krb5 1.21.3-11

- Fix strchr() conformance to C23

.fmf/version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1

.gitignore

@@ -1,49 +1,50 @@
-krb5-1.3.4.tar.gz
-krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz
-krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz
-krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.4.tar.gz
-krb5-1.4.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz
-krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz
-krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz
-krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.5.tar.gz
-krb5-1.5.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.6.tar.gz
-krb5-1.6.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.6-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz
-krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.6.1-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz
-krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.6.2-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz
-krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.6.3-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.7.tar.gz
-krb5-1.7.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.7-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz
-krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.7.1-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.8.tar.gz
-krb5-1.8.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz
-krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.8-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz
-krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.8.1-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.8.2.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.8.2-pdf.tar.gz
-krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz
-krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz.asc
-krb5-1.8.3-pdf.tar.gz
+/results_krb5
+/krb5-1.3.4.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.4.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.4.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.5.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.5.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.6.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.6.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.6-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.6.1-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.6.2-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.6.3-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.7.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.7.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.7-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.7.1-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.8.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.8.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz
+/krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.8-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.8.1-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.8.2.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.8.2-pdf.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.8.3-pdf.tar.gz
 /krb5-1.9-beta2.tar.gz
 /krb5-1.9-beta2.tar.gz.asc
 /krb5-1.9-beta2-pdf.tar.bz2
@@ -187,3 +188,23 @@ krb5-1.8.3-pdf.tar.gz
 /krb5-1.18.1.tar.gz.asc
 /krb5-1.18.2.tar.gz
 /krb5-1.18.2.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.18.3.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.18.3.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.19-beta1.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.19-beta1.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.19-beta2.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.19-beta2.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.19.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.19.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.19.1.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.19.1.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.19.2.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.19.2.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.20.1.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.20.1.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.21.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.21.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.21.2.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.21.2.tar.gz.asc
+/krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz
+/krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz.asc

0001-downstream-Revert-Don-t-issue-session-keys-with-depr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+From 6f7fd964539dfe4a885068f43a91db9738661870 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2024 11:15:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Revert "Don't issue session keys with
+ deprecated enctypes"
+
+This reverts commit 1b57a4d134bbd0e7c52d5885a92eccc815726463.
+---
+ doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 12 ------------
+ doc/admin/enctypes.rst             | 23 +++-------------------
+ src/include/k5-int.h               |  4 ----
+ src/kdc/kdc_util.c                 | 10 ----------
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c      | 31 +++++++++++-------------------
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c        | 10 ----------
+ src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py     |  3 +--
+ src/tests/t_etype_info.py          |  2 +-
+ src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py         | 28 ++-------------------------
+ src/util/k5test.py                 |  4 ++--
+ 10 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+index ecdf917501..f22d5db11b 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+@@ -95,18 +95,6 @@ Additionally, krb5.conf may include any of the relations described in
+ 
+ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+ 
+-**allow_des3**
+-    Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.
+-    In future releases, this flag will allow des3-cbc-sha1 to be used
+-    at all.  The default value for this tag is false.  (Added in
+-    release 1.21.)
+-
+-**allow_rc4**
+-    Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour-hmac session keys.
+-    In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour-hmac to be used
+-    at all.  The default value for this tag is false.  (Added in
+-    release 1.21.)
+-
+ **allow_weak_crypto**
+     If this flag is set to false, then weak encryption types (as noted
+     in :ref:`Encryption_types` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`) will be filtered
+diff --git a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+index dce19ad43e..694922c0d9 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+@@ -48,15 +48,12 @@ Session key selection
+ The KDC chooses the session key enctype by taking the intersection of
+ its **permitted_enctypes** list, the list of long-term keys for the
+ most recent kvno of the service, and the client's requested list of
+-enctypes.  Starting in krb5-1.21, all services are assumed to support
+-aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, des3-cbc-sha1 and arcfour-hmac session
+-keys will not be issued by default.
++enctypes.
+ 
+ Starting in krb5-1.11, it is possible to set a string attribute on a
+ service principal to control what session key enctypes the KDC may
+-issue for service tickets for that principal, overriding the service's
+-long-term keys and the assumption of aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 support.
+-See :ref:`set_string` in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
++issue for service tickets for that principal.  See :ref:`set_string`
++in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
+ 
+ 
+ Choosing enctypes for a service
+@@ -90,20 +87,6 @@ affect how enctypes are chosen.
+     acceptable risk for your environment and the weak enctypes are
+     required for backward compatibility.
+ 
+-**allow_des3**
+-    was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*.  Unless this
+-    flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
+-    des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.  In a future release, this flag will
+-    control whether des3-cbc-sha1 is permitted in similar fashion to
+-    weak enctypes.
+-
+-**allow_rc4**
+-    was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*.  Unless this
+-    flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
+-    arcfour-hmac session keys.  In a future release, this flag will
+-    control whether arcfour-hmac is permitted in similar fashion to
+-    weak enctypes.
+-
+ **permitted_enctypes**
+     controls the set of enctypes that a service will permit for
+     session keys and for ticket and authenticator encryption.  The KDC
+diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
+index 2f7791b775..1d1c8293f4 100644
+--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
++++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
+@@ -180,8 +180,6 @@ typedef unsigned char   u_char;
+  * matches the variable name.  Keep these alphabetized. */
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ACL_FILE                     "acl_file"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ADMIN_SERVER                 "admin_server"
+-#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3                   "allow_des3"
+-#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4                    "allow_rc4"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO            "allow_weak_crypto"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL                "auth_to_local"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL_NAMES          "auth_to_local_names"
+@@ -1240,8 +1238,6 @@ struct _krb5_context {
+     struct _kdb_log_context *kdblog_context;
+ 
+     krb5_boolean allow_weak_crypto;
+-    krb5_boolean allow_des3;
+-    krb5_boolean allow_rc4;
+     krb5_boolean ignore_acceptor_hostname;
+     krb5_boolean enforce_ok_as_delegate;
+     enum dns_canonhost dns_canonicalize_hostname;
+diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+index e54cc751f9..75e04b73db 100644
+--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
++++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+@@ -1088,16 +1088,6 @@ select_session_keytype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
+         if (!krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, ktype[i]))
+             continue;
+ 
+-        /*
+-         * Prevent these deprecated enctypes from being used as session keys
+-         * unless they are explicitly allowed.  In the future they will be more
+-         * comprehensively disabled and eventually removed.
+-         */
+-        if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 && !context->allow_des3)
+-            continue;
+-        if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC && !context->allow_rc4)
+-            continue;
+-
+         if (dbentry_supports_enctype(context, server, ktype[i]))
+             return ktype[i];
+     }
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+index ea089f0fcc..1b420a3ac2 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+@@ -1582,31 +1582,22 @@ warn_pw_expiry(krb5_context context, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options,
+     (*prompter)(context, data, 0, banner, 0, 0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Display a warning via the prompter if a deprecated enctype was used for
+- * either the reply key or the session key. */
++/* Display a warning via the prompter if des3-cbc-sha1 was used for either the
++ * reply key or the session key. */
+ static void
+-warn_deprecated(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+-                krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
++warn_des3(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
++          krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
+ {
+-    krb5_enctype etype;
+-    char encbuf[128], banner[256];
++    const char *banner;
+ 
+-    if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
+-        return;
+-
+-    if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(as_key_enctype))
+-        etype = as_key_enctype;
+-    else if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype))
+-        etype = ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype;
+-    else
++    if (as_key_enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 &&
++        ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1)
+         return;
+-
+-    if (krb5_enctype_to_name(etype, FALSE, encbuf, sizeof(encbuf)) != 0)
++    if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
+         return;
+-    snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
+-             _("Warning: encryption type %s used for authentication is "
+-               "deprecated and will be disabled"), encbuf);
+ 
++    banner = _("Warning: encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 used for "
++               "authentication is weak and will be disabled");
+     /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
+     (*ctx->prompter)(context, ctx->prompter_data, NULL, banner, 0, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -1857,7 +1848,7 @@ init_creds_step_reply(krb5_context context,
+     ctx->complete = TRUE;
+     warn_pw_expiry(context, ctx->opt, ctx->prompter, ctx->prompter_data,
+                    ctx->in_tkt_service, ctx->reply);
+-    warn_deprecated(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
++    warn_des3(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
+ 
+ cleanup:
+     krb5_free_pa_data(context, kdc_padata);
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+index a6c2bbeb54..87b486c53f 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+@@ -221,16 +221,6 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
+         goto cleanup;
+     ctx->allow_weak_crypto = tmp;
+ 
+-    retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3, 0, &tmp);
+-    if (retval)
+-        goto cleanup;
+-    ctx->allow_des3 = tmp;
+-
+-    retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4, 0, &tmp);
+-    if (retval)
+-        goto cleanup;
+-    ctx->allow_rc4 = tmp;
+-
+     retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_IGNORE_ACCEPTOR_HOSTNAME, 0, &tmp);
+     if (retval)
+         goto cleanup;
+diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+index f5f11842e2..7494d7fcdb 100755
+--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
++++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ d_rc4 = 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac'
+ # These tests make assumptions about the default enctype lists, so set
+ # them explicitly rather than relying on the library defaults.
+ supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
+-conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4',
+-                        'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
++conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4'},
+         'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supp}}}
+ realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf)
+ shutil.copyfile(realm.ccache, os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'save'))
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+index 38cf96ca8f..c982508d8b 100644
+--- a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ from k5test import *
+ 
+ supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts des3-cbc-sha1 rc4-hmac'
+-conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
++conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_weak_crypto': 'true'},
+         'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
+ realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False, krb5_conf=conf)
+ 
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+index 5a213617b5..9024aee838 100755
+--- a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ conf3 = {'libdefaults': {
+         'default_tkt_enctypes': 'aes128-cts',
+         'default_tgs_enctypes': 'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts'}}
+ conf4 = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes256-cts'}}
+-conf5 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'}}
+-conf6 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true'}}
+ # Test with client request and session_enctypes preferring aes128, but
+ # aes256 long-term key.
+ realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf1, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+@@ -56,12 +54,10 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
+            'aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
+ test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+ 
+-# 3b: Skip RC4 (as the KDC does not allow it for session keys by
+-# default) and negotiate aes128-cts session key, with only an aes256
+-# long-term service key.
++# 3b: Negotiate rc4-hmac session key when principal only has aes256 long-term.
+ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
+            'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
+-test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
++test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+ realm.stop()
+ 
+ # 4: Check that permitted_enctypes is a default for session key enctypes.
+@@ -71,24 +67,4 @@ realm.run([kvno, 'user'],
+           expected_trace=('etypes requested in TGS request: aes256-cts',))
+ realm.stop()
+ 
+-# 5: allow_rc4 permits negotiation of rc4-hmac session key.
+-realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf5, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
+-realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'rc4-hmac'])
+-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+-realm.stop()
+-
+-# 6: allow_des3 permits negotiation of des3-cbc-sha1 session key.
+-realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf6, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
+-realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'des3-cbc-sha1'])
+-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:des3-cbc-sha1', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+-realm.stop()
+-
+-# 7: default config negotiates aes256-sha1 session key for RC4-only service.
+-realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'rc4-hmac', 'server'])
+-test_kvno(realm, 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac')
+-realm.stop()
+-
+ success('sesskeynego')
+diff --git a/src/util/k5test.py b/src/util/k5test.py
+index 8e5f5ba8e9..2a86c5cdfc 100644
+--- a/src/util/k5test.py
++++ b/src/util/k5test.py
+@@ -1340,14 +1340,14 @@ _passes = [
+ 
+     # Exercise the DES3 enctype.
+     ('des3', None,
+-     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3 aes256-sha1'}},
++     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3'}},
+      {'realms': {'$realm': {
+                     'supported_enctypes': 'des3-cbc-sha1:normal',
+                     'master_key_type': 'des3-cbc-sha1'}}}),
+ 
+     # Exercise the arcfour enctype.
+     ('arcfour', None,
+-     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4 aes256-sha1'}},
++     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4'}},
+      {'realms': {'$realm': {
+                     'supported_enctypes': 'arcfour-hmac:normal',
+                     'master_key_type': 'arcfour-hmac'}}}),
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0002-downstream-ksu-pam-integration.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 9feb7298b90d3e6a34821fce7315757c0bf81c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From de4205c45e310ceaaa7cd7958af7293322fa43a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:29:58 -0400
 Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] ksu pam integration
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ Last-updated: krb5-1.18-beta1
  create mode 100644 src/clients/ksu/pam.h
 
 diff --git a/src/aclocal.m4 b/src/aclocal.m4
-index 2394f7e33..830203683 100644
+index 3d66a876b3..ce3c5a9bac 100644
 --- a/src/aclocal.m4
 +++ b/src/aclocal.m4
-@@ -1675,3 +1675,72 @@ if test "$with_ldap" = yes; then
+@@ -1458,3 +1458,72 @@ if test "$with_ldap" = yes; then
    OPENLDAP_PLUGIN=yes
  fi
  ])dnl
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ index 2394f7e33..830203683 100644
 +])dnl
 +
 diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in b/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
-index 8b4edce4d..9d58f29b5 100644
+index 8b4edce4d8..9d58f29b5d 100644
 --- a/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
 +++ b/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
 @@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ BUILDTOP=$(REL)..$(S)..
@@ -145,11 +145,11 @@ index 8b4edce4d..9d58f29b5 100644
  clean:
  	$(RM) ksu
 diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/main.c b/src/clients/ksu/main.c
-index 57c349200..508242e0e 100644
+index af12861729..931f054041 100644
 --- a/src/clients/ksu/main.c
 +++ b/src/clients/ksu/main.c
 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
-  * KSU was writen by:  Ari Medvinsky, ari@isi.edu
+  * KSU was written by:  Ari Medvinsky, ari@isi.edu
   */
  
 +#include "autoconf.h"
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ index 57c349200..508242e0e 100644
      }
 diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/pam.c b/src/clients/ksu/pam.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..cbfe48704
+index 0000000000..cbfe487047
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/src/clients/ksu/pam.c
 @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ index 000000000..cbfe48704
 +#endif
 diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/pam.h b/src/clients/ksu/pam.h
 new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..0ab76569c
+index 0000000000..0ab76569cb
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/src/clients/ksu/pam.h
 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
@@ -760,10 +760,10 @@ index 000000000..0ab76569c
 +void appl_pam_cleanup(void);
 +#endif
 diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index 234f4281c..d1f576124 100644
+index 77be7a2025..587221936e 100644
 --- a/src/configure.ac
 +++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -1390,6 +1390,8 @@ AC_SUBST([VERTO_VERSION])
+@@ -1399,6 +1399,8 @@ AC_SUBST([VERTO_VERSION])
  
  AC_PATH_PROG(GROFF, groff)
  
@@ -772,3 +772,6 @@ index 234f4281c..d1f576124 100644
  # Make localedir work in autoconf 2.5x.
  if test "${localedir+set}" != set; then
      localedir='$(datadir)/locale'
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0003-downstream-SELinux-integration.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From f8c70f6190a0573e2aca0b40964cf3b1a73ca8bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 30ff501e4b519396f5aea25e24919be817863e7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:30:53 -0400
 Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] SELinux integration
@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ The selabel APIs for looking up the context should be thread-safe (per
 Red Hat #273081), so switching to using them instead of matchpathcon(),
 which we used earlier, is some improvement.
 
-Last-updated: krb5-1.18-beta1
+Last-updated: krb5-1.20.1
+[jrische@redhat.com: Replace deprecated security_context_t by char *:
+    - src/util/support/selinux.c]
 ---
  src/aclocal.m4                                |  48 +++
  src/build-tools/krb5-config.in                |   3 +-
@@ -61,16 +63,16 @@ Last-updated: krb5-1.18-beta1
  .../kdb/ldap/ldap_util/kdb5_ldap_services.c   |  11 +-
  src/util/profile/prof_file.c                  |   3 +-
  src/util/support/Makefile.in                  |   3 +-
- src/util/support/selinux.c                    | 406 ++++++++++++++++++
- 24 files changed, 573 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+ src/util/support/selinux.c                    | 405 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 24 files changed, 572 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
  create mode 100644 src/include/k5-label.h
  create mode 100644 src/util/support/selinux.c
 
 diff --git a/src/aclocal.m4 b/src/aclocal.m4
-index 830203683..6796fec53 100644
+index ce3c5a9bac..3331970930 100644
 --- a/src/aclocal.m4
 +++ b/src/aclocal.m4
-@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ AC_SUBST_FILE(libnodeps_frag)
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ AC_SUBST_FILE(libnodeps_frag)
  dnl
  KRB5_AC_PRAGMA_WEAK_REF
  WITH_LDAP
@@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ index 830203683..6796fec53 100644
  KRB5_LIB_PARAMS
  KRB5_AC_INITFINI
  KRB5_AC_ENABLE_THREADS
-@@ -1743,4 +1744,51 @@ AC_SUBST(PAM_LIBS)
+@@ -1526,4 +1527,51 @@ AC_SUBST(PAM_LIBS)
  AC_SUBST(PAM_MAN)
  AC_SUBST(NON_PAM_MAN)
  ])dnl
@@ -131,10 +133,10 @@ index 830203683..6796fec53 100644
 +AC_SUBST(SELINUX_LIBS)
 +])dnl
 diff --git a/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in b/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
-index f6184da3f..c17cb5eb5 100755
+index 8e6eb86601..7677f37359 100755
 --- a/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
 +++ b/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
-@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ DL_LIB='@DL_LIB@'
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ DL_LIB='@DL_LIB@'
  DEFCCNAME='@DEFCCNAME@'
  DEFKTNAME='@DEFKTNAME@'
  DEFCKTNAME='@DEFCKTNAME@'
@@ -142,7 +144,7 @@ index f6184da3f..c17cb5eb5 100755
  
  LIBS='@LIBS@'
  GEN_LIB=@GEN_LIB@
-@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ if test -n "$do_libs"; then
+@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ if test -n "$do_libs"; then
      fi
  
      # If we ever support a flag to generate output suitable for static
@@ -152,7 +154,7 @@ index f6184da3f..c17cb5eb5 100755
  
      echo $lib_flags
 diff --git a/src/config/pre.in b/src/config/pre.in
-index ce87e21ca..917357df9 100644
+index a0c60c70b3..7eaa2f351c 100644
 --- a/src/config/pre.in
 +++ b/src/config/pre.in
 @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ LD = $(PURE) @LD@
@@ -163,7 +165,7 @@ index ce87e21ca..917357df9 100644
  
  INSTALL=@INSTALL@
  INSTALL_STRIP=
-@@ -402,7 +403,7 @@ SUPPORT_LIB			= -l$(SUPPORT_LIBNAME)
+@@ -379,7 +380,7 @@ SUPPORT_LIB			= -l$(SUPPORT_LIBNAME)
  # HESIOD_LIBS is -lhesiod...
  HESIOD_LIBS	= @HESIOD_LIBS@
  
@@ -173,10 +175,10 @@ index ce87e21ca..917357df9 100644
  GSS_LIBS	= $(GSS_KRB5_LIB)
  # needs fixing if ever used on macOS!
 diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index d1f576124..440a22bd9 100644
+index 587221936e..69be9030f8 100644
 --- a/src/configure.ac
 +++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -1392,6 +1392,8 @@ AC_PATH_PROG(GROFF, groff)
+@@ -1401,6 +1401,8 @@ AC_PATH_PROG(GROFF, groff)
  
  KRB5_WITH_PAM
  
@@ -186,7 +188,7 @@ index d1f576124..440a22bd9 100644
  if test "${localedir+set}" != set; then
      localedir='$(datadir)/locale'
 diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
-index 9616b24bf..0d9af3d95 100644
+index 1d1c8293f4..768110e5ef 100644
 --- a/src/include/k5-int.h
 +++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
 @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ typedef unsigned char   u_char;
@@ -199,7 +201,7 @@ index 9616b24bf..0d9af3d95 100644
  #define KRB5_KDB_MAX_RLIFE      (60*60*24*7) /* one week */
 diff --git a/src/include/k5-label.h b/src/include/k5-label.h
 new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..dfaaa847c
+index 0000000000..dfaaa847cb
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/src/include/k5-label.h
 @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
@@ -236,10 +238,10 @@ index 000000000..dfaaa847c
 +#endif
 +#endif
 diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-index 79761f6d2..e9435c693 100644
+index 4e09ed345d..09f800be52 100644
 --- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
 +++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-@@ -87,6 +87,12 @@
+@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@
  #define THREEPARAMOPEN(x,y,z) open(x,y,z)
  #endif
  
@@ -253,7 +255,7 @@ index 79761f6d2..e9435c693 100644
  
  #include <stdlib.h>
 diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
-index 301e3476d..19f2cc230 100644
+index a89b5144f6..4d6cc0bdf9 100644
 --- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
 +++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
 @@ -148,12 +148,21 @@ create_ofile(char *ofile, char **tmpname)
@@ -288,10 +290,10 @@ index 301e3476d..19f2cc230 100644
          com_err(progname, errno, _("while creating 'ok' file, '%s'"), file_ok);
          goto cleanup;
 diff --git a/src/kdc/main.c b/src/kdc/main.c
-index fdcd694d7..1ede4bf2f 100644
+index bfdfef5c48..b43fe9a082 100644
 --- a/src/kdc/main.c
 +++ b/src/kdc/main.c
-@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ write_pid_file(const char *path)
+@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ write_pid_file(const char *path)
      FILE *file;
      unsigned long pid;
  
@@ -301,10 +303,10 @@ index fdcd694d7..1ede4bf2f 100644
          return errno;
      pid = (unsigned long) getpid();
 diff --git a/src/kprop/kpropd.c b/src/kprop/kpropd.c
-index 5622d56e1..356e3e0e6 100644
+index aa3c81ea30..cb9785aaeb 100644
 --- a/src/kprop/kpropd.c
 +++ b/src/kprop/kpropd.c
-@@ -487,6 +487,9 @@ doit(int fd)
+@@ -488,6 +488,9 @@ doit(int fd)
      krb5_enctype etype;
      int database_fd;
      char host[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1];
@@ -314,7 +316,7 @@ index 5622d56e1..356e3e0e6 100644
  
      signal_wrapper(SIGALRM, alarm_handler);
      alarm(params.iprop_resync_timeout);
-@@ -542,9 +545,15 @@ doit(int fd)
+@@ -543,9 +546,15 @@ doit(int fd)
          free(name);
          exit(1);
      }
@@ -331,10 +333,10 @@ index 5622d56e1..356e3e0e6 100644
                              KRB5_LOCKMODE_EXCLUSIVE | KRB5_LOCKMODE_DONTBLOCK);
      if (retval) {
 diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c b/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c
-index c6885edf2..9aec3c05e 100644
+index e14da53790..b879a4049b 100644
 --- a/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c
 +++ b/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c
-@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ krb5_klog_init(krb5_context kcontext, char *ename, char *whoami, krb5_boolean do
+@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ krb5_klog_init(krb5_context kcontext, char *ename, char *whoami, krb5_boolean do
                       */
                      append = (cp[4] == ':') ? O_APPEND : 0;
                      if (append || cp[4] == '=') {
@@ -343,7 +345,7 @@ index c6885edf2..9aec3c05e 100644
                                    S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP);
                          if (fd != -1)
                              f = fdopen(fd, append ? "a" : "w");
-@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ krb5_klog_reopen(krb5_context kcontext)
+@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ krb5_klog_reopen(krb5_context kcontext)
               * In case the old logfile did not get moved out of the
               * way, open for append to prevent squashing the old logs.
               */
@@ -353,7 +355,7 @@ index c6885edf2..9aec3c05e 100644
                  set_cloexec_file(f);
                  log_control.log_entries[lindex].lfu_filep = f;
 diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
-index 2659a2501..e9b95fce5 100644
+index 2659a25018..e9b95fce59 100644
 --- a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
 +++ b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
 @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ ulog_map(krb5_context context, const char *logname, uint32_t ulogentries)
@@ -366,7 +368,7 @@ index 2659a2501..e9b95fce5 100644
              retval = errno;
              goto cleanup;
 diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c
-index 7b100a0ec..5683a0433 100644
+index 1da40b51d0..f3ab7340a6 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c
 @@ -183,10 +183,19 @@ write_primary_file(const char *primary_path, const char *contents)
@@ -416,7 +418,7 @@ index 7b100a0ec..5683a0433 100644
                    _("Credential cache directory %s does not exist"),
                    dirname);
 diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_file.c b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_file.c
-index 021c94398..aaf573439 100644
+index e510211fc5..f3ea28c8ec 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_file.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_file.c
 @@ -735,14 +735,14 @@ krb5_ktfileint_open(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id, int mode)
@@ -437,10 +439,10 @@ index 021c94398..aaf573439 100644
                  goto report_errno;
              writevno = 1;
 diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c
-index 7073459f0..e9b99f4ca 100644
+index 4cbbbb270a..c4058ddc96 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c
-@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ krb5_set_trace_filename(krb5_context context, const char *filename)
+@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ krb5_set_trace_filename(krb5_context context, const char *filename)
      fd = malloc(sizeof(*fd));
      if (fd == NULL)
          return ENOMEM;
@@ -450,7 +452,7 @@ index 7073459f0..e9b99f4ca 100644
          free(fd);
          return errno;
 diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/adb_openclose.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/adb_openclose.c
-index 7db30a33b..2b9d01921 100644
+index 9a506e9d44..f92ab47143 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/adb_openclose.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/adb_openclose.c
 @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ osa_adb_init_db(osa_adb_db_t *dbp, char *filename, char *lockfilename,
@@ -463,7 +465,7 @@ index 7db30a33b..2b9d01921 100644
               * maybe someone took away write permission so we could only
               * get shared locks?
 diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/kdb_db2.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/kdb_db2.c
-index 5106a5c99..e481e8121 100644
+index 2c163d91cc..9a344a603e 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/kdb_db2.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/kdb_db2.c
 @@ -694,8 +694,8 @@ ctx_create_db(krb5_context context, krb5_db2_context *dbc)
@@ -478,7 +480,7 @@ index 5106a5c99..e481e8121 100644
          retval = errno;
          goto cleanup;
 diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c
-index 2977b17f3..d5809a5a9 100644
+index 2977b17f3a..d5809a5a93 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/btree/bt_open.c
 @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#)bt_open.c	8.11 (Berkeley) 11/2/95";
@@ -499,7 +501,7 @@ index 2977b17f3..d5809a5a9 100644
  
  	} else {
 diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/hash.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/hash.c
-index 862dbb164..686a960c9 100644
+index 862dbb1640..686a960c96 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/hash.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/hash/hash.c
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#)hash.c	8.12 (Berkeley) 11/7/95";
@@ -520,7 +522,7 @@ index 862dbb164..686a960c9 100644
  		(void)fcntl(hashp->fp, F_SETFD, 1);
  	}
 diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/recno/rec_open.c b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/recno/rec_open.c
-index d8b26e701..b0daa7c02 100644
+index d8b26e7011..b0daa7c021 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/recno/rec_open.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/kdb/db2/libdb2/recno/rec_open.c
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#)rec_open.c	8.12 (Berkeley) 11/18/94";
@@ -542,7 +544,7 @@ index d8b26e701..b0daa7c02 100644
  
  	if (fname != NULL && fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
 diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/kdb5_ldap_services.c b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/kdb5_ldap_services.c
-index b92cb58c7..0a95101ad 100644
+index e87688d666..30f7c00ab5 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/kdb5_ldap_services.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/kdb5_ldap_services.c
 @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ kdb5_ldap_stash_service_password(int argc, char **argv)
@@ -579,7 +581,7 @@ index b92cb58c7..0a95101ad 100644
          if (newfile == NULL) {
              com_err(me, errno, _("Error creating file %s"), tmp_file);
 diff --git a/src/util/profile/prof_file.c b/src/util/profile/prof_file.c
-index aa951df05..79f9500f6 100644
+index aa951df05f..79f9500f69 100644
 --- a/src/util/profile/prof_file.c
 +++ b/src/util/profile/prof_file.c
 @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
@@ -600,7 +602,7 @@ index aa951df05..79f9500f6 100644
          retval = errno;
          if (retval == 0)
 diff --git a/src/util/support/Makefile.in b/src/util/support/Makefile.in
-index 86d5a950a..1052d53a1 100644
+index 86d5a950a6..1052d53a1e 100644
 --- a/src/util/support/Makefile.in
 +++ b/src/util/support/Makefile.in
 @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ IPC_SYMS= \
@@ -622,10 +624,10 @@ index 86d5a950a..1052d53a1 100644
  
 diff --git a/src/util/support/selinux.c b/src/util/support/selinux.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..6d41f3244
+index 0000000000..807d039da3
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/src/util/support/selinux.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright 2007,2008,2009,2011,2012,2013,2016 Red Hat, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
 + *
@@ -724,17 +726,16 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +    }
 +}
 +
-+static security_context_t
++static char *
 +push_fscreatecon(const char *pathname, mode_t mode)
 +{
-+    security_context_t previous, configuredsc, currentsc, derivedsc;
++    char *previous, *configuredsc, *currentsc, *genpath;
++    const char *derivedsc, *fullpath, *currentuser;
 +    context_t current, derived;
-+    const char *fullpath, *currentuser;
-+    char *genpath;
 +
-+    previous = configuredsc = currentsc = derivedsc = NULL;
++    previous = configuredsc = currentsc = genpath = NULL;
++    derivedsc = NULL;
 +    current = derived = NULL;
-+    genpath = NULL;
 +
 +    fullpath = pathname;
 +
@@ -862,7 +863,7 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +}
 +
 +static void
-+pop_fscreatecon(security_context_t previous)
++pop_fscreatecon(char *previous)
 +{
 +    if (!is_selinux_enabled()) {
 +        return;
@@ -916,7 +917,7 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +{
 +    FILE *fp;
 +    int errno_save;
-+    security_context_t ctx;
++    char *ctx;
 +
 +    if ((strcmp(mode, "r") == 0) ||
 +        (strcmp(mode, "rb") == 0)) {
@@ -942,7 +943,7 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +{
 +    int fd;
 +    int errno_save;
-+    security_context_t ctx;
++    char *ctx;
 +
 +    k5_once(&labeled_once, label_mutex_init);
 +    k5_mutex_lock(&labeled_mutex);
@@ -963,7 +964,7 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +{
 +    int ret;
 +    int errno_save;
-+    security_context_t ctx;
++    char *ctx;
 +
 +    k5_once(&labeled_once, label_mutex_init);
 +    k5_mutex_lock(&labeled_mutex);
@@ -984,7 +985,7 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +{
 +    int ret;
 +    int errno_save;
-+    security_context_t ctx;
++    char *ctx;
 +
 +    k5_once(&labeled_once, label_mutex_init);
 +    k5_mutex_lock(&labeled_mutex);
@@ -1005,7 +1006,7 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +{
 +    int fd;
 +    int errno_save;
-+    security_context_t ctx;
++    char *ctx;
 +    mode_t mode;
 +    va_list ap;
 +
@@ -1032,3 +1033,6 @@ index 000000000..6d41f3244
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* USE_SELINUX */
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0004-downstream-fix-debuginfo-with-y.tab.c.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From c6e103db0eb02c31a13b8cbcbae296c473074991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 393830d96000ed692aa9a99ef87187d6f2863931 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:49:25 -0400
 Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] fix debuginfo with y.tab.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Last-updated: krb5-1.9
  2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in b/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in
-index adfea6e2b..d1327e400 100644
+index adfea6e2b5..d1327e400b 100644
 --- a/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in
 +++ b/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in
 @@ -37,3 +37,8 @@ clean-unix::
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ index adfea6e2b..d1327e400 100644
 +	$(YACC.y) $< 
 +	$(CP) y.tab.c $@
 diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in
-index 8669c2436..a22f23c02 100644
+index 8669c2436c..a22f23c02c 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in
 +++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in
 @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ $(PROG): $(OBJS) $(KADMSRV_DEPLIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIB) $(GETDATE)
@@ -39,3 +39,6 @@ index 8669c2436..a22f23c02 100644
  
  install:
  	$(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $(PROG) ${DESTDIR}$(ADMIN_BINDIR)/$(PROG)
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0006-downstream-FIPS-with-PRNG-and-RADIUS-and-MD4.patch

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From bf8521bfaa4a4d54f6eb94f785c68942f4afa055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 7b6453903c248a761d3ceb538dfacebbf3d3a9ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 15:12:21 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] FIPS with PRNG and RADIUS and MD4
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ post6 restores MD4 (and therefore keygen-only RC4).
 
 post7 restores MD5 and adds radius_md5_fips_override.
 
-Last-updated: krb5-1.17
+post8 silences a static analyzer warning.
+
+Last-updated: krb5-1.20
 ---
  doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst            |  6 +++
- src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c                     | 11 ++++-
+ src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c                     | 15 +++++-
  .../crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c    |  6 +++
  src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c     | 13 +++++-
  .../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c   | 12 +++++
@@ -36,13 +38,13 @@ Last-updated: krb5-1.17
  src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c                      |  4 +-
  src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c      |  6 +++
  src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c         |  6 +++
- 15 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+ 15 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-index 1d2aa7f68..3a8b9cf47 100644
+index f22d5db11b..a33711d918 100644
 --- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
 +++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-@@ -331,6 +331,12 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+@@ -330,6 +330,12 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
      qualification of shortnames, set this relation to the empty string
      with ``qualify_shortname = ""``.  (New in release 1.18.)
  
@@ -56,22 +58,26 @@ index 1d2aa7f68..3a8b9cf47 100644
      If this flag is true, reverse name lookup will be used in addition
      to forward name lookup to canonicalizing hostnames for use in
 diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
-index cb9ca9b98..f0e9984ca 100644
+index d6b79e2dea..9e80a03d21 100644
 --- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
 +++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
  
  #include "crypto_int.h"
  
 +#include <openssl/rand.h>
++
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#endif
 +
  krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
  krb5_c_random_seed(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
  {
-@@ -99,9 +101,16 @@ krb5_boolean
- k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int strong)
+@@ -96,9 +102,16 @@ cleanup:
+ static krb5_boolean
+ get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
  {
-     const char *device;
 -#if defined(__linux__) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
      int r;
  
@@ -87,10 +93,10 @@ index cb9ca9b98..f0e9984ca 100644
          /*
           * Pull from the /dev/urandom pool, but require it to have been seeded.
 diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
-index 2da691329..f79679a0b 100644
+index 01920e6ce1..d9f327add6 100644
 --- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
 +++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
-@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@ krb5int_camellia_cbc_mac(krb5_key key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data,
+@@ -387,6 +387,9 @@ krb5int_camellia_cbc_mac(krb5_key key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data,
      unsigned char blockY[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE], blockB[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE];
      struct iov_cursor cursor;
  
@@ -100,7 +106,7 @@ index 2da691329..f79679a0b 100644
      if (output->length < CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE)
          return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
  
-@@ -331,6 +334,9 @@ static krb5_error_code
+@@ -418,6 +421,9 @@ static krb5_error_code
  krb5int_camellia_init_state (const krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_keyusage usage,
                               krb5_data *state)
  {
@@ -111,10 +117,10 @@ index 2da691329..f79679a0b 100644
      state->data = (void *) malloc(16);
      if (state->data == NULL)
 diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
-index a65d57b7a..6ccaca94a 100644
+index 448d563348..ce63cb5f1b 100644
 --- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
 +++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
-@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ k5_arcfour_docrypt(krb5_key key, const krb5_data *state, krb5_crypto_iov *data,
+@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ k5_arcfour_docrypt(krb5_key key, const krb5_data *state, krb5_crypto_iov *data,
      EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
      struct arcfour_state *arcstate;
  
@@ -124,7 +130,7 @@ index a65d57b7a..6ccaca94a 100644
      arcstate = (state != NULL) ? (void *)state->data : NULL;
      if (arcstate != NULL) {
          ctx = arcstate->ctx;
-@@ -113,7 +116,12 @@ k5_arcfour_docrypt(krb5_key key, const krb5_data *state, krb5_crypto_iov *data,
+@@ -116,7 +119,12 @@ k5_arcfour_docrypt(krb5_key key, const krb5_data *state, krb5_crypto_iov *data,
  static void
  k5_arcfour_free_state(krb5_data *state)
  {
@@ -138,7 +144,7 @@ index a65d57b7a..6ccaca94a 100644
  
      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(arcstate->ctx);
      free(arcstate);
-@@ -125,6 +133,9 @@ k5_arcfour_init_state(const krb5_keyblock *key,
+@@ -128,6 +136,9 @@ k5_arcfour_init_state(const krb5_keyblock *key,
  {
      struct arcfour_state *arcstate;
  
@@ -149,10 +155,10 @@ index a65d57b7a..6ccaca94a 100644
       * The cipher state here is a saved pointer to a struct arcfour_state
       * object, rather than a flat byte array as in most enc providers.  The
 diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
-index 1e0fb8fc3..2eb5139c0 100644
+index f2fbffdb29..11659908bb 100644
 --- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
 +++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
-@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
      if (ctx == NULL)
          return ENOMEM;
  
@@ -164,7 +170,7 @@ index 1e0fb8fc3..2eb5139c0 100644
      ok = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
      for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
          if (!SIGN_IOV(&data[i]))
-@@ -64,12 +69,19 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+@@ -78,6 +83,11 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
  static krb5_error_code
  hash_md4(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
  {
@@ -176,6 +182,7 @@ index 1e0fb8fc3..2eb5139c0 100644
      return hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
  }
  
+@@ -90,6 +100,8 @@ const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md4 = {
  static krb5_error_code
  hash_md5(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
  {
@@ -185,24 +192,24 @@ index 1e0fb8fc3..2eb5139c0 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
-index 7dc59dcc0..769a50c00 100644
+index bf12b8d6a0..f21e268f7f 100644
 --- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
 +++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
-@@ -103,7 +103,11 @@ map_digest(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash)
+@@ -111,7 +111,11 @@ map_digest(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash)
          return EVP_sha256();
-     else if (!strncmp(hash->hash_name, "SHA-384",7))
+     else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_sha384)
          return EVP_sha384();
--    else if (!strncmp(hash->hash_name, "MD5", 3))
+-    else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
 +
 +    if (FIPS_mode())
 +        return NULL;
 +
-+    if (!strncmp(hash->hash_name, "MD5", 3))
++    if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
          return EVP_md5();
-     else if (!strncmp(hash->hash_name, "MD4", 3))
+     else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md4)
          return EVP_md4();
 diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attr.c b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
-index 9c13d9d75..42d354a3b 100644
+index 9c13d9d755..42d354a3b5 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krad/attr.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
 @@ -38,7 +38,8 @@
@@ -326,7 +333,7 @@ index 9c13d9d75..42d354a3b 100644
  
  krad_attr
 diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
-index 03c613716..d89982a13 100644
+index f309f1581c..6ec031e320 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
 @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ krad_attrset_copy(const krad_attrset *set, krad_attrset **copy)
@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ index 03c613716..d89982a13 100644
              return retval;
  
 diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
-index 996a89372..312dc8258 100644
+index 7619563fc5..e123763954 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
 +++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
 @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
@@ -395,7 +402,7 @@ index 996a89372..312dc8258 100644
  
  /* Decode attributes from a buffer. */
  krb5_error_code
-@@ -152,4 +163,17 @@ gai_error_code(int err)
+@@ -156,4 +167,17 @@ gai_error_code(int err)
      }
  }
  
@@ -407,14 +414,14 @@ index 996a89372..312dc8258 100644
 +    if (!FIPS_mode())
 +        return 0;
 +
-+    profile_get_boolean(ctx->profile, "libdefaults",
-+                        "radius_md5_fips_override", NULL, 0, &val);
++    (void)profile_get_boolean(ctx->profile, "libdefaults",
++                              "radius_md5_fips_override", NULL, 0, &val);
 +    return !val;
 +}
 +
  #endif /* INTERNAL_H_ */
 diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
-index c597174b6..fc2d24800 100644
+index c597174b65..fc2d248001 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
 @@ -53,12 +53,6 @@ typedef unsigned char uchar;
@@ -475,7 +482,7 @@ index c597174b6..fc2d24800 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/src/lib/krad/remote.c b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
-index 437f7e91a..0f90443ce 100644
+index 06ae751bc8..929f1cef67 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krad/remote.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
 @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ on_io_write(krad_remote *rr)
@@ -496,7 +503,7 @@ index 437f7e91a..0f90443ce 100644
                  request_finish(r, 0, rsp);
                  break;
              }
-@@ -455,6 +455,12 @@ kr_remote_send(krad_remote *rr, krad_code code, krad_attrset *attrs,
+@@ -460,6 +460,12 @@ kr_remote_send(krad_remote *rr, krad_code code, krad_attrset *attrs,
                                       (krad_packet_iter_cb)iterator, &r, &tmp);
      if (retval != 0)
          goto error;
@@ -510,7 +517,7 @@ index 437f7e91a..0f90443ce 100644
      K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &rr->list, list) {
          if (r->request == tmp) {
 diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c
-index eb2a780c8..4d285ad9d 100644
+index eb2a780c89..4d285ad9de 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c
 @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ main()
@@ -531,7 +538,7 @@ index eb2a780c8..4d285ad9d 100644
      insist(len == sizeof(encoded));
      insist(memcmp(outbuf, encoded, len) == 0);
 diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
-index 7928335ca..0f9576253 100644
+index 7928335ca4..0f95762534 100644
 --- a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
 +++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
 @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ main()
@@ -553,7 +560,7 @@ index 7928335ca..0f9576253 100644
  
