1980,6 +1991,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
+		case 'm':
+			/* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
+			permforce = 1;
+			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
+			    *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
+			    errno != 0))
+				fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+++ b/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 9bb31b63142adaaf949e20c2d86c97f9b787217b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 24/50] openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index 49a4f35f..f6112458 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -140,7 +140,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+ 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+ 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+ 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
+#ifdef __s390__
+		{
+		    /*
+		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
+		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
+		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
+		     */
+		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
+		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
+				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
+		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
+			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
+			if (len > 0) {
+			    lpath[len] = 0;
+			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
+				fd = -1;
+			}
+		    }
+		    if (fd >= 0)
+			(void) close((int) fd);
+		}
+#else
+ 		(void) close((int) fd);
+#endif
+ 	}
+ 	(void) closedir(dirp);
+ 	return;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+From 36e3430d1f81397d5f40600e075272a81f7effce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 25/50] openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays
+
+---
+ channels.c    |  9 ++++++---
+ channels.h    |  2 +-
+ servconf.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
+ servconf.h    |  2 ++
+ session.c     |  5 +++--
+ sshd_config.5 |  7 +++++++
+ 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index d46531ce..7438c1a5 100644
+--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
+@@ -4996,7 +4996,7 @@ rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+  */
+ int
+ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+-    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
+    int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
+     u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+ {
+ 	Channel *nc = NULL;
+@@ -5009,8 +5009,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+ 	    x11_display_offset > UINT16_MAX - X11_BASE_PORT - MAX_DISPLAYS)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
+	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
+
+ 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
+ 	    display_number++) {
+ 		port = X11_BASE_PORT + display_number;
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+@@ -5065,7 +5068,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+ 		if (num_socks > 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_BASE_PORT ) {
+ 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
+index 134528d5..8a09a820 100644
+--- a/channels.h
+++ b/channels.h
+@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+ 
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
+ int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
+-int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+ void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
+ 	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
+ int      x11_channel_used_recently(struct ssh *ssh);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 105e301d..15c99b30 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
+ 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+ 	options->permit_tty = -1;
+ 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+@@ -353,6 +354,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
+	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
+		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+ 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+ 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+@@ -576,7 +579,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+@@ -714,6 +717,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1750,6 +1754,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
+	case sX11MaxDisplays:
+		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+ 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+ 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3004,6 +3012,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+@@ -3299,6 +3308,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
+	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c08cf6a7..7c7e5d43 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
+#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+ 
+ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+ 					 * searching at */
+	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
+ 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+ 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+ 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 54da09d5..28bbb8a7 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -2611,8 +2611,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
+	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
+	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index fe246fc2..26fcdc84 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1391,6 +1391,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
+ .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
+ .Cm X11Forwarding
+ and
+ .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
+@@ -2111,6 +2112,12 @@ Specifies the first display number available for
+ X11 forwarding.
+ This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+ The default is 10.
+.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
+Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
+X11 forwarding.
+This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
+The default is 1000.
+ .It Cm X11Forwarding
+ Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+ The argument must be
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+From 43320351b6f150167190aacc84f2f87030fef3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 26/50] openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux
+
+---
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  8 ++++--
+ misc.c                           |  5 ++--
+ misc.h                           |  2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++---------------
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  4 +--
+ platform.c                       |  6 ++++-
+ sshconnect.c                     |  2 +-
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |  6 +++--
+ 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 267a27d2..0d5ae0df 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
+ 
+ static char *
+@@ -485,7 +487,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+@@ -755,7 +758,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 1e31acc9..09722962 100644
+--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2764,7 +2764,8 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+ pid_t
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
+    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
+    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f = NULL;
+ 	struct stat st;
+@@ -2898,7 +2899,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 			_exit(1);
+ 		}
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
+ 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
+ 			    strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(127);
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index efecdf1a..9efa9cf4 100644
+--- a/misc.h
+++ b/misc.h
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
+    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
+ 
+ typedef struct arglist arglist;
+ struct arglist {
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 646f0887..291b569a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern ServerOptions options;
+-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+-extern int inetd_flag;
+-
+ /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+ int
+ sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
+@@ -222,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	*role = NULL;
+ 	*level = NULL;
+@@ -240,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+ 
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+-	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
+    security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	char *sename, *lvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -249,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	context_t con = NULL;
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ 	if (r == 0) {
+ 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
+		if (inetd) {
+ 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+ 
+ 			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+@@ -332,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	const char *reqlvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -341,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ 
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
+	if (inetd) {
+ 		use_current = "1";
+ 	} else {
+ 		use_current = "";
+@@ -361,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -373,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
+	if (use_pam) {
+ 		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
+ 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ 			case -1:
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
+@@ -407,7 +409,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
+ 
+-	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
+	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
+ 	if (r >= 0) {
+ 		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+ 		if (r < 0) {
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 7f8ba200..3cd7da6a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
+ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 0d12f311..f0800b1f 100644
+--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+ int
+@@ -140,7 +142,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index c86182d1..04084810 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index e4a8edfd..897db9b4 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
+++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
+int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Saved arguments to main(). */
+ static char **saved_argv;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 9342e416..81d30152 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
+int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1359,7 +1359,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ b/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 35205319dd71d8e61c1596b8f9479df91aff7756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 27/50] openssh-7.5p1-sandbox
+
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index b31062c2..1fabf99d 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -277,6 +277,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -295,6 +298,21 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_gettid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+@@ -304,6 +322,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
--- a/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 507e6f245557ae7261806f7ecbd40697cb0dd389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 29/50] openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 9554b188..7f9795a5 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1183,7 +1183,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
+-			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
+			addargs(&alist,
+			    /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
+			    strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
+ 			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+ 			    thost, targ);
+ 			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -0,0 +1,654 @@
+From b436140fe3abd9f97f01f9af9f5da5cf6c5d7725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 30/50] openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5  | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ sshd_config.5 | 179 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 8d5d0722..a43b2a27 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -438,17 +438,13 @@ A single argument of
+ causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
+ This is the default behaviour.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -587,20 +583,25 @@ If the option is set to
+ (the default),
+ the check will not be executed.
+ .It Cm Ciphers
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+@@ -616,13 +617,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+@@ -1022,6 +1016,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+@@ -1034,10 +1033,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+.Pp
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+@@ -1056,36 +1053,25 @@ will not be converted automatically,
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
+-to the default set instead of replacing them.
+to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+-at the head of the default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+@@ -1138,6 +1124,17 @@ to prefer their algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+.Pp
+The proposed
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
+.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
+.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
+would break the order given by the
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+ real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+@@ -1376,6 +1373,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+ and
+ .Cm pam .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
+ their preference order.
+ The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
+@@ -1384,29 +1386,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-.Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
+ .Pp
+built-in openssh default set.
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+ .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+@@ -1522,37 +1512,33 @@ function, and all code in the
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+ .It Cm MACs
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+ in order of preference.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+ calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+ These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -1741,39 +1727,31 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
+-instead of replacing it.
+character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default instead of replacing it.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+.Pp
+This option affects also
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be
+@@ -2497,7 +2475,9 @@ for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+ This file must be world-readable.
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+-.Xr ssh 1
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 26fcdc84..583a01cd 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@ If the argument is
+ then no banner is displayed.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -533,20 +529,25 @@ The default is
+ indicating not to
+ .Xr chroot 2 .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Pp
+@@ -573,13 +574,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+@@ -774,53 +768,43 @@ For this to work
+ .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-gss-gex-sha1-,
+-gss-group1-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha256-,
+-gss-group16-sha512-,
+-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+gss-gex-sha1-
+gss-group1-sha1-
+gss-group14-sha1-
+gss-group14-sha256-
+gss-group16-sha512-
+gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+-.Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+-the default set instead of replacing them.
+the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
+-the head of the default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -887,25 +871,14 @@ is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+ The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+@@ -1052,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+ The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
+@@ -1060,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported algorithms are:
+ .Pp
+@@ -1106,14 +1084,6 @@ sntrup761x25519-sha512
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm ListenAddress
+@@ -1200,21 +1170,26 @@ function, and all code in the
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+ .It Cm MACs
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+@@ -1257,15 +1232,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+ umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm Match
+@@ -1753,36 +1719,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -2289,7 +2244,9 @@ This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+-.Xr sshd 8
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ b/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From 430bd33963725beb8ec01a1e581529ae6bf6bec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 31/50] openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf
+
+---
+ configure.ac |   1 +
+ kex.c        | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d9bd2f51..d92a8580 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3137,6 +3137,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 19a56e8e..8b200ff4 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -1078,6 +1083,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+static const char *
+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
+{
+	switch (digest_type) {
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+		return SN_sha1;
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+		return SN_sha256;
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
+		return SN_sha384;
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+		return SN_sha512;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	u_char *key = NULL;
+	int r, key_len;
+
+	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
+       char keytype = (char)id;
+
+	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (md == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (param_bld == NULL) {
+		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
+				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
+				hash, hashlen) &&
+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
+				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
+				&keytype, 1);
+	if (r != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
+	if (params == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
+	if (r != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
+#endif
+	*keyp = key;
+	key = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+
+out:
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+	free (key);
+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1141,6 +1247,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+++ b/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 6aa231d9acfeca870ee87e3bf9c4a1239518706d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 32/50] openssh-8.2p1-visibility
+
+---
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+index 347b2122..344f8a8a 100644
+--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-uint32_t
+uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_api_version(void)
+ {
+ 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-int
+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+ {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From cfe5a99d335eb57b8c08b4eb6b4535dd042d96e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 33/50] openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6
+
+---
+ channels.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index 7438c1a5..95836d50 100644
+--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
+@@ -5055,6 +5055,16 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
+ 				    strerror(errno));
+ 				close(sock);
+
+				/* do not remove successfully opened
+				 * sockets if the request failed because
+				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
+				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
+				 * supported)
+				 */
+				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
+    					continue;
+
+ 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
+ 					close(socks[n]);
+ 				num_socks = 0;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+++ b/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 8de0391e3b3eb75e23ee9f173f04a9c78f2b96c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 34/50] openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index b4100ea1..a042c3c8 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -523,7 +523,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 
+ 	if (!do_pam_account()) {
+-		sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+		/* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
+		 * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
+		if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED
+			&& sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
+			sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 	}
+ 	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+@@ -580,8 +584,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+-	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED
+		|| sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN
+		|| sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
+ 	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ 		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
+ 	else
+@@ -890,9 +896,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+ 		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+			sshpam_account_status = 0;
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+ 		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+-			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-				sshpam_account_status = 0;
+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
+ 			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ 				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ 			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+++ b/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From a68f3741fdc01bf6823a69d2442caba7de9835f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 35/50] openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch
+
+---
+ pathnames.h | 1 +
+ scp.1       | 7 +++++++
+ scp.c       | 8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
+index 1158bec9..43f0c570 100644
+--- a/pathnames.h
+++ b/pathnames.h
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
+ #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+ #define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
+#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH		SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
+ 
+ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+ #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index aa2e2d8b..373d7237 100644
+--- a/scp.1
+++ b/scp.1
+@@ -331,6 +331,13 @@ during download or upload.
+ By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+ .El
+ .El
+.Pp
+Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
+.Ar /etc/ssh/disable_scp
+file. If this file exists, when SCP protocol is in use (either remotely or 
+via the
+.Fl O
+option), the program will exit.
