Makefile | 38 ++++++- arch/arm/Kconfig | 4 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 27 +++++ arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c | 5 + arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 22 ++-- crypto/sig.c | 3 +- crypto/testmgr.c | 2 +- drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c | 8 ++ drivers/acpi/irq.c | 17 ++- drivers/acpi/scan.c | 9 ++ drivers/ata/libahci.c | 18 +++ drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c | 15 +++ drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 16 ++- drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 124 +++++++++++++++------ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 5 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 14 ++- drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 38 +++++++ drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c | 66 ----------- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 19 ++++ drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c | 124 ++++++++++++--------- drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 22 ++++ drivers/pci/quirks.c | 24 ++++ drivers/scsi/sd.c | 10 ++ drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 7 ++ fs/erofs/super.c | 19 +++- include/linux/efi.h | 22 ++-- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/module.h | 1 + include/linux/rmi.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++ kernel/module/main.c | 2 + kernel/module/signing.c | 9 +- scripts/Makefile.lib | 3 + scripts/mod/modpost.c | 8 ++ scripts/tags.sh | 2 + security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 6 +- security/lockdown/Kconfig | 13 +++ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 11 ++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c | 31 ------ 44 files changed, 563 insertions(+), 222 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 30c332829b0f..fb93f8fdd6a0 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -355,6 +355,17 @@ ifneq ($(filter install,$(MAKECMDGOALS)),) endif endif +# CKI/cross compilation hack +# Do we need to rebuild scripts after cross compilation? +# If kernel was cross-compiled, these scripts have arch of build host. +REBUILD_SCRIPTS_FOR_CROSS:=0 + +# Regenerating config with incomplete source tree will produce different +# config options. Disable it. +ifeq ($(REBUILD_SCRIPTS_FOR_CROSS),1) +may-sync-config:= +endif + ifdef mixed-build # =========================================================================== # We're called with mixed targets (*config and build targets). @@ -1304,6 +1315,8 @@ uapi-asm-generic: # Generate some files # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +include $(srctree)/Makefile.rhelver + # KERNELRELEASE can change from a few different places, meaning version.h # needs to be updated, so this check is forced on all builds @@ -1328,7 +1341,13 @@ define filechk_version.h ((c) > 255 ? 255 : (c)))'; \ echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR $(VERSION); \ echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL $(PATCHLEVEL); \ - echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_SUBLEVEL $(SUBLEVEL) + echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_SUBLEVEL $(SUBLEVEL); \ + echo '#define RHEL_MAJOR $(RHEL_MAJOR)'; \ + echo '#define RHEL_MINOR $(RHEL_MINOR)'; \ + echo '#define RHEL_RELEASE_VERSION(a,b) (((a) << 8) + (b))'; \ + echo '#define RHEL_RELEASE_CODE \ + $(shell expr $(RHEL_MAJOR) \* 256 + $(RHEL_MINOR))'; \ + echo '#define RHEL_RELEASE "$(RHEL_RELEASE)"' endef $(version_h): private PATCHLEVEL := $(or $(PATCHLEVEL), 0) @@ -1931,6 +1950,23 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +scripts_build: + $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts/basic + $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts/mod + $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts scripts/module.lds + $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts scripts/unifdef + $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts + +prepare_after_cross: + # disable STACK_VALIDATION to avoid building objtool + sed -i '/^CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION/d' ./include/config/auto.conf || true + # build minimum set of scripts and resolve_btfids to allow building + # external modules + $(MAKE) KBUILD_EXTMOD="" M="" scripts_build V=1 + $(MAKE) -C tools/bpf/resolve_btfids + +PHONY += prepare_after_cross scripts_build + modules.order: $(build-dir) @: diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index 4fb985b76e97..ed23eedf6c2d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -1214,9 +1214,9 @@ config HIGHMEM If unsure, say n. config HIGHPTE - bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem" if EXPERT + bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem" depends on HIGHMEM - default y + default n help The VM uses one page of physical memory for each page table. For systems with a lot of processes, this can use a lot of diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 6663ffd23f25..b2e4aa83a696 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1432,7 +1432,7 @@ endchoice config ARM64_FORCE_52BIT bool "Force 52-bit virtual addresses for userspace" - depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52 && EXPERT + depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52 help For systems with 52-bit userspace VAs enabled, the kernel will attempt to maintain compatibility with older software by providing 48-bit VAs diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c index 23c05dc7a8f2..d7b7b2f39e16 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -207,6 +209,24 @@ static void __init setup_machine_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys) dump_stack_set_arch_desc("%s (DT)", name); } +static void __init init_secureboot_mode(void) +{ + void *fdt = initial_boot_params; + u64 chosen; + const __be32 *prop; + int len; + + chosen = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen"); + if (chosen < 0) + return; + + prop = fdt_getprop(fdt, chosen, "secure-boot-mode", &len); + if (!prop || len != sizeof(u32)) + return; + + efi_set_secure_boot((enum efi_secureboot_mode)fdt32_to_cpu(*prop)); +} + static void __init request_standard_resources(void) { struct memblock_region *region; @@ -327,6 +347,13 @@ void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) pr_warn(FW_BUG "Kernel image misaligned