Based on openssh-7.4p1-23.el7_9

Based on openssh-7.4p1-22.el7_9
Add HPN patch
2023-08-11 22:57:54 +02:00 · 2021-11-24 17:40:33 +01:00 · 2020-10-23 20:10:23 +02:00 · 2019-08-07 23:08:32 +02:00 · 2019-05-28 16:42:24 +02:00 · 2019-02-27 13:05:37 +01:00
129 changed files with 19166 additions and 34432 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 /*.tar.bz2
 /*.tar.gz
 /*.tar.gz.asc
-/*.gpg
+/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
--- a/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-From 99d8e250514023d3b88a1c9eb724c4898aba9827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 02/50] openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux
-
---
- openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
- session.c                        | 16 +++++++++-------
- sshd-auth.c                      |  4 ++++
- sshd-session.c                   |  2 +-
- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index b9fbe38b..dfafc622 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -415,6 +415,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
- 	debug3_f("done");
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
-+		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index 055c825e..498d242a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 6444c77f..e4657cef 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
- 
-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
- 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
-@@ -1382,6 +1382,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
- 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- 			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1417,6 +1420,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (in_chroot == 0)
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1434,9 +1442,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		fprintf(stderr,
- 		    "You must change your password now and log in again!\n");
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		setexeccon(NULL);
-#endif
- #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
- 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
- 		    (char *)NULL);
-@@ -1649,9 +1654,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
-#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
-index 30eecd8a..f957dc22 100644
--- a/sshd-auth.c
-+++ b/sshd-auth.c
-@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
- 	if ((box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor)) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
- #endif
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Demote the child */
- 	if (privsep_chroot) {
- 		/* Change our root directory */
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 74d2cbc7..4a148db4 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
- 	 * special privileges to begin with.
- 	 */
-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
-+#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
- 	skip_privdrop = 1;
- #endif
- 
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ b/0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From 80359feb76fd8061b5ce18f73451d7b9db0c2477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 06/50] openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe
-
---
- ssh-keyscan.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
-index 3436c0b5..9f76ad22 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
-+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
-@@ -798,6 +798,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
- 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
- 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
-+ 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-+
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
- 	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
- 		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-From 6b2a33044583e892badb9ac86cd2c6252b1a532f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 08/50] openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress
-
---
- contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-index a62f9815..cb7152dc 100644
--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- 
- #include <X11/Xlib.h>
-+#include <glib.h>
- #include <gtk/gtk.h>
- #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+static void
-+move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
-+{
-+	gdouble step;
-+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
-+	
-+	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
-+	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
-+}
-+
- static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
- {
-@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
- 	char *passphrase, *local;
- 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
- 	int buttons, default_response;
-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
-+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
- 	GdkGrabStatus status;
- 	GdkColor fg, bg;
- 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
-@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
- 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
- 
- 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
-+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+		    FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
- 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
- 		if (fg_set)
- 			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
- 		if (bg_set)
- 			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
- 		gtk_box_pack_start(
-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
-+		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
- 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
-@@ -225,6 +242,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
- 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
- 			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
- 		}
-+
-+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
-+		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
-+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
-+		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
-+
-+		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
-+		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
-+		    TRUE, 5);
-+		gtk_widget_show(progress);
-+		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
-+				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
-+
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Grab focus */
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 710ce53fdf1d32a0629fce2e42fb49d407e2b06c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 09/50] openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info
-
---
- contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 8 ++++++--
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-index cb7152dc..bbe93d83 100644
--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
- 
- 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
-	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
-	    "on your session.", what);
-+	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
-+	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
-+	    "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
-+	    "on your session.\n"
-+	    "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
-+	    "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
- 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 
- 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-From 5f21983f6472b26693babea4d6ca6b95a7dc7b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 10/50] openssh-8.7p1-redhat
-
---
- ssh_config            |  7 +++++++
- ssh_config_redhat     | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- sshd_config           |  8 ++++++++
- sshd_config.0         |  6 +++---
- sshd_config.5         |  2 +-
- sshd_config_redhat    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- sshd_config_redhat_cp |  7 +++++++
- 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 ssh_config_redhat
- create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat
- create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat_cp
-
-diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index cc566356..18169187 100644
--- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
-@@ -44,3 +44,10 @@
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
- #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
- #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
-+#
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
-+# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
-+#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
-+# included below. For more information, see manual page for
-+#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
-+Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff --git a/ssh_config_redhat b/ssh_config_redhat
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..8b1b5902
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh_config_redhat
-@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-+# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
-+# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
-+Match final all
-+	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
-+	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
-+
-+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+
-+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
-+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
-+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
-+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+
-+# rhbz#2352653 - export COLORTERM
-+	SendEnv COLORTERM
-+
-+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
-+# Host *.local
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 0f4a3a72..608203e4 100644
--- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
- 
-+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
-+
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
-index 2f77b4f4..49349bb3 100644
--- a/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/sshd_config.0
-@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-      SyslogFacility
-              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
-             default is AUTH.
-+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+             The default is AUTH.
- 
-      TCPKeepAlive
-              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index c0771737..035a50c8 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
- .It Cm SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- .Xr sshd 8 .
-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
- LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
- .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat b/sshd_config_redhat
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..993a28d5
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/sshd_config_redhat
-@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
-+
-+KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
-+
-+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
-+
-+UsePAM yes
-+
-+X11Forwarding yes
-+
-+# rhbz#2352653 - accept COLORTERM
-+	AcceptEnv COLORTERM
-+
-+# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
-+# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
-+PrintMotd no
-+
-diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat_cp b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..1d592d13
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
-@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
-+# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
-+# write it before this block or include it before this file.
-+# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
-+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 56b8d082bc9e25a77b5227d576f27088446c6fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 11/50] openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning
-
---
- sshd-session.c | 4 ++++
- sshd_config    | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index a365f26f..a70b36c9 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1127,6 +1127,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			    "enabled authentication methods");
- 	}
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
-+
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 608203e4..48af6321 100644
--- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
-+# problems.
- #UsePAM no
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
--- a/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@ -1,665 +0,0 @@
-From 5fca5946aa97dce23c6824c52b070a92532752a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 14/50] openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique
-
---
- auth-krb5.c     | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- auth.h          |   3 +-
- gss-serv-krb5.c |  42 +++-----
- gss-serv.c      |  10 +-
- servconf.c      |  12 ++-
- servconf.h      |   2 +
- session.c       |   5 +-
- ssh-gss.h       |   4 +-
- sshd-session.c  |   2 +-
- sshd_config.5   |   8 ++
- 10 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index c99e4e43..77714e3d 100644
--- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <krb5.h>
-+#include <profile.h>
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- #endif
- 	krb5_error_code problem;
- 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	int len;
-+	char *ticket_name = NULL;
- 	char *client, *platform_client;
- 	const char *errmsg;
- 
-@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-+	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
-@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 		goto out;
- #endif
- 
-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+	problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
- 
-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
-	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
-	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
-+	krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-+	if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
- 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- void
- krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-+	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
-+	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
-+
- 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+		krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
-+		krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
-+		krb5_ccache ccache;
-+		int ret;
-+
-+		krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
-+
-+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
-+		if (ret)
-+			goto out;
-+
-+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
-+		if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
-+			/* There is at least one other ccache in collection
-+			 * we can switch to */
-+			krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
-+		} else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
-+			/* Clean up the collection too */
-+			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
-+			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
-+			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
-+			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
-+
-+				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
-+
-+				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
-+					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
-+						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
-+						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
-+						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
-+							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
-+							    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+					}
-+					else
-+						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
-+						    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
-+		krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
- 	}
-+out:
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
- 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
- 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -238,36 +281,189 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- }
- 
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-krb5_error_code
-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-	char ccname[40];
-	mode_t old_umask;
- 
-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
-		return ENOMEM;
-
-	old_umask = umask(0177);
-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
-	oerrno = errno;
-	umask(old_umask);
-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-		return oerrno;
-+#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
-+int
-+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
-+	char *src, *old;
-+	va_list ap;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	va_start(ap, fmt);
-+	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
-+	va_end(ap);
-+
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	old = *dsc;
-+
-+	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1) {
-+		*dsc = old;
-+		free(src);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(old);
-+	free(src);
-+
-+	return i;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
-+	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
-+
-+	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
-+	if (template == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
-+	r = xstrdup("");
-+
-+	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
-+
-+		*p_n++ = '\0';
-+		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+			goto cleanup;
-+
-+		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
-+			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		} else {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
-+			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
-+			goto cleanup;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+		goto cleanup;
-+
-+	*result = r;
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return 0;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+	free(r);
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
-+	profile_t p;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	char *value = NULL;
-+
-+	debug3_f("called");
-+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
-+	if (ret || !value)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
-+
-+	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
-+	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
-+	char *ccname = NULL;
-+	mode_t old_umask;
-+	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
-+
-+	debug3_f("called");
-+	if (need_environment)
-+		*need_environment = 0;
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
-+	if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
-+		/* Otherwise, go with the old method */
-+		if (ccname)
-+			free(ccname);
-+		ccname = NULL;
-+
-+		ret = asprintf(&ccname,
-+		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+		if (ret < 0)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+
-+		old_umask = umask(0177);
-+		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- 		oerrno = errno;
-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+		umask(old_umask);
-+		if (tmpfd == -1) {
-+			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+			oerrno = errno;
-+			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			close(tmpfd);
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-+		if (need_environment)
-+			*need_environment = 1;
- 		close(tmpfd);
-		return oerrno;
- 	}
-	close(tmpfd);
- 
-	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
-+	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
-+	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
-+		type_len = colon - ccname;
-+		type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
-+		if (type == NULL)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+		strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
-+		type[type_len] = 0;
-+	} else {
-+		type = strdup(ccname);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
-+	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
-+	 */
-+	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
-+		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
-+		free(type);
-+		if (ret)
-+			return ret;
-+
-+		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
-+		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
-+	} else {
-+		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
-+		 * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
-+		 * collections
-+		 */
-+		free(type);
-+		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
-+		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	}
- }
- #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 83d07ae8..10e88e11 100644
--- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 14502c5a..df55512d 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
- /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
-  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
- 
-static void
-+static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- 	krb5_ccache ccache;
-@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- 	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
- 	const char *errmsg;
-+	int set_env = 0;
- 
- 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
- 		debug("No credentials stored");
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 
- #ifdef HEIMDAL
- # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
- # endif
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- #else
-	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
-+	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
- 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
-		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
-+		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
- 
-@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
-@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 	    client->creds, ccache))) {
- 		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
- 	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-
-	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-	client->store.filename = NULL;
-#else
-	if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
-		new_ccname++;
- 	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
-	if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
-		char *p;
-		p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
-		if (p)
-			*p = '\0';
-+
-+	if (set_env) {
-+		client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
- 	}
- 	if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
- 		client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-#endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-+	if (options.use_pam && set_env)
- 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 
- 	client->store.data = krb_context;
- 
-	return;
-+	return set_env;
- }
- 
- int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index a5cca797..9d5435ed 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -414,13 +414,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
-void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -500,9 +502,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index d4f7fd66..55aa5bf0 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
-+	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
- 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -382,6 +383,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
- 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
- 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
-+	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
-+		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -564,7 +567,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
- 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-@@ -655,11 +658,13 @@ static struct {
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1668,6 +1673,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
-+		intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sGssAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3293,6 +3302,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- # ifdef USE_AFS
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
- # endif
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index c3f50140..a4a38d6d 100644
--- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * file on logout. */
- 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
-+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 89b3a9cf..2620dd11 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
- 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
- 	 */
-	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
-+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
-+		ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1101,7 +1102,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef KRB5
-	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
-+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
- 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
- #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index db34d77f..a894e23c 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index f8c8a797..478381db 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
- 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
-+		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
- 		restore_uid();
- 	}
- #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 8bc6586e..1251d4d5 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1033,6 +1033,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
- file on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
-+Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
-+cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
-+.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
-+The default value
-+.Cm no
-+can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
-+user account.
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- offer to clients.
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ b/0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From 20aabb2c445e29d211266ce7434bb0273edf88b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 17/50] openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote
-
---
- scp.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 57c242ff..716ae386 100644
--- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1162,7 +1162,10 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
- 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
-+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
-+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
-+			else
-+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
- 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
- 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-From 6481ac7fbd0027a7038560e0f51dd0af056cc229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 18/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts
-
---
- openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  2 +-
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
- sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 8c5fc1fe..646f0887 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
- #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-@@ -450,7 +451,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
- void
- sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- {
-	security_context_t *ctx;
-+	char *ctx;
- 
- 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
-@@ -469,6 +470,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
-+	const char *contexts_path;
-+	FILE *contexts_file;
-+	struct stat sb;
-+
-+	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
-+	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
-+	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else");
-+		fclose(contexts_file);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
-+		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
-+		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
-+			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
-+				break;
-+			line[len] = '\0';
-+		}
-+
-+		if (line[0] == '\0')
-+			continue;
-+
-+		cp = line;
-+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+
-+		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
-+				fclose(contexts_file);
-+				return;
-+			}
-+			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	fclose(contexts_file);
-+
-+	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
-+	free(preauth_context);
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 7426f6f7..9a6b1d6e 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
- 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
- 
-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
-+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
- 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
- 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index 1b745a76..7f8ba200 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
-index d51e4636..e4a8edfd 100644
--- a/sshd-auth.c
-+++ b/sshd-auth.c
-@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
- 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Demote the child */
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-From 825018f5f2d892655f3d63167a0d1f3391cec678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 19/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot
-
---
- log.c              | 11 +++++++++--
- log.h              |  1 +
- monitor.c          | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- monitor.h          |  2 +-
- session.c          | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
- sftp-server-main.c |  2 +-
- sftp-server.c      |  6 +++---
- sftp.h             |  2 +-
- sshd-session.c     |  7 ++++++-
- 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
-index 6617f267..9782cfb0 100644
--- a/log.c
-+++ b/log.c
-@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ void
- log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
-     int on_stderr)
- {
-+	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
- #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
- #endif
-@@ -208,8 +213,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
-	log_handler = NULL;
-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+	if (reset_handler) {
-+		log_handler = NULL;
-+		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+	}
- 
- 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
- 	if (on_stderr)
-diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
-index 8e8dfc23..70048a8a 100644
--- a/log.h
-+++ b/log.h
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
- 
- void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
- LogLevel log_level_get(void);
- int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
- int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 2ef16cc8..43c10a4e 100644
--- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -2001,9 +2001,22 @@ monitor_init(void)
- }
- 
- void
-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
-+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
- {
-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
-+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
-+	char *dev_log_path;
-+	int do_logfds = 0;
-+
-+	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
-+		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
-+
-+		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
-+			do_logfds = 1;
-+		}
-+		free(dev_log_path);
-+	}
-+	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
- }
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index dbc7e003..d4d631dd 100644
--- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct monitor {
- };
- 
- struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
-+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
- 
- struct Authctxt;
- void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 2620dd11..54da09d5 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
- 
- static int is_child = 0;
- static int in_chroot = 0;
-+static int have_dev_log = 1;
- 
- /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
- static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -670,6 +671,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 	int ret;
- 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
- 	char session_type[1024];
-+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
- 
- 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
- 		original_command = command;
-@@ -729,6 +731,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 			tty += 5;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+		have_dev_log = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
- 	    session_type,
- 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1512,14 +1518,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
- 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
-
-	/*
-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
-	 * descriptors open.
-	 */
-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -1652,8 +1650,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 			exit(1);
- 	}
- 
-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
- 
- 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1678,9 +1674,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
-+		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
-+	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
-+	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
-+	 * descriptors open.
-+	 */
-+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-+
- 	fflush(NULL);
- 
- 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
-index 2c70f89b..bbb79f27 100644
--- a/sftp-server-main.c
-+++ b/sftp-server-main.c
-@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
- 
-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
-index a4abb9f7..4985da38 100644
--- a/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/sftp-server.c
-@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
- }
- 
- int
-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
-+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
- {
- 	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
- 	ssize_t len, olen;
-@@ -1913,7 +1913,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
- 	extern char *__progname;
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
- 
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
-@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
-index 2bde8bb7..ddf1a396 100644
--- a/sftp.h
-+++ b/sftp.h
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
- 
- struct passwd;
- 
-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 478381db..9342e416 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
- #endif
- 
- 	/* New socket pair */
-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
-+	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
- 
- 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
- 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -456,6 +456,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
-+	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
-+	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
-+
-+	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
-+		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+++ b/0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 007ee98fa9100f7241985ac2a7eed71e17d89a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 20/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory
-
---
- scp.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 716ae386..9554b188 100644
--- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1876,6 +1876,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
- 			free(vect[0]);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
-+			errno = ENOTDIR;
-+			goto bad;
-+		}
- 		omode = mode;
- 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-From 9c75c175e3555377328fc5fc9b06e94f129b7cd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 21/50] openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users
-
---
- gss-serv-krb5.c |  3 +--
- servconf.c      | 13 ++++++++++++-
- servconf.h      |  1 +
- sshd_config     |  1 +
- sshd_config.5   |  6 ++++++
- 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 187faf92..03188d9b 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
- 	FILE *fp;
- 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
- 	char *line = NULL;
-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
- 	struct stat st;
- 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
- 	int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
- 
- 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
- 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
-+	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
-                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
-                                         k5login_exists);
- 	}
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 5dd5ca21..c0de7110 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
-+	options->enable_k5users = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- #endif
- 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
- 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
-+	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
-+		options->enable_k5users = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -585,7 +588,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
- 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -681,6 +684,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -689,6 +693,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -2450,6 +2455,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssEnablek5users:
-+		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sMatch:
- 		if (cmdline)
- 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -3005,6 +3014,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -3314,6 +3324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- # endif
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 11de36a2..c08cf6a7 100644
--- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
- 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
- 	int	use_kuserok;
-+	int		enable_k5users;
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index ea5a878e..33713c88 100644
--- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 0fcb409a..fe246fc2 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -739,6 +739,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
-+access control. Further details are described in
-+.Xr ksu 1 .
-+The default is
-+.Cm no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
- doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+++ b/0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 05b09904f431333e19cd24528ef66d1fd15e9efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 22/50] openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output
-
---
- servconf.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index c0de7110..105e301d 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -3366,7 +3366,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
- 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-From 36e3430d1f81397d5f40600e075272a81f7effce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 25/50] openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays
-
---
- channels.c    |  9 ++++++---
- channels.h    |  2 +-
- servconf.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
- servconf.h    |  2 ++
- session.c     |  5 +++--
- sshd_config.5 |  7 +++++++
- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index d46531ce..7438c1a5 100644
--- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -4996,7 +4996,7 @@ rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
-  */
- int
- x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
-    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
-+    int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
-     u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
- {
- 	Channel *nc = NULL;
-@@ -5009,8 +5009,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
- 	    x11_display_offset > UINT16_MAX - X11_BASE_PORT - MAX_DISPLAYS)
- 		return -1;
- 
-+	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
-+	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
-+
- 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
-+	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
- 	    display_number++) {
- 		port = X11_BASE_PORT + display_number;
- 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-@@ -5065,7 +5068,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
- 		if (num_socks > 0)
- 			break;
- 	}
-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
-+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_BASE_PORT ) {
- 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
-index 134528d5..8a09a820 100644
--- a/channels.h
-+++ b/channels.h
-@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
- 
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
- int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
-int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
-+int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
- void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
- 	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
- int      x11_channel_used_recently(struct ssh *ssh);
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 105e301d..15c99b30 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
- 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
- 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
-+	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
- 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
- 	options->permit_tty = -1;
- 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
-@@ -353,6 +354,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
- 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
- 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
-+	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
-+		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
- 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
- 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
- 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -576,7 +579,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
- 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
- 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
- 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
- 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -714,6 +717,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1750,6 +1754,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 			*intptr = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sX11MaxDisplays:
-+		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
- 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3004,6 +3012,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
-@@ -3299,6 +3308,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #endif
- 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
-+	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index c08cf6a7..7c7e5d43 100644
--- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- 
- #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
- #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
-+#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
- 
- /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
- #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
-@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
- 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
- 					 * searching at */
-+	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
- 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
- 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
- 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 54da09d5..28bbb8a7 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -2611,8 +2611,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
-+	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
-+	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
-+	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
- 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index fe246fc2..26fcdc84 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1391,6 +1391,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
- .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
- .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
-+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
- .Cm X11Forwarding
- and
- .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
-@@ -2111,6 +2112,12 @@ Specifies the first display number available for
- X11 forwarding.
- This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
- The default is 10.
-+.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
-+Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
-+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
-+X11 forwarding.
-+This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
-+The default is 1000.
- .It Cm X11Forwarding
- Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
- The argument must be
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@ -1,312 +0,0 @@
-From 43320351b6f150167190aacc84f2f87030fef3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 26/50] openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux
-
---
- auth2-pubkey.c                   |  8 ++++--
- misc.c                           |  5 ++--
- misc.h                           |  2 +-
- openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++---------------
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  4 +--
- platform.c                       |  6 ++++-
- sshconnect.c                     |  2 +-
- sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
- sshd-session.c                   |  6 +++--
- 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index 267a27d2..0d5ae0df 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@
- 
- /* import */
- extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
- 
- static char *
-@@ -485,7 +487,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
- 	    ac, av, &f,
- 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
-+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	uid_swapped = 1;
-@@ -755,7 +758,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
- 	    ac, av, &f,
- 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
-+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index 1e31acc9..09722962 100644
--- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -2764,7 +2764,8 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
- pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
-     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
-+    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
-+    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	FILE *f = NULL;
- 	struct stat st;
-@@ -2898,7 +2899,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
- 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
- 			    strerror(errno));
- 			_exit(127);
-diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
-index efecdf1a..9efa9cf4 100644
--- a/misc.h
-+++ b/misc.h
-@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
- pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
-+    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
- 
- typedef struct arglist arglist;
- struct arglist {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 646f0887..291b569a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- #endif
- 
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-extern int inetd_flag;
-
- /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
- int
- sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -222,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
- }
- 
- static void
-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
-+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
-+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	*role = NULL;
- 	*level = NULL;
-@@ -240,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
- 
- /* Return the default security context for the given username */
- static int
-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
-	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
-+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
-+    security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	char *sename, *lvl;
- 	char *role;
-@@ -249,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 	int r = 0;
- 	context_t con = NULL;
- 
-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
- 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 
- 	if (r == 0) {
- 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-		if (inetd_flag) {
-+		if (inetd) {
- 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
- 
- 			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-@@ -332,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 
- /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
- static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
-+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
-+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	const char *reqlvl;
- 	char *role;
-@@ -341,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
- 
- 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
- 
-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
- 
- 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- 
-	if (inetd_flag) {
-+	if (inetd) {
- 		use_current = "1";
- 	} else {
- 		use_current = "";
-@@ -361,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
- }
- 
- static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
-+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -373,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
- }
- 
- int
-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
- {
-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
-+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
- }
- 
- /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
- void
-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
-+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
- {
- 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
- 	int r = 0;
- 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
-+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
- 
- 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
-	if (options.use_pam) {
-+	if (use_pam) {
- 		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
- 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
- 			case -1:
- 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
-@@ -407,7 +409,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
- 
- 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
- 
-	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
-+	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
- 	if (r >= 0) {
- 		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
- 		if (r < 0) {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index 7f8ba200..3cd7da6a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
- int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
- void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
-index 0d12f311..f0800b1f 100644
--- a/platform.c
-+++ b/platform.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- 
- /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
- int
-@@ -140,7 +142,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
- 	}
- #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- }
- 
-diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
-index c86182d1..04084810 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
- 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
-diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
-index e4a8edfd..897db9b4 100644
--- a/sshd-auth.c
-+++ b/sshd-auth.c
-@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
- int debug_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Saved arguments to main(). */
- static char **saved_argv;
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 9342e416..81d30152 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
- int debug_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
- static int log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1359,7 +1359,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ b/0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From 35205319dd71d8e61c1596b8f9479df91aff7756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 27/50] openssh-7.5p1-sandbox
-
---
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index b31062c2..1fabf99d 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -277,6 +277,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
- #endif
-@@ -295,6 +298,21 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_gettid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-@@ -304,6 +322,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
--- a/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 507e6f245557ae7261806f7ecbd40697cb0dd389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 29/50] openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6
-
---
- scp.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 9554b188..7f9795a5 100644
--- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1183,7 +1183,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
-			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
-+			addargs(&alist,
-+			    /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
-+			    strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
- 			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
- 			    thost, targ);
- 			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -1,654 +0,0 @@
-From b436140fe3abd9f97f01f9af9f5da5cf6c5d7725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 30/50] openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies
-
---
- ssh_config.5  | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
- sshd_config.5 | 179 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
- 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 8d5d0722..a43b2a27 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -438,17 +438,13 @@ A single argument of
- causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
- This is the default behaviour.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-.Pp
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
- character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -587,20 +583,25 @@ If the option is set to
- (the default),
- the check will not be executed.
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -616,13 +617,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .Ed
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -1022,6 +1016,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -1034,10 +1033,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
- .Pp
-The default is
-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1056,36 +1053,25 @@ will not be converted automatically,
- but may be manually hashed using
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
- authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
- character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
-to the default set instead of replacing them.
-+to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
-at the head of the default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-+at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The
- .Fl Q
-@@ -1138,6 +1124,17 @@ to prefer their algorithms.
- .Pp
- The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
-+.Pp
-+The proposed
-+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-+during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
-+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
-+and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
-+.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
-+.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
-+would break the order given by the
-+.Pa known_hosts
-+file.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlias
- Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
- real host name when looking up or saving the host key
-@@ -1376,6 +1373,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
- and
- .Cm pam .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
- their preference order.
- The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
-@@ -1384,29 +1386,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- .Pp
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
-.Ed
- .Pp
-+built-in openssh default set.
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
- .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
-@@ -1522,37 +1512,33 @@ function, and all code in the
- file.
- This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
- in order of preference.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
- calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
- These are considered safer and their use recommended.
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1741,39 +1727,31 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
- The default is
- .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
- authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
-instead of replacing it.
-+character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default instead of replacing it.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-+.Pp
-+This option affects also
-+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
- .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
- Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
- The argument to this keyword must be
-@@ -2497,7 +2475,9 @@ for those users who do not have a configuration file.
- This file must be world-readable.
- .El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1
-+.Xr ssh 1 ,
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
- .Sh AUTHORS
- .An -nosplit
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 26fcdc84..583a01cd 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@ If the argument is
- then no banner is displayed.
- By default, no banner is displayed.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-.Pp
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
- character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -533,20 +529,25 @@ The default is
- indicating not to
- .Xr chroot 2 .
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Pp
-@@ -573,13 +574,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -774,53 +768,43 @@ For this to work
- .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-gss-gex-sha1-,
-gss-group1-sha1-,
-gss-group14-sha1-,
-gss-group14-sha256-,
-gss-group16-sha512-,
-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-+gss-gex-sha1-
-+gss-group1-sha1-
-+gss-group14-sha1-
-+gss-group14-sha256-
-+gss-group16-sha512-
-+gss-nistp256-sha256-
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
-.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
- authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
- character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
-the default set instead of replacing them.
-+the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
-the head of the default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-+the head of the built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -887,25 +871,14 @@ is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
- .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the host key signature algorithms
- that the server offers.
- The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
- .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -1052,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- offer to clients.
- The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
-@@ -1060,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- .Pp
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The supported algorithms are:
- .Pp
-@@ -1106,14 +1084,6 @@ sntrup761x25519-sha512
- sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
- .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1200,21 +1170,26 @@ function, and all code in the
- file.
- This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
-@@ -1257,15 +1232,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
- umac-128-etm@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm Match
-@@ -1753,36 +1719,25 @@ or equivalent.)
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
- authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -2289,7 +2244,9 @@ This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
- .El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
-+.Xr sshd 8 ,
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
- .Sh AUTHORS
- .An -nosplit
- OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ b/0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-From 430bd33963725beb8ec01a1e581529ae6bf6bec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 31/50] openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf
-
---
- configure.ac |   1 +
- kex.c        | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index d9bd2f51..d92a8580 100644
--- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -3137,6 +3137,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 		HMAC_CTX_init \
- 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
- 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
- 	])
- 
- 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index 19a56e8e..8b200ff4 100644
--- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
-+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -1078,6 +1083,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
-+static const char *
-+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return SN_sha1;
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return SN_sha256;
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return SN_sha384;
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return SN_sha512;
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-+{
-+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	u_char *key = NULL;
-+	int r, key_len;
-+
-+	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
-+       char keytype = (char)id;
-+
-+	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (md == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (param_bld == NULL) {
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
-+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
-+		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
-+				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
-+				hash, hashlen) &&
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
-+				&keytype, 1);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
-+	if (params == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
-+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
-+#endif
-+	*keyp = key;
-+	key = NULL;
-+	r = 0;
-+
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	free (key);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else
- static int
- derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-@@ -1141,6 +1247,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- 	return r;
- }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
- 
- #define NKEYS	6
- int
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+++ b/0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 6aa231d9acfeca870ee87e3bf9c4a1239518706d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 32/50] openssh-8.2p1-visibility
-
---
- regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-index 347b2122..344f8a8a 100644
--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
- #endif
- }
- 
-uint32_t
-+uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_api_version(void)
- {
- 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
-@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
-     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
-     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
-@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
-     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
- {
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From cfe5a99d335eb57b8c08b4eb6b4535dd042d96e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 33/50] openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6
-
---
- channels.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 7438c1a5..95836d50 100644
--- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -5055,6 +5055,16 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
- 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
- 				    strerror(errno));
- 				close(sock);
-+
-+				/* do not remove successfully opened
-+				 * sockets if the request failed because
-+				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
-+				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
-+				 * supported)
-+				 */
-+				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
-+    					continue;
-+
- 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
- 					close(socks[n]);
- 				num_socks = 0;
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+++ b/0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From 8de0391e3b3eb75e23ee9f173f04a9c78f2b96c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 34/50] openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors
-
---
- auth-pam.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
-index b4100ea1..a042c3c8 100644
--- a/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -523,7 +523,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
- 		goto auth_fail;
- 
- 	if (!do_pam_account()) {
-		sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
-+		/* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
-+		 * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
-+		if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED
-+			&& sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
-+			sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
- 		goto auth_fail;
- 	}
- 	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -580,8 +584,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
- 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
-	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
-		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
-+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED
-+		|| sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN
-+		|| sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
-+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
- 	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
- 		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
- 	else
-@@ -890,9 +896,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
- 			free(msg);
- 			break;
- 		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
-+			sshpam_account_status = 0;
-+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
- 		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
-			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
-				sshpam_account_status = 0;
-+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
-+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
- 			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
- 				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
- 			/* FALLTHROUGH */
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+++ b/0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From a68f3741fdc01bf6823a69d2442caba7de9835f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 35/50] openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch
-
---
- pathnames.h | 1 +
- scp.1       | 7 +++++++
- scp.c       | 8 ++++++++
- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
-index 1158bec9..43f0c570 100644
--- a/pathnames.h
-+++ b/pathnames.h
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
- #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
- #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
- #define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
-+#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH		SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
- 
- #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
- #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index aa2e2d8b..373d7237 100644
--- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -331,6 +331,13 @@ during download or upload.
- By default a 32KB buffer is used.
- .El
- .El
-+.Pp
-+Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
-+.Ar /etc/ssh/disable_scp
-+file. If this file exists, when SCP protocol is in use (either remotely or 
-+via the
-+.Fl O
-+option), the program will exit.
- .Sh EXIT STATUS
- .Ex -std scp
- .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 7f9795a5..7ed1a54c 100644
--- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -649,6 +649,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	if (iamremote)
- 		mode = MODE_SCP;
- 
-+	if (mode == MODE_SCP) {
-+		FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r");
-+		if (f != NULL) {
-+			fclose(f);
-+			fatal("SCP protocol is forbidden via %s", _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
- 		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
- 
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+++ b/0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
-From 99e1e3af524376788e591ca73387f1ca37e6f5ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 36/50] openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp
-
---
- scp.c         |  2 +-
- sftp-client.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- sftp-client.h |  4 ++--
- sftp.c        |  6 +++---
- 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 7ed1a54c..0c87dd0e 100644
--- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
- 
- 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
- 		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
-+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
- 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
- 			errs = 1;
- 		}
-diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
-index 9f8ab4af..873dec04 100644
--- a/sftp-client.c
-+++ b/sftp-client.c
-@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
- 
- /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
- static char *
-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
-+sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *msg;
- 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
-		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
-		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
-		free(errmsg);
-		sshbuf_free(msg);
-		return NULL;
-+		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
-+			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
-+			if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
-+				sshbuf_free(msg);
-+				return NULL;
-+			}
-+			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
-+			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
-+					path, strlen(path));
-+
-+			get_msg(conn, msg);
-+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
-+				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
-+
-+			if (id != expected_id)
-+				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
-+
-+			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
-+				free(errmsg);
-+
-+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
-+					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
-+				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
-+				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
-+				free(errmsg);
-+				sshbuf_free(msg);
-+				return NULL;
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
-+			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
-+			free(errmsg);
-+			sshbuf_free(msg);
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
- 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
- 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
-@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
- }
- 
- char *
-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
-+sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
- {
-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
-+	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
- }
- 
- int
-@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@ sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
- 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
-		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
-+		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
- 	}
-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
-+	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
- }
- 
- int
-@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@ sftp_download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
- 	char *src_canon;
- 	int ret;
- 
-	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
- 		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -2366,12 +2398,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
- int
- sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
-    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
- {
- 	char *dst_canon;
- 	int ret;
- 
-	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
- 		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -2826,7 +2858,7 @@ sftp_crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
- 	char *from_path_canon;
- 	int ret;
- 
-	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
- 		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
- 		    from_path);
- 		return -1;
-diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
-index 74cdae7d..00ed6630 100644
--- a/sftp-client.h
-+++ b/sftp-client.h
-@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
- int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
- 
- /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-+char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
- char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int sftp_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
- int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
-    int, int, int, int, int, int);
-+    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
-diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
-index bdedd141..322e6d1f 100644
--- a/sftp.c
-+++ b/sftp.c
-@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
- 		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- 			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
-@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
- 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
- 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
- 		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
-		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
-+		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
- 			err = 1;
- 			break;
- 		}
-@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
- 	}
- #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
- 
-	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
-+	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("Need cwd");
- 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
- 
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+++ b/0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 286bc4a302b5130f732c857095ae665f7bea01dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 37/50] openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits
-
---
- readconf.c | 1 +
- servconf.c | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index 6c04ed43..f340bf50 100644
--- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
- 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
- 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
-+	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
- 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
- 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
- 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 15c99b30..84891544 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
- 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+++ b/0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 26af04432f6404eb03780265a5cce948ecfec8dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 38/50] openssh-8.7p1-ibmca
-
---
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-index f6112458..417c2048 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
-+#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
--- a/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
-From c288d4a26ad44dc481c9d18d2920c9d70474833c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 40/50] openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition
-
---