      /* Manually encode User-Name. */
 diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
-index 00734a13b..a3ce22b70 100644
+index 00734a13b5..a3ce22b70f 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
 @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
@@ -577,7 +584,7 @@ index 00734a13b..a3ce22b70 100644
      vt->name = "spake";
      vt->pa_type_list = pa_types;
 diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
-index 88c964ce1..c7df0392f 100644
+index 1a772d450f..232e78bc05 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
 @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
@@ -589,7 +596,7 @@ index 88c964ce1..c7df0392f 100644
  /*
   * The SPAKE kdcpreauth module uses a secure cookie containing the following
   * concatenated fields (all integer fields are big-endian):
-@@ -571,6 +573,10 @@ kdcpreauth_spake_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
+@@ -551,6 +553,10 @@ kdcpreauth_spake_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
  
      if (maj_ver != 1)
          return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
@@ -600,3 +607,6 @@ index 88c964ce1..c7df0392f 100644
      vt = (krb5_kdcpreauth_vtable)vtable;
      vt->name = "spake";
      vt->pa_type_list = pa_types;
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0007-downstream-Allow-krad-UDP-TCP-localhost-connection-w.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 707fa7bd2be6327343dc8fc5c20dc77645524518 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 17:15:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Allow krad UDP/TCP localhost connection
+ with FIPS
+
+libkrad allows to establish connections only to UNIX socket in FIPS
+mode, because MD5 digest is not considered safe enough to be used for
+network communication. However, FreeRadius requires connection on TCP or
+UDP ports.
+
+This commit allows TCP or UDP connections in FIPS mode if destination is
+localhost.
+
+Resolves: rhbz#2082189
+---
+ src/lib/krad/remote.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/remote.c b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
+index 929f1cef67..063f17a613 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/remote.c
++++ b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
+ 
+ #include <sys/un.h>
+ 
+@@ -74,6 +75,35 @@ on_io(verto_ctx *ctx, verto_ev *ev);
+ static void
+ on_timeout(verto_ctx *ctx, verto_ev *ev);
+ 
++static in_addr_t get_in_addr(struct addrinfo *info)
++{ return ((struct sockaddr_in *)(info->ai_addr))->sin_addr.s_addr; }
++
++static struct in6_addr *get_in6_addr(struct addrinfo *info)
++{ return &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(info->ai_addr))->sin6_addr); }
++
++static bool is_inet_localhost(struct addrinfo *info)
++{
++    struct addrinfo *p;
++
++    for (p = info; p; p = p->ai_next) {
++        switch (p->ai_family) {
++            case AF_INET:
++                if (IN_LOOPBACKNET != (get_in_addr(p) & IN_CLASSA_NET
++                                                      >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT))
++                    return false;
++                break;
++            case AF_INET6:
++                if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(get_in6_addr(p)))
++                    return false;
++                break;
++            default:
++                return false;
++        }
++    }
++
++    return true;
++}
++
+ /* Iterate over the set of outstanding packets. */
+ static const krad_packet *
+ iterator(request **out)
+@@ -460,8 +490,9 @@ kr_remote_send(krad_remote *rr, krad_code code, krad_attrset *attrs,
+                                      (krad_packet_iter_cb)iterator, &r, &tmp);
+     if (retval != 0)
+         goto error;
+-    else if (tmp->is_fips && rr->info->ai_family != AF_LOCAL &&
+-        rr->info->ai_family != AF_UNIX) {
++    else if (tmp->is_fips && rr->info->ai_family != AF_LOCAL
++                          && rr->info->ai_family != AF_UNIX
++                          && !is_inet_localhost(rr->info)) {
+         /* This would expose cleartext passwords, so abort. */
+         retval = ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
+         goto error;
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0008-downstream-Make-tests-compatible-with-sssd_krb5_loca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 1da88bea558348be2974470774aa688f8be634c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2022 13:22:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Make tests compatible with
+ sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so
+
+The sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so plugin provided by sssd-client conflicts
+with the upstream test t_discover_uri.py. The test has to be modified in
+order to avoid false positive.
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py b/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py
+index 87bac17929..26bc95a8dc 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py
+@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
++from os.path import exists
+ from k5test import *
+ 
+ entries = ('URI _kerberos.TEST krb5srv::kkdcp:https://kdc1 1 1\n',
+@@ -37,8 +38,14 @@ realm.env['RESOLV_WRAPPER_HOSTS'] = hosts_filename
+ out = realm.run(['./t_locate_kdc', 'TEST'], env=realm.env)
+ l = out.splitlines()
+ 
++if (exists('/usr/lib/krb5/plugins/libkrb5/sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so')
++    or exists('/usr/lib64/krb5/plugins/libkrb5/sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so')):
++    line_range = range(6, 14)
++else:
++    line_range = range(4, 12)
++
+ j = 0
+-for i in range(4, 12):
++for i in line_range:
+     if l[i].strip() != expected[j]:
+         fail('URI answers do not match')
+     j += 1
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0009-downstream-Include-missing-OpenSSL-FIPS-header.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 775ed8588cc21385fb16a4cec4a861f0d578ce04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2023 20:06:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Include missing OpenSSL FIPS header
+
+The inclusion of openssl/fips.h, which provides the declaration of
+FIPS_mode(), was removed from openssl/crypto.h. As a consequence, this
+header file has to be included explicitly in krb5 code.
+---
+ src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c                      | 4 +++-
+ src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c | 1 +
+ src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c      | 4 ++++
+ src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c                  | 1 +
+ src/lib/krad/internal.h                        | 4 ++++
+ src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c       | 4 ++++
+ src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c          | 4 ++++
+ 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
+index 9e80a03d21..ae37c77518 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
+@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+ 
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#else
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
+index d9f327add6..3dd3b0624f 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/camellia.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #else
+ #include <openssl/modes.h>
+ #endif
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
+index ce63cb5f1b..6a83f10d27 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * The loopback field is a pointer to the structure.  If the application copies
+  * the state (not a valid operation, but one which happens to works with some
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+index f21e268f7f..25a419d73a 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+ #include <openssl/params.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #else
+ #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ #endif
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+index e123763954..a17b6f39b1 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
++++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef UCHAR_MAX
+ #define UCHAR_MAX 255
+ #endif
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
+index a3ce22b70f..13c699071f 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#endif
++
+ typedef struct reqstate_st {
+     krb5_pa_spake *msg;         /* set in prep_questions, used in process */
+     krb5_keyblock *initial_key;
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
+index 232e78bc05..3394f8a58e 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * The SPAKE kdcpreauth module uses a secure cookie containing the following
+  * concatenated fields (all integer fields are big-endian):
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0010-downstream-Do-not-set-root-as-ksu-file-owner.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 4fd20741afcf76085ea62eb015cd589bb9392a7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 22:39:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Do not set root as ksu file owner
+
+Upstream Makefile uses the install command to set root as owner of the
+ksu executable file. However, this is no longer supported on latest
+versions of the Mock build environment.
+
+In case of ksu, the owner, group, and mode are already set using %attr()
+in the specfile.
+---
+ src/config/pre.in | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/config/pre.in b/src/config/pre.in
+index 7eaa2f351c..e9ae71471e 100644
+--- a/src/config/pre.in
++++ b/src/config/pre.in
+@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ INSTALL_PROGRAM=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(INSTALL_STRIP)
+ INSTALL_SCRIPT=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@
+ INSTALL_DATA=@INSTALL_DATA@
+ INSTALL_SHLIB=@INSTALL_SHLIB@
+-INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP) -m 4755 -o root
++INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL)
+ ## This is needed because autoconf will sometimes define @exec_prefix@ to be
+ ## ${prefix}.
+ prefix=@prefix@
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0011-downstream-Allow-KRB5KDF-MD5-and-MD4-in-FIPS-mode.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+From 16f90c007036789d8d9343e8a0cbabfd21853b5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 19:22:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Allow KRB5KDF, MD5, and MD4 in FIPS mode
+
+OpenSSL's restrictions to use KRB5KDF, MD5, and MD4 in FIPS mode are
+bypassed in case AES SHA-1 HMAC or RC4 encryption types are allowed by
+the crypto policy.
+---
+ .../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c   | 97 +++++++++++++++++--
+ src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c                  |  2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+index 11659908bb..eb2e693e9f 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,49 @@
+ #define EVP_MD_CTX_free EVP_MD_CTX_destroy
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/provider.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <threads.h>
++
++typedef struct ossl_lib_md_context {
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
++    OSSL_PROVIDER *default_provider;
++    OSSL_PROVIDER *legacy_provider;
++} ossl_md_context_t;
++
++static thread_local ossl_md_context_t *ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
++
++static krb5_error_code
++init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx, const char *algo)
++{
++    ctx->libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
++    if (!ctx->libctx)
++        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++
++    /* Load both legacy and default provider as both may be needed. */
++    ctx->default_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "default");
++    ctx->legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "legacy");
++
++    if (!(ctx->default_provider && ctx->legacy_provider))
++        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++
++    return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx)
++{
++    if (ctx->legacy_provider)
++        OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->legacy_provider);
++
++    if (ctx->default_provider)
++        OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->default_provider);
++
++    if (ctx->libctx)
++        OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ctx->libctx);
++}
++
++
+ static krb5_error_code
+ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+          krb5_data *output)
+@@ -60,11 +103,6 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         return ENOMEM;
+ 
+-    if (type == EVP_md4() || type == EVP_md5()) {
+-        /* See comments below in hash_md4() and hash_md5(). */
+-        EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+-    }
+-
+     ok = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
+     for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
+         if (!SIGN_IOV(&data[i]))
+@@ -77,6 +115,43 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+     return ok ? 0 : KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ 
++static krb5_error_code
++hash_legacy_evp(const char *algo, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
++                krb5_data *output)
++{
++    krb5_error_code err;
++    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
++
++    if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
++        ossl_md_ctx = malloc(sizeof(ossl_md_context_t));
++        if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
++            err = ENOMEM;
++            goto end;
++        }
++
++        err = init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_ctx, algo);
++        if (err) {
++            deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_ctx);
++            free(ossl_md_ctx);
++            ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++
++    md = EVP_MD_fetch(ossl_md_ctx->libctx, algo, NULL);
++    if (!md) {
++        err = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++        goto end;
++    }
++
++    err = hash_evp(md, data, num_data, output);
++
++end:
++    if (md)
++        EVP_MD_free(md);
++
++    return err;
++}
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef K5_OPENSSL_MD4
+@@ -88,7 +163,8 @@ hash_md4(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
+      * by IPA.  These keys are only used along a (separately) secured channel
+      * for legacy reasons when performing trusts to Active Directory.
+      */
+-    return hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
++    return FIPS_mode() ? hash_legacy_evp("MD4", data, num_data, output)
++                       : hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
+ }
+ 
+ const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md4 = {
+@@ -100,9 +176,12 @@ const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md4 = {
+ static krb5_error_code
+ hash_md5(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
+ {
+-    /* MD5 is needed in FIPS mode for communication with RADIUS servers.  This
+-     * is gated in libkrad by libdefaults->radius_md5_fips_override. */
+-    return hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output);
++    /*
++     * MD5 is needed in FIPS mode for communication with RADIUS servers.  This
++     * is gated in libkrad by libdefaults->radius_md5_fips_override.
++     */
++    return FIPS_mode() ? hash_legacy_evp("MD5", data, num_data, output)
++                       : hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output);
+ }
+ 
+ const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md5 = {
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c
+index 5a43c3d9eb..8528ddc4a9 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c
+@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ k5_derive_random_rfc3961(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc, krb5_key key,
+         goto done;
+     }
+ 
+-    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KRB5KDF", NULL);
++    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KRB5KDF", "-fips");
+     if (kdf == NULL) {
+         ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+         goto done;
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0012-downstream-Allow-to-set-PAC-ticket-signature-as-opti.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+From 23b58199db429603802e338db530677b61561335 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 15:56:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Allow to set PAC ticket signature as
+ optional
+
+MS-PAC states that "The ticket signature SHOULD be included in tickets
+that are not encrypted to the krbtgt account". However, the
+implementation of krb5_kdc_verify_ticket() will require the ticket
+signature to be present in case the target of the request is a service
+principal.
+
+In gradual upgrade environments, it results in S4U2Proxy requests
+against a 1.20 KDC using a service ticket generated by an older version
+KDC to fail.
+
+This commit adds a krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext() function with an extra
+switch parameter to tolerate the absence of ticket signature in this
+scenario. If the ticket signature is present, it has to be valid,
+regardless of this parameter.
+
+This parameter is set based on the "optional_pac_tkt_chksum" string
+attribute of the TGT KDB entry.
+---
+ doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst |  6 ++++
+ doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst             |  1 +
+ src/include/kdb.h                         |  1 +
+ src/include/krb5/krb5.hin                 | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/kdc/kdc_util.c                        | 32 ++++++++++++++----
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c                    | 31 +++++++++++++++---
+ src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports              |  1 +
+ src/man/kadmin.man                        |  6 ++++
+ 8 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst b/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
+index 2435b3c361..58ac79549f 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
+@@ -658,6 +658,12 @@ KDC:
+     Directory realm when using aes-sha2 keys on the local krbtgt
+     entry.
+ 
++**optional_pac_tkt_chksum**
++    Boolean value defining the behavior of the KDC in case an expected
++    ticket checksum signed with one of this principal keys is not
++    present in the PAC. This is typically the case for TGS or
++    cross-realm TGS principals when processing S4U2Proxy requests.
++
+ This command requires the **modify** privilege.
+ 
+ Alias: **setstr**
+diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
+index d12be47c3c..9b95ebd0f9 100644
+--- a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
++++ b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
+@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ Rarely used public interfaces
+    krb5_is_referral_realm.rst
+    krb5_kdc_sign_ticket.rst
+    krb5_kdc_verify_ticket.rst
++   krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext.rst
+    krb5_kt_add_entry.rst
+    krb5_kt_end_seq_get.rst
+    krb5_kt_get_entry.rst
+diff --git a/src/include/kdb.h b/src/include/kdb.h
+index 745b24f351..6075349e5e 100644
+--- a/src/include/kdb.h
++++ b/src/include/kdb.h
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
+ #define KRB5_KDB_SK_PAC_PRIVSVR_ENCTYPE         "pac_privsvr_enctype"
+ #define KRB5_KDB_SK_SESSION_ENCTYPES            "session_enctypes"
+ #define KRB5_KDB_SK_REQUIRE_AUTH                "require_auth"
++#define KRB5_KDB_SK_OPTIONAL_PAC_TKT_CHKSUM     "optional_pac_tkt_chksum"
+ 
+ #if !defined(_WIN32)
+ 
+diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
+index c5a625db8f..2d9b64dc85 100644
+--- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
++++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
+@@ -8329,6 +8329,46 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+                        const krb5_keyblock *server,
+                        const krb5_keyblock *privsvr, krb5_pac *pac_out);
+ 
++/**
++ * Verify a PAC, possibly including ticket signature
++ *
++ * @param [in] context              Library context
++ * @param [in] enc_tkt              Ticket enc-part, possibly containing a PAC
++ * @param [in] server_princ         Canonicalized name of ticket server
++ * @param [in] server               Key to validate server checksum (or NULL)
++ * @param [in] privsvr              Key to validate KDC checksum (or NULL)
++ * @paran [in] optional_tkt_chksum  Whether to require a ticket checksum
++ * @param [out] pac_out             Verified PAC (NULL if no PAC included)
++ *
++ * This function is an extension of krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(), adding the @a
++ * optional_tkt_chksum parameter allowing to tolerate the absence of the PAC
++ * ticket signature.
++ *
++ * If a PAC is present in @a enc_tkt, verify its signatures.  If @a privsvr is
++ * not NULL and @a server_princ is not a krbtgt or kadmin/changepw service and
++ * @a optional_tkt_chksum is FALSE, require a ticket signature over @a enc_tkt
++ * in addition to the KDC signature. Place the verified PAC in @a pac_out.  If
++ * an invalid PAC signature is found, return an error matching the Windows KDC
++ * protocol code for that condition as closely as possible.
++ *
++ * If no PAC is present in @a enc_tkt, set @a pac_out to NULL and return
++ * successfully.
++ *
++ * @note This function does not validate the PAC_CLIENT_INFO buffer.  If a
++ * specific value is expected, the caller can make a separate call to
++ * krb5_pac_verify_ext() with a principal but no keys.
++ *
++ * @retval 0 Success; otherwise - Kerberos error codes
++ */
++krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
++krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(krb5_context context,
++                           const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
++                           krb5_const_principal server_princ,
++                           const krb5_keyblock *server,
++                           const krb5_keyblock *privsvr,
++                           krb5_boolean optional_tkt_chksum,
++                           krb5_pac *pac_out);
++
+ /** @deprecated Use krb5_kdc_sign_ticket() instead. */
+ krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+ krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
+diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+index fe4e48209a..93415ba862 100644
+--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
++++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+@@ -560,16 +560,36 @@ cleanup:
+ static krb5_error_code
+ try_verify_pac(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+                krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_keyblock *server_key,
+-               const krb5_keyblock *tgt_key, krb5_pac *pac_out)
++               krb5_db_entry *tgt, const krb5_keyblock *tgt_key,
++               krb5_pac *pac_out)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code ret;
++    krb5_boolean optional_tkt_chksum;
++    char *str = NULL;
+     krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key;
+ 
+     ret = pac_privsvr_key(context, server, tgt_key, &privsvr_key);
+     if (ret)
+         return ret;
+-    ret = krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(context, enc_tkt, server->princ, server_key,
+-                                 privsvr_key, pac_out);
++
++    /* Check if the absence of ticket signature is tolerated for this realm */
++    ret = krb5_dbe_get_string(context, tgt,
++                              KRB5_KDB_SK_OPTIONAL_PAC_TKT_CHKSUM, &str);
++    /* TODO: should be using _krb5_conf_boolean(), but os-proto.h is not
++     * available here.
++     */
++    optional_tkt_chksum = !ret && str && (strncasecmp(str, "true", 4) == 0
++                                       || strncasecmp(str, "t",    1) == 0
++                                       || strncasecmp(str, "yes",  3) == 0
++                                       || strncasecmp(str, "y",    1) == 0
++                                       || strncasecmp(str, "1",    1) == 0
++                                       || strncasecmp(str, "on",   2) == 0);
++
++    krb5_dbe_free_string(context, str);
++
++    ret = krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(context, enc_tkt, server->princ,
++                                     server_key, privsvr_key,
++                                     optional_tkt_chksum, pac_out);
+     krb5_free_keyblock(context, privsvr_key);
+     return ret;
+ }
+@@ -599,7 +619,7 @@ get_verified_pac(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+                                       server_key, NULL, pac_out);
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, tgt_key,
++    ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, tgt, tgt_key,
+                          pac_out);
+     if (ret != KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED && ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE)
+         return ret;
+@@ -613,8 +633,8 @@ get_verified_pac(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+         ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, kd, &old_key, NULL);
+         if (ret)
+             return ret;
+-        ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, &old_key,
+-                             pac_out);
++        ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, tgt,
++                             &old_key, pac_out);
+         krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &old_key);
+         if (!ret)
+             return 0;
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
+index 5d1fdf1ba0..0c0e2ada68 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
+@@ -594,6 +594,19 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+                        krb5_const_principal server_princ,
+                        const krb5_keyblock *server,
+                        const krb5_keyblock *privsvr, krb5_pac *pac_out)
++{
++    return krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(context, enc_tkt, server_princ, server,
++                                      privsvr, FALSE, pac_out);
++}
++
++krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
++krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(krb5_context context,
++                           const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
++                           krb5_const_principal server_princ,
++                           const krb5_keyblock *server,
++                           const krb5_keyblock *privsvr,
++                           krb5_boolean optional_tkt_chksum,
++                           krb5_pac *pac_out)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     krb5_pac pac = NULL;
+@@ -602,7 +615,7 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+     krb5_authdata *orig, **ifrel = NULL, **recoded_ifrel = NULL;
+     uint8_t z = 0;
+     krb5_authdata zpac = { KV5M_AUTHDATA, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, 1, &z };
+-    krb5_boolean is_service_tkt;
++    krb5_boolean is_service_tkt, has_tkt_chksum = FALSE;
+     size_t i, j;
+ 
+     *pac_out = NULL;
+@@ -667,11 +680,21 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+ 
+         ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM, privsvr,
+                               KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, recoded_tkt);
+-        if (ret)
+-            goto cleanup;
++        if (ret) {
++            if (!optional_tkt_chksum)
++                goto cleanup;
++            else if (ret != ENOENT)
++                goto cleanup;
++            /* Otherwise ticket signature is absent but optional. Proceed... */
++        } else {
++            has_tkt_chksum = TRUE;
++        }
+     }
++    /* Else, we make the assumption the ticket signature is absent in case this
++     * is not a service ticket.
++     */
+ 
+-    ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, is_service_tkt, server, privsvr);
++    ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, has_tkt_chksum, server, privsvr);
+     if (ret)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
+index 4c50e935a2..d4b0455c8c 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
+@@ -463,6 +463,7 @@ krb5_is_thread_safe
+ krb5_kdc_rep_decrypt_proc
+ krb5_kdc_sign_ticket
+ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket
++krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext
+ krb5_kt_add_entry
+ krb5_kt_client_default
+ krb5_kt_close
+diff --git a/src/man/kadmin.man b/src/man/kadmin.man
+index 8413e70ccd..f68eb0569d 100644
+--- a/src/man/kadmin.man
++++ b/src/man/kadmin.man
+@@ -724,6 +724,12 @@ encryption type.  It may be necessary to set this value to
+ "aes256\-sha1" on the cross\-realm krbtgt entry for an Active
+ Directory realm when using aes\-sha2 keys on the local krbtgt
+ entry.
++.TP
++\fBoptional_pac_tkt_chksum\fP
++Boolean value defining the behavior of the KDC in case an expected ticket
++checksum signed with one of this principal keys is not present in the PAC. This
++is typically the case for TGS or cross-realm TGS principals when processing
++S4U2Proxy requests.
+ .UNINDENT
+ .sp
+ This command requires the \fBmodify\fP privilege.
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0013-downstream-Make-PKINIT-CMS-SHA-1-signature-verificat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 31b9debcf2cbd558f8f315fefb69fc8206b115b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 May 2023 12:19:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Make PKINIT CMS SHA-1 signature
+ verification available in FIPS mode
+
+We recommend using the SHA1 crypto-module in order to allow the
+verification of SHA-1 signature for CMS messages. However, this module
+does not work in FIPS mode, because the SHA-1 algorithm is absent from
+the OpenSSL FIPS provider.
+
+This commit enables the signature verification process to fetch the
+algorithm from a non-FIPS OpenSSL provider.
+
+Support for SHA-1 CMS signature is still required, especially in order
+to interoperate with Active Directory. At least it is until elliptic
+curve cryptography is implemented for PKINIT in MIT krb5.
+---
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+index cb9c79626c..17dd18e37d 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -1844,8 +1844,17 @@ cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
+     if (oid == NULL)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++    /* Do not use FIPS provider (even in FIPS mode) because it keeps from
++     * allowing SHA-1 signature verification using the SHA1 crypto-module
++     */
++    cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new_ex(NULL, "-fips");
++    if (!cms)
++        goto cleanup;
++#endif
++
+     /* decode received CMS message */
+-    if ((cms = d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(NULL, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) == NULL) {
++    if (!d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(&cms, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) {
+         retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decode CMS message"));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0014-Enable-PKINIT-if-at-least-one-group-is-available.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+From c24c9faf859ddc04910a6bc591d8ddb2ada93e80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 01:21:48 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Enable PKINIT if at least one group is available
+
+OpenSSL may no longer allow decoding of non-well-known Diffie-Hellman
+group parameters as EVP_PKEY objects in FIPS mode.  However, OpenSSL
+does not know about MODP group 2 (1024-bit), which is considered as a
+custom group.  As a consequence, the PKINIT kdcpreauth module fails to
+load in FIPS mode.
+
+Allow initialization of PKINIT plugin if at least one of the MODP
+well-known group parameters successfully decodes.
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: minor commit message and code edits]
+
+ticket: 9096 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 509d8db922e9ad6f108883838473b6178f89874a)
+---
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c      |  2 +-
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h    |  3 +-
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 76 +++++++++++--------
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c       |  2 +-
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h     |  3 +
+ 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
+index 725d5bc438..ea9ba454df 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
+@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ pkinit_client_plugin_init(krb5_context context,
+     if (retval)
+         goto errout;
+ 
+-    retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(&ctx->cryptoctx);
++    retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(context, &ctx->cryptoctx);
+     if (retval)
+         goto errout;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+index 9fa315d7a0..8bdbea8e95 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ typedef struct _pkinit_cert_matching_data {
+ /*
+  * Functions to initialize and cleanup crypto contexts
+  */
+-krb5_error_code pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *);
++krb5_error_code pkinit_init_plg_crypto(krb5_context,
++				       pkinit_plg_crypto_context *);
+ void pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context);
+ 
+ krb5_error_code pkinit_init_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context *);
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+index 17dd18e37d..8cdc40bfb4 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@
+ static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
+ static void pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
+ 
+-static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
++static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_dh_params(krb5_context,
++                                             pkinit_plg_crypto_context);
+ static void pkinit_fini_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx);
+@@ -951,7 +952,8 @@ oerr_cert(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, X509_STORE_CTX *certctx,
+ }
+ 
+ krb5_error_code
+-pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
++pkinit_init_plg_crypto(krb5_context context,
++                       pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
+     pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
+@@ -969,7 +971,7 @@ pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
+     if (retval)
+         goto out;
+ 
+-    retval = pkinit_init_dh_params(ctx);
++    retval = pkinit_init_dh_params(context, ctx);
+     if (retval)
+         goto out;
+ 
+@@ -1278,30 +1280,36 @@ pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx)
+     ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_kp_serverAuth);
+ }
+ 
+-static krb5_error_code
+-pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
++static int
++try_import_group(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *params,
++                 const char *name, EVP_PKEY **pkey_out)
+ {
+-    krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
+-
+-    plgctx->dh_1024 = decode_dh_params(&oakley_1024);
+-    if (plgctx->dh_1024 == NULL)
+-        goto cleanup;
+-
+-    plgctx->dh_2048 = decode_dh_params(&oakley_2048);
+-    if (plgctx->dh_2048 == NULL)
+-        goto cleanup;
++    *pkey_out = decode_dh_params(params);
++    if (*pkey_out == NULL)
++        TRACE_PKINIT_DH_GROUP_UNAVAILABLE(context, name);
++    return (*pkey_out != NULL) ? 1 : 0;
++}
+ 
+-    plgctx->dh_4096 = decode_dh_params(&oakley_4096);
+-    if (plgctx->dh_4096 == NULL)
+-        goto cleanup;
++static krb5_error_code
++pkinit_init_dh_params(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
++{
++    int n = 0;
+ 
+-    retval = 0;
++    n += try_import_group(context, &oakley_1024, "MODP 2 (1024-bit)",
++                          &plgctx->dh_1024);
++    n += try_import_group(context, &oakley_2048, "MODP 14 (2048-bit)",
++                          &plgctx->dh_2048);
++    n += try_import_group(context, &oakley_4096, "MODP 16 (4096-bit)",
++                          &plgctx->dh_4096);
+ 
+-cleanup:
+-    if (retval)
++    if (n == 0) {
+         pkinit_fini_dh_params(plgctx);
++        k5_setmsg(context, ENOMEM,
++                  _("PKINIT cannot initialize any key exchange groups"));
++        return ENOMEM;
++    }
+ 
+-    return retval;
++    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -2912,11 +2920,11 @@ client_create_dh(krb5_context context,
+ 
+     if (cryptoctx->received_params != NULL)
+         params = cryptoctx->received_params;
+-    else if (dh_size == 1024)
++    else if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024 != NULL && dh_size == 1024)
+         params = plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024;
+-    else if (dh_size == 2048)
++    else if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048 != NULL && dh_size == 2048)
+         params = plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048;
+-    else if (dh_size == 4096)
++    else if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096 != NULL && dh_size == 4096)
+         params = plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096;
+     else
+         goto cleanup;
+@@ -3212,19 +3220,23 @@ pkinit_create_td_dh_parameters(krb5_context context,
+     krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_4096 = { dh_oid, oakley_4096 };
+     krb5_algorithm_identifier *alglist[4];
+ 
+-    if (opts->dh_min_bits > 4096) {
+-        ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+-        goto cleanup;
+-    }
+-
+     i = 0;
+-    if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048)
++    if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048 != NULL && opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048)
+         alglist[i++] = &alg_2048;
+-    alglist[i++] = &alg_4096;
+-    if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024)
++    if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096 != NULL && opts->dh_min_bits <= 4096)
++        alglist[i++] = &alg_4096;
++    if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024 != NULL && opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024)
+         alglist[i++] = &alg_1024;
+     alglist[i] = NULL;
+ 
++    if (i == 0) {
++        ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
++        k5_setmsg(context, ret,
++                  _("OpenSSL has no supported key exchange groups for "
++                    "pkinit_dh_min_bits=%d"), opts->dh_min_bits);
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++
+     ret = k5int_encode_krb5_td_dh_parameters(alglist, &der_alglist);
+     if (ret)
+         goto cleanup;
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+index 1b3bf6d4d0..768a4e559f 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ pkinit_server_plugin_init_realm(krb5_context context, const char *realmname,
+         goto errout;
+     plgctx->realmname_len = strlen(plgctx->realmname);
+ 
+-    retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(&plgctx->cryptoctx);
++    retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(context, &plgctx->cryptoctx);
+     if (retval)
+         goto errout;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+index 259e95c6c2..5ee39c085c 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_TRYAGAIN(c)                                 \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT client trying again with KDC-provided parameters")
+ 
++#define TRACE_PKINIT_DH_GROUP_UNAVAILABLE(c, name)                      \
++    TRACE(c, "PKINIT key exchange group {str} unsupported", name)
++
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_OPENSSL_ERROR(c, msg)              \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT OpenSSL error: {str}", msg)
+ 
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0015-Replace-ssl.wrap_socket-for-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From e92365b510a2407eaceaec90836f5c713403d75f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 13:43:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Replace ssl.wrap_socket() for tests
+
+The ssl.wrap_socket() function was deprecated in Python 3.7 and is
+removed in Python 3.12.  The ssl.SSLContext.wrap_socket() method
+replaces it.
+
+Bump the required Python version for tests to 3.4 for
+ssl.create_default_context().
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: changed minimum Python version]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0ceab6c363e65fb21d3312a663f2b9b569ecc415)
+---
+ src/configure.ac             | 9 ++++-----
+ src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py | 4 +++-
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
+index 2561e917a2..487f393146 100644
+--- a/src/configure.ac
++++ b/src/configure.ac
+@@ -1157,10 +1157,9 @@ AC_SUBST(PKINIT)
+ # for lib/apputils
+ AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(daemon)
+ 
+-# For Python tests.  Python version 3.2.4 is required as prior
+-# versions do not accept string input to subprocess.Popen.communicate
+-# when universal_newlines is set.
+-PYTHON_MINVERSION=3.2.4
++# For Python tests.  Python version 3.4 is required for
++# ssl.create_default_context().
++PYTHON_MINVERSION=3.4
+ AC_SUBST(PYTHON_MINVERSION)
+ AC_CHECK_PROG(PYTHON,python3,python3)
+ if test x"$PYTHON" = x; then
+@@ -1168,7 +1167,7 @@ if test x"$PYTHON" = x; then
+ fi
+ HAVE_PYTHON=no
+ if test x"$PYTHON" != x; then
+-	wantver="(sys.hexversion >= 0x30204F0)"
++	wantver="(sys.hexversion >= 0x30400F0)"
+ 	if "$PYTHON" -c "import sys; sys.exit(not $wantver and 1 or 0)"; then
+ 		HAVE_PYTHON=yes
+ 	fi
+diff --git a/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py b/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py
+index 58759696b6..d1d10d733c 100755
+--- a/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py
++++ b/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py
+@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ else:
+     pem = '*'
+ 
+ server = make_server('localhost', port, kdcproxy.Application())
+-server.socket = ssl.wrap_socket(server.socket, certfile=pem, server_side=True)
++sslctx = ssl.create_default_context(purpose=ssl.Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH)
++sslctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=pem)
++server.socket = sslctx.wrap_socket(server.socket, server_side=True)
+ os.write(sys.stdout.fileno(), b'proxy server ready\n')
+ server.serve_forever()
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0017-Fix-two-unlikely-memory-leaks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+From ee66c1feedb57ce06ce51aaa823f9a61f564c58e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 19:53:07 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix two unlikely memory leaks
+
+In gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(), one of the bounds checks (which
+could probably never be triggered) leaks plain.data.  Fix this leak
+and use current practices for cleanup throughout the function.
+
+In xmt_rmtcallres() (unused within the tree and likely elsewhere),
+store port_ptr into crp->port_ptr as soon as it is allocated;
+otherwise it could leak if the subsequent xdr_u_int32() operation
+fails.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c5f9c816107f70139de11b38aa02db2f1774ee0d)
+---
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c | 56 +++++++++++++++-------------------
+ src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c         | 10 +++---
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
+index 1fcbdfbb87..d3210c1107 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+                                 int conf_req_flag, int toktype)
+ {
+     size_t bufsize = 16;
+-    unsigned char *outbuf = 0;
++    unsigned char *outbuf = NULL;
+     krb5_error_code err;
+     int key_usage;
+     unsigned char acceptor_flag;
+@@ -75,9 +75,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+ #endif
+     size_t ec;
+     unsigned short tok_id;
+-    krb5_checksum sum;
++    krb5_checksum sum = { 0 };
+     krb5_key key;
+     krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
++    krb5_data plain = empty_data();
++
++    token->value = NULL;
++    token->length = 0;
+ 
+     acceptor_flag = ctx->initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
+     key_usage = (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
+@@ -107,14 +111,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+ #endif
+ 
+     if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && conf_req_flag) {
+-        krb5_data plain;
+         krb5_enc_data cipher;
+         size_t ec_max;
+         size_t encrypt_size;
+ 
+         /* 300: Adds some slop.  */
+-        if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length)
+-            return ENOMEM;
++        if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length) {
++            err = ENOMEM;
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
+         ec_max = SIZE_MAX - message->length - 300;
+         if (ec_max > 0xffff)
+             ec_max = 0xffff;
+@@ -126,20 +131,20 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+ #endif
+         err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16 + ec);
+         if (err)
+-            return err;
++            goto cleanup;
+ 
+         /* Get size of ciphertext.  */
+         encrypt_size = krb5_encrypt_size(plain.length, key->keyblock.enctype);
+         if (encrypt_size > SIZE_MAX / 2) {
+             err = ENOMEM;
+-            goto error;
++            goto cleanup;
+         }
+         bufsize = 16 + encrypt_size;
+         /* Allocate space for header plus encrypted data.  */
+         outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
+         if (outbuf == NULL) {
+-            free(plain.data);
+-            return ENOMEM;
++            err = ENOMEM;
++            goto cleanup;
+         }
+ 
+         /* TOK_ID */
+@@ -164,11 +169,8 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+         cipher.ciphertext.length = bufsize - 16;
+         cipher.enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
+         err = krb5_k_encrypt(context, key, key_usage, 0, &plain, &cipher);
+-        zap(plain.data, plain.length);
+-        free(plain.data);
+-        plain.data = 0;
+         if (err)
+-            goto error;
++            goto cleanup;
+ 
+         /* Now that we know we're returning a valid token....  */
+         ctx->seq_send++;
+@@ -181,7 +183,6 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+         /* If the rotate fails, don't worry about it.  */
+ #endif
+     } else if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && !conf_req_flag) {
+-        krb5_data plain;
+         size_t cksumsize;
+ 
+         /* Here, message is the application-supplied data; message2 is
+@@ -193,21 +194,19 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+     wrap_with_checksum:
+         err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16);
+         if (err)
+-            return err;
++            goto cleanup;
+ 
+         err = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
+         if (err)
+-            goto error;
++            goto cleanup;
+ 
+         assert(cksumsize <= 0xffff);
+ 
+         bufsize = 16 + message2->length + cksumsize;
+         outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
+         if (outbuf == NULL) {
+-            free(plain.data);
+-            plain.data = 0;
+             err = ENOMEM;
+-            goto error;
++            goto cleanup;
+         }
+ 
+         /* TOK_ID */
+@@ -239,23 +238,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+         if (message2->length)
+             memcpy(outbuf + 16, message2->value, message2->length);
+ 
+-        sum.contents = outbuf + 16 + message2->length;
+-        sum.length = cksumsize;
+-
+         err = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, key,
+                                    key_usage, &plain, &sum);
+-        zap(plain.data, plain.length);
+-        free(plain.data);
+-        plain.data = 0;
+         if (err) {
+             zap(outbuf,bufsize);
+-            goto error;
++            goto cleanup;
+         }
+         if (sum.length != cksumsize)
+             abort();
+         memcpy(outbuf + 16 + message2->length, sum.contents, cksumsize);
+-        krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
+-        sum.contents = 0;
+         /* Now that we know we're actually generating the token...  */
+         ctx->seq_send++;
+ 
+@@ -285,12 +276,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
+ 
+     token->value = outbuf;
+     token->length = bufsize;
+-    return 0;
++    outbuf = NULL;
++    err = 0;
+ 
+-error:
++cleanup:
++    krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
++    zapfree(plain.data, plain.length);
+     gssalloc_free(outbuf);
+-    token->value = NULL;
+-    token->length = 0;
+     return err;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
+index 434e4eea65..f55ca46c60 100644
+--- a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
++++ b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
+@@ -161,12 +161,12 @@ xdr_rmtcallres(
+ 	caddr_t port_ptr;
+ 
+ 	port_ptr = (caddr_t)(void *)crp->port_ptr;
+-	if (xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
+-			  (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32) &&
+-	    xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen)) {
+-		crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
++	if (!xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
++			   (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32))
++		return (FALSE);
++	crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
++	if (xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen))
+ 		return ((*(crp->xdr_results))(xdrs, crp->results_ptr));
+-	}
+ 	return (FALSE);
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0019-Remove-klist-s-defname-global-variable.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 05bb6d9c729a3c6a4ba35270368bc0f6e1875ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 16:52:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Remove klist's defname global variable
+
+Addition of a "cleanup" section in kinit's show_ccache() function as
+part of commit 6c5471176f5266564fbc8a7e02f03b4b042202f8 introduced a
+double-free bug, because defname is a global variable.  After the
+first call, successive calls may take place with a dangling pointer in
+defname, which will be freed if krb5_cc_get_principal() fails.
+
+Convert "defname" to a local variable initialized at the beginning of
+show_ccache().
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 5b00197227231943bd2305328c8260dd0b0dbcf0)
+---
+ src/clients/klist/klist.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/clients/klist/klist.c b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+index b5ae96a843..b5808e5c93 100644
+--- a/src/clients/klist/klist.c
++++ b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ int show_flags = 0, show_time = 0, status_only = 0, show_keys = 0;
+ int show_etype = 0, show_addresses = 0, no_resolve = 0, print_version = 0;
+ int show_adtype = 0, show_all = 0, list_all = 0, use_client_keytab = 0;
+ int show_config = 0;
+-char *defname;
+ char *progname;
+ krb5_timestamp now;
+ unsigned int timestamp_width;
+@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ krb5_context context;
+ 
+ static krb5_boolean is_local_tgt(krb5_principal princ, krb5_data *realm);
+ static char *etype_string(krb5_enctype );
+-static void show_credential(krb5_creds *);
++static void show_credential(krb5_creds *, const char *);
+ 
+ static void list_all_ccaches(void);
+ static int list_ccache(krb5_ccache);
+@@ -473,6 +472,7 @@ show_ccache(krb5_ccache cache)
+     krb5_creds creds;
+     krb5_principal princ = NULL;
+     krb5_error_code ret;
++    char *defname = NULL;
+     int status = 1;
+ 
+     ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &princ);
+@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ show_ccache(krb5_ccache cache)
+     }
+     while ((ret = krb5_cc_next_cred(context, cache, &cur, &creds)) == 0) {
+         if (show_config || !krb5_is_config_principal(context, creds.server))
+-            show_credential(&creds);
++            show_credential(&creds, defname);
+         krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
+     }
+     if (ret == KRB5_CC_END) {
+@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ print_config_data(int col, krb5_data *data)
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-show_credential(krb5_creds *cred)
++show_credential(krb5_creds *cred, const char *defname)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
+-- 
+2.45.1
+