+ .Sh EXIT STATUS
+ .Ex -std scp
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 7f9795a5..7ed1a54c 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -649,6 +649,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (iamremote)
+ 		mode = MODE_SCP;
+ 
+	if (mode == MODE_SCP) {
+		FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r");
+		if (f != NULL) {
+			fclose(f);
+			fatal("SCP protocol is forbidden via %s", _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH);
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+++ b/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+From 99e1e3af524376788e591ca73387f1ca37e6f5ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 36/50] openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp
+
+---
+ scp.c         |  2 +-
+ sftp-client.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ sftp-client.h |  4 ++--
+ sftp.c        |  6 +++---
+ 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 7ed1a54c..0c87dd0e 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
+ 			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 9f8ab4af..873dec04 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
+++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ 
+ /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+ static char *
+-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+-		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+-		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+-		free(errmsg);
+-		sshbuf_free(msg);
+-		return NULL;
+		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
+			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
+			if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
+				sshbuf_free(msg);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
+			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
+					path, strlen(path));
+
+			get_msg(conn, msg);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+			if (id != expected_id)
+				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+				free(errmsg);
+
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+				free(errmsg);
+				sshbuf_free(msg);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+		} else {
+			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+			free(errmsg);
+			sshbuf_free(msg);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+ 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
+ {
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@ sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+-		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
+ 	}
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
+	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@ sftp_download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2366,12 +2398,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ int
+ sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
+	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2826,7 +2858,7 @@ sftp_crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ 	char *from_path_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
+	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
+ 		    from_path);
+ 		return -1;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+index 74cdae7d..00ed6630 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.h
+++ b/sftp-client.h
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+ int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+ char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int sftp_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+ int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    int, int, int, int, int, int);
+    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index bdedd141..322e6d1f 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+ 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+ 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
+ 		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+-		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
+		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 			err = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+ 	}
+ #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+ 
+-	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
+	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("Need cwd");
+ 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+++ b/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 286bc4a302b5130f732c857095ae665f7bea01dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 37/50] openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits
+
+---
+ readconf.c | 1 +
+ servconf.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 6c04ed43..f340bf50 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+ 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 15c99b30..84891544 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+++ b/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 26af04432f6404eb03780265a5cce948ecfec8dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 38/50] openssh-8.7p1-ibmca
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index f6112458..417c2048 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
+#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
--- a/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+From c288d4a26ad44dc481c9d18d2920c9d70474833c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 40/50] openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition
+
+---
+ monitor_wrap.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor_wrap.h |  2 ++
+ session.c      | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 1a079c15..768a59f9 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1415,4 +1415,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
+
+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+	u_int blen, msg_len;
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r, ret = 0;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	do {
+		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
+			break;
+		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
+			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
+		sshbuf_reset(m);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
+		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+	} while (1);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return ret;
+}
+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
+{
+	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
+}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 661ed63b..e957ba6e 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 83fc9418..b4753d93 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int paudit[2];
+#endif
+
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+ static int have_dev_log = 1;
+@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
+
+ #define USE_PIPES 1
+ /*
+  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+@@ -513,6 +519,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		close(err[0]);
+ #endif
+ 
+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
+ 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ 		do_child(ssh, s, command);
+ 		/* NOTREACHED */
+@@ -630,6 +638,9 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ttyfd);
+ 
+		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
+ 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ 		do_login(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -766,6 +777,8 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	}
+ 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
+	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -781,6 +794,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	 */
+ 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+ 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	close(paudit[1]);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
+		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
+		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
+		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
+		 */
+		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
+	}
+	close(paudit[0]);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1532,6 +1559,33 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+ }
+ 
+void
+child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	int pparent = paudit[1];
+	close(paudit[0]);
+	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
+	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
+#endif
+
+	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+	/* FIXME beldmit destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); */
+	/*
+	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
+	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
+	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
+	 */
+	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
+	/* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
+	/* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	/* Notify parent that we are done */
+	close(pparent);
+#endif
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+@@ -1549,13 +1603,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 
+ 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+ 
+-	/* remove keys from memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
+-	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+-	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
+-
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+++ b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+From 80d967a18261156573e7385f8e534a89d2767d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 41/50] openssh-9.0p1-audit-log
+
+---
+ audit-bsm.c   |  2 +-
+ audit-linux.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ audit.c       | 18 +++++++++---
+ audit.h       |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+index a49abb92..c6f56553 100644
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
+index d484b82b..dcfde3a9 100644
+--- a/audit-linux.c
+++ b/audit-linux.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char *audit_username(void);
+ 
+ static void
+-linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+ 	}
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	close(audit_fd);
+ 
+@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+	const char *rip;
+	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
+ 		else
+ 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
+	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+-		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+ 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		goto out;
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
+-		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
+		rip, NULL, rv);
+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (cert) {
+		char *pbuf;
+
+		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
+		if (pbuf == NULL)
+			goto out;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
+			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
+		free(pbuf);
+		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+			goto out;
+
+		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
+			if (pbuf == NULL)
+				goto out;
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
+			free(pbuf);
+			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+ out:
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+@@ -179,26 +211,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+ int
+ audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
+		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
+	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+	free(audit_hostname);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
+ {
+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
+	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
+		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -211,31 +251,41 @@ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
+		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
+		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
+	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
+	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
+	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
+	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
+		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
+		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+
+ 	switch(event) {
+ 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+ 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+@@ -255,9 +305,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 		if (user_login_count) {
+ 			while (user_login_count--)
+ 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
+				    audit_hostname,
+ 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
+			    audit_hostname,
+ 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ 		}
+@@ -266,12 +318,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
+			audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
+index d0433c3a..28d51a14 100644
+--- a/audit.c
+++ b/audit.c
+@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ void
+ audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
+ {
+-	char *fp;
+	char *key_fp = NULL;
+	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
+	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
+	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
+		cert = key->cert;
+		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
+										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+	}
+	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
+ 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	free(fp);
+	if (key_fp)
+		free(key_fp);
+	if (issuer_fp)
+		free(issuer_fp);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
+index 45d66ccf..05ac132c 100644
+--- a/audit.h
+++ b/audit.h
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+ int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+-int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
+int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
+ void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+From 79f9b2763d85ec592cb7e54dcf1c695d8dd138b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 14:01:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 42/54] openssh-7.7p1-fips
+
+---
+ dh.c                     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ dh.h                     |  1 +
+ kex-names.c              |  6 +++-
+ kex.c                    |  3 +-
+ kexgen.c                 | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ kexgexc.c                |  5 +++
+ myproposal.h             | 33 ++++++++++++++++++
+ readconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  3 ++
+ servconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
+ ssh-ed25519.c            |  9 +++++
+ ssh-gss.h                |  5 +++
+ ssh-keygen.c             | 22 ++++++++++--
+ ssh-rsa.c                |  3 ++
+ ssh.c                    |  5 +++
+ sshconnect2.c            |  9 ++++-
+ sshd-session.c           |  1 +
+ sshd.c                   | 13 +++++++
+ sshkey.c                 | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 19 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
+--- a/dh.c
+++ b/dh.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+ 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+ 	struct dhgroup dhg;
+ 
+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+	}
+
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
+@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 	return 8192;
+ }
+ 
+/*
+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
+ */
+int
+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
+	DH *known = NULL;
+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
+
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+	if (bits <= 3072) {
+		known = dh_new_group14();
+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
+		known = dh_new_group16();
+	} else {
+		known = dh_new_group18();
+	}
+
+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
+
+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
+		rv = 1;
+	}
+
+	DH_free(known);
+	return rv;
+}
+
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
+index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644
+--- a/dh.h
+++ b/dh.h
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+ 
+ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index 6c0b7c2b3..cd3902ad2 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
+++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -206,7 +207,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+			if (FIPS_mode())
+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+			else
+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 62f607d6f..71fbe5cbe 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ # include <openssl/param_build.h>
+@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+ 
+ 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
+ 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
+-		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
+ 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
+ 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
+index 15df591ca..eecdceba2 100644
+--- a/kexgen.c
+++ b/kexgen.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+		        &shared_secret);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+		        &shared_secret);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+		        &shared_secret);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		} else {
+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
+index e99e0cf21..4c3feae09 100644
+--- a/kexgexc.c
+++ b/kexgexc.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+ 
+ 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
+index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
+--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
+@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256"
+ 
+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+	"rsa-sha2-256"
+
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
+@@ -79,6 +91,27 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
+	"hmac-sha1," \
+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
+
+ /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+ #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index f340bf501..ea9d293c3 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+ # include <glob.h>
+ #else
+@@ -3043,11 +3044,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 1fabf99d0..ccb61586e 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+ #endif
+#ifdef __NR_socket
+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 84891544b..8b708cbf4 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ #include <util.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -247,11 +248,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
+index 22d8db026..41942f4e5 100644
+--- a/ssh-ed25519.c
+++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -164,6 +165,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -221,6 +226,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..329dc9da0 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
+ 	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+ 
+#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
+	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
+	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
+
+ #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 16cff9473..792aafde0 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
+ #include "cipher.h"
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
+#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
+@@ -202,6 +204,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -259,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+ 	char *name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ 	else {
+ 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
+ #ifdef WITH_DSA
+@@ -1144,9 +1152,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
+		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
+
+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
+			goto next;
+		}
+
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+@@ -3849,7 +3865,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+ 
+ 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
+ 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 3ad1fddc4..6c2f771a3 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 98b103c9e..abc8b8439 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -1642,6 +1643,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
+	}
+
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 0af15bcc1..3e02f485d 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+		char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
+			 match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+
+ 		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ 		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ 		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+		    options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
+		free(gss_kex_filtered);
+
+ 		if (gss) {
+ 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a808ac9a6..a67a78391 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 8a99f0b29..5ff0b5ff0 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1611,6 +1613,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
+				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
+		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
+		    sshkey_free(key);
+		    key = NULL;
+		    continue;
+		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -1830,6 +1839,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
+	}
+
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 4e41a78c7..ca1cdb642 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -408,6 +410,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+ 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 			continue;
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+			switch (impl->type) {
+			case KEY_ED25519:
+			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+			     continue;
+			     break;
+			default:
+			     break;
+			}
+		}
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
+@@ -1441,6 +1455,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ 	}
+ 
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		    sshkey_free(k);
+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+ 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+ 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+ 	*ret = *k;
+@@ -2275,6 +2303,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*lenp = 0;
+ 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	/* Fallthrough */
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+@@ -2311,6 +2344,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*detailsp = NULL;
+ 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+-- 
+2.51.0
+
--- a/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+++ b/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 299a602802d7c7d121306eb2aeae1502871a35cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 43/50] openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage
+
+---
+ ssh.1 | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 6a9fbdc5..755cdef2 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It BatchMode
+ .It BindAddress
+ .It BindInterface
+-.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CanonicalDomains
+ .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ .It CanonicalizeHostname
+ .It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CertificateFile
+ .It ChannelTimeout
+ .It CheckHostIP
+@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
+ .It DynamicForward
+.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
+ .It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EscapeChar
+@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
+.It RevokedHostKeys
+.It SecurityKeyProvider
+ .It RequiredRSASize
+ .It RevokedHostKeys
+ .It SecurityKeyProvider
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+++ b/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From 5c92430c08ac392b5b2ace899cc043247c923734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 44/50] openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs
+
+---
+ regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ sshconnect2.c            | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+index 28dcfe17..b9e716dc 100644
+--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
+ 
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
+ 
+PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
+    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
+SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
+r=$?
+if [ $r == 0 ]; then
+echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
+fi
+fi
+
+ trace "load hostkeys"
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
+ 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
+@@ -32,12 +45,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either
+ 
+ unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "key type $k"
+	hka=$k
+	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
+	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
+	fi
+ 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
+ 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+@@ -50,15 +67,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ done
+ 
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com' | maybe_filter_sk`
+SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+ 
+ # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ HOSTKEYALGS=""
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
+ 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
+ done
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
+@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
+   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "cert type $k"
+ 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 14f7671a..ad3f560f 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
+	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -257,10 +257,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
+ 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ 
+	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
+		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
+				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
+		if (hkalgs)
+			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
+			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+		else
+			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
+			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+	}
+
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+-	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+	    filtered_algs);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+@@ -304,6 +316,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
+	free(filtered_algs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
+++ b/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+From be23afbab800c9b5ffea56b3f410a04156c08df2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 45/50] openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex
+
+---
+ dh.c      |  98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ kex.c     | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kex.h     |   6 +++
+ kexdh.c   |  52 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ kexecdh.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 5 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 8c9a29fa..ea0a0b09 100644
+--- a/dh.c
+++ b/dh.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
+	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
+
+	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
+		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
+		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
+	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
+		error_f("Failed key generation");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* reuse context for key generation */
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+	ctx = NULL;
+
+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
+		error_f("Could not create or init context");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
+		error_f("Could not generate keys");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
+		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
+	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
+	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
+		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* transferred */
+	pub_key = NULL;
+	priv_key = NULL;
+out:
+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
+	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
+	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 71fbe5cb..ce6a7b81 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -1614,3 +1614,142 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* 
+ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
+ * The private key can be omitted.