- monitor_wrap.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- monitor_wrap.h |  2 ++
- session.c      | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 1a079c15..768a59f9 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1415,4 +1415,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- }
-+
-+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
-+{
-+	u_char buf[4];
-+	u_int blen, msg_len;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+	int r, ret = 0;
-+
-+	debug3_f("entering");
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+	do {
-+		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
-+		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
-+			break;
-+		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+
-+		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
-+		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
-+		sshbuf_reset(m);
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
-+		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+	} while (1);
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
-+{
-+	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 661ed63b..e957ba6e 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
- void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
-+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 83fc9418..b4753d93 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
- login_cap_t *lc;
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+int paudit[2];
-+#endif
-+
- static int is_child = 0;
- static int in_chroot = 0;
- static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
-+
- #define USE_PIPES 1
- /*
-  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
-@@ -513,6 +519,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 		close(err[0]);
- #endif
- 
-+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
-+
- 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
- 		do_child(ssh, s, command);
- 		/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -630,6 +638,9 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
- 		close(ttyfd);
- 
-+		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
-+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
-+
- 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
- #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
- 		do_login(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -766,6 +777,8 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 	}
- 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
-+	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
-+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- #endif
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -781,6 +794,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 	 */
- 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (ret == 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
-+		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
-+		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
-+		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
-+		 */
-+		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
-+	}
-+	close(paudit[0]);
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-+
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -1532,6 +1559,33 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
- }
- 
-+void
-+child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	int pparent = paudit[1];
-+	close(paudit[0]);
-+	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	/* FIXME beldmit destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); */
-+	/*
-+	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
-+	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
-+	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
-+	 */
-+	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
-+	/* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
-+	/* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	/* Notify parent that we are done */
-+	close(pparent);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
-  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1549,13 +1603,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 
- 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- 
-	/* remove keys from memory */
-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
-	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
-	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
-
- 	/* Force a password change */
- 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- 		do_setusercontext(pw);
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+++ b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-From 80d967a18261156573e7385f8e534a89d2767d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 41/50] openssh-9.0p1-audit-log
-
---
- audit-bsm.c   |  2 +-
- audit-linux.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- audit.c       | 18 +++++++++---
- audit.h       |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
-index a49abb92..c6f56553 100644
--- a/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- }
- 
- int
-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
-index d484b82b..dcfde3a9 100644
--- a/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/audit-linux.c
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char *audit_username(void);
- 
- static void
-linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
-     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
- {
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
- 	}
- 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
- 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	close(audit_fd);
- 
-@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
- }
- 
- int
-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
- {
- 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+	const char *rip;
-+	u_int i;
- 
- 	audit_fd = audit_open();
- 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
- 		else
- 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
-+	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
- 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
- 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
- 		goto out;
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
- 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
-		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+		rip, NULL, rv);
-+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	if (cert) {
-+		char *pbuf;
-+
-+		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
-+		if (pbuf == NULL)
-+			goto out;
-+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
-+			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
-+		free(pbuf);
-+		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
-+		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+			goto out;
-+
-+		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
-+			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
-+			if (pbuf == NULL)
-+				goto out;
-+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
-+			free(pbuf);
-+			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
-+			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
- out:
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
-@@ -179,26 +211,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
- int
- audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
- {
-+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
- 	if (!user_login_count++)
- 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+		    audit_hostname,
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+	    audit_hostname,
- 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
-+	free(audit_hostname);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
- void
- audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
- {
-+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
- 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+	    audit_hostname,
- 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
- 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
- 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+		    audit_hostname,
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+	free(audit_hostname);
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -211,31 +251,41 @@ void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
- 	if (!user_login_count++)
-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- {
-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
- 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
-+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
-+
- 	switch(event) {
- 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
- 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
- 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
- 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname,
- 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-@@ -255,9 +305,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 		if (user_login_count) {
- 			while (user_login_count--)
- 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+				    audit_hostname,
- 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
- 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+			    audit_hostname,
- 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- 		}
-@@ -266,12 +318,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
- 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
-+			audit_hostname,
- 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- 		break;
- 	}
-+	free(audit_hostname);
- }
- 
- void
-diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
-index d0433c3a..28d51a14 100644
--- a/audit.c
-+++ b/audit.c
-@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- void
- audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
- {
-	char *fp;
-+	char *key_fp = NULL;
-+	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
-+	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
- 
-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
-+	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
-+		cert = key->cert;
-+		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
-+										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
-+	}
-+	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
- 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	free(fp);
-+	if (key_fp)
-+		free(key_fp);
-+	if (issuer_fp)
-+		free(issuer_fp);
- }
- 
- void
-diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
-index 45d66ccf..05ac132c 100644
--- a/audit.h
-+++ b/audit.h
-@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
- int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
-+int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
- void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
- void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
- void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -1,763 +0,0 @@
-From 79f9b2763d85ec592cb7e54dcf1c695d8dd138b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 14:01:38 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 42/54] openssh-7.7p1-fips
-
---
- dh.c                     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- dh.h                     |  1 +
- kex-names.c              |  6 +++-
- kex.c                    |  3 +-
- kexgen.c                 | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- kexgexc.c                |  5 +++
- myproposal.h             | 33 ++++++++++++++++++
- readconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  3 ++
- servconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
- ssh-ed25519.c            |  9 +++++
- ssh-gss.h                |  5 +++
- ssh-keygen.c             | 22 ++++++++++--
- ssh-rsa.c                |  3 ++
- ssh.c                    |  5 +++
- sshconnect2.c            |  9 ++++-
- sshd-session.c           |  1 +
- sshd.c                   | 13 +++++++
- sshkey.c                 | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 19 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
-index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
--- a/dh.c
-+++ b/dh.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
- 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
- 	struct dhgroup dhg;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
-+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
-+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
- 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
- 	return 8192;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
-+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
-+ */
-+int
-+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
-+{
-+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
-+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
-+	DH *known = NULL;
-+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
-+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-+
-+	if (bits <= 3072) {
-+		known = dh_new_group14();
-+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
-+		known = dh_new_group16();
-+	} else {
-+		known = dh_new_group18();
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
-+
-+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
-+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
-+		rv = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_free(known);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
-index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644
--- a/dh.h
-+++ b/dh.h
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
- 
- int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
-index 6c0b7c2b3..cd3902ad2 100644
--- a/kex-names.c
-+++ b/kex-names.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #endif
- 
-@@ -206,7 +207,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index 62f607d6f..71fbe5cbe 100644
--- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
- # include <openssl/kdf.h>
- # include <openssl/param_build.h>
-@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
- 
- 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
- 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
-		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
- 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
- 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
- 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
-diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
-index 15df591ca..eecdceba2 100644
--- a/kexgen.c
-+++ b/kexgen.c
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
-@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
-		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
-		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
-+		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
-+		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
-index e99e0cf21..4c3feae09 100644
--- a/kexgexc.c
-+++ b/kexgexc.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
- 
- 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
-index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
-+++ b/myproposal.h
-@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
- 	"rsa-sha2-256"
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256"
-+
- #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
-@@ -79,6 +91,27 @@
- 
- #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
-+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+
- /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
- #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index f340bf501..ea9d293c3 100644
--- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
- # include <glob.h>
- #else
-@@ -3043,11 +3044,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 1fabf99d0..ccb61586e 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_open
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socket
-+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 84891544b..8b708cbf4 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
- #include <limits.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
- #include <util.h>
- #endif
-@@ -247,11 +248,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
-index 22d8db026..41942f4e5 100644
--- a/ssh-ed25519.c
-+++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
- 
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
-@@ -164,6 +165,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key,
- 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
- 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
- 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
- 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -221,6 +226,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index a894e23c9..329dc9da0 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
- 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
- 	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
- 
-+#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
-+	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
-+
- #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
- 
- typedef struct {
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 16cff9473..792aafde0 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
-@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
- #include "cipher.h"
- 
- #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
-+#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
- 
- /*
-  * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
-@@ -202,6 +204,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -259,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
- 	char *name = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
-		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
-+		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
- 	else {
- 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
- #ifdef WITH_DSA
-@@ -1144,9 +1152,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
-@@ -3849,7 +3865,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
-		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
-+		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
- 
- 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
- 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 3ad1fddc4..6c2f771a3 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 98b103c9e..abc8b8439 100644
--- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -1642,6 +1643,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
- 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
- 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index 0af15bcc1..3e02f485d 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
-+			 match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+
- 		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
- 		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
- 		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- 		}
- 
- 		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+		    options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
-+		free(gss_kex_filtered);
-+
- 		if (gss) {
- 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
- 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index a808ac9a6..a67a78391 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 8a99f0b29..5ff0b5ff0 100644
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
- #endif
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <time.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
-@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-@@ -1611,6 +1613,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
- 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
- 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
-+				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
-+		    sshkey_free(key);
-+		    key = NULL;
-+		    continue;
-+		}
- 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
- 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
- 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
-@@ -1830,6 +1839,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	 * unmounted if desired.
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 4e41a78c7..ca1cdb642 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@
- #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- #include "ssh-sk.h"
- 
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -408,6 +410,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
- 		impl = keyimpls[i];
- 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
- 			continue;
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			switch (impl->type) {
-+			case KEY_ED25519:
-+			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
-+			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
-+			     continue;
-+			     break;
-+			default:
-+			     break;
-+			}
-+		}
- 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
- 			continue;
- 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
-@@ -1441,6 +1455,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
- 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
- 	}
- 
-+	switch (type) {
-+	case KEY_ED25519:
-+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
-+	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    sshkey_free(k);
-+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		}
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		break;
-+	}
- 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
- 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
- 	*ret = *k;
-@@ -2275,6 +2303,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
- 		*lenp = 0;
- 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+	/* Fallthrough */
- 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
- 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
-@@ -2311,6 +2344,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		*detailsp = NULL;
- 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
- 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
- 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
-- 
-2.51.0
-
--- a/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+++ b/0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 299a602802d7c7d121306eb2aeae1502871a35cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 43/50] openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage
-
---
- ssh.1 | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 6a9fbdc5..755cdef2 100644
--- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It BatchMode
- .It BindAddress
- .It BindInterface
-.It CASignatureAlgorithms
- .It CanonicalDomains
- .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- .It CanonicalizeHostname
- .It CanonicalizeMaxDots
- .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
-+.It CASignatureAlgorithms
- .It CertificateFile
- .It ChannelTimeout
- .It CheckHostIP
-@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It ControlPath
- .It ControlPersist
- .It DynamicForward
-+.It EnableSSHKeysign
- .It EnableEscapeCommandline
- .It EnableSSHKeysign
- .It EscapeChar
-@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It RemoteCommand
- .It RemoteForward
- .It RequestTTY
-+.It RevokedHostKeys
-+.It SecurityKeyProvider
- .It RequiredRSASize
- .It RevokedHostKeys
- .It SecurityKeyProvider
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+++ b/0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-From 5c92430c08ac392b5b2ace899cc043247c923734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 44/50] openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs
-
---
- regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- sshconnect2.c            | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
-index 28dcfe17..b9e716dc 100644
--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
-+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
-@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
- 
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
- 
-+PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
-+    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
-+SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
-+echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
-+r=$?
-+if [ $r == 0 ]; then
-+echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
-+r=$?
-+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
-+SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
-+fi
-+fi
-+
- trace "load hostkeys"
-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
-+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
- 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
- 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
- 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
-@@ -32,12 +45,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either
- 
- unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- 
-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
-+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
- 	verbose "key type $k"
-+	hka=$k
-+	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
-+	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
-+	fi
- 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
-+	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
- 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
- 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
- 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
-@@ -50,15 +67,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
- done
- 
- SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com' | maybe_filter_sk`
-+SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
- 
- # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
- cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- HOSTKEYALGS=""
-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
-+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
- 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
- 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
- done
-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
-+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
- 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
-@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
-   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
- 
-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
-+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
- 	verbose "cert type $k"
- 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
- 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index 14f7671a..ad3f560f 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
-     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
-+	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
- 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-@@ -257,10 +257,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
- 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
- 
-+	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
-+		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
-+				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
-+	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
-+		if (hkalgs)
-+			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
-+			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
-+		else
-+			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
-+			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
-+	}
-+
- 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
- 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
- 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
-	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+	    filtered_algs);
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-@@ -304,6 +316,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- #endif
- 
- 	free(hkalgs);
-+	free(filtered_algs);
- 
- 	/* start key exchange */
- 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
+++ b/0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
@ -1,616 +0,0 @@
-From be23afbab800c9b5ffea56b3f410a04156c08df2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 45/50] openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex
-
---
- dh.c      |  98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- kex.c     | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- kex.h     |   6 +++
- kexdh.c   |  52 ++++++++++++++++++--
- kexecdh.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 5 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
-index 8c9a29fa..ea0a0b09 100644
--- a/dh.c
-+++ b/dh.c
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
- int
- dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
- {
-	int pbits;
-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
-+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	int pbits, r = 0;
- 
-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
- 
- 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
- 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
-@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 	if (need < 256)
- 		need = 256;
-+
-+	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	/*
- 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
- 	 * so double requested need here.
- 	 */
-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-
-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-	return 0;
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
-+		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed key generation");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* reuse context for key generation */
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not create or init context");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate keys");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
-+	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
-+	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* transferred */
-+	pub_key = NULL;
-+	priv_key = NULL;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
-+	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
-+	return r;
- }
- 
- DH *
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index 71fbe5cb..ce6a7b81 100644
--- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -1614,3 +1614,142 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+/* 
-+ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
-+ * The private key can be omitted.
-+ */
-+EVP_PKEY *
-+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
-+  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
-+  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-+  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
-+  	const char *group_name;
-+  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (k == NULL)
-+    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
-+     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
-+                group_name,
-+                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+	}
-+  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
-+    		const EC_GROUP *group;
-+    		size_t len;
-+
-+		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
-+		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
-+		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
-+		    pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len,
-+		    bn_ctx);
-+		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len) != 1) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-+  	free(pub_ser);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
-+    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int r = 0;
-+
-+	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (priv != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return r;
-+}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index 6a55aadf..48f3bb87 100644
--- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
- # include <openssl/bn.h>
- # include <openssl/dh.h>
- # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-+# include <openssl/evp.h>
-+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #  include <openssl/ec.h>
- # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-@@ -311,6 +314,9 @@ int	kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
-     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-+int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
-+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
- 
- #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
- void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
-diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
-index 0faab21b..32e1de51 100644
--- a/kexdh.c
-+++ b/kexdh.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
-@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@ int
- kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
- {
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- 	size_t klen = 0;
-	int kout, r;
-+	int r = 0;
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
-@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
- 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
-+
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
-+	/* import key */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* import peer key 
-+	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
-+	 */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not get key size");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
-+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not derive key");
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
- 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
-  out:
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
-index efb2e55a..d92ba54f 100644
--- a/kexecdh.c
-+++ b/kexecdh.c
-@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
- #include <signal.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- 
- static int
- kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
-     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
- 
-+static EC_KEY *
-+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
-+{
-+	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	const char *group_name;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+out:
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	return client_key;
-+}
-+
- int
- kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- {
-@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@ kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
- 	*server_blobp = NULL;
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
-	size_t klen = 0;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
-+	size_t klen = 0, publen;
-+	const char *group_name;
- 	int r;
- 
-+	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
-+	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
- 	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-+
-+	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
-+	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
- #endif
-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
-+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	*shared_secretp = buf;
- 	buf = NULL;
-  out:
-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
-+	freezero(pub, publen);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
- }
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+++ b/0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
-From e4ca3b9dba1cc832a9974493c91207d42e218a68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 46/50] openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof
-
---
- compat.c                               |  6 +++++
- compat.h                               |  2 +-
- monitor.c                              | 27 ++++++++++++++++------
- regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c       |  3 ++-
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c   |  3 ++-
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c   |  3 ++-
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------
- serverloop.c                           |  6 ++++-
- ssh-rsa.c                              |  3 ++-
- sshconnect2.c                          |  8 +++++++
- sshd-session.c                         | 21 +++++++++++++++++
- 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
-index b59f0bfc..4e611dc3 100644
--- a/compat.c
-+++ b/compat.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ void
- compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
- {
- 	int i;
-+	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
- 	static struct {
- 		char	*pat;
- 		int	bugs;
-@@ -125,16 +126,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
- 	};
- 
- 	/* process table, return first match */
-+	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
- 	ssh->compat = 0;
- 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
- 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
- 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
- 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
- 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
- 			return;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
- }
- 
- /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
-diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
-index 1a19060f..2e6db5bf 100644
--- a/compat.h
-+++ b/compat.h
-@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
- #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
-+#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
- #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
- /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
- #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index fbc35782..19cb058e 100644
--- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -747,11 +747,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	struct sshkey *pubkey, *key;
- 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
-	char *alg = NULL;
-	size_t datlen, siglen;
-	int r, is_proof = 0, keyid;
-	u_int compat;
-+	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
-+	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
-+	int r, is_proof = 0;
-+	u_int keyid, compat;
- 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
-+	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
- 
- 	debug3_f("entering");
- 
-@@ -809,18 +810,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
-+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
-+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
-+		} else {
-+			effective_alg = alg;
-+		}
-+		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
- 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
- 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
- 	    auth_sock > 0) {
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