0020-End-connection-on-KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From d7bcca2a215de880f4419afc450a96a747d48560 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 00:44:53 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] End connection on KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE
+
+In sendto_kdc.c:service_fds(), if a message handler indicates that a
+message should be discarded, kill the connection so we don't continue
+waiting on it for more data.
+
+ticket: 7899
+(cherry picked from commit ca80f64c786341d5871ae1de18142e62af64f7b9)
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+index 0f4bf23a95..262edf09b4 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+@@ -1440,7 +1440,10 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
+                 if (msg_handler != NULL) {
+                     krb5_data reply = make_data(state->in.buf, state->in.pos);
+ 
+-                    stop = (msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data) != 0);
++                    if (!msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data)) {
++                        kill_conn(context, state, selstate);
++                        stop = 0;
++                    }
+                 }
+ 
+                 if (stop) {
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0021-Add-request_timeout-configuration-parameter.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+From a07b3ae29fd972c40e30b95f6bcc8fb3ed4d9991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 14:20:34 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Add request_timeout configuration parameter
+
+Add a parameter to limit the total amount of time taken for a KDC or
+password change request.
+
+ticket: 9106 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 802318cda963456b3ed7856c836e89da891483be)
+---
+ doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst |  9 ++++++
+ src/include/k5-int.h               |  2 ++
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c        | 14 +++++++-
+ src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c       | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+index a33711d918..65fb592d98 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+@@ -356,6 +356,15 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+     (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the default renewable lifetime
+     for initial ticket requests.  The default value is 0.
+ 
++**request_timeout**
++    (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
++    password change requests.  This timeout does not affect the
++    intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
++    fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
++    contacted.  A value of 0 indicates no specific maximum, in which
++    case requests will time out if no server responds after several
++    tries.  The default value is 0.  (New in release 1.22.)
++
+ **spake_preauth_groups**
+     A whitespace or comma-separated list of words which specifies the
+     groups allowed for SPAKE preauthentication.  The possible values
+diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
+index b3e07945c1..69d6a6f569 100644
+--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
++++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
+@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ typedef unsigned char   u_char;
+ #define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_INDICATOR      "spake_preauth_indicator"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_KDC_CHALLENGE  "spake_preauth_kdc_challenge"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_GROUPS         "spake_preauth_groups"
++#define KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT              "request_timeout"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_TICKET_LIFETIME              "ticket_lifetime"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_UDP_PREFERENCE_LIMIT         "udp_preference_limit"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_UNLOCKITER                   "unlockiter"
+@@ -1200,6 +1201,7 @@ struct _krb5_context {
+     kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle;
+     /* allowable clock skew */
+     krb5_deltat     clockskew;
++    krb5_deltat     req_timeout;
+     krb5_flags      kdc_default_options;
+     krb5_flags      library_options;
+     krb5_boolean    profile_secure;
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+index 2b5abcd817..582a2945ff 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
+     krb5_context ctx = 0;
+     krb5_error_code retval;
+     int tmp;
+-    char *plugin_dir = NULL;
++    char *plugin_dir = NULL, *timeout_str = NULL;
+ 
+     /* Verify some assumptions.  If the assumptions hold and the
+        compiler is optimizing, this should result in no code being
+@@ -240,6 +240,17 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
+     get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_CLOCKSKEW, DEFAULT_CLOCKSKEW, &tmp);
+     ctx->clockskew = tmp;
+ 
++    retval = profile_get_string(ctx->profile, KRB5_CONF_LIBDEFAULTS,
++                                KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, NULL, NULL,
++                                &timeout_str);
++    if (retval)
++        goto cleanup;
++    if (timeout_str != NULL) {
++        retval = krb5_string_to_deltat(timeout_str, &ctx->req_timeout);
++        if (retval)
++            goto cleanup;
++    }
++
+     get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_KDC_DEFAULT_OPTIONS, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK,
+                 &tmp);
+     ctx->kdc_default_options = tmp;
+@@ -281,6 +292,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
+ 
+ cleanup:
+     profile_release_string(plugin_dir);
++    profile_release_string(timeout_str);
+     krb5_free_context(ctx);
+     return retval;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+index 262edf09b4..98247a1089 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+@@ -1395,34 +1395,41 @@ get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
+ 
+ static krb5_boolean
+ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
+-            time_ms interval, struct conn_state *conns,
++            time_ms interval, time_ms timeout, struct conn_state *conns,
+             struct select_state *seltemp, const krb5_data *realm,
+             int (*msg_handler)(krb5_context, const krb5_data *, void *),
+             void *msg_handler_data, struct conn_state **winner_out)
+ {
+     int e, selret = 0;
+-    time_ms endtime;
++    time_ms curtime, interval_end, endtime;
+     struct conn_state *state;
+ 
+     *winner_out = NULL;
+ 
+-    e = get_curtime_ms(&endtime);
++    e = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
+     if (e)
+         return TRUE;
+-    endtime += interval;
++    interval_end = curtime + interval;
+ 
+     e = 0;
+     while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
+-        e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, get_endtime(endtime, conns),
+-                              seltemp, &selret);
++        endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
++        /* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
++        if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
++            endtime = timeout;
++        e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
+         if (e == EINTR)
+             continue;
+         if (e != 0)
+             break;
+ 
+-        if (selret == 0)
+-            /* Timeout, return to caller.  */
++        if (selret == 0) {
++            /* We timed out.  Stop if we hit the overall request timeout. */
++            if (timeout && (get_curtime_ms(&curtime) || curtime >= timeout))
++                return TRUE;
++            /* Otherwise return to the caller to send the next request. */
+             return FALSE;
++        }
+ 
+         /* Got something on a socket, process it.  */
+         for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
+@@ -1495,7 +1502,7 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
+           void *msg_handler_data)
+ {
+     int pass;
+-    time_ms delay;
++    time_ms delay, timeout = 0;
+     krb5_error_code retval;
+     struct conn_state *conns = NULL, *state, **tailptr, *next, *winner;
+     size_t s;
+@@ -1505,6 +1512,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
+ 
+     *reply = empty_data();
+ 
++    if (context->req_timeout) {
++        retval = get_curtime_ms(&timeout);
++        if (retval)
++            return retval;
++        timeout += 1000 * context->req_timeout;
++    }
++
+     /* One for use here, listing all our fds in use, and one for
+      * temporary use in service_fds, for the fds of interest.  */
+     sel_state = malloc(2 * sizeof(*sel_state));
+@@ -1532,8 +1546,9 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
+             if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
+                            callback_info))
+                 continue;
+-            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
+-                               realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
++            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
++                               seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
++                               &winner);
+         }
+     }
+ 
+@@ -1545,13 +1560,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
+         if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
+                        callback_info))
+             continue;
+-        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
++        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
+                            realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+     }
+ 
+     /* Wait for two seconds at the end of the first pass. */
+     if (!done) {
+-        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, conns, seltemp,
++        done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
+                            realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -1562,15 +1577,17 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
+             if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
+                            callback_info))
+                 continue;
+-            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
+-                               realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
++            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
++                               seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
++                               &winner);
+             if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
+                 break;
+         }
+         /* Wait for the delay backoff at the end of this pass. */
+         if (!done) {
+-            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, conns, seltemp,
+-                               realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
++            done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, timeout, conns,
++                               seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
++                               &winner);
+         }
+         if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
+             break;
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0022-Wait-indefinitely-on-KDC-TCP-connections.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From 1da153d97d7fb30a44fca35f9b71b8f4ed5385b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 16:26:42 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Wait indefinitely on KDC TCP connections
+
+When making a KDC or password change request, wait indefinitely
+(limited only by request_timeout if set) once a KDC has accepted a TCP
+connection.
+
+ticket: 9105 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 6436a3808061da787a43c6810f5f0370cdfb6e36)
+---
+ doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst |  2 +-
+ src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c       | 50 ++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+index 65fb592d98..b7284c47df 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+     for initial ticket requests.  The default value is 0.
+ 
+ **request_timeout**
+-    (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
++    (:ref:`duration` string.)  Sets the maximum total time for KDC and
+     password change requests.  This timeout does not affect the
+     intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
+     fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+index 98247a1089..924f5b2d26 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ struct conn_state {
+     krb5_data callback_buffer;
+     size_t server_index;
+     struct conn_state *next;
+-    time_ms endtime;
+     krb5_boolean defer;
+     struct {
+         const char *uri_path;
+@@ -344,15 +343,19 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
+                   struct select_state *out, int *sret)
+ {
+ #ifndef USE_POLL
+-    struct timeval tv;
++    struct timeval tv, *tvp;
+ #endif
+     krb5_error_code retval;
+     time_ms curtime, interval;
+ 
+-    retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
+-    if (retval != 0)
+-        return retval;
+-    interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
++    if (endtime != 0) {
++        retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
++        if (retval != 0)
++            return retval;
++        interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
++    } else {
++        interval = -1;
++    }
+ 
+     /* We don't need a separate copy of the selstate for poll, but use one for
+      * consistency with how we use select. */
+@@ -361,9 +364,14 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
+ #ifdef USE_POLL
+     *sret = poll(out->fds, out->nfds, interval);
+ #else
+-    tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
+-    tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
+-    *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, &tv);
++    if (interval != -1) {
++        tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
++        tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
++        tvp = &tv;
++    } else {
++        tvp = NULL;
++    }
++    *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, tvp);
+ #endif
+ 
+     return (*sret < 0) ? SOCKET_ERRNO : 0;
+@@ -1099,11 +1107,6 @@ service_tcp_connect(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
+     }
+ 
+     conn->state = WRITING;
+-
+-    /* Record this connection's timeout for service_fds. */
+-    if (get_curtime_ms(&conn->endtime) == 0)
+-        conn->endtime += 10000;
+-
+     return conn->service_write(context, realm, conn, selstate);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1378,19 +1381,18 @@ kill_conn:
+     return FALSE;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Return the maximum of endtime and the endtime fields of all currently active
+- * TCP connections. */
+-static time_ms
+-get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
++/* Return true if conns contains any states with connected TCP sockets. */
++static krb5_boolean
++any_tcp_connections(struct conn_state *conns)
+ {
+     struct conn_state *state;
+ 
+     for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
+-        if ((state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING) &&
+-            state->endtime > endtime)
+-            endtime = state->endtime;
++        if (state->addr.transport != UDP &&
++            (state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING))
++            return TRUE;
+     }
+-    return endtime;
++    return FALSE;
+ }
+ 
+ static krb5_boolean
+@@ -1413,9 +1415,9 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
+ 
+     e = 0;
+     while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
+-        endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
++        endtime = any_tcp_connections(conns) ? 0 : interval_end;
+         /* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
+-        if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
++        if (timeout && (!endtime || endtime > timeout))
+             endtime = timeout;
+         e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
+         if (e == EINTR)
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0024-Fix-various-issues-detected-by-static-analysis.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+From 3999883b9745bfd7065d41ff05b19e56bcb2e791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 17:18:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix various issues detected by static analysis
+
+In klists's show_credential(), ensure that the column counter doesn't
+decrease if printf() fails.
+
+In process_k5beta7_princ(), bounds-check the e_length field.
+
+In ndr_enc_delegation_info(), initialize b so it is always valid for
+the cleanup handler.
+
+In krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data(), change the flow control so ret is
+always set by the end of the function.  Return KRB5_KDB_INVALIDKEYSIZE
+if there isn't enough data in the first key_data_contents field or if
+the serialized key length is invalid.
+
+In svcauth_gss_validate(), expand rpchdr to accomodate the header plus
+MAX_AUTH_BYTES.
+
+In svcudp_reply(), change slen to unsigned to match the return type of
+XDR_GETPOS() and eliminate an unnecessary check for slen >= 0.
+
+In krb5int_pthread_loaded()(), remove pthread_equal() from the weak
+symbol checks.  It is implemented as an inline function in some glibc
+versions, which makes the comparison "&pthread_equal == 0" always
+false.
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: further modified krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data() for
+clarity; added detail to commit message]
+
+(cherry picked from commit a96541981ee34c8642ddeb6101b98e883e41c6e5)
+---
+ src/clients/klist/klist.c  | 12 ++++-----
+ src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c   |  5 ++++
+ src/kdc/ndr.c              |  2 +-
+ src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c  | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c |  5 +++-
+ src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c      | 13 ++++-----
+ src/util/support/threads.c |  2 --
+ 7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/clients/klist/klist.c b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+index b5808e5c93..ba9539fd23 100644
+--- a/src/clients/klist/klist.c
++++ b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ show_credential(krb5_creds *cred, const char *defname)
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
+     char *name = NULL, *sname = NULL, *tktsname, *flags;
+-    int extra_field = 0, ccol = 0, i;
++    int extra_field = 0, ccol = 0, i, r;
+     krb5_boolean is_config = krb5_is_config_principal(context, cred->server);
+ 
+     ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cred->client, &name);
+@@ -711,11 +711,11 @@ show_credential(krb5_creds *cred, const char *defname)
+         fputs("config: ", stdout);
+         ccol = 8;
+         for (i = 1; i < cred->server->length; i++) {
+-            ccol += printf("%s%.*s%s",
+-                           i > 1 ? "(" : "",
+-                           (int)cred->server->data[i].length,
+-                           cred->server->data[i].data,
+-                           i > 1 ? ")" : "");
++            r = printf("%s%.*s%s", i > 1 ? "(" : "",
++                       (int)cred->server->data[i].length,
++                       cred->server->data[i].data, i > 1 ? ")" : "");
++            if (r >= 0)
++                ccol += r;
+         }
+         fputs(" = ", stdout);
+         ccol += 3;
+diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
+index 4d6cc0bdf9..feb053d834 100644
+--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
++++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
+@@ -704,6 +704,11 @@ process_k5beta7_princ(krb5_context context, const char *fname, FILE *filep,
+ 
+     dbentry->len = u1;
+     dbentry->n_key_data = u4;
++
++    if (u5 > UINT16_MAX) {
++        load_err(fname, *linenop, _("invalid principal extra data size"));
++        goto fail;
++    }
+     dbentry->e_length = u5;
+ 
+     if (kp != NULL) {
+diff --git a/src/kdc/ndr.c b/src/kdc/ndr.c
+index d438408ee2..38be9fe42a 100644
+--- a/src/kdc/ndr.c
++++ b/src/kdc/ndr.c
+@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ ndr_enc_delegation_info(struct pac_s4u_delegation_info *in, krb5_data *out)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     size_t i;
+-    struct k5buf b;
++    struct k5buf b = EMPTY_K5BUF;
+     struct encoded_wchars pt_encoded = { 0 }, *tss_encoded = NULL;
+     uint32_t pointer = 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c b/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
+index 82bbed6312..21aa3742b1 100644
+--- a/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
++++ b/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data(krb5_context context, const krb5_keyblock *mkey,
+                               krb5_keyblock *dbkey_out,
+                               krb5_keysalt *keysalt_out)
+ {
+-    krb5_error_code ret;
++    krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+     int16_t keylen;
+     krb5_enc_data cipher;
+     krb5_data plain = empty_data();
+@@ -74,36 +74,38 @@ krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data(krb5_context context, const krb5_keyblock *mkey,
+     if (mkey == NULL)
+         return KRB5_KDB_BADSTORED_MKEY;
+ 
+-    if (kd->key_data_contents[0] != NULL && kd->key_data_length[0] >= 2) {
+-        keylen = load_16_le(kd->key_data_contents[0]);
+-        if (keylen < 0)
+-            return EINVAL;
+-        cipher.enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
+-        cipher.ciphertext = make_data(kd->key_data_contents[0] + 2,
+-                                      kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
+-        ret = alloc_data(&plain, kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
+-        if (ret)
+-            goto cleanup;
++    if (kd->key_data_contents[0] == NULL || kd->key_data_length[0] < 2)
++        return KRB5_KDB_INVALIDKEYSIZE;
+ 
+-        ret = krb5_c_decrypt(context, mkey, 0, 0, &cipher, &plain);
+-        if (ret)
+-            goto cleanup;
++    keylen = load_16_le(kd->key_data_contents[0]);
++    if (keylen < 0)
++        return KRB5_KDB_INVALIDKEYSIZE;
+ 
+-        /* Make sure the plaintext has at least as many bytes as the true ke
+-         * length (it may have more due to padding). */
+-        if ((unsigned int)keylen > plain.length) {
+-            ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+-            if (ret)
+-                goto cleanup;
+-        }
++    cipher.enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
++    cipher.ciphertext = make_data(kd->key_data_contents[0] + 2,
++                                  kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
++    ret = alloc_data(&plain, kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
++    if (ret)
++        goto cleanup;
+ 
+-        kb.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+-        kb.enctype = kd->key_data_type[0];
+-        kb.length = keylen;
+-        kb.contents = (uint8_t *)plain.data;
+-        plain = empty_data();
++    ret = krb5_c_decrypt(context, mkey, 0, 0, &cipher, &plain);
++    if (ret)
++        goto cleanup;
++
++    /* Make sure the plaintext has at least as many bytes as the true key
++     * length (it may have more due to padding). */
++    if ((unsigned int)keylen > plain.length) {
++        ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++        if (ret)
++            goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
++    kb.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
++    kb.enctype = kd->key_data_type[0];
++    kb.length = keylen;
++    kb.contents = (uint8_t *)plain.data;
++    plain = empty_data();
++
+     /* Decode salt data. */
+     if (keysalt_out != NULL) {
+         if (kd->key_data_ver == 2) {
+diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c b/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
+index 98d601c8ab..4f1d2911b0 100644
+--- a/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
++++ b/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
+@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
+ 	struct opaque_auth	*oa;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc		 rpcbuf, checksum;
+ 	OM_uint32		 maj_stat, min_stat, qop_state;
+-	u_char			 rpchdr[128];
++	u_char			 rpchdr[32 + MAX_AUTH_BYTES];
+ 	int32_t			*buf;
+ 
+ 	log_debug("in svcauth_gss_validate()");
+@@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
+ 		return (FALSE);
+ 
+ 	buf = (int32_t *)(void *)rpchdr;
++
++	/* Write the 32 first bytes of the header. */
+ 	IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_xid);
+ 	IXDR_PUT_ENUM(buf, msg->rm_direction);
+ 	IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_call.cb_rpcvers);
+@@ -323,6 +325,7 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
+ 	IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_call.cb_proc);
+ 	IXDR_PUT_ENUM(buf, oa->oa_flavor);
+ 	IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, oa->oa_length);
++
+ 	if (oa->oa_length) {
+ 		memcpy((caddr_t)buf, oa->oa_base, oa->oa_length);
+ 		buf += RNDUP(oa->oa_length) / sizeof(int32_t);
+diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c b/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
+index 8ecbdf2b33..3aff277eb7 100644
+--- a/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
++++ b/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
+@@ -248,8 +248,9 @@ static bool_t svcudp_reply(
+ {
+      struct svcudp_data *su = su_data(xprt);
+      XDR *xdrs = &su->su_xdrs;
+-     int slen;
++     u_int slen;
+      bool_t stat = FALSE;
++     ssize_t r;
+ 
+      xdrproc_t xdr_results = NULL;
+      caddr_t xdr_location = 0;
+@@ -272,12 +273,12 @@ static bool_t svcudp_reply(
+      if (xdr_replymsg(xdrs, msg) &&
+ 	 (!has_args ||
+ 	  (SVCAUTH_WRAP(xprt->xp_auth, xdrs, xdr_results, xdr_location)))) {
+-	  slen = (int)XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
+-	  if (sendto(xprt->xp_sock, rpc_buffer(xprt), slen, 0,
+-		     (struct sockaddr *)&(xprt->xp_raddr), xprt->xp_addrlen)
+-	      == slen) {
++	  slen = XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
++	  r = sendto(xprt->xp_sock, rpc_buffer(xprt), slen, 0,
++		     (struct sockaddr *)&(xprt->xp_raddr), xprt->xp_addrlen);
++	  if (r >= 0 && (u_int)r == slen) {
+ 	       stat = TRUE;
+-	       if (su->su_cache && slen >= 0) {
++	       if (su->su_cache) {
+ 		    cache_set(xprt, (uint32_t) slen);
+ 	       }
+ 	  }
+diff --git a/src/util/support/threads.c b/src/util/support/threads.c
+index be7e4c2e3f..4ded805b79 100644
+--- a/src/util/support/threads.c
++++ b/src/util/support/threads.c
+@@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ struct tsd_block {
+ # pragma weak pthread_mutex_destroy
+ # pragma weak pthread_mutex_init
+ # pragma weak pthread_self
+-# pragma weak pthread_equal
+ # pragma weak pthread_getspecific
+ # pragma weak pthread_setspecific
+ # pragma weak pthread_key_create
+@@ -151,7 +150,6 @@ int krb5int_pthread_loaded (void)
+         || &pthread_mutex_destroy == 0
+         || &pthread_mutex_init == 0
+         || &pthread_self == 0
+-        || &pthread_equal == 0
+         /* Any program that's really multithreaded will have to be
+            able to create threads.  */
+         || &pthread_create == 0
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0025-Generate-and-verify-message-MACs-in-libkrad.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
+From ea02fd7bb79861b8e36517c7c95af821a16657c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:15:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Generate and verify message MACs in libkrad
+
+Implement some of the measures specified in
+draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 for mitigating the BlastRADIUS
+attack (CVE-2024-3596):
+
+* Include a Message-Authenticator MAC as the first attribute when
+  generating a packet of type Access-Request, Access-Reject,
+  Access-Accept, or Access-Challenge (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4), if
+  the secret is non-empty.  (An empty secret indicates the use of Unix
+  domain socket transport.)
+
+* Validate the Message-Authenticator MAC in received packets, if
+  present.
+
+FreeRADIUS enforces Message-Authenticator as of versions 3.2.5 and
+3.0.27.  libkrad must generate Message-Authenticator attributes in
+order to remain compatible with these implementations.
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: adjusted style and naming; simplified some
+functions; edited commit message]
+
+ticket: 9142 (new)
+tags: pullup
+target_version: 1.21-next
+
+(cherry picked from commit 871125fea8ce0370a972bf65f7d1de63f619b06c)
+---
+ src/include/k5-int.h                   |   5 +
+ src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c |  28 ++++
+ src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports     |   1 +
+ src/lib/krad/attr.c                    |  17 ++
+ src/lib/krad/attrset.c                 |  59 +++++--
+ src/lib/krad/internal.h                |   7 +-
+ src/lib/krad/packet.c                  | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c               |   2 +-
+ src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py               |   3 +-
+ src/lib/krad/t_packet.c                |  11 ++
+ src/tests/t_otp.py                     |   3 +
+ 11 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
+index 69d6a6f569..b7789a2dd8 100644
+--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
++++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
+@@ -2403,4 +2403,9 @@ krb5_boolean
+ k5_sname_compare(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal sname,
+                  krb5_const_principal princ);
+ 
++/* Generate an HMAC-MD5 keyed checksum as specified by RFC 2104. */
++krb5_error_code
++k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
++            krb5_data *output);
++
+ #endif /* _KRB5_INT_H */
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
+index ec024f3966..a809388549 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
+@@ -92,3 +92,31 @@ cleanup:
+     free(hash_iov);
+     return ret;
+ }
++
++krb5_error_code
++k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
++            krb5_data *output)
++{
++    krb5_error_code ret;
++    const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = &krb5int_hash_md5;
++    krb5_keyblock keyblock = { 0 };
++    krb5_data hashed_key;
++    uint8_t hkeybuf[16];
++    krb5_crypto_iov iov;
++
++    /* Hash the key if it is longer than the block size. */
++    if (key->length > hash->blocksize) {
++        hashed_key = make_data(hkeybuf, sizeof(hkeybuf));
++        iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
++        iov.data = *key;
++        ret = hash->hash(&iov, 1, &hashed_key);
++        if (ret)
++            return ret;
++        key = &hashed_key;
++    }
++
++    keyblock.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
++    keyblock.length = key->length;
++    keyblock.contents = (uint8_t *)key->data;
++    return krb5int_hmac_keyblock(hash, &keyblock, data, num_data, output);
++}
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
+index d8ffa63304..00e0ce1812 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
+@@ -102,3 +102,4 @@ krb5_c_prfplus
+ krb5_c_derive_prfplus
+ k5_enctype_to_ssf
+ krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype
++k5_hmac_md5
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attr.c b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
+index 42d354a3b5..65ed1d35e7 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/attr.c
++++ b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
+@@ -125,6 +125,23 @@ static const attribute_record attributes[UCHAR_MAX] = {
+     {"NAS-Port-Type", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
+     {"Port-Limit", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
+     {"Login-LAT-Port", 1, MAX_ATTRSIZE, NULL, NULL},
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Password-Retry */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Prompt */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Connect-Info */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Configuration-Token */
++    {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* EAP-Message */
++    {"Message-Authenticator", MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL, NULL},
+ };
+ 
+ /* Encode User-Password attribute. */
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
+index 6ec031e320..e5457ebfd7 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
++++ b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
+@@ -164,15 +164,44 @@ krad_attrset_copy(const krad_attrset *set, krad_attrset **copy)
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/* Place an encoded attributes into outbuf at position *i.  Increment *i by the
++ * length of the encoding. */
++static krb5_error_code
++append_attr(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
++            const uint8_t *auth, krad_attr type, const krb5_data *data,
++            uint8_t outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *i, krb5_boolean *is_fips)
++{
++    uint8_t buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
++    size_t attrlen;
++    krb5_error_code retval;
++
++    retval = kr_attr_encode(ctx, secret, auth, type, data, buffer, &attrlen,
++                            is_fips);
++    if (retval)
++        return retval;
++
++    if (attrlen > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE - *i - 2)
++        return EMSGSIZE;
++
++    outbuf[(*i)++] = type;
++    outbuf[(*i)++] = attrlen + 2;
++    memcpy(outbuf + *i, buffer, attrlen);
++    *i += attrlen;
++
++    return 0;
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
+-                  const unsigned char *auth,
++                  const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
+                   unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+                   krb5_boolean *is_fips)
+ {
+-    unsigned char buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
+     krb5_error_code retval;
+-    size_t i = 0, attrlen;
++    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
++    const uint8_t zeroes[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
++    krb5_data zerodata;
++    size_t i = 0;
+     attr *a;
+ 
+     if (set == NULL) {
+@@ -180,19 +209,21 @@ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
+-        retval = kr_attr_encode(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
+-                                buffer, &attrlen, is_fips);
+-        if (retval != 0)
++    if (add_msgauth) {
++        /* Encode Message-Authenticator as the first attribute, per
++         * draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 section 5.2. */
++        zerodata = make_data((uint8_t *)zeroes, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
++        retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, msgauth_type, &zerodata,
++                             outbuf, &i, is_fips);
++        if (retval)
+             return retval;
++    }
+ 
+-        if (i + attrlen + 2 > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE)
+-            return EMSGSIZE;
+-
+-        outbuf[i++] = a->type;
+-        outbuf[i++] = attrlen + 2;
+-        memcpy(&outbuf[i], buffer, attrlen);
+-        i += attrlen;
++    K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
++        retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
++                             outbuf, &i, is_fips);
++        if (retval)
++            return retval;
+     }
+ 
+     *outlen = i;
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+index a17b6f39b1..ca66f3ec68 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
++++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
+ #define UCHAR_MAX 255
+ #endif
+ 
++#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
++
+ /* RFC 2865 */
+ #define MAX_ATTRSIZE (UCHAR_MAX - 2)
+ #define MAX_ATTRSETSIZE (KRAD_PACKET_SIZE_MAX - 20)
+@@ -79,10 +81,11 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
+                krad_attr type, const krb5_data *in,
+                unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
+ 
+-/* Encode the attributes into the buffer. */
++/* Encode set into outbuf.  If add_msgauth is true, include a zeroed
++ * Message-Authenticator as the first attribute. */
+ krb5_error_code
+ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
+-                  const unsigned char *auth,
++                  const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
+                   unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+                   krb5_boolean *is_fips);
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+index c5446b890c..3c1a4d507e 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
++++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ typedef unsigned char uchar;
+ 
+ /* RFC 2865 */
++#define MSGAUTH_SIZE (2 + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ #define OFFSET_CODE 0
+ #define OFFSET_ID 1
+ #define OFFSET_LENGTH 2
+@@ -222,6 +223,106 @@ packet_set_attrset(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_packet *pkt)
+     return kr_attrset_decode(ctx, &tmp, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), &pkt->attrset);
+ }
+ 
++/* Determine if a packet requires a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
++static inline krb5_boolean
++requires_msgauth(const char *secret, krad_code code)
++{
++    /* If no secret is provided, assume that the transport is a UNIX socket.
++     * Message-Authenticator is required only on UDP and TCP connections. */
++    if (*secret == '\0')
++        return FALSE;
++
++    /*
++     * Per draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4,
++     * Message-Authenticator is required in Access-Request packets and all
++     * potential responses when UDP or TCP transport is used.
++     */
++    return code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request") ||
++        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Reject") ||
++        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Accept") ||
++        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Challenge");
++}
++
++/* Check if the packet has a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
++static inline krb5_boolean
++has_pkt_msgauth(const krad_packet *pkt)
++{
++    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
++
++    return krad_attrset_get(pkt->attrset, msgauth_type, 0) != NULL;
++}
++
++/* Return the beginning of the Message-Authenticator attribute in pkt, or NULL
++ * if no such attribute is present. */
++static const uint8_t *
++lookup_msgauth_addr(const krad_packet *pkt)
++{
++    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
++    size_t i;
++    uint8_t *p;
++
++    i = OFFSET_ATTR;
++    while (i + 2 < pkt->pkt.length) {
++        p = (uint8_t *)offset(&pkt->pkt, i);
++        if (msgauth_type == *p)
++            return p;
++        i += p[1];
++    }
++
++    return NULL;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Calculate the message authenticator MAC for pkt as specified in RFC 2869
++ * section 5.14, placing the result in mac_out.  Use the provided authenticator
++ * auth, which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request.
++ */
++static krb5_error_code
++calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
++              const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE],
++              uint8_t mac_out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE])
++{
++    uint8_t zeroed_msgauth[MSGAUTH_SIZE];
++    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
++    const uint8_t *msgauth_attr, *msgauth_end, *pkt_end;
++    krb5_crypto_iov input[5];
++    krb5_data ksecr, mac;
++
++    msgauth_attr = lookup_msgauth_addr(pkt);
++    if (msgauth_attr == NULL)
++        return EINVAL;
++    msgauth_end = msgauth_attr + MSGAUTH_SIZE;
++    pkt_end = (const uint8_t *)pkt->pkt.data + pkt->pkt.length;
++
++    /* Read code, id, and length from the packet. */
++    input[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
++    input[0].data = make_data(pkt->pkt.data, OFFSET_AUTH);
++
++    /* Read the provided authenticator. */
++    input[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
++    input[1].data = make_data((uint8_t *)auth, AUTH_FIELD_SIZE);
++
++    /* Read any attributes before Message-Authenticator. */
++    input[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
++    input[2].data = make_data(pkt_attr(pkt), msgauth_attr - pkt_attr(pkt));
++
++    /* Read Message-Authenticator with the data bytes all set to zero, per RFC
++     * 2869 section 5.14. */
++    zeroed_msgauth[0] = msgauth_type;
++    zeroed_msgauth[1] = MSGAUTH_SIZE;
++    memset(zeroed_msgauth + 2, 0, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
++    input[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
++    input[3].data = make_data(zeroed_msgauth, MSGAUTH_SIZE);
++
++    /* Read any attributes after Message-Authenticator. */
++    input[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
++    input[4].data = make_data((uint8_t *)msgauth_end, pkt_end - msgauth_end);
++
++    mac = make_data(mac_out, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
++    ksecr = string2data((char *)secret);
++    return k5_hmac_md5(&ksecr, input, 5, &mac);
++}
++
+ ssize_t
+ krad_packet_bytes_needed(const krb5_data *buffer)
+ {
+@@ -255,6 +356,7 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
+     krad_packet *pkt;
+     uchar id;
+     size_t attrset_len;
++    krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
+ 
+     pkt = packet_new();
+     if (pkt == NULL) {
+@@ -274,9 +376,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
+     if (retval != 0)
+         goto error;
+ 
++    /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
++    msgauth_required = (*secret != '\0' &&
++                        code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request"));
++
+     /* Encode the attributes. */
+-    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt),
+-                               &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
++    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), msgauth_required,
++                               pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
+     if (retval != 0)
+         goto error;
+ 
+@@ -285,6 +391,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
+     pkt_code_set(pkt, code);
+     pkt_len_set(pkt, pkt->pkt.length);
+ 
++    if (msgauth_required) {
++        /* Calculate and set the Message-Authenticator MAC. */
++        retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
++        if (retval != 0)
++            goto error;
++    }
++
+     /* Copy the attrset for future use. */
+     retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
+     if (retval != 0)
+@@ -307,14 +420,19 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
+     krb5_error_code retval;
+     krad_packet *pkt;
+     size_t attrset_len;
++    krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
+ 
+     pkt = packet_new();
+     if (pkt == NULL)
+         return ENOMEM;
+ 
++    /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
++    msgauth_required = requires_msgauth(secret, code);
++
+     /* Encode the attributes. */
+-    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request), pkt_attr(pkt),
+-                               &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
++    retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request),
++                               msgauth_required, pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len,
++                               &pkt->is_fips);
+     if (retval != 0)
+         goto error;
+ 
+@@ -330,6 +448,18 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
+     if (retval != 0)
+         goto error;
+ 
++    if (msgauth_required) {
++        /*
++         * Calculate and replace the Message-Authenticator MAC.  Per RFC 2869
++         * section 5.14, use the authenticator from the request, not from the
++         * response.
++         */
++        retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
++                               pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
++        if (retval != 0)
++            goto error;
++    }
++
+     /* Copy the attrset for future use. */
+     retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
+     if (retval != 0)
+@@ -343,6 +473,34 @@ error:
+     return retval;
+ }
+ 
++/* Verify the Message-Authenticator value in pkt, using the provided
++ * authenticator (which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request). */
++static krb5_error_code
++verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
++               const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE])
++{
++    uint8_t mac[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
++    krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
++    const krb5_data *msgauth;
++    krb5_error_code retval;
++
++    msgauth = krad_packet_get_attr(pkt, msgauth_type, 0);
++    if (msgauth == NULL)
++        return ENODATA;
++
++    retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, auth, mac);
++    if (retval)
++        return retval;
++
++    if (msgauth->length != MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
++        return EMSGSIZE;
++
++    if (k5_bcmp(mac, msgauth->data, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0)
++        return EBADMSG;
++
++    return 0;
++}
++
+ /* Decode a packet. */
+ static krb5_error_code
+ decode_packet(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krb5_data *buffer,
+@@ -394,21 +552,35 @@ krad_packet_decode_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
+                            krad_packet **reqpkt)
+ {
+     const krad_packet *tmp = NULL;
++    krad_packet *req;
+     krb5_error_code retval;
+ 
+-    retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, reqpkt);
+-    if (cb != NULL && retval == 0) {
++    retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, &req);
++    if (retval)
++        return retval;
++
++    /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
++    if (has_pkt_msgauth(req)) {
++        retval = verify_msgauth(secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
++        if (retval) {
++            krad_packet_free(req);
++            return retval;
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (cb != NULL) {
+         for (tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE); tmp != NULL; tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE)) {
+             if (pkt_id_get(*reqpkt) == pkt_id_get(tmp))
+                 break;
+         }
+-    }
+ 
+-    if (cb != NULL && (retval != 0 || tmp != NULL))
+-        (*cb)(data, TRUE);
++        if (tmp != NULL)
++            (*cb)(data, TRUE);
++    }
+ 
++    *reqpkt = req;
+     *duppkt = tmp;
+-    return retval;
++    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ krb5_error_code
+@@ -435,9 +607,17 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
+                 break;
+             }
+ 
+-            /* If the authenticator matches, then the response is valid. */
+-            if (memcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) == 0)
+-                break;
++            /* Verify the response authenticator. */
++            if (k5_bcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) != 0)
++                continue;
++
++            /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
++            if (has_pkt_msgauth(*rsppkt)) {
++                if (verify_msgauth(secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
++                    continue;
++            }
++
++            break;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
+index 4cdb8b7d8e..f9c66509bd 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
++++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ main(void)
+     noerror(krad_attrset_add(set, krad_attr_name2num("User-Password"), &tmp));
+ 
+     /* Encode attrset. */
+-    noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, buffer, &encode_len,
++    noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, FALSE, buffer, &encode_len,
+                               &is_fips));
+     krad_attrset_free(set);
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
+index 4a3de079c7..647d4894eb 100755
+--- a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
++++ b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ DICTIONARY = """
+ ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Name\t1\tstring
+ ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Password\t2\toctets
+ ATTRIBUTE\tNAS-Identifier\t32\tstring
++ATTRIBUTE\tMessage-Authenticator\t80\toctets
+ """
+ 
+ class TestServer(server.Server):
+@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ class TestServer(server.Server):
+             if key == "User-Password":
+                 passwd = [pkt.PwDecrypt(x) for x in pkt[key]]
+ 
+-        reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt)
++        reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt, message_authenticator=True)
+         if passwd == ['accept']:
+             reply.code = packet.AccessAccept
+         else:
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
+index c22489144f..104b6507a2 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
++++ b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
+@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
+     krb5_data username, password;
+     krb5_boolean auth = FALSE;
+     krb5_context ctx;
++    const krad_packet *dupreq;
++    const krb5_data *encpkt;
++    krad_packet *decreq;
+ 
+     username = string2data("testUser");
+ 
+@@ -184,9 +187,17 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
+ 
+     password = string2data("accept");
+     noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]));
++    encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]);
++    noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
++                                       &dupreq, &decreq));
++    krad_packet_free(decreq);
+ 
+     password = string2data("reject");
+     noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[REJECT_PACKET]));
++    encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[REJECT_PACKET]);
++    noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
++                                       &dupreq, &decreq));
++    krad_packet_free(decreq);
+ 
+     memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+     hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_otp.py b/src/tests/t_otp.py
+index c3b820a411..dd5cdc5c26 100755
+--- a/src/tests/t_otp.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_otp.py
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ ATTRIBUTE    User-Name    1    string
+ ATTRIBUTE    User-Password   2    octets
+ ATTRIBUTE    Service-Type    6    integer
+ ATTRIBUTE    NAS-Identifier  32    string
++ATTRIBUTE    Message-Authenticator 80 octets
+ '''
+ 
+ class RadiusDaemon(Process):
+@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ class RadiusDaemon(Process):
+             reply.code = packet.AccessReject
+             replyq['reply'] = False
+ 
++        reply.add_message_authenticator()
++
+         outq.put(replyq)
+         if addr is None:
+             sock.send(reply.ReplyPacket())
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

0027-Add-ecdsa-with-sha512-256-to-supportedCMSTypes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 43d10f1580c033fe706470e7588c720ac7854918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 18:27:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Add ecdsa-with-sha512/256 to supportedCMSTypes
+
+Elliptic curve certificates are already supported for PKINIT
+pre-authentication, but their associated signature types aren't
+advertized.  Add ecdsa-with-sha512 and ecdsa-with-sha256 OIDs to the
+supportedCMSTypes list sent by the client.
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message]
+
+ticket: 9100 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 9913e5c92c4e5cb76d6ae58386f744766d2e6454)
+---
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
+index 10f8688ec2..905e90d29c 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
+@@ -64,14 +64,52 @@ static char sha512WithRSAEncr_oid[9] = {
+     0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0d
+ };
+ 
++/* RFC 3279 ecdsa-with-SHA1: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
++ * signatures(4) 1 */
++static char ecdsaWithSha1_oid[] = {
++    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x01
++};
++
++/* RFC 5758 ecdsa-with-SHA256: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
++ * signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 */
++static char ecdsaWithSha256_oid[] = {
++    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02
++};
++
++/* RFC 5758 ecdsa-with-SHA384: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
++ * signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 */
++static char ecdsaWithSha384_oid[] = {
++    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x03
++};
++
++/* RFC 5758 ecdsa-with-SHA512: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
++ * signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 */
++static char ecdsaWithSha512_oid[] = {
++    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04
++};
++
+ const krb5_data sha256WithRSAEncr_id = {
+     KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha256WithRSAEncr_oid), sha256WithRSAEncr_oid
+ };
+ const krb5_data sha512WithRSAEncr_id = {
+     KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha512WithRSAEncr_oid), sha512WithRSAEncr_oid
+ };
++const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha1_id = {
++    KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha1_oid), ecdsaWithSha1_oid
++};
++const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha256_id = {
++    KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha256_oid), ecdsaWithSha256_oid
++};
++const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha384_id = {
++    KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha384_oid), ecdsaWithSha384_oid
++};
++const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha512_id = {
++    KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha512_oid), ecdsaWithSha512_oid
++};
+ 
+ krb5_data const * const supported_cms_algs[] = {
++    &ecdsaWithSha512_id,
++    &ecdsaWithSha256_id,
+     &sha512WithRSAEncr_id,
+     &sha256WithRSAEncr_id,
+     NULL
+-- 
+2.47.1
+

0028-Get-rid-of-pkinit_crypto_openssl.h.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+From fba4cbf0bc50569b8ea6d1e1c3303eaab84935e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 01:07:38 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Get rid of pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
+
+Fold pkinit_crypto_openssl.h into the one source file where it was
+used.  Also clean up the include of <arpa/inet.h>, as htonl() is no
+longer used after commit 1c87ce6c44a9de0824580a2d72a8a202237e01f4.
+
+(cherry picked from commit b3352945fb8836f8b4095e0b8aad04b54aca3152)
+---
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps               |   2 +-
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    |  85 +++++++++++-
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h    | 121 ------------------
+ 3 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
+
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps
+index 58320aa801..b6f4476fe8 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps
+@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ pkinit_crypto_openssl.so pkinit_crypto_openssl.po $(OUTPRE)pkinit_crypto_openssl
+   $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/plugin.h $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/preauth_plugin.h \
+   $(top_srcdir)/include/port-sockets.h $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h \
+   pkcs11.h pkinit.h pkinit_accessor.h pkinit_crypto.h \
+-  pkinit_crypto_openssl.c pkinit_crypto_openssl.h pkinit_trace.h
++  pkinit_crypto_openssl.c pkinit_trace.h
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+index f6d494bd11..ae8599d5a2 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -30,20 +30,99 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include "k5-int.h"
+-#include "pkinit_crypto_openssl.h"
+ #include "k5-buf.h"
+ #include "k5-err.h"
+ #include "k5-hex.h"
+-#include <unistd.h>
++#include "pkinit.h"
+ #include <dirent.h>
+-#include <arpa/inet.h>
+ 
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
++#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
++#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
++#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
++#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/sha.h>
++#include <openssl/asn1.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
++#include <openssl/cms.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/kdf.h>
++#include <openssl/decoder.h>
+ #include <openssl/params.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#define DN_BUF_LEN  256
++#define MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED 20
++
++struct _pkinit_cred_info {
++    char *name;
++    X509 *cert;
++    EVP_PKEY *key;
++#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
++    CK_BYTE_PTR cert_id;
++    int cert_id_len;
++#endif
++};
++typedef struct _pkinit_cred_info *pkinit_cred_info;
++
++struct _pkinit_identity_crypto_context {
++    pkinit_cred_info creds[MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED+1];
++    STACK_OF(X509) *my_certs;   /* available user certs */
++    char *identity;             /* identity name for user cert */
++    int cert_index;             /* cert to use out of available certs*/
++    EVP_PKEY *my_key;           /* available user keys if in filesystem */
++    STACK_OF(X509) *trustedCAs; /* available trusted ca certs */
++    STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs;   /* available intermediate ca certs */
++    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked;    /* available crls */
++    int pkcs11_method;
++    krb5_prompter_fct prompter;
++    void *prompter_data;
++#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
++    char *p11_module_name;
++    CK_SLOT_ID slotid;
++    char *token_label;
++    char *cert_label;
++    /* These are crypto-specific. */
++    struct plugin_file_handle *p11_module;
++    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
++    CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11;
++    uint8_t *cert_id;
++    size_t cert_id_len;
++    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech;
++#endif
++    krb5_boolean defer_id_prompt;
++    pkinit_deferred_id *deferred_ids;
++};
++
++struct _pkinit_plg_crypto_context {
++    EVP_PKEY *dh_1024;
++    EVP_PKEY *dh_2048;
++    EVP_PKEY *dh_4096;
++    EVP_PKEY *ec_p256;
++    EVP_PKEY *ec_p384;
++    EVP_PKEY *ec_p521;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_authData;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_DHKeyData;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_rkeyData;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_san;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_san_upn;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPClientAuth;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPKdc;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_kp_sc_logon;
++    ASN1_OBJECT *id_kp_serverAuth;
++};
++
++struct _pkinit_req_crypto_context {
++    X509 *received_cert;
++    EVP_PKEY *client_pkey;
++};
++
+ static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
+ static void pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
+deleted file mode 100644
+index b7a3358800..0000000000
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
+-/*
+- * COPYRIGHT (C) 2006,2007
+- * THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
+- * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
+- *
+- * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
+- * and redistribute this software and such derivative works
+- * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
+- * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
+- * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
+- * without specific, written prior authorization.  If the
+- * above copyright notice or any other identification of the
+- * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
+- * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
+- * also be included.
+- *
+- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
+- * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
+- * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
+- * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+- * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
+- * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
+- * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
+- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
+- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
+- * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+- * SUCH DAMAGES.
+- */
+-
+-#ifndef _PKINIT_CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H
+-#define _PKINIT_CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H
+-
+-#include "pkinit.h"
+-
+-#include <openssl/bn.h>
+-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+-#include <openssl/x509.h>
+-#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+-#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+-#include <openssl/err.h>
+-#include <openssl/evp.h>
+-#include <openssl/sha.h>
+-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+-#include <openssl/pem.h>
+-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+-#include <openssl/cms.h>
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+-#include <openssl/decoder.h>
+-#endif
+-
+-#define DN_BUF_LEN  256
+-#define MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED 20
+-
+-struct _pkinit_cred_info {
+-    char *name;
+-    X509 *cert;
+-    EVP_PKEY *key;
+-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+-    CK_BYTE_PTR cert_id;
+-    int cert_id_len;
+-#endif
+-};
+-typedef struct _pkinit_cred_info * pkinit_cred_info;
+-
+-struct _pkinit_identity_crypto_context {
+-    pkinit_cred_info creds[MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED+1];
+-    STACK_OF(X509) *my_certs;   /* available user certs */
+-    char *identity;             /* identity name for user cert */
+-    int cert_index;             /* cert to use out of available certs*/
+-    EVP_PKEY *my_key;           /* available user keys if in filesystem */
+-    STACK_OF(X509) *trustedCAs; /* available trusted ca certs */
+-    STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs;   /* available intermediate ca certs */
+-    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked;    /* available crls */
+-    int pkcs11_method;
+-    krb5_prompter_fct prompter;
+-    void *prompter_data;
+-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+-    char *p11_module_name;
+-    CK_SLOT_ID slotid;
+-    char *token_label;
+-    char *cert_label;
+-    /* These are crypto-specific */
+-    struct plugin_file_handle *p11_module;
+-    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+-    CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11;
+-    uint8_t *cert_id;
+-    size_t cert_id_len;
+-    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech;
+-#endif
+-    krb5_boolean defer_id_prompt;
+-    pkinit_deferred_id *deferred_ids;
+-};
+-
+-struct _pkinit_plg_crypto_context {
+-    EVP_PKEY *dh_1024;
+-    EVP_PKEY *dh_2048;
+-    EVP_PKEY *dh_4096;
+-    EVP_PKEY *ec_p256;
+-    EVP_PKEY *ec_p384;
+-    EVP_PKEY *ec_p521;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_authData;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_DHKeyData;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_rkeyData;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_san;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_san_upn;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPClientAuth;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPKdc;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_kp_sc_logon;
+-    ASN1_OBJECT *id_kp_serverAuth;
+-};
+-
+-struct _pkinit_req_crypto_context {
+-    X509 *received_cert;
+-    EVP_PKEY *client_pkey;
+-};
+-
+-#endif	/* _PKINIT_CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H */
+-- 
+2.47.1
+

0029-Use-SoftHSMv2-for-PKCS11-PKINIT-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From 1b01057df4c2223fbf92be44f1e764207208ef03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 19:03:38 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Use SoftHSMv2 for PKCS11 PKINIT tests
+
+Instead of softpkcs11, use SoftHSMv2 to mock the PKCS11 token for
+PKINIT tests.  Use pkcs11-tool from OpenSC to initialize the token and
+import a certificate and key.  SoftHSM does not support PIN-less
+tokens (see https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/480) so
+remove that test for now.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 8ab61608236883fdc5c2d43f4bd1ff2094401d19)
+---
+ .github/workflows/build.yml |  2 +-
+ src/tests/t_pkinit.py       | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/.github/workflows/build.yml b/.github/workflows/build.yml
+index 68a4788adb..d7ae86b150 100644
+--- a/.github/workflows/build.yml
++++ b/.github/workflows/build.yml
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
+               if: startsWith(matrix.os, 'ubuntu')
+               run: |
+                 sudo apt-get update -qq
+-                sudo apt-get install -y bison gettext keyutils ldap-utils libcmocka-dev libldap2-dev libkeyutils-dev libsasl2-dev libssl-dev python3-kdcproxy python3-pip slapd tcsh
++                sudo apt-get install -y bison gettext keyutils ldap-utils libcmocka-dev libldap2-dev libkeyutils-dev libsasl2-dev libssl-dev python3-kdcproxy python3-pip slapd tcsh softhsm2 opensc
+                 pip3 install pyrad
+             - name: Build
+               env:
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
+index f8f2debc1b..4435746429 100755
+--- a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
+@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
+ from k5test import *
++import re
+ 
+ # Skip this test if pkinit wasn't built.
+ if not pkinit_enabled:
+     skip_rest('PKINIT tests', 'PKINIT module not built')
+ 
+-soft_pkcs11 = os.path.join(buildtop, 'tests', 'softpkcs11', 'softpkcs11.so')
+-
+ # Construct a krb5.conf fragment configuring pkinit.
+ user_pem = os.path.join(pkinit_certs, 'user.pem')
+ privkey_pem = os.path.join(pkinit_certs, 'privkey.pem')
+@@ -55,9 +54,6 @@ p12_upn2_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % user_upn2_p12
+ p12_upn3_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % user_upn3_p12
+ p12_generic_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % generic_p12
+ p12_enc_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % user_enc_p12
+-p11_identity = 'PKCS11:' + soft_pkcs11
+-p11_token_identity = ('PKCS11:module_name=' + soft_pkcs11 +
+-                      ':slotid=1:token=SoftToken (token)')
+ 
+ # Start a realm with the test kdb module for the following UPN SAN tests.
+ realm = K5Realm(kdc_conf=alias_kdc_conf, create_kdb=False, pkinit=True)
+@@ -389,53 +385,63 @@ realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
+ realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=,'],
+             expected_code=1, expected_msg='Preauthentication failed while')
+ 
+-softpkcs11rc = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), 'testdir', 'soft-pkcs11.rc')
+-realm.env['SOFTPKCS11RC'] = softpkcs11rc
++softhsm2 = '/usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so'
++if not os.path.exists(softhsm2):
++    skip_rest('PKCS11 tests', 'SoftHSMv2 required')
++pkcs11_tool = which('pkcs11-tool')
++if not pkcs11_tool:
++    skip_rest('PKCS11 tests', 'pkcs11-tool from OpenSC required')
++tool_cmd = [pkcs11_tool, '--module', softhsm2]
++
++# Prepare a SoftHSM token.
++softhsm2_conf = os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'softhsm2.conf')
++softhsm2_tokens = os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'tokens')
++os.mkdir(softhsm2_tokens)
++realm.env['SOFTHSM2_CONF'] = softhsm2_conf
++with open(softhsm2_conf, 'w') as f:
++    f.write('directories.tokendir = %s\n' % softhsm2_tokens)
++realm.run(tool_cmd + ['--init-token', '--label', 'user',
++                      '--so-pin', 'sopin', '--init-pin', '--pin', 'userpin'])
++realm.run(tool_cmd + ['-w', user_pem, '-y', 'cert'])
++realm.run(tool_cmd + ['-w', privkey_pem, '-y', 'privkey',
++                      '-l', '--pin', 'userpin'])
++
++# Extract the slot ID generated by SoftHSM.
++out = realm.run(tool_cmd + ['-L'])
++m = re.search(r'slot ID 0x([0-9a-f]+)\n', out)
++if not m:
++    fail('could not extract slot ID from SoftHSM token')
++slot_id = int(m.group(1), 16)
++
++p11_attr = 'X509_user_identity=PKCS11:' + softhsm2
++p11_token_identity = ('PKCS11:module_name=%s:slotid=%d:token=user' %
++                      (softhsm2, slot_id))
+ 
+-# PKINIT with PKCS11: identity, with no need for a PIN.
+-mark('PKCS11 identity, no PIN')
+-conf = open(softpkcs11rc, 'w')
+-conf.write("%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n" % ('user', 'user token', user_pem, privkey_pem))
+-conf.close()
+-# Expect to succeed without having to supply any more information.
+-realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
+-            flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity])
++mark('PKCS11 identity, with PIN (prompter)')
++realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, flags=['-X', p11_attr], password='userpin')
+ realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
+ realm.run([kvno, realm.host_princ])
+ 
+-# PKINIT with PKCS11: identity, with a PIN supplied by the prompter.
+-mark('PKCS11 identity, with PIN (prompter)')
+-os.remove(softpkcs11rc)
+-conf = open(softpkcs11rc, 'w')
+-conf.write("%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n" % ('user', 'user token', user_pem,
+-                                 privkey_enc_pem))
+-conf.close()
+-# Expect failure if the responder does nothing, and there's no prompter
++mark('PKCS11 identity, unavailable PIN')
+ realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 0}' % p11_token_identity,
+-           '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity, realm.user_princ],
+-          expected_code=2)
+-realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
+-            flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity],
+-            password='encrypted')
+-realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
+-realm.run([kvno, realm.host_princ])
++           '-X', p11_attr, realm.user_princ], expected_code=2)
+ 
+-# Supply the wrong PIN.
+ mark('PKCS11 identity, wrong PIN')
+ expected_trace = ('PKINIT client has no configured identity; giving up',)
+ realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
+-            flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity],
++            flags=['-X', p11_attr],
+             password='wrong', expected_code=1, expected_trace=expected_trace)
+ 
+ # PKINIT with PKCS11: identity, with a PIN supplied by the responder.
+-# Supply the response in raw form.
++# Supply the response in raw form.  Expect the PIN_COUNT_LOW flag (1)
++# to be set due to the previous test.
+ mark('PKCS11 identity, with PIN (responder)')
+-realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 0}' % p11_token_identity,
+-           '-r', 'pkinit={"%s": "encrypted"}' % p11_token_identity,
+-           '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity, realm.user_princ])
++realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 1}' % p11_token_identity,
++           '-r', 'pkinit={"%s": "userpin"}' % p11_token_identity,
++           '-X', p11_attr, realm.user_princ])
+ # Supply the response through the convenience API.
+-realm.run(['./responder', '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity,
+-           '-p', '%s=%s' % (p11_token_identity, 'encrypted'),
++realm.run(['./responder', '-X', p11_attr,
++           '-p', '%s=%s' % (p11_token_identity, 'userpin'),
+            realm.user_princ])
+ realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
+ realm.run([kvno, realm.host_princ])
+-- 
+2.47.1
+

