Based on openssh-8.4p1-8.fc33

Clean up HPN patch

.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 /*.tar.bz2
 /*.tar.gz
 /*.tar.gz.asc
-/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+/*.gpg

gsi-openssh.spec

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 %global libedit 1
 
 %global openssh_ver 8.4p1
-%global openssh_rel 3
+%global openssh_rel 10
 
 Summary: An implementation of the SSH protocol with GSI authentication
 Name: gsi-openssh
@@ -158,11 +158,22 @@ Patch967: openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
 Patch968: openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
 Patch969: openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+# https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/6.8/common/015_sshagent.patch.sig
+Patch970: openssh-8.4p1-cve-2021-28041.patch
+# CVE-2021-41617
+Patch978: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
 
+# Fix issue with read-only ssh buffer during gssapi key exchange (#1938224)
+# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/19
+Patch97: openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch
 # This is the patch that adds GSI support
 # Based on hpn_isshd-gsi.7.5p1b.patch from Globus upstream
 Patch98: openssh-8.4p1-gsissh.patch
 
+# This is the HPN patch
+# Based on https://sourceforge.net/projects/hpnssh/files/Patches/HPN-SSH%2015v1%208.4p1/
+Patch99: openssh-8.4p1-hpn-15.1-modified.patch
+
 License: BSD
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
 
@@ -302,6 +313,8 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 %patch967 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
 %patch968 -p1 -b .seccomp
 %patch969 -p0 -b .debian
+%patch970 -p1 -b .cve-2021-28041
+%patch978 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@@ -309,7 +322,9 @@ gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
 
 %patch100 -p1 -b .coverity
 
+%patch97 -p1 -b .sshbuf-ro
 %patch98 -p1 -b .gsi
+%patch99 -p1 -b .hpn
 
 sed 's/sshd.pid/gsisshd.pid/' -i pathnames.h
 sed 's!$(piddir)/sshd.pid!$(piddir)/gsisshd.pid!' -i Makefile.in
@@ -458,7 +473,7 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 
 %files
 %license LICENCE
-%doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns README.sshd-and-gsisshd TODO
+%doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README HPN-README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns README.sshd-and-gsisshd TODO
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/moduli
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsissh-keygen
@@ -501,7 +516,29 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_tmpfilesdir}/gsissh.conf
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Dec  9 2020 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-3
+* Sat Oct 23 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-10
+- Based on openssh-8.4p1-8.fc33
+
+* Mon Jun 21 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-9
+- Based on openssh-8.4p1-7.fc33
+
+* Tue May 25 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-8
+- Based on openssh-8.4p1-6.fc33
+
+* Tue Mar 30 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-7
+- Disable MTAES
+
+* Tue Mar 16 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-6
+- Fix issue with read-only ssh buffer during gssapi key exchange
+- Clean up HPN patch
+
+* Thu Mar 11 2021 Frank Scheiner <scheiner@hlrs.de> - 8.4p1-5
+- Add HPN patch
+
+* Fri Feb 05 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-4
+- Based on openssh-8.4p1-5.fc33
+
+* Wed Dec 09 2020 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-3
 - Based on openssh-8.4p1-4.fc33
 
 * Mon Nov 30 2020 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.4p1-2

openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
---- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
+@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
+@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
  	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -266,11 +266,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",

openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch

@@ -2159,12 +2159,13 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -717,18 +874,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+@@ -717,19 +874,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
- 	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 -	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 +	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
  		error("invalid attribute length");
  		return (NULL);
@@ -2259,12 +2260,13 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -838,18 +998,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+@@ -838,19 +998,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
- 	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 -	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 +	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
  		error("invalid attribute length");
  		return (NULL);

openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+From 063e1a255b53abde1147522f9aceccfd2a7ceb9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 19:45:25 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Unbreak gsi-openssh by not holding the sshbuf structures
+ originated from incoming packet buffer
+
+Keeping buffers from sshpkt_getb_froms() for breaks further packet
+processing because the "derived" buffer keeps a "link" to te parent
+buffer, which is then considered readonly.
+
+This addresses the visible issue in the kexgss_server(), which
+demonstrated with GSI (requiring more round trips than GSSAPI
+with kerberos).
+
+The additional two places in the client were never hit, because the host
+keys are never sent as part of the gssapi key exchange but in case we
+would have different server or we would start sending hostkeys as the
+code is ready for that, we would hit it anyway.
+
+Fixes #18
+---
+ kexgssc.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ kexgsss.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
+index 1c62740e..29b8b031 100644
+--- a/kexgssc.c
++++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -162,11 +162,16 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			do {
+ 				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ 				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++					char *tmp = NULL;
++					size_t tmp_len = 0;
++
+ 					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+ 					if (server_host_key_blob)
+ 						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+-					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
++					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
+ 						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
++					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
++						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
+ 				}
+ 			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+ 
+@@ -453,11 +458,16 @@ kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			do {
+ 				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ 				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++					char *tmp = NULL;
++					size_t tmp_len = 0;
++
+ 					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+ 					if (server_host_key_blob)
+ 						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+-					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
++					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
+ 						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
++						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
+ 				}
+ 			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+ 
+diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
+index a2c02148..c8b7d652 100644
+--- a/kexgsss.c
++++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+-	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ 	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
+ 		switch(type) {
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+-			if (client_pubkey != NULL)
++			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
+ 				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+ 			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+ 			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
+@@ -135,6 +135,31 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 				goto out;
+ 
+ 			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
++			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
++			* buffer state->incoming_packet
++			*/
++			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
++			    kex->hash_alg,
++			    kex->client_version,
++			    kex->server_version,
++			    kex->peer,
++			    kex->my,
++			    empty,
++			    client_pubkey,
++			    server_pubkey,
++			    shared_secret,
++			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
++				goto out;
++
++			gssbuf.value = hash;
++			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++			client_pubkey = NULL;
++
+ 			break;
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ 			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
+@@ -156,7 +181,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+ 			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+ 
+-		if (client_pubkey == NULL)
++		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
+ 			fatal("No client public key");
+ 
+ 		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+@@ -185,23 +210,6 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ 		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+ 
+-	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+-	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+-	    kex->hash_alg,
+-	    kex->client_version,
+-	    kex->server_version,
+-	    kex->peer,
+-	    kex->my,
+-	    empty,
+-	    client_pubkey,
+-	    server_pubkey,
+-	    shared_secret,
+-	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+-		goto out;
+-
+-	gssbuf.value = hash;
+-	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+-
+ 	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
+ 		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+ 

openssh-8.4p1-cve-2021-28041.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c.cve-2021-28041 openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c.cve-2021-28041	2021-06-17 13:15:58.691479334 +0200
++++ openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2021-06-17 13:17:16.573118348 +0200
+@@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+ 				goto err;
+ 			}
+ 			free(ext_name);
++			ext_name = NULL;
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype);

openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ # include <paths.h>
+ #endif
+ #include <pwd.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+ #include <login.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 		}
+ 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ 
++		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
++		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
++			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
++			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
+		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+ 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,