-+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
-+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
-+		} else {
-+			effective_alg = alg;
-+		}
- 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
-+		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
- 	} else
- 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
- 
-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
-+	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
- 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
- 
- 	sshbuf_reset(m);
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
-index caf8f57f..09016aea 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
-@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
- 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
- 	if (kex != NULL)
- 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
-+	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
-+		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
- 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
-index 3babe604..cc80fe97 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
-@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
- 	sshkey_free(k2);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
-@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
- 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
- 	sshkey_free(k2);
-	TEST_DONE();
-+	TEST_DONE(); */
- 
- 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
-index 0aff7c9b..951122e1 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
-@@ -338,13 +338,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
- 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
-	TEST_DONE();
-+	TEST_DONE();*/
- 
- 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
- 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
-index 5bf4b65c..6d0a35bb 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
-@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
- 	u_char *sigblob;
- 	size_t siglen;
- 
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
-+
- 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
-@@ -102,8 +105,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
-+	if (expected == 0)
-+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
- 
- 	free(sigblob);
- 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
-@@ -120,16 +124,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
- {
- 	size_t len;
- 	u_char *sig;
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
-+	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
-+		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
- 
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
-+	if (expected == 0) {
-+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
-+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
-+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
-+		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
-+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+	}
- 	free(sig);
- }
- 
-@@ -526,7 +536,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
- 	    NULL), 0);
- 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
-+	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
- 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
- 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
-diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
-index 40ddfb04..9c5b1567 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
-+++ b/serverloop.c
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "serverloop.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "compat.h"
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
-@@ -699,7 +700,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
- 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
- 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
- 		}
-
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
-+			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
-+		}
- 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
- 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 6c2f771a..8dd4ab01 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
-+		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
-+			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
- 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index ad3f560f..3941e089 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -1434,6 +1434,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 			retried = 1;
- 			goto retry_pin;
- 		}
-+		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
-+			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
-+
-+			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
-+			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
-+				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
-+		}
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index a808ac9a..c3349a8a 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1316,6 +1316,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	check_ip_options(ssh);
- 
-+	{
-+		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
-+		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
-+		if (rsakey == NULL)
-+			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
-+
-+		if (rsakey != NULL) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
-+		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
-+		    }
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
- 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
- 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
+++ b/0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 497de886faaddec60b7ad1013396c7d4f3145968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 47/50] openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost
-
---
- auth-pam.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
-index a042c3c8..a321e0d3 100644
--- a/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
- 		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
- 	}
-	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
-+	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
- 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
- 		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
- 		    sshpam_rhost);
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
+++ b/0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From b97b1040bc0918fe9be89cdb482d046270e92d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 48/50] openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign
-
---
- ssh_config.5 | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index a43b2a27..9d5da2a6 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ or
- This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
- See
- .Xr ssh-keysign 8
-for more information.
-+for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly.
- .It Cm EscapeChar
- Sets the escape character (default:
- .Ql ~ ) .
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
+++ b/0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
@ -1,398 +0,0 @@
-From 0a621a2ccb8444e4c6da906b0e112e0522658122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 49/50] openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem
-
---
- kex-names.c         |  20 +++
- kexmlkem768x25519.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 311 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
-index cd3902ad..36a953ab 100644
--- a/kex-names.c
-+++ b/kex-names.c
-@@ -108,6 +108,19 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
- 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
- };
- 
-+static int is_mlkem768_available()
-+{
-+	static int is_fetched = -1;
-+
-+	if (is_fetched == -1) {
-+		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
-+		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
-+		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
-+	}
-+
-+	return is_fetched;
-+}
-+
- static char *
- kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
- {
-@@ -116,6 +129,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
- 	const struct kexalg *k;
- 
- 	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
-+			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
-+			continue;
- 		if (ret != NULL)
- 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
- 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
-@@ -147,6 +163,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- 	const struct kexalg *k;
- 
-+	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
-+		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
-+	return NULL;
-+
- 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- 			return k;
-diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
-index 2b5d3960..670049dc 100644
--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
-+++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
-@@ -48,10 +48,127 @@
- #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
- 
- #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+
-+static int
-+mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
-+{
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+    int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
-+    if (ctx == NULL) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
-+        || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
-+	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
-+	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+    ret = 0;
-+
-+ err:
-+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
-+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
-+{
-+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
-+	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
-+
-+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
-+		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
-+    if (pkey == NULL) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
-+    if (ctx == NULL
-+	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
-+        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
-+	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
-+	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+    r = 0;
-+
-+ err:
-+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
-+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+
-+    return r;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
-+{
-+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
-+	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
-+
-+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
-+		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
-+    if (pkey == NULL) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
-+    if (ctx == NULL
-+	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
-+        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
-+	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+    r = 0;
-+
-+ err:
-+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+
-+    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
-+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+
-+    return r;
-+}
- 
- int
- kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
- 	size_t need;
-@@ -86,6 +203,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
-+#else
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	u_char *cp = NULL;
-+	size_t need;
-+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
-+	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
-+#endif
-+	cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
-+	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+#endif
-+	/* success */
-+	r = 0;
-+	kex->client_pub = buf;
-+	buf = NULL;
-+ out:
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	return r;
-+#endif
- }
- 
- int
-@@ -93,6 +240,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
-    const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
-    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	const u_char *client_pub;
-@@ -185,12 +333,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
- 	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
-+#else
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	const u_char *client_pub;
-+	u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t need;
-+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
-+
-+	*server_blobp = NULL;
-+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
-+
-+	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
-+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
-+	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
-+	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
-+	    client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
-+	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
-+	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
-+	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
-+	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	/* append ECDH shared key */
-+	client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
-+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+	dump_digest("server cipher text:",
-+	    enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
-+	dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
-+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
-+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	/* success */
-+	r = 0;
-+	*server_blobp = server_blob;
-+	*shared_secretp = buf;
-+	server_blob = NULL;
-+	buf = NULL;
-+ out:
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
-+	explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	return r;
-+#endif
- }
- 
- int
- kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
-     const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
- 	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
-@@ -258,6 +491,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
- 	explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
-+#else
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
-+	size_t need;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
-+
-+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
-+	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
-+	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
-+	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+#endif
-+	if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
-+	    buf, 1)) < 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
-+	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
-+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
-+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	/* success */
-+	r = 0;
-+	*shared_secretp = buf;
-+	buf = NULL;
-+ out:
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	return r;
-+#endif
- }
- #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
- int
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+++ b/0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From fd32e753ae7f3b314712e6aa8b2bed3c1fca1ef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 14:53:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 50/51] openssh-9.9p2-error_processing
-
---
- ssh-agent.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index 798bf9b6..dfb6ac72 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -1377,6 +1377,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
- 	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
- 	    k == NULL ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
-+		if (!r) /* k == NULL */
-+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		error_fr(r, "parse");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
+++ b/0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 4965cdbc1ee1e6a0c665797bb8b944d96d3d411f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 15:11:59 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 51/53] Provide better error for non-supported private keys
-
-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
---
- sshkey.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ca1cdb642..aada474e0 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -3582,6 +3582,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
- 			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		}
- 	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
-+#ifdef ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER
-+	case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
-+#endif
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 	}
- 	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
+++ b/0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From 9ed09ef158a113e21be7b3fefa7c5f932632749b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:52:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 52/53] Ignore bad hostkeys in known_hosts file
-
-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
---
- hostfile.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- hostfile.h |  1 +
- ssh.c      |  2 ++
- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
-index c5669c703..5c402f501 100644
--- a/hostfile.c
-+++ b/hostfile.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
- #include "hmac.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- 
-+static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
-+
-+void
-+hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
-+{
-+	required_rsa_size = size;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
- 
- static int
-@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
- 	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
- 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
- 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
-+	int r = 0;
- 
- 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
- 		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
-@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+		debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
-+		    l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
- 	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
- 	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
-diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
-index a24a4e329..0e9b1a19a 100644
--- a/hostfile.h
-+++ b/hostfile.h
-@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
-     const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
- 
- void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
-+void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
- 
- #endif
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index abc8b8439..33787a8d4 100644
--- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "utf8.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
- 		}
- 	}
-+	hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
- 	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
- 		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
- 
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
+++ b/0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
@ -1,450 +0,0 @@
-From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
-
-RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
-associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
-name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
-to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
-may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
-issuance process.
-
-Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
-GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
-that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
-on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
-
-Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
-
-Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
---
- configure.ac    |   1 +
- gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
- servconf.h      |   2 +
- ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
- sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
- 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
- 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
- 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
-+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
- 
- 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
- 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "match.h"
- 
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
-@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
-+ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
-+ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
-+ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
-+ */
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
-+{
-+	int ret;
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	/* Check indicators */
-+	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
-+					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
-+		/* negative or positive match */
-+		if (ret != 0) {
-+			*matched = i;
-+			return ret;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	/* No rule matched */
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
-  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
-  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
-@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- {
- 	krb5_principal princ;
-	int retval;
-+	int retval, matched;
- 	const char *errmsg;
- 	int k5login_exists;
- 
-@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 	if (k5login_exists &&
- 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
- 		retval = 1;
-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
- 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
- 		name, k5login_exists)) {
- 		retval = 1;
-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
-		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
- 	} else
- 		retval = 0;
- 
-+	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
-+		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
-+		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
-+		retval = 0;
-+		if (client->indicators) {
-+			matched = -1;
-+			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
-+			if (retval != 0) {
-+				retval = (retval == 1);
-+				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
-+					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
-+					client->indicators[matched],
-+					(char *)client->displayname.value,
-+				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
-+				goto cont;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if (retval == 0) {
-+			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
-+				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
-+			(char *)client->displayname.value);
-+		}
-+	}
-+cont:
-+	if (retval == 1) {
-+		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
-+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
-+	}
- 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- 	return retval;
- }
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
-     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-+    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
- 
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
- 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
- 
-+
-+/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
-+ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
-+ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
-+ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
-+
-+#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
-+
-+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
-+static OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+	gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
-+	gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
-+	size_t count, i;
-+
-+	ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
-+				      &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
-+	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+		return (ctx->major);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
-+		/* No indicators in the ticket */
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+
-+	count = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
-+		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
-+		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
-+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
-+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
-+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
-+			continue;
-+		count++;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (count == 0) {
-+		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
-+		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+
-+	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
-+	count = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
-+		authenticated = 0;
-+		complete = 0;
-+		more = -1;
-+		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
-+		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
-+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
-+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
-+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
-+			continue;
-+		/* retrieve all indicators */
-+		while (more != 0) {
-+			value.value = NULL;
-+			display_value.value = NULL;
-+			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
-+					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
-+					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
-+			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+				goto out;
-+			}
-+
-+			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
-+				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
-+				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
-+				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
-+				count++;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+out:
-+	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
-+	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
-+	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
-+	return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+
- /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
-  * be called once for a context */
- 
-@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 	}
- 
- 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
-+	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
-+	    ctx->client, client))) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+		return (ctx->major);
-+	}
- 
- 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
- ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
- {
- 	OM_uint32 lmin;
-+	size_t i;
- 
- 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
- 
-@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
- 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
-+
-+			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
-+				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
-+				}
-+				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
-+			}
-+
- 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
- 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
- 			return 0;
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
-+	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
- 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
-@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
-+	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sGssIndicators:
-+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
-+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
-+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
-+		if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
-+			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
-+		break;
-+
- 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
- #endif
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
--- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	char   **allow_groups;
- 	u_int num_deny_groups;
- 	char   **deny_groups;
-+	char   *gss_indicators;
- 
- 	u_int num_subsystems;
- 	char   **subsystem_name;
-@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
- 		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
- 		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
- 		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
-+		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
- #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
-+#include <gssapi_ext.h>
-+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
-+#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef KRB5
- # ifndef HEIMDAL
- #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
- 	int used;
- 	int updated;
-+	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
- 
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
-+Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
-+mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
-+authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
-+.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
-+When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
-+will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
-+indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
-+.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
-+is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
-+policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
-+access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
-+rejected.
-+.Pp
-+By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
-+indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
-+to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
-+preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
-+authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
-+(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
-+indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
-+inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
-+.Pp
-+Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
-+particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
-+FreeIPA environments:
-+.Pp
-+.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
-+.It Cm hardened
-+SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
-+.It Cm pkinit
-+smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
-+.It Cm radius
-+pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
-+.It Cm otp
-+TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
-+.It Cm idp
-+OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
-+and device authorization grant flow
-+.It Cm passkey
-+FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
-+.El
-+.Pp
-+The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- The default is handled system-wide by
- .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/1000-openssh-coverity.patch
+++ b/1000-openssh-coverity.patch
@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-From 24c411970682dc67873c36bac05b4b460d68a628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 50/50] openssh-6.7p1-coverity
-
---
- auth-krb5.c                   | 2 ++
- gss-genr.c                    | 3 ++-
- krl.c                         | 3 +++
- loginrec.c                    | 2 ++
- misc.c                        | 3 +++
- monitor.c                     | 4 ++--
- openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 2 +-
- openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c  | 8 ++++----
- readconf.c                    | 1 +
- servconf.c                    | 5 +++--
- serverloop.c                  | 2 +-
- ssh-agent.c                   | 1 +
- ssh-keygen.c                  | 3 +++
- 13 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index bae153c9..209a3265 100644
--- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
- 		umask(old_umask);
- 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
- 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 
-@@ -434,6 +435,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- 			close(tmpfd);
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
-index 3034370c..c357e973 100644
--- a/gss-genr.c
-+++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -168,8 +168,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
- 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
-
-+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
- 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
- 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
-diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
-index 0d0f6953..d8517f12 100644
--- a/krl.c
-+++ b/krl.c
-@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1212,6 +1213,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1223,6 +1225,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
-index c4a9bd48..2583612c 100644
--- a/loginrec.c
-+++ b/loginrec.c
-@@ -683,9 +683,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
- 	 */
- 
- 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
- # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
- # endif
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index 09722962..cd71c1b2 100644
--- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -1556,6 +1556,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
- 	}
- 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(nullfd);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- }
- 
- char *
-@@ -2749,6 +2751,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
- 	}
- 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(devnull);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 19cb058e..58fbac9d 100644
--- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
-@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- 
- 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
-
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
- 	return (0);
- 
-  error:
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-index 346c7fe5..f42792fd 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
-	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
-index 26bdc3e0..8e2939b9 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
-@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
- static void
- pselect_notify_parent(void)
- {
-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2_f("reading");
- 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- 	}
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index ea9d293c..9680c38c 100644
--- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -2164,6 +2164,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
- 			} else if (r != 0) {
- 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
- 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
-+				free(arg2);
- 				goto out;
- 			}
- 			free(arg2);
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 8b708cbf..e7e4ad04 100644
--- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -2293,8 +2293,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
-			if (intptr != NULL)
-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
-index 9c5b1567..768ee9fa 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
-+++ b/serverloop.c
-@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		debug_f("invalid tun");
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index 798bf9b6..0e39dff7 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -1593,6 +1593,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
- 
- 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
- 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 			return NULL;
- 		}
- 		/* validate also provider from URI */
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 792aafde..96b3474d 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -2424,6 +2424,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
- 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
- 			if (r != 0)
- 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
-+			freezero(blob, blen);
-+			blob = NULL;
-+			blen = 0;
- 		} else {
- 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
- 				cp += 4;
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
+++ b/2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
--- a/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
+++ b/gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-#Type Name ID  GECOS                     Home directory        Shell
-u     sshd 74  "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd -
--- a/gsi-openssh.spec
+++ b/gsi-openssh.spec
--- a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=Update gsissh host key permissions
-Documentation=https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
-Before=gsisshd.service
-After=gsissh-keygen.target
-ConditionPathExists=!/var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-ExecStart=-/usr/libexec/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
-ExecStart=touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
-RemainAfterExit=yes
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=gsisshd.service
--- a/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
+++ b/gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/bash
-set -eu -o pipefail
-# Detect existing non-conforming host keys and perform the permissions migration
-# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
-#
-# Example output looks like:
-# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
-# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
-# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
-# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' are too open.
-# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
-# This private key will be ignored.
-# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
-# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
-# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
-# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key' are too open.
-# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
-# This private key will be ignored.
-# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
-# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
-# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
-# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key' are too open.
-# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
-# This private key will be ignored.
-# gsisshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.
-#
-output="$(gsisshd -T 2>&1 || true)" # expected to fail
-while read line; do
-    if [[ $line =~ ^Permissions\ [0-9]+\ for\ \'(.*)\'\ are\ too\ open. ]]; then
-        keyfile=${BASH_REMATCH[1]}
-        echo $line
-        echo -e "\t-> changing permissions on $keyfile"
-        chmod --verbose g-r $keyfile
-        chown --verbose root:root $keyfile
-    fi
-done <<< "$output"
--- a/183
+++ b/183
@ -1,45 +1,154 @@
 #!/bin/bash