at boot, please fix your bootloader!"); WARN_TAINT(mmu_enabled_at_boot, TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, FW_BUG "Booted with MMU enabled!"); + } else { + init_secureboot_mode(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) + security_lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX); +#endif } arm64_memblock_init(); diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h index b0d00032479d..afb9544fb007 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ int ipl_report_add_component(struct ipl_report *report, struct kexec_buf *kbuf, unsigned char flags, unsigned short cert); int ipl_report_add_certificate(struct ipl_report *report, void *key, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); +bool ipl_get_secureboot(void); /* * DIAG 308 support diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c index dcdc7e274848..6b2fc225fa18 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c @@ -2521,3 +2521,8 @@ int ipl_report_free(struct ipl_report *report) } #endif + +bool ipl_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return !!ipl_secure_flag; +} diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c index 892fce2b7549..eefbda45ac47 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -919,6 +920,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) log_component_list(); + if (ipl_get_secureboot()) + security_lock_kernel_down("Secure IPL mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX); + /* Have one command line that is parsed and saved in /proc/cmdline */ /* boot_command_line has been already set up in early.c */ *cmdline_p = boot_command_line; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 1b2edd07a3e1..1c434c6900eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -991,6 +992,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) efi_init(); + efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot); + +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) + security_lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX); +#endif + reserve_ibft_region(); x86_init.resources.dmi_setup(); @@ -1154,19 +1162,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) /* Allocate bigger log buffer */ setup_log_buf(1); - if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { - switch (boot_params.secure_boot) { - case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled: - pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n"); - break; - case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled: - pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); - break; - default: - pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n"); - break; - } - } + efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot); reserve_initrd(); diff --git a/crypto/sig.c b/crypto/sig.c index beba745b6405..fd41f6d3abf9 100644 --- a/crypto/sig.c +++ b/crypto/sig.c @@ -112,8 +112,7 @@ static int sig_prepare_alg(struct sig_alg *alg) { struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->base; - if (!alg->sign) - alg->sign = sig_default_sign; + alg->sign = sig_default_sign; if (!alg->verify) alg->verify = sig_default_verify; if (!alg->set_priv_key) diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 6a490aaa71b9..a654d7096bfa 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -4070,7 +4070,7 @@ static int test_sig_one(struct crypto_sig *tfm, const struct sig_testvec *vecs) * Don't invoke sign test (which requires a private key) * for vectors with only a public key. */ - if (vecs->public_key_vec) + if (1 || vecs->public_key_vec) return 0; sig_size = crypto_sig_maxsize(tfm); diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c index 20d757687e3d..90a13f20f052 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c @@ -142,6 +142,14 @@ static int apei_hest_parse(apei_hest_func_t func, void *data) if (hest_disable || !hest_tab) return -EINVAL; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 + /* Ignore broken firmware */ + if (!strncmp(hest_tab->header.oem_id, "HPE ", 6) && + !strncmp(hest_tab->header.oem_table_id, "ProLiant", 8) && + MIDR_IMPLEMENTOR(read_cpuid_id()) == ARM_CPU_IMP_APM) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + hest_hdr = (struct acpi_hest_header *)(hest_tab + 1); for (i = 0; i < hest_tab->error_source_count; i++) { len = hest_esrc_len(hest_hdr); diff --git a/drivers/acpi/irq.c b/drivers/acpi/irq.c index 76a856c32c4d..f2d25d95811c 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/irq.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/irq.c @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx { unsigned int index; unsigned long *res_flags; struct irq_fwspec *fwspec; + bool skip_producer_check; }; /** @@ -216,7 +217,8 @@ static acpi_status acpi_irq_parse_one_cb(struct acpi_resource *ares, return AE_CTRL_TERMINATE; case ACPI_RESOURCE_TYPE_EXTENDED_IRQ: eirq = &ares->data.extended_irq; - if (eirq->producer_consumer == ACPI_PRODUCER) + if (!ctx->skip_producer_check && + eirq->producer_consumer == ACPI_PRODUCER) return AE_OK; if (ctx->index >= eirq->interrupt_count) { ctx->index -= eirq->interrupt_count; @@ -252,8 +254,19 @@ static acpi_status acpi_irq_parse_one_cb(struct acpi_resource *ares, static int acpi_irq_parse_one(acpi_handle handle, unsigned int index, struct irq_fwspec *fwspec, unsigned long *flags) { - struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx ctx = { -EINVAL, index, flags, fwspec }; + struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx ctx = { -EINVAL, index, flags, fwspec, false }; + /* + * Firmware on arm64-based HPE m400 platform incorrectly marks + * its UART interrupt as ACPI_PRODUCER rather than ACPI_CONSUMER. + * Don't do the producer/consumer check for that device. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64)) { + struct acpi_device *adev = acpi_get_acpi_dev(handle); + + if (adev && !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(adev), "APMC0D08")) + ctx.skip_producer_check = true; + } acpi_walk_resources(handle, METHOD_NAME__CRS, acpi_irq_parse_one_cb, &ctx); return ctx.rc; } diff --git a/drivers/acpi/scan.c b/drivers/acpi/scan.c index ef16d58b2949..a3119cc4a9a9 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/scan.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/scan.c @@ -1802,6 +1802,15 @@ static bool acpi_device_enumeration_by_parent(struct acpi_device *device) if (!acpi_match_device_ids(device, ignore_serial_bus_ids)) return false; + /* + * Firmware on some arm64 X-Gene platforms will make the UART + * device appear as both a UART and a slave of that UART. Just + * bail out here for X-Gene UARTs. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64) && + !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(device), "APMC0D08")) + return false; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resource_list); acpi_dev_get_resources(device, &resource_list, acpi_check_serial_bus_slave, diff --git a/drivers/ata/libahci.c b/drivers/ata/libahci.c index c79abdfcd7a9..e23bfb7f94c7 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/libahci.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libahci.c @@ -731,6 +731,24 @@ int ahci_stop_engine(struct ata_port *ap) tmp &= ~PORT_CMD_START; writel(tmp, port_mmio + PORT_CMD); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 + /* Rev Ax of Cavium CN99XX needs a hack for port stop */ + if (dev_is_pci(ap->host->dev) && + to_pci_dev(ap->host->dev)->vendor == 0x14e4 && + to_pci_dev(ap->host->dev)->device == 0x9027 && + midr_is_cpu_model_range(read_cpuid_id(), + MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_BRCM, BRCM_CPU_PART_VULCAN), + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0), + MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, MIDR_REVISION_MASK))) { + tmp = readl(hpriv->mmio + 0x8000); + udelay(100); + writel(tmp | (1 << 26), hpriv->mmio + 0x8000); + udelay(100); + writel(tmp & ~(1 << 26), hpriv->mmio + 0x8000); + dev_warn(ap->host->dev, "CN99XX SATA reset workaround applied\n"); + } +#endif + /* wait for engine to stop. This could be as long as 500 msec */ tmp = ata_wait_register(ap, port_mmio + PORT_CMD, PORT_CMD_LIST_ON, PORT_CMD_LIST_ON, 1, 500); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c index bbf7029e224b..cf7faa970dd6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c @@ -215,6 +215,21 @@ static int __init scan_for_dmi_ipmi(void) { const struct dmi_device *dev = NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 + /* RHEL-only + * If this is ARM-based HPE m400, return now, because that platform + * reports the host-side ipmi address as intel port-io space, which + * does not exist in the ARM architecture. + */ + const char *dmistr = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME); + + if (dmistr && (strcmp("ProLiant m400 Server", dmistr) == 0)) { + pr_debug("%s does not support host ipmi\n", dmistr); + return 0; + } + /* END RHEL-only */ +#endif + while ((dev = dmi_find_device(DMI_DEV_TYPE_IPMI, NULL, dev))) dmi_decode_ipmi((const struct dmi_header *) dev->device_data); diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c index 0a886399f9da..5193de5880c9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "39.2" @@ -5592,8 +5593,21 @@ static int __init ipmi_init_msghandler_mod(void) { int rv; - pr_info("version " IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "\n"); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 + /* RHEL-only + * If this is ARM-based HPE m400, return now, because that platform + * reports the host-side ipmi address as intel port-io space, which + * does not exist in the ARM architecture. + */ + const char *dmistr = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME); + if (dmistr && (strcmp("ProLiant m400 Server", dmistr) == 0)) { + pr_debug("%s does not support host ipmi\n", dmistr); + return -ENOSYS; + } + /* END RHEL-only */ +#endif + pr_info("version " IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "\n"); mutex_lock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex); rv = ipmi_register_driver(); mutex_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile index 8efbcf699e4f..96d5a1ca981d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += libstub obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL) += efibc.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST) += test/ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER) += dev-path-parser.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += secureboot.o obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES) += apple-properties.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE) += rci2-table.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE) += embedded-firmware.o diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index fc407d891348..43e706613c51 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -1019,40 +1020,101 @@ int efi_mem_type(unsigned long phys_addr) return -EINVAL; } +struct efi_error_code { + efi_status_t status; + int errno; + const char *description; +}; + +static const struct efi_error_code efi_error_codes[] = { + { EFI_SUCCESS, 0, "Success"}, +#if 0 + { EFI_LOAD_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Load Error"}, +#endif + { EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, -EINVAL, "Invalid Parameter"}, + { EFI_UNSUPPORTED, -ENOSYS, "Unsupported"}, + { EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE, -ENOSPC, "Bad Buffer Size"}, + { EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, -ENOSPC, "Buffer Too Small"}, + { EFI_NOT_READY, -EAGAIN, "Not Ready"}, + { EFI_DEVICE_ERROR, -EIO, "Device Error"}, + { EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED, -EROFS, "Write Protected"}, + { EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES, -ENOMEM, "Out of Resources"}, +#if 0 + { EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Volume Corrupt"}, + { EFI_VOLUME_FULL, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Volume Full"}, + { EFI_NO_MEDIA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No Media"}, + { EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Media changed"}, +#endif + { EFI_NOT_FOUND, -ENOENT, "Not Found"}, +#if 0 + { EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Access Denied"}, + { EFI_NO_RESPONSE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No Response"}, + { EFI_NO_MAPPING, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No mapping"}, + { EFI_TIMEOUT, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Time out"}, + { EFI_NOT_STARTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Not started"}, + { EFI_ALREADY_STARTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Already started"}, +#endif + { EFI_ABORTED, -EINTR, "Aborted"}, +#if 0 + { EFI_ICMP_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "ICMP