+ */
+EVP_PKEY *
+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
+  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
+  		return NULL;
+  	}
+  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
+  		return NULL;
+  	}
+  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
+  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
+  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+  		return NULL;
+  	}
+  	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
+  	const char *group_name;
+  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
+  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
+  	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (k == NULL)
+    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
+      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
+      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+    		goto out;
+  	}
+
+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
+     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
+                group_name,
+                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+    		goto out;
+	}
+  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
+    		const EC_GROUP *group;
+    		size_t len;
+
+		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
+		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+		    pub,
+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+		    pub_ser,
+		    len,
+		    bn_ctx);
+		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
+		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+		    pub_ser,
+		    len) != 1) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+  	}
+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+    		goto out;
+  	}
+
+out:
+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+  	free(pub_ser);
+  	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
+    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
+{
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
+		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (priv != NULL &&
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
+		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+out:
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 6a55aadf..48f3bb87 100644
+--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -311,6 +314,9 @@ int	kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
+int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
+diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
+index 0faab21b..32e1de51 100644
+--- a/kexdh.c
+++ b/kexdh.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@ int
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
+	int r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
+	/* import key */
+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
+	if (r != 0) {
+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* import peer key 
+	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
+	 */
+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
+	if (r != 0) {
+		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
+		error_f("Could not get key size");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
+index efb2e55a..d92ba54f 100644
+--- a/kexecdh.c
+++ b/kexecdh.c
+@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
+static EC_KEY *
+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
+{
+	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+	const char *group_name;
+
+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
+	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
+		goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+	return client_key;
+}
+
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
+	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@ kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
+	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
+	size_t klen = 0, publen;
+	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
+	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+
+	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
+	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
+	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
+		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
+	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+	ctx = NULL;
+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
+		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+++ b/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+From e4ca3b9dba1cc832a9974493c91207d42e218a68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 46/50] openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof
+
+---
+ compat.c                               |  6 +++++
+ compat.h                               |  2 +-
+ monitor.c                              | 27 ++++++++++++++++------
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c       |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------
+ serverloop.c                           |  6 ++++-
+ ssh-rsa.c                              |  3 ++-
+ sshconnect2.c                          |  8 +++++++
+ sshd-session.c                         | 21 +++++++++++++++++
+ 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
+index b59f0bfc..4e611dc3 100644
+--- a/compat.c
+++ b/compat.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -125,16 +126,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
+	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
+index 1a19060f..2e6db5bf 100644
+--- a/compat.h
+++ b/compat.h
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
+#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index fbc35782..19cb058e 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -747,11 +747,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	struct sshkey *pubkey, *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
+-	size_t datlen, siglen;
+-	int r, is_proof = 0, keyid;
+-	u_int compat;
+	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
+	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+	int r, is_proof = 0;
+	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
+	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -809,18 +810,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
+		} else {
+			effective_alg = alg;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
+		} else {
+			effective_alg = alg;
+		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
+		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
+	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+index caf8f57f..09016aea 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
+ 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ 	if (kex != NULL)
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
+	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
+		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+index 3babe604..cc80fe97 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
+	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+index 0aff7c9b..951122e1 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+@@ -338,13 +338,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
+	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+index 5bf4b65c..6d0a35bb 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
+	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
+
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -102,8 +105,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
+	if (expected == 0)
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -120,16 +124,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
+	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
+	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
+		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
+	if (expected == 0) {
+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -526,7 +536,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
+	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 40ddfb04..9c5b1567 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -699,7 +700,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
+-
+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
+			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
+		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 6c2f771a..8dd4ab01 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
+		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
+			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index ad3f560f..3941e089 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1434,6 +1434,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
+		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
+			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
+			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
+
+			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
+				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
+		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a808ac9a..c3349a8a 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1316,6 +1316,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
+	{
+		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
+		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
+		if (rsakey == NULL)
+			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
+
+		if (rsakey != NULL) {
+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
+		    int res;
+
+		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		    free(tmp);
+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
+			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
+		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+		    }
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
+++ b/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 497de886faaddec60b7ad1013396c7d4f3145968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 47/50] openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index a042c3c8..a321e0d3 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+ 		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ 	}
+-	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
+	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
+ 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+ 		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
+ 		    sshpam_rhost);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
+++ b/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From b97b1040bc0918fe9be89cdb482d046270e92d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 48/50] openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5 | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index a43b2a27..9d5da2a6 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ or
+ This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
+ See
+ .Xr ssh-keysign 8
+-for more information.
+for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly.
+ .It Cm EscapeChar
+ Sets the escape character (default:
+ .Ql ~ ) .
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
+++ b/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+From 0a621a2ccb8444e4c6da906b0e112e0522658122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 49/50] openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem
+
+---
+ kex-names.c         |  20 +++
+ kexmlkem768x25519.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 311 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index cd3902ad..36a953ab 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
+++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -108,6 +108,19 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+ };
+ 
+static int is_mlkem768_available()
+{
+	static int is_fetched = -1;
+
+	if (is_fetched == -1) {
+		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
+	}
+
+	return is_fetched;
+}
+
+ static char *
+ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ {
+@@ -116,6 +129,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+ 	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
+			continue;
+ 		if (ret != NULL)
+ 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
+@@ -147,6 +163,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
+	return NULL;
+
+ 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+index 2b5d3960..670049dc 100644
+--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+@@ -48,10 +48,127 @@
+ #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 
+ #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+static int
+mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
+	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
+	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
+	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
+		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
+    if (ctx == NULL
+	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
+	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
+	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	goto err;
+    }
+    r = 0;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+    return r;
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
+	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
+		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
+    if (ctx == NULL
+	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
+        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
+	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	goto err;
+    }
+    r = 0;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+    return r;
+}
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
+ 	size_t need;
+@@ -86,6 +203,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+#else
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	u_char *cp = NULL;
+	size_t need;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
+	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+#endif
+	cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	kex->client_pub = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -93,6 +240,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
+#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	const u_char *client_pub;
+@@ -185,12 +333,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ 	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+#else
+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	const u_char *client_pub;
+	u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t need;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
+
+	*server_blobp = NULL;
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
+	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
+	    client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
+	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
+	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
+	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* append ECDH shared key */
+	client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	dump_digest("server cipher text:",
+	    enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
+	dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*server_blobp = server_blob;
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	server_blob = NULL;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+	explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+     const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
+#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ 	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+@@ -258,6 +491,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ 	explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+#else
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+	size_t need;
+	int r;
+
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
+	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
+	    buf, 1)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
+	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+#endif
+ }
+ #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+ int
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+++ b/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From fd32e753ae7f3b314712e6aa8b2bed3c1fca1ef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 14:53:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 50/51] openssh-9.9p2-error_processing
+
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 798bf9b6..dfb6ac72 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1377,6 +1377,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
+ 	    k == NULL ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
+		if (!r) /* k == NULL */
+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 		error_fr(r, "parse");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
+++ b/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 4965cdbc1ee1e6a0c665797bb8b944d96d3d411f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 15:11:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 51/53] Provide better error for non-supported private keys
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ sshkey.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ca1cdb642..aada474e0 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -3582,6 +3582,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
+ 			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		}
+ 	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
+#ifdef ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER
+	case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
+#endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 	}
+ 	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
+++ b/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 9ed09ef158a113e21be7b3fefa7c5f932632749b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:52:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 52/53] Ignore bad hostkeys in known_hosts file
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ hostfile.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ hostfile.h |  1 +
+ ssh.c      |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
+index c5669c703..5c402f501 100644
+--- a/hostfile.c
+++ b/hostfile.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
+ #include "hmac.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ 
+static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+
+void
+hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
+{
+	required_rsa_size = size;
+}
+
+ /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+ 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+ 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
+	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ 		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
+		    l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+ 	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
+ 	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+ 	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
+index a24a4e329..0e9b1a19a 100644
+--- a/hostfile.h
+++ b/hostfile.h
+@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
+     const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+ 
+ void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
+void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index abc8b8439..33787a8d4 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+	hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
+ 	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+ 		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
+++ b/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
+
+RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
+associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
+name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
+to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
+may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
+issuance process.
+
+Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
+GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
+that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
+on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
+
+Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+---
+ configure.ac    |   1 +
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
+ sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
+ 
+ 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
+ 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
+ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
+ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
+ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
+ */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* Check indicators */
+	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
+					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
+		/* negative or positive match */
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			*matched = i;
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+	/* No rule matched */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+ /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+-	int retval;
+	int retval, matched;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	if (k5login_exists &&
+ 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
+ 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
+ 		name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
+-		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
+ 	} else
+ 		retval = 0;
+ 
+	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
+		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
+		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
+		retval = 0;
+		if (client->indicators) {
+			matched = -1;
+			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
+			if (retval != 0) {
+				retval = (retval == 1);
+				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
+					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
+					client->indicators[matched],
+					(char *)client->displayname.value,
+				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
+				goto cont;
+			}
+		}
+		if (retval == 0) {
+			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
+				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
+			(char *)client->displayname.value);
+		}
+	}
+cont:
+	if (retval == 1) {
+		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
+	}
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+ 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
+
+/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
+ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
+ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
+ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
+
+#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
+
+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+	gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+	gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
+	size_t count, i;
+
+	ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
+				      &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
+	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
+		/* No indicators in the ticket */
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	count = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
+		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
+		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
+			continue;
+		count++;
+	}
+
+	if (count == 0) {
+		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
+		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
+	count = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
+		authenticated = 0;
+		complete = 0;
+		more = -1;
+		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
+		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
+			continue;
+		/* retrieve all indicators */
+		while (more != 0) {
+			value.value = NULL;
+			display_value.value = NULL;
+			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
+					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
+					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
+			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
+				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
+				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
+				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
+				count++;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
+	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
+	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+
+ /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+  * be called once for a context */
+ 
+@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
+	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
+	    ctx->client, client))) {
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+ 
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
+	size_t i;
+ 
+ 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
+ 
+@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+
+			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
+				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
+					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
+				}
+				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
+			}
+
+ 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+ 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ 			return 0;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+-	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
+	case sGssIndicators:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
+			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
+	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   **allow_groups;
+ 	u_int num_deny_groups;
+ 	char   **deny_groups;
+	char   *gss_indicators;
+ 
+ 	u_int num_subsystems;
+ 	char   **subsystem_name;
+@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
+#include <gssapi_ext.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
+#endif
+
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ # ifndef HEIMDAL
+ #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
+	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
+Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
+mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
+authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
+.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
+When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
+will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
+indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
+.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
+is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
+policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
+access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
+rejected.
+.Pp
+By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
+indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
+to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
+preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
+authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
+(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
+indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
+inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
+.Pp
+Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
+particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
+FreeIPA environments:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
+.It Cm hardened
+SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
+.It Cm pkinit
+smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
+.It Cm radius
+pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
+.It Cm otp
+TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
+.It Cm idp
+OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
+and device authorization grant flow
+.It Cm passkey
+FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ The default is handled system-wide by
+ .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/1000-openssh-coverity.patch
+++ b/1000-openssh-coverity.patch
@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+From 24c411970682dc67873c36bac05b4b460d68a628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 50/50] openssh-6.7p1-coverity
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c                   | 2 ++
+ gss-genr.c                    | 3 ++-
+ krl.c                         | 3 +++
+ loginrec.c                    | 2 ++
+ misc.c                        | 3 +++
+ monitor.c                     | 4 ++--
+ openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c  | 8 ++++----
+ readconf.c                    | 1 +
+ servconf.c                    | 5 +++--
+ serverloop.c                  | 2 +-
+ ssh-agent.c                   | 1 +
+ ssh-keygen.c                  | 3 +++
+ 13 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index bae153c9..209a3265 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -434,6 +435,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
+			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index 3034370c..c357e973 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
+++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -168,8 +168,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index 0d0f6953..d8517f12 100644
+--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
+@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1212,6 +1213,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1223,6 +1225,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
+index c4a9bd48..2583612c 100644
+--- a/loginrec.c
+++ b/loginrec.c
+@@ -683,9 +683,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 09722962..cd71c1b2 100644
+--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
+@@ -1556,6 +1556,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2749,6 +2751,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 19cb058e..58fbac9d 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+index 346c7fe5..f42792fd 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+index 26bdc3e0..8e2939b9 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index ea9d293c..9680c38c 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -2164,6 +2164,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
+				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 8b708cbf..e7e4ad04 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2293,8 +2293,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 9c5b1567..768ee9fa 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 798bf9b6..0e39dff7 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1593,6 +1593,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
+			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 792aafde..96b3474d 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -2424,6 +2424,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
+			freezero(blob, blen);
+			blob = NULL;
+			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
--- a/2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch
+++ b/2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch
--- a/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
+++ b/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
--- a/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
+++ b/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#Type Name ID  GECOS                     Home directory        Shell
+u     sshd 74  "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd -
--- a/gsi-openssh.spec
+++ b/gsi-openssh.spec
--- a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Update gsissh host key permissions
+Documentation=https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Before=gsisshd.service
+After=gsissh-keygen.target
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=-/usr/libexec/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+ExecStart=touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=gsisshd.service
--- a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
+++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash
+set -eu -o pipefail
+# Detect existing non-conforming host keys and perform the permissions migration
+# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+#
+# Example output looks like:
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# gsisshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.