 # Create the host keys for the gsissh server.
-KEYTYPE=$1
-case $KEYTYPE in
-	"dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS
-	"ed25519")
-		FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
-		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
-			exit 0
-		fi ;;
-	"rsa")
-		if [[ ! -z $SSH_RSA_BITS  ]]; then
-			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_RSA_BITS"
-		fi ;; # always ok
-	"ecdsa")
-		if [[ ! -z $SSH_ECDSA_BITS  ]]; then
-			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_ECDSA_BITS"
-		fi ;;
-	*) # wrong argument
-		exit 12 ;;
-esac
-KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key
+#
+# The creation is controlled by the $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS environment
+# variable.
+AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA ECDSA ED25519"

+# source function library
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
+
+# Some functions to make the below more readable
 KEYGEN=/usr/bin/gsissh-keygen
-if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then
-	exit 13
+RSA1_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_key
+RSA_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+DSA_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ECDSA_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ED25519_KEY=/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+
+# pull in sysconfig settings
+[ -f /etc/sysconfig/gsisshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
+
+fips_enabled() {
+	if [ -r /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled ]; then
+		cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
+	else
+		echo 0
+	fi
+}
+
+do_rsa1_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $RSA1_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH1 RSA host key: "
+		rm -f $RSA1_KEY
+		if test ! -f $RSA1_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA1_KEY
+			chmod 640 $RSA1_KEY
+			chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY{,.pub}
+			fi
+			success $"RSA1 key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"RSA1 key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+do_rsa_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 RSA host key: "
+		rm -f $RSA_KEY
+		if test ! -f $RSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA_KEY
+			chmod 640 $RSA_KEY
+			chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY{,.pub}
+			fi
+			success $"RSA key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"RSA key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+do_dsa_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 DSA host key: "
+		rm -f $DSA_KEY
+		if test ! -f $DSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chgrp ssh_keys $DSA_KEY
+			chmod 640 $DSA_KEY
+			chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY{,.pub}
+			fi
+			success $"DSA key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"DSA key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+do_ecdsa_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $ECDSA_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 ECDSA host key: "
+		rm -f $ECDSA_KEY
+		if test ! -f $ECDSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t ecdsa -f $ECDSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chgrp ssh_keys $ECDSA_KEY
+			chmod 640 $ECDSA_KEY
+			chmod 644 $ECDSA_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $ECDSA_KEY{,.pub}
+			fi
+			success $"ECDSA key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"ECDSA key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+do_ed25519_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $ED25519_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 ED25519 host key: "
+		rm -f $ED25519_KEY
+		if test ! -f $ED25519_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t ed25519 -f $ED25519_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chgrp ssh_keys $ED25519_KEY
+			chmod 640 $ED25519_KEY
+			chmod 644 $ED25519_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $ED25519_KEY{,.pub}
+			fi
+			success $"ED25519 key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"ED25519 key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" == "xNO" ]; then
+	exit 0
 fi

-# remove old keys
-rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
+# legacy options
+case $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS in
+	NODSA) AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA ECDSA ED25519";;
+	RSAONLY) AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA";;
+	YES) AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="DSA RSA ECDSA ED25519";;
+esac

-# create new keys
-if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE $SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-	exit 1
-fi
-
-# sanitize permissions
-/usr/bin/chmod 600 $KEY
-/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
-if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
-	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
-fi
-
-exit 0
+for KEY in $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS; do
+	case $KEY in
+		DSA) do_dsa_keygen;;
+		RSA) do_rsa_keygen;;
+		ECDSA) do_ecdsa_keygen;;
+		ED25519) do_ed25519_keygen;;
+	esac
+done
--- a/gsisshd-keygen.service
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen.service
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=gsissh Server Key Generation
+ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+PartOf=gsisshd.service gsisshd.socket
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd-keygen
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
--- a/gsisshd-keygen.target
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen.target
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Wants=gsisshd-keygen@rsa.service
-Wants=gsisshd-keygen@ecdsa.service
-Wants=gsisshd-keygen@ed25519.service
-PartOf=gsisshd.service
--- a/gsisshd-keygen@.service
+++ b/gsisshd-keygen@.service
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=gsissh %i Server Key Generation
-ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_%i_key
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
-# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
-Environment=OPTIONS=
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
-ExecStart=/usr/libexec/gsissh/sshd-keygen %i
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=gsisshd-keygen.target
--- a/gsisshd.pam
+++ b/gsisshd.pam
@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
+auth       required     pam_sepermit.so
 auth       substack     password-auth
 auth       include      postlogin
-account    required     pam_sepermit.so
+# Used with polkit to reauthorize users in remote sessions
+-auth      optional     pam_reauthorize.so prepare
 account    required     pam_nologin.so
 account    include      password-auth
 password   include      password-auth
@ -12,6 +14,7 @@ session    required     pam_loginuid.so
 session    required     pam_selinux.so open env_params
 session    required     pam_namespace.so
 session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
-session    optional     pam_motd.so
 session    include      password-auth
 session    include      postlogin
+# Used with polkit to reauthorize users in remote sessions
+-session   optional     pam_reauthorize.so prepare
--- a/gsisshd.service
+++ b/gsisshd.service
@ -1,17 +1,11 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=gsissh server daemon
 Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
-After=network.target gsisshd-keygen.target
-Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
-# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
-# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
-Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+After=network.target gsisshd-keygen.service
+Wants=gsisshd-keygen.service

 [Service]
 Type=notify
-# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
-# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
-Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
--- a/gsisshd.sysconfig
+++ b/gsisshd.sysconfig
@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
-# Configuration file for the gsisshd service.
+# Configuration file for the sshd service.

 # The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing.
-# To change the automatic creation, adjust gsisshd.service options for
-# example using  systemctl enable gsisshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
-# of DSA key or  systemctl mask gsisshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
-# creation.
+# To change the automatic creation uncomment and change the appropriate
+# line. Accepted key types are: DSA RSA ECDSA ED25519.
+# The default is "RSA ECDSA ED25519"

-#SSH_RSA_BITS=3072
-#SSH_ECDSA_BITS=256
-OPTIONS=""
+# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=""
+# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS="RSA ECDSA ED25519"
+
+# Do not change this option unless you have hardware random
+# generator and you REALLY know what you are doing
+
+SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=0
+# SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=1
--- a/gsisshd@.service
+++ b/gsisshd@.service
@ -1,18 +1,10 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=gsissh per-connection server daemon
 Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
-Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
-After=gsisshd-keygen.target
-# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
-# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
-Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+Wants=gsisshd-keygen.service
+After=gsisshd-keygen.service

 [Service]
-# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
-# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
-Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS
-ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys"
 StandardInput=socket
-ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
+@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+ 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
+ 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-				     "Could not grab %s. "
+-				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+-				     "on your session.", what);
+				     "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
+				     "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
+				     "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
+				     "on your session.\n"
+				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
+				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
+ 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 
+ 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <glib.h>
+ #include <gtk/gtk.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+ 
+@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+ 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ }
+ 
+static void
+move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
+{
+	gdouble step;
+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
+	
+	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
+	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
+	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
+}
+
+ static int
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ {
+ 	const char *failed;
+ 	char *passphrase, *local;
+ 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+ 	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 
+ 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 					"%s",
+ 					message);
+ 
+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+	    FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
+ 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ 	gtk_box_pack_start(
+-	    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
+-	    FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+	    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry,
+	    TRUE, FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ 
+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+	    FALSE, 8);
+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
+	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
+	
+	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
+	    TRUE, 5);
+	gtk_widget_show(progress);
+
+ 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+ 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
+			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
+ 
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ 
--- a/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@ -1,17 +1,7 @@
-From cf6d48305cf6601448ea7a0d96ae825cbbbf0a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 07/50] openssh-7.2p2-x11
-
---
- channels.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644
--- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -5098,11 +5098,13 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935	2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c	2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
 }
 
 static int
@ -24,10 +14,8 @@ index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock == -1) {
+ 	if (sock < 0)
 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-@@ -5110,11 +5112,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
- 	}
 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@ -42,7 +30,7 @@ index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644
 	return -1;
 }
 
-@@ -5122,8 +5125,18 @@ static int
+@@ -3207,8 +3210,18 @@ static int
 connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 {
 	char buf[1024];
@ -62,7 +50,4 @@ index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644
 +	return -1;
 }
 
