Fix for CVE-2013-0190 xen corruption with 32bit pvops (rhbz 896051 896038)
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@ -786,6 +786,9 @@ Patch2150: 3.7.3-stable-queue.patch
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#rhbz 886946
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Patch21234: iwlegacy-fix-IBSS-cleanup.patch
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#rhbz 896051 896038 CVE-2013-0190
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Patch21250: xen-fix-stack-corruption-in-xen_failsafe_callback.patch
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# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
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%endif
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@ -1511,6 +1514,9 @@ ApplyPatch 3.7.3-stable-queue.patch
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#rhbz 886948
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ApplyPatch iwlegacy-fix-IBSS-cleanup.patch
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#rhbz 896051 896038 CVE-2013-0190
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ApplyPatch xen-fix-stack-corruption-in-xen_failsafe_callback.patch
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# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
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%endif
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@ -2383,6 +2389,9 @@ fi
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# ||----w |
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# || ||
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%changelog
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* Wed Jan 16 2013 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com> 3.7.2-204
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- Fix for CVE-2013-0190 xen corruption with 32bit pvops (rhbz 896051 896038)
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* Wed Jan 16 2013 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
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- Add patch from Stanislaw Gruszka to fix iwlegacy IBSS cleanup (rhbz 886946)
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62
xen-fix-stack-corruption-in-xen_failsafe_callback.patch
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62
xen-fix-stack-corruption-in-xen_failsafe_callback.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
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From 38174c8c07ad638cd18285ba402b59076849dc21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2013 17:16:30 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] xen: Fix stack corruption in xen_failsafe_callback for 32bit PVOPS guests.
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There has been an error on the xen_failsafe_callback path for failed
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iret, which causes the stack pointer to be wrong when entering the
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iret_exc error path. This can result in the kernel crashing.
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In the classic kernel case, the relevant code looked a little like:
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popl %eax # Error code from hypervisor
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jz 5f
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addl $16,%esp
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jmp iret_exc # Hypervisor said iret fault
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5: addl $16,%esp
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# Hypervisor said segment selector fault
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Here, there are two identical addls on either option of a branch which
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appears to have been optimised by hoisting it above the jz, and
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converting it to an lea, which leaves the flags register unaffected.
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In the PVOPS case, the code looks like:
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popl_cfi %eax # Error from the hypervisor
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lea 16(%esp),%esp # Add $16 before choosing fault path
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CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -16
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jz 5f
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addl $16,%esp # Incorrectly adjust %esp again
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jmp iret_exc
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It is possible unprivileged userspace applications to cause this
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behaviour, for example by loading an LDT code selector, then changing
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the code selector to be not-present. At this point, there is a race
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condition where it is possible for the hypervisor to return back to
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userspace from an interrupt, fault on its own iret, and inject a
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failsafe_callback into the kernel.
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This bug has been present since the introduction of Xen PVOPS support
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in commit 5ead97c84 (xen: Core Xen implementation), in 2.6.23.
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Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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---
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arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S | 1 -
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1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
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index ff84d54..6ed91d9 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
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+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
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@@ -1065,7 +1065,6 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
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lea 16(%esp),%esp
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CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -16
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jz 5f
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- addl $16,%esp
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jmp iret_exc
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5: pushl_cfi $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
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SAVE_ALL
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--
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1.7.2.5
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