+#
+output="$(gsisshd -T 2>&1 || true)" # expected to fail
+while read line; do
+    if [[ $line =~ ^Permissions\ [0-9]+\ for\ \'(.*)\'\ are\ too\ open. ]]; then
+        keyfile=${BASH_REMATCH[1]}
+        echo $line
+        echo -e "\t-> changing permissions on $keyfile"
+        chmod --verbose g-r $keyfile
+        chown --verbose root:root $keyfile
+    fi
+done <<< "$output"
--- a/155
+++ b/155
@ -1,122 +1,45 @@
 #!/bin/bash

 # Create the host keys for the gsissh server.
-#
-# The creation is controlled by the $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS environment
-# variable.
-AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=RSAONLY
+KEYTYPE=$1
+case $KEYTYPE in
+	"dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS
+	"ed25519")
+		FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
+		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
+			exit 0
+		fi ;;
+	"rsa")
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_RSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_RSA_BITS"
+		fi ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa")
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_ECDSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_ECDSA_BITS"
+		fi ;;
+	*) # wrong argument
+		exit 12 ;;
+esac
+KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key

-# source function library
-. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
-
-# Some functions to make the below more readable
 KEYGEN=/usr/bin/gsissh-keygen
-RSA1_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_key
-RSA_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-DSA_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-ECDSA_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-
-# pull in sysconfig settings
-[ -f /etc/sysconfig/gsisshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
-
-fips_enabled() {
-	if [ -r /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled ]; then
-		cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
-	else
-		echo 0
-	fi
-}
-
-do_rsa1_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $RSA1_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH1 RSA host key: "
-		rm -f $RSA1_KEY
-		if test ! -f $RSA1_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA1_KEY
-			chmod 640 $RSA1_KEY
-			chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"RSA1 key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"RSA1 key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_rsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 RSA host key: "
-		rm -f $RSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $RSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA_KEY
-			chmod 640 $RSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"RSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"RSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_dsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 DSA host key: "
-		rm -f $DSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $DSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $DSA_KEY
-			chmod 640 $DSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"DSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"DSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_ecdsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $ECDSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 ECDSA host key: "
-		rm -f $ECDSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $ECDSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t ecdsa -f $ECDSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $ECDSA_KEY
-			chmod 600 $ECDSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $ECDSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $ECDSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"ECDSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"ECDSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-# Create keys if necessary
-if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNO ]; then
-	do_rsa_keygen
-	if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xRSAONLY ]; then
-		do_rsa1_keygen
-		do_dsa_keygen
-		do_ecdsa_keygen
-	fi
+if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then
+	exit 13
 fi
+
+# remove old keys
+rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
+
+# create new keys
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE $SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# sanitize permissions
+/usr/bin/chmod 600 $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
+if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
+	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
+fi
+
+exit 0
--- a/gsisshd-keygen.service
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen.service
@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=gsissh Server Key Generation
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd-keygen
-Type=oneshot
--- a/gsisshd-keygen.target
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen.target
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[Unit]
+Wants=gsisshd-keygen@rsa.service
+Wants=gsisshd-keygen@ecdsa.service
+Wants=gsisshd-keygen@ed25519.service
+PartOf=gsisshd.service
--- a/gsisshd-keygen@.service
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen@.service
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=gsissh %i Server Key Generation
+ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_%i_key
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
+ExecStart=/usr/libexec/gsissh/sshd-keygen %i
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=gsisshd-keygen.target
--- a/gsisshd.pam
+++ b/gsisshd.pam
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
-auth       required     pam_sepermit.so
 auth       substack     password-auth
 auth       include      postlogin
+account    required     pam_sepermit.so
 account    required     pam_nologin.so
 account    include      password-auth
 password   include      password-auth
@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ session    required     pam_selinux.so close
 session    required     pam_loginuid.so
 # pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
 session    required     pam_selinux.so open env_params
+session    required     pam_namespace.so
 session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
+session    optional     pam_motd.so
 session    include      password-auth
 session    include      postlogin
--- a/gsisshd.service
+++ b/gsisshd.service
@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=gsissh server daemon
-After=syslog.target network.target auditd.service
+Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
+After=network.target gsisshd-keygen.target
+Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service

 [Service]
-EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
-ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/gsisshd-keygen
+Type=notify
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 KillMode=process
--- a/gsisshd.socket
+++ b/gsisshd.socket
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=gsissh Server Socket
+Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
 Conflicts=gsisshd.service

 [Socket]
--- a/gsisshd.sysconfig
+++ b/gsisshd.sysconfig
@ -1,15 +1,11 @@
-# Configuration file for the sshd service.
+# Configuration file for the gsisshd service.

-# The server keys are automatically generated if they ommited
-# to change the automatic creation uncomment the approprite 
-# line. The default is RSAONLY
+# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing.
+# To change the automatic creation, adjust gsisshd.service options for
+# example using  systemctl enable gsisshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
+# of DSA key or  systemctl mask gsisshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
+# creation.

-# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=RSAONLY
-# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NO
-# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=YES
-
-# Do not change this option unless you have hardware random
-# generator and you REALLY know what you are doing
-
-SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=0
-# SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=1
+#SSH_RSA_BITS=3072
+#SSH_ECDSA_BITS=256
+OPTIONS=""
--- a/gsisshd@.service
+++ b/gsisshd@.service
@ -1,9 +1,18 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=gsissh per-connection server daemon
-Wants=gsisshd-keygen.service
-After=auditd.service gsisshd-keygen.service
+Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
+Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
+After=gsisshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service

 [Service]
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys"
 StandardInput=socket
+ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
--- openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2006-07-17 15:10:11.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2006-07-17 15:25:04.000000000 +0200
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@
- 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
- 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
- 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
-				     "Could not grab %s. "
-				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
-				     "on your session.", what);
-+				     "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
-+				     "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
-+				     "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
-+				     "on your session.\n"
-+				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
-+				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
- 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 	gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label),
- 				TRUE);
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--- openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <X11/Xlib.h>
-+#include <glib.h>
- #include <gtk/gtk.h>
- #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- 
-@@ -83,13 +84,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
- 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
-+{
-+	gdouble step;
-+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
-+	
-+	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
-+	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
-+}
-+
- static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- {
- 	const char *failed;
- 	char *passphrase, *local;
- 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
-	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
-+	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
- 	GdkGrabStatus status;
- 
- 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
-@@ -102,13 +114,31 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 					"%s",
- 					message);
- 
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+	    FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
- 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
-	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE,
- 	    FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
- 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
- 
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+	    FALSE, 8);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
-+	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
-+	
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
-+	    TRUE, 5);
-+	gtk_widget_show(progress);
-+
- 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
- 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
-@@ -119,6 +149,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
- 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
-+	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
-+			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
- 
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
- 
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch
@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage openssh-5.1p1/scp.1
--- openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage	2008-07-12 09:12:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.1p1/scp.1	2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ treating file names containing
- as host specifiers.
- Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
- .Pp
-+When copying a source file to a target file which already exists,
-+.Nm 
-+will replace the contents of the target file (keeping the inode).
-+.Pp
-+If the target file does not yet exist, an empty file with the target
-+file name is created, then filled with the source file contents.
-+No attempt is made at "near-atomic" transfer using temporary files.
-+.Pp
- The options are as follows:
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
- .It Fl 1
--- a/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c
--- openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts	2009-02-14 06:28:21.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c	2009-09-01 15:31:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -169,12 +169,27 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
- 	option_size = sizeof(options);
- 	if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
- 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
-		text[0] = '\0';
-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-			    " %2.2x", options[i]);
-		fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
-		    ipaddr, text);
-+		i = 0;
-+		do {
-+			switch (options[i]) {
-+				case 0:
-+				case 1:
-+					++i;
-+					break;
-+				case 131:
-+				case 137:
-+				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
-+					text[0] = '\0';
-+					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
-+						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-+							" %2.2x", options[i]);
-+					fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
-+						ipaddr, text);
-+				default:
-+					i += options[i + 1];
-+			}
-+		} while (i < option_size);
- 	}
- #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
- }
--- a/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
--- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock	2010-08-05 15:09:48.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2010-08-23 12:41:43.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1647,6 +1647,10 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *r
- 	u_int dlen, olen = 0;
- 	int len;
- 
-+	if(c->wfd != -1 && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0 && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
-+		debug("channel %d: forcing write", c->self);
-+		FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
-+	}
- 	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
- 	if (c->wfd != -1 &&
- 	    FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
--- a/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch
@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
--- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:12:54.427852524 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2012-02-14 16:13:22.818928690 +0100
-@@ -3275,6 +3275,9 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-+#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
-+		hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
-+#endif
- 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- 		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
- 		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c
--- openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:09:25.057964291 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c	2012-02-14 16:09:25.106047007 +0100
-@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct soc
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = family;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-+	hints.ai_flags = AI_V4MAPPED | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
- 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,
--- a/openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch
@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob	2011-03-07 20:17:34.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c	2011-03-07 20:18:47.000000000 +0100
-@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 	memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
- 	cur.conn = conn;
- 
-	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
-+	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_LIMIT | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
- }
--- a/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2010-12-01 02:03:39.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c	2011-04-21 16:43:36.859648916 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "cipher.h"
-@@ -600,6 +612,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+		struct group *gr;
-+
-+		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
-+			st.st_mode &= ~040;
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
--- a/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain	2011-04-22 11:37:49.273648812 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config	2011-04-22 11:39:31.758648401 +0200
-@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ X11Forwarding yes
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 
-+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
-+#Host *.local
-+#	CheckHostIP no
-+
- # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
- #Match User anoncvs
- #	X11Forwarding no
--- a/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet	2011-04-05 13:29:06.998648899 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/packet.c	2011-04-05 13:30:32.967648596 +0200
-@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
- 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
- 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
- 
-+	if (!active_state)
-+		return 0;
- 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
- 	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
- 		return 1;
--- a/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale openssh-5.8p2/mux.c
--- openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale	2011-01-14 02:01:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/mux.c	2011-06-09 15:27:42.556360291 +0200
-@@ -1867,6 +1867,9 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
- 			unlink(path);
- 		} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
- 			debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
-+		} else if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) {
-+			debug("Removing stale control socket \"%.100s\"", path);
-+			unlink(path);
- 		} else {
- 			error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
- 			    strerror(errno));
--- a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
- 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-+
- 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- 
--- a/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch
@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/dns.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/dns.c	2011-09-09 08:05:27.782440497 +0200
-@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
- {
- 	u_int counter;
- 	int result;
-+	unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
- 	struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
- 
- 	u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
-@@ -200,8 +201,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
-+	 * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
-+	 * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
-+	 *
-+	 * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
-+	 */
-+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
-+	rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
-+#endif
- 	result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
-	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
-+	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
-+
- 	if (result) {
- 		verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
- 		return -1;
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns	2009-07-13 03:38:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c	2011-09-09 15:03:39.930500801 +0200
-@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
-	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
-	if (flags) {
-+	/* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
-+	if ((flags & ~RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
- 		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
-@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
- #endif /* DEBUG */
- 
- #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
-	/* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
-	if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
-		_resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
-+	/* turn on DNSSEC if required  */
-+	if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
-+		_resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
- #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
- 
- 	/* make query */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns	2007-10-26 08:26:50.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h	2011-09-09 08:05:27.965438689 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
- #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
- # define RRSET_VALIDATED	1
- #endif
-+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
-+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0	0x0001
-+#endif
- 
- /*
-  * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
--- a/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean	2011-08-30 13:52:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c	2011-08-30 13:57:44.630111338 +0200
-@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
- 
-+	/* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
-+	atexit(RAND_cleanup);
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
--- a/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch
@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile
--- openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld	2012-05-19 07:24:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile	2012-09-14 20:35:47.565704718 +0200
-@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all:
- 	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
- 
- gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
-	$(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
-+	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
- 		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
- 		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
- 
- gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-	$(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
-+	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
- 		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
- 		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
- 
--- a/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost	2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100
-@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	static u_int mech = 0;
- 	OM_uint32 min;
- 	int ok = 0;
-	const char *gss_host;
-+	const char *gss_host = NULL;
- 
- 	if (options.gss_server_identity)
- 		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+	else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
- 		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+		if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" )  == 0 )
-+			gss_host = authctxt->host;
-+	}
- 	else
- 		gss_host = authctxt->host;
- 
--- a/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 20:55:42.289477749 +0200
-@@ -1617,6 +1617,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    &cfg, NULL);
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
-+
- 	seed_rng();
- 
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.514255748 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 20:54:58.551255954 +0200
-@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
-+# problems.