- #ifdef __APPLE__
-- 
-2.49.0
-
+ int
--- a/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet	2011-04-05 13:29:06.998648899 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p1/packet.c	2011-04-05 13:30:32.967648596 +0200
+@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
+ 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+ 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+ 
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+ 	if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
--- a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
+--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
+@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+ 
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+ 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ 
--- a/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+++ b/0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
@ -1,18 +1,7 @@
-From 388be633842a9f3e4b0a76fe40cf7035912a913a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 05/50] openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man
-
---
- ssh.1  | 2 ++
- sshd.8 | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 697f4e42..db92ac9a 100644
--- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
 .Nm
 exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
 if an error occurred.
@ -21,11 +10,10 @@ index 697f4e42..db92ac9a 100644
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr scp 1 ,
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 08ebf53a..2aa73271 100644
--- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -1018,6 +1018,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
+--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
+@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
 started last).
 The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
 .El
@ -34,6 +22,3 @@ index 08ebf53a..2aa73271 100644
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr scp 1 ,
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost	2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100
+@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
+-	const char *gss_host;
+	const char *gss_host = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (options.gss_server_identity)
+ 		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+-	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+	else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ 		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
+		if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" )  == 0 )
+			gss_host = authctxt->host;
+	}
+ 	else
+ 		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
--- a/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.977836854 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac	2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -4930,6 +4930,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel,
+  [  --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG  specify a vendor patch level],
+  [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"],
+  [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none])
+ 
+ dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
+ dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
+@@ -5194,6 +5200,7 @@ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+ echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+ echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+echo "                Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->max_authtries = -1;
+ 	options->max_sessions = -1;
+ 	options->banner = NULL;
+	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
+ 	options->use_dns = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+@@ -325,6 +326,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+ 	if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
+ 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
+		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -402,7 +405,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile,
+ 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+-	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+	sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+@@ -528,6 +531,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1369,6 +1373,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
+	case sShowPatchLevel:
+		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+ 	case sAllowUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+@@ -2269,6 +2277,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	max_authtries;
+ 	int	max_sessions;
+ 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
+	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
+ 	int	use_dns;
+ 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
+ 					 * poke the client this often to
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.990836761 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
+@@ -1334,6 +1334,14 @@ an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm ShowPatchLevel 
+Specifies whether 
+.Nm sshd 
+will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. 
+The patch level is set at compile-time. 
+The default is 
+.Dq no . 
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only. 
+ .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+ Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+ .Pq umask
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.990836761 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
+@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #Compression delayed
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
+#ShowPatchLevel no
+ #UseDNS no
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10:30:100
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor	2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-10 10:48:41.633648667 +0100
+@@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh
+ 	char remote_version[256];	/* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+ 
+ 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+-	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
+	    (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+ 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+ 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+ 
+@@ -1654,7 +1655,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
+	debug("sshd version %s, %s",
+	    (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	    SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+ #else
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
+ 
+ struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
+ {
+-	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
+ 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ };
+ 
+@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
+ {
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+ 	size_t n = 0;
+-	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
+ 
+ 	if (len == 0)
+ 		return (1);
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
+ 		return (0);
+ 
+-	while ((len--) > 0) {
+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
+		u_int r,a,b;
+
+ 		if (n == 0) {
+-			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
+-			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			int outl, i, buflen;
+
+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
+
+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			}
+
+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
+				ctrbuf, buflen);
+ 		}
+-		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
+-		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
+		r = a ^ b;
+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
+		src += sizeof(a);
+		dest += sizeof(r);
+
+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
+ 	}
+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
+ 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+ 	}
+-	if (key != NULL)
+-		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
+-		    &c->aes_ctx);
+
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
+
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
+			case 128:
+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
+				break;
+			case 192:
+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
+				break;
+			case 256:
+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
+				break;
+			default:
+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
+		}
+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
+	}
+ 	if (iv != NULL)
+ 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ 	return (1);
+@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
+ 
+ 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
+ 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ 		free(c);
+ 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch
@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2013-10-23 22:03:52.322950759 +0200
+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c	2013-10-23 22:04:24.295799873 +0200
+@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <krb5.h>
+#include <profile.h>
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
+@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ #endif
+ 	krb5_error_code problem;
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+	const char *ccache_type;
+ 	int len;
+ 	char *client, *platform_client;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+@@ -191,12 +194,30 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 		goto out;
+ #endif
+ 
+	ccache_type = krb5_cc_get_type(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 
+-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+	if (authctxt->krb5_ticket_file[0] == ':')
+		authctxt->krb5_ticket_file++;
+
+	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + strlen(ccache_type) + 2;
+ 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
+ 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#else
+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "%s:%s",
+	    ccache_type, authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
+
+	if (strcmp(ccache_type, "DIR") == 0) {
+		char *p;
+		p = strrchr(authctxt->krb5_ccname, '/');
+		if (p)
+			*p = '\0';
+	}
+
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -235,10 +256,36 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ void
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
+	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
+
+ 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
+
+		if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
+			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
+			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
+			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
+			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
+
+				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
+
+				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
+					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
+						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
+						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
+						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
+							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
+					}
+					else
+						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
+							krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno)
+							);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+ 	}
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+@@ -250,34 +295,139 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+int
+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
+	char *src, *old;
+	va_list ap;
+	int i;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	old = *dsc;
+
+	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
+		free(src);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	free(old);
+	free(src);
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
+	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
+
+	if (template == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
+	r = xstrdup("");
+
+	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
+
+		*p_n++ = '\0';
+		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
+			goto cleanup;
+
+		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
+			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
+				goto cleanup;
+			continue;
+		}
+		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
+				goto cleanup;
+			continue;
+		} else {
+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
+			p_o = '\0';
+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
+			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	*result = r;
+	free(tmp_template);
+	return 0;
+
+cleanup:
+	free(r);
+	free(tmp_template);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
+	profile_t p;
+	int ret = 0;
+	char *value = NULL;
+
+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+ 	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
+	char *ccname;
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
+#else
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
+	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
+-	}
+#endif
+
+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+	if (ret) {
+		ret = asprintf(&ccname, cctemplate, geteuid());
+		if (ret == -1)
+			return ENOMEM;
+		old_umask = umask(0177);
+		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+		umask(old_umask);
+		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+			return oerrno;
+		}
+
+		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+			close(tmpfd);
+			return oerrno;
+		}
+ 		close(tmpfd);
+-		return oerrno;
+ 	}
+-	close(tmpfd);
+	debug("%s: Setting ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
+ 
+ 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
--- a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
+			else
+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-localdomain.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-localdomain.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index 03a228f..49a4f6c 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -46,3 +46,7 @@
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+#
+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
+# Host *.local
+#   CheckHostIP no
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 626a642..b186ca1 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1859,6 +1859,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 
+ 	if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
+ 		printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
+		logit("The session allows sftp connections only");
+ 		fflush(NULL);
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	} else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-mls-fix-labeling.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-mls-fix-labeling.patch
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 22ea8ef..2660085 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -116,7 +116,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.403859893 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2017-02-09 10:10:47.414859882 +0100
+@@ -260,7 +260,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	FILE *fp;
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	char line[BUFSIZ];
+-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ 	int found_principal = 0;
+@@ -269,7 +268,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
+                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+                                         k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 10:18:45.800385543 +0100
+@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ }
+@@ -337,6 +338,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
+ 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+ 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
+		options->enable_k5users = 0;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ 		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ 	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -497,12 +500,14 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+	case sGssEnablek5users:
+		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 
+@@ -2319,6 +2329,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
+@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	int	num_permitted_opens;
+ 
+-	int	use_kuserok;
+	int		use_kuserok;
+	int		enable_k5users;
+ 	char   *chroot_directory;
+ 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-09 10:19:29.420336796 +0100
+@@ -633,6 +633,12 @@ Specifies whether key exchange based on
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
+Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
+access control. Further details are described in
+.Xr ksu 1 .
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+ Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
+ a client authenticates against.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
--- a/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -1,17 +1,7 @@
-From 28333f1dfe68b0ffc80c2a4799759587b4c32d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 04/50] openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts
-
---
- sshd-session.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 4a148db4..a365f26f 100644
--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -778,12 +778,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
 
 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@ -31,14 +21,11 @@ index 4a148db4..a365f26f 100644
 +				case 130:
 +				case 133:
 +				case 134:
-+					if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
-+						i += opts[i + 1];
-+						break;
-+					}
-+					/* FALLTHROUGH */
+					i += opts[i + 1];
+					break;
 +				default:
 +				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * or incorrect source routing options. */
+			 	 * source routing options. */
 +					text[0] = '\0';
 +					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
 +						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
@ -48,8 +35,5 @@ index 4a148db4..a365f26f 100644
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
 	}
+ 	return;
 #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
- }
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-allowGroups-documentation.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-allowGroups-documentation.patch
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 2320128..6244e68 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
+All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
+is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+@@ -160,6 +162,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
+All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
+is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+@@ -430,6 +434,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
+All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
+is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+@@ -449,6 +455,8 @@ The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+ .Cm DenyGroups ,
+ and finally
+ .Cm AllowGroups .
+All of the specified user and group tests must succeed, before user
+is allowed to log in.
+ .Pp
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch
@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2017-02-09 14:07:56.870994116 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2017-02-09 14:07:56.874994112 +0100
+@@ -1107,4 +1107,48 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+
+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+	u_int blen, msg_len;
+	Buffer m;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	do {
+		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
+			break;
+		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
+		buffer_clear(&m);
+		buffer_append_space(&m, msg_len);
+		if (atomicio(read, fdin, buffer_ptr(&m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
+		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+	} while (1);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+	return ret;
+}
+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
+{
+	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
+}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2017-02-09 14:07:56.870994116 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2017-02-09 14:07:56.874994112 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2017-02-09 14:07:56.871994115 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2017-02-09 14:09:44.710893783 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int paudit[2];
+#endif
+
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+ static int have_dev_log = 1;
+@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+void child_destory_sensitive_data();
+
+ #define USE_PIPES 1
+ /*
+  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+ 		cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+ #endif
+ 
+		child_destory_sensitive_data();
+
+ 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ 		do_child(s, command);
+ 		/* NOTREACHED */
+@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ttyfd);
+ 
+		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
+		child_destory_sensitive_data();
+
+ 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+ #ifdef _UNICOS
+ 		cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	}
+ 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
+ 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
+	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
+@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	 */
+ 	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ 
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	close(paudit[1]);
+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
+		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
+		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
+		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
+		 */
+		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
+	}
+	close(paudit[0]);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1542,6 +1569,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	endpwent();
+ }
+ 
+void
+child_destory_sensitive_data()
+{
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	int pparent = paudit[1];
+	close(paudit[0]);
+	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
+	if (use_privsep)
+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
+#endif
+
+	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+	destroy_sensitive_data(use_privsep);
+	/*
+	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
+	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
+	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
+	 */
+	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	/* Notify parent that we are done */
+	close(pparent);
+#endif
+
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+@@ -1558,12 +1612,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 
+-	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+-	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+-
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch
@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
+index 2d483b3..b361a04 100644
+--- a/entropy.c
+++ b/entropy.c
+@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+#ifdef __linux__
+	linux_seed();
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+ 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+ 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+ }
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index b912dbe..9206337 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
+ 
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy	2016-12-23 18:34:27.747753563 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:34:27.769753570 +0100
+@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ void oom_adjust_restore(void);
+ void oom_adjust_setup(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+void linux_seed(void);
+
+ #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..92a617c
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+void
+linux_seed(void)
+{
+	char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
+	char *random = "/dev/random";
+	size_t len, ienv, randlen = 14;
+
+	if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0"))
+		random = "/dev/urandom";
+	else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > randlen)
+		randlen = ienv;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) {
+		if (errno)
+			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
+		else
+			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
+	}
+}
+diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0
+index ba43fee..0b2629a 100644
+--- a/ssh-add.0
+++ b/ssh-add.0
+@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT
+              Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+              with the agent.
+ 
+     SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+             The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done
+             from /dev/urandom.  If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari-
+             able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is
+             reseeded from /dev/random.  The number of bytes read is defined
+             by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.  Minimum is 14 bytes.  This set-
+             ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+             random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec-
+             tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+
+ FILES
+      ~/.ssh/identity
+              Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
+index 4812448..16305bf 100644
+--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
+@@ -161,6 +161,20 @@ to make this work.)
+ Identifies the path of a
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
+index 281ecbd..1a9a635 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
+ These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+ The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
+index 12e00d4..1b51a4a 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -832,6 +832,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
+index 69d0829..02d79f8 100644
+--- a/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
+@@ -80,6 +80,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+ information corresponding with the private keys above.
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 929904b..f65e42f 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1309,6 +1309,23 @@ For more information, see the
+ .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+ option in
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+ .It Pa ~/.rhosts
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index c2c237f..058d37a 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -951,6 +951,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.Pp
+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
+.Cm /dev/urandom .
+If the 
+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
+environment variable is set to value other than
+.Cm 0
+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
+.Cm /dev/random .
+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
+Minimum is 14 bytes.
+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+.El
+ .Sh IPV6
+ IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
--- a/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+++ b/0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
@ -1,17 +1,5 @@
-From f5e5ee321def2a3674600714ad98fd1ca9b2cff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 13/50] openssh-6.6p1-force_krb
-
---
- gss-serv-krb5.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- session.c       |  23 +++++++
- ssh-gss.h       |   4 ++
- sshd.8          |   7 +++
- 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
+index 42de994..60de320 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
@ -23,16 +11,16 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 +#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@
- 
+ #include "key.h"
+@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
 #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -55,6 +58,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+@@ -55,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
 #endif
 
@ -46,7 +34,7 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
 
 /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
 	krb5_principal princ;
 	int retval;
 	const char *errmsg;
@ -54,7 +42,7 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 
 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
 		return 0;
-@@ -98,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -98,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
 		return 0;
 	}
@ -78,7 +66,7 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 	} else
 		retval = 0;
 
-@@ -109,6 +132,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -109,6 +133,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
 	return retval;
 }
 
@ -109,14 +97,13 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 +{
 +	FILE *fp;
 +	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char *line = NULL;
+	char line[BUFSIZ];
 +	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
 +	struct stat st;
 +	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
 +	int found_principal = 0;
 +	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
-+	u_long linenum = 0;
-+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	u_long linenum;
 +
 +	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
 +	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@ -160,9 +147,9 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 +	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
 +	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +
-+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
-+	while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
-+		linenum++;
+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines.  We don't. */
+	while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line),
+	    &linenum) != -1) {
 +		char *token;
 +
 +		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
@ -195,7 +182,6 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 +			}
 +		}
 +       }
-+	free(line);
 +	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		/* terminate vector */
 +		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
@ -217,11 +203,11 @@ index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
 diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index cbfbcee8..89b3a9cf 100644
+index b5dc144..ba4589b 100644
 --- a/session.c
 +++ b/session.c
-@@ -680,6 +680,29 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- 		command = auth_opts->force_command;
+@@ -806,6 +806,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		command = forced_command;
 		forced = "(key-option)";
 	}
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
@ -247,11 +233,11 @@ index cbfbcee8..89b3a9cf 100644
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
- 	s->forced = 0;
 	if (forced != NULL) {
- 		s->forced = 1;
+ 		if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
+ 			s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
 diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 8ec45192..db34d77f 100644
+index 0374c88..509109a 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
@ -266,10 +252,10 @@ index 8ec45192..db34d77f 100644
 