0030-Simplify-PKINIT-cert-representation.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+From b0315d30f066c4241fcecc33dd9e4d1c7c28b9d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 17:32:40 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Simplify PKINIT cert representation
+
+In the _pkinit_identity_crypto_context structure, the my_certs field
+is a stack which only ever contains one cert and is only ever used to
+retrieve that one cert.  The cert_index field is always 0.  Replace
+these fields with a my_cert field pointing directly to the X509
+certificate.
+
+Simplify crypto_cert_select_default() by making it call
+crypto_cert_select() with index 0 after verifying the certificate
+count.
+
+(cherry picked from commit f95dfb7908456f9563cee66706216a21df8d791f)
+---
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 74 +++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+index ae8599d5a2..da59cb1e02 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -73,10 +73,9 @@ typedef struct _pkinit_cred_info *pkinit_cred_info;
+ 
+ struct _pkinit_identity_crypto_context {
+     pkinit_cred_info creds[MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED+1];
+-    STACK_OF(X509) *my_certs;   /* available user certs */
++    X509 *my_cert;              /* selected user or KDC cert */
+     char *identity;             /* identity name for user cert */
+-    int cert_index;             /* cert to use out of available certs*/
+-    EVP_PKEY *my_key;           /* available user keys if in filesystem */
++    EVP_PKEY *my_key;           /* selected cert key if in filesystem */
+     STACK_OF(X509) *trustedCAs; /* available trusted ca certs */
+     STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs;   /* available intermediate ca certs */
+     STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked;    /* available crls */
+@@ -1489,8 +1488,7 @@ pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++)
+         ctx->creds[i] = NULL;
+-    ctx->my_certs = NULL;
+-    ctx->cert_index = 0;
++    ctx->my_cert = NULL;
+     ctx->my_key = NULL;
+     ctx->trustedCAs = NULL;
+     ctx->intermediateCAs = NULL;
+@@ -1506,8 +1504,8 @@ pkinit_fini_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         return;
+ 
+-    if (ctx->my_certs != NULL)
+-        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->my_certs, X509_free);
++    if (ctx->my_cert != NULL)
++        X509_free(ctx->my_cert);
+ 
+     if (ctx->my_key != NULL)
+         EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->my_key);
+@@ -1696,7 +1694,6 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
+     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL;
+     unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0;
+     unsigned char *y = NULL;
+-    X509 *cert = NULL;
+     ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL, *oid_copy;
+ 
+     /* Start creating PKCS7 data. */
+@@ -1715,7 +1712,7 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
+     if (oid == NULL)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+-    if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
++    if (id_cryptoctx->my_cert != NULL) {
+         X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
+         X509_STORE_CTX *certctx;
+         STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL;
+@@ -1726,8 +1723,6 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
+         if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+             goto cleanup;
+ 
+-        cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
+-
+         certstore = X509_STORE_new();
+         if (certstore == NULL)
+             goto cleanup;
+@@ -1736,7 +1731,7 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
+         certctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+         if (certctx == NULL)
+             goto cleanup;
+-        X509_STORE_CTX_init(certctx, certstore, cert,
++        X509_STORE_CTX_init(certctx, certstore, id_cryptoctx->my_cert,
+                             id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs);
+         X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs);
+         if (!X509_verify_cert(certctx)) {
+@@ -1764,13 +1759,13 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
+         if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1))
+             goto cleanup;
+         if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
+-                           X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
++                           X509_get_issuer_name(id_cryptoctx->my_cert)))
+             goto cleanup;
+         /* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do
+          * things the ugly way. */
+         ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial);
+         if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial =
+-              ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
++              ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(id_cryptoctx->my_cert))))
+             goto cleanup;
+ 
+         /* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
+@@ -3311,7 +3306,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
+     PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
+     const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
+     int status = 1;
+-    X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
++    X509 *kdc_cert = id_cryptoctx->my_cert;
+ 
+     *valid_kdcPkId = 0;
+     pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
+@@ -4783,7 +4778,8 @@ cleanup:
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Set the certificate in idctx->creds[cred_index] as the selected certificate.
++ * Set the certificate in idctx->creds[cred_index] as the selected certificate,
++ * stealing pointers from it.
+  */
+ krb5_error_code
+ crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
+@@ -4795,20 +4791,17 @@ crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
+         return ENOENT;
+ 
+     ci = idctx->creds[cred_index];
+-    /* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
+-    if (idctx->my_certs != NULL)
+-        sk_X509_pop_free(idctx->my_certs, X509_free);
+-    idctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+-    sk_X509_push(idctx->my_certs, ci->cert);
+-    free(idctx->identity);
++
++    idctx->my_cert = ci->cert;
++    ci->cert = NULL;
++
+     /* hang on to the selected credential name */
++    free(idctx->identity);
+     if (ci->name != NULL)
+         idctx->identity = strdup(ci->name);
+     else
+         idctx->identity = NULL;
+ 
+-    ci->cert = NULL;       /* Don't free it twice */
+-    idctx->cert_index = 0;
+     if (idctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
+         idctx->my_key = ci->key;
+         ci->key = NULL;    /* Don't free it twice */
+@@ -4837,41 +4830,14 @@ crypto_cert_select_default(krb5_context context,
+ 
+     retval = crypto_cert_get_count(id_cryptoctx, &cert_count);
+     if (retval)
+-        goto errout;
++        return retval;
+ 
+     if (cert_count != 1) {
+         TRACE_PKINIT_NO_DEFAULT_CERT(context, cert_count);
+-        retval = EINVAL;
+-        goto errout;
+-    }
+-    /* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
+-    if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
+-        sk_X509_pop_free(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, X509_free);
++        return EINVAL;
+     }
+-    id_cryptoctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+-    sk_X509_push(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert);
+-    id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = NULL;        /* Don't free it twice */
+-    id_cryptoctx->cert_index = 0;
+-    /* hang on to the selected credential name */
+-    if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name != NULL)
+-        id_cryptoctx->identity = strdup(id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name);
+-    else
+-        id_cryptoctx->identity = NULL;
+ 
+-    if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
+-        id_cryptoctx->my_key = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key;
+-        id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = NULL;     /* Don't free it twice */
+-    }
+-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+-    else {
+-        id_cryptoctx->cert_id = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id;
+-        id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
+-        id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len;
+-    }
+-#endif
+-    retval = 0;
+-errout:
+-    return retval;
++    return crypto_cert_select(context, id_cryptoctx, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.47.1
+

0032-Improve-PKCS11-error-reporting-in-PKINIT.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+From e43c05e7b0b93401dd68fc3ec3186c3a455b04ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 13:51:26 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Improve PKCS11 error reporting in PKINIT
+
+Create a helper p11err() to set extended error message for failed
+PKCS11 operations, and use it instead of pkiDebug() and pkcs11error().
+
+ticket: 9113 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 98afb314d13939cbee19c69885dcb655db8460da)
+---
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 262 ++++++++++--------
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h     |   9 -
+ 2 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+index 4accfc2664..402bf1b9b3 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -161,9 +161,11 @@ static krb5_error_code pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers
+  int type, krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out);
+ 
+ #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+-static krb5_error_code pkinit_find_private_key
+-(pkinit_identity_crypto_context, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
+- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp);
++static krb5_error_code
++pkinit_find_private_key(krb5_context context,
++                        pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
++                        CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
++                        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp);
+ static krb5_error_code pkinit_login
+ (krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+  CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip, const char *password);
+@@ -180,6 +182,8 @@ static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11
+ (krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+  unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
+  unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len);
++
++static krb5_error_code p11err(krb5_context context, CK_RV rv, const char *op);
+ #endif  /* WITHOUT_PKCS11 */
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_fs
+@@ -197,9 +201,6 @@ create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context,
+ static krb5_error_code
+ create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
+                               krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids);
+-static const char *
+-pkcs11err(int err);
+-
+ 
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ 
+@@ -944,8 +945,9 @@ cleanup:
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L */
+ 
++#ifndef WITHOUT_PKC11
+ static struct pkcs11_errstrings {
+-    short code;
++    CK_RV code;
+     char *text;
+ } pkcs11_errstrings[] = {
+     { 0x0,      "ok" },
+@@ -1035,6 +1037,7 @@ static struct pkcs11_errstrings {
+     { 0x200,    "function rejected" },
+     { -1,       NULL }
+ };
++#endif
+ 
+ MAKE_INIT_FUNCTION(pkinit_openssl_init);
+ 
+@@ -1563,6 +1566,8 @@ pkinit_fini_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
+     free(ctx->token_label);
+     free(ctx->cert_id);
+     free(ctx->cert_label);
++    ctx->p11_module_name = ctx->token_label = ctx->cert_label = NULL;
++    ctx->cert_id = NULL;
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+@@ -3344,48 +3349,53 @@ pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type)
+ }
+ 
+ #ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+-static struct plugin_file_handle *
++static krb5_error_code
+ load_pkcs11_module(krb5_context context, const char *modname,
+-                   CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p)
++                   struct plugin_file_handle **handle_out,
++                   CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11_out)
+ {
+     struct plugin_file_handle *handle = NULL;
+-    CK_RV (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
++    CK_RV rv, (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
+     struct errinfo einfo = EMPTY_ERRINFO;
+-    const char *errmsg = NULL;
++    const char *errmsg = NULL, *failure;
+     void (*sym)(void);
+     long err;
+-    CK_RV rv;
+ 
+     TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN(context, modname);
+     err = krb5int_open_plugin(modname, &handle, &einfo);
+     if (err) {
+-        errmsg = k5_get_error(&einfo, err);
+-        TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN_FAILED(context, errmsg);
++        failure = _("Cannot load PKCS11 module");
+         goto error;
+     }
+ 
+     err = krb5int_get_plugin_func(handle, "C_GetFunctionList", &sym, &einfo);
+     if (err) {
+-        errmsg = k5_get_error(&einfo, err);
+-        TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETSYM_FAILED(context, errmsg);
++        failure = _("Cannot find C_GetFunctionList in PKCS11 module");
+         goto error;
+     }
+ 
+     getflist = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR))sym;
+-    rv = (*getflist)(p11p);
++    rv = (*getflist)(p11_out);
+     if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+-        TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETFLIST_FAILED(context, pkcs11err(rv));
++        failure = _("Cannot retrieve function list in PKCS11 module");
+         goto error;
+     }
+ 
+-    return handle;
++    *handle_out = handle;
++    return 0;
+ 
+ error:
+-    k5_free_error(&einfo, errmsg);
++    if (err) {
++        errmsg = k5_get_error(&einfo, err);
++        k5_setmsg(context, err, _("%s: %s"), failure, errmsg);
++    } else {
++        err = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++        k5_setmsg(context, err, "%s", failure);
++    }
+     k5_clear_error(&einfo);
+     if (handle != NULL)
+         krb5int_close_plugin(handle);
+-    return NULL;
++    return err;
+ }
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code
+@@ -3393,12 +3403,13 @@ pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
+              pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+              CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip, const char *password)
+ {
++    krb5_error_code ret = 0;
++    CK_RV rv;
+     krb5_data rdat;
+     char *prompt;
+     const char *warning;
+     krb5_prompt kprompt;
+     krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
+-    int r = 0;
+ 
+     if (tip->flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) {
+         rdat.data = NULL;
+@@ -3407,7 +3418,7 @@ pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
+         rdat.data = strdup(password);
+         rdat.length = strlen(password);
+     } else if (id_cryptoctx->prompter == NULL) {
+-        r = KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
++        ret = KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
+         rdat.data = NULL;
+     } else {
+         if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
+@@ -3431,31 +3442,28 @@ pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
+ 
+         /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
+         k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
+-        r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
+-                                      NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
++        ret = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
++                                        NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
+         k5int_set_prompt_types(context, 0);
+         free(prompt);
+     }
+ 
+-    if (r == 0) {
+-        r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Login(id_cryptoctx->session, CKU_USER,
+-                                       (u_char *) rdat.data, rdat.length);
+-
+-        if (r != CKR_OK) {
+-            TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_LOGIN_FAILED(context, pkcs11err(r));
+-            r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+-        }
++    if (!ret) {
++        rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Login(id_cryptoctx->session, CKU_USER,
++                                        (uint8_t *)rdat.data, rdat.length);
++        if (rv != CKR_OK)
++            ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_Login");
+     }
+     free(rdat.data);
+ 
+-    return r;
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code
+ pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
+                     pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx)
+ {
+-    CK_ULONG i, pret;
++    CK_ULONG i, rv;
+     unsigned char *cp;
+     size_t label_len;
+     CK_ULONG count = 0;
+@@ -3469,30 +3477,35 @@ pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
+         return 0; /* session already open */
+ 
+     /* Load module */
+-    cctx->p11_module = load_pkcs11_module(context, cctx->p11_module_name,
+-                                          &cctx->p11);
+-    if (cctx->p11_module == NULL)
+-        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    ret = load_pkcs11_module(context, cctx->p11_module_name, &cctx->p11_module,
++                             &cctx->p11);
++    if (ret)
++        goto cleanup;
+ 
+     /* Init */
+-    pret = cctx->p11->C_Initialize(NULL);
+-    if (pret != CKR_OK) {
+-        pkiDebug("C_Initialize: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
+-        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    rv = cctx->p11->C_Initialize(NULL);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_Initialize");
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+     /* Get the list of available slots */
+-    if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, NULL, &count) != CKR_OK)
+-        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    rv = cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, NULL, &count);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetSlotList");
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
+     if (count == 0) {
+         TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_NO_TOKEN(context);
+-        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+-    slotlist = calloc(count, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
++    slotlist = k5calloc(count, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID), &ret);
+     if (slotlist == NULL)
+-        return ENOMEM;
+-    if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, slotlist, &count) != CKR_OK) {
+-        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++        goto cleanup;
++    rv = cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, slotlist, &count);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetSlotList");
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -3503,19 +3516,17 @@ pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
+             continue;
+ 
+         /* Open session */
+-        pret = cctx->p11->C_OpenSession(slotlist[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+-                                        NULL, NULL, &cctx->session);
+-        if (pret != CKR_OK) {
+-            pkiDebug("C_OpenSession: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
+-            ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++        rv = cctx->p11->C_OpenSession(slotlist[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++                                      NULL, NULL, &cctx->session);
++        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++            ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_OpenSession");
+             goto cleanup;
+         }
+ 
+         /* Get token info */
+-        pret = cctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(slotlist[i], &tinfo);
+-        if (pret != CKR_OK) {
+-            pkiDebug("C_GetTokenInfo: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
+-            ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++        rv = cctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(slotlist[i], &tinfo);
++        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++            ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetTokenInfo");
+             goto cleanup;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -3577,6 +3588,10 @@ pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
+ 
+     ret = 0;
+ cleanup:
++    /* On error, finalize the PKCS11 fields to ensure that we don't mistakenly
++     * short-circuit with success on the next call. */
++    if (ret)
++        pkinit_fini_pkcs11(cctx);
+     free(slotlist);
+     free(p11name);
+     return ret;
+@@ -3598,16 +3613,17 @@ cleanup:
+  * If there are more than one, we just take the first one.
+  */
+ 
+-krb5_error_code
+-pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
++static krb5_error_code
++pkinit_find_private_key(krb5_context context,
++                        pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+                         CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
+                         CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp)
+ {
+     CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls;
+     CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4];
+     CK_ULONG count;
++    CK_RV rv;
+     unsigned int nattrs = 0;
+-    int r;
+ #ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE
+     CK_BBOOL true_false;
+ #endif
+@@ -3637,18 +3653,21 @@ pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+     attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len;
+     nattrs++;
+ 
+-    r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs);
+-    if (r != CKR_OK) {
+-        pkiDebug("krb5_pkinit_sign_data: C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n",
+-                 pkcs11err(r));
+-        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+-    }
++    rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs,
++                                              nattrs);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK)
++        return p11err(context, rv, _("C_FindObjectsInit"));
+ 
+-    r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1, &count);
++    rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1,
++                                          &count);
+     id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session);
+-    pkiDebug("found %d private keys (%s)\n", (int)count, pkcs11err(r));
+-    if (r != CKR_OK || count < 1)
++    if (rv != CKR_OK)
++        return p11err(context, rv, _("C_FindObjects"));
++    if (count < 1) {
++        k5_setmsg(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
++                  _("Found no private keys in PKCS11 token"));
+         return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    }
+     return 0;
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -3796,34 +3815,32 @@ pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
+     CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11;
+     CK_ATTRIBUTE attr;
+     CK_KEY_TYPE keytype;
++    CK_RV rv;
+     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+     const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha256();
+     unsigned int mdlen;
+     uint8_t mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *dinfo = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *input;
+     size_t dinfo_len, input_len;
+-    int r;
+ 
+     *sig = NULL;
+     *sig_len = 0;
+ 
+-    if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
+-        pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
+-        return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+-    }
++    ret = pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx);
++    if (ret)
++        return ret;
+     p11 = id_cryptoctx->p11;
+     session = id_cryptoctx->session;
+ 
+-    ret = pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_SIGN, &obj);
++    ret = pkinit_find_private_key(context, id_cryptoctx, CKA_SIGN, &obj);
+     if (ret)
+         return ret;
+ 
+     attr.type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
+     attr.pValue = &keytype;
+     attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(keytype);
+-    r = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, &attr, 1);
+-    if (r) {
+-        pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkcs11err(r));
+-        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    rv = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, &attr, 1);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetAttributeValue");
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -3865,10 +3882,9 @@ pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
+     mech.pParameter = NULL;
+     mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ 
+-    r = p11->C_SignInit(session, &mech, obj);
+-    if (r != CKR_OK) {
+-        pkiDebug("C_SignInit: %s\n", pkcs11err(r));
+-        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    rv = p11->C_SignInit(session, &mech, obj);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_SignInit");
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -3881,18 +3897,17 @@ pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
+     if (sigbuf == NULL)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+-    r = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
+-    if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || (r == CKR_OK && len >= PK_SIGLEN_GUESS)) {
++    rv = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
++    if (rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ||
++        (rv == CKR_OK && len >= PK_SIGLEN_GUESS)) {
+         free(sigbuf);
+-        pkiDebug("C_Sign realloc %d\n", (int) len);
+         sigbuf = k5alloc(len, &ret);
+         if (sigbuf == NULL)
+             goto cleanup;
+-        r = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
++        rv = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
+     }
+-    if (r != CKR_OK) {
+-        pkiDebug("C_Sign: %s\n", pkcs11err(r));
+-        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_Sign");
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -4348,13 +4363,14 @@ reassemble_pkcs11_name(pkinit_identity_opts *idopts)
+ }
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code
+-load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+-              pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_cred_info *cred_out)
++load_one_cert(krb5_context context, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11,
++              CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
++              pkinit_cred_info *cred_out)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[2];
+     CK_BYTE_PTR cert = NULL, cert_id = NULL;
+-    CK_RV pret;
++    CK_RV rv;
+     const unsigned char *cp;
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
+     CK_ULONG count;
+@@ -4364,8 +4380,8 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+     *cred_out = NULL;
+ 
+     /* Look for X.509 cert. */
+-    pret = p11->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &count);
+-    if (pret != CKR_OK || count <= 0)
++    rv = p11->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &count);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK || count <= 0)
+         return 0;
+ 
+     /* Get cert and id len. */
+@@ -4375,10 +4391,9 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+     attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
+     attrs[1].pValue = NULL;
+     attrs[1].ulValueLen = 0;
+-    pret = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
+-    if (pret != CKR_OK && pret != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+-        pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
+-        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    rv = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetAttributeValue");
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -4393,10 +4408,9 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+     attrs[0].pValue = cert;
+     attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
+     attrs[1].pValue = cert_id;
+-    pret = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
+-    if (pret != CKR_OK) {
+-        pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
+-        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++    rv = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetAttributeValue");
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -4406,7 +4420,8 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+     cp = (unsigned char *)cert;
+     x = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)attrs[0].ulValueLen);
+     if (x == NULL) {
+-        ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
++        ret = oerr(context, 0,
++                   _("Failed to decode X509 certificate from PKCS11 token"));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -4444,7 +4459,7 @@ pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
+     int i;
+     unsigned int nattrs;
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+-    CK_RV pret;
++    CK_RV rv;
+ 
+     /* Copy stuff from idopts -> id_cryptoctx */
+     if (idopts->p11_module_name != NULL) {
+@@ -4516,16 +4531,16 @@ pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
+         nattrs++;
+     }
+ 
+-    pret = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs,
+-                                                nattrs);
+-    if (pret != CKR_OK) {
+-        pkiDebug("C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
++    rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs,
++                                              nattrs);
++    if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++        ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_FindObjectsInit");
+         return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+     }
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) {
+-        ret = load_one_cert(id_cryptoctx->p11, id_cryptoctx->session, idopts,
+-                            &id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
++        ret = load_one_cert(context, id_cryptoctx->p11, id_cryptoctx->session,
++                            idopts, &id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
+         if (ret)
+             return ret;
+         if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] == NULL)
+@@ -5510,19 +5525,26 @@ print_pubkey(BIGNUM * key, char *msg)
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-static const char *
+-pkcs11err(int err)
++#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
++static krb5_error_code
++p11err(krb5_context context, CK_RV rv, const char *op)
+ {
++    krb5_error_code code = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+     int i;
++    const char *msg;
+ 
+-    for (i = 0; pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL; i++)
+-        if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].code == err)
++    for (i = 0; pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL; i++) {
++        if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].code == rv)
+             break;
+-    if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL)
+-        return (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text);
++    }
++    msg = pkcs11_errstrings[i].text;
++    if (msg == NULL)
++        msg = "unknown PKCS11 error";
+ 
+-    return "unknown PKCS11 error";
++    krb5_set_error_message(context, code, _("PKCS11 error (%s): %s"), op, msg);
++    return code;
+ }
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Add an item to the pkinit_identity_crypto_context's list of deferred
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+index 1c1ceb5a41..1faa6816d7 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+@@ -98,21 +98,12 @@
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_OPENSSL_ERROR(c, msg)              \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT OpenSSL error: {str}", msg)
+ 
+-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETFLIST_FAILED(c, errstr)                  \
+-    TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS11 C_GetFunctionList failed: {str}", errstr)
+-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETSYM_FAILED(c, errstr)                    \
+-    TRACE(c, "PKINIT unable to find PKCS11 plugin symbol "              \
+-          "C_GetFunctionList: {str}", errstr)
+-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_LOGIN_FAILED(c, errstr)             \
+-    TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS11 C_Login failed: {str}", errstr)
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_NO_MATCH_TOKEN(c)                   \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 module has no matching tokens")
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_NO_TOKEN(c)                                 \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 module shows no slots with tokens")
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN(c, name)                       \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT opening PKCS#11 module \"{str}\"", name)
+-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN_FAILED(c, errstr)                      \
+-    TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 module open failed: {str}", errstr)
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_SLOT(c, slot, len, label)            \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 slotid {int} token {lenstr}",       \
+           slot, len, label)
+-- 
+2.47.1
+

0033-Set-missing-mask-flags-for-kdb5_util-operations.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 946f7dba8cea3d2ed0e68c5e7594cbd7e1364609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2024 10:56:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Set missing mask flags for kdb5_util operations
+
+Set KADM5_TL_DATA for the use_mkey and update_princ_encryption
+commands.  (Commit c877f13c8985d820583b0d7ac1bb4c5dc36e677e did this
+for the add_new_mkey and purge_mkeys commands.)  Set appropriate flags
+for the add_random_key command.
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: combined two commits; pruned out proposed mask flag
+additions for values represented within key data or tl-data (like
+KADM5_MKVNO), as those flags are currently only used in the kadm5
+protocol, not to communicate with the KDB module]
+
+ticket: 9158 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 4ed7da378940198cf4415f86d4eb013de6ac6455)
+---
+ src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c | 4 +++-
+ src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c
+index aceb0a9b80..ac5c51d05e 100644
+--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c
++++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c
+@@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ kdb5_use_mkey(int argc, char *argv[])
+         goto cleanup_return;
+     }
+ 
++    master_entry->mask |= KADM5_TL_DATA;
++
+     if ((retval = krb5_db_put_principal(util_context, master_entry))) {
+         com_err(progname, retval,
+                 _("while adding master key entry to the database"));
+@@ -814,7 +816,7 @@ update_princ_encryption_1(void *cb, krb5_db_entry *ent)
+         goto fail;
+     }
+ 
+-    ent->mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA;
++    ent->mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_TL_DATA;
+ 
+     if ((retval = krb5_db_put_principal(util_context, ent))) {
+         com_err(progname, retval, _("while updating principal '%s' key data "
+diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
+index 55d529fa4c..afc817891b 100644
+--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
++++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
+@@ -600,6 +600,9 @@ add_random_key(int argc, char **argv)
+         exit_status++;
+         return;
+     }
++
++    dbent->mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_TL_DATA;
++
+     ret = krb5_db_put_principal(util_context, dbent);
+     krb5_db_free_principal(util_context, dbent);
+     if (ret) {
+-- 
+2.47.1
+

0034-Prevent-overflow-when-calculating-ulog-block-size.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 9b669dd42b28e7900f5ccac2816204e7d04ea23c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Borbely <Zoltan.Borbely@morganstanley.com>
+Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 16:39:25 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent overflow when calculating ulog block size
+
+In kdb_log.c:resize(), log an error and fail if the update size is
+larger than the largest possible block size (2^16-1).
+
+CVE-2025-24528:
+
+In MIT krb5 release 1.7 and later with incremental propagation
+enabled, an authenticated attacker can cause kadmind to write beyond
+the end of the mapped region for the iprop log file, likely causing a
+process crash.
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message and added CVE description]
+
+ticket: 9159 (new)
+tags: pullup
+target_version: 1.21-next
+
+(cherry picked from commit 78ceba024b64d49612375be4a12d1c066b0bfbd0)
+---
+ src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
+index e9b95fce59..c805ebd988 100644
+--- a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
++++ b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ extend_file_to(int fd, unsigned int new_size)
+  */
+ static krb5_error_code
+ resize(kdb_hlog_t *ulog, uint32_t ulogentries, int ulogfd,
+-       unsigned int recsize)
++       unsigned int recsize, const kdb_incr_update_t *upd)
+ {
+     unsigned int new_block, new_size;
+ 
+@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ resize(kdb_hlog_t *ulog, uint32_t ulogentries, int ulogfd,
+     new_block *= ULOG_BLOCK;
+     new_size += ulogentries * new_block;
+ 
++    if (new_block > UINT16_MAX) {
++        syslog(LOG_ERR, _("ulog overflow caused by principal %.*s"),
++               upd->kdb_princ_name.utf8str_t_len,
++               upd->kdb_princ_name.utf8str_t_val);
++        return KRB5_LOG_ERROR;
++    }
+     if (new_size > MAXLOGLEN)
+         return KRB5_LOG_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -291,7 +297,7 @@ store_update(kdb_log_context *log_ctx, kdb_incr_update_t *upd)
+     recsize = sizeof(kdb_ent_header_t) + upd_size;
+ 
+     if (recsize > ulog->kdb_block) {
+-        retval = resize(ulog, ulogentries, log_ctx->ulogfd, recsize);
++        retval = resize(ulog, ulogentries, log_ctx->ulogfd, recsize, upd);
+         if (retval)
+             return retval;
+     }
+-- 
+2.48.1
+