- #UsePAM no
- UsePAM yes
- 
--- a/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch
@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.737611051 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c	2013-03-25 19:31:42.797611433 +0100
-@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-+#ifdef __linux__
-+	linux_seed();
-+#endif /* __linux__ */
- 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
- 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2013-03-25 19:33:02.042116876 +0100
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport
- 
- COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
- 
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c	2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
-+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+
-+void
-+linux_seed(void)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
-+	char *random = "/dev/random";
-+	size_t ienv, randlen = 14;
-+
-+	if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0"))
-+		random = "/dev/urandom";
-+	else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > randlen)
-+		randlen = ienv;
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) {
-+		if (errno)
-+			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
-+		else
-+			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
-+	}
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0
--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy	2013-03-22 00:38:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0	2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100
-@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT
-              Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
-              with the agent.
- 
-+     SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+             The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done
-+             from /dev/urandom.  If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari-
-+             able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is
-+             reseeded from /dev/random.  The number of bytes read is defined
-+             by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.  Minimum is 14 bytes.  This set-
-+             ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+             random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec-
-+             tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+
- FILES
-      ~/.ssh/identity
-              Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1
--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy	2012-12-07 03:06:13.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100
-@@ -160,6 +160,20 @@ to make this work.)
- Identifies the path of a
- .Ux Ns -domain
- socket used to communicate with the agent.
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1
--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy	2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100
-@@ -198,6 +198,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t
- These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
- The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8	2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100
-@@ -945,6 +945,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh IPV6
- IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1
--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy	2013-01-20 12:35:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100
-@@ -806,6 +806,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8
--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8	2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100
-@@ -78,6 +78,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
- information corresponding with the private keys above.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1
--- openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100
-@@ -1277,6 +1277,23 @@ For more information, see the
- .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
- option in
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.rhosts
--- a/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac
--- openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.277495179 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac	2013-03-25 19:34:01.377495818 +0100
-@@ -4420,6 +4420,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
- 		fi
- 	]
- )
-+AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel,
-+  [  --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG  specify a vendor patch level],
-+  [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
-+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"],
-+  [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
-+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none])
- 
- dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
- dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
-@@ -4681,6 +4687,7 @@ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
- echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
- echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
-+echo "                Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
- 
- echo ""
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.197494668 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c	2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->max_authtries = -1;
- 	options->max_sessions = -1;
- 	options->banner = NULL;
-+	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
- 	options->use_dns = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
-@@ -287,6 +288,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
- 	if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
- 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
-+	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
-+		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+
- 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- 	if (use_privsep == -1)
- 		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
-@@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
- 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
- 	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
-	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
-+	sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-@@ -439,6 +443,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1163,6 +1168,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
-+	case sShowPatchLevel:
-+		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sAllowUsers:
- 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
-@@ -1950,6 +1959,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor	2013-01-09 05:56:45.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h	2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100
-@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int	max_authtries;
- 	int	max_sessions;
- 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
-+	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
- 	int	use_dns;
- 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
- 					 * poke the client this often to
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.380495837 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config	2013-03-25 19:44:43.471296362 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
- #Compression delayed
- #ClientAliveInterval 0
- #ClientAliveCountMax 3
-+#ShowPatchLevel no
- #UseDNS yes
- #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
- #MaxStartups 10:30:100
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.361495716 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0	2013-03-25 19:34:01.381495844 +0100
-@@ -595,6 +595,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
-              server key.  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
- 
-+     ShowPatchLevel
-+	     Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
-+	     the binary in the server identification string.  The patch level
-+	     is set at compile-time.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
-+
-      StrictModes
-              Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
-              of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.362495722 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5	2013-03-25 19:34:01.382495850 +0100
-@@ -1019,6 +1019,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version
- .It Cm ServerKeyBits
- Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
- The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
-+.It Cm ShowPatchLevel 
-+Specifies whether 
-+.Nm sshd 
-+will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. 
-+The patch level is set at compile-time. 
-+The default is 
-+.Dq no . 
-+This option applies to protocol version 1 only. 
- .It Cm StrictModes
- Specifies whether
- .Xr sshd 8
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.332495531 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c	2013-03-25 19:44:11.864112092 +0100
-@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
- 	}
- 
- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
-	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
-+	    major, minor, (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
- 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
- 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
- 
-@@ -1675,7 +1675,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
-	debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
-+	debug("sshd version %s, %s",
-+	    (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
- 	    SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
- 
- 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch
@ -1,788 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity	2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.288298063 +0200
-@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void *
- 	if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
- 		return (sshpam_thread_status);
- 	signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
-	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
-+	while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) {                     
-+		if (errno == EINTR)                                
-+			continue;
-+		fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,         
-+				strerror(errno));                      
-+	}
- 	return (status);
- }
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/channels.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity	2013-09-13 08:19:31.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/channels.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200
-@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
- 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
- 
-	if (rfd != -1)
-+	if (rfd >= 0)
- 		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
-+	if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
- 		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
-+	if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
- 		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- 
- 	c->rfd = rfd;
-@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
- 	if (nonblock) {
-		if (rfd != -1)
-+		if (rfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
-		if (wfd != -1)
-+		if (wfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(wfd);
-		if (efd != -1)
-+		if (efd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(efd);
- 	}
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity	2013-06-10 05:07:12.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200
-@@ -2068,14 +2068,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_
- 	char *rtype;
- 	int want_reply;
- 	int success = 0;
-+/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */
- 
- 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
- 	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
- 	    rtype, want_reply);
- 	if (want_reply) {
-		packet_start(success ?
-		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
-+		packet_start(/*success ?
-+		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- 		packet_send();
- 		packet_write_wait();
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/key.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity	2013-06-01 23:41:51.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.290298054 +0200
-@@ -807,8 +807,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
- 		success = 1;
- /*XXXX*/
- 		key_free(k);
-+/*XXXX
- 		if (success != 1)
- 			break;
-+XXXX*/
- 		/* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
- 		while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
- 			cp++;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c	2013-10-07 13:54:36.761314042 +0200
-@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
-@@ -1202,6 +1202,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
-+	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-+
- 	if (key != NULL)
- 		key_free(key);
- 
-@@ -1223,9 +1227,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
- 		free(chost);
- 	}
- 
-	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
-	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200
-@@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
-		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
-		if (tmp2 > 0)
-			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2010-12-03 00:50:26.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
-	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/packet.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity	2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200
-@@ -1199,6 +1199,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
- 		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
- 			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
- 			    "network attack detected");
-+			break;
- 		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
- 			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
- 			    "service detected");
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity	2013-06-02 15:46:24.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c	2013-10-07 13:42:32.377850691 +0200
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int);
- 
- static time_t start;		/* start progress */
- static time_t last_update;	/* last progress update */
-static char *file;		/* name of the file being transferred */
-+static const char *file;	/* name of the file being transferred */
- static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
- static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
- static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
- }
- 
- void
-start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
-+start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
- {
- 	start = last_update = monotime();
- 	file = f;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity	2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h	2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200
-@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  */
- 
-void	start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
-+void	start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
- void	stop_progress_meter(void);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/scp.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity	2013-07-18 08:11:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/scp.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200
-@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.293298039 +0200
-@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
-@@ -1414,8 +1414,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
-			if (intptr != NULL)
-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c	2013-10-07 13:43:36.620537138 +0200
-@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
- }
- 
-@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **rea
- 		 * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
- 		 * to the program.
- 		 */
-		if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
-+		if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
- 			FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
- 	}
- 	notify_prepare(*readsetp);
-@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset)
- 	int len;
- 
- 	/* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
-	if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
-+	if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
- 		data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
- 		dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
- 		len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
-@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	set_nonblock(fdin);
- 	set_nonblock(fdout);
- 	/* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
-	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		set_nonblock(fderr);
- 
- 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
-@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
-	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 		 * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
- 		 * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
- 		 */
-		if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
-+		if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- 			if (fdin != fdout)
- 				close(fdin);
- 			else
-@@ -739,15 +739,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
- 
- 	/* Close the file descriptors. */
-	if (fdout != -1)
-+	if (fdout >= 0)
- 		close(fdout);
- 	fdout = -1;
- 	fdout_eof = 1;
-	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		close(fderr);
- 	fderr = -1;
- 	fderr_eof = 1;
-	if (fdin != -1)
-+	if (fdin >= 0)
- 		close(fdin);
- 	fdin = -1;
- 
-@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int
- 
- 	debug("Window change received.");
- 	packet_check_eom();
-	if (fdin != -1)
-+	if (fdin >= 0)
- 		pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
- }
- 
-@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 	}
- 
- 	tun = packet_get_int();
-	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
- 			goto done;
- 		tun = forced_tun_device;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity	2013-07-26 00:40:00.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c	2013-10-07 13:48:45.885027420 +0200
-@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *
- }
- 
- static void
-send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
-+send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
-     u_int len)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *co
- 
- static void
- send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
-    char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
-+    const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 
-@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *con
- }
- 
- int
-do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
- {
- 	u_int id, status;
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
- 
- 
- static int
-do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
-+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int printflag,
-     SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
- }
- 
- int
-do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
-+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- 	return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
- }
-@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
- }
- 
- int
-do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path
- }
- 
- int
-do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
-+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
- }
- 
- int
-do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
- }
- 
- Attrib *
-do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- 	u_int id;
- 
-@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *pa
- }
- 
- Attrib *
-do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- 	u_int id;
- 
-@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
- #endif
- 
- int
-do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
-+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
-do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-     Attrib *a)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- char *
-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
-do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- }
- 
- int
-do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
-do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn
- }
- 
- int
-do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
-+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path,
-     Attrib *a, int pflag, int resume)
- {
- 	Attrib junk;
-@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- static int
-download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int depth, int resume)
- {
- 	int i, ret = 0;
-@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- }
- 
- int
-download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int resume)
- {
- 	char *src_canon;
-@@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
- }
- 
- int
-do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
-+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path,
-     int pflag)
- {
- 	int local_fd;
-@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- }
- 
- static int
-upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int pflag, int printflag, int depth)
- {
- 	int ret = 0, status;
-@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- }
- 
- int
-upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int printflag,
-+upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int printflag,
-     int pflag)
- {
- 	char *dst_canon;
-@@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- char *
-path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
-+path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
- {
- 	char *ret;
- 	size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity	2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h	2013-10-07 13:45:10.108080813 +0200
-@@ -56,49 +56,49 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_in
- u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
- 
- /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
-int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
-+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int);
- 
- /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
-int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
-+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
- 
- /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
- void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
- 
- /* Delete file 'path' */