 /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 2aa73271..049d0a94 100644
+index 058d37a..5c4f15b 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
 The client tries to authenticate itself using
 host-based authentication,
 public key authentication,
@ -277,7 +263,7 @@ index 2aa73271..049d0a94 100644
 challenge-response authentication,
 or password authentication.
 .Pp
-@@ -874,6 +875,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
 but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
 rlogin/rsh.
 .Pp
@ -290,6 +276,3 @@ index 2aa73271..049d0a94 100644
 .It Pa ~/.ssh/
 This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
 and authentication information.
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@ -1,24 +1,11 @@
-From 25540939422660b024b8832f67eab82267aa8df6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 15/50] openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory
-
---
- auth-krb5.c     | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- auth.h          |  2 ++
- gss-serv-krb5.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
- sshd.8          |  4 ++++
- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
 diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 77714e3d..74f56d47 100644
+index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
 --- a/auth-krb5.c
 +++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -465,5 +465,21 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
- 		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- 	}
+@@ -375,6 +375,22 @@ cleanup:
+ 	return -1;
 }
-+
+ 
 +/*
 + * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
 + */
@ -34,26 +21,27 @@ index 77714e3d..74f56d47 100644
 +	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
 +		k5login_directory);
 +}
- #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
- #endif /* KRB5 */
+
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
+ 	profile_t p;
 diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 10e88e11..39163035 100644
+index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
+@@ -222,5 +222,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
 #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
- krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #include <krb5.h>
+ krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
 +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
 +	char **k5login_directory);
 #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
+ #endif
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index df55512d..820f794c 100644
+index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -144,8 +144,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
 {
 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
@ -61,7 +49,7 @@ index df55512d..820f794c 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
 +	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
 +		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
 +		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
@ -76,17 +64,17 @@ index df55512d..820f794c 100644
 +			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
 +			pw->pw_name);
 +	}
-+	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
 
 -	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
 }
 
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 049d0a94..6784286d 100644
+index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
 These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
 Further details are described in
 .Xr ksu 1 .
@ -97,6 +85,3 @@ index 049d0a94..6784286d 100644
 .Pp
 .It Pa ~/.ssh/
 This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@ -1,26 +1,61 @@
-From 5e35e18a419a5a66b6e1cb2b98beaaf4d9db0dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 03/50] openssh-6.6p1-keycat
-
---
- HOWTO.ssh-keycat                 |  12 ++
- Makefile.in                      |   8 +-
- configure.ac                     |   6 +
- misc.c                           |   7 +
- openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c |  44 +++++-
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   2 +
- platform.c                       |   2 +-
- ssh-keycat.c                     | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 8 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 HOWTO.ssh-keycat
- create mode 100644 ssh-keycat.c
-
-diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..630ec628
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2017-02-08 14:40:26.125216292 +0100
+@@ -1043,6 +1043,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd
+ 		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
+ 	}
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
+			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(127);
+		}
+#endif
+
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.keycat openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.011581451 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac	2017-02-08 14:32:33.016581448 +0100
+@@ -3129,6 +3129,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+ 
+@@ -3139,6 +3140,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4255,6 +4257,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5206,6 +5209,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+ echo "          +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+ fi
+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
+fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+--- openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.014581449 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.014581449 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@ -34,116 +69,72 @@ index 00000000..630ec628
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 4617cebc..438efc51 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
- ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.012581451 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in	2017-02-08 14:38:28.839306815 +0100
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
 SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
- SSHD_AUTH=$(libexecdir)/sshd-auth
 SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
- K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
 GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+ SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
 SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
 LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
- LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
- LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@
-@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
+ AR=@AR@
+ AWK=@AWK@
+@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+@@ -190,6 +192,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -260,6 +262,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
- ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
- 
-+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
 
-@@ -447,6 +452,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -332,6 +337,7 @@ install-files:
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	fi
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index ee77a048..d546788c 100644
--- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -3566,6 +3566,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.009581453 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
 
- 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
 
-@@ -3576,6 +3577,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 					;;
- 				*)
- 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- 					;;
- 				esac
- 			fi
-@@ -4801,6 +4803,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
- 
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5812,6 +5815,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
- 
- echo ""
- 
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index c932f9bb..1e31acc9 100644
--- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -2897,6 +2897,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
- 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(127);
-+		}
-+#endif
- 		if (env != NULL)
- 			execve(av[0], av, env);
- 		else
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.008581454 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
 
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@ -162,7 +153,7 @@ index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
 /* Send audit message */
 static int
 sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-@@ -317,7 +331,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -307,7 +321,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
 
 /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
 static int
@ -171,14 +162,14 @@ index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
 {
 	const char *reqlvl;
 	char *role;
-@@ -328,16 +342,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -318,16 +332,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 
 	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 
- 	if (inetd_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 		use_current = "1";
 	} else {
 		use_current = "";
@ -191,7 +182,7 @@ index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
 
 	if (role != NULL)
 		free(role);
-@@ -345,6 +359,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -335,6 +349,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 	return rv;
 }
 
@ -216,7 +207,7 @@ index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
 void
 sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -353,7 +385,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -343,7 +375,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
 	int r = 0;
 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
 
@ -225,7 +216,7 @@ index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
 		return;
 
 	if (options.use_pam) {
-@@ -420,7 +452,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+@@ -414,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
 {
 	security_context_t *ctx;
 
@ -234,26 +225,10 @@ index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
 		return;
 
 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index 498d242a..1b745a76 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
-index 1bfb4bea..0d12f311 100644
--- a/platform.c
-+++ b/platform.c
-@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/platform.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.007581455 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/platform.c	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
 {
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
@ -262,12 +237,10 @@ index 1bfb4bea..0d12f311 100644
 #endif
 
 #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..5678be07
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh-keycat.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c	2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@ -317,9 +290,6 @@ index 00000000..5678be07
 +#include <pwd.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
-+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-+#include <stdint.h>
-+#endif
 +
 +#include <security/pam_appl.h>
 +
@ -509,6 +479,3 @@ index 00000000..5678be07
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c	2014-05-05 15:20:43.075246776 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -979,6 +980,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename
+ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+ #endif
+	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
+		struct group *gr;
+
+		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
+			st.st_mode &= ~040;
+	}
+
+ 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index a7b8b6a..24ab272 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1620,6 +1620,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+ 	    &cfg, NULL);
+ 
+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux */
+	if (! options.use_pam)
+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several problems.");
+
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
+ 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 36cb27a..c1b7c03 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and may cause several
+# problems.
+ UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.memory-problems openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.memory-problems	2017-02-09 10:41:42.483123417 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 10:42:16.392102462 +0100
+@@ -2006,6 +2006,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 		dst->n = src->n; \
+ } while (0)
+ 
+	u_int i;
+
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+@@ -2058,8 +2060,10 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ } while(0)
+ #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\
+ 	if (src->num_n != 0) { \
+		for (i = 0; i < dst->num_n; i++) \
+			free(dst->n[i]); \
+ 		for (dst->num_n = 0; dst->num_n < src->num_n; dst->num_n++) \
+-			dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \
+			dst->n[dst->num_n] = src->n[dst->num_n]; \
+ 	} \
+ } while(0)
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.memory-problems openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index c18524e..d04f4ed 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -409,6 +409,25 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+ 
+void
+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+{
+	security_context_t *ctx;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
+			logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
+		freecon(ctx);
+	}
+}
+
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 8ef6cc4..b18893c 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 2bcf818..b5dc144 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1538,6 +1538,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			    pw->pw_uid);
+ 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
+#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1565,6 +1568,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
+#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1826,9 +1835,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 07f9926..a97f8b7 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -632,6 +632,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
+#endif
+
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+@@ -768,6 +772,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+ 
+  skip:
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	/* switch SELinux content for root too */
+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+		sshd_selinux_copy_context();
+	}
+#endif
+
+ 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+ 	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+ 
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch
@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.redhat	2017-02-08 15:22:30.811307915 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config	2017-02-08 15:22:30.812307915 +0100
+@@ -52,3 +52,15 @@
+ # Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
+ # Host *.local
+ #   CheckHostIP no
+
+Host *
+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
+# Send locale-related environment variables
+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2016-12-19 06:21:22.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0	2017-02-08 15:22:30.813307914 +0100
+@@ -837,9 +837,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-08 15:22:30.813307914 +0100
+@@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.redhat	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2017-02-08 15:33:24.705736576 +0100
+@@ -10,21 +10,26 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+ 
+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
+# SELinux about this change.
+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
+#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+ #ListenAddress ::
+ 
+-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ 
+ # Ciphers and keying
+ #RekeyLimit default none
+ 
+ # Logging
+ #SyslogFacility AUTH
+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+ #LogLevel INFO
+ 
+ # Authentication:
+@@ -57,9 +62,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+PasswordAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+@@ -68,8 +75,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+-#GSSAPIAuthentication no
+-#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+@@ -80,12 +87,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+-#X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes
+@@ -108,6 +115,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
+# Accept locale-related environment variables
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
+
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 
--- a/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+++ b/0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
@ -1,17 +1,21 @@
-From 9bb31b63142adaaf949e20c2d86c97f9b787217b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 24/50] openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom
+Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
+
+All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
+sshd process to handle a new client connection is
+spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
+without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
+files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
+closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
+
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>

 ---
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-index 49a4f35f..f6112458 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -140,7 +140,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
@ -44,7 +48,5 @@ index 49a4f35f..f6112458 100644
 +#endif
 	}
 	(void) closedir(dirp);
- 	return;
-- 
-2.49.0
+     } else

--- a/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@ -1,43 +1,29 @@
-From 34b196198018059bed294fa7a08e70606b4cbc36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 23/50] openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission
-
---
- sftp-server.8 |  7 +++++++
- sftp-server.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
-index 5311bf92..5e6e3aa4 100644
--- a/sftp-server.8
-+++ b/sftp-server.8
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8	2017-02-09 10:35:41.926475399 +0100
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+ .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
 .Op Fl u Ar umask
 +.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
 .Ek
 .Nm
 .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
+@@ -138,6 +139,10 @@ Sets an explicit
 .Xr umask 2
 to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
 user's default mask.
 +.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
 +Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
 +of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
-+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
-+umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
-+for newly created files.
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
 .El
 .Pp
 On some systems,
-diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
-index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
--- a/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/sftp-server.c
-@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2017-02-09 10:22:36.498019921 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2017-02-09 10:35:07.190520959 +0100
+@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
 /* Version of client */
 static u_int version;
 
@ -48,7 +34,7 @@ index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
 /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
 static int init_done;
 
-@@ -745,6 +749,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -679,6 +683,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
 	Attrib a;
 	char *name;
 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@ -56,18 +42,18 @@ index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
 
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -754,6 +759,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -688,6 +693,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
 +	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
 +		mode = permforcemode;
 +		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
-+	}	
+	}
 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
 	if (readonly &&
-@@ -775,6 +784,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -709,6 +718,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
 			}
 		}
 	}
@ -76,16 +62,16 @@ index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
 		send_status(id, status);
 	free(name);
-@@ -1894,7 +1905,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1490,7 +1501,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr,
 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
 	    __progname, __progname);
 	exit(1);
-@@ -1918,7 +1929,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
+@@ -1516,7 +1527,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
 