0035-Don-t-issue-session-keys-with-deprecated-enctypes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+From c617915958a5cb05463713adcf03b6a0e0512ac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:31:07 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Don't issue session keys with deprecated enctypes
+
+A paper by Tom Tervoort noted that rc4-hmac pre-hashes the input for
+its checksum and GSS operations before applying HMAC, and is therefore
+potentially vulnerable to hash collision attacks if a protocol
+contains a restricted signing oracle.
+
+In light of these potential attacks, begin the functional deprecation
+of DES3 and RC4 by disallowing their use as session key enctypes by
+default.  Add the variables allow_des3 and allow_rc4 in case
+negotiability of these enctypes for session keys needs to be turned
+back on, with the expectation that in future releases the enctypes
+will be more comprehensively deprecated.
+
+ticket: 9081
+(cherry picked from commit 1b57a4d134bbd0e7c52d5885a92eccc815726463)
+---
+ doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 12 ++++++++++++
+ doc/admin/enctypes.rst             | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---
+ src/include/k5-int.h               |  4 ++++
+ src/kdc/kdc_util.c                 | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c      | 31 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c        | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py     |  5 +++--
+ src/tests/t_etype_info.py          |  5 +++--
+ src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py         | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/util/k5test.py                 |  9 ++++++++-
+ 10 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+index dca52e1426..d51fd3ce7e 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+@@ -95,6 +95,18 @@ Additionally, krb5.conf may include any of the relations described in
+ 
+ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+ 
++**allow_des3**
++    Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.
++    In future releases, this flag will allow des3-cbc-sha1 to be used
++    at all.  The default value for this tag is false.  (Added in
++    release 1.21.)
++
++**allow_rc4**
++    Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour-hmac session keys.
++    In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour-hmac to be used
++    at all.  The default value for this tag is false.  (Added in
++    release 1.21.)
++
+ **allow_weak_crypto**
+     If this flag is set to false, then weak encryption types (as noted
+     in :ref:`Encryption_types` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`) will be filtered
+diff --git a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+index c4d5499d3b..2b4ed7da0b 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+@@ -48,12 +48,15 @@ Session key selection
+ The KDC chooses the session key enctype by taking the intersection of
+ its **permitted_enctypes** list, the list of long-term keys for the
+ most recent kvno of the service, and the client's requested list of
+-enctypes.
++enctypes.  Starting in krb5-1.21, all services are assumed to support
++aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, des3-cbc-sha1 and arcfour-hmac session
++keys will not be issued by default.
+ 
+ Starting in krb5-1.11, it is possible to set a string attribute on a
+ service principal to control what session key enctypes the KDC may
+-issue for service tickets for that principal.  See :ref:`set_string`
+-in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
++issue for service tickets for that principal, overriding the service's
++long-term keys and the assumption of aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 support.
++See :ref:`set_string` in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
+ 
+ 
+ Choosing enctypes for a service
+@@ -87,6 +90,20 @@ affect how enctypes are chosen.
+     acceptable risk for your environment and the weak enctypes are
+     required for backward compatibility.
+ 
++**allow_des3**
++    was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*.  Unless this
++    flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
++    des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.  In a future release, this flag will
++    control whether des3-cbc-sha1 is permitted in similar fashion to
++    weak enctypes.
++
++**allow_rc4**
++    was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*.  Unless this
++    flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
++    arcfour-hmac session keys.  In a future release, this flag will
++    control whether arcfour-hmac is permitted in similar fashion to
++    weak enctypes.
++
+ **permitted_enctypes**
+     controls the set of enctypes that a service will permit for
+     session keys and for ticket and authenticator encryption.  The KDC
+diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
+index b7789a2dd8..d0a263aa7d 100644
+--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
++++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ typedef unsigned char   u_char;
+  * matches the variable name.  Keep these alphabetized. */
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ACL_FILE                     "acl_file"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ADMIN_SERVER                 "admin_server"
++#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3                   "allow_des3"
++#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4                    "allow_rc4"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO            "allow_weak_crypto"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL                "auth_to_local"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL_NAMES          "auth_to_local_names"
+@@ -1241,6 +1243,8 @@ struct _krb5_context {
+     struct _kdb_log_context *kdblog_context;
+ 
+     krb5_boolean allow_weak_crypto;
++    krb5_boolean allow_des3;
++    krb5_boolean allow_rc4;
+     krb5_boolean ignore_acceptor_hostname;
+     krb5_boolean enforce_ok_as_delegate;
+     enum dns_canonhost dns_canonicalize_hostname;
+diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+index 93415ba862..c7b6e4090d 100644
+--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
++++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+@@ -1108,6 +1108,16 @@ select_session_keytype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
+         if (!krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, ktype[i]))
+             continue;
+ 
++        /*
++         * Prevent these deprecated enctypes from being used as session keys
++         * unless they are explicitly allowed.  In the future they will be more
++         * comprehensively disabled and eventually removed.
++         */
++        if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 && !context->allow_des3)
++            continue;
++        if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC && !context->allow_rc4)
++            continue;
++
+         if (dbentry_supports_enctype(context, server, ktype[i]))
+             return ktype[i];
+     }
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+index 1b420a3ac2..ea089f0fcc 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+@@ -1582,22 +1582,31 @@ warn_pw_expiry(krb5_context context, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options,
+     (*prompter)(context, data, 0, banner, 0, 0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Display a warning via the prompter if des3-cbc-sha1 was used for either the
+- * reply key or the session key. */
++/* Display a warning via the prompter if a deprecated enctype was used for
++ * either the reply key or the session key. */
+ static void
+-warn_des3(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+-          krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
++warn_deprecated(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
++                krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
+ {
+-    const char *banner;
++    krb5_enctype etype;
++    char encbuf[128], banner[256];
+ 
+-    if (as_key_enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 &&
+-        ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1)
+-        return;
+     if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
+         return;
+ 
+-    banner = _("Warning: encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 used for "
+-               "authentication is weak and will be disabled");
++    if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(as_key_enctype))
++        etype = as_key_enctype;
++    else if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype))
++        etype = ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype;
++    else
++        return;
++
++    if (krb5_enctype_to_name(etype, FALSE, encbuf, sizeof(encbuf)) != 0)
++        return;
++    snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
++             _("Warning: encryption type %s used for authentication is "
++               "deprecated and will be disabled"), encbuf);
++
+     /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
+     (*ctx->prompter)(context, ctx->prompter_data, NULL, banner, 0, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -1848,7 +1857,7 @@ init_creds_step_reply(krb5_context context,
+     ctx->complete = TRUE;
+     warn_pw_expiry(context, ctx->opt, ctx->prompter, ctx->prompter_data,
+                    ctx->in_tkt_service, ctx->reply);
+-    warn_des3(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
++    warn_deprecated(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
+ 
+ cleanup:
+     krb5_free_pa_data(context, kdc_padata);
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+index 582a2945ff..a32f8dbf03 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+@@ -220,6 +220,16 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
+         goto cleanup;
+     ctx->allow_weak_crypto = tmp;
+ 
++    retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3, 0, &tmp);
++    if (retval)
++        goto cleanup;
++    ctx->allow_des3 = tmp;
++
++    retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4, 0, &tmp);
++    if (retval)
++        goto cleanup;
++    ctx->allow_rc4 = tmp;
++
+     retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_IGNORE_ACCEPTOR_HOSTNAME, 0, &tmp);
+     if (retval)
+         goto cleanup;
+diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+index 2f95d89967..e6bde47afc 100755
+--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
++++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ d_rc4 = 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac'
+ 
+ # These tests make assumptions about the default enctype lists, so set
+ # them explicitly rather than relying on the library defaults.
+-supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
+-conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes rc4'},
++supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
++conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4',
++                        'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+         'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supp}}}
+ realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf)
+ shutil.copyfile(realm.ccache, os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'save'))
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+index a6f538b66d..75d9621dd6 100644
+--- a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
+ from k5test import *
+ 
+-supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts rc4-hmac'
+-conf = {'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
++supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts des3-cbc-sha1 rc4-hmac'
++conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
++        'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
+ realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False, krb5_conf=conf)
+ 
+ realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-pw', 'pw', '+requires_preauth',
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+index 9024aee838..5a213617b5 100755
+--- a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ conf3 = {'libdefaults': {
+         'default_tkt_enctypes': 'aes128-cts',
+         'default_tgs_enctypes': 'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts'}}
+ conf4 = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes256-cts'}}
++conf5 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'}}
++conf6 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true'}}
+ # Test with client request and session_enctypes preferring aes128, but
+ # aes256 long-term key.
+ realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf1, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+@@ -54,10 +56,12 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
+            'aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
+ test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+ 
+-# 3b: Negotiate rc4-hmac session key when principal only has aes256 long-term.
++# 3b: Skip RC4 (as the KDC does not allow it for session keys by
++# default) and negotiate aes128-cts session key, with only an aes256
++# long-term service key.
+ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
+            'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
+-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
++test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+ realm.stop()
+ 
+ # 4: Check that permitted_enctypes is a default for session key enctypes.
+@@ -67,4 +71,24 @@ realm.run([kvno, 'user'],
+           expected_trace=('etypes requested in TGS request: aes256-cts',))
+ realm.stop()
+ 
++# 5: allow_rc4 permits negotiation of rc4-hmac session key.
++realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf5, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
++realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
++realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'rc4-hmac'])
++test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
++realm.stop()
++
++# 6: allow_des3 permits negotiation of des3-cbc-sha1 session key.
++realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf6, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
++realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
++realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'des3-cbc-sha1'])
++test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:des3-cbc-sha1', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
++realm.stop()
++
++# 7: default config negotiates aes256-sha1 session key for RC4-only service.
++realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False)
++realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'rc4-hmac', 'server'])
++test_kvno(realm, 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac')
++realm.stop()
++
+ success('sesskeynego')
+diff --git a/src/util/k5test.py b/src/util/k5test.py
+index d823653aa0..8e5f5ba8e9 100644
+--- a/src/util/k5test.py
++++ b/src/util/k5test.py
+@@ -1338,9 +1338,16 @@ _passes = [
+     # No special settings; exercises AES256.
+     ('default', None, None, None),
+ 
++    # Exercise the DES3 enctype.
++    ('des3', None,
++     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3 aes256-sha1'}},
++     {'realms': {'$realm': {
++                    'supported_enctypes': 'des3-cbc-sha1:normal',
++                    'master_key_type': 'des3-cbc-sha1'}}}),
++
+     # Exercise the arcfour enctype.
+     ('arcfour', None,
+-     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4'}},
++     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4 aes256-sha1'}},
+      {'realms': {'$realm': {
+                     'supported_enctypes': 'arcfour-hmac:normal',
+                     'master_key_type': 'arcfour-hmac'}}}),
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0036-downstream-Remove-3des-support-cumulative-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+From b0993b57dbe584f9308cc7773b930efe76e19ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2025 15:08:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Remove 3des support (cumulative 1)
+
+Remove mentions for the triple-DES encryption type which were added
+since the previous downstream patch.
+---
+ README                             | 15 +++++++--------
+ doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst |  6 ------
+ doc/admin/enctypes.rst             | 11 ++---------
+ doc/mitK5features.rst              |  5 ++---
+ src/include/k5-int.h               |  2 --
+ src/kdc/kdc_util.c                 |  2 --
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c        |  5 -----
+ src/man/krb5.conf.man              |  6 ------
+ src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py     |  5 ++---
+ src/tests/t_etype_info.py          |  4 ++--
+ src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py         |  8 --------
+ src/util/k5test.py                 |  7 -------
+ 12 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/README b/README
+index 6d6f7f16e3..9341bd3dd8 100644
+--- a/README
++++ b/README
+@@ -81,11 +81,11 @@ Triple-DES and RC4 transitions
+ ------------------------------
+ 
+ Beginning with the krb5-1.21 release, the KDC will not issue tickets
+-with triple-DES or RC4 session keys unless explicitly configured using
+-the new allow_des3 and allow_rc4 variables in [libdefaults].  To
+-facilitate the negotiation of session keys, the KDC will assume that
+-all services can handle aes256-sha1 session keys unless the service
+-principal has a session_enctypes string attribute.
++with RC4 session keys unless explicitly configured using the new
++allow_rc4 variable in [libdefaults].  To facilitate the negotiation of
++session keys, the KDC will assume that all services can handle
++aes256-sha1 session keys unless the service principal has a
++session_enctypes string attribute.
+ 
+ Beginning with the krb5-1.19 release, a warning will be issued if
+ initial credentials are acquired using the des3-cbc-sha1 encryption
+@@ -164,9 +164,8 @@ Developer experience:
+ 
+ Protocol evolution:
+ 
+-* The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 or triple-DES session
+-  keys unless explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4 or
+-  allow_des3 variables respectively.
++* The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 session keys unless
++  explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4 variable.
+ 
+ * The KDC will assume that all services can handle aes256-sha1 session
+   keys unless the service principal has a session_enctypes string
+diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+index d51fd3ce7e..d20dcf18e3 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+@@ -95,12 +95,6 @@ Additionally, krb5.conf may include any of the relations described in
+ 
+ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+ 
+-**allow_des3**
+-    Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.
+-    In future releases, this flag will allow des3-cbc-sha1 to be used
+-    at all.  The default value for this tag is false.  (Added in
+-    release 1.21.)
+-
+ **allow_rc4**
+     Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour-hmac session keys.
+     In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour-hmac to be used
+diff --git a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+index 2b4ed7da0b..6ce4638d5e 100644
+--- a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
++++ b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ The KDC chooses the session key enctype by taking the intersection of
+ its **permitted_enctypes** list, the list of long-term keys for the
+ most recent kvno of the service, and the client's requested list of
+ enctypes.  Starting in krb5-1.21, all services are assumed to support
+-aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, des3-cbc-sha1 and arcfour-hmac session
+-keys will not be issued by default.
++aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, arcfour-hmac session keys will not be
++issued by default.
+ 
+ Starting in krb5-1.11, it is possible to set a string attribute on a
+ service principal to control what session key enctypes the KDC may
+@@ -90,13 +90,6 @@ affect how enctypes are chosen.
+     acceptable risk for your environment and the weak enctypes are
+     required for backward compatibility.
+ 
+-**allow_des3**
+-    was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*.  Unless this
+-    flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
+-    des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.  In a future release, this flag will
+-    control whether des3-cbc-sha1 is permitted in similar fashion to
+-    weak enctypes.
+-
+ **allow_rc4**
+     was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*.  Unless this
+     flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
+diff --git a/doc/mitK5features.rst b/doc/mitK5features.rst
+index cad0855724..64d746b0af 100644
+--- a/doc/mitK5features.rst
++++ b/doc/mitK5features.rst
+@@ -659,9 +659,8 @@ Release 1.21
+ 
+ * Protocol evolution:
+ 
+-  - The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 or triple-DES
+-    session keys unless explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4
+-    or allow_des3 variables respectively.
++  - The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 session keys unless
++    explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4 variable.
+ 
+   - The KDC will assume that all services can handle aes256-sha1
+     session keys unless the service principal has a session_enctypes
+diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
+index d0a263aa7d..82a763298d 100644
+--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
++++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
+@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ typedef unsigned char   u_char;
+  * matches the variable name.  Keep these alphabetized. */
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ACL_FILE                     "acl_file"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ADMIN_SERVER                 "admin_server"
+-#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3                   "allow_des3"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4                    "allow_rc4"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO            "allow_weak_crypto"
+ #define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL                "auth_to_local"
+@@ -1243,7 +1242,6 @@ struct _krb5_context {
+     struct _kdb_log_context *kdblog_context;
+ 
+     krb5_boolean allow_weak_crypto;
+-    krb5_boolean allow_des3;
+     krb5_boolean allow_rc4;
+     krb5_boolean ignore_acceptor_hostname;
+     krb5_boolean enforce_ok_as_delegate;
+diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+index c7b6e4090d..bafcf5f728 100644
+--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
++++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+@@ -1113,8 +1113,6 @@ select_session_keytype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
+          * unless they are explicitly allowed.  In the future they will be more
+          * comprehensively disabled and eventually removed.
+          */
+-        if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 && !context->allow_des3)
+-            continue;
+         if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC && !context->allow_rc4)
+             continue;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+index a32f8dbf03..82aba64c5e 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+@@ -220,11 +220,6 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
+         goto cleanup;
+     ctx->allow_weak_crypto = tmp;
+ 
+-    retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3, 0, &tmp);
+-    if (retval)
+-        goto cleanup;
+-    ctx->allow_des3 = tmp;
+-
+     retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4, 0, &tmp);
+     if (retval)
+         goto cleanup;
+diff --git a/src/man/krb5.conf.man b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
+index 6c0e9aff8c..4b53988712 100644
+--- a/src/man/krb5.conf.man
++++ b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
+@@ -178,12 +178,6 @@ kdc.conf(5), but it is not a recommended practice.
+ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+ .INDENT 0.0
+ .TP
+-\fBallow_des3\fP
+-Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3\-cbc\-sha1 session keys.
+-In future releases, this flag will allow des3\-cbc\-sha1 to be used
+-at all.  The default value for this tag is false.  (Added in
+-release 1.21.)
+-.TP
+ \fBallow_rc4\fP
+ Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour\-hmac session keys.
+ In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour\-hmac to be used
+diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+index e6bde47afc..1bb8c40b6b 100755
+--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
++++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+@@ -10,9 +10,8 @@ d_rc4 = 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac'
+ 
+ # These tests make assumptions about the default enctype lists, so set
+ # them explicitly rather than relying on the library defaults.
+-supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
+-conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4',
+-                        'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
++supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
++conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes rc4', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+         'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supp}}}
+ realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf)
+ shutil.copyfile(realm.ccache, os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'save'))
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+index 75d9621dd6..e82ff7ff07 100644
+--- a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ from k5test import *
+ 
+-supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts des3-cbc-sha1 rc4-hmac'
+-conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
++supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts rc4-hmac'
++conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+         'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
+ realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False, krb5_conf=conf)
+ 
+diff --git a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+index 5a213617b5..c7dba0ff5b 100755
+--- a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
++++ b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ conf3 = {'libdefaults': {
+         'default_tgs_enctypes': 'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts'}}
+ conf4 = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes256-cts'}}
+ conf5 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'}}
+-conf6 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true'}}
+ # Test with client request and session_enctypes preferring aes128, but
+ # aes256 long-term key.
+ realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf1, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+@@ -78,13 +77,6 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'rc4-hmac'])
+ test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+ realm.stop()
+ 
+-# 6: allow_des3 permits negotiation of des3-cbc-sha1 session key.
+-realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf6, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
+-realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'des3-cbc-sha1'])
+-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:des3-cbc-sha1', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+-realm.stop()
+-
+ # 7: default config negotiates aes256-sha1 session key for RC4-only service.
+ realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+ realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'rc4-hmac', 'server'])
+diff --git a/src/util/k5test.py b/src/util/k5test.py
+index 8e5f5ba8e9..b953827018 100644
+--- a/src/util/k5test.py
++++ b/src/util/k5test.py
+@@ -1338,13 +1338,6 @@ _passes = [
+     # No special settings; exercises AES256.
+     ('default', None, None, None),
+ 
+-    # Exercise the DES3 enctype.
+-    ('des3', None,
+-     {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3 aes256-sha1'}},
+-     {'realms': {'$realm': {
+-                    'supported_enctypes': 'des3-cbc-sha1:normal',
+-                    'master_key_type': 'des3-cbc-sha1'}}}),
+-
+     # Exercise the arcfour enctype.
+     ('arcfour', None,
+      {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4 aes256-sha1'}},
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0037-Add-PKINIT-paChecksum2-from-MS-PKCA-v20230920.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,692 @@
+From 9d03713af124c2096d071ba36893018da8d71655 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 13:31:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add PKINIT paChecksum2 from MS-PKCA v20230920
+
+In 2023, Microsoft updated MS-PKCA to add the optional paChecksum2
+element in the PKAuthenticator sequence.  This checksum accepts SHA-1,
+SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 digests.
+
+In Windows Server 2025, this checksum becomes mandatory when using
+PKINIT with FFDH (but strangely not with ECDH if SHA-1 is configured as
+allowed).
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: refactored crypto interfaces to reduce complexity of
+calling code]
+
+ticket: 9166 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 310793ba63782af5ffa3a95d20e41f8f03ca7e00)
+---
+ src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h                   |  25 ++--
+ src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c            |  18 ++-
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h           |   1 +
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c      |  41 +++----
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c |  42 +++++--
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h    |  24 +++-
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 116 +++++++++++++++++-
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c  |   4 +-
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c       |  16 ++-
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c       |  38 ++----
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h     |   5 +-
+ src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c            |   2 +-
+ src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c                       |   7 +-
+ src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c                 |   2 +-
+ src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out             |   2 +-
+ src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out              |   2 +-
+ 16 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h b/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h
+index 915904e518..cf6b1f99c5 100644
+--- a/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h
++++ b/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h
+@@ -36,21 +36,28 @@
+  * pkinit structures
+  */
+ 
+-/* PKAuthenticator */
+-typedef struct _krb5_pk_authenticator {
+-    krb5_int32      cusec;  /* (0..999999) */
+-    krb5_timestamp  ctime;
+-    krb5_int32      nonce;  /* (0..4294967295) */
+-    krb5_checksum   paChecksum;
+-    krb5_data      *freshnessToken;
+-} krb5_pk_authenticator;
+-
+ /* AlgorithmIdentifier */
+ typedef struct _krb5_algorithm_identifier {
+     krb5_data algorithm;      /* OID */
+     krb5_data parameters; /* Optional */
+ } krb5_algorithm_identifier;
+ 
++/* PAChecksum2 */
++typedef struct _krb5_pachecksum2 {
++    krb5_data checksum;
++    krb5_algorithm_identifier algorithmIdentifier;
++} krb5_pachecksum2;
++
++/* PKAuthenticator */
++typedef struct _krb5_pk_authenticator {
++    krb5_int32        cusec;  /* (0..999999) */
++    krb5_timestamp    ctime;
++    krb5_int32        nonce;  /* (0..4294967295) */
++    krb5_data         paChecksum;
++    krb5_data        *freshnessToken; /* Optional */
++    krb5_pachecksum2 *paChecksum2; /* Optional */
++} krb5_pk_authenticator;
++
+ /** AuthPack from RFC 4556*/
+ typedef struct _krb5_auth_pack {
+     krb5_pk_authenticator       pkAuthenticator;
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c
+index 5378b5c23b..cf7b500837 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c
+@@ -1394,20 +1394,30 @@ DEFSEQTYPE(pkinit_supp_pub_info, krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info,
+ MAKE_ENCODER(encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info, pkinit_supp_pub_info);
+ MAKE_ENCODER(encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info, sp80056a_other_info);
+ 
+-/* A krb5_checksum encoded as an OCTET STRING, for PKAuthenticator. */
+-DEFCOUNTEDTYPE(ostring_checksum, krb5_checksum, contents, length, octetstring);
++DEFFIELD(pachecksum2_0, krb5_pachecksum2, checksum, 0, ostring_data);
++DEFFIELD(pachecksum2_1, krb5_pachecksum2, algorithmIdentifier, 1,
++         algorithm_identifier);
++static const struct atype_info *pachecksum2_fields[] = {
++    &k5_atype_pachecksum2_0, &k5_atype_pachecksum2_1
++};
++DEFSEQTYPE(pachecksum2, krb5_pachecksum2, pachecksum2_fields);
++
++DEFPTRTYPE(pachecksum2_ptr, pachecksum2);
++DEFOPTIONALZEROTYPE(opt_pachecksum2_ptr, pachecksum2_ptr);
+ 
+ DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_0, krb5_pk_authenticator, cusec, 0, int32);
+ DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_1, krb5_pk_authenticator, ctime, 1, kerberos_time);
+ DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_2, krb5_pk_authenticator, nonce, 2, int32);
+ DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_3, krb5_pk_authenticator, paChecksum, 3,
+-         ostring_checksum);
++         ostring_data);
+ DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_4, krb5_pk_authenticator, freshnessToken, 4,
+          opt_ostring_data_ptr);
++DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_5, krb5_pk_authenticator, paChecksum2, 5,
++         opt_pachecksum2_ptr);
+ static const struct atype_info *pk_authenticator_fields[] = {
+     &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_0, &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_1,
+     &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_2, &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_3,
+-    &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_4
++    &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_4, &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_5
+ };
+ DEFSEQTYPE(pk_authenticator, krb5_pk_authenticator, pk_authenticator_fields);
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
+index 7ba7155bb4..a1564b6df2 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
+@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ void free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(krb5_external_principal_identifier
+ void free_krb5_algorithm_identifiers(krb5_algorithm_identifier ***in);
+ void free_krb5_algorithm_identifier(krb5_algorithm_identifier *in);
+ void free_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(krb5_kdc_dh_key_info **in);
++void free_pachecksum2(krb5_context context, krb5_pachecksum2 **in);
+ krb5_error_code pkinit_copy_krb5_data(krb5_data *dst, const krb5_data *src);
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
+index b08022a214..433f477538 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
+@@ -56,10 +56,9 @@ use_content_info(krb5_context context, pkinit_req_context req,
+ static krb5_error_code
+ pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context, pkinit_context plgctx,
+                      pkinit_req_context reqctx, krb5_timestamp ctsec,
+-                     krb5_int32 cusec, krb5_ui_4 nonce,
+-                     const krb5_checksum *cksum,
+-                     krb5_principal client, krb5_principal server,
+-                     krb5_data **as_req);
++                     krb5_int32 cusec, krb5_ui_4 nonce, const krb5_data *cksum,
++                     const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2, krb5_principal client,
++                     krb5_principal server, krb5_data **as_req);
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code
+ pkinit_as_rep_parse(krb5_context context, pkinit_context plgctx,
+@@ -89,7 +88,8 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
+     krb5_timestamp ctsec = 0;
+     krb5_int32 cusec = 0;
+     krb5_ui_4 nonce = 0;
+-    krb5_checksum cksum;
++    krb5_data cksum = empty_data();
++    krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2 = NULL;
+     krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
+     krb5_pa_data **return_pa_data = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -118,15 +118,10 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+-    retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, der_req,
+-                                  &cksum);
++    retval = crypto_generate_checksums(context, der_req, &cksum, &cksum2);
+     if (retval)
+         goto cleanup;
+-    TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUM(context, &cksum);
+-#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
+-    pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n", der_req->length);
+-    print_buffer(der_req->data, der_req->length);
+-#endif
++    TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUMS(context, &cksum, cksum2);
+ 
+     retval = cb->get_preauth_time(context, rock, TRUE, &ctsec, &cusec);
+     if (retval)
+@@ -140,7 +135,8 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
+     nonce = request->nonce;
+ 
+     retval = pkinit_as_req_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, ctsec, cusec,
+-                                  nonce, &cksum, request->client, request->server, &out_data);
++                                  nonce, &cksum, cksum2, request->client,
++                                  request->server, &out_data);
+     if (retval) {
+         pkiDebug("error %d on pkinit_as_req_create; aborting PKINIT\n",
+                  (int) retval);
+@@ -168,23 +164,19 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
+ 
+ cleanup:
+     krb5_free_data(context, der_req);
+-    krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &cksum);
++    krb5_free_data_contents(context, &cksum);
++    free_pachecksum2(context, &cksum2);
+     krb5_free_data(context, out_data);
+     krb5_free_pa_data(context, return_pa_data);
+     return retval;
+ }
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code
+-pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context,
+-                     pkinit_context plgctx,
+-                     pkinit_req_context reqctx,
+-                     krb5_timestamp ctsec,
+-                     krb5_int32 cusec,
+-                     krb5_ui_4 nonce,
+-                     const krb5_checksum * cksum,
+-                     krb5_principal client,
+-                     krb5_principal server,
+-                     krb5_data ** as_req)
++pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context, pkinit_context plgctx,
++                     pkinit_req_context reqctx, krb5_timestamp ctsec,
++                     krb5_int32 cusec, krb5_ui_4 nonce, const krb5_data *cksum,
++                     const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2, krb5_principal client,
++                     krb5_principal server, krb5_data **as_req)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
+     krb5_data spki = empty_data(), *coded_auth_pack = NULL;
+@@ -202,6 +194,7 @@ pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context,
+     auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum = *cksum;
+     if (!reqctx->opts->disable_freshness)
+         auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken = reqctx->freshness_token;
++    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum2 = (krb5_pachecksum2 *)cksum2;
+     auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
+     auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
+index 905e90d29c..a32b373c32 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
+@@ -34,25 +34,49 @@
+ 
+ /* RFC 8636 id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1: iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+  * internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) kdf(6) sha1(1) */
+-static char sha1_oid[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x01 };
++static char kdf_sha1[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x01 };
+ /* RFC 8636 id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256: iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+  * internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) kdf(6) sha256(2) */
+-static char sha256_oid[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x02 };
++static char kdf_sha256[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x02 };
+ /* RFC 8636 id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512: iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
+  * internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) kdf(6) sha512(3) */
+-static char sha512_oid[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x03 };
++static char kdf_sha512[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x03 };
+ 
+-const krb5_data sha1_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha1_oid), sha1_oid };
+-const krb5_data sha256_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha256_oid), sha256_oid };
+-const krb5_data sha512_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha512_oid), sha512_oid };
++const krb5_data kdf_sha1_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(kdf_sha1), kdf_sha1 };
++const krb5_data kdf_sha256_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(kdf_sha256), kdf_sha256 };
++const krb5_data kdf_sha512_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(kdf_sha512), kdf_sha512 };
+ 
+ krb5_data const * const supported_kdf_alg_ids[] = {
+-    &sha256_id,
+-    &sha1_id,
+-    &sha512_id,
++    &kdf_sha256_id,
++    &kdf_sha1_id,
++    &kdf_sha512_id,
+     NULL
+ };
+ 
++/* RFC 3370 sha-1: iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
++ * algorithm(2) 26 */
++static char cms_sha1[] = { 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a };
++/* RFC 5754 id-sha256: joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
++ * gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 */
++static char cms_sha256[] = {
++    0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
++};
++/* RFC 5754 id-sha384: joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
++ * gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 */
++static char cms_sha384[] = {
++    0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
++};
++/* RFC 5754 id-sha512: joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
++ * gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 */
++static char cms_sha512[] = {
++    0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
++};
++
++const krb5_data cms_sha1_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha1), cms_sha1 };
++const krb5_data cms_sha256_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha256), cms_sha256 };
++const krb5_data cms_sha384_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha384), cms_sha384 };
++const krb5_data cms_sha512_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha512), cms_sha512 };
++
+ /* RFC 4055 sha256WithRSAEncryption: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
+  * rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 11 */
+ static char sha256WithRSAEncr_oid[9] = {
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+index fd876e4850..3b12e904b1 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+@@ -562,9 +562,13 @@ pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
+                        krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
+                        krb5_keyblock *key_block);
+ 
+-extern const krb5_data sha1_id;
+-extern const krb5_data sha256_id;
+-extern const krb5_data sha512_id;
++extern const krb5_data kdf_sha1_id;
++extern const krb5_data kdf_sha256_id;
++extern const krb5_data kdf_sha512_id;
++extern const krb5_data cms_sha1_id;
++extern const krb5_data cms_sha256_id;
++extern const krb5_data cms_sha384_id;
++extern const krb5_data cms_sha512_id;
+ extern const krb5_data oakley_1024;
+ extern const krb5_data oakley_2048;
+ extern const krb5_data oakley_4096;
+@@ -597,4 +601,18 @@ crypto_req_cert_matching_data(krb5_context context,
+ 
+ int parse_dh_min_bits(krb5_context context, const char *str);
+ 
++/* Generate a SHA-1 checksum over body in *cksum1_out and a SHA-256 checksum
++ * over body in *cksum2_out with appropriate metadata. */
++krb5_error_code
++crypto_generate_checksums(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *body,
++			  krb5_data *cksum1_out,
++			  krb5_pachecksum2 **cksum2_out);
++
++/* Verify the SHA-1 checksum in cksum1 and the tagged checksum in cksum2.
++ * cksum2 may be NULL, in which case only cksum1 is verified. */
++krb5_error_code
++crypto_verify_checksums(krb5_context context, krb5_data *body,
++			const krb5_data *cksum1,
++			const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2);
++
+ #endif	/* _PKINIT_CRYPTO_H */
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+index 402bf1b9b3..429b7d202c 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -2616,11 +2616,11 @@ cleanup:
+ static const EVP_MD *
+ algid_to_md(const krb5_data *alg_id)
+ {
+-    if (data_eq(*alg_id, sha1_id))
++    if (data_eq(*alg_id, kdf_sha1_id))
+         return EVP_sha1();
+-    if (data_eq(*alg_id, sha256_id))
++    if (data_eq(*alg_id, kdf_sha256_id))
+         return EVP_sha256();
+-    if (data_eq(*alg_id, sha512_id))
++    if (data_eq(*alg_id, kdf_sha512_id))
+         return EVP_sha512();
+     return NULL;
+ }
+@@ -5663,3 +5663,113 @@ parse_dh_min_bits(krb5_context context, const char *str)
+     TRACE_PKINIT_DH_INVALID_MIN_BITS(context, str);
+     return PKINIT_DEFAULT_DH_MIN_BITS;
+ }
++
++/* Return the OpenSSL message digest type matching the given CMS OID, or NULL
++ * if it doesn't match any of the CMS OIDs we know about. */
++static const EVP_MD *
++md_from_cms_oid(const krb5_data *alg_id)
++{
++    if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha1_id))
++        return EVP_sha1();
++    if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha256_id))
++        return EVP_sha256();
++    if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha384_id))
++        return EVP_sha384();
++    if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha512_id))
++        return EVP_sha512();
++    return NULL;
++}
++
++/* Compute a message digest of the given type over body, placing the result in
++ * *digest_out in allocated storage.  Return true on success. */
++static krb5_boolean
++make_digest(const krb5_data *body, const EVP_MD *md, krb5_data *digest_out)
++{
++    krb5_error_code ret;
++    krb5_data d;
++
++    if (md == NULL)
++        return FALSE;
++    ret = alloc_data(&d, EVP_MD_size(md));
++    if (ret)
++        return FALSE;
++    if (!EVP_Digest(body->data, body->length, (uint8_t *)d.data, &d.length, md,
++                    NULL)) {
++        free(d.data);
++        return FALSE;
++    }
++    *digest_out = d;
++    return TRUE;
++}
++
++/* Return true if digest verifies for the given body and message digest
++ * type. */
++static krb5_boolean
++check_digest(const krb5_data *body, const EVP_MD *md, const krb5_data *digest)
++{
++    unsigned int digest_len;
++    uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++
++    if (md == NULL)
++        return FALSE;
++    if (!EVP_Digest(body->data, body->length, buf, &digest_len, md, NULL))
++        return FALSE;
++    return (digest->length == digest_len &&
++            CRYPTO_memcmp(digest->data, buf, digest_len) == 0);
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++crypto_generate_checksums(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *body,
++                          krb5_data *cksum1_out, krb5_pachecksum2 **cksum2_out)
++{
++    krb5_data cksum1 = empty_data();
++    krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2 = NULL;
++    krb5_error_code ret;
++
++    if (!make_digest(body, EVP_sha1(), &cksum1))
++        goto fail;
++
++    cksum2 = k5alloc(sizeof(*cksum2), &ret);
++    if (cksum2 == NULL)
++        goto fail;
++
++    if (!make_digest(body, EVP_sha256(), &cksum2->checksum))
++        goto fail;
++
++    if (krb5int_copy_data_contents(context, &cms_sha256_id,
++                                   &cksum2->algorithmIdentifier.algorithm))
++        goto fail;
++
++    cksum2->algorithmIdentifier.parameters = empty_data();
++
++    *cksum1_out = cksum1;
++    *cksum2_out = cksum2;
++    return 0;
++
++fail:
++    krb5_free_data_contents(context, &cksum1);
++    free_pachecksum2(context, &cksum2);
++    return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++crypto_verify_checksums(krb5_context context, krb5_data *body,
++                        const krb5_data *cksum1,
++                        const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2)
++{
++    const EVP_MD *md;
++
++    /* RFC 4556 doesn't say what error to return if the checksum doesn't match.
++     * Windows returns this one. */
++    if (!check_digest(body, EVP_sha1(), cksum1))
++        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
++
++    if (cksum2 == NULL)
++        return 0;
++
++    md = md_from_cms_oid(&cksum2->algorithmIdentifier.algorithm);
++    if (!check_digest(body, md, &cksum2->checksum))
++        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
++
++    return 0;
++}
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c
+index 99c93ac128..dd6e8d7503 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c
+@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+     /* TEST 1:  SHA-1/AES */
+     /* set up algorithm id */
+-    alg_id.algorithm = sha1_id;
++    alg_id.algorithm = kdf_sha1_id;
+ 
+     enctype = enctype_aes;
+ 
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+     /* TEST 2: SHA-256/AES */
+     /* set up algorithm id */
+-    alg_id.algorithm = sha256_id;
++    alg_id.algorithm = kdf_sha256_id;
+ 
+     enctype = enctype_aes;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
+index 25965eb5d2..891f47fd26 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+  * SUCH DAMAGES.
+  */
+ 
++#include "k5-int.h"
+ #include "pkinit.h"
+ 
+ #define FAKECERT
+@@ -119,8 +120,9 @@ free_krb5_auth_pack(krb5_auth_pack **in)
+ {
+     if ((*in) == NULL) return;
+     krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, &(*in)->clientPublicValue);
+-    free((*in)->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents);
++    free((*in)->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.data);
+     krb5_free_data(NULL, (*in)->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken);
++    free_pachecksum2(NULL, &(*in)->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum2);
+     if ((*in)->supportedCMSTypes != NULL)
+         free_krb5_algorithm_identifiers(&((*in)->supportedCMSTypes));
+     if ((*in)->supportedKDFs) {
+@@ -196,6 +198,18 @@ free_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(krb5_kdc_dh_key_info **in)
+     free(*in);
+ }
+ 
++void
++free_pachecksum2(krb5_context context, krb5_pachecksum2 **in)
++{
++    if (*in == NULL)
++        return;
++    krb5_free_data_contents(context, &(*in)->checksum);
++    krb5_free_data_contents(context, &(*in)->algorithmIdentifier.algorithm);
++    krb5_free_data_contents(context, &(*in)->algorithmIdentifier.parameters);
++    free(*in);
++    *in = NULL;
++}
++
+ void
+ init_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(krb5_pa_pk_as_req **in)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+index e22bcb195b..f558308483 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+@@ -428,11 +428,12 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
+     krb5_data authp_data = {0, 0, NULL}, krb5_authz = {0, 0, NULL};
+     krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
+     krb5_auth_pack *auth_pack = NULL;
++    krb5_pk_authenticator *pka;
+     pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
+     pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL;
+     krb5_checksum cksum = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
+     krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
+-    krb5_data k5data, *ftoken;
++    krb5_data k5data;
+     int is_signed = 1;
+     krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
+     krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
+@@ -524,8 +525,9 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
+         pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
++    pka = &auth_pack->pkAuthenticator;
+ 
+-    retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
++    retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, pka->ctime);
+     if (retval)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+@@ -548,36 +550,14 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+     der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
+-    retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, der_req,
+-                                  &cksum);
+-    if (retval) {
+-        pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
+-        goto cleanup;
+-    }
+-    if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
+-        k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
+-                cksum.length) != 0) {
+-        pkiDebug("failed to match the checksum\n");
+-#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
+-        pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n", req_pkt->length);
+-        print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
+-        pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ",
+-                 auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.checksum_type,
+-                 auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
+-        print_buffer(auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
+-                     auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
+-        pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ",
+-                 cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length);
+-        print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length);
+-#endif
+ 
+-        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
++    retval = crypto_verify_checksums(context, der_req, &pka->paChecksum,
++                                     pka->paChecksum2);
++    if (retval)
+         goto cleanup;
+-    }
+ 
+-    ftoken = auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken;
+-    if (ftoken != NULL) {
+-        retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, ftoken);
++    if (pka->freshnessToken != NULL) {
++        retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, pka->freshnessToken);
+         if (retval)
+             goto cleanup;
+         valid_freshness_token = TRUE;
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+index 1faa6816d7..7b68d4b3b1 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT client verified DH reply")
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_DH_FAIL(c)              \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT client could not verify DH reply")
+-#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUM(c, cksum)                      \
+-    TRACE(c, "PKINIT client computed kdc-req-body checksum {cksum}", cksum)
++#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUMS(c, ck1, ck2)                  \
++    TRACE(c, "PKINIT client computed checksums: {hexdata} {hexdata}",   \
++          ck1, &(ck2)->checksum)
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_DH(c)                           \
+     TRACE(c, "PKINIT client making DH request")
+ #define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_SAN_CONFIG_DNSNAME(c, host)                 \
+diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c b/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c
+index 2fa6dce8eb..f47849abad 100644
+--- a/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c
++++ b/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c
+@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+     /* decode_krb5_auth_pack */
+     {
+         setup(krb5_auth_pack,ktest_make_sample_auth_pack);
+-        decode_run("krb5_auth_pack","","30 81 85 A0 35 30 33 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 06 04 04 31 32 33 34 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61",
++        decode_run("krb5_auth_pack","","30 81 89 A0 39 30 37 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61",
+                    acc.decode_krb5_auth_pack,
+                    ktest_equal_auth_pack,ktest_free_auth_pack);
+         ktest_empty_auth_pack(&ref);
+diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c
+index d37e4fa7e6..7f54aa3184 100644
+--- a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c
++++ b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c
+@@ -700,9 +700,7 @@ ktest_make_sample_pk_authenticator(krb5_pk_authenticator *p)
+     p->cusec = SAMPLE_USEC;
+     p->ctime = SAMPLE_TIME;
+     p->nonce = SAMPLE_NONCE;
+-    ktest_make_sample_checksum(&p->paChecksum);
+-    /* We don't encode the checksum type, only the contents. */
+-    p->paChecksum.checksum_type = 0;
++    ktest_make_sample_data(&p->paChecksum);
+     p->freshnessToken = ealloc(sizeof(krb5_data));
+     ktest_make_sample_data(p->freshnessToken);
+ }
+@@ -1604,8 +1602,7 @@ ktest_empty_pa_otp_req(krb5_pa_otp_req *p)
+ static void
+ ktest_empty_pk_authenticator(krb5_pk_authenticator *p)
+ {
+-    ktest_empty_checksum(&p->paChecksum);
+-    p->paChecksum.contents = NULL;
++    ktest_empty_data(&p->paChecksum);
+     krb5_free_data(NULL, p->freshnessToken);
+     p->freshnessToken = NULL;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c
+index b48a0285d2..13786dd1e5 100644
+--- a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c
++++ b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c
+@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ ktest_equal_pk_authenticator(krb5_pk_authenticator *ref,
+     p = p && scalar_equal(cusec);
+     p = p && scalar_equal(ctime);
+     p = p && scalar_equal(nonce);
+-    p = p && struct_equal(paChecksum, ktest_equal_checksum);
++    p = p && data_eq(ref->paChecksum, var->paChecksum);
+     return p;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out
+index 6ec7aaa36a..a764182e15 100644
+--- a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out
++++ b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req: 30 38 80 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 22 30 20 30 1E 80 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 81 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 82 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 82 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
+ encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(dhInfo): A0 28 30 26 80 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A2 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
+ encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(encKeyPack): 81 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
+-encode_krb5_auth_pack: 30 81 85 A0 35 30 33 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 06 04 04 31 32 33 34 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
++encode_krb5_auth_pack: 30 81 89 A0 39 30 37 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
+ encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info: 30 25 A0 0B 03 09 00 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 03 02 01 2A A2 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A
+ encode_krb5_reply_key_pack: 30 26 A0 13 30 11 A0 03 02 01 01 A1 0A 04 08 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 A1 0F 30 0D A0 03 02 01 01 A1 06 04 04 31 32 33 34
+ encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info: 30 81 81 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A0 32 04 30 30 2E A0 10 1B 0E 41 54 48 45 4E 41 2E 4D 49 54 2E 45 44 55 A1 1A 30 18 A0 03 02 01 01 A1 11 30 0F 1B 06 68 66 74 73 61 69 1B 05 65 78 74 72 61 A1 32 04 30 30 2E A0 10 1B 0E 41 54 48 45 4E 41 2E 4D 49 54 2E 45 44 55 A1 1A 30 18 A0 03 02 01 01 A1 11 30 0F 1B 06 68 66 74 73 61 69 1B 05 65 78 74 72 61 A2 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
+diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out
+index 46f4a34108..c47bd71f67 100644
+--- a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out
++++ b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ encode_krb5_auth_pack:
+ .  .  [0] [Integer] 123456
+ .  .  [1] [Generalized Time] "19940610060317Z"
+ .  .  [2] [Integer] 42
+-.  .  [3] [Octet String] "1234"
++.  .  [3] [Octet String] "krb5data"
+ .  .  [4] [Octet String] "krb5data"
+ .  [1] [Octet String] "pvalue"
+ .  [2] [Sequence/Sequence Of]
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0038-downstream-Do-not-block-HMAC-MD4-5-in-FIPS-mode.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+From 33afd2a6cfdf87d153170b41fbabfb92be49c422 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 10:04:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Do not block HMAC-MD4/5 in FIPS mode
+
+To ensure RC4 HMAC-MD5 was not used in FIPS mode, access to HMAC-MD4/5
+was not allowed in this mode. However, since we provide the
+"radius_md5_fips_override" configuration parameter to allow using RADIUS
+regardless to the FIPS restrictions, we should allow HMAC-MD5 to be used
+too in this case, because it is required for the newly supported
+Message-Authenticator attribute.
+
+A FIPS mode check is added in calculate_mac() which will fail if
+"radius_md5_fips_override" is not true. It will not affect interactions
+between krb5kdc and ipa-otpd, because the Message-Authenticator
+attribute is not generated in this case.
+---
+ src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h               |  9 +++
+ src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in            |  9 ++-
+ src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c               | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
+ .../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c   | 62 ++------------
+ src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c                 | 15 ++--
+ src/lib/krad/packet.c                         | 19 +++--
+ 6 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h b/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
+index 1ee4b30e02..ff67b6bd35 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
+@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++
++#include <openssl/provider.h>
++
+ /*
+  * OpenSSL 3.0 relegates MD4 and RC4 to the legacy provider, which must be
+  * explicitly loaded into a library context.  Performing this loading within a
+@@ -660,4 +663,10 @@ iov_cursor_advance(struct iov_cursor *c, size_t nblocks)
+     c->out_pos += nblocks * c->block_size;
+ }
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++
++krb5_error_code k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX **libctx);
++
++#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */
++
+ #endif /* CRYPTO_INT_H */
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in
+index 8e4cdb8bbf..cc131000bd 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in
+@@ -8,21 +8,24 @@ STLIBOBJS=\
+ 	hmac.o	\
+ 	kdf.o	\
+ 	pbkdf2.o \
+-	sha256.o
++	sha256.o \
++	common.o
+ 
+ OBJS=\
+ 	$(OUTPRE)cmac.$(OBJEXT)	\
+ 	$(OUTPRE)hmac.$(OBJEXT)	\
+ 	$(OUTPRE)kdf.$(OBJEXT)	\
+ 	$(OUTPRE)pbkdf2.$(OBJEXT) \
+-	$(OUTPRE)sha256.$(OBJEXT)
++	$(OUTPRE)sha256.$(OBJEXT) \
++	$(OUTPRE)common.$(OBJEXT)
+ 
+ SRCS=\
+ 	$(srcdir)/cmac.c	\
+ 	$(srcdir)/hmac.c	\
+ 	$(srcdir)/kdf.c		\
+ 	$(srcdir)/pbkdf2.c	\
+-	$(srcdir)/sha256.c
++	$(srcdir)/sha256.c	\
++	$(srcdir)/common.c
+ 
+ SUBDIROBJLISTS= md4/OBJS.ST 		\
+ 		md5/OBJS.ST sha1/OBJS.ST sha2/OBJS.ST 	\
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..ced43fd54c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
++#include "crypto_int.h"
++
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
++
++#include <openssl/provider.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <threads.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++
++typedef struct ossl_legacy_context {
++    bool initialized;
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
++    OSSL_PROVIDER *default_provider;
++    OSSL_PROVIDER *legacy_provider;
++} ossl_legacy_context_t;
++
++static thread_local ossl_legacy_context_t g_ossl_legacy_ctx;
++
++static krb5_error_code
++init_ossl_legacy_ctx(ossl_legacy_context_t *ctx)
++{
++    ctx->libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
++    if (!ctx->libctx)
++        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++
++    /* Load both legacy and default provider as both may be needed. */
++    ctx->default_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "default");
++    ctx->legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "legacy");
++
++    if (!(ctx->default_provider && ctx->legacy_provider))
++        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++
++    ctx->initialized = true;
++    return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++deinit_ossl_legacy_ctx(ossl_legacy_context_t *ctx)
++{
++    if (ctx->legacy_provider)
++        OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->legacy_provider);
++
++    if (ctx->default_provider)
++        OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->default_provider);
++
++    if (ctx->libctx)
++        OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ctx->libctx);
++
++    ctx->initialized = false;
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX **libctx)
++{
++    krb5_error_code err;
++
++    if (!FIPS_mode()) {
++        if (libctx)
++            *libctx = NULL;
++        err = 0;
++        goto end;
++    }
++
++    if (!g_ossl_legacy_ctx.initialized) {
++        err = init_ossl_legacy_ctx(&g_ossl_legacy_ctx);
++        if (err) {
++            deinit_ossl_legacy_ctx(&g_ossl_legacy_ctx);
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (libctx)
++        *libctx = g_ossl_legacy_ctx.libctx;
++    err = 0;
++
++end:
++    return err;
++}
++
++#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+index eb2e693e9f..2fd5d383d6 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+@@ -44,48 +44,7 @@
+ #define EVP_MD_CTX_free EVP_MD_CTX_destroy
+ #endif
+ 
+-#include <openssl/provider.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
+-#include <threads.h>
+-
+-typedef struct ossl_lib_md_context {
+-    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+-    OSSL_PROVIDER *default_provider;
+-    OSSL_PROVIDER *legacy_provider;
+-} ossl_md_context_t;
+-
+-static thread_local ossl_md_context_t *ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-static krb5_error_code
+-init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx, const char *algo)
+-{
+-    ctx->libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
+-    if (!ctx->libctx)
+-        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+-
+-    /* Load both legacy and default provider as both may be needed. */
+-    ctx->default_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "default");
+-    ctx->legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "legacy");
+-
+-    if (!(ctx->default_provider && ctx->legacy_provider))
+-        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+-
+-    return 0;
+-}
+-
+-static void
+-deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx)
+-{
+-    if (ctx->legacy_provider)
+-        OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->legacy_provider);
+-
+-    if (ctx->default_provider)
+-        OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->default_provider);
+-
+-    if (ctx->libctx)
+-        OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ctx->libctx);
+-}
+-
+ 
+ static krb5_error_code
+ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+@@ -120,25 +79,14 @@ hash_legacy_evp(const char *algo, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+                 krb5_data *output)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code err;
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_libctx;
+     EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ 
+-    if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
+-        ossl_md_ctx = malloc(sizeof(ossl_md_context_t));
+-        if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
+-            err = ENOMEM;
+-            goto end;
+-        }
+-
+-        err = init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_ctx, algo);
+-        if (err) {
+-            deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_ctx);
+-            free(ossl_md_ctx);
+-            ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
+-            goto end;
+-        }
+-    }
++    err = k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(&ossl_libctx);
++    if (err)
++        goto end;
+ 
+-    md = EVP_MD_fetch(ossl_md_ctx->libctx, algo, NULL);
++    md = EVP_MD_fetch(ossl_libctx, algo, NULL);
+     if (!md) {
+         err = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+         goto end;
+diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+index 25a419d73a..8f9e88fec9 100644
+--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
++++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+ #include <openssl/params.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+-#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #else
+ #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -112,11 +111,7 @@ map_digest(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash)
+         return EVP_sha256();
+     else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_sha384)
+         return EVP_sha384();
+-
+-    if (FIPS_mode())
+-        return NULL;
+-
+-    if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
++    else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
+         return EVP_md5();
+     else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md4)
+         return EVP_md4();
+@@ -138,13 +133,19 @@ krb5int_hmac_keyblock(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
+     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+     size_t i = 0, md_len;
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_libctx;
++    krb5_error_code err;
+ 
+     if (md == NULL || keyblock->length > hash->blocksize)
+         return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+     if (output->length < hash->hashsize)
+         return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
+ 
+-    mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL);
++    err = k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(&ossl_libctx);
++    if (err)
++        return err;
++
++    mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ossl_libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
+     if (mac == NULL)
+         return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+index 3c1a4d507e..b95c99df65 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
++++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ lookup_msgauth_addr(const krad_packet *pkt)
+  * auth, which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request.
+  */
+ static krb5_error_code
+-calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
++calculate_mac(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+               const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE],
+               uint8_t mac_out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE])
+ {
+@@ -288,6 +288,10 @@ calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+     krb5_crypto_iov input[5];
+     krb5_data ksecr, mac;
+ 
++    /* Do not use HMAC-MD5 if not explicitly allowed */
++    if (kr_use_fips(ctx))
++        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
++
+     msgauth_attr = lookup_msgauth_addr(pkt);
+     if (msgauth_attr == NULL)
+         return EINVAL;
+@@ -393,7 +397,8 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
+ 
+     if (msgauth_required) {
+         /* Calculate and set the Message-Authenticator MAC. */
+-        retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
++        retval = calculate_mac(ctx, secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt),
++                               pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+         if (retval != 0)
+             goto error;
+     }
+@@ -454,7 +459,7 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
+          * section 5.14, use the authenticator from the request, not from the
+          * response.
+          */
+-        retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
++        retval = calculate_mac(ctx, secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
+                                pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+         if (retval != 0)
+             goto error;
+@@ -476,7 +481,7 @@ error:
+ /* Verify the Message-Authenticator value in pkt, using the provided
+  * authenticator (which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request). */
+ static krb5_error_code
+-verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
++verify_msgauth(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+                const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE])
+ {
+     uint8_t mac[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+@@ -488,7 +493,7 @@ verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+     if (msgauth == NULL)
+         return ENODATA;
+ 
+-    retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, auth, mac);
++    retval = calculate_mac(ctx, secret, pkt, auth, mac);
+     if (retval)
+         return retval;
+ 
+@@ -561,7 +566,7 @@ krad_packet_decode_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
+ 
+     /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+     if (has_pkt_msgauth(req)) {
+-        retval = verify_msgauth(secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
++        retval = verify_msgauth(ctx, secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
+         if (retval) {
+             krad_packet_free(req);
+             return retval;
+@@ -613,7 +618,7 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
+ 
+             /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+             if (has_pkt_msgauth(*rsppkt)) {
+-                if (verify_msgauth(secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
++                if (verify_msgauth(ctx, secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
+                     continue;
+             }
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0039-Fix-strchr-conformance-to-C23.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+From 1761e06398e4f043e4f540f57131c37fcc53a1b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2025 10:42:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix strchr() conformance to C23
+
+C23 7.28.5.1 specifies search functions such as strchr() as generic,
+returning const char * if the first argument is of type const char *.
+Fix uses of strchr() to conform to this change.
+
+[jrische@redhat.com: altered changes to avoid casts; fixed an
+additional case]
+[ghudson@mit.edu: condensed some declarations; rewrote commit message]
+
+ticket: 9191 (new)
+(cherry picked from commit 6cd8580d823585d50ee4f30efd9f7e855823a369)
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c                      |  4 ++--
+ src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c                     |  3 ++-
+ src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c                      | 15 +++++++--------
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h        |  2 +-
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c        |  6 +++---
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c      |  2 +-
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c      |  2 +-
+ src/tests/responder.c                             |  3 +--
+ 8 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c
+index 5a01320832..1aada91b5e 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c
+@@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ krb5_cc_register(krb5_context context, const krb5_cc_ops *ops,
+ krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+ krb5_cc_resolve (krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_ccache *cache)
+ {
+-    char *pfx, *cp;
+-    const char *resid;
++    char *pfx;
++    const char *cp, *resid;
+     unsigned int pfxlen;
+     krb5_error_code err;
+     const krb5_cc_ops *ops;
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c
+index 5cbccf08c8..6569b8820b 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c
+@@ -454,7 +454,8 @@ k5_expand_path_tokens_extra(krb5_context context, const char *path_in,
+ {
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     struct k5buf buf;
+-    char *tok_begin, *tok_end, *tok_val, **extra_tokens = NULL, *path;
++    const char *tok_begin, *tok_end;
++    char *tok_val, **extra_tokens = NULL, *path;
+     const char *path_left;
+     size_t nargs = 0, i;
+     va_list ap;
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c
+index edca5ac7eb..47e15c849f 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c
+@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ oom:
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-parse_uri_if_https(const char *host_or_uri, k5_transport *transport,
+-                   const char **host, const char **uri_path)
++parse_uri_if_https(char *host_or_uri, k5_transport *transport,
++                   char **host, const char **uri_path)
+ {
+     char *cp;
+ 
+@@ -229,8 +229,7 @@ locate_srv_conf_1(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
+                   k5_transport transport, int udpport)
+ {
+     const char *realm_srv_names[4];
+-    char **hostlist = NULL, *realmstr = NULL, *host = NULL;
+-    const char *hostspec;
++    char **hostlist = NULL, *realmstr = NULL, *host = NULL, *hostspec;
+     krb5_error_code code;
+     int i, default_port;
+ 
+@@ -535,8 +534,8 @@ prof_locate_server(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
+  * Return a NULL *host_out if there are any problems parsing the URI.
+  */
+ static void
+-parse_uri_fields(const char *uri, k5_transport *transport_out,
+-                 const char **host_out, int *primary_out)
++parse_uri_fields(char *uri, k5_transport *transport_out,
++                 char **host_out, int *primary_out)
+ 
+ {
+     k5_transport transport;
+@@ -604,8 +603,8 @@ locate_uri(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     k5_transport transport, host_trans;
+     struct srv_dns_entry *answers, *entry;
+-    char *host;
+-    const char *host_field, *path;
++    char *host, *host_field;
++    const char *path;
+     int port, def_port, primary;
+ 
+     ret = k5_make_uri_query(context, realm, req_service, &answers);
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+index 3b12e904b1..99e2394040 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ krb5_error_code crypto_load_cas_and_crls
+ 		    defines the storage type (file, directory, etc) */
+ 	int catype,					/* IN
+ 		    defines the ca type (anchor, intermediate, crls) */
+-	char *id);					/* IN
++	const char *id);				/* IN
+ 		    defines the location (filename, directory name, etc) */
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+index 429b7d202c..6013080afc 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -4956,7 +4956,7 @@ load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
+                   pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
+                   pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+                   int catype,
+-                  char *filename)
++                  const char *filename)
+ {
+     STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL;
+     STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
+@@ -5114,7 +5114,7 @@ load_cas_and_crls_dir(krb5_context context,
+                       pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
+                       pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+                       int catype,
+-                      char *dirname)
++                      const char *dirname)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
+     DIR *d = NULL;
+@@ -5166,7 +5166,7 @@ crypto_load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
+                          pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+                          int idtype,
+                          int catype,
+-                         char *id)
++                         const char *id)
+ {
+     switch (idtype) {
+     case IDTYPE_FILE:
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
+index a5a979f279..b06d519c66 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
+@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ process_option_ca_crl(krb5_context context,
+                       const char *value,
+                       int catype)
+ {
+-    char *residual;
++    const char *residual;
+     unsigned int typelen;
+     int idtype;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c
+index b42485a50a..5a7f2ba3fa 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c
+@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ parse_rule_component(krb5_context context,
+     char err_buf[128];
+     int ret;
+     struct keyword_desc *kw, *nextkw;
+-    char *nk;
++    const char *nk;
+     int found_next_kw = 0;
+     char *value = NULL;
+     size_t len;
+diff --git a/src/tests/responder.c b/src/tests/responder.c
+index 82f870ea5d..4221a20283 100644
+--- a/src/tests/responder.c
++++ b/src/tests/responder.c
+@@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ responder(krb5_context ctx, void *rawdata, krb5_responder_context rctx)
+     /* Provide a particular response for an OTP challenge. */
+     if (data->otp_answer != NULL) {
+         if (krb5_responder_otp_get_challenge(ctx, rctx, &ochl) == 0) {
+-            key = strchr(data->otp_answer, '=');
+-            if (key != NULL) {
++            if (strchr(data->otp_answer, '=') != NULL) {
+                 /* Make a copy of the answer that we can chop up. */
+                 key = strdup(data->otp_answer);
+                 if (key == NULL)
+-- 
+2.51.1
+