-int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Create directory 'path' */
-int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int);
-+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
- 
- /* Remove directory 'path' */
-int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
-Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
-Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Set file attributes of 'path' */
-int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
-+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
- 
- /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
-int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
-+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *);
- 
- /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
- int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
- 
- /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
- /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
-/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+/* Symlink 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
- /* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */
- 
-@@ -106,27 +106,27 @@ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char
-  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int);
-+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve 
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
-+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int);
-+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve 
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int);
-+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int);
- 
- /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
-char *path_append(char *, char *);
-+char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity	2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c	2013-10-07 13:49:47.322727449 +0200
-@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (sshpid > 1) {
- 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
-		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args)
- 
- /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
- static char *
-path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
-+path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
- {
- 	size_t len;
- 
-@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
- }
- 
- static char *
-make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
-+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
- {
- 	char *abs_str;
- 
-@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **a
- }
- 
- static int
-is_dir(char *path)
-+is_dir(const char *path)
- {
- 	struct stat sb;
- 
-@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ is_dir(char *path)
- }
- 
- static int
-remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	Attrib *a;
- 
-@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
- 
- /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
- static int
-pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
-+pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
- {
- 	size_t l = strlen(pathname);
- 
-@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
- }
- 
- static int
-process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
-     int pflag, int rflag, int resume)
- {
- 	char *abs_src = NULL;
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ out:
- }
- 
- static int
-process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
-     int pflag, int rflag)
- {
- 	char *tmp_dst = NULL;
-@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void
- 
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
- static int
-do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
-+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag)
- {
- 	int n;
- 	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
-@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- 
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
- static int
-do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
-+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path,
-     int lflag)
- {
- 	char *fname, *lname;
-@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
- }
- 
- static int
-do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
-+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
- {
- 	struct sftp_statvfs st;
- 	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:22:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200
-@@ -1143,8 +1143,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
-	setegid(getgid());
-	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
- 	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200
-@@ -699,8 +699,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- 			privsep_preauth_child();
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
-		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1345,6 +1347,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
- 			break;
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- 
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void usage(void) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+        exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
-+{
-+        unsigned char *bin;
-+        char *p;
-+        size_t n = 0;
-+        int shift = 4;
-+        unsigned char out = 0;
-+        unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
-+        optr = bin;
-+
-+        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+                unsigned char c;
-+
-+                c = *p;
-+                if (isspace(c))
-+                        continue;
-+
-+                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+                        c = c - '0';
-+                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+                        break;
-+                }
-+
-+                out |= c << shift;
-+                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+                if (shift) {
-+                        *(optr++) = out;
-+                        out = 0;
-+                        ++n;
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        *len = n;
-+        return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+        char *buf;
-+        size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+        do {
-+                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
-+                        break;
-+
-+                total += n;
-+                buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+        return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+        Cipher *c;
-+        CipherContext cc;
-+        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+        char *hexkey = NULL;
-+        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+        char *hexdata = NULL;
-+        char *p;
-+        int i;
-+        int encrypt = 1;
-+        void *key;
-+        size_t keylen;
-+        void *iv;
-+        size_t ivlen;
-+        void *data;
-+        size_t datalen;
-+        void *outdata;
-+
-+        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+                        algo = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+                        hexkey = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+                        ++i;
-+                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 1;
-+                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 0;
-+                        } else {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+                        hexiv = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+                        hexdata = argv[++i];
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+                usage();
-+        }
-+
-+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+	if (c == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+                hexdata = read_stdin();
-+        } else {
-+                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+        }
-+
-+        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+        if (ivlen != 16) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+        }
-+
-+        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
-+
-+        free(key);
-+        free(iv);
-+
-+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+	if(outdata == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	cipher_crypt(&cc, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
-+
-+        free(data);
-+
-+	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
-+
-+        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
-+	}
-+
-+        free(outdata);
-+
-+        printf("\n");
-+        return 0;
-+}
-+
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2013-03-25 21:35:52.451586280 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in	2013-03-25 21:37:14.956114584 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
- 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -174,6 +175,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -281,6 +285,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
- 
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
- {
-	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
- 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- };
- 
-@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
- {
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 	size_t n = 0;
-	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
-+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
- 
- 	if (len == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- 		return (0);
- 
-	while ((len--) > 0) {
-+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
-+		u_int r,a,b;
-+
- 		if (n == 0) {
-			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
-			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			int outl, i, buflen;
-+
-+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+
-+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+
-+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
-+				ctrbuf, buflen);
- 		}
-		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
-		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
-+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
-+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
-+		r = a ^ b;
-+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
-+		src += sizeof(a);
-+		dest += sizeof(r);
-+
-+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
- 	}
-+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
- 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- 	}
-	if (key != NULL)
-		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
-		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
-+			case 128:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 192:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 256:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
-+		}
-+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
-+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
-+	}
- 	if (iv != NULL)
- 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- 	return (1);
-@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
- 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch
@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.c	2013-10-07 15:42:05.243812405 +0200
-@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
- 	case 1:
-  revoked:
- 		/* Key revoked */
-		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
-		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
-+		    "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
- 		free(key_fp);
- 		return 1;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2013-10-07 15:43:49.747355927 +0200
-@@ -200,16 +200,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw,
- 
- 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
- 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-+			    SSH_FP_HEX);		
- 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
-			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
-			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
-+			    "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
-+			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- 			    cuser, lookup);
- 		} else {
-			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
-			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",
-+			    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+			    fp, cuser, lookup);
- 		}
- 		free(fp);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint	2013-07-18 08:10:10.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-10-07 15:50:44.617495624 +0200
-@@ -359,10 +359,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
- 				continue;
- 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
- 				continue;
-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
-			    SSH_FP_HEX);
-			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
-			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",
-+			    file, linenum, key_type(found),
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 			/*
- 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
- 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
-@@ -400,9 +400,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
- 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
- 				continue;
- 			found_key = 1;
-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
-+			    key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 			free(fp);
- 			break;
- 		}
-@@ -425,13 +425,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
- 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
- 		return 0;
- 
-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
- 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
-		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
-+		debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-+		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,
- 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.971968285 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c	2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200
-@@ -598,6 +598,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
-+enum fp_type
-+key_fingerprint_selection(void)
-+{
-+	static enum fp_type rv;
-+	static char rv_defined = 0;
-+	char *env;
-+
-+	if (!rv_defined) {
-+		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		rv_defined = 1;
-+	}
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
-+{
-+	return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_fingerprint_prefix(void)
-+{
-+	return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
-  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h	2013-10-07 15:44:17.574233450 +0200
-@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, cons
- int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
- char		*key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
- u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
-+enum fp_type	 key_fingerprint_selection(void);
-+char		*key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
-+char		*key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
- const char	*key_type(const Key *);
- const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
- int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c	2013-10-07 14:44:57.466515766 +0200
-@@ -326,10 +326,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
- 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
- 			had_identities = 1;
- 			if (do_fp) {
-				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-				    SSH_FP_HEX);
-				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
-				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
-+				fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+				printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",
-+				    key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+				    fp, comment, key_type(key));
- 				free(fp);
- 			} else {
- 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2013-10-07 15:41:11.627044336 +0200
-@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
- 	char *p;
- 	int ret = -1;
- 
-	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
-	    id->comment, p))
-+	p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",
-+	    id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))
- 		ret = 0;
- 	free(p);
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint	2013-07-20 05:22:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c	2013-10-07 14:25:52.864145038 +0200
-@@ -767,13 +767,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- {
- 	FILE *f;
- 	Key *public;
-	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
-+	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
- 	enum fp_rep rep;
- 	enum fp_type fptype;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+	pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 
- 	if (!have_identity)
-@@ -785,8 +786,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
- 	if (public != NULL) {
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -851,8 +852,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 		}
- 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,
- 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -970,13 +971,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key
- 	if (print_fingerprint) {
- 		enum fp_rep rep;
- 		enum fp_type fptype;
-		char *fp, *ra;
-+		char *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- 
-		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+		pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-+
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -1855,16 +1858,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
- 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
- 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
- 
-	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
- 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
- 	    key_cert_type(key));
-	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
-	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",
-	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
-+	printf("        Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
-+	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",
-+	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);
- 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
- 	if (!v00) {
- 		printf("        Serial: %llu\n",
-@@ -2655,13 +2659,12 @@ passphrase_again:
- 	fclose(f);
- 
- 	if (!quiet) {
-		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
-		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
- 		    identity_file);
- 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
-		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
-+		printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);
- 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
- 		printf("%s\n", ra);
- 		free(ra);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint	2013-06-01 23:31:19.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c	2013-10-07 14:43:54.859822036 +0200
-@@ -830,10 +830,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
- 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
- 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);
- 			free(ra);
- 			free(fp);
- 		}
-@@ -871,9 +871,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 			else
- 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
- 			/* The default */
-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			msg2[0] = '\0';
- 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
-@@ -888,10 +887,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
- 			    "established%s\n"
-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
-+			    "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"
- 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
- 			    "(yes/no)? ",
-			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
-+			    host, ip, msg1, type,
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- 			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
- 			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
- 			    msg2);
-@@ -1136,8 +1136,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
- 	int flags = 0;
- 	char *fp;
- 
-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
-@@ -1238,14 +1239,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
- 			continue;
- 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
- 			continue;
-		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
- 		    "in %s:%lu\n"
-		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
-+		    "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",
- 		    key_type(found->key),
- 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
-		    key_type(found->key), fp);
-+		    key_type(found->key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 		if (options.visual_host_key)
- 			logit("%s", ra);
- 		free(ra);
-@@ -1260,7 +1262,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- {
- 	char *fp;
- 
-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
-@@ -1268,8 +1270,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
-	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
-	    key_type(host_key), fp);
-+	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",
-+	    key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(),  fp);
- 	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
- 
- 	free(fp);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:37.001968139 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2013-10-07 15:20:09.403234714 +0200
-@@ -590,8 +590,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
- 		    key->type, pktype);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -1202,8 +1203,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
- 	int have_sig = 1;
- 	char *fp;
- 
-	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch
@ -1,607 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.850031186 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in	2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200
-@@ -147,25 +147,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
- 	$(RANLIB) $@
- 
- ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
- 
- sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
- 
- scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
- 
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips	2013-10-24 15:43:46.019999906 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c	2013-10-24 15:44:09.262890686 +0200
-@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p