 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@ -94,7 +80,7 @@ index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'Q':
 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1980,6 +1991,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
+@@ -1576,6 +1587,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
 			break;
@ -110,6 +96,3 @@ index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
 		case 'h':
 		default:
 			sftp_server_usage();
-- 
-2.49.0
-
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch
@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
+
+    systemd stuff
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
+# Check whether user wants systemd support
+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
+			else
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi ]
+)
+
+
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e0d4923
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
+KillMode=process
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
+#endif
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1833,6 +1837,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+	/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
+	sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
+#endif
+
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.sshd-t openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.sshd-t	2017-02-09 10:19:56.859306131 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 10:22:07.895104402 +0100
+@@ -2337,7 +2337,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner == NULL ? "none" : o->banner);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.sshd-t openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.sshd-t	2017-02-09 10:19:56.823306172 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1	2017-02-09 10:19:56.859306131 +0100
+@@ -512,7 +512,11 @@ For full details of the options listed b
+ .It GatewayPorts
+ .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ .It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIKeyExchange
+.It GSSAPIClientIdentity
+ .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+.It GSSAPITrustDns
+ .It HashKnownHosts
+ .It Host
+ .It HostbasedAuthentication
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.690996627 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
+@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+ 
+ /* -- X11 forwarding */
+ 
+-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+-#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
+ 
+ /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
+ static char *x11_saved_display = NULL;
+@@ -4228,7 +4228,8 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+  */
+ int
+ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
+-    int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+    int x11_max_displays, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp,
+    int **chanids)
+ {
+ 	Channel *nc = NULL;
+ 	int display_number, sock;
+@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 	if (chanids == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
+	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
+
+ 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
+ 	    display_number++) {
+-		port = 6000 + display_number;
+		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
+		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
+			break;
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 		if (num_socks > 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
+ 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+ 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* Connect it to the display. */
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 			close(sock);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	}
+ 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ 	if (!ai) {
+-		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
+-		    strerror(errno));
+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	set_nodelay(sock);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2017-02-09 12:49:50.230929693 +0100
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+ 
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int);
+ int	 x11_connect_display(void);
+-int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+ int      x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
+ 	     const char *, int);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.741996552 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 12:51:03.167822492 +0100
+@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
+ 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+ 	options->permit_tty = -1;
+ 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+@@ -242,6 +243,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
+	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
+		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+ 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+ 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+@@ -416,7 +419,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+@@ -537,6 +540,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1313,6 +1317,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
+	case sX11MaxDisplays:
+		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+ 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+ 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2060,6 +2068,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+@@ -2312,6 +2321,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
+	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.741996552 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
+#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+ 
+ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+ 					 * searching at */
+	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
+ 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+ 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+ 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.742996550 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2017-02-09 12:49:04.745996546 +0100
+@@ -2502,8 +2502,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
+-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
+	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
+	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2017-02-09 12:49:04.742996550 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2017-02-09 12:51:24.656790909 +0100
+@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+ .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
+ .Cm X11Forwarding
+ and
+ .Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+@@ -1563,6 +1564,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+ X11 forwarding.
+ This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+ The default is 10.
+.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
+Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
+X11 forwarding.
+This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
+The default is 1000.
+ .It Cm X11Forwarding
+ Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+ The argument must be
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-CVE-2018-15473.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-CVE-2018-15473.patch
@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From 74287f5df9966a0648b4a68417451dd18f079ab8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2018 03:10:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: delay bailout for invalid authentic
+
+=?UTF-8?q?ating=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the?=
+=?UTF-8?q?=20request=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dar?=
+=?UTF-8?q?iusz=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4891882fbe413f230fe8ac8a37349b03bd0b70d
+---
+ auth2-gss.c       | 11 +++++++----
+ auth2-hostbased.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ auth2-pubkey.c    | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 47308c5ce..9351e0428 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -70,9 +70,6 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	u_char *doid = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
+-		return (0);
+-
+ 	mechs = packet_get_int();
+ 	if (mechs == 0) {
+ 		debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
+@@ -106,6 +103,12 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+		debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+		free(doid);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+ 	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+ 		if (ctxt != NULL)
+ 			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index 60159a56c..359393291 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -67,10 +67,6 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	int pktype;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+-	if (!authctxt->valid) {
+-		debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
+-		return 0;
+-	}
+ 	pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+ 	pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ 	chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
+@@ -117,6 +113,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+		debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+ 	service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
+ 	    authctxt->service;
+ 	buffer_init(&b);
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index c4d0f7908..e1c150401 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -89,16 +89,12 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	Key *key = NULL;
+-	char *pkalg, *userstyle, *pubkey, *fp = NULL;
+-	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+	char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *pubkey = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+	u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+ 	u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ 	int have_sig, pktype;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+-	if (!authctxt->valid) {
+-		debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+-		return 0;
+-	}
+ 	have_sig = packet_get_char();
+ 	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ 		debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__);
+@@ -167,6 +163,12 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		} else {
+ 			buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ 		}
+		if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+			buffer_free(&b);
+			debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
+			    __func__);
+			goto done;
+		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+ 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ 		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+@@ -183,7 +184,6 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ #endif
+ 		pubkey = sshkey_format_oneline(key, options.fingerprint_hash);
+ 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s", pubkey);
+-
+ 		/* test for correct signature */
+ 		authenticated = 0;
+ 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
+@@ -194,7 +194,6 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			free(pubkey);
+ 		}
+ 		buffer_free(&b);
+-		free(sig);
+ 	} else {
+ 		debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
+ 		    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
+@@ -205,6 +204,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
+ 		packet_check_eom();
+ 
+		if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+			debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
+			    __func__);
+			goto done;
+		}
+ 		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
+ 		/*
+ 		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
+@@ -238,6 +242,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	free(pkalg);
+ 	free(pkblob);
+ 	free(fp);
+	free(sig);
+ 	return authenticated;
+ }
+ 
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-ControlPath_too_long.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-ControlPath_too_long.patch
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/mux.c.controlPath openssh-7.4p1/mux.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/mux.c.controlPath	2017-05-04 14:49:44.629247946 +0200
+++ openssh-7.4p1/mux.c	2017-05-04 14:52:54.955109022 +0200
+@@ -1290,6 +1290,12 @@ muxserver_listen(void)
+ 	oerrno = errno;
+ 	umask(old_umask);
+ 	if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
+		if (oerrno == ENAMETOOLONG) {
+			/* the error is already logged from unix_listener() */
+			error("ControlPath %s too long, "
+			    "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
+			goto disable_mux_master;
+		}
+ 		if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
+ 			error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
+ 			    "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-audit.patch
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-authorized_keys_command.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-authorized_keys_command.patch
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From ddd3d34e5c7979ca6f4a3a98a7d219a4ed3d98c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2016 22:08:02 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
+
+fix deadlock when keys/principals command produces a lot of
+output and a key is matched early; bz#2655, patch from jboning AT gmail.com
+
+Upstream-ID: e19456429bf99087ea994432c16d00a642060afe
+---
+ auth2-pubkey.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 20f3309e1..70c021589 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 
+ 	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert);
+ 
+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
+ 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -1050,6 +1053,9 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
+ 
+ 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
+ 
+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
+ 	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-canonize-pkcs11-provider.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-canonize-pkcs11-provider.patch
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 1320cda..2441329 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ send:
+ static void
+ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+-	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ 	int r, version, success = 0;
+ 	Identity *id, *nxt;
+ 	Idtab *tab;
+@@ -831,6 +831,13 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	free(pin);
+ 
+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+		    provider, strerror(errno));
+		goto send;
+	}
+
+	debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+ 	for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
+ 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ 		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+@@ -838,18 +845,19 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 			/* Skip file--based keys */
+ 			if (id->provider == NULL)
+ 				continue;
+-			if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
+			if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
+ 				TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ 				free_identity(id);
+ 				tab->nentries--;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
+	if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
+ 		success = 1;
+ 	else
+ 		error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
+ 		    " pkcs11_del_provider failed");
+send:
+ 	free(provider);
+ 	send_status(e, success);
+ }
+
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-cbc-weakness.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-cbc-weakness.patch
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+commit 0fb1a617a07b8df5de188dd5a0c8bf293d4bfc0e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Mar 11 13:07:35 2017 +0000
+
+    upstream commit
+    
+    Don't count the initial block twice when computing how
+    many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode.
+    ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL
+    
+    Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2
+
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 01e2d45..2f3a2ec 100644
+--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1850,11 +1850,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ 				goto out;
+ 			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+-			if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+			if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+ 				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
+ 			    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+-			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
+ 		}
+ 		/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
+ 		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-coverity.patch
@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.786064600 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2017-02-09 15:01:28.869890219 +0100
+@@ -266,11 +266,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, efd);
+ 
+-	if (rfd != -1)
+	if (rfd >= 0)
+ 		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
+	if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
+ 		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+	if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+ 		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ 
+ 	c->rfd = rfd;
+@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 
+ 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+ 	if (nonblock) {
+-		if (rfd != -1)
+		if (rfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(rfd);
+-		if (wfd != -1)
+		if (wfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(wfd);
+-		if (efd != -1)
+		if (efd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(efd);
+ 	}
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/key.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/key.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.793064593 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.797064589 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+-		if (tmp1 > 0)
+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ 			close(tmp1);
+-		if (tmp2 > 0)
+-			close(tmp2);
+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
+			close(tmp2);*/
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmp1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/packet.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/progressmeter.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.761064625 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.590058852 +0100
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (signo)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:32.801064585 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.591058851 +0100
+@@ -1544,7 +1544,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!*activep) {
+-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+@@ -1635,8 +1635,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.592058850 +0100
+@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
+ }
+ 
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	tun = packet_get_int();
+-	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
+	if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+ 			goto done;
+ 		tun = forced_tun_device;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2017-02-09 14:58:38.598058844 +0100
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (sshpid > 1) {
+ 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:38.596058846 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c	2017-02-09 15:20:18.893624636 +0100
+@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.h.coverity        2017-02-10 09:28:10.951155129 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.h 2017-02-10 09:27:28.685069870 +0100
+@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, cons
+ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
+-int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int);
+int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *, u_int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:38.599058843 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2017-02-09 15:29:21.938917065 +0100
+@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	/* drop */
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	setgid(getgid());
+	(void) setegid(getgid());
+	(void) setgid(getgid());
+ 
+ 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2017-02-09 14:58:38.600058842 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2017-02-09 15:30:33.403800831 +0100
+@@ -679,8 +679,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 		privsep_preauth_child();
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
+		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+			free(box);
+		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1382,6 +1384,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+
+	if (fdset != NULL)
+		free(fdset);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index e554ec4..bd16d80 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -834,6 +834,8 @@ fake_password(const char *wire_password)
+ 		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
+ 
+ 	ret = malloc(l + 1);
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ 		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
+ 	ret[i] = '\0';
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index c6a4138..9b00e12 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+ 			free(response);
+ 			response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
+ 			    "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
+-			if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
+			if (response != NULL && strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
+ 				break;
+ 			else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
+ 			    strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
+diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
+index 13b63c2..dfa9b8d 100644
+--- a/digest-openssl.c
+++ b/digest-openssl.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+ 	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+ 	u_int l = dlen;
+ 
+-	if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+	if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index a30dabe..a8ac91f 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -195,8 +195,10 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL)
+		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+			free(m);
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -651,8 +653,10 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+ #endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
+ 	}
+-	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
+		free(name);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+ 	enc->name = name;
+ 	enc->enabled = 0;
+ 	enc->iv = NULL;
+@@ -670,8 +674,10 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+ #endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
+ 	}
+-	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
+		free(name);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+ 	/* truncate the key */
+ 	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+ 		mac->key_len = 16;
+@@ -695,6 +701,7 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+ 	} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ 		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
+ 	} else {
+		free(name);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	}
+ 	comp->name = name;
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 3e7a5d8..acc1391 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1500,6 +1500,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 			if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+ 				debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
+ 				    "files",filename, linenum, arg2);
+				free(arg2);
+ 				continue;
+ 			} else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
+ 				fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 6ab1cb4..5f2464a 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2284,8 +2284,6 @@ dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+ static void
+ dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
+ {
+-	if (val == NULL)
+-		return;
+ 	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
+ 	    val == NULL ? "none" : val);
+ }
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 07f80cd..5d4b41b 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1533,6 +1533,7 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
+ 	if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
+ 	    !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
+ 		debug3("user denied adding this key");
+		close(auth_sock);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1541,4 +1542,5 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
+ 		debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
+ 	else
+ 		debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
+	close(auth_sock);
+ }
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index f31c24c..aecf765 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1061,6 +1061,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+ 
+ 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ 		/* we cannot handle this key */
+		free(blob);
+ 		debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1170,6 +1171,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+ 
+ 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ 		/* we cannot handle this key */
+		free(blob);
+ 		debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 85fd1bd..58c1051 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -1375,8 +1375,6 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ 		retval = 0;
+ /*XXXX*/
+ 		sshkey_free(k);
+-		if (retval != 0)
+-			break;
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index e271a19..69bec99 100644
+--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
+@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+ 			break;
+ 		case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+ 			/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
+-			sshbuf_reset(sect);
+			sshbuf_free(sect);
+ 			sect = NULL;
+ 			if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
+ 				goto out;
+@@ -1288,7 +1288,8 @@ ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 	debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
+ 	r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
+  out:
+-	close(fd);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
+ 	sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+ 	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ 	if (r != 0)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index acc1391..c4dff15 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 		value = cipher_number(arg);
+ 		if (value == -1)
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
+ 			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
+ 			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ parse_int:
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+-				filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+				filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ 		value = proto_spec(arg);
+ 		if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5f2464a..4564494 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1476,7 +1476,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (options->ciphers == NULL)
+ 			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (options->macs == NULL)
+ 			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+-			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index aaf712d..62a76b3 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -536,8 +536,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 				X509_free(x509);
+ 		}
+ 		if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
+-		    pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
+-			key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+		    pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0 &&
+		    (key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) != NULL) {
+ 			key->rsa = rsa;
+ 			key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ 			key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
+index a045361..0e1a506 100644
+--- a/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/sshconnect1.c
+@@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ 		cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
+ 
+ 	/* Get the public key. */
+-	server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
+ 	bits = packet_get_int();
+ 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
+ 	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
+@@ -532,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ 		logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+ 	}
+ 	/* Get the host key. */
+-	host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+	if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
+ 	bits = packet_get_int();
+ 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+ 	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 58c1051..6afacb5 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -1239,6 +1239,9 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ 	u_long bits;
+ #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ 
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ 	cp = *cpp;
+ 
+ 	switch (ret->type) {
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
+ 
+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+void usage(void) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
+                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
+                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
+                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
+                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
+        exit(1);
+}
+
+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
+{
+        unsigned char *bin;
+        char *p;
+        size_t n = 0;
+        int shift = 4;
+        unsigned char out = 0;
+        unsigned char *optr;
+
+        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
+        optr = bin;
+
+        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
+                unsigned char c;
+
+                c = *p;
+                if (isspace(c))
+                        continue;
+
+                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
+                        c = c - '0';
+                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
+                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
+                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
+                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
+                } else {
+                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
+                        break;
+                }
+
+                out |= c << shift;
+                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
+
+                if (shift) {
+                        *(optr++) = out;
+                        out = 0;
+                        ++n;
+                }
+        }
+
+        *len = n;
+        return bin;
+}
+
+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
+char *read_stdin(void)
+{
+        char *buf;
+        size_t n, total = 0;
+
+        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
+
+        do {
+                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
+                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
+                        break;
+
+                total += n;
+                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
+        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
+        return buf;
+}
+
+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+
+        const struct sshcipher *c;
+        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
+        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
+        char *hexkey = NULL;
+        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
+        char *hexdata = NULL;
+        char *p;
+        int i;
+        int encrypt = 1;
+        void *key;
+        size_t keylen;
+        void *iv;
+        size_t ivlen;
+        void *data;
+        size_t datalen;
+        void *outdata;
+
+        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
+                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
+                        algo = argv[++i];
+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
+                        hexkey = argv[++i];
+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
+                        ++i;
+                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
+                                usage();
+                        }
+                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
+                                encrypt = 1;
+                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
+                                encrypt = 0;
+                        } else {
+                                usage();
+                        }
+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
+                        hexiv = argv[++i];
+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
+                        hexdata = argv[++i];
+                }
+        }
+
+        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
+                usage();
+        }
+
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+        if (hexdata == NULL) {
+                hexdata = read_stdin();
+        } else {
+                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
+        }
+
+        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
+
+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
+
+        if (ivlen != 16) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
+		return 2;
+        }
+
+        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
+
+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
+
+        free(key);
+        free(iv);
+
+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
+	if(outdata == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
+
+        free(data);
+
+	cipher_free(cc);
+
+        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
+	}
+
+        free(outdata);
+
+        printf("\n");
+        return 0;
+}
+
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-debian-restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-debian-restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.tcp_wrappers	2016-12-23 15:36:38.745411192 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac	2016-12-23 15:36:38.777411197 +0100
+@@ -1491,6 +1491,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
+ 	]
+ )
+ 
+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
+TCPW_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
+	[  --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+			saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+			saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+			if test -n "${withval}" && \
+			    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+				if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
+					if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+						LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+					else
+						LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+					fi
+				else
+					if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+						LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+					else
+						LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+					fi
+				fi
+				if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
+					CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+				else
+					CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+				fi
+			fi
+			LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
+			AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <tcpd.h>
+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
+				]], [[
+	hosts_access(0);
+				]])], [
+					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+					AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
+						[Define if you want
+						TCP Wrappers support])
+					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
+					TCPW_MSG="yes"
+				], [
+					AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
+				
+			])
+			LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+ # Check whether user wants to use ldns
+ LDNS_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+@@ -5214,6 +5270,7 @@ echo "                 KerberosV support
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
+ echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8.tcp_wrappers	2016-12-23 15:36:38.759411194 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8	2016-12-23 15:36:38.778411197 +0100
+@@ -836,6 +836,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes access
+ This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+ readable by anyone else.
+ .Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+@@ -960,6 +966,7 @@ IPv6 address can be used everywhere wher
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+ .Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.tcp_wrappers	2016-12-23 15:36:38.772411196 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:37:15.032417028 +0100
+@@ -123,6 +123,13 @@
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+#include <tcpd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+int allow_severity;
+int deny_severity;
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD	(STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+@@ -2012,6 +2019,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+ #endif
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+	allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
+	deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
+	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+		struct request_info req;
+
+		request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
+		fromhost(&req);
+
+		if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
+			debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
+			refuse(&req);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+			fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
+		}
+	}
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+ 
+ 	/* Log the connection. */
+ 	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
--- a/Show more
+++ b/Show more
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Mattias Ellert	513f05f80f	Based on openssh-7.4p1-23.el7_9	2023-08-11 22:57:54 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	91484c75c8	Based on openssh-7.4p1-22.el7_9	2021-11-24 17:40:33 +01:00
Frank Scheiner	ed68bed373	Add HPN patch	2020-10-23 20:10:23 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	9bb59e17ee	Based on openssh-7.4p1-21.el7	2019-08-07 23:08:32 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	1d6d885889	Change GSSAPITrustDNS default to no	2019-05-28 16:42:24 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	5308f95f9c	Remove usage statistics collection support	2019-02-27 13:05:37 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	57d77f9250	Based on openssh-7.4p1-16.el7	2018-04-10 17:14:06 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	16c223fac6	Based on openssh-7.4p1-13.el7_4	2017-11-13 12:40:23 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	e59e91f6ab	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-35.el7_3 Update GSI patch with more openssl 1.1.0 fixes from Globus	2017-07-31 11:37:50 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	53e3b2afc3	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-33.el7_3	2017-02-24 14:10:14 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	2202381388	Adding mechanism OID negotiation with the introduction of micv2 OID	2016-12-15 16:41:25 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	6348beb8a1	Based on openssh 6.6.1p1-31.el7	2016-12-15 09:18:40 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	aa9e2ef9b3	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-25.el7_2	2016-06-26 07:42:37 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	92bc715130	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-23.el7_2	2016-01-19 22:49:53 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	95ab173057	Fix typos in gsisshd.service file	2015-08-05 11:53:02 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	72c0682d9d	Based on openssh-6.6.1p1-12.el7_1	2015-07-05 15:16:49 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	50cfa4c143	Based on openssh-6.4p1-8.el7	2014-07-16 23:13:46 +02:00
Mattias Ellert	4ba46b6c82	Based on openssh-6.4p1-1.el7	2014-01-28 09:34:16 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	509f103f2d	Based on openssh-6.2p2-7.fc19	2013-12-12 03:15:00 +01:00
Mattias Ellert	da751ef47d	Based on openssh-6.2p2-6.fc19	2013-11-26 16:01:28 +01:00