0040-automated-fast.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+From 3baf9b93dc1dfe38585722c71d7268304cb4a01a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2025 11:14:51 +0300
+Subject: libkrb5: in case PKINIT is configured, attempt Anonymous
+ PKINIT for FAST
+
+If auto_fast_armor is configured for the realm or globally, optimistically
+assume that Anonymous PKINIT is supported as well and try to obtain it for
+FAST use in case no pre-made FAST channel was established by the caller.
+
+This behavior will automatically enable use of passwordless pre-authentication
+methods which rely on FAST channel presence in deployments such as FreeIPA.
+
+Notably, Microsoft Active Directory KDCs do not support Anonymous PKINIT. For
+these deployments only a machine account (host keytab) can be used to build a
+FAST channel. However, libkrb5 does not have access to /etc/krb5.keytab in a
+general case.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h |   2 +
+ src/man/krb5.conf.man   |  13 +++++
+ 3 files changed, 133 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c
+index 62c9f0841..ee2e08189 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c
+@@ -168,6 +168,109 @@ krb5int_fast_prep_req_body(krb5_context context,
+     return retval;
+ }
+ 
++static krb5_boolean
++fast_is_pkinit_allowed(krb5_context context, krb5_data *realm)
++{
++    int value;
++    krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
++    char realmstr[1024];
++    const char *option = "auto_fast_armor";
++    const int def_value = FALSE;
++
++    if (realm != NULL && realm->length > sizeof(realmstr)-1)
++        return FALSE;
++
++    if (realm != NULL) {
++        strncpy(realmstr, realm->data, realm->length);
++        realmstr[realm->length] = '\0';
++
++        retval = profile_get_boolean(context->profile,
++                                     KRB5_CONF_REALMS, realmstr,
++                                     option, def_value, &value);
++    }
++
++    return retval ? FALSE : value;
++
++}
++
++static krb5_error_code
++fast_acquire_pkinit_armor(krb5_context context,
++                           struct krb5int_fast_request_state *state,
++                           krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, krb5_kdc_req *request)
++{
++    krb5_context ctx;
++    krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options = NULL;
++    krb5_error_code retval = 0;
++    krb5_data *target_realm = &request->server->realm;
++    krb5_creds creds;
++    krb5_principal anon_princ = NULL;
++    krb5_ccache out_cc;
++
++    /* short circuit, we are asked to perform Anonymous PKINIT already */
++    if (opt->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ANONYMOUS) {
++        return EINVAL;
++    }
++
++    /* skip realms which do not allow use of automated FAST armor */
++    if (!fast_is_pkinit_allowed(context, target_realm)) {
++        return EINVAL;
++    }
++
++    retval = krb5_init_context(&ctx);
++    if (retval != 0) {
++        return retval;
++    }
++    retval = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(ctx, &options);
++    if (retval != 0) {
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++    krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous(options, 1);
++    retval = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, "MEMORY", NULL, &out_cc);
++    if (retval != 0) {
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++
++    retval = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_out_ccache(ctx, options, out_cc);
++    if (retval != 0) {
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++
++    retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(ctx, &anon_princ,
++                                      target_realm->length, target_realm->data,
++                                      strlen(KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAMESTR),
++                                      KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAMESTR,
++                                      strlen(KRB5_ANONYMOUS_PRINCSTR),
++                                      KRB5_ANONYMOUS_PRINCSTR, 0);
++    if (retval != 0) {
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
++
++    retval = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, anon_princ, 0,
++                                          NULL /* no prompter */, NULL,
++                                          0, NULL /* service name */,
++                                          options);
++    if (retval == 0) {
++        state->fast_state_flags |= KRB5INT_FAST_OWN_ARMOR;
++        state->armor_ccache = out_cc;
++    }
++cleanup:
++    if (retval != 0 && out_cc != NULL) {
++        (void) krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, out_cc);
++    }
++    if (retval == 0) {
++        krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &creds);
++    }
++    if (options != NULL) {
++        krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(ctx, options);
++    }
++    if (anon_princ != NULL) {
++        krb5_free_principal(ctx, anon_princ);
++    }
++    krb5_free_context(ctx);
++
++    return retval;
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+ krb5int_fast_as_armor(krb5_context context,
+                       struct krb5int_fast_request_state *state,
+@@ -178,10 +281,20 @@ krb5int_fast_as_armor(krb5_context context,
+     krb5_principal target_principal = NULL;
+     krb5_data *target_realm;
+     const char *ccname = k5_gic_opt_get_fast_ccache_name(opt);
++    char *fast_ccname = NULL;
+     krb5_flags fast_flags;
+ 
+     krb5_clear_error_message(context);
+     target_realm = &request->server->realm;
++    if (ccname == NULL) {
++        retval = fast_acquire_pkinit_armor(context, state, opt, request);
++        if (retval == 0) {
++            retval = krb5_cc_get_full_name(context, state->armor_ccache, &fast_ccname);
++            if (retval == 0 && fast_ccname != NULL)
++                ccname = fast_ccname;
++        }
++        retval = 0;
++    }
+     if (ccname != NULL) {
+         TRACE_FAST_ARMOR_CCACHE(context, ccname);
+         state->fast_state_flags |= KRB5INT_FAST_ARMOR_AVAIL;
+@@ -220,6 +333,8 @@ krb5int_fast_as_armor(krb5_context context,
+         krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
+     if (target_principal)
+         krb5_free_principal(context, target_principal);
++    if (fast_ccname)
++        free(fast_ccname);
+     return retval;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -615,6 +730,9 @@ krb5int_fast_free_state(krb5_context context,
+     /*We are responsible for none of the store in the fast_outer_req*/
+     krb5_free_keyblock(context, state->armor_key);
+     krb5_free_fast_armor(context, state->armor);
++    if (state->fast_state_flags & KRB5INT_FAST_OWN_ARMOR) {
++        krb5_cc_destroy(context, state->armor_ccache);
++    }
+     free(state);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h
+index 7156ea203..e5fe8bd54 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct krb5int_fast_request_state {
+     krb5_kdc_req fast_outer_request;
+     krb5_keyblock *armor_key; /*non-null means fast is in use*/
+     krb5_fast_armor *armor;
++    krb5_ccache armor_ccache;
+     krb5_ui_4 fast_state_flags;
+     krb5_ui_4 fast_options;
+     krb5_int32 nonce;
+@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ struct krb5int_fast_request_state {
+ 
+ #define KRB5INT_FAST_DO_FAST     (1l<<0)  /* Perform FAST */
+ #define KRB5INT_FAST_ARMOR_AVAIL (1l<<1)
++#define KRB5INT_FAST_OWN_ARMOR   (1l<<2)
+ 
+ krb5_error_code
+ krb5int_fast_prep_req_body(krb5_context context,
+diff --git a/src/man/krb5.conf.man b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
+index d4caa2bd3..ac7649647 100644
+--- a/src/man/krb5.conf.man
++++ b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
+@@ -650,6 +650,19 @@ primary KDC, in case the user\(aqs password has just been changed, and
+ the updated database has not been propagated to the replica
+ servers yet.  New in release 1.19.
+ .TP
++\fBauto_fast_armor\fP
++If this flag is true, then initial ticket request will use Anonymous
++PKINIT to protect the communication as a FAST channel in case an application
++did not provide its own FAST channel. This is useful for deployments where
++pre-authentication methods require use of the FAST channel, such as
++passwordless methods provided by FreeIPA. Microsoft Active Directory
++implementation of PKINIT does not support Anonymous PKINIT feature.
++As a result, \fIauto_fast_armor\fP defaults to false.
++.sp
++Use of \fIauto_fast_armor = true\fP requires properly configured PKINIT and
++WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS principal defined on the KDC side. Consult KDC documentation
++for details.
++.TP
+ \fBv4_instance_convert\fP
+ This subsection allows the administrator to configure exceptions
+ to the \fBdefault_domain\fP mapping rule.  It contains V4 instances
+-- 
+2.51.0
+

0041-bail-if-prompter-is-not-specified-but-required.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From ff580d9cf86202d45454a6b6f53accc22cb40b62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2025 18:14:29 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] bail if prompter is not specified but required
+
+GSSAPI gss_init_sec_context() may trigger credential re-initialization
+if the cred in ccache is expired. If automatic FAST armor is in use,
+we'd request Anonymous PKINIT and use it as an armor and this will
+enable seeing pre-authentication methods which require armor presence.
+
+OTP is one of such methods and its use requires prompter to be set,
+but GSSAPI cannot specify a prompter and thus we should fail any
+pre-auth where a prompter wasn't passed.
+
+PKINIT PKCS11 and SAM-2 preauth methods use KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD while PKINIT
+and gic_pwd.c use EIO. Use EIO here because we technically attempt to read a
+PIN rather than a password.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
+index 07ffc15c2..48003da62 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
+@@ -479,6 +479,9 @@ doprompt(krb5_context context, krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data,
+     krb5_error_code retval;
+     krb5_prompt_type prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
+ 
++    if (prompter == NULL)
++        return EIO;
++
+     if (prompttxt == NULL || out == NULL)
+         return EINVAL;
+ 
+-- 
+2.51.0
+

Add-channel-bindings-tests.patch

@@ -1,419 +0,0 @@
-From 6d36ea6fcfe281a8ce73fc5aa5c133f435d93fa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 00:17:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add channel bindings tests
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: adjusted test program to output channel-bound state
-instead of optionally enforcing it; adjusted tests to check program
-output; split out tests into separate Python script; made cosmetic
-changes]
-
-ticket: 8900
-(cherry picked from commit b0b21b6d25b06f3e2b365dfe9dd4c99b3d43bf57)
-[rharwood@redhat.com: .gitignore]
----
- src/plugins/gssapi/negoextest/main.c |  18 +++++
- src/tests/gssapi/Makefile.in         |  49 ++++++------
- src/tests/gssapi/common.c            |  25 ++++--
- src/tests/gssapi/common.h            |   9 +++
- src/tests/gssapi/deps                |   4 +
- src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.c        | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.py       |  43 +++++++++++
- src/tests/gssapi/t_negoex.py         |   7 ++
- 8 files changed, 237 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.c
- create mode 100644 src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.py
-
-diff --git a/src/plugins/gssapi/negoextest/main.c b/src/plugins/gssapi/negoextest/main.c
-index 6c340f41b..72fc5273a 100644
---- a/src/plugins/gssapi/negoextest/main.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/gssapi/negoextest/main.c
-@@ -57,6 +57,15 @@ gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-     const char *envstr;
-     uint8_t hops, mech_last_octet;
- 
-+    envstr = getenv("GSS_INIT_BINDING");
-+    if (envstr != NULL) {
-+        assert(strlen(envstr) > 0);
-+        assert(input_chan_bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS);
-+        assert(strlen(envstr) == input_chan_bindings->application_data.length);
-+        assert(strcmp((char *)input_chan_bindings->application_data.value,
-+                      envstr) == 0);
-+    }
-+
-     if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
-         envstr = getenv("HOPS");
-         hops = (envstr != NULL) ? atoi(envstr) : 1;
-@@ -112,6 +121,15 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
-     uint8_t hops, mech_last_octet;
-     const char *envstr;
- 
-+    envstr = getenv("GSS_ACCEPT_BINDING");
-+    if (envstr != NULL) {
-+        assert(strlen(envstr) > 0);
-+        assert(input_chan_bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS);
-+        assert(strlen(envstr) == input_chan_bindings->application_data.length);
-+        assert(strcmp((char *)input_chan_bindings->application_data.value,
-+                      envstr) == 0);
-+    }
-+
-     /*
-      * The unwrapped token sits at the end and is just one byte giving the
-      * remaining number of hops.  The final octet of the mech encoding should
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/Makefile.in b/src/tests/gssapi/Makefile.in
-index 5cc1e0f58..68c132b79 100644
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/Makefile.in
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/Makefile.in
-@@ -9,33 +9,33 @@ LOCALINCLUDES = -I$(srcdir)/../../lib/gssapi/mechglue \
- 	-I../../lib/gssapi/generic
- 
- SRCS=	$(srcdir)/ccinit.c $(srcdir)/ccrefresh.c $(srcdir)/common.c \
--	$(srcdir)/t_accname.c $(srcdir)/t_add_cred.c $(srcdir)/t_ccselect.c \
--	$(srcdir)/t_ciflags.c $(srcdir)/t_context.c $(srcdir)/t_credstore.c \
--	$(srcdir)/t_enctypes.c $(srcdir)/t_err.c $(srcdir)/t_export_cred.c \
--	$(srcdir)/t_export_name.c $(srcdir)/t_gssexts.c \
--	$(srcdir)/t_imp_cred.c $(srcdir)/t_imp_name.c $(srcdir)/t_invalid.c \
--	$(srcdir)/t_inq_cred.c $(srcdir)/t_inq_ctx.c \
-+	$(srcdir)/t_accname.c $(srcdir)/t_add_cred.c $(srcdir)/t_bindings.c \
-+	$(srcdir)/t_ccselect.c $(srcdir)/t_ciflags.c $(srcdir)/t_context.c \
-+	$(srcdir)/t_credstore.c $(srcdir)/t_enctypes.c $(srcdir)/t_err.c \
-+	$(srcdir)/t_export_cred.c $(srcdir)/t_export_name.c \
-+	$(srcdir)/t_gssexts.c $(srcdir)/t_imp_cred.c $(srcdir)/t_imp_name.c \
-+	$(srcdir)/t_invalid.c $(srcdir)/t_inq_cred.c $(srcdir)/t_inq_ctx.c \
- 	$(srcdir)/t_inq_mechs_name.c $(srcdir)/t_iov.c \
- 	$(srcdir)/t_lifetime.c $(srcdir)/t_namingexts.c $(srcdir)/t_oid.c \
- 	$(srcdir)/t_pcontok.c $(srcdir)/t_prf.c $(srcdir)/t_s4u.c \
- 	$(srcdir)/t_s4u2proxy_krb5.c $(srcdir)/t_saslname.c \
- 	$(srcdir)/t_spnego.c $(srcdir)/t_srcattrs.c
- 
--OBJS=	ccinit.o ccrefresh.o common.o t_accname.o t_add_cred.o t_ccselect.o \
--	t_ciflags.o t_context.o t_credstore.o t_enctypes.o t_err.o \
--	t_export_cred.o t_export_name.o t_gssexts.o t_imp_cred.o t_imp_name.o \
--	t_invalid.o t_inq_cred.o t_inq_ctx.o t_inq_mechs_name.o t_iov.o \
--	t_lifetime.o t_namingexts.o t_oid.o t_pcontok.o t_prf.o t_s4u.o \
--	t_s4u2proxy_krb5.o t_saslname.o t_spnego.o t_srcattrs.o
-+OBJS=	ccinit.o ccrefresh.o common.o t_accname.o t_add_cred.o t_bindings.o \
-+	t_ccselect.o t_ciflags.o t_context.o t_credstore.o t_enctypes.o \
-+	t_err.o t_export_cred.o t_export_name.o t_gssexts.o t_imp_cred.o \
-+	t_imp_name.o t_invalid.o t_inq_cred.o t_inq_ctx.o t_inq_mechs_name.o \
-+	t_iov.o t_lifetime.o t_namingexts.o t_oid.o t_pcontok.o t_prf.o \
-+	t_s4u.o t_s4u2proxy_krb5.o t_saslname.o t_spnego.o t_srcattrs.o
- 
- COMMON_DEPS= common.o $(GSS_DEPLIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
- COMMON_LIBS= common.o $(GSS_LIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_LIBS)
- 
--all: ccinit ccrefresh t_accname t_add_cred t_ccselect t_ciflags t_context \
--	t_credstore t_enctypes t_err t_export_cred t_export_name t_gssexts \
--	t_imp_cred t_imp_name t_invalid t_inq_cred t_inq_ctx t_inq_mechs_name \
--	t_iov t_lifetime t_namingexts t_oid t_pcontok t_prf t_s4u \
--	t_s4u2proxy_krb5 t_saslname t_spnego t_srcattrs
-+all: ccinit ccrefresh t_accname t_add_cred t_bindings t_ccselect t_ciflags \
-+	t_context t_credstore t_enctypes t_err t_export_cred t_export_name \
-+	t_gssexts t_imp_cred t_imp_name t_invalid t_inq_cred t_inq_ctx \
-+	t_inq_mechs_name t_iov t_lifetime t_namingexts t_oid t_pcontok t_prf \
-+	t_s4u t_s4u2proxy_krb5 t_saslname t_spnego t_srcattrs
- 
- check-unix: t_oid
- 	$(RUN_TEST) ./t_invalid
-@@ -43,11 +43,12 @@ check-unix: t_oid
- 	$(RUN_TEST) ./t_prf
- 	$(RUN_TEST) ./t_imp_name
- 
--check-pytests: ccinit ccrefresh t_accname t_add_cred t_ccselect t_ciflags \
--	t_context t_credstore t_enctypes t_err t_export_cred t_export_name \
--	t_imp_cred t_inq_cred t_inq_ctx t_inq_mechs_name t_iov t_lifetime \
--	t_pcontok t_s4u t_s4u2proxy_krb5 t_spnego t_srcattrs
-+check-pytests: ccinit ccrefresh t_accname t_add_cred t_bindings t_ccselect \
-+	t_ciflags t_context t_credstore t_enctypes t_err t_export_cred \
-+	t_export_name t_imp_cred t_inq_cred t_inq_ctx t_inq_mechs_name t_iov \
-+	t_lifetime t_pcontok t_s4u t_s4u2proxy_krb5 t_spnego t_srcattrs
- 	$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_gssapi.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
-+	$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_bindings.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
- 	$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_ccselect.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
- 	$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_client_keytab.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
- 	$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_enctypes.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
-@@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ t_accname: t_accname.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
- 	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ t_accname.o $(COMMON_LIBS)
- t_add_cred: t_add_cred.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
- 	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ t_add_cred.o $(COMMON_LIBS)
-+t_bindings: t_bindings.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
-+	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ t_bindings.o $(COMMON_LIBS)
- t_ccselect: t_ccselect.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
- 	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ t_ccselect.o $(COMMON_LIBS)
- t_ciflags: t_ciflags.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
-@@ -118,8 +121,8 @@ t_srcattrs: t_srcattrs.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
- 	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ t_srcattrs.o $(COMMON_LIBS)
- 
- clean:
--	$(RM) ccinit ccrefresh t_accname t_add_cred t_ccselect t_ciflags
--	$(RM) t_context t_credstore t_enctypes t_err t_export_cred
-+	$(RM) ccinit ccrefresh t_accname t_add_cred t_bindings t_ccselect
-+	$(RM) t_ciflags t_context t_credstore t_enctypes t_err t_export_cred
- 	$(RM) t_export_name t_gssexts t_imp_cred t_imp_name t_invalid
- 	$(RM) t_inq_cred t_inq_ctx t_inq_mechs_name t_iov t_lifetime
- 	$(RM) t_namingexts t_oid t_pcontok t_prf t_s4u t_s4u2proxy_krb5
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/common.c b/src/tests/gssapi/common.c
-index 83e9d9bb8..7ba72f7b2 100644
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/common.c
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/common.c
-@@ -115,6 +115,20 @@ establish_contexts(gss_OID imech, gss_cred_id_t icred, gss_cred_id_t acred,
-                    gss_name_t tname, OM_uint32 flags, gss_ctx_id_t *ictx,
-                    gss_ctx_id_t *actx, gss_name_t *src_name, gss_OID *amech,
-                    gss_cred_id_t *deleg_cred)
-+{
-+    return establish_contexts_ex(imech, icred, acred, tname, flags, ictx, actx,
-+                                 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
-+                                 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, NULL, src_name,
-+                                 amech, deleg_cred);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+establish_contexts_ex(gss_OID imech, gss_cred_id_t icred, gss_cred_id_t acred,
-+                      gss_name_t tname, OM_uint32 flags, gss_ctx_id_t *ictx,
-+                      gss_ctx_id_t *actx, gss_channel_bindings_t icb,
-+                      gss_channel_bindings_t acb, OM_uint32 *aret_flags,
-+                      gss_name_t *src_name, gss_OID *amech,
-+                      gss_cred_id_t *deleg_cred)
- {
-     OM_uint32 minor, imaj, amaj;
-     gss_buffer_desc itok, atok;
-@@ -126,17 +140,16 @@ establish_contexts(gss_OID imech, gss_cred_id_t icred, gss_cred_id_t acred,
-     for (;;) {
-         (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &itok);
-         imaj = gss_init_sec_context(&minor, icred, ictx, tname, imech, flags,
--                                    GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
--                                    GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &atok, NULL,
--                                    &itok, NULL, NULL);
-+                                    GSS_C_INDEFINITE, icb, &atok, NULL, &itok,
-+                                    NULL, NULL);
-         check_gsserr("gss_init_sec_context", imaj, minor);
-         if (amaj == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-             break;
- 
-         (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &atok);
--        amaj = gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, actx, acred, &itok,
--                                      GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, src_name,
--                                      amech, &atok, NULL, NULL, deleg_cred);
-+        amaj = gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, actx, acred, &itok, acb,
-+                                      src_name, amech, &atok, aret_flags, NULL,
-+                                      deleg_cred);
-         check_gsserr("gss_accept_sec_context", amaj, minor);
-         (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &itok);
-         if (imaj == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/common.h b/src/tests/gssapi/common.h
-index ae11b51d4..a5c8f87e6 100644
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/common.h
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/common.h
-@@ -62,6 +62,15 @@ void establish_contexts(gss_OID imech, gss_cred_id_t icred,
-                         gss_name_t *src_name, gss_OID *amech,
-                         gss_cred_id_t *deleg_cred);
- 
-+/* Establish contexts with channel bindings. */
-+void establish_contexts_ex(gss_OID imech, gss_cred_id_t icred,
-+                           gss_cred_id_t acred, gss_name_t tname,
-+                           OM_uint32 flags, gss_ctx_id_t *ictx,
-+                           gss_ctx_id_t *actx, gss_channel_bindings_t icb,
-+                           gss_channel_bindings_t acb, OM_uint32 *aret_flags,
-+                           gss_name_t *src_name, gss_OID *amech,
-+                           gss_cred_id_t *deleg_cred);
-+
- /* Export *cred to a token, then release *cred and replace it by re-importing
-  * the token. */
- void export_import_cred(gss_cred_id_t *cred);
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/deps b/src/tests/gssapi/deps
-index acd0e96f8..73e4d9a74 100644
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/deps
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/deps
-@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ $(OUTPRE)t_add_cred.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi.h \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi_ext.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/krb5/krb5.h $(COM_ERR_DEPS) $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5.h \
-   common.h t_add_cred.c
-+$(OUTPRE)t_bindings.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi.h \
-+  $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi_ext.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h \
-+  $(BUILDTOP)/include/krb5/krb5.h $(COM_ERR_DEPS) $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5.h \
-+  common.h t_bindings.c
- $(OUTPRE)t_ccselect.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi.h \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi_ext.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h \
-   $(BUILDTOP)/include/krb5/krb5.h $(COM_ERR_DEPS) $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5.h \
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.c b/src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..e8906715b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
-+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2020 by Red Hat, Inc.
-+ * All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ *   the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ *   distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
-+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
-+ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-+ * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
-+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <assert.h>
-+
-+#include "common.h"
-+
-+/*
-+ * Establish contexts (without and with GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) with the default
-+ * initiator name, a specified principal name as target name, initiator
-+ * bindings, and acceptor bindings.  If any call is unsuccessful, display an
-+ * error message.  Output "yes" or "no" to indicate whether the contexts were
-+ * reported as channel-bound on the acceptor.  Exit with status 0 if all
-+ * operations are successful, or 1 if not.
-+ *
-+ * Usage: ./t_bindings [-s] targetname icb acb
-+ *
-+ * An icb or abc value of "-" will not specify channel bindings.
-+ */
-+
-+int
-+main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+    OM_uint32 minor, flags1, flags2;
-+    gss_name_t target_name;
-+    gss_ctx_id_t ictx, actx;
-+    struct gss_channel_bindings_struct icb_data = {0}, acb_data = {0};
-+    gss_channel_bindings_t icb = GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
-+    gss_channel_bindings_t acb = GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
-+    gss_OID_desc *mech;
-+
-+    argv++;
-+    argc--;
-+    if (*argv != NULL && strcmp(*argv, "-s") == 0) {
-+        mech = &mech_spnego;
-+        argv++;
-+        argc--;
-+    } else {
-+        mech = &mech_krb5;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (argc != 3) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: t_bindings [-s] targetname icb acb\n");
-+        return 1;
-+    }
-+
-+    target_name = import_name(argv[0]);
-+
-+    if (strcmp(argv[1], "-") != 0) {
-+        icb_data.application_data.length = strlen(argv[1]);
-+        icb_data.application_data.value = argv[1];
-+        icb = &icb_data;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (strcmp(argv[2], "-") != 0) {
-+        acb_data.application_data.length = strlen(argv[2]);
-+        acb_data.application_data.value = argv[2];
-+        acb = &acb_data;
-+    }
-+
-+    establish_contexts_ex(mech, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+                          target_name, 0, &ictx, &actx, icb, acb, &flags1,
-+                          NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+    /* Try again with GSS_C_DCE_STYLE */
-+    (void)gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &ictx, NULL);
-+    (void)gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &actx, NULL);
-+
-+    establish_contexts_ex(mech, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+                          target_name, GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, &ictx, &actx, icb, acb,
-+                          &flags2, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+    assert((flags1 & GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG) ==
-+           (flags2 & GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG));
-+    printf("%s\n", (flags1 & GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG) ? "yes" : "no");
-+
-+    (void)gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &ictx, NULL);
-+    (void)gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &actx, NULL);
-+    (void)gss_release_name(&minor, &target_name);
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.py
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..f377977b6
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_bindings.py
-@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
-+from k5test import *
-+
-+realm = K5Realm()
-+server = 'p:' + realm.host_princ
-+
-+mark('krb5 channel bindings')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, '-', '-'], expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, 'a', '-'], expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, 'a', 'a'], expected_msg='yes')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, '-', 'a'], expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, 'a', 'x'],
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Incorrect channel bindings')
-+
-+mark('SPNEGO channel bindings')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, '-', '-'], expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, 'a', '-'], expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, 'a', 'a'], expected_msg='yes')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, '-', 'a'], expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, 'a', 'x'],
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Incorrect channel bindings')
-+
-+client_aware_conf = {'libdefaults': {'client_aware_channel_bindings': 'true'}}
-+e = realm.special_env('cb_aware', False, krb5_conf=client_aware_conf)
-+
-+mark('krb5 client_aware_channel_bindings')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, '-', '-'], env=e, expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, 'a', '-'], env=e, expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, 'a', 'a'], env=e, expected_msg='yes')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, '-', 'a'], env=e,
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Incorrect channel bindings')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', server, 'a', 'x'], env=e,
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Incorrect channel bindings')
-+
-+mark('SPNEGO client_aware_channel_bindings')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, '-', '-'], env=e, expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, 'a', '-'], env=e, expected_msg='no')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, 'a', 'a'], env=e, expected_msg='yes')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, '-', 'a'], env=e,
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Incorrect channel bindings')
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', server, 'a', 'x'], env=e,
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Incorrect channel bindings')
-+
-+success('channel bindings tests')
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_negoex.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_negoex.py
-index 88470d2fa..a218899c4 100644
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_negoex.py
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_negoex.py
-@@ -139,4 +139,11 @@ msgs = ('sending [3]AP_REQUEST', 'sending [7]CHALLENGE', 'sending [8]VERIFY',
-         'sending [11]CHALLENGE', 'sending [12]VERIFY', 'sending [13]VERIFY')
- test({'HOPS': '4', 'KEY': 'accept-always'}, expected_trace=())
- 
-+mark('channel bindings')
-+e = realm.env.copy()
-+e.update({'HOPS': '1', 'GSS_INIT_BINDING': 'a', 'GSS_ACCEPT_BINDING': 'b'})
-+# The test mech will verify that the bindings are communicated to the
-+# mech, but does not set the channel-bound flag.
-+realm.run(['./t_bindings', '-s', 'h:host', 'a', 'b'], env=e, expected_msg='no')
-+
- success('NegoEx tests')

Add-client_aware_channel_bindings-option.patch

@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-From 46ec975eb8f33b6d42c440758fc0deb826f87313 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 13:13:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add client_aware_channel_bindings option
-
-Add client support for KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT in the form of a profile
-option "client_aware_gss_bindings".  Adjust the make_etype_list()
-helper so that enctype negotiation and AP_OPTIONS can be included in
-the same IF-RELEVANT wrapper.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: refactored; edited documentation; wrote commit
-message]
-
-ticket: 8900
-(cherry picked from commit 225e6ef7f021cd1a8ef2a054af0ca58b7288fd81)
----
- doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst |   6 +
- src/include/k5-int.h               |   1 +
- src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_req_ext.c      | 177 +++++++++++++++--------------
- 3 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-index 38f450367..da5ad00f2 100644
---- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
-     credentials will fail if the client machine does not have a
-     keytab.  The default value is false.
- 
-+**client_aware_channel_bindings**
-+    If this flag is true, then all application protocol authentication
-+    requests will be flagged to indicate that the application supports
-+    channel bindings when operating over a secure channel.  The
-+    default value is false.
-+
- .. _realms:
- 
- [realms]
-diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
-index 0d9af3d95..eb18a4cd6 100644
---- a/src/include/k5-int.h
-+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
-@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ typedef unsigned char   u_char;
- #define KRB5_CONF_V4_INSTANCE_CONVERT          "v4_instance_convert"
- #define KRB5_CONF_V4_REALM                     "v4_realm"
- #define KRB5_CONF_VERIFY_AP_REQ_NOFAIL         "verify_ap_req_nofail"
-+#define KRB5_CONF_CLIENT_AWARE_GSS_BINDINGS    "client_aware_channel_bindings"
- 
- /* Cache configuration variables */
- #define KRB5_CC_CONF_FAST_AVAIL                "fast_avail"
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_req_ext.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_req_ext.c
-index 9fc6a0e52..08504860c 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_req_ext.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_req_ext.c
-@@ -68,10 +68,9 @@
- */
- 
- static krb5_error_code
--make_etype_list(krb5_context context,
--                krb5_enctype *desired_etypes,
--                krb5_enctype tkt_enctype,
--                krb5_authdata ***authdata);
-+make_ap_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype *desired_enctypes,
-+                 krb5_enctype tkt_enctype, krb5_boolean client_aware_cb,
-+                 krb5_authdata ***authdata_out);
- 
- static krb5_error_code
- generate_authenticator(krb5_context,
-@@ -263,7 +262,8 @@ generate_authenticator(krb5_context context, krb5_authenticator *authent,
-                        krb5_enctype tkt_enctype)
- {
-     krb5_error_code retval;
--    krb5_authdata **ext_authdata = NULL;
-+    krb5_authdata **ext_authdata = NULL, **ap_authdata, **combined;
-+    int client_aware_cb;
- 
-     authent->client = client;
-     authent->checksum = cksum;
-@@ -297,99 +297,104 @@ generate_authenticator(krb5_context context, krb5_authenticator *authent,
-         krb5_free_authdata(context, ext_authdata);
-     }
- 
--    /* Only send EtypeList if we prefer another enctype to tkt_enctype */
--    if (desired_etypes != NULL && desired_etypes[0] != tkt_enctype) {
--        TRACE_MK_REQ_ETYPES(context, desired_etypes);
--        retval = make_etype_list(context, desired_etypes, tkt_enctype,
--                                 &authent->authorization_data);
-+    retval = profile_get_boolean(context->profile, KRB5_CONF_LIBDEFAULTS,
-+                                 KRB5_CONF_CLIENT_AWARE_GSS_BINDINGS, NULL,
-+                                 FALSE, &client_aware_cb);
-+    if (retval)
-+        return retval;
-+
-+    /* Add etype negotiation or channel-binding awareness authdata to the
-+     * front, if appropriate. */
-+    retval = make_ap_authdata(context, desired_etypes, tkt_enctype,
-+                              client_aware_cb, &ap_authdata);
-+    if (retval)
-+        return retval;
-+    if (ap_authdata != NULL) {
-+        retval = krb5_merge_authdata(context, ap_authdata,
-+                                     authent->authorization_data, &combined);
-+        krb5_free_authdata(context, ap_authdata);
-         if (retval)
-             return retval;
-+        krb5_free_authdata(context, authent->authorization_data);
-+        authent->authorization_data = combined;
-     }
- 
-     return(krb5_us_timeofday(context, &authent->ctime, &authent->cusec));
- }
- 
--/* RFC 4537 */
-+/* Set *out to a DER-encoded RFC 4537 etype list, or to NULL if no etype list
-+ * should be sent. */
- static krb5_error_code
--make_etype_list(krb5_context context,
--                krb5_enctype *desired_etypes,
--                krb5_enctype tkt_enctype,
--                krb5_authdata ***authdata)
-+make_etype_list(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype *desired_enctypes,
-+                krb5_enctype tkt_enctype, krb5_data **out)
- {
--    krb5_error_code code;
--    krb5_etype_list etypes;
--    krb5_data *enc_etype_list;
--    krb5_data *ad_if_relevant;
--    krb5_authdata *etype_adata[2], etype_adatum, **adata;
--    int i;
-+    krb5_etype_list etlist;
-+    int count;
- 
--    etypes.etypes = desired_etypes;
-+    *out = NULL;
- 
--    for (etypes.length = 0;
--         etypes.etypes[etypes.length] != ENCTYPE_NULL;
--         etypes.length++)
--    {
--        /*
--         * RFC 4537:
--         *
--         *   If the enctype of the ticket session key is included in the enctype
--         *   list sent by the client, it SHOULD be the last on the list;
--         */
--        if (etypes.length && etypes.etypes[etypes.length - 1] == tkt_enctype)
-+    /* Only send a list if we prefer another enctype to tkt_enctype. */
-+    if (desired_enctypes == NULL || desired_enctypes[0] == tkt_enctype)
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    /* Count elements of desired_etypes, stopping at tkt_enctypes if present.
-+     * (Per RFC 4537, it must be the last option if it is included.) */
-+    for (count = 0; desired_enctypes[count] != ENCTYPE_NULL; count++) {
-+        if (count > 0 && desired_enctypes[count - 1] == tkt_enctype)
-             break;
-     }
- 
--    code = encode_krb5_etype_list(&etypes, &enc_etype_list);
--    if (code) {
--        return code;
--    }
--
--    etype_adatum.magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA;
--    etype_adatum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION;
--    etype_adatum.length = enc_etype_list->length;
--    etype_adatum.contents = (krb5_octet *)enc_etype_list->data;
--
--    etype_adata[0] = &etype_adatum;
--    etype_adata[1] = NULL;
--
--    /* Wrap in AD-IF-RELEVANT container */
--    code = encode_krb5_authdata(etype_adata, &ad_if_relevant);
--    if (code) {
--        krb5_free_data(context, enc_etype_list);
--        return code;
--    }
--
--    krb5_free_data(context, enc_etype_list);
--
--    adata = *authdata;
--    if (adata == NULL) {
--        adata = (krb5_authdata **)calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_authdata *));
--        i = 0;
--    } else {
--        for (i = 0; adata[i] != NULL; i++)
--            ;
--
--        adata = (krb5_authdata **)realloc(*authdata,
--                                          (i + 2) * sizeof(krb5_authdata *));
--    }
--    if (adata == NULL) {
--        krb5_free_data(context, ad_if_relevant);
--        return ENOMEM;
--    }
--    *authdata = adata;
--
--    adata[i] = (krb5_authdata *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_authdata));
--    if (adata[i] == NULL) {
--        krb5_free_data(context, ad_if_relevant);
--        return ENOMEM;
--    }
--    adata[i]->magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA;
--    adata[i]->ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
--    adata[i]->length = ad_if_relevant->length;
--    adata[i]->contents = (krb5_octet *)ad_if_relevant->data;
--    free(ad_if_relevant); /* contents owned by adata[i] */
--
--    adata[i + 1] = NULL;
--
--    return 0;
-+    etlist.etypes = desired_enctypes;
-+    etlist.length = count;
-+    return encode_krb5_etype_list(&etlist, out);
-+}
-+
-+/* Set *authdata_out to appropriate authenticator authdata for the request,
-+ * encoded in a single AD_IF_RELEVANT element. */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+make_ap_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype *desired_enctypes,
-+                 krb5_enctype tkt_enctype, krb5_boolean client_aware_cb,
-+                 krb5_authdata ***authdata_out)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_authdata etypes_ad, flags_ad, *list[3];
-+    krb5_data *der_etypes = NULL;
-+    size_t count = 0;
-+    uint8_t flagbuf[4];
-+    const uint32_t KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT = 0x4000;
-+
-+    *authdata_out = NULL;
-+
-+    /* Include an ETYPE_NEGOTIATION element if appropriate. */
-+    ret = make_etype_list(context, desired_enctypes, tkt_enctype, &der_etypes);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    if (der_etypes != NULL) {
-+        etypes_ad.magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA;
-+        etypes_ad.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION;
-+        etypes_ad.length = der_etypes->length;
-+        etypes_ad.contents = (uint8_t *)der_etypes->data;
-+        list[count++] = &etypes_ad;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Include an AP_OPTIONS element if the CBT flag is configured. */
-+    if (client_aware_cb != 0) {
-+        store_32_le(KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT, flagbuf);
-+        flags_ad.magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA;
-+        flags_ad.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_AP_OPTIONS;
-+        flags_ad.length = 4;
-+        flags_ad.contents = flagbuf;
-+        list[count++] = &flags_ad;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (count > 0) {
-+        list[count] = NULL;
-+        ret = krb5_encode_authdata_container(context,
-+                                             KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
-+                                             list, authdata_out);
-+    }
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    krb5_free_data(context, der_etypes);
-+    return ret;
- }

Add-finalization-safety-check-to-com_err.patch

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From 96a36ef54aecb48b71c1ae0cc85b83ef644c3bd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jiri Sasek <Jiri.Sasek@Oracle.COM>
-Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2020 19:02:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add finalization safety check to com_err
-
-If the linker erroneously runs the libkrb5 finalizer after the
-libcom_err finalizer, the consequent remove_error_table() calls could
-crash due to accessing a destroyed mutex or an invalid et_list
-pointer.  Add an unsynchronized check on finalized in
-remove_error_table(), and set et_list to null in com_err_terminate()
-after destroying the list.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: minimized code hanges; rewrote comment and commit
-message]
-
-ticket: 8890 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 9d654aa05e26bbf22f140abde3436afeff2fdf8d)
----
- src/util/et/error_message.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/util/et/error_message.c b/src/util/et/error_message.c
-index d7069a9df..7dc02a34e 100644
---- a/src/util/et/error_message.c
-+++ b/src/util/et/error_message.c
-@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
- 
- static struct et_list *et_list;
- static k5_mutex_t et_list_lock = K5_MUTEX_PARTIAL_INITIALIZER;
--static int terminated = 0;      /* for debugging shlib fini sequence errors */
-+static int terminated = 0;      /* for safety and finalization debugging */
- 
- MAKE_INIT_FUNCTION(com_err_initialize);
- MAKE_FINI_FUNCTION(com_err_terminate);
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ void com_err_terminate(void)
-         enext = e->next;
-         free(e);
-     }
-+    et_list = NULL;
-     k5_mutex_unlock(&et_list_lock);
-     k5_mutex_destroy(&et_list_lock);
-     terminated = 1;
-@@ -280,6 +281,10 @@ remove_error_table(const struct error_table *et)
- {
-     struct et_list **ep, *e;
- 
-+    /* Safety check in case libraries are finalized in the wrong order. */
-+    if (terminated)
-+        return ENOENT;
-+
-     if (CALL_INIT_FUNCTION(com_err_initialize))
-         return 0;
-     k5_mutex_lock(&et_list_lock);

Add-recursion-limit-for-ASN.1-indefinite-lengths.patch

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-From b7aca8b57422cdc67a2d2bff385f09646ca037bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2020 17:07:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Add recursion limit for ASN.1 indefinite lengths
-
-The libkrb5 ASN.1 decoder supports BER indefinite lengths.  It
-computes the tag length using recursion; the lack of a recursion limit
-allows an attacker to overrun the stack and cause the process to
-crash.  Reported by Demi Obenour.
-
-CVE-2020-28196:
-
-In MIT krb5 releases 1.11 and later, an unauthenticated attacker can
-cause a denial of service for any client or server to which it can
-send an ASN.1-encoded Kerberos message of sufficient length.
-
-ticket: 8959 (new)
-tags: pullup
-target_version: 1.18-next
-target_version: 1.17-next
-
-(cherry picked from commit 57415dda6cf04e73ffc3723be518eddfae599bfd)
----
- src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c | 16 +++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c
-index a160cf4fe..cd6b879f7 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c
-@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ make_tag(asn1buf *buf, const taginfo *t, size_t len)
- static krb5_error_code
- get_tag(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len, taginfo *tag_out,
-         const uint8_t **contents_out, size_t *clen_out,
--        const uint8_t **remainder_out, size_t *rlen_out)
-+        const uint8_t **remainder_out, size_t *rlen_out, int recursion)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-     uint8_t o;
-@@ -394,9 +394,11 @@ get_tag(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len, taginfo *tag_out,
-         /* Indefinite form (should not be present in DER, but we accept it). */
-         if (tag_out->construction != CONSTRUCTED)
-             return ASN1_MISMATCH_INDEF;
-+        if (recursion >= 32)
-+            return ASN1_OVERFLOW;
-         p = asn1;
-         while (!(len >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0)) {
--            ret = get_tag(p, len, &t, &c, &clen, &p, &len);
-+            ret = get_tag(p, len, &t, &c, &clen, &p, &len, recursion + 1);
-             if (ret)
-                 return ret;
-         }
-@@ -613,7 +615,7 @@ split_der(asn1buf *buf, uint8_t *const *der, size_t len, taginfo *tag_out)
-     const uint8_t *contents, *remainder;
-     size_t clen, rlen;
- 
--    ret = get_tag(*der, len, tag_out, &contents, &clen, &remainder, &rlen);
-+    ret = get_tag(*der, len, tag_out, &contents, &clen, &remainder, &rlen, 0);
-     if (ret)
-         return ret;
-     if (rlen != 0)
-@@ -1199,7 +1201,7 @@ decode_atype(const taginfo *t, const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len,
-         const uint8_t *rem;
-         size_t rlen;
-         if (!tag->implicit) {
--            ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &inner_tag, &asn1, &len, &rem, &rlen);
-+            ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &inner_tag, &asn1, &len, &rem, &rlen, 0);
-             if (ret)
-                 return ret;
-             /* Note: we don't check rlen (it should be 0). */
-@@ -1420,7 +1422,7 @@ decode_sequence(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len, const struct seq_info *seq,
-     for (i = 0; i < seq->n_fields; i++) {
-         if (len == 0)
-             break;
--        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len);
-+        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len, 0);
-         if (ret)
-             goto error;
-         /*
-@@ -1478,7 +1480,7 @@ decode_sequence_of(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len,
-     *seq_out = NULL;
-     *count_out = 0;
-     while (len > 0) {
--        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len);
-+        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len, 0);
-         if (ret)
-             goto error;
-         if (!check_atype_tag(elemtype, &t)) {
-@@ -1584,7 +1586,7 @@ k5_asn1_full_decode(const krb5_data *code, const struct atype_info *a,
- 
-     *retrep = NULL;
-     ret = get_tag((uint8_t *)code->data, code->length, &t, &contents,
--                  &clen, &remainder, &rlen);
-+                  &clen, &remainder, &rlen, 0);
-     if (ret)
-         return ret;
-     /* rlen should be 0, but we don't check it (and due to padding in