- 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
- 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
- 
-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- 		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
- 		free(fp);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips	2013-10-24 15:39:05.008319990 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-10-24 15:39:05.029319892 +0200
-@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
- 
- 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-		    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		    FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
- 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
- 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
- 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- 		free(fp);
- 	} else {
-		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
- 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- 		free(fp);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.857031153 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200
-@@ -148,8 +148,14 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffe
- 	/* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
- 	cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer));
- 
-	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-+	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-+	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) {
-+		error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
-+		buffer_free(&encrypted);
-+		buffer_free(&buffer);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
- 	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0);
- 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-@@ -472,8 +478,13 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, con
- 	cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(&copy));
- 
- 	/* Rest of the buffer is encrypted.  Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
-	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-	    CIPHER_DECRYPT);
-+	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-+	    CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) {
-+		error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
-+		buffer_free(&decrypted);
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
- 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
- 	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy), 0, 0);
- 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200
-@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
-@@ -86,6 +87,27 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
- 	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
- };
- 
-+static const struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = {
-+	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
-+	{ "des",	SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
-+	{ "3des",	SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
-+	{ "3des-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-+	{ "aes128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
-+	{ "aes192-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
-+	{ "aes256-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+	{ "aes128-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
-+	{ "aes192-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
-+	{ "aes256-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-+	{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
-+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
-+	{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
-+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
-+};
- /*--*/
- 
- /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
-@@ -96,7 +118,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(void)
- 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- 	const Cipher *c;
- 
-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
- 		if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
- 			continue;
- 		if (ret != NULL)
-@@ -161,7 +183,7 @@ const Cipher *
- cipher_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- 	const Cipher *c;
-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c;
- 	return NULL;
-@@ -171,7 +193,7 @@ const Cipher *
- cipher_by_number(int id)
- {
- 	const Cipher *c;
-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (c->number == id)
- 			return c;
- 	return NULL;
-@@ -215,7 +237,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
- 	const Cipher *c;
- 	if (name == NULL)
- 		return -1;
-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c->number;
- 	return -1;
-@@ -374,14 +396,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
-  * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
-  */
- 
-void
-+int
- cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
-     const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
- {
- 	MD5_CTX md;
- 	u_char digest[16];
- 
-	MD5_Init(&md);
-+	if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0)
-+		return -1;
- 	MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- 	MD5_Final(digest, &md);
- 
-@@ -389,6 +412,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc,
- 
- 	memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
- 	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h	2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ void	 cipher_init(CipherContext *, const
- void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *,
-     u_int, u_int, u_int);
- void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
-void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int);
-+int	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int);
- u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_authlen(const Cipher *);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/key.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
-@@ -606,9 +607,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void)
- 	char *env;
- 
- 	if (!rv_defined) {
-		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			rv = SSH_FP_SHA1;
-+		else {
-+			env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+			rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+				SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		}
- 		rv_defined = 1;
- 	}
- 	return rv;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/mac.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.c	2013-10-11 22:25:35.394737186 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ struct macalg {
- 	int		etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
- };
- 
-static const struct macalg macs[] = {
-+static const struct macalg all_macs[] = {
- 	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
- 	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-@@ -91,6 +92,18 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
- 	{ NULL,					0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
- };
- 
-+static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = {
-+	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL,					0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
-+};
-+
- /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported MACs. */
- char *
- mac_alg_list(void)
-@@ -99,7 +112,7 @@ mac_alg_list(void)
- 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- 	const struct macalg *m;
- 
-	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
-+	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- 		if (ret != NULL)
- 			ret[rlen++] = '\n';
- 		nlen = strlen(m->name);
-@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
- {
- 	const struct macalg *m;
- 
-	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
-+	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- 		if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
- 			continue;
- 		if (mac != NULL)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips	2013-06-11 04:10:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h	2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200
-@@ -114,6 +114,19 @@
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512"
-+#else
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1"
-+#endif
- 
- static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
- 	KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips	2010-03-25 22:52:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200
-@@ -37,25 +37,18 @@
- #define REKEY_BYTES	(1 << 24)
- 
- static int rc4_ready = 0;
-static RC4_KEY rc4;
- 
- unsigned int
- arc4random(void)
- {
- 	unsigned int r = 0;
-	static int first_time = 1;
-+	void *rp = &r;
- 
-	if (rc4_ready <= 0) {
-		if (first_time)
-			seed_rng();
-		first_time = 0;
-+	if (!rc4_ready) {
- 		arc4random_stir();
- 	}
-+	RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r));
- 
-	RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r);
-
-	rc4_ready -= sizeof(r);
-	
- 	return(r);
- }
- 
-@@ -63,24 +56,11 @@ void
- arc4random_stir(void)
- {
- 	unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
-	int i;
- 
-	memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4));
- 	if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0)
- 		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
- 		    ERR_get_error());
-	RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf);
-
-	/*
-	 * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in:
-	 * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
-	 */
-	for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf))
-		RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf);
-
-	memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf));
-
-	rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
-+	rc4_ready = 1;
- }
- #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2013-10-24 15:45:06.055623916 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c	2013-10-24 15:45:36.906478986 +0200
-@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
- 	enum fp_type fptype;
- 	char *fp, *ra;
- 
-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : (FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5);
- 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 
- 	pkcs11_init(0);
-@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
- 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- 		if (print_fingerprint) {
- 			fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
-			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
-+			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
- 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
- 			    fp, key_type(keys[i]));
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips	2013-07-25 03:55:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -253,6 +255,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
-+		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL))
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+			else
-+				logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
- 
- #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
-@@ -330,6 +339,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case '1':
-+			if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+				fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+			}
- 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
- 			break;
- 		case '2':
-@@ -647,7 +659,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (!host)
- 		usage();
- 
-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- 
- 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
-@@ -748,6 +759,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	seed_rng();
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	if (options.user == NULL)
- 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- 
-@@ -816,6 +831,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
-+		if (options.protocol == 0)
-+			fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- 	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
- 	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms,
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.810031374 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.873031077 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -170,6 +172,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
-+
- 	}
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -185,7 +191,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- 	}
-+
- 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.842031223 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.873031077 +0200
-@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-@@ -1450,6 +1452,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
-+		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL))
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+			else
-+				logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1601,8 +1611,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	else
- 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
- 
-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-
- 	/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
- 	if (logfile != NULL) {
- 		log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
-@@ -1773,6 +1781,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype,
- 		    key_type(key ? key : pubkey));
- 	}
-+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-+	}
- 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
- 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-@@ -1936,6 +1948,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Initialize the random number generator. */
- 	arc4random_stir();
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
-@@ -2498,6 +2514,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
- 	}
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -2507,6 +2526,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- 	}
- 	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex.patch
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch
@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-diff -U0 openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog
--- openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df	2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog	2013-10-23 22:39:46.051788366 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-+20131010
-+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13
-+   [dh.c dh.h]
-+   Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each
-+   symmetric key size.  New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with
-+   the upper limit specified by RFC4419.  Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok
-+   djm@.
-+
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df	2013-07-18 08:12:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.c	2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.51 2013/07/02 12:31:43 markus Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.52 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-@@ -352,17 +352,20 @@ dh_new_group14(void)
- 
- /*
-  * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
- * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).  Estimate
- * with:  O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3)))
-+ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).
-+ * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
-+ * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value
-+ * from RFC4419 section 3.
-  */
- 
- int
- dh_estimate(int bits)
- {
-
-+	if (bits <= 112)
-+		return 2048;
- 	if (bits <= 128)
-		return (1024);	/* O(2**86) */
-+		return 3072;
- 	if (bits <= 192)
-		return (2048);	/* O(2**116) */
-	return (4096);		/* O(2**156) */
-+		return 7680;
-+	return 8192;
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df	2008-06-29 14:47:04.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.h	2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.10 2008/06/26 09:19:40 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.11 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
- 
- int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
-+/* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
- #define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
- #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
- 
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch
@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2013-10-23 22:03:52.322950759 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c	2013-10-23 22:04:24.295799873 +0200
-@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <krb5.h>
-+#include <profile.h>
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- #endif
- 	krb5_error_code problem;
- 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+	const char *ccache_type;
- 	int len;
- 	char *client, *platform_client;
- 	const char *errmsg;
-@@ -191,12 +194,30 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 		goto out;
- #endif
- 
-+	ccache_type = krb5_cc_get_type(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 
-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
-+	if (authctxt->krb5_ticket_file[0] == ':')
-+		authctxt->krb5_ticket_file++;
-+
-+	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + strlen(ccache_type);
- 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
-+
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
- 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
-+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "%s:%s",
-+	    ccache_type, authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (strcmp(ccache_type, "DIR") == 0) {
-+		char *p;
-+		p = strrchr(authctxt->krb5_ccname, '/');
-+		if (p)
-+			*p = '\0';
-+	}
-+
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -235,10 +256,34 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- void
- krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-+	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
-+	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
-+
- 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
-+
-+		strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
-+		krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
-+		*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
-+		if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
-+
-+			strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
-+
-+			if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
-+				if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
-+					krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
-+					*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
-+					if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
-+						debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+				}
-+				else
-+					debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
-+						krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno)
-+						);
-+			}
-+		}
- 	}
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
- 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
-@@ -250,34 +295,139 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+int
-+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
-+	char *src, *old;
-+	va_list ap;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	va_start(ap, fmt);
-+	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
-+	va_end(ap);
-+
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	old = *dsc;
-+
-+	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
-+		free(src);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(old);
-+	free(src);
-+
-+	return i;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
-+	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
-+
-+	if (template == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
-+	r = xstrdup("");
-+
-+	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
-+
-+		*p_n++ = '\0';
-+		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+			goto cleanup;
-+
-+		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
-+			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		} else {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
-+			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
-+			goto cleanup;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+		goto cleanup;
-+
-+	*result = r;
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return 0;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+	free(r);
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
-+	profile_t p;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	char *value = NULL;
-+
-+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
- 	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-	char ccname[40];
-+	char *ccname;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
- 	mode_t old_umask;
-+	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
- 
-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
-		return ENOMEM;
-
-	old_umask = umask(0177);
-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
-	oerrno = errno;
-	umask(old_umask);
-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-		return oerrno;
-	}
-+#endif
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
- 
-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+	if (ret) {
-+		ret = asprintf(&ccname, cctemplate, geteuid());
-+		if (ret == -1)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+		old_umask = umask(0177);
-+		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- 		oerrno = errno;
-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+		umask(old_umask);
-+		if (tmpfd == -1) {
-+			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+			oerrno = errno;
-+			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			close(tmpfd);
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
- 		close(tmpfd);
-		return oerrno;
- 	}
-	close(tmpfd);
-+	debug("%s: Setting ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
- 
- 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch
@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.889087613 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c	2013-10-11 21:41:42.905087537 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client)
-+{
-+	if (options.use_kuserok)
-+		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
-+	else {
-+		char kuser[65];
-+
-+		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
-+			return 0;
-+		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- static int
- krb5_init(void *context)
- {
-@@ -159,7 +173,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
-+	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
- 		problem = -1;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.901087556 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2013-10-11 21:46:42.898673597 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
-     int);
- 
