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Sync up specfile, config generation, and patches

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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jeremy Cline 2019-12-04 13:55:02 -05:00
commit cce01a3bcf
108 changed files with 4326 additions and 6210 deletions
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254
efi-secureboot.patch
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@ -1,7 +1,109 @@
From 478a0cff698409224330ea9e25eb332220b55dbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 21:22:47 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] security: lockdown: expose a hook to lock the kernel down
In order to automatically lock down kernels running on UEFI machines
booted in Secure Boot mode, expose the lock_kernel_down() hook.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a3763247547c..8d76d1f153ed 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1454,6 +1454,12 @@
* code execution in kernel space should be permitted.
*
* @what: kernel feature being accessed
+ *
+ * @lock_kernel_down
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ *
+ * @where: Where the lock-down is originating from (e.g. command line option)
+ * @level: The lock-down level (can only increase)
*/
union security_list_options {
int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
@@ -1818,6 +1824,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what);
+ int (*lock_kernel_down)(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level);
};
struct security_hook_heads {
@@ -2060,6 +2067,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
struct hlist_head locked_down;
+ struct hlist_head lock_kernel_down;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a8d59d612d27..467b9ccdf993 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -442,6 +442,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
+int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1269,6 +1270,10 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 8a10b43daf74..72a623075749 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(lock_kernel_down, lock_kernel_down),
};
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1bc000f834e2..1506b95427cf 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2404,3 +2404,9 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+
+int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(lock_kernel_down, 0, where, level);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lock_kernel_down);
--
2.21.0
From b5123d0553f4ed5e734f6457696cdd30228d1eee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 29/31] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure
boot mode
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT
@ -15,6 +117,7 @@ Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
[Rebased for context; efi_is_table_address was moved to arch/x86]
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 +-----------
@ -25,10 +128,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index b74e7bfed6ab..7da1712c89c9 100644
index bbe35bf879f5..7e528b6af86b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1158,19 +1158,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
@@ -1179,19 +1179,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
@ -50,7 +153,7 @@ index b74e7bfed6ab..7da1712c89c9 100644
reserve_initrd();
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index 5f9f5039de50..7a0a6378203e 100644
index 4ac2de4dfa72..195b078a423c 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP) += fake_mem.o
@ -59,8 +162,8 @@ index 5f9f5039de50..7a0a6378203e 100644
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER) += dev-path-parser.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += secureboot.o
obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES) += apple-properties.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE) += rci2-table.o
arm-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) := arm-init.o arm-runtime.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9070055de0a1
@ -106,10 +209,10 @@ index 000000000000..9070055de0a1
+ }
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 100ce4a4aff6..62361b647a75 100644
index 21d81021c1f4..758ec061d03b 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1155,6 +1155,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
@@ -1204,6 +1204,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
@ -124,16 +227,16 @@ index 100ce4a4aff6..62361b647a75 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
@@ -1198,6 +1206,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
@@ -1214,6 +1222,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
return test_bit(feature, &efi.flags) != 0;
}
extern void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused);
extern bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr);
+
+extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode);
#else
static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
{
@@ -1216,6 +1226,8 @@ static inline bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr)
@@ -1227,6 +1237,8 @@ efi_capsule_pending(int *reset_type)
{
return false;
}
@ -142,9 +245,7 @@ index 100ce4a4aff6..62361b647a75 100644
#endif
extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
@@ -1577,12 +1589,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
#endif
@@ -1619,12 +1631,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(void) { return true; }
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void);
@ -158,121 +259,76 @@ index 100ce4a4aff6..62361b647a75 100644
#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
--
2.19.1
2.21.0
From d78bf678059f83e22bec8ada1a448e22b9b90203 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 15368f76d4997912318d35c52bfeb9041d85098e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 30/31] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 21:28:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may
also require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a
configuration option that to lock down the kernel - which includes
requiring validly signed modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++--
fs/debugfs/inode.c | 2 +-
security/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++
security/lock_down.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 8 ++++++++
security/lockdown/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index adeee6329f55..27a54ec878bd 100644
index 77ea96b794bd..a119e1bc9623 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
@@ -1005,6 +1006,10 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
#include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
#include <video/edid.h>
@@ -1027,6 +1028,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_init();
+ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+
+ init_lockdown();
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ security_lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot mode", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
+#endif
+
dmi_setup();
/*
@@ -1159,8 +1164,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
- efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
-
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
index ce261e1765ff..7aff55b309a6 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static bool debugfs_registered;
static int debugfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
{
if ((ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) &&
- kernel_is_locked_down("debugfs"))
+ kernel_is_locked_down("changing perms in debugfs"))
return -EPERM;
return simple_setattr(dentry, ia);
}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 9c343f262bdd..30788bc47863 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -244,6 +244,20 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE
Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, by pressing a SysRq key
combination on a wired keyboard. On x86, this is SysRq+x.
diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
index e84ddf484010..d0501353a4b9 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will
unconditionally be called before any other LSMs.
+config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode"
+ default n
+ select LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+ depends on EFI
+ depends on EFI && SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
+ help
+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Secure boot mode may
+ be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if
+ not indicated by the boot parameters.
+
+ Enabling this option turns on results in kernel lockdown being
+ triggered if EFI Secure Boot is set.
+ Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being triggered if
+ EFI Secure Boot is set.
+
source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
source "security/smack/Kconfig"
source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
index ee00ca2677e7..bb4dc7838f3e 100644
--- a/security/lock_down.c
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/sysrq.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -44,6 +45,10 @@ void __init init_lockdown(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_FORCE
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration");
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ lock_kernel_down("EFI secure boot");
+#endif
}
/**
choice
prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode"
default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
--
2.14.3
2.21.0