Add-three-kvno-options-from-Heimdal-kgetcred.patch

@@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
-From 538d787aa7c10894cc0426f54db0d8248efcf7c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2020 20:48:38 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Add three kvno options from Heimdal kgetcred
-
-Add the flags --cached-only and --no-store, which pass the
-corresponding options to krb5_get_credentials().  Add the option
---out-cache to write the retrieved credentials to a specified output
-cache.
-
-Add a Python test script for kvno command-line options, including
-tests for the new options.
-
-ticket: 8917 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 876bab8418d7dd134c9d9db812ee2118d5ad58f0)
----
- doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst |  13 ++++
- src/clients/kvno/Makefile.in    |   3 +
- src/clients/kvno/kvno.c         | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- src/clients/kvno/t_kvno.py      |  75 +++++++++++++++++++++
- src/man/kvno.man                |  13 ++++
- 5 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 src/clients/kvno/t_kvno.py
-
-diff --git a/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst b/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst
-index 3892f0ca5..718313576 100644
---- a/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst
-+++ b/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst
-@@ -74,6 +74,19 @@ OPTIONS
-     client principal with the X.509 certificate in *cert_file*.  The
-     certificate file must be in PEM format.
- 
-+**--cached-only**
-+    Only retrieve credentials already present in the cache, not from
-+    the KDC.
-+
-+**--no-store**
-+    Do not store retrieved credentials in the cache.  If
-+    **--out-cache** is also specified, credentials will still be
-+    stored into the output credential cache.
-+
-+**--out-cache** *ccache*
-+    Initialize *ccache* and store all retrieved credentials into it.
-+    Do not store acquired credentials in the input cache.
-+
- **--u2u** *ccache*
-     Requests a user-to-user ticket.  *ccache* must contain a local
-     krbtgt ticket for the server principal.  The reported version
-diff --git a/src/clients/kvno/Makefile.in b/src/clients/kvno/Makefile.in
-index 1c3f79392..5ba877271 100644
---- a/src/clients/kvno/Makefile.in
-+++ b/src/clients/kvno/Makefile.in
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ kvno: kvno.o $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
- ##WIN32##	link $(EXE_LINKOPTS) /out:$@ $**
- ##WIN32##	$(_VC_MANIFEST_EMBED_EXE)
- 
-+check-pytests: kvno
-+	$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_kvno.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
-+
- clean-unix::
- 	$(RM) kvno.o kvno
- 
-diff --git a/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c b/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c
-index 2472c0cfe..9d85864f6 100644
---- a/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c
-+++ b/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c
-@@ -44,14 +44,17 @@ xusage()
-     fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [-C] [-u] [-c ccache] [-e etype]\n"), prog);
-     fprintf(stderr, _("\t[-k keytab] [-S sname] [{-I | -U} for_user | "
-                       "[-F cert_file] [-P]]\n"));
--    fprintf(stderr, _("\t[--u2u ccache] service1 service2 ...\n"));
-+    fprintf(stderr, _("\t[--cached-only] [--no-store] [--out-cache ccache] "
-+                      "[--u2u ccache]\n"));
-+    fprintf(stderr, _("\tservice1 service2 ...\n"));
-     exit(1);
- }
- 
- static void do_v5_kvno(int argc, char *argv[], char *ccachestr, char *etypestr,
--                       char *keytab_name, char *sname, int canon, int unknown,
--                       char *for_user, int for_user_enterprise,
--                       char *for_user_cert_file, int proxy,
-+                       char *keytab_name, char *sname, int cached_only,
-+                       int canon, int no_store, int unknown, char *for_user,
-+                       int for_user_enterprise, char *for_user_cert_file,
-+                       int proxy, const char *out_ccname,
-                        const char *u2u_ccname);
- 
- #include <com_err.h>
-@@ -61,18 +64,21 @@ static void extended_com_err_fn(const char *myprog, errcode_t code,
- int
- main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
--    enum { OPTION_U2U = 256 };
--    struct option lopts[] = {
--        { "u2u", 1, NULL, OPTION_U2U },
--        { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
--    };
-+    enum { OPTION_U2U = 256, OPTION_OUT_CACHE = 257 };
-     const char *shopts = "uCc:e:hk:qPS:I:U:F:";
-     int option;
-     char *etypestr = NULL, *ccachestr = NULL, *keytab_name = NULL;
-     char *sname = NULL, *for_user = NULL, *u2u_ccname = NULL;
--    char *for_user_cert_file = NULL;
-+    char *for_user_cert_file = NULL, *out_ccname = NULL;
-     int canon = 0, unknown = 0, proxy = 0, for_user_enterprise = 0;
--    int impersonate = 0;
-+    int impersonate = 0, cached_only = 0, no_store = 0;
-+    struct option lopts[] = {
-+        { "cached-only", 0, &cached_only, 1 },
-+        { "no-store", 0, &no_store, 1 },
-+        { "out-cache", 1, NULL, OPTION_OUT_CACHE },
-+        { "u2u", 1, NULL, OPTION_U2U },
-+        { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
-+    };
- 
-     setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
-     set_com_err_hook(extended_com_err_fn);
-@@ -135,6 +141,12 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
-         case OPTION_U2U:
-             u2u_ccname = optarg;
-             break;
-+        case OPTION_OUT_CACHE:
-+            out_ccname = optarg;
-+            break;
-+        case 0:
-+            /* If this option set a flag, do nothing else now. */
-+            break;
-         default:
-             xusage();
-             break;
-@@ -159,8 +171,9 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
-         xusage();
- 
-     do_v5_kvno(argc - optind, argv + optind, ccachestr, etypestr, keytab_name,
--               sname, canon, unknown, for_user, for_user_enterprise,
--               for_user_cert_file, proxy, u2u_ccname);
-+               sname, cached_only, canon, no_store, unknown, for_user,
-+               for_user_enterprise, for_user_cert_file, proxy, out_ccname,
-+               u2u_ccname);
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -274,14 +287,16 @@ static krb5_error_code
- kvno(const char *name, krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_principal me,
-      krb5_enctype etype, krb5_keytab keytab, const char *sname,
-      krb5_flags options, int unknown, krb5_principal for_user_princ,
--     krb5_data *for_user_cert, int proxy, krb5_data *u2u_ticket)
-+     krb5_data *for_user_cert, int proxy, krb5_data *u2u_ticket,
-+     krb5_creds **creds_out)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-     krb5_principal server = NULL;
-     krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
--    krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds = NULL;
-+    krb5_creds in_creds, *creds = NULL;
-     char *princ = NULL;
- 
-+    *creds_out = NULL;
-     memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds));
- 
-     if (sname != NULL) {
-@@ -321,13 +336,12 @@ kvno(const char *name, krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_principal me,
-         in_creds.client = for_user_princ;
-         in_creds.server = me;
-         ret = krb5_get_credentials_for_user(context, options, ccache,
--                                            &in_creds, for_user_cert,
--                                            &out_creds);
-+                                            &in_creds, for_user_cert, &creds);
-     } else {
-         in_creds.client = me;
-         in_creds.server = server;
-         ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, options, ccache, &in_creds,
--                                   &out_creds);
-+                                   &creds);
-     }
- 
-     if (ret) {
-@@ -336,7 +350,7 @@ kvno(const char *name, krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_principal me,
-     }
- 
-     /* We need a native ticket. */
--    ret = krb5_decode_ticket(&out_creds->ticket, &ticket);
-+    ret = krb5_decode_ticket(&creds->ticket, &ticket);
-     if (ret) {
-         com_err(prog, ret, _("while decoding ticket for %s"), princ);
-         goto cleanup;
-@@ -362,15 +376,15 @@ kvno(const char *name, krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_principal me,
-     }
- 
-     if (proxy) {
--        in_creds.client = out_creds->client;
--        out_creds->client = NULL;
--        krb5_free_creds(context, out_creds);
--        out_creds = NULL;
-+        in_creds.client = creds->client;
-+        creds->client = NULL;
-+        krb5_free_creds(context, creds);
-+        creds = NULL;
-         in_creds.server = server;
- 
-         ret = krb5_get_credentials_for_proxy(context, KRB5_GC_CANONICALIZE,
-                                              ccache, &in_creds, ticket,
--                                             &out_creds);
-+                                             &creds);
-         krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.client);
-         if (ret) {
-             com_err(prog, ret, _("%s: constrained delegation failed"),
-@@ -379,10 +393,13 @@ kvno(const char *name, krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_principal me,
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    *creds_out = creds;
-+    creds = NULL;
-+
- cleanup:
-     krb5_free_principal(context, server);
-     krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
--    krb5_free_creds(context, out_creds);
-+    krb5_free_creds(context, creds);
-     krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, princ);
-     return ret;
- }
-@@ -428,19 +445,28 @@ cleanup:
- 
- static void
- do_v5_kvno(int count, char *names[], char * ccachestr, char *etypestr,
--           char *keytab_name, char *sname, int canon, int unknown,
--           char *for_user, int for_user_enterprise,
--           char *for_user_cert_file, int proxy, const char *u2u_ccname)
-+           char *keytab_name, char *sname, int cached_only, int canon,
-+           int no_store, int unknown, char *for_user, int for_user_enterprise,
-+           char *for_user_cert_file, int proxy, const char *out_ccname,
-+           const char *u2u_ccname)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
--    int i, errors, flags;
-+    int i, errors, flags, initialized = 0;
-     krb5_enctype etype;
--    krb5_ccache ccache;
-+    krb5_ccache ccache, out_ccache = NULL;
-     krb5_principal me;
-     krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
-     krb5_principal for_user_princ = NULL;
--    krb5_flags options = canon ? KRB5_GC_CANONICALIZE : 0;
-+    krb5_flags options = 0;
-     krb5_data cert_data = empty_data(), *user_cert = NULL, *u2u_ticket = NULL;
-+    krb5_creds *creds;
-+
-+    if (canon)
-+        options |= KRB5_GC_CANONICALIZE;
-+    if (cached_only)
-+        options |= KRB5_GC_CACHED;
-+    if (no_store || out_ccname != NULL)
-+        options |= KRB5_GC_NO_STORE;
- 
-     ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
-     if (ret) {
-@@ -467,6 +493,14 @@ do_v5_kvno(int count, char *names[], char * ccachestr, char *etypestr,
-         exit(1);
-     }
- 
-+    if (out_ccname != NULL) {
-+        ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, out_ccname, &out_ccache);
-+        if (ret) {
-+            com_err(prog, ret, _("while resolving output ccache"));
-+            exit(1);
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-     if (keytab_name != NULL) {
-         ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_name, &keytab);
-         if (ret) {
-@@ -513,8 +547,25 @@ do_v5_kvno(int count, char *names[], char * ccachestr, char *etypestr,
-     errors = 0;
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-         if (kvno(names[i], ccache, me, etype, keytab, sname, options, unknown,
--                 for_user_princ, user_cert, proxy, u2u_ticket) != 0)
-+                 for_user_princ, user_cert, proxy, u2u_ticket, &creds) != 0) {
-             errors++;
-+        } else if (out_ccache != NULL) {
-+            if (!initialized) {
-+                ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, out_ccache, creds->client);
-+                if (ret) {
-+                    com_err(prog, ret, _("while initializing output ccache"));
-+                    exit(1);
-+                }
-+                initialized = 1;
-+            }
-+            ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, out_ccache, creds);
-+            if (ret) {
-+                com_err(prog, ret, _("while storing creds in output ccache"));
-+                exit(1);
-+            }
-+        }
-+
-+        krb5_free_creds(context, creds);
-     }
- 
-     if (keytab != NULL)
-diff --git a/src/clients/kvno/t_kvno.py b/src/clients/kvno/t_kvno.py
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..e98b90e8a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/clients/kvno/t_kvno.py
-@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
-+from k5test import *
-+
-+realm = K5Realm()
-+
-+def check_cache(ccache, expected_services):
-+    # Fetch the klist output and skip past the header.
-+    lines = realm.run([klist, '-c', ccache]).splitlines()
-+    lines = lines[4:]
-+
-+    # For each line not beginning with an indent, match against the
-+    # expected service principals.
-+    svcs = {x: True for x in expected_services}
-+    for l in lines:
-+        if not l.startswith('\t'):
-+            svcprinc = l.split()[4]
-+            if svcprinc in svcs:
-+                del svcs[svcprinc]
-+            else:
-+                fail('unexpected service princ ' + svcprinc)
-+
-+    if svcs:
-+        fail('services not found in klist output: ' + ' '.join(svcs.keys()))
-+
-+
-+mark('no options')
-+realm.run([kvno, realm.user_princ], expected_msg='user@KRBTEST.COM: kvno = 1')
-+check_cache(realm.ccache, [realm.krbtgt_princ, realm.user_princ])
-+
-+mark('-e')
-+msgs = ('etypes requested in TGS request: camellia128-cts',
-+        '/KDC has no support for encryption type')
-+realm.run([kvno, '-e', 'camellia128-cts', realm.host_princ],
-+          expected_code=1, expected_trace=msgs)
-+
-+mark('--cached-only')
-+realm.run([kvno, '--cached-only', realm.user_princ], expected_msg='kvno = 1')
-+realm.run([kvno, '--cached-only', realm.host_princ],
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Matching credential not found')
-+check_cache(realm.ccache, [realm.krbtgt_princ, realm.user_princ])
-+
-+mark('--no-store')
-+realm.run([kvno, '--no-store', realm.host_princ], expected_msg='kvno = 1')
-+check_cache(realm.ccache, [realm.krbtgt_princ, realm.user_princ])
-+
-+mark('--out-cache') # and multiple services
-+out_ccache = os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'ccache.out')
-+realm.run([kvno, '--out-cache', out_ccache,
-+           realm.host_princ, realm.admin_princ])
-+check_cache(realm.ccache, [realm.krbtgt_princ, realm.user_princ])
-+check_cache(out_ccache, [realm.host_princ, realm.admin_princ])
-+
-+mark('--out-cache --cached-only') # tests out-cache overwriting, and -q
-+realm.run([kvno, '--out-cache', out_ccache, '--cached-only', realm.host_princ],
-+          expected_code=1, expected_msg='Matching credential not found')
-+out = realm.run([kvno, '-q', '--out-cache', out_ccache, '--cached-only',
-+                 realm.user_princ])
-+if out:
-+    fail('unexpected kvno output with -q')
-+check_cache(out_ccache, [realm.user_princ])
-+
-+mark('-U') # and -c
-+svc_ccache = os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'ccache.svc')
-+realm.run([kinit, '-k', '-c', svc_ccache, realm.host_princ])
-+realm.run([kvno, '-c', svc_ccache, '-U', 'user', realm.host_princ])
-+realm.run([klist, '-c', svc_ccache], expected_msg='for client user@')
-+realm.run([kvno, '-c', svc_ccache, '-U', 'user', '--out-cache', out_ccache,
-+           realm.host_princ])
-+out = realm.run([klist, '-c', out_ccache])
-+if ('Default principal: user@KRBTEST.COM' not in out):
-+    fail('wrong default principal in klist output')
-+
-+# More S4U options are tested in tests/gssapi/t_s4u.py.
-+# --u2u is tested in tests/t_u2u.py.
-+
-+success('kvno tests')
-diff --git a/src/man/kvno.man b/src/man/kvno.man
-index 005a2ec97..b9f6739eb 100644
---- a/src/man/kvno.man
-+++ b/src/man/kvno.man
-@@ -95,6 +95,19 @@ Specifies that protocol transition is to be used, identifying the
- client principal with the X.509 certificate in \fIcert_file\fP\&.  The
- certificate file must be in PEM format.
- .TP
-+\fB\-\-cached\-only\fP
-+Only retrieve credentials already present in the cache, not from
-+the KDC.
-+.TP
-+\fB\-\-no\-store\fP
-+Do not store retrieved credentials in the cache.  If
-+\fB\-\-out\-cache\fP is also specified, credentials will still be
-+stored into the output credential cache.
-+.TP
-+\fB\-\-out\-cache\fP \fIccache\fP
-+Initialize \fIccache\fP and store all retrieved credentials into it.
-+Do not store acquired credentials in the input cache.
-+.TP
- \fB\-\-u2u\fP \fIccache\fP
- Requests a user\-to\-user ticket.  \fIccache\fP must contain a local
- krbtgt ticket for the server principal.  The reported version

Adjust-KDC-alias-helper-function-contract.patch

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-From 758f5031fe9d6c1e3eb33818bc6d57cf8b4a3a72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 01:11:39 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Adjust KDC alias helper function contract
-
-Change the name of is_client_alias() to is_client_db_alias(), and
-change the contract so that the already-canonical principal name comes
-from a DB entry (which is less flexible, but clearer since DB entries
-always contain canonical principal names).  Make the function
-available outside of kdc_util.c.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: clarified commit message]
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9fb5f572dd6ce808b234cb60a573eac48136d7ca)
----
- src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 14 +++++++-------
- src/kdc/kdc_util.h |  4 ++++
- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-index dcb2df8dc..6330387d0 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-@@ -1463,10 +1463,10 @@ cleanup:
-     return code;
- }
- 
--/* Return true if princ canonicalizes to the same principal as canon. */
--static krb5_boolean
--is_client_alias(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal canon,
--                krb5_const_principal princ)
-+/* Return true if princ canonicalizes to the same principal as entry's. */
-+krb5_boolean
-+is_client_db_alias(krb5_context context, const krb5_db_entry *entry,
-+                   krb5_const_principal princ)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-     krb5_db_entry *self;
-@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ is_client_alias(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal canon,
-     ret = krb5_db_get_principal(context, princ,
-                                 KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY, &self);
-     if (!ret) {
--        is_self = krb5_principal_compare(context, canon, self->princ);
-+        is_self = krb5_principal_compare(context, entry->princ, self->princ);
-         krb5_db_free_principal(context, self);
-     }
- 
-@@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
- 
-     /* If the server is local, check that the request is for self. */
-     if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ISSUING_REFERRAL) &&
--        !is_client_alias(kdc_context, server->princ, client_princ)) {
-+        !is_client_db_alias(kdc_context, server, client_princ)) {
-         *status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST_SERVER_MISMATCH";
-         return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error */
-     }
-@@ -1728,7 +1728,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, unsigned int flags,
-         }
- 
-         client_princ = *stkt_authdata_client;
--    } else if (!is_client_alias(kdc_context, server->princ, server_princ)) {
-+    } else if (!is_client_db_alias(kdc_context, server, server_princ)) {
-         *status = "EVIDENCE_TICKET_MISMATCH";
-         return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
-     }
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-index 384b21ad2..2c9d8cf69 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-@@ -344,6 +344,10 @@ log_tgs_badtrans(krb5_context ctx, krb5_principal cprinc,
- void
- log_tgs_alt_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p);
- 
-+krb5_boolean
-+is_client_db_alias(krb5_context context, const krb5_db_entry *entry,
-+                   krb5_const_principal princ);
-+
- /* FAST*/
- enum krb5_fast_kdc_flags {
-     KRB5_FAST_REPLY_KEY_USED = 0x1,

Allow-aliases-when-matching-U2U-second-ticket.patch

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-From ccc5b9663e229f20421c01836aa5ecb06f1f2a48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 01:17:11 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Allow aliases when matching U2U second ticket
-
-In process_tgs_req() when verifying the user-to-user second ticket,
-compare the canonical names of the request server and the second
-ticket client.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: expanded commit message; trimmed tests]
-
-ticket: 8951 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit afc494ef9418e6be7fbb887364efa6606b10034a)
----
- src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c |  2 +-
- src/tests/t_u2u.py   | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-index 463a9c0dd..74cd19e96 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *pkt,
-          */
-         krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
-         krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
--        if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
-+        if (!is_client_db_alias(kdc_context, server, client2)) {
-             altcprinc = client2;
-             errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
-             status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
-diff --git a/src/tests/t_u2u.py b/src/tests/t_u2u.py
-index 1ca6ac87e..4b8a82a2f 100644
---- a/src/tests/t_u2u.py
-+++ b/src/tests/t_u2u.py
-@@ -32,4 +32,29 @@ realm.run([kvno, '--u2u', realm.ccache, realm.user_princ])
- 
- realm.run([klist])
- 
-+realm.stop()
-+
-+# Load the test KDB module to test aliases
-+testprincs = {'krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM': {'keys': 'aes128-cts'},
-+              'user': {'keys': 'aes128-cts', 'flags': '+preauth'},
-+              'WIN10': {'keys': 'aes128-cts'}}
-+kdcconf = {'realms': {'$realm': {'database_module': 'test'}},
-+           'dbmodules': {'test': {'db_library': 'test',
-+                                  'princs': testprincs,
-+                                  'alias': {'HOST/win10': 'WIN10'}}}}
-+
-+realm = K5Realm(kdc_conf=kdcconf, create_kdb=False)
-+realm.start_kdc()
-+
-+# Create a second user principal and get tickets for it.
-+u2u_ccache = 'FILE:' + os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'ccu2u')
-+realm.extract_keytab('WIN10', realm.keytab)
-+realm.kinit('WIN10', None, ['-k', '-c', u2u_ccache])
-+
-+realm.extract_keytab(realm.user_princ, realm.keytab)
-+realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, None, ['-k'])
-+
-+realm.run([kvno, '--u2u', u2u_ccache, 'HOST/win10'], expected_msg='kvno = 0')
-+realm.run([kvno, '--u2u', u2u_ccache, 'WIN10'], expected_msg='kvno = 0')
-+
- success('user-to-user tests')

Allow-certauth-modules-to-set-hw-authent-flag.patch

@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-From 5b62f6f6a960e5a428a39a3e83e0a16dba5a914a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 15:58:59 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Allow certauth modules to set hw-authent flag
-
-In PKINIT, if a certauth module returns KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH from its
-authorize method, set the hw-authent flag in the ticket.
-
-ticket: 8879 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 50fb43b4a2d97ce2cd53e1ced30e8e8224fede70)
----
- doc/plugindev/certauth.rst              |  7 +++++--
- src/include/krb5/certauth_plugin.h      |  9 ++++++---
- src/lib/krb5/error_tables/k5e1_err.et   |  1 +
- src/plugins/certauth/test/Makefile.in   |  4 ++--
- src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c        | 11 +++++++++--
- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
- src/tests/t_certauth.py                 | 13 +++++++++++++
- 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/plugindev/certauth.rst b/doc/plugindev/certauth.rst
-index 8a7f7c5eb..3b715f738 100644
---- a/doc/plugindev/certauth.rst
-+++ b/doc/plugindev/certauth.rst
-@@ -15,8 +15,11 @@ principal.  **authorize** receives the DER-encoded certificate, the
- requested client principal, and a pointer to the client's
- krb5_db_entry (for modules that link against libkdb5).  It returns the
- authorization status and optionally outputs a list of authentication
--indicator strings to be added to the ticket.  A module must use its
--own internal or library-provided ASN.1 certificate decoder.
-+indicator strings to be added to the ticket.  Beginning in release
-+1.19, the authorize method can request that the hardware
-+authentication bit be set in the ticket by returning
-+**KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH**.  A module must use its own internal or
-+library-provided ASN.1 certificate decoder.
- 
- A module can optionally create and destroy module data with the
- **init** and **fini** methods.  Module data objects last for the
-diff --git a/src/include/krb5/certauth_plugin.h b/src/include/krb5/certauth_plugin.h
-index 3074790f8..3466cf345 100644
---- a/src/include/krb5/certauth_plugin.h
-+++ b/src/include/krb5/certauth_plugin.h
-@@ -85,14 +85,17 @@ typedef void
- (*krb5_certauth_fini_fn)(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata);
- 
- /*
-- * Mandatory:
-- * Return 0 if the DER-encoded cert is authorized for PKINIT authentication by
-- * princ; otherwise return one of the following error codes:
-+ * Mandatory: return 0 or KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH if the DER-encoded cert is
-+ * authorized for PKINIT authentication by princ; otherwise return one of the
-+ * following error codes:
-  * - KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH - incorrect SAN value
-  * - KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE - incorrect EKU
-  * - KRB5KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH - other extension error
-  * - KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE - the module has no opinion about cert
-  *
-+ * Returning KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH will cause the hw-authent flag to be set in
-+ * the issued ticket (new in release 1.19).
-+ *
-  * - opts is used by built-in modules to receive internal data, and must be
-  *   ignored by other modules.
-  * - db_entry receives the client principal database entry, and can be ignored
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/error_tables/k5e1_err.et b/src/lib/krb5/error_tables/k5e1_err.et
-index ade5caecf..abd9f3bfe 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/error_tables/k5e1_err.et
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/error_tables/k5e1_err.et
-@@ -42,4 +42,5 @@ error_code KRB5_KCM_MALFORMED_REPLY, "Malformed reply from KCM daemon"
- error_code KRB5_KCM_RPC_ERROR, "Mach RPC error communicating with KCM daemon"
- error_code KRB5_KCM_REPLY_TOO_BIG, "KCM daemon reply too big"
- error_code KRB5_KCM_NO_SERVER, "No KCM server found"
-+error_code KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH, "Authorize and set hw-authent ticket flag"
- end
-diff --git a/src/plugins/certauth/test/Makefile.in b/src/plugins/certauth/test/Makefile.in
-index d3524084c..e94c13845 100644
---- a/src/plugins/certauth/test/Makefile.in
-+++ b/src/plugins/certauth/test/Makefile.in
-@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ LIBBASE=certauth_test
- LIBMAJOR=0
- LIBMINOR=0
- RELDIR=../plugins/certauth/test
--SHLIB_EXPDEPS=$(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
--SHLIB_EXPLIBS=$(KRB5_BASE_LIBS)
-+SHLIB_EXPDEPS=$(KDB5_DEPLIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
-+SHLIB_EXPLIBS=$(KDB5_LIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_LIBS)
- 
- STLIBOBJS=main.o
- 
-diff --git a/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c b/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c
-index 77641230c..d4633b8cd 100644
---- a/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
-  */
- 
- #include <k5-int.h>
-+#include <kdb.h>
- #include "krb5/certauth_plugin.h"
- 
- struct krb5_certauth_moddata_st {
-@@ -131,7 +132,8 @@ has_cn(krb5_context context, const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
- 
- /*
-  * Test module 2 returns OK if princ matches the CN part of the subject name,
-- * and returns indicators of the module name and princ.
-+ * and returns indicators of the module name and princ.  If the "hwauth" string
-+ * attribute is set on db_entry, it returns KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH.
-  */
- static krb5_error_code
- test2_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
-@@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ test2_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
-                 char ***authinds_out)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
--    char *name = NULL, **ais = NULL;
-+    char *name = NULL, *strval = NULL, **ais = NULL;
- 
-     *authinds_out = NULL;
- 
-@@ -167,6 +169,11 @@ test2_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
- 
-     ais = NULL;
- 
-+    ret = krb5_dbe_get_string(context, (krb5_db_entry *)db_entry, "hwauth",
-+                              &strval);
-+    ret = (strval != NULL) ? KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH : 0;
-+    krb5_dbe_free_string(context, strval);
-+
- cleanup:
-     krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, name);
-     return ret;
-diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
-index feca11806..3ae56c064 100644
---- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
-@@ -320,12 +320,12 @@ static krb5_error_code
- authorize_cert(krb5_context context, certauth_handle *certauth_modules,
-                pkinit_kdc_context plgctx, pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx,
-                krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
--               krb5_principal client)
-+               krb5_principal client, krb5_boolean *hwauth_out)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-     certauth_handle h;
-     struct certauth_req_opts opts;
--    krb5_boolean accepted = FALSE;
-+    krb5_boolean accepted = FALSE, hwauth = FALSE;
-     uint8_t *cert;
-     size_t i, cert_len;
-     void *db_ent = NULL;
-@@ -347,9 +347,10 @@ authorize_cert(krb5_context context, certauth_handle *certauth_modules,
- 
-     /*
-      * Check the certificate against each certauth module.  For the certificate
--     * to be authorized at least one module must return 0, and no module can an
--     * error code other than KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE (pass).  Add indicators from
--     * modules that return 0 or pass.
-+     * to be authorized at least one module must return 0 or
-+     * KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH, and no module can return an error code other than
-+     * KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE (pass).  Add indicators from modules that return 0
-+     * or pass.
-      */
-     ret = KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
-     for (i = 0; certauth_modules != NULL && certauth_modules[i] != NULL; i++) {
-@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ authorize_cert(krb5_context context, certauth_handle *certauth_modules,
-                               &opts, db_ent, &ais);
-         if (ret == 0)
-             accepted = TRUE;
-+        else if (ret == KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH)
-+            accepted = hwauth = TRUE;
-         else if (ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE)
-             goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -374,6 +377,7 @@ authorize_cert(krb5_context context, certauth_handle *certauth_modules,
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    *hwauth_out = hwauth;
-     ret = accepted ? 0 : KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
- 
- cleanup:
-@@ -430,7 +434,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
-     int is_signed = 1;
-     krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
-     krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
--    krb5_boolean valid_freshness_token = FALSE;
-+    krb5_boolean valid_freshness_token = FALSE, hwauth = FALSE;
-     char **sp;
- 
-     pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n");
-@@ -494,7 +498,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
-     }
-     if (is_signed) {
-         retval = authorize_cert(context, moddata->certauth_modules, plgctx,
--                                reqctx, cb, rock, request->client);
-+                                reqctx, cb, rock, request->client, &hwauth);
-         if (retval)
-             goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -613,6 +617,8 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
- 
-     /* remember to set the PREAUTH flag in the reply */
-     enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
-+    if (hwauth)
-+        enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH;
-     modreq = (krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq)reqctx;
-     reqctx = NULL;
- 
-@@ -1044,7 +1050,9 @@ pkinit_server_get_flags(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_preauthtype patype)
- {
-     if (patype == KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX)
-         return PA_INFO;
--    return PA_SUFFICIENT | PA_REPLACES_KEY | PA_TYPED_E_DATA;
-+    /* PKINIT does not normally set the hw-authent ticket flag, but a
-+     * certauth module can cause it to do so. */
-+    return PA_SUFFICIENT | PA_REPLACES_KEY | PA_TYPED_E_DATA | PA_HARDWARE;
- }
- 
- static krb5_preauthtype supported_server_pa_types[] = {
-diff --git a/src/tests/t_certauth.py b/src/tests/t_certauth.py
-index 9c7094525..0fe0fdb4a 100644
---- a/src/tests/t_certauth.py
-+++ b/src/tests/t_certauth.py
-@@ -43,4 +43,17 @@ out = realm.kinit("user2@KRBTEST.COM",
-                   expected_code=1,
-                   expected_msg='kinit: Certificate mismatch')
- 
-+# Test the KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH return code.
-+mark('hw-authent flag tests')
-+# First test +requires_hwauth without causing the hw-authent ticket
-+# flag to be set.  This currently results in a preauth loop.
-+realm.run([kadminl, 'modprinc', '+requires_hwauth', realm.user_princ])
-+realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
-+            flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % file_identity],
-+            expected_code=1, expected_msg='Looping detected')
-+# Cause the test2 module to return KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH and try again.
-+realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', realm.user_princ, 'hwauth', 'x'])
-+realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
-+            flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % file_identity])
-+
- success("certauth tests")

Allow-gss_unwrap_iov-of-unpadded-RC4-tokens.patch

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 594c9d225f470e73a46dd2a85c5e50571e90598c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 21:57:30 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Allow gss_unwrap_iov() of unpadded RC4 tokens
-
-Windows Remote Management, when used with an RC4 session key, appears
-to generate GSS wrap tokens with no padding instead of the expected
-one byte (RFC 4757 section 7.3).  These tokens cannot be decoded with
-gss_unwrap() or a STREAM buffer (even with Microsoft SSPI), but SSPI
-allows them to be decoded using explicit IOVs with either a
-zero-length padding buffer or no padding buffer.  Allow these cases to
-work in kg_fixup_padding_iov().  (It is already possible to make this
-work with HEADER | DATA | DATA, but only by
-accident--kg_fixup_padding_iov() doesn't find a data buffer because
-kg_locate_iov() only looks for singleton buffers, so it exits early.)
-
-ticket: 8926 (new)
-tags: pullup
-target_version: 1.18-next
-
-(cherry picked from commit 3f204ddd567715ef360b4bb0b32961b6a9877f9d)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c | 9 +++------
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c
-index f7d3e92c4..d6c71aeb8 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c
-@@ -638,16 +638,13 @@ kg_fixup_padding_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
-     data = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA);
-     padding = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING);
- 
--    if (data == NULL) {
-+    /* Do nothing if padding is absent or empty, to allow unwrapping of WinRM
-+     * unpadded RC4 tokens using an explicit IOV array. */
-+    if (data == NULL || padding == NULL || padding->buffer.length == 0) {
-         *minor_status = 0;
-         return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-     }
- 
--    if (padding == NULL || padding->buffer.length == 0) {
--        *minor_status = EINVAL;
--        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
--    }
--
-     p = (unsigned char *)padding->buffer.value;
-     padlength = p[padding->buffer.length - 1];
- 

Avoid-passing-DB-entry-structures-in-KDC.patch

@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
-From dd8b146093d4bdf8a7d0c0eb8156b62d090448d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 02:12:00 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Avoid passing DB entry structures in KDC
-
-When validating AS or TGS requests, pass pointers to DB entry
-structures, not the structures themselves.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 7ccc08a889b40693b2ce7f108f2cdda51bc04bff)
----
- src/kdc/do_as_req.c  |  4 ++--
- src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c |  2 +-
- src/kdc/kdc_util.c   | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
- src/kdc/kdc_util.h   |  6 +++---
- src/kdc/tgs_policy.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-index 9ae7b0a5e..c2dfea9b8 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-@@ -663,8 +663,8 @@ process_as_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *req_pkt,
-     au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL;
- 
-     if ((errcode = validate_as_request(kdc_active_realm,
--                                       state->request, *state->client,
--                                       *state->server, state->kdc_time,
-+                                       state->request, state->client,
-+                                       state->server, state->kdc_time,
-                                        &state->status, &state->e_data))) {
-         errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
-         goto errout;
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-index 74cd19e96..d345797c4 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *pkt,
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-     if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
--                                       request, *server, header_ticket,
-+                                       request, server, header_ticket,
-                                        kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
-         if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
-             au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-index a4a05b9fa..b2042862a 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-@@ -612,8 +612,8 @@ check_anon(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-                             KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY | KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)
- int
- validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
--                    krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry client,
--                    krb5_db_entry server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
-+                    krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry *client,
-+                    krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
-                     const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
- {
-     krb5_error_code ret;
-@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-     }
- 
-     /* The client must not be expired */
--    if (client.expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, client.expiration)) {
-+    if (client->expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, client->expiration)) {
-         *status = "CLIENT EXPIRED";
-         if (vague_errors)
-             return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
-@@ -637,8 +637,8 @@ validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
- 
-     /* The client's password must not be expired, unless the server is
-        a KRB5_KDC_PWCHANGE_SERVICE. */
--    if (client.pw_expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, client.pw_expiration) &&
--        !isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
-+    if (client->pw_expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, client->pw_expiration) &&
-+        !isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
-         *status = "CLIENT KEY EXPIRED";
-         if (vague_errors)
-             return(KRB_ERR_GENERIC);
-@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-     }
- 
-     /* The server must not be expired */
--    if (server.expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, server.expiration)) {
-+    if (server->expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, server->expiration)) {
-         *status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
-         return(KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP);
-     }
-@@ -656,8 +656,8 @@ validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-      * If the client requires password changing, then only allow the
-      * pwchange service.
-      */
--    if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE) &&
--        !isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
-+    if (isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE) &&
-+        !isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE)) {
-         *status = "REQUIRED PWCHANGE";
-         return(KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP);
-     }
-@@ -665,37 +665,37 @@ validate_as_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-     /* Client and server must allow postdating tickets */
-     if ((isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE) ||
-          isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) &&
--        (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED) ||
--         isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED))) {
-+        (isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED) ||
-+         isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED))) {
-         *status = "POSTDATE NOT ALLOWED";
-         return(KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE);
-     }
- 
-     /* Check to see if client is locked out */
--    if (isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
-+    if (isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
-         *status = "CLIENT LOCKED OUT";
-         return(KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED);
-     }
- 
-     /* Check to see if server is locked out */
--    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
-+    if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) {
-         *status = "SERVICE LOCKED OUT";
-         return(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
-     }
- 
-     /* Check to see if server is allowed to be a service */
--    if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
-+    if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR)) {
-         *status = "SERVICE NOT ALLOWED";
-         return(KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER);
-     }
- 
--    if (check_anon(kdc_active_realm, client.princ, request->server) != 0) {
-+    if (check_anon(kdc_active_realm, client->princ, request->server) != 0) {
-         *status = "ANONYMOUS NOT ALLOWED";
-         return(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
-     }
- 
-     /* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
--    ret = krb5_db_check_policy_as(kdc_context, request, &client, &server,
-+    ret = krb5_db_check_policy_as(kdc_context, request, client, server,
-                                   kdc_time, status, e_data);
-     if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
-         return errcode_to_protocol(ret);
-@@ -1568,8 +1568,8 @@ kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-         princ->pw_expiration = 0;
-         clear(princ->attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE);
- 
--        code = validate_as_request(kdc_active_realm, request, *princ,
--                                   no_server, kdc_time, status, &e_data);
-+        code = validate_as_request(kdc_active_realm, request, princ,
-+                                   &no_server, kdc_time, status, &e_data);
-         if (code) {
-             krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, princ);
-             krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-index 42b7ee208..04007a8f5 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-@@ -76,12 +76,12 @@ get_local_tgt(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
-               krb5_db_entry **storage_out, krb5_keyblock *kb_out);
- 
- int
--validate_as_request (kdc_realm_t *, krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_db_entry,
--                     krb5_db_entry, krb5_timestamp,
-+validate_as_request (kdc_realm_t *, krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_db_entry *,
-+                     krb5_db_entry *, krb5_timestamp,
-                      const char **, krb5_pa_data ***);
- 
- int
--validate_tgs_request (kdc_realm_t *, krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_db_entry,
-+validate_tgs_request (kdc_realm_t *, krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_db_entry *,
-                       krb5_ticket *, krb5_timestamp,
-                       const char **, krb5_pa_data ***);
- 
-diff --git a/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c b/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c
-index 554345ba5..3f4fa8499 100644
---- a/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ struct tgsflagrule {
- };
- 
- /* Service principal TGS policy checking functions */
--typedef int (check_tgs_svc_pol_fn)(krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_db_entry,
-+typedef int (check_tgs_svc_pol_fn)(krb5_kdc_req *, krb5_db_entry *,
-                                    krb5_ticket *, krb5_timestamp,
-                                    const char **);
- 
-@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static const struct tgsflagrule svcdenyrules[] = {
-  * A service principal can forbid some TGS-REQ options.
-  */
- static int
--check_tgs_svc_deny_opts(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server,
-+check_tgs_svc_deny_opts(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry *server,
-                         krb5_ticket *tkt, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
-                         const char **status)
- {
-@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ check_tgs_svc_deny_opts(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server,
-         r = &svcdenyrules[i];
-         if (!(r->reqflags & req->kdc_options))
-             continue;
--        if (r->checkflag & server.attributes) {
-+        if (r->checkflag & server->attributes) {
-             *status = r->status;
-             return r->err;
-         }
-@@ -134,20 +134,20 @@ check_tgs_svc_deny_opts(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server,
-  * A service principal can deny all TGS-REQs for it.
-  */
- static int
--check_tgs_svc_deny_all(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server,
-+check_tgs_svc_deny_all(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry *server,
-                        krb5_ticket *tkt, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
-                        const char **status)
- {
--    if (server.attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX) {
-+    if (server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX) {
-         *status = "SERVER LOCKED OUT";
-         return KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
-     }
--    if ((server.attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR) &&
-+    if ((server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR) &&
-         !(req->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
-         *status = "SERVER NOT ALLOWED";
-         return KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER;
-     }
--    if (server.attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED) {
-+    if (server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED) {
-         if (krb5_is_tgs_principal(tkt->server)) {
-             *status = "TGT BASED NOT ALLOWED";
-             return KDC_ERR_POLICY;
-@@ -160,17 +160,17 @@ check_tgs_svc_deny_all(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server,
-  * A service principal can require certain TGT flags.
-  */
- static int
--check_tgs_svc_reqd_flags(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server,
-+check_tgs_svc_reqd_flags(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry *server,
-                          krb5_ticket *tkt,
-                          krb5_timestamp kdc_time, const char **status)
- {
--    if (server.attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH) {
-+    if (server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH) {
-         if (!(tkt->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH)) {
-             *status = "NO HW PREAUTH";
-             return KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-         }
-     }
--    if (server.attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH) {
-+    if (server->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH) {
-         if (!(tkt->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH)) {
-             *status = "NO PREAUTH";
-             return KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-@@ -180,10 +180,10 @@ check_tgs_svc_reqd_flags(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server,
- }
- 
- static int
--check_tgs_svc_time(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server, krb5_ticket *tkt,
-+check_tgs_svc_time(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_ticket *tkt,
-                    krb5_timestamp kdc_time, const char **status)
- {
--    if (server.expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, server.expiration)) {
-+    if (server->expiration && ts_after(kdc_time, server->expiration)) {
-         *status = "SERVICE EXPIRED";
-         return KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
-     }
-@@ -191,8 +191,9 @@ check_tgs_svc_time(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server, krb5_ticket *tkt,
- }
- 
- static int
--check_tgs_svc_policy(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry server, krb5_ticket *tkt,
--                     krb5_timestamp kdc_time, const char **status)
-+check_tgs_svc_policy(krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry *server,
-+                     krb5_ticket *tkt, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
-+                     const char **status)
- {
-     int errcode;
-     size_t i;
-@@ -317,7 +318,7 @@ check_tgs_tgt(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
- 
- int
- validate_tgs_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
--                     krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry server,
-+                     krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry *server,
-                      krb5_ticket *ticket, krb5_timestamp kdc_time,
-                      const char **status, krb5_pa_data ***e_data)
- {
-@@ -367,8 +368,8 @@ validate_tgs_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-     }
- 
-     /* Perform KDB module policy checks. */
--    ret = krb5_db_check_policy_tgs(kdc_context, request, &server,
--                                   ticket, status, e_data);
-+    ret = krb5_db_check_policy_tgs(kdc_context, request, server, ticket,
-+                                   status, e_data);
-     if (ret && ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP)
-         return errcode_to_protocol(ret);
- 

Correctly-import-service-GSS-host-based-name.patch

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From f56afbeb7848322f3208edd55f2c12a9e32127f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 15:26:02 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Correctly import "service@" GSS host-based name
-
-The intended way to specify only a service in a GSS host-based name is
-to omit the "@" separator.  Some applications include the separator
-but no hostname, and this happened to yield wildcard hostname behavior
-prior to commit 996353767fe8afa7f67a3b5b465e4d70e18bad7c when
-shortname qualification was added.  To restore this behavior, check in
-parse_hostbased() that at least one character is present after the "@"
-separator before copying the hostname.  Add a test case to t_gssapi.py.
-
-ticket: 8892
-tags: pullup
-target_version: 1.18-next
-
-(cherry picked from commit a2f047af0400ba8080dc26033fae2b17534501e2)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/import_name.c | 4 ++--
- src/tests/gssapi/t_gssapi.py      | 3 +++
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/import_name.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/import_name.c
-index da2ab1423..21023dd76 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/import_name.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/import_name.c
-@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ parse_hostbased(const char *str, size_t len,
-     memcpy(service, str, servicelen);
-     service[servicelen] = '\0';
- 
--    /* If present, copy the hostname. */
--    if (at != NULL) {
-+    /* Copy the hostname if present (at least one character after '@'). */
-+    if (len - servicelen > 1) {
-         hostlen = len - servicelen - 1;
-         host = malloc(hostlen + 1);
-         if (host == NULL) {
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_gssapi.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_gssapi.py
-index 54d5cf549..ecf982604 100755
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_gssapi.py
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_gssapi.py
-@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ realm.run(['./t_accname', 'p:service2/calvin', 'h:service2'],
-           expected_msg='service2/calvin')
- realm.run(['./t_accname', 'p:service2/calvin', 'h:service1'], expected_code=1,
-           expected_msg=' found in keytab but does not match server principal')
-+# Regression test for #8892 (trailing @ in name).
-+realm.run(['./t_accname', 'p:service1/andrew', 'h:service1@'],
-+          expected_msg='service1/abraham')
- 
- # Test with acceptor name containing service and host.  Use the
- # client's un-canonicalized hostname as acceptor input to mirror what