- static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
-+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *);
- 
- /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
- 
-@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
- 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
- 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
- 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
- 		retval = 1;
- 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c	2013-10-11 21:48:24.664194016 +0200
-@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
-+	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -310,6 +311,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- 	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
- 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
-+		options->use_kuserok = 1;
- 
- 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- 	if (use_privsep == -1)
-@@ -336,7 +339,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -409,11 +412,13 @@ static struct {
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1515,6 +1520,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*activep = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-+		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-@@ -1815,6 +1824,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 
-@@ -2055,6 +2065,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
- 
- 	/* string arguments */
- 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h	2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200
-@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- 	int	num_permitted_opens;
- 
-+	int	use_kuserok;
- 	char   *chroot_directory;
- 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
- 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5	2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200
-@@ -675,6 +675,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
- file on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
-+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -833,6 +837,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
- .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
-+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
- .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config	2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200
-@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-ldap.patch
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux	2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2013-10-10 15:13:57.864306950 +0200
-@@ -503,6 +503,25 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
- 	free(newctx);
- }
- 
-+void
-+ssh_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
-+void ssh_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/session.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2013-10-10 14:58:20.617762326 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c	2013-10-10 15:13:16.520503590 +0200
-@@ -1522,6 +1522,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 			    pw->pw_uid);
- 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1544,6 +1547,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
-+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
-+			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1808,9 +1817,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
-#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2013-10-10 14:58:20.632762255 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c	2013-10-10 14:58:20.635762241 +0200
-@@ -668,6 +668,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Change our root directory */
- 	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
- 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
-@@ -811,6 +815,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
- 
-  skip:
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	/* switch SELinux content for root too */
-+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
-+		ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- 	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
- 
--- a/Show more
+++ b/Show more
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Mattias Ellert	93af84c40a	Based on openssh-10.0p1-6.fc44	2025-09-01 10:25:58 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	17373deae6	Based on openssh-10.0p1-4.fc43	2025-09-01 10:19:42 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	261508c76c	Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild	2025-07-24 16:39:59 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	ab8e6d64cd	Update sources file	2025-06-16 07:43:14 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	dff7de33ab	Based on openssh-10.0p1-3.fc43	2025-06-16 05:31:00 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	6a6b9524b2	Bump release	2025-04-20 06:13:54 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	4205fcb944	Based on openssh-9.9p1-15.fc43	2025-04-20 05:56:15 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	beffeababd	Based on openssh-9.9p1-11.fc43	2025-03-05 14:28:17 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	850caa568b	Based on openssh-9.9p1-9.fc42	2025-03-05 14:14:30 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	6f3daee4f0	Based on openssh-9.9p1-8.fc42	2025-02-05 12:58:20 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	3c2a11925b	Based on openssh-9.9p1-7.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-2.fc41	2025-02-05 11:43:01 +01:00
Björn Esser	9e253dc61c	Add explicit BR: libxcrypt-devel Signed-off-by: Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org>	2025-02-01 19:54:26 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	06032544b5	Based on openssh-9.9p1-5.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-1.fc41	2025-01-21 09:58:09 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering	480372390c	Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild	2025-01-17 05:17:11 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	c81b691d2c	Based on openssh-9.8p1-4.fc42	2024-10-03 00:52:03 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	f463dc835a	Based on openssh-9.8p1-3.fc41.1	2024-10-03 00:49:37 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	75b18e250a	Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild	2024-07-18 08:40:59 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	0c7244d48f	Add scp and hpnscp symlinks in gsisshd's path	2024-07-12 20:31:20 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	85175e1ba2	Fix s390x compilation	2024-07-10 21:31:40 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	8ba66847e4	Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc41.13	2024-07-10 15:35:42 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	bd16300680	Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc40.4	2024-07-10 15:35:42 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	ed01b0a2c5	Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild	2024-01-24 21:07:00 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	3e94785b28	Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40.1	2024-01-20 22:54:58 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering	4a1597c64d	Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild	2024-01-20 21:35:29 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	76c16c6e5a	Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40 Drop patch openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch (now included in openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch)	2023-10-24 21:25:00 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	78f4185f33	Based on openssh-9.3p1-12.fc40	2023-10-17 07:01:51 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	5b20a7546c	Based on openssh-9.3p1-9.fc39	2023-10-17 03:14:46 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	c0e4707d7b	Based on openssh-9.3p1-8.fc39	2023-08-11 21:46:58 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	0172aacf0a	Based on openssh-9.3p1-5.fc39.1	2023-07-23 08:40:50 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	b26b3e1a8b	Based on openssh-9.3p1-3.fc39 Fix keyex patch	2023-07-19 17:05:44 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	1b534648ec	Based on openssh-9.0p1-17.fc39	2023-04-16 05:19:44 +02:00
Florian Weimer	b6fce45c3e	C99 compatibility fixes Apply patches from the upstream portable OpenSSH project to fix C99 compatibility issues in the configure script. Related to: <https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/PortingToModernC> <https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Toolchain/PortingToModernC>	2023-04-12 13:22:12 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	f21cbd932c	Based on openssh-9.0p1-12.fc38	2023-03-12 04:47:25 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering	4e50d957c8	Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2023-01-19 11:37:02 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	82ba7b5b8b	Based on openssh-9.0p1-9.fc38	2023-01-10 20:54:37 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	06837d883b	Based on openssh-9.0p1-7.fc38	2022-11-09 13:47:29 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	a8b9dae4de	Based on openssh-9.0p1-6.fc38	2022-10-08 09:55:00 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	05c1b1980c	Update sources file	2022-09-01 16:16:32 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	66cc7b96c8	Based on openssh-9.0p1-3.fc38	2022-09-01 10:32:01 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	3c863da50a	Based on openssh-8.8p1-6.fc37	2022-08-30 18:31:37 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	f49266f739	Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2022-07-21 13:07:18 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	9e07719d88	Based on openssh-8.8p1-2.fc37	2022-05-08 11:00:52 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	4dc1dfc111	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2022-01-20 11:51:24 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	6960e6c5d7	Based on openssh-8.8p1-1.fc36	2021-12-01 17:31:50 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	5d089cb67f	Based on openssh-8.7p1-3.fc36	2021-10-24 11:05:38 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	568625900e	Based on openssh-8.7p1-2.fc35	2021-10-24 10:28:51 +02:00
Sahana Prasad	d614a17ecd	Rebuilt with OpenSSL 3.0.0	2021-09-14 19:03:56 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	e6eac867a9	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2021-07-22 07:10:16 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	757dff8637	Based on openssh-8.6p1-5.fc35	2021-06-21 19:05:41 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	3b5263e189	Based on openssh-8.6p1-4.fc34	2021-06-21 18:45:20 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	24087bf920	Based on openssh-8.6p1-3.fc35	2021-05-22 09:07:37 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	152f5ddac3	Disable MTAES	2021-03-30 10:00:53 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	d482358b18	Based on openssh-8.5p1-1.fc34 Fix issue with read-only ssh buffer during gssapi key exchange Add HPN patch	2021-03-16 19:39:34 +01:00
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek	b7578f68fd	Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583.	2021-03-02 16:13:40 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	b77bb495c7	Based on openssh-8.4p1-5.fc34	2021-02-05 15:06:38 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering	01d6be4f82	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2021-01-26 13:01:57 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	02fff16642	Based on openssh-8.4p1-4.fc33	2020-12-09 20:31:47 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	409dc9ed62	Based on openssh-8.4p1-3.fc33	2020-11-30 07:39:27 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	79afa4b64a	Based on openssh-8.4p1-2.fc33	2020-10-06 12:30:41 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	acf84ac51a	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2020-07-28 00:25:23 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	e920d28c57	Based on openssh-8.3p1-3.fc32	2020-06-11 10:03:55 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	4713fab392	Based on openssh-8.3p1-2.fc32	2020-06-04 15:55:34 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	3e49e59ef4	Based on openssh-8.3p1-1.fc32	2020-05-30 19:33:41 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	c2b8146adc	Add missing buffer initialization in gsissh patch	2020-05-04 19:43:04 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	9549c46d29	Based on openssh-8.2p1-3.fc32	2020-04-14 15:47:13 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	2469144c2d	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2020-01-29 03:38:21 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	03327bb7c3	Based on openssh-8.1p1-1.fc31	2019-10-21 10:23:32 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	abde90a9cb	Based on openssh-8.0p1-8.fc31	2019-08-08 11:24:52 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	f67408c45e	Based on openssh-8.0p1-5.fc30	2019-08-07 21:57:57 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	db99f0a0e6	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2019-07-25 07:50:56 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	15b86ea960	Based on openssh-8.0p1-4.fc30	2019-06-19 10:17:38 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	7ea48e01a0	Based on openssh-8.0p1-3.fc30 Change GSSAPITrustDNS default to no	2019-05-28 15:41:32 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	b9cd944358	Based on openssh-8.0p1-2.fc30	2019-05-20 08:38:52 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	678fe5c83c	Update sources file	2019-05-05 18:16:41 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	aa3c245244	Based on openssh-8.0p1-1.fc30	2019-05-05 18:06:52 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	f25f213974	Based on openssh-7.9p1-5.fc29	2019-03-22 11:28:50 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	a7d5063016	Remove usage statistics collection support	2019-02-27 08:59:43 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	515c95fb14	CVE-2019-7639	2019-02-08 22:18:53 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	ae75c3d4f7	Based on openssh-7.9p1-4.fc29	2019-02-07 14:21:29 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering	f09e89f05d	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2019-02-01 01:40:10 +00:00
Igor Gnatenko	bd3d327c9a	Remove obsolete Group tag References: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Remove_Group_Tag	2019-01-28 20:24:06 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	460eae6bd4	Based on openssh-7.9p1-3.fc29	2019-01-15 16:01:10 +01:00
Björn Esser	b3988fbe66	Rebuilt for libcrypt.so.2 (#1666033 )	2019-01-14 19:03:17 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	f0dc592cfc	Based on openssh-7.9p1-2.fc29	2018-11-14 13:19:09 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	afffcadde3	Based on openssh-7.9p1-1.fc29	2018-10-24 23:45:22 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	5923b7b936	Based on openssh-7.8p1-3.fc28	2018-10-24 22:15:12 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	50a1d2c054	Based on openssh-7.7p1-6.fc28	2018-08-16 15:00:52 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	f751fba9b3	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2018-07-13 04:34:59 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	db96e2a44d	Based on openssh-7.7p1-5.fc28	2018-07-05 15:46:16 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	9975263d7c	Based on openssh-7.7p1-3.fc28	2018-04-17 12:57:28 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	e4f9d53906	Based on openssh-7.7p1-2.fc28	2018-04-12 14:34:43 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	33eb081b60	Based on openssh-7.7p1-1.fc28	2018-04-10 12:46:30 +02:00
Igor Gnatenko	586f2ba02d	Remove %clean section None of currently supported distributions need that. Last one was EL5 which is EOL for a while. Signed-off-by: Igor Gnatenko <ignatenkobrain@fedoraproject.org>	2018-02-14 08:05:17 +01:00
Igor Gnatenko	ea308e0d4c	Remove BuildRoot definition None of currently supported distributions need that. It was needed last for EL5 which is EOL now Signed-off-by: Igor Gnatenko <ignatenkobrain@fedoraproject.org>	2018-02-13 23:28:36 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering	2763d0178d	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2018-02-07 15:33:04 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	c6a932d446	Update GSI patch	2018-01-26 17:22:22 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	076d654b20	Based on openssh-7.6p1-6.fc28	2018-01-26 17:11:36 +01:00
Björn Esser	261e529a3e	Rebuilt for switch to libxcrypt	2018-01-20 23:06:50 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	c99ce4eacc	Based on openssh-7.6p1-5.1.fc28	2018-01-18 09:56:30 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	01510d75b6	Based on openssh-7.6p1-4.fc28	2017-12-20 10:13:26 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	3e0625ed70	Based on openssh-7.6p1-3.fc27	2017-12-20 10:03:02 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	c7d42e73db	Based on openssh-7.6p1-2.fc27	2017-11-22 22:56:38 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	2f685df7e6	Based on openssh-7.5p1-5.fc27	2017-11-11 23:12:08 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	b297717538	Based on openssh-7.5p1-3.fc26 Update GSI patch with more openssl 1.1.0 fixes from Globus	2017-07-31 14:28:42 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering	f080e94f93	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Mass_Rebuild	2017-07-26 12:07:26 +00:00
Petr Písař	9246721f0b	perl dependency renamed to perl-interpreter <https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/perl_Package_to_Install_Core_Modules >	2017-07-12 14:43:23 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	f249377320	Based on openssh-7.5p1-2.fc26	2017-03-25 04:59:20 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	fba2e4ad34	Based on openssh-7.4p1-4.fc25	2017-03-04 15:32:31 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	4d141e4d08	Based on openssh-7.4p1-3.fc25 Remove MON_ONCE from the monitoring flags for MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC (rhbz #1423000)	2017-02-24 12:59:06 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	a3ffcc1efa	Based on openssh-7.4p1-2.fc25	2017-02-07 11:27:13 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	6995654e64	Based on openssh-7.4p1-1	2017-01-24 16:42:47 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	1f8a82b0c7	Adding mechanism OID negotiation with the introduction of micv2 OID	2016-12-15 17:55:39 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	25f492eb24	Based on openssh-7.3p1-7.fc25	2016-12-09 15:38:57 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	8c517cb8d1	Based on openssh-7.3p1-5.fc26	2016-11-02 16:44:54 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	da02042fe2	Based on openssh-7.3p1-4.fc25	2016-10-20 14:22:37 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	a0915d8c5e	Based on openssh-7.3p1-3.fc25	2016-08-15 16:22:23 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	0bd6bf86e4	Based on openssh-7.2p2-10.fc24	2016-07-18 20:30:44 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	1ad3d9f343	Based on openssh-7.2p2-9.fc24	2016-07-03 07:48:50 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	8c873b6826	Based on openssh-7.2p2-8.fc24	2016-06-26 06:03:04 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	7ecf78753c	Based on openssh-7.2p2-5.fc24	2016-05-12 13:10:52 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	5fd763c594	Based on openssh-7.2p2-4.fc24	2016-04-16 17:30:25 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	873d1aca80	Based on openssh-8.2p2-2.fc23	2016-04-16 15:20:56 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	845bd874e8	Based on openssh-7.2p1-2.fc23	2016-03-04 17:18:15 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	1d944e946b	Based on openssh-7.1p2-4.fc23	2016-03-02 17:20:42 +01:00
Dennis Gilmore	414c76f112	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_24_Mass_Rebuild	2016-02-03 23:23:17 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	9eea03bdb0	Based on openssh-7.1p2-3.fc23	2016-02-01 16:07:36 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	d8907457dc	Based on openssh-7.1p2-2.fc23	2016-01-29 17:24:42 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	adf76a364f	Based on openssh-7.1p2-1.fc23	2016-01-19 21:52:10 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	e3fc8ce78b	Based on openssh-7.1p1-3.fc23	2015-10-08 11:22:22 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	ae3d65d08a	Based on openssh-7.1p1-1.fc23	2015-08-24 23:00:37 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	b6360055e2	Based on openssh-7.0p1-1.fc23	2015-08-14 15:24:20 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	e2d7866367	Based on openssh-6.9p1-4.fc22	2015-07-29 10:12:11 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	c93878a6e6	Based on openssh-6.9p1-3.fc22	2015-07-27 10:50:57 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	00e17c136b	Based on openssh-6.8p1-10.fc22	2015-07-05 07:18:45 +02:00
Dennis Gilmore	bb89cad94f	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_23_Mass_Rebuild	2015-06-17 09:52:51 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	b88dcfd523	Based on openssh-6.8p1-5.fc22	2015-04-21 11:00:54 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	04aef646ab	Based on openssh-6.8p1-4.fc22	2015-04-14 11:49:37 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	17725e15da	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-12.fc21	2015-04-13 20:01:21 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	300c081db2	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-11.1.fc21	2015-01-15 21:56:09 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	b5761e5d23	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-8.fc21	2014-11-24 13:32:03 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	913439ce70	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-5.fc21	2014-10-22 19:07:34 +02:00
Peter Robinson	0670469f97	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild	2014-08-16 19:11:21 +00:00
Mattias Ellert	0ae19bf766	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-2.fc21	2014-07-16 07:05:09 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	a60f428d3d	Based on openssh-6.4p1-4.fc20	2014-07-10 20:14:43 +02:00
Dennis Gilmore	0823728727	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_Mass_Rebuild	2014-06-07 13:51:35 -05:00
Mattias Ellert	36e3247d20	Based on openssh-6.4p1-3.fc20	2013-12-12 03:07:35 +01:00