Error"}, + { EFI_TFTP_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "TFTP Error"}, + { EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Protocol Error"}, + { EFI_INCOMPATIBLE_VERSION, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Incompatible Version"}, +#endif + { EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, -EACCES, "Security Policy Violation"}, +#if 0 + { EFI_CRC_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "CRC Error"}, + { EFI_END_OF_MEDIA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "End of Media"}, + { EFI_END_OF_FILE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "End of File"}, + { EFI_INVALID_LANGUAGE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Invalid Languages"}, + { EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Compromised Data"}, + + // warnings + { EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Unknown Glyph"}, + { EFI_WARN_DELETE_FAILURE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Delete Failure"}, + { EFI_WARN_WRITE_FAILURE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Write Failure"}, + { EFI_WARN_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Buffer Too Small"}, +#endif +}; + +static int +efi_status_cmp_bsearch(const void *key, const void *item) +{ + u64 status = (u64)(uintptr_t)key; + struct efi_error_code *code = (struct efi_error_code *)item; + + if (status < code->status) + return -1; + if (status > code->status) + return 1; + return 0; +} + int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status) { - int err; - - switch (status) { - case EFI_SUCCESS: - err = 0; - break; - case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER: - err = -EINVAL; - break; - case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES: - err = -ENOSPC; - break; - case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR: - err = -EIO; - break; - case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED: - err = -EROFS; - break; - case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION: - err = -EACCES; - break; - case EFI_NOT_FOUND: - err = -ENOENT; - break; - case EFI_ABORTED: - err = -EINTR; - break; - default: - err = -EINVAL; - } + struct efi_error_code *found; + size_t num = sizeof(efi_error_codes) / sizeof(struct efi_error_code); - return err; + found = bsearch((void *)(uintptr_t)status, efi_error_codes, + sizeof(struct efi_error_code), num, + efi_status_cmp_bsearch); + if (!found) + return -EINVAL; + return found->errno; +} + +const char * +efi_status_to_str(efi_status_t status) +{ + struct efi_error_code *found; + size_t num = sizeof(efi_error_codes) / sizeof(struct efi_error_code); + + found = bsearch((void *)(uintptr_t)status, efi_error_codes, + sizeof(struct efi_error_code), num, + efi_status_cmp_bsearch); + if (!found) + return "Unknown error code"; + return found->description; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efi_status_to_err); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c index 6a337f1f8787..89244e0d9fa8 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c @@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *orig_fdt, unsigned long orig_fdt_size, } } + fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32((u32)efi_get_secureboot()); + status = fdt_setprop_var(fdt, node, "secure-boot-mode", fdt_val32); + if (status) + goto fdt_set_fail; + /* Shrink the FDT back to its minimum size: */ fdt_pack(fdt); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c index 516f4f0069bd..380354755108 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c @@ -29,10 +29,13 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void) { u32 attr; unsigned long size; - enum efi_secureboot_mode mode; + static enum efi_secureboot_mode mode; efi_status_t status; u8 moksbstate; + if (mode != efi_secureboot_mode_unset) + return mode; + mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(get_var); if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) { efi_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n"); @@ -53,10 +56,13 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void) /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) goto secure_boot_enabled; - if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) && moksbstate == 1) - return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) && moksbstate == 1) { + mode = efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + return mode; + } secure_boot_enabled: efi_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n"); - return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; + mode = efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; + return mode; } diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..de0a3714a5d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* Core kernel secure boot support. + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled. + */ +void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) +{ + if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { + switch (mode) { + case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled: + pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n"); + break; + case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled: + set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags); + pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); + break; + default: + pr_warn("Secure boot could not be determined (mode %u)\n", + mode); + break; + } + } +} diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c index d4af17fdba46..154f0403cbf4 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c @@ -321,21 +321,12 @@ static int rmi_input_event(struct hid_device *hdev, u8 *data, int size) { struct rmi_data *hdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = hdata->xport.rmi_dev; - unsigned long flags; if (!(test_bit(RMI_STARTED, &hdata->flags))) return 0; - pm_wakeup_event(hdev->dev.parent, 0); - - local_irq_save(flags); - rmi_set_attn_data(rmi_dev, data[1], &data[2], size - 2); - generic_handle_irq(hdata->rmi_irq); - - local_irq_restore(flags); - return 1; } @@ -589,56 +580,6 @@ static const struct rmi_transport_ops hid_rmi_ops = { .reset = rmi_hid_reset, }; -static void rmi_irq_teardown(void *data) -{ - struct rmi_data *hdata = data; - struct irq_domain *domain = hdata->domain; - - if (!domain) - return; - - irq_dispose_mapping(irq_find_mapping(domain, 0)); - - irq_domain_remove(domain); - hdata->domain = NULL; - hdata->rmi_irq = 0; -} - -static int rmi_irq_map(struct irq_domain *h, unsigned int virq, - irq_hw_number_t hw_irq_num) -{ - irq_set_chip_and_handler(virq, &dummy_irq_chip, handle_simple_irq); - - return 0; -} - -static const struct irq_domain_ops rmi_irq_ops = { - .map = rmi_irq_map, -}; - -static int rmi_setup_irq_domain(struct hid_device *hdev) -{ - struct rmi_data *hdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); - int ret; - - hdata->domain = irq_domain_create_linear(hdev->dev.fwnode, 1, - &rmi_irq_ops, hdata); - if (!hdata->domain) - return -ENOMEM; - - ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&hdev->dev, &rmi_irq_teardown, hdata); - if (ret) - return ret; - - hdata->rmi_irq = irq_create_mapping(hdata->domain, 0); - if (hdata->rmi_irq <= 0) { - hid_err(hdev, "Can't allocate an IRQ\n"); - return hdata->rmi_irq < 0 ? hdata->rmi_irq : -ENXIO; - } - - return 0; -} - static int rmi_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) { struct rmi_data *data = NULL; @@ -711,18 +652,11 @@ static int rmi_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) mutex_init(&data->page_mutex); - ret = rmi_setup_irq_domain(hdev); - if (ret) { - hid_err(hdev, "failed to allocate IRQ domain\n"); - return ret; - } - if (data->device_flags & RMI_DEVICE_HAS_PHYS_BUTTONS) rmi_hid_pdata.gpio_data.disable = true; data->xport.dev = hdev->dev.parent; data->xport.pdata = rmi_hid_pdata; - data->xport.pdata.irq = data->rmi_irq; data->xport.proto_name = "hid"; data->xport.ops = &hid_rmi_ops; diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c index fdda924a2c71..6483f1078866 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -2483,6 +2484,16 @@ static const struct amba_id etm4_ids[] = { {}, }; +static const struct dmi_system_id broken_coresight[] = { + { + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "HPE"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Apollo 70"), + }, + }, + { } /* terminating entry */ +}; + MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(amba, etm4_ids); static struct amba_driver etm4x_amba_driver = { @@ -2557,6 +2568,11 @@ static int __init etm4x_init(void) { int ret; + if (dmi_check_system(broken_coresight)) { + pr_info("ETM4 disabled due to firmware bug\n"); + return 0; + } + ret = etm4_pm_setup(); /* etm4_pm_setup() does its own cleanup - exit on error */ @@ -2583,6 +2599,9 @@ static int __init etm4x_init(void) static void __exit etm4x_exit(void) { + if (dmi_check_system(broken_coresight)) + return; + amba_driver_unregister(&etm4x_amba_driver); platform_driver_unregister(&etm4_platform_driver); etm4_pm_clear(); diff --git a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c index ccd9338a44db..5c54e522e8a4 100644 --- a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c +++ b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c @@ -183,34 +183,47 @@ void rmi_set_attn_data(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, unsigned long irq_status, attn_data.data = fifo_data; kfifo_put(&drvdata->attn_fifo, attn_data); + + schedule_work(&drvdata->attn_work); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmi_set_attn_data); -static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) +static void attn_callback(struct work_struct *work) { - struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = dev_id; - struct rmi_driver_data *drvdata = dev_get_drvdata(&rmi_dev->dev); + struct rmi_driver_data *drvdata = container_of(work, + struct rmi_driver_data, + attn_work); struct rmi4_attn_data attn_data = {0}; int ret, count; count = kfifo_get(&drvdata->attn_fifo, &attn_data); - if (count) { - *(drvdata->irq_status) = attn_data.irq_status; - drvdata->attn_data = attn_data; - } + if (!count) + return; - ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); + *(drvdata->irq_status) = attn_data.irq_status; + drvdata->attn_data = attn_data; + + ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(drvdata->rmi_dev); if (ret) - rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &rmi_dev->dev, + rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &drvdata->rmi_dev->dev, "Failed to process interrupt request: %d\n", ret); - if (count) { - kfree(attn_data.data); - drvdata->attn_data.data = NULL; - } + kfree(attn_data.data); + drvdata->attn_data.data = NULL; if (!kfifo_is_empty(&drvdata->attn_fifo)) - return rmi_irq_fn(irq, dev_id); + schedule_work(&drvdata->attn_work); +} + +static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) +{ + struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = dev_id; + int ret; + + ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); + if (ret) + rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &rmi_dev->dev, + "Failed to process interrupt request: %d\n", ret); return IRQ_HANDLED; } @@ -218,7 +231,6 @@ static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id) static int rmi_irq_init(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev) { struct rmi_device_platform_data *pdata = rmi_get_platform_data(rmi_dev); - struct rmi_driver_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(&rmi_dev->dev); int irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq); int ret; @@ -236,8 +248,6 @@ static int rmi_irq_init(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev) return ret; } - data->enabled = true; - return 0; } @@ -887,23 +897,27 @@ void rmi_enable_irq(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, bool clear_wake) if (data->enabled) goto out; - enable_irq(irq); - data->enabled = true; - if (clear_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { - retval = disable_irq_wake(irq); - if (retval) - dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, - "Failed to disable irq for wake: %d\n", - retval); - } + if (irq) { + enable_irq(irq); + data->enabled = true; + if (clear_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { + retval = disable_irq_wake(irq); + if (retval) + dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, + "Failed to disable irq for wake: %d\n", + retval); + } - /* - * Call rmi_process_interrupt_requests() after enabling irq, - * otherwise we may lose interrupt on edge-triggered systems. - */ - irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq); - if (irq_flags & IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH) - rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); + /* + * Call rmi_process_interrupt_requests() after enabling irq, + * otherwise we may lose interrupt on edge-triggered systems. + */ + irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq); + if (irq_flags & IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH) + rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev); + } else { + data->enabled = true; + } out: mutex_unlock(&data->enabled_mutex); @@ -923,20 +937,22 @@ void rmi_disable_irq(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, bool enable_wake) goto out; data->enabled = false; - disable_irq(irq); - if (enable_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { - retval = enable_irq_wake(irq); - if (retval) - dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, - "Failed to enable irq for wake: %d\n", - retval); - } - - /* make sure the fifo is clean */ - while (!kfifo_is_empty(&data->attn_fifo)) { - count = kfifo_get(&data->attn_fifo, &attn_data); - if (count) - kfree(attn_data.data); + if (irq) { + disable_irq(irq); + if (enable_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) { + retval = enable_irq_wake(irq); + if (retval) + dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev, + "Failed to enable irq for wake: %d\n", + retval); + } + } else { + /* make sure the fifo is clean */ + while (!kfifo_is_empty(&data->attn_fifo)) { + count = kfifo_get(&data->attn_fifo, &attn_data); + if (count) + kfree(attn_data.data); + } } out: @@ -979,6 +995,8 @@ static int rmi_driver_remove(struct device *dev) rmi_disable_irq(rmi_dev, false); + cancel_work_sync(&data->attn_work); + rmi_f34_remove_sysfs(rmi_dev); rmi_free_function_list(rmi_dev); @@ -1224,9 +1242,15 @@ static int rmi_driver_probe(struct device *dev) } } - retval = rmi_irq_init(rmi_dev); - if (retval < 0) - goto err_destroy_functions; + if (pdata->irq) { + retval = rmi_irq_init(rmi_dev); + if (retval < 0) + goto err_destroy_functions; + } + + data->enabled = true; + + INIT_WORK(&data->attn_work, attn_callback); if (data->f01_container->dev.driver) { /* Driver already bound, so enable ATTN now. */ diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c index 59244c744eab..183f4eaab6e2 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -2967,6 +2968,27 @@ int iommu_fwspec_add_ids(struct device *dev, const u32 *ids, int num_ids) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_fwspec_add_ids); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 +static int __init iommu_quirks(void) +{ + const char *vendor, *name; + + vendor = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_SYS_VENDOR); + name = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME); + + if (vendor && + (strncmp(vendor, "GIGABYTE", 8) == 0 && name && + (strncmp(name, "R120", 4) == 0 || + strncmp(name, "R270", 4) == 0))) { + pr_warn("Gigabyte %s detected, force iommu passthrough mode", name); + iommu_def_domain_type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY; + } + + return 0; +} +arch_initcall(iommu_quirks); +#endif + /** * iommu_setup_default_domain - Set the default_domain for the group * @group: Group to change diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c index b9c252aa6fe0..166a5815e1ef 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c @@ -4453,6 +4453,30 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9000, DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9084, quirk_bridge_cavm_thrx2_pcie_root); +/* + * PCI BAR 5 is not setup correctly for the on-board AHCI controller + * on Broadcom's Vulcan processor. Added a quirk to fix BAR 5 by + * using BAR 4's resources which are populated correctly and NOT + * actually used by the AHCI controller. + */ +static void quirk_fix_vulcan_ahci_bars(struct pci_dev *dev) +{ + struct resource *r = &dev->resource[4]; + + if (!(r->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM) || (r->start == 0)) + return; + + /* Set BAR5 resource to BAR4 */ + dev->resource[5] = *r; + + /* Update BAR5 in pci config space */ + pci_write_config_dword(dev, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_5, r->start); + + /* Clear BAR4's resource */ + memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); +} +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9027, quirk_fix_vulcan_ahci_bars); + /* * Intersil/Techwell TW686[4589]-based video capture cards have an empty (zero) * class code. Fix it. diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sd.c b/drivers/scsi/sd.c index 0252d3f6bed1..4dc09593f0eb 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/sd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sd.c @@ -121,6 +121,14 @@ static const char *sd_cache_types[] = { "write back, no read (daft)" }; +static const char *sd_probe_types[] = { "async", "sync" }; + +static char sd_probe_type[6] = "async"; +module_param_string(probe, sd_probe_type, sizeof(sd_probe_type), + S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(probe, "async or sync. Setting to 'sync' disables asynchronous " + "device number assignments (sda, sdb, ...)."); + static void sd_set_flush_flag(struct scsi_disk *sdkp, struct queue_limits *lim) { @@ -4375,6 +4383,8 @@ static int __init init_sd(void) goto err_out_class; } + if (!strcmp(sd_probe_type, "sync")) + sd_template.gendrv.probe_type = PROBE_FORCE_SYNCHRONOUS; err = scsi_register_driver(&sd_template.gendrv); if (err) goto err_out_driver; diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c index 256fe8c86828..2e4a09948df8 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c @@ -5893,6 +5893,13 @@ static void hub_event(struct work_struct *work) (u16) hub->change_bits[0], (u16) hub->event_bits[0]); + /* Don't disconnect USB-SATA on TrimSlice */ + if (strcmp(dev_name(hdev->bus->controller), "tegra-ehci.0") == 0) { + if ((hdev->state == 7) && (hub->change_bits[0] == 0) && + (hub->event_bits[0] == 0x2)) + hub->event_bits[0] = 0; + } + /* Lock the device, then check to see if we were * disconnected while waiting for the lock to succeed. */ usb_lock_device(hdev); diff --git a/fs/erofs/super.c b/fs/erofs/super.c index 937a215f626c..5136cda5972a 100644 --- a/fs/erofs/super.c +++ b/fs/erofs/super.c @@ -644,14 +644,21 @@ static int erofs_fc_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) * fs contexts (including its own) due to self-controlled RO * accesses/contexts and no side-effect changes that need to * context save & restore so it can reuse the current thread - * context. However, it still needs to bump `s_stack_depth` to - * avoid kernel stack overflow from nested filesystems. + * context. + * However, we still need to prevent kernel stack overflow due + * to filesystem nesting: just ensure that s_stack_depth is 0 + * to disallow mounting EROFS on stacked filesystems. + * Note: s_stack_depth is not incremented here for now, since + * EROFS is the only fs supporting file-backed mounts for now. + * It MUST change if another fs plans to support them, which + * may also require adjusting FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH. */ if (erofs_is_fileio_mode(sbi)) { - sb->s_stack_depth = - file_inode(sbi->dif0.file)->i_sb->s_stack_depth + 1; - if (sb->s_stack_depth > FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH) { - erofs_err(sb, "maximum fs stacking depth exceeded"); + inode = file_inode(sbi->dif0.file); + if ((inode->i_sb->s_op == &erofs_sops && + !inode->i_sb->s_bdev) || + inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth) { + erofs_err(sb, "file-backed mounts cannot be applied to stacked fses"); return -ENOTBLK; } } diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index a98cc39e7aaa..00f31eefd0c5 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ struct screen_info; #define EFI_ABORTED (21 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) #define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION (26 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) +#define EFI_IS_ERROR(x) ((x) & (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))) + typedef unsigned long efi_status_t; typedef u8 efi_bool_t; typedef u16 efi_char16_t; /* UNICODE character */ @@ -865,6 +867,14 @@ static inline int efi_range_is_wc(unsigned long start, unsigned long len) #define EFI_MEM_ATTR 9 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */ #define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE 10 /* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */ #define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS 11 /* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */ +#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 12 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */ + +enum efi_secureboot_mode { + efi_secureboot_mode_unset, + efi_secureboot_mode_unknown, + efi_secureboot_mode_disabled, + efi_secureboot_mode_enabled, +}; #ifdef CONFIG_EFI /* @@ -876,6 +886,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature) } extern void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused); +extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode); + bool __pure __efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void); static inline bool __pure efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void) @@ -897,6 +909,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature) static inline void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused) {} +static inline void efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) {} + static inline bool efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void) { return false; @@ -911,6 +925,7 @@ static inline void efi_find_mirror(void) {} #endif extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status); +extern const char *efi_status_to_str(efi_status_t status); /* * Variable Attributes @@ -1126,13 +1141,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(void) { return true; } extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const void *caller); extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void); -enum efi_secureboot_mode { - efi_secureboot_mode_unset, - efi_secureboot_mode_unknown, - efi_secureboot_mode_disabled, - efi_secureboot_mode_enabled, -}; - static inline enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var) { diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 8c42b4bde09c..694ce5c5bcd4 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -446,6 +446,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what) + #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, int type) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_alloc, struct perf_event *event) diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index e135cc79acee..65a08753a2e7 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ struct module { struct module_attribute *modinfo_attrs; const char *version; const char *srcversion; + const char *rhelversion; struct kobject *holders_dir; /* Exported symbols */ diff --git a/include/linux/rmi.h b/include/linux/rmi.h index ab7eea01ab42..fff7c5f737fc 100644 --- a/include/linux/rmi.h +++ b/include/linux/rmi.h @@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ struct rmi_driver_data { struct rmi4_attn_data attn_data; DECLARE_KFIFO(attn_fifo, struct rmi4_attn_data, 16); + struct work_struct attn_work; }; int rmi_register_transport_device(struct rmi_transport_dev *xport); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 92ac3f27b973..d9efb9b50aed 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2407,4 +2407,13 @@ static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM +extern int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level); +#else +static inline int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM */ + #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c index c66b26184936..7da1349a42a2 100644 --- a/kernel/module/main.c +++ b/kernel/module/main.c @@ -606,6 +606,7 @@ static const struct module_attribute modinfo_##field = { \ MODINFO_ATTR(version); MODINFO_ATTR(srcversion); +MODINFO_ATTR(rhelversion); static struct { char name[MODULE_NAME_LEN]; @@ -1058,6 +1059,7 @@ const struct module_attribute *const modinfo_attrs[] = { &module_uevent, &modinfo_version, &modinfo_srcversion, + &modinfo_rhelversion, &modinfo_initstate, &modinfo_coresize, #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLOC diff --git a/kernel/module/signing.c b/kernel/module/signing.c index a2ff4242e623..f0d2be1ee4f1 100644 --- a/kernel/module/signing.c +++ b/kernel/module/signing.c @@ -61,10 +61,17 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms); info->len = modlen; - return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); + if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) { + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); + } + return ret; } int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib index 1d581ba5df66..7826803444df 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.lib +++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib @@ -191,7 +191,10 @@ objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += --static-call objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION) += --uaccess objtool-args-$(or $(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL),$(CONFIG_KCOV)) += --no-unreachable objtool-args-$(CONFIG_PREFIX_SYMBOLS) += --prefix=$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_PADDING_BYTES) +# RHEL-only: don't enforce OBJTOOL_WERROR for out of tree modules +ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),) objtool-args-$(CONFIG_OBJTOOL_WERROR) += --Werror +endif objtool-args = $(objtool-args-y) \ $(if $(delay-objtool), --link) \ diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index 47c8aa2a6939..de98c5afa921 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include "modpost.h" #include "../../include/linux/license.h" +#include "../../include/generated/uapi/linux/version.h" #define MODULE_NS_PREFIX "module:" @@ -2029,6 +2030,12 @@ static void write_buf(struct buffer *b, const char *fname) } } +static void add_rhelversion(struct buffer *b, struct module *mod) +{ + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(rhelversion, \"%d.%d\");\n", RHEL_MAJOR, + RHEL_MINOR); +} + static void write_if_changed(struct buffer *b, const char *fname) { char *tmp; @@ -2113,6 +2120,7 @@ static void write_mod_c_file(struct module *mod) } add_srcversion(&buf, mod); + add_rhelversion(&buf, mod); ret = snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s.mod.c", mod->name); if (ret >= sizeof(fname)) { diff --git a/scripts/tags.sh b/scripts/tags.sh index 99ce427d9a69..f191cd9d7ee6 100755 --- a/scripts/tags.sh +++ b/scripts/tags.sh @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ fi ignore="$(echo "$RCS_FIND_IGNORE" | sed 's|\\||g' )" # tags and cscope files should also ignore MODVERSION *.mod.c files ignore="$ignore ( -name *.mod.c ) -prune -o" +# RHEL tags and cscope should also ignore redhat/rpm +ignore="$ignore ( -path redhat/rpm ) -prune -o" # ignore arbitrary directories if [ -n "${IGNORE_DIRS}" ]; then diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index d1fdd113450a..182e8090cfe8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, return NULL; if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status); + pr_err("Couldn't get size: %s (0x%lx)\n", + efi_status_to_str(*status), *status); return NULL; } @@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) { kfree(db); - pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status); + pr_err("Error reading db var: %s (0x%lx)\n", + efi_status_to_str(*status), *status); return NULL; } diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig index e84ddf484010..d0501353a4b9 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig +++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig @@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will unconditionally be called before any other LSMs. +config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT + bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode" + default n + depends on EFI && SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY + help + UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware + will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Secure boot mode may + be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if + not indicated by the boot parameters. + + Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being triggered if + EFI Secure Boot is set. + choice prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode" default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index cf83afa1d879..aba751e7abff 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -72,6 +72,17 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) return 0; } +/** + * security_lock_kernel_down() - Put the kernel into lock-down mode. + * + * @where: Where the lock-down is originating from (e.g. command line option) + * @level: The lock-down level (can only increase) + */ +int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) +{ + return lock_kernel_down(where, level); +} + static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down), }; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile index e59b2bbf8d92..ac86a0947f60 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ LSKELS := fexit_sleep.c trace_printk.c trace_vprintk.c map_ptr_kern.c \ LSKELS_SIGNED := fentry_test.c fexit_test.c atomics.c # Generate both light skeleton and libbpf skeleton for these -LSKELS_EXTRA := test_ksyms_module.c test_ksyms_weak.c kfunc_call_test.c \ +LSKELS_EXTRA := test_ksyms_module.c kfunc_call_test.c \ kfunc_call_test_subprog.c SKEL_BLACKLIST += $$(LSKELS) $$(LSKELS_SIGNED) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c index 1d7a2f1e0731..b22f3a9cb8b8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ #include "test_ksyms_btf.skel.h" #include "test_ksyms_btf_null_check.skel.h" #include "test_ksyms_weak.skel.h" -#include "test_ksyms_weak.lskel.h" #include "test_ksyms_btf_write_check.skel.h" static int duration; @@ -111,33 +110,6 @@ static void test_weak_syms(void) test_ksyms_weak__destroy(skel); } -static void test_weak_syms_lskel(void) -{ - struct test_ksyms_weak_lskel *skel; - struct test_ksyms_weak_lskel__data *data; - int err; - - skel = test_ksyms_weak_lskel__open_and_load(); - if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_ksyms_weak_lskel__open_and_load")) - return; - - err = test_ksyms_weak_lskel__attach(skel); - if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "test_ksyms_weak_lskel__attach")) - goto cleanup; - - /* trigger tracepoint */ - usleep(1); - - data = skel->data; - ASSERT_EQ(data->out__existing_typed, 0, "existing typed ksym"); - ASSERT_NEQ(data->out__existing_typeless, -1, "existing typeless ksym"); - ASSERT_EQ(data->out__non_existent_typeless, 0, "nonexistent typeless ksym"); - ASSERT_EQ(data->out__non_existent_typed, 0, "nonexistent typed ksym"); - -cleanup: - test_ksyms_weak_lskel__destroy(skel); -} - static void test_write_check(bool test_handler1) { struct test_ksyms_btf_write_check *skel; @@ -180,9 +152,6 @@ void test_ksyms_btf(void) if (test__start_subtest("weak_ksyms")) test_weak_syms(); - if (test__start_subtest("weak_ksyms_lskel")) - test_weak_syms_lskel(); - if (test__start_subtest("write_check1")) test_write_check(true);