Default-dns_canonicalize_hostname-to-fallback.patch

@@ -1,371 +0,0 @@
-From c3d2c3bcafe0ac87d9cbbf37f1488ad642627fc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 18:48:35 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Default dns_canonicalize_hostname to "fallback"
-
-This change should mitigate some of the pain caused by the rdns=true
-default (generally associated with unwanted PTR records that cannot
-easily be changed), with a minimum of fallout.
-
-Update the documentation and tests accordingly.  In test environments,
-disable qualify_shortname and use the uncanonicalized system hostname
-(lowercased) to match the initial sn2princ result.
-
-ticket: 8911 (new)
----
- doc/admin/appl_servers.rst                    | 14 +++---
- doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst            |  9 ++--
- doc/admin/princ_dns.rst                       | 44 +++++++++++--------
- src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto      |  8 ++--
- src/kadmin/testing/scripts/env-setup.shin     |  4 +-
- src/kadmin/testing/scripts/init_db            |  3 +-
- src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers      |  3 +-
- .../testing/scripts/start_servers_local       |  2 +-
- .../kadm5/unit-test/api.current/init-v2.exp   |  6 +--
- src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c                   |  2 +-
- src/tests/dejagnu/config/default.exp          |  5 +--
- src/tests/t_sn2princ.py                       |  5 ++-
- src/util/k5test.py                            | 25 +++--------
- 13 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/admin/appl_servers.rst b/doc/admin/appl_servers.rst
-index 5232db9af..afdf30297 100644
---- a/doc/admin/appl_servers.rst
-+++ b/doc/admin/appl_servers.rst
-@@ -115,14 +115,12 @@ Getting DNS information correct
- -------------------------------
- 
- Several aspects of Kerberos rely on name service.  When a hostname is
--used to name a service, the Kerberos library canonicalizes the
--hostname using forward and reverse name resolution.  (The reverse name
--resolution step can be turned off using the **rdns** variable in
--:ref:`libdefaults`.)  The result of this canonicalization must match
--the principal entry in the host's keytab, or authentication will fail.
--
--Each host's canonical name must be the fully-qualified host name
--(including the domain), and each host's IP address must
-+used to name a service, clients may canonicalize the hostname using
-+forward and possibly reverse name resolution.  The result of this
-+canonicalization must match the principal entry in the host's keytab,
-+or authentication will fail.  To work with all client canonicalization
-+configurations, each host's canonical name must be the fully-qualified
-+host name (including the domain), and each host's IP address must
- reverse-resolve to the canonical name.
- 
- Configuration of hostnames varies by operating system.  On the
-diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-index 3a8b9cf47..38f450367 100644
---- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
-@@ -188,11 +188,10 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
-     hostnames for use in service principal names.  Setting this flag
-     to false can improve security by reducing reliance on DNS, but
-     means that short hostnames will not be canonicalized to
--    fully-qualified hostnames.  The default value is true.
--
--    If this option is set to ``fallback`` (new in release 1.18), DNS
--    canonicalization will only be performed the server hostname is not
--    found with the original name when requesting credentials.
-+    fully-qualified hostnames.  If this option is set to ``fallback`` (new
-+    in release 1.18), DNS canonicalization will only be performed the
-+    server hostname is not found with the original name when
-+    requesting credentials.  The default value is ``fallback``.
- 
- **dns_lookup_kdc**
-     Indicate whether DNS SRV records should be used to locate the KDCs
-diff --git a/doc/admin/princ_dns.rst b/doc/admin/princ_dns.rst
-index e1d823f27..32a269afc 100644
---- a/doc/admin/princ_dns.rst
-+++ b/doc/admin/princ_dns.rst
-@@ -31,27 +31,35 @@ based on rotating ``CNAME`` records in DNS.
- Service principal canonicalization
- ----------------------------------
- 
--MIT Kerberos clients currently always do forward resolution (looking
--up the IPv4 and possibly IPv6 addresses using ``getaddrinfo()``) of
--the hostname part of a host-based service principal to canonicalize
--the hostname.  They obtain the "canonical" name of the host when doing
--so.  By default, MIT Kerberos clients will also then do reverse DNS
--resolution (looking up the hostname associated with the IPv4 or IPv6
--address using ``getnameinfo()``) of the hostname.  Using the
--:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` setting::
-+In the MIT krb5 client library, canonicalization of host-based service
-+principals is controlled by the **dns_canonicalize_hostname**,
-+**rnds**, and **qualify_shortname** variables in :ref:`libdefaults`.
- 
--    [libdefaults]
--        rdns = false
-+If **dns_canonicalize_hostname** is set to ``true`` (the default value
-+before release 1.19), the client performs forward resolution by
-+looking up the IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses of the hostname using
-+``getaddrinfo()``.  This process will typically add a domain suffix to
-+the hostname if needed, and follow CNAME records in the DNS.  If
-+**rdns** is also set to ``true`` (the default), the client will then
-+perform a reverse lookup of the first returned Internet address using
-+``getnameinfo()``, finding the name associated with the PTR record.
- 
--will disable reverse DNS lookup on clients.  The default setting is
--"true".
-+If **dns_canonicalize_hostname** is set to ``false``, the hostname is
-+not canonicalized using DNS.  If the hostname has only one component
-+(i.e. it contains no "." characters), the host's primary DNS search
-+domain will be appended, if there is one.  The **qualify_shortname**
-+variable can be used to override or disable this suffix.
-+
-+If **dns_canonicalize_hostname** is set to ``fallback`` (the default
-+value in release 1.19 and later), the hostname is initially treated
-+according to the rules for ``dns_canonicalize_hostname=false``.  If a
-+ticket request fails because the service principal is unknown, it the
-+hostname will be canonicalized according to the rules for
-+``dns_canonicalize_hostname=true`` and the request will be retried.
-+
-+In all cases, the hostname is converted to lowercase, and any trailing
-+dot is removed.
- 
--Operating system bugs may prevent a setting of ``rdns = false`` from
--disabling reverse DNS lookup.  Some versions of GNU libc have a bug in
--``getaddrinfo()`` that cause them to look up ``PTR`` records even when
--not required.  MIT Kerberos releases krb5-1.10.2 and newer have a
--workaround for this problem, as does the krb5-1.9.x series as of
--release krb5-1.9.4.
- 
- 
- Reverse DNS mismatches
-diff --git a/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto b/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto
-index e710852d4..c0af716a5 100644
---- a/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto
-+++ b/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto
-@@ -2,19 +2,19 @@
- 	default_realm = __REALM__
- 	default_keytab_name = FILE:__K5ROOT__/keytab
- 	dns_fallback = no
-+	qualify_shortname = ""
- 	plugin_base_dir = __PLUGIN_DIR__
- 	allow_weak_crypto = true
- 
- [realms]
- 	__REALM__ = {
--		kdc = __KDCHOST__:1750
--		admin_server = __KDCHOST__:1751
-+		kdc = __HOSTNAME__:1750
-+		admin_server = __HOSTNAME__:1751
- 		database_module = foobar_db2_module_blah
- 	}
- 
- [domain_realm]
--	__LOCALHOST__ = __REALM__
--	__KDCHOST__ = __REALM__
-+	__HOSTNAME__ = __REALM__
- 
- [logging]
- 	admin_server = FILE:__K5ROOT__/syslog
-diff --git a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/env-setup.shin b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/env-setup.shin
-index 969c5340c..88f8ad1aa 100755
---- a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/env-setup.shin
-+++ b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/env-setup.shin
-@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ BSDDB_DUMP=$TESTDIR/util/bsddb_dump; export BSDDB_DUMP
- CLNTTCL=$TESTDIR/util/kadm5_clnt_tcl; export CLNTTCL
- SRVTCL=$TESTDIR/util/kadm5_srv_tcl; export SRVTCL
- 
--QUALNAME=`$BUILDTOP/tests/resolve/resolve -q | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'`
--export QUALNAME
-+HOSTNAME=`hostname | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'`
-+export HOSTNAME
- 
- KRB5_CONFIG=$K5ROOT/krb5.conf; export KRB5_CONFIG
- KRB5_KDC_PROFILE=$K5ROOT/kdc.conf; export KRB5_KDC_PROFILE
-diff --git a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/init_db b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/init_db
-index e65826c96..216f62793 100755
---- a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/init_db
-+++ b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/init_db
-@@ -79,8 +79,7 @@ fi
- # done
- 
- sed -e "s/__REALM__/$REALM/g" -e "s#__K5ROOT__#$K5ROOT#g" \
--	-e "s/__KDCHOST__/$QUALNAME/g" \
--	-e "s/__LOCALHOST__/$QUALNAME/g" \
-+	-e "s/__HOSTNAME__/$HOSTNAME/g" \
- 	-e "s#__MODDIR__#$MODDIR#g" \
- 	< $STESTDIR/proto/krb5.conf.proto > $K5ROOT/krb5.conf
- sed -e "s/__REALM__/$REALM/g" -e "s#__K5ROOT__#$K5ROOT#g" \
-diff --git a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers
-index f23df0682..05519e4ee 100755
---- a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers
-+++ b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers
-@@ -36,8 +36,7 @@ if [ $local = 0 ]; then
- 
- 	# Fix up the local krb5.conf to point to the remote 
- 	sed -e "s/__REALM__/$REALM/g" -e "s#__K5ROOT__#$K5ROOT#g" \
--		-e "s/__KDCHOST__/$hostname/g" \
--		-e "s/__LOCALHOST__/$QUALNAME/g" \
-+		-e "s/__HOSTNAME__/$HOSTNAME/g" \
- 		-e "s#__MODDIR__#$TOP/../plugins/kdb#g"\
- 		-e "s#__PLUGIN_DIR__#$TOP/../plugins#g"\
- 		< $STESTDIR/proto/krb5.conf.proto > $K5ROOT/krb5.conf
-diff --git a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers_local b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers_local
-index 998ef9164..858e88031 100755
---- a/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers_local
-+++ b/src/kadmin/testing/scripts/start_servers_local
-@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ cat - > /tmp/start_servers_local$$ <<\EOF
- if { [catch {
- 	source $env(STOP)/testing/tcl/util.t
- 	set r $env(REALM)
--	set q $env(QUALNAME)
-+	set q $env(HOSTNAME)
- 	puts stdout [kadm5_init $env(SRVTCL) mrroot null \
- 		[config_params {KADM5_CONFIG_REALM} $r] \
- 		$KADM5_STRUCT_VERSION $KADM5_API_VERSION_3 server_handle]
-diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/unit-test/api.current/init-v2.exp b/src/lib/kadm5/unit-test/api.current/init-v2.exp
-index 7a353d4e9..47764c212 100644
---- a/src/lib/kadm5/unit-test/api.current/init-v2.exp
-+++ b/src/lib/kadm5/unit-test/api.current/init-v2.exp
-@@ -3,18 +3,14 @@ load_lib lib.t
- api_exit
- api_start
- 
--if ![info exists RESOLVE] {
--    set RESOLVE [findfile $objdir/../../../tests/resolve/resolve]
--}
- proc get_hostname { } {
--    global RESOLVE
-     global hostname
- 
-     if {[info exists hostname]} {
- 	return 1
-     }
- 
--    catch "exec $RESOLVE -q >myname" exec_output
-+    catch "exec hostname >myname" exec_output
-     if ![string match "" $exec_output] {
- 	send_log "$exec_output\n"
- 	verbose $exec_output
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
-index 9a4741fa6..0b8ae6714 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
-@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
-     ctx->enforce_ok_as_delegate = tmp;
- 
-     retval = get_tristate(ctx, KRB5_CONF_DNS_CANONICALIZE_HOSTNAME, "fallback",
--                          CANONHOST_FALLBACK, 1, &tmp);
-+                          CANONHOST_FALLBACK, CANONHOST_FALLBACK, &tmp);
-     if (retval)
-         goto cleanup;
-     ctx->dns_canonicalize_hostname = tmp;
-diff --git a/src/tests/dejagnu/config/default.exp b/src/tests/dejagnu/config/default.exp
-index 4d8c917cd..1e7777f1e 100644
---- a/src/tests/dejagnu/config/default.exp
-+++ b/src/tests/dejagnu/config/default.exp
-@@ -268,7 +268,6 @@ foreach i {
-     {KTUTIL $objdir/../../kadmin/ktutil/ktutil}
-     {KLIST $objdir/../../clients/klist/klist}
-     {KDESTROY $objdir/../../clients/kdestroy/kdestroy}
--    {RESOLVE $objdir/../resolve/resolve}
-     {T_INETD $objdir/t_inetd}
-     {KPROPLOG $objdir/../../kprop/kproplog}
-     {KPASSWD $objdir/../../clients/kpasswd/kpasswd}
-@@ -462,7 +461,6 @@ proc setup_runtime_env { } {
- # 0 on failure.
- 
- proc get_hostname { } {
--    global RESOLVE
-     global hostname
-     global tmppwd
- 
-@@ -472,7 +470,7 @@ proc get_hostname { } {
- 
-     envstack_push
-     setup_runtime_env
--    catch "exec $RESOLVE -q >$tmppwd/hostname" exec_output
-+    catch "exec hostname >$tmppwd/hostname" exec_output
-     envstack_pop
-     if ![string match "" $exec_output] {
- 	verbose -log $exec_output
-@@ -710,6 +708,7 @@ proc setup_krb5_conf { {type client} } {
- 	puts $conffile "\[libdefaults\]"
- 	puts $conffile "	default_realm = $REALMNAME"
- 	puts $conffile "	dns_lookup_kdc = false"
-+	puts $conffile "	qualify_shortname = \"\""
- 	if [info exists allow_weak_crypto($type)] {
- 	    puts $conffile "	allow_weak_crypto = $allow_weak_crypto($type)"
- 	} else {
-diff --git a/src/tests/t_sn2princ.py b/src/tests/t_sn2princ.py
-index 26dcb91c2..f3e187286 100755
---- a/src/tests/t_sn2princ.py
-+++ b/src/tests/t_sn2princ.py
-@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ from k5test import *
- 
- offline = (len(args) > 0 and args[0] != "no")
- 
--conf = {'domain_realm': {'kerberos.org': 'R1',
-+conf = {'libdefaults': {'dns_canonicalize_hostname': 'true'},
-+        'domain_realm': {'kerberos.org': 'R1',
-                          'example.com': 'R2',
-                          'mit.edu': 'R3'}}
- no_rdns_conf = {'libdefaults': {'rdns': 'false'}}
-@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ def testbase(host, nametype, princhost, princrealm, env=None):
-         fail('Expected %s, got %s' % (expected, out))
- 
- def test(host, princhost, princrealm):
--    # Test with the host-based name type in the default environment.
-+    # Test with the host-based name type with canonicalization enabled.
-     testbase(host, 'srv-hst', princhost, princrealm)
- 
- def testnc(host, princhost, princrealm):
-diff --git a/src/util/k5test.py b/src/util/k5test.py
-index eea92275d..5196cfa43 100644
---- a/src/util/k5test.py
-+++ b/src/util/k5test.py
-@@ -193,7 +193,10 @@ Scripts may use the following functions and variables:
- 
- * plugins: The plugin directory in the build tree (absolute path).
- 
--* hostname: This machine's fully-qualified domain name.
-+* hostname: The local hostname as it will initially appear in
-+  krb5_sname_to_principal() results.  (Shortname qualification is
-+  turned off in the test environment to make this value easy to
-+  discover from Python.)
- 
- * null_input: A file opened to read /dev/null.
- 
-@@ -525,23 +528,6 @@ def _find_srctop():
-     return os.path.abspath(root)
- 
- 
--# Return the local hostname as it will be canonicalized by
--# krb5_sname_to_principal.  We can't simply use socket.getfqdn()
--# because it explicitly prefers results containing periods and
--# krb5_sname_to_principal doesn't care.
--def _get_hostname():
--    hostname = socket.gethostname()
--    try:
--        ai = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None, 0, 0, 0, socket.AI_CANONNAME)
--    except socket.gaierror as e:
--        fail('Local hostname "%s" does not resolve: %s.' % (hostname, e[1]))
--    (family, socktype, proto, canonname, sockaddr) = ai[0]
--    try:
--        name = socket.getnameinfo(sockaddr, socket.NI_NAMEREQD)
--    except socket.gaierror:
--        return canonname.lower()
--    return name[0].lower()
--
- # Parse command line arguments, setting global option variables.  Also
- # sets the global variable args to the positional arguments, which may
- # be used by the test script.
-@@ -1263,6 +1249,7 @@ _default_krb5_conf = {
-     'libdefaults': {
-         'default_realm': '$realm',
-         'dns_lookup_kdc': 'false',
-+        'qualify_shortname': '',
-         'plugin_base_dir': '$plugins'},
-     'realms': {'$realm': {
-             'kdc': '$hostname:$port0',
-@@ -1356,7 +1343,7 @@ buildtop = _find_buildtop()
- srctop = _find_srctop()
- plugins = os.path.join(buildtop, 'plugins')
- runenv = _import_runenv()
--hostname = _get_hostname()
-+hostname = socket.gethostname().lower()
- null_input = open(os.devnull, 'r')
- 
- # A DB pass is a tuple of: name, kdc_conf.

Do-expiration-warnings-for-all-init_creds-APIs.patch

@@ -1,425 +0,0 @@
-From 51a9f8e7498591b22558a7a61d42a821030f9c4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 10:11:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Do expiration warnings for all init_creds APIs
-
-Move the password expiration warning code from gic_pwd.c to
-get_in_tkt.c.  Call it from init_creds_step_reply() on successful
-completion.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: added test case; simplified doc comment; moved call
-site to init_creds_step_reply(); rewrote commit message]
-
-ticket: 8893 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit e1efb890f7ac31b32c68ab816ef118dbfb5a8c7e)
----
- src/include/krb5/krb5.hin         |   9 ++-
- src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c     | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- src/lib/krb5/krb/gic_pwd.c        | 110 -----------------------------
- src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.c  |  47 +++++++++----
- src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.py |  22 ++++--
- 5 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-index 6355e6540..f8269fb17 100644
---- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-@@ -7174,11 +7174,10 @@ typedef void
-  *
-  * Set a callback to receive password and account expiration times.
-  *
-- * This option only applies to krb5_get_init_creds_password().  @a cb will be
-- * invoked if and only if credentials are successfully acquired.  The callback
-- * will receive the @a context from the krb5_get_init_creds_password() call and
-- * the @a data argument supplied with this API.  The remaining arguments should
-- * be interpreted as follows:
-+ * @a cb will be invoked if and only if credentials are successfully acquired.
-+ * The callback will receive the @a context from the calling function and the
-+ * @a data argument supplied with this API.  The remaining arguments should be
-+ * interpreted as follows:
-  *
-  * If @a is_last_req is true, then the KDC reply contained last-req entries
-  * which unambiguously indicated the password expiration, account expiration,
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
-index 870df62a1..cc0f70e83 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
-@@ -1482,6 +1482,116 @@ accept_method_data(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx)
-                                      ctx->method_padata);
- }
- 
-+/* Return the password expiry time indicated by enc_part2.  Set *is_last_req
-+ * if the information came from a last_req value. */
-+static void
-+get_expiry_times(krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part *enc_part2, krb5_timestamp *pw_exp,
-+                 krb5_timestamp *acct_exp, krb5_boolean *is_last_req)
-+{
-+    krb5_last_req_entry **last_req;
-+    krb5_int32 lr_type;
-+
-+    *pw_exp = 0;
-+    *acct_exp = 0;
-+    *is_last_req = FALSE;
-+
-+    /* Look for last-req entries for password or account expiration. */
-+    if (enc_part2->last_req) {
-+        for (last_req = enc_part2->last_req; *last_req; last_req++) {
-+            lr_type = (*last_req)->lr_type;
-+            if (lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ALL_PW_EXPTIME ||
-+                lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ONE_PW_EXPTIME) {
-+                *is_last_req = TRUE;
-+                *pw_exp = (*last_req)->value;
-+            } else if (lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ALL_ACCT_EXPTIME ||
-+                       lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ONE_ACCT_EXPTIME) {
-+                *is_last_req = TRUE;
-+                *acct_exp = (*last_req)->value;
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    /* If we didn't find any, use the ambiguous key_exp field. */
-+    if (*is_last_req == FALSE)
-+        *pw_exp = enc_part2->key_exp;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Send an appropriate warning prompter if as_reply indicates that the password
-+ * is going to expire soon.  If an expire callback was provided, use that
-+ * instead.
-+ */
-+static void
-+warn_pw_expiry(krb5_context context, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options,
-+               krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *data,
-+               const char *in_tkt_service, krb5_kdc_rep *as_reply)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_expire_callback_func expire_cb;
-+    void *expire_data;
-+    krb5_timestamp pw_exp, acct_exp, now;
-+    krb5_boolean is_last_req;
-+    krb5_deltat delta;
-+    char ts[256], banner[1024];
-+
-+    if (as_reply == NULL || as_reply->enc_part2 == NULL)
-+        return;
-+
-+    get_expiry_times(as_reply->enc_part2, &pw_exp, &acct_exp, &is_last_req);
-+
-+    k5_gic_opt_get_expire_cb(options, &expire_cb, &expire_data);
-+    if (expire_cb != NULL) {
-+        /* Invoke the expire callback and don't send prompter warnings. */
-+        (*expire_cb)(context, expire_data, pw_exp, acct_exp, is_last_req);
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Don't warn if no password expiry value was sent. */
-+    if (pw_exp == 0)
-+        return;
-+
-+    /* Don't warn if the password is being changed. */
-+    if (in_tkt_service && strcmp(in_tkt_service, "kadmin/changepw") == 0)
-+        return;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * If the expiry time came from a last_req field, assume the KDC wants us
-+     * to warn.  Otherwise, warn only if the expiry time is less than a week
-+     * from now.
-+     */
-+    ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
-+    if (ret != 0)
-+        return;
-+    if (!is_last_req &&
-+        (ts_after(now, pw_exp) || ts_delta(pw_exp, now) > 7 * 24 * 60 * 60))
-+        return;
-+
-+    if (!prompter)
-+        return;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_timestamp_to_string(pw_exp, ts, sizeof(ts));
-+    if (ret != 0)
-+        return;
-+
-+    delta = ts_delta(pw_exp, now);
-+    if (delta < 3600) {
-+        snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
-+                 _("Warning: Your password will expire in less than one hour "
-+                   "on %s"), ts);
-+    } else if (delta < 86400 * 2) {
-+        snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
-+                 _("Warning: Your password will expire in %d hour%s on %s"),
-+                 delta / 3600, delta < 7200 ? "" : "s", ts);
-+    } else {
-+        snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
-+                 _("Warning: Your password will expire in %d days on %s"),
-+                 delta / 86400, ts);
-+    }
-+
-+    /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
-+    (*prompter)(context, data, 0, banner, 0, 0);
-+}
-+
- static krb5_error_code
- init_creds_step_reply(krb5_context context,
-                       krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
-@@ -1693,6 +1803,8 @@ init_creds_step_reply(krb5_context context,
- 
-     /* success */
-     ctx->complete = TRUE;
-+    warn_pw_expiry(context, ctx->opt, ctx->prompter, ctx->prompter_data,
-+                   ctx->in_tkt_service, ctx->reply);
- 
- cleanup:
-     krb5_free_pa_data(context, kdc_padata);
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/gic_pwd.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/gic_pwd.c
-index 14ce23ba4..54e0a8ebe 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/gic_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/gic_pwd.c
-@@ -133,113 +133,6 @@ krb5_init_creds_set_password(krb5_context context,
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--/* Return the password expiry time indicated by enc_part2.  Set *is_last_req
-- * if the information came from a last_req value. */
--static void
--get_expiry_times(krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part *enc_part2, krb5_timestamp *pw_exp,
--                 krb5_timestamp *acct_exp, krb5_boolean *is_last_req)
--{
--    krb5_last_req_entry **last_req;
--    krb5_int32 lr_type;
--
--    *pw_exp = 0;
--    *acct_exp = 0;
--    *is_last_req = FALSE;
--
--    /* Look for last-req entries for password or account expiration. */
--    if (enc_part2->last_req) {
--        for (last_req = enc_part2->last_req; *last_req; last_req++) {
--            lr_type = (*last_req)->lr_type;
--            if (lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ALL_PW_EXPTIME ||
--                lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ONE_PW_EXPTIME) {
--                *is_last_req = TRUE;
--                *pw_exp = (*last_req)->value;
--            } else if (lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ALL_ACCT_EXPTIME ||
--                       lr_type == KRB5_LRQ_ONE_ACCT_EXPTIME) {
--                *is_last_req = TRUE;
--                *acct_exp = (*last_req)->value;
--            }
--        }
--    }
--
--    /* If we didn't find any, use the ambiguous key_exp field. */
--    if (*is_last_req == FALSE)
--        *pw_exp = enc_part2->key_exp;
--}
--
--/*
-- * Send an appropriate warning prompter if as_reply indicates that the password
-- * is going to expire soon.  If an expire callback was provided, use that
-- * instead.
-- */
--static void
--warn_pw_expiry(krb5_context context, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options,
--               krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *data,
--               const char *in_tkt_service, krb5_kdc_rep *as_reply)
--{
--    krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_expire_callback_func expire_cb;
--    void *expire_data;
--    krb5_timestamp pw_exp, acct_exp, now;
--    krb5_boolean is_last_req;
--    krb5_deltat delta;
--    char ts[256], banner[1024];
--
--    get_expiry_times(as_reply->enc_part2, &pw_exp, &acct_exp, &is_last_req);
--
--    k5_gic_opt_get_expire_cb(options, &expire_cb, &expire_data);
--    if (expire_cb != NULL) {
--        /* Invoke the expire callback and don't send prompter warnings. */
--        (*expire_cb)(context, expire_data, pw_exp, acct_exp, is_last_req);
--        return;
--    }
--
--    /* Don't warn if no password expiry value was sent. */
--    if (pw_exp == 0)
--        return;
--
--    /* Don't warn if the password is being changed. */
--    if (in_tkt_service && strcmp(in_tkt_service, "kadmin/changepw") == 0)
--        return;
--
--    /*
--     * If the expiry time came from a last_req field, assume the KDC wants us
--     * to warn.  Otherwise, warn only if the expiry time is less than a week
--     * from now.
--     */
--    ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return;
--    if (!is_last_req &&
--        (ts_after(now, pw_exp) || ts_delta(pw_exp, now) > 7 * 24 * 60 * 60))
--        return;
--
--    if (!prompter)
--        return;
--
--    ret = krb5_timestamp_to_string(pw_exp, ts, sizeof(ts));
--    if (ret != 0)
--        return;
--
--    delta = ts_delta(pw_exp, now);
--    if (delta < 3600) {
--        snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
--                 _("Warning: Your password will expire in less than one hour "
--                   "on %s"), ts);
--    } else if (delta < 86400*2) {
--        snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
--                 _("Warning: Your password will expire in %d hour%s on %s"),
--                 delta / 3600, delta < 7200 ? "" : "s", ts);
--    } else {
--        snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
--                 _("Warning: Your password will expire in %d days on %s"),
--                 delta / 86400, ts);
--    }
--
--    /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
--    (*prompter)(context, data, 0, banner, 0, 0);
--}
--
- /*
-  * Create a temporary options structure for getting a kadmin/changepw ticket,
-  * based on the appplication-specified options.  Propagate all application
-@@ -496,9 +389,6 @@ krb5_get_init_creds_password(krb5_context context,
-         goto cleanup;
- 
- cleanup:
--    if (ret == 0)
--        warn_pw_expiry(context, options, prompter, data, in_tkt_service,
--                       as_reply);
-     free(chpw_opts);
-     zapfree(gakpw.storage.data, gakpw.storage.length);
-     memset(pw0array, 0, sizeof(pw0array));
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.c
-index 1e59acba1..dc8dc8fb3 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@
- 
- static int exp_dummy, prompt_dummy;
- 
-+static void
-+check(krb5_error_code code)
-+{
-+    if (code != 0)
-+        abort();
-+}
-+
- static krb5_error_code
- prompter_cb(krb5_context ctx, void *data, const char *name,
-             const char *banner, int num_prompts, krb5_prompt prompts[])
-@@ -52,36 +59,48 @@ int
- main(int argc, char **argv)
- {
-     krb5_context ctx;
-+    krb5_init_creds_context icctx;
-     krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt;
-     char *user, *password, *service = NULL;
--    krb5_boolean use_cb;
-+    krb5_boolean use_cb, stepwise;
-     krb5_principal client;
-     krb5_creds creds;
- 
--    if (argc < 4) {
--        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s username password {1|0} [service]\n",
-+    if (argc < 5) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s username password {1|0} {1|0} [service]\n",
-                 argv[0]);
-         return 1;
-     }
-     user = argv[1];
-     password = argv[2];
-     use_cb = atoi(argv[3]);
--    if (argc >= 5)
--        service = argv[4];
-+    stepwise = atoi(argv[4]);
-+    if (argc >= 6)
-+        service = argv[5];
- 
--    assert(krb5_init_context(&ctx) == 0);
--    assert(krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(ctx, &opt) == 0);
-+    check(krb5_init_context(&ctx));
-+    check(krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(ctx, &opt));
-     if (use_cb) {
--        assert(krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_expire_callback(ctx, opt, expire_cb,
--                                                           &exp_dummy) == 0);
-+        check(krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_expire_callback(ctx, opt, expire_cb,
-+                                                          &exp_dummy));
-+    }
-+    check(krb5_parse_name(ctx, user, &client));
-+    if (stepwise) {
-+        check(krb5_init_creds_init(ctx, client, prompter_cb, &prompt_dummy, 0,
-+                                   opt, &icctx));
-+        krb5_init_creds_set_password(ctx, icctx, password);
-+        if (service != NULL)
-+            check(krb5_init_creds_set_service(ctx, icctx, service));
-+        check(krb5_init_creds_get(ctx, icctx));
-+        krb5_init_creds_free(ctx, icctx);
-+    } else {
-+        check(krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, client, password,
-+                                           prompter_cb, &prompt_dummy, 0,
-+                                           service, opt));
-+        krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &creds);
-     }
--    assert(krb5_parse_name(ctx, user, &client) == 0);
--    assert(krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, client, password,
--                                        prompter_cb, &prompt_dummy, 0, service,
--                                        opt) == 0);
-     krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(ctx, opt);
-     krb5_free_principal(ctx, client);
--    krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &creds);
-     krb5_free_context(ctx);
-     return 0;
- }
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.py b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.py
-index 781f2728a..e163cc7e4 100755
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.py
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_expire_warn.py
-@@ -34,23 +34,33 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-pw', 'pass', '-pwexpire', '12 hours',
- realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-pw', 'pass', '-pwexpire', '3 days', 'days'])
- 
- # Check for expected prompter warnings when no expire callback is used.
--output = realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'noexpire', 'pass', '0'])
-+output = realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'noexpire', 'pass', '0', '0'])
- if output:
-     fail('Unexpected output for noexpire')
--realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'minutes', 'pass', '0'],
-+realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'minutes', 'pass', '0', '0'],
-           expected_msg=' less than one hour on ')
--realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'hours', 'pass', '0'], expected_msg=' hours on ')
--realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'days', 'pass', '0'], expected_msg=' days on ')
-+realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'hours', 'pass', '0', '0'],
-+          expected_msg=' hours on ')
-+realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'days', 'pass', '0', '0'],
-+          expected_msg=' days on ')
-+# Try one case with the stepwise interface.
-+realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'days', 'pass', '0', '1'],
-+          expected_msg=' days on ')
- 
- # Check for expected expire callback behavior.  These tests are
- # carefully agnostic about whether the KDC supports last_req fields,
- # and could be made more specific if last_req support is added.
--output = realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'noexpire', 'pass', '1'])
-+output = realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'noexpire', 'pass', '1', '0'])
- if 'password_expiration = 0\n' not in output or \
-         'account_expiration = 0\n' not in output or \
-         'is_last_req = ' not in output:
-     fail('Expected callback output not seen for noexpire')
--output = realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'days', 'pass', '1'])
-+output = realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'days', 'pass', '1', '0'])
-+if 'password_expiration = ' not in output or \
-+        'password_expiration = 0\n' in output:
-+    fail('Expected non-zero password expiration not seen for days')
-+# Try one case with the stepwise interface.
-+output = realm.run(['./t_expire_warn', 'days', 'pass', '1', '1'])
- if 'password_expiration = ' not in output or \
-         'password_expiration = 0\n' in output:
-     fail('Expected non-zero password expiration not seen for days')

Eliminate-redundant-PKINIT-responder-invocation.patch

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From b27a2f1f330afed53b034a66031f9a801b4568b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2020 19:10:03 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Eliminate redundant PKINIT responder invocation
-
-In pkinit_client_prep_questions(), only act if the input padata type
-is KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ.  Otherwise we will ask questions again when
-the KDC issues a ticket.
-
-Commit 7621d2f9a87214327ca3b2594e34dc7cea84596b (ticket 8242)
-unintentionally changed the behavior of pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(),
-causing pkinit_client_prep_questions() to do nothing on its first
-call.  Restore the original behavior of returning 0 when prompting is
-deferred.
-
-Modify the existing "FILE identity, password on key (responder)"
-PKINIT test to check that the responder is only invoked once.
-
-ticket: 8885
-(cherry picked from commit f1286842ce7b9e507a4ce0a47f44ab361a98be63)
----
- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c           |  5 +++++
- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 13 +++++++------
- src/tests/t_pkinit.py                              | 11 +++++++----
- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
-index 2f0431991..9b991ffe0 100644
---- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
-@@ -897,6 +897,11 @@ pkinit_client_prep_questions(krb5_context context,
-     k5_json_object jval = NULL;
-     k5_json_number jflag = NULL;
- 
-+    /* Don't ask questions for the informational padata items or when the
-+     * ticket is issued. */
-+    if (pa_data->pa_type != KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ)
-+        return 0;
-+
-     if (!reqctx->identity_initialized) {
-         pkinit_client_profile(context, plgctx, reqctx, cb, rock,
-                               &request->server->realm);
-diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
-index dd718c2be..dbb054378 100644
---- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
-@@ -4362,17 +4362,18 @@ pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(krb5_context context,
- 
-     /* Load the certificate. */
-     retval = get_cert(certname, &x);
--    if (retval != 0 || x == NULL) {
--        retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Cannot read certificate file '%s'"),
-+    if (retval) {
-+        retval = oerr(context, retval, _("Cannot read certificate file '%s'"),
-                       certname);
--        goto cleanup;
-     }
-+    if (retval || x == NULL)
-+        goto cleanup;
-     /* Load the key. */
-     retval = get_key(context, id_cryptoctx, keyname, fsname, &y, password);
--    if (retval != 0 || y == NULL) {
--        retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Cannot read key file '%s'"), fsname);
-+    if (retval)
-+        retval = oerr(context, retval, _("Cannot read key file '%s'"), fsname);
-+    if (retval || y == NULL)
-         goto cleanup;
--    }
- 
-     id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
-     if (id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] == NULL) {
-diff --git a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
-index 69daf4987..ecd450e8a 100755
---- a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
-+++ b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
-@@ -248,10 +248,13 @@ realm.run(['./adata', realm.host_princ],
- # supplied by the responder.
- # Supply the response in raw form.
- mark('FILE identity, password on key (responder)')
--realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 0}' % file_enc_identity,
--           '-r', 'pkinit={"%s": "encrypted"}' % file_enc_identity,
--           '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % file_enc_identity,
--           realm.user_princ])
-+out = realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 0}' % file_enc_identity,
-+                 '-r', 'pkinit={"%s": "encrypted"}' % file_enc_identity,
-+                 '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % file_enc_identity,
-+                 realm.user_princ])
-+# Regression test for #8885 (password question asked twice).
-+if out.count('OK: ') != 1:
-+    fail('Wrong number of responder calls')
- # Supply the response through the convenience API.
- realm.run(['./responder', '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % file_enc_identity,
-            '-p', '%s=%s' % (file_enc_identity, 'encrypted'), realm.user_princ])

Fix-input-length-checking-in-SPNEGO-DER-decoding.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From 5b42970afea248889fd3350448a40045d467ff3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 12:58:26 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix input length checking in SPNEGO DER decoding
-
-In get_mech_set(), check the length before reading the first byte, and
-decrease the length by the tag byte when reading and verifying the
-sequence length.
-
-In get_req_flags(), check the length before reading the first byte,
-and check the context tag length after decoding it.
-
-ticket: 8933 (new)
-tags: pullup
-target_version: 1.18-next
-target_version: 1.17-next
-
-(cherry picked from commit 64f4b75a22212681ca293f8f09ddd24b0244d5b4)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-index 4cf011143..13c351620 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-@@ -3462,14 +3462,14 @@ get_mech_set(OM_uint32 *minor_status, unsigned char **buff_in,
- 	unsigned char		*start;
- 	int i;
- 
--	if (**buff_in != SEQUENCE_OF)
-+	if (buff_length < 1 || **buff_in != SEQUENCE_OF)
- 		return (NULL);
- 
- 	start = *buff_in;
- 	(*buff_in)++;
- 
--	length = gssint_get_der_length(buff_in, buff_length, &bytes);
--	if (length < 0 || buff_length - bytes < (unsigned int)length)
-+	length = gssint_get_der_length(buff_in, buff_length - 1, &bytes);
-+	if (length < 0 || buff_length - 1 - bytes < (unsigned int)length)
- 		return NULL;
- 
- 	major_status = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status,
-@@ -3549,11 +3549,11 @@ get_req_flags(unsigned char **buff_in, OM_uint32 bodysize,
- {
- 	unsigned int len;
- 
--	if (**buff_in != (CONTEXT | 0x01))
-+	if (bodysize < 1 || **buff_in != (CONTEXT | 0x01))
- 		return (0);
- 
- 	if (g_get_tag_and_length(buff_in, (CONTEXT | 0x01),
--				bodysize, &len) < 0)
-+				 bodysize, &len) < 0 || len != 4)
- 		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- 
- 	if (*(*buff_in)++ != BIT_STRING)

Fix-leak-in-KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT-server-support.patch

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From ff47523d7d812fba24106f416aafa5d1f2c433a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 16:05:24 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix leak in KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT server support
-
-In check_cbt(), use a local variable to hold the retrieved authdata
-list, and free it before returning.
-
-ticket: 8900
-(cherry picked from commit bf2ddff13c178e0c291f8fb382b040080d159e4f)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-index 175a24c4e..3d5b84b15 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-@@ -433,27 +433,30 @@ static const uint8_t null_cb[CB_MD5_LEN];
- /* Look for AP_OPTIONS in authdata.  If present and the options include
-  * KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT, set *cbt_out to true. */
- static krb5_error_code
--check_cbt(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata,
-+check_cbt(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata *const *authdata,
-           krb5_boolean *cbt_out)
- {
-     krb5_error_code code;
-+    krb5_authdata **ad;
-     uint32_t ad_ap_options;
-     const uint32_t KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT = 0x4000;
- 
-     *cbt_out = FALSE;
- 
-     code = krb5_find_authdata(context, NULL, authdata,
--                              KRB5_AUTHDATA_AP_OPTIONS, &authdata);
--    if (code || authdata == NULL)
-+                              KRB5_AUTHDATA_AP_OPTIONS, &ad);
-+    if (code || ad == NULL)
-         return code;
--    if (authdata[1] != NULL || authdata[0]->length != 4)
--        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE;
-+    if (ad[1] != NULL || ad[0]->length != 4) {
-+        code = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE;
-+    } else {
-+        ad_ap_options = load_32_le(ad[0]->contents);
-+        if (ad_ap_options & KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT)
-+            *cbt_out = TRUE;
-+    }
- 
--    ad_ap_options = load_32_le(authdata[0]->contents);
--    if (ad_ap_options & KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT)
--        *cbt_out = TRUE;
--
--    return 0;
-+    krb5_free_authdata(context, ad);
-+    return code;
- }
- 
- /*

Fix-minor-static-analysis-defects.patch

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From c3d96fca46cb2cc3ee9f4c2e2a4ed98bad3e310a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 18:15:29 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix minor static analysis defects
-
-Remove an unused variable in krb5_ldap_create().  Handle the return
-value from krb5_dbe_get_string() in the certauth test plugin module.
-Handle the return value from k5_expand_path_tokens() in
-k5_rc_default().  Remove dead assignments in
-krb5_get_credentials_for_user() and kg_accept_krb5().
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: squashed and edited commit message; simplified
-k5_rc_default() change]
-
-(cherry picked from commit b27461141810fddd299764928649148c5d0e99f3)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c       | 4 +---
- src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c                   | 1 -
- src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_base.c                  | 2 ++
- src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c               | 3 +++
- src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_create.c | 4 ----
- 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-index 3d5b84b15..e2c5e2b59 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-     krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
-     krb5_ticket * ticket = NULL;
-     const gss_OID_desc *mech_used = NULL;
--    OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+    OM_uint32 major_status;
-     OM_uint32 tmp_minor_status;
-     krb5_error krb_error_data;
-     krb5_data scratch;
-@@ -878,8 +878,6 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-     if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-         goto fail;
- 
--    major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--
-     if (exts->iakerb.conv && !exts->iakerb.verified) {
-         major_status = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-         goto fail;
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c
-index d8f486dc6..35a8843e5 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c
-@@ -714,7 +714,6 @@ krb5_get_credentials_for_user(krb5_context context, krb5_flags options,
-         } else if (code != KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND && code != KRB5_CC_NOT_KTYPE) {
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
--        code = 0;
-     }
- 
-     /* Note the authdata we asked for in the output creds. */
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_base.c b/src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_base.c
-index 5f456d1f3..f9a482318 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_base.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_base.c
-@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ k5_rc_default(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache *rc_out)
-                            &profstr) == 0 && profstr != NULL) {
-         ret = k5_expand_path_tokens(context, profstr, &rcname);
-         profile_release_string(profstr);
-+        if (ret)
-+            return ret;
-         ret = k5_rc_resolve(context, rcname, rc_out);
-         free(rcname);
-         return ret;
-diff --git a/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c b/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c
-index d4633b8cd..7e7a3ef4c 100644
---- a/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/certauth/test/main.c
-@@ -171,6 +171,9 @@ test2_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
- 
-     ret = krb5_dbe_get_string(context, (krb5_db_entry *)db_entry, "hwauth",
-                               &strval);
-+    if (ret)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-     ret = (strval != NULL) ? KRB5_CERTAUTH_HWAUTH : 0;
-     krb5_dbe_free_string(context, strval);
- 
-diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_create.c b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_create.c
-index 5b57c799a..2d6605666 100644
---- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_create.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_create.c
-@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ krb5_ldap_create(krb5_context context, char *conf_section, char **db_args)
-     krb5_error_code status = 0;
-     krb5_ldap_realm_params *rparams = NULL;
-     krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL;
--    krb5_boolean realm_obj_created = FALSE;
-     int mask = 0;
- 
-     /* Clear the global error string */
-@@ -109,9 +108,6 @@ krb5_ldap_create(krb5_context context, char *conf_section, char **db_args)
-     if ((status = krb5_ldap_create_realm(context, rparams, mask)))
-         goto cleanup;
- 
--    /* We just created the Realm container. Here starts our transaction tracking */
--    realm_obj_created = TRUE;
--
-     /* verify realm object */
-     if ((status = krb5_ldap_read_realm_params(context,
-                                               rparams->realm_name,

Fix-typo-in-in-in-the-ksu-man-page.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From bf8567ed95991628f198e88403e30f78e2d74e15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 15:01:18 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix typo ("in in") in the ksu man page
-
-(cherry picked from commit 1011841acdc1020f308ef4f569c6622f279d8c3f)
----
- doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst | 2 +-
- src/man/ksu.man                | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst b/doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst
-index 8d6c7ef79..933738229 100644
---- a/doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst
-+++ b/doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst
-@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ wrong password is typed in, ksu fails.
- .. note::
- 
-           During authentication, only the tickets that could be
--          obtained without providing a password are cached in in the
-+          obtained without providing a password are cached in the
-           source cache.
- 
- 
-diff --git a/src/man/ksu.man b/src/man/ksu.man
-index 81e34815d..8d4c6a359 100644
---- a/src/man/ksu.man
-+++ b/src/man/ksu.man
-@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ wrong password is typed in, ksu fails.
- .INDENT 0.0
- .INDENT 3.5
- During authentication, only the tickets that could be
--obtained without providing a password are cached in in the
-+obtained without providing a password are cached in the
- source cache.
- .UNINDENT
- .UNINDENT

Ignore-bad-enctypes-in-krb5_string_to_keysalts.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From e74f9424e47ab914c46e549fc5a2cbdf2615ef93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 15:42:20 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Ignore bad enctypes in krb5_string_to_keysalts()
-
-Fixes a problem where the presence of legacy/unrecognized keysalts in
-supported_enctypes would prevent the kadmin programs from starting.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: ideally we would put a warning in the kadmind log,
-but that is difficult to do when the parsing is done inside a library.
-Even adding a trace log is difficult because the kadm5 str_conv
-functions do not accept contexts.]
-
-ticket: 8929 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit be5396ada0e8dabd68bd0aceb733cfca39a609bc)
----
- src/lib/kadm5/str_conv.c | 7 ++++---
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/str_conv.c b/src/lib/kadm5/str_conv.c
-index 7cf51d316..798295606 100644
---- a/src/lib/kadm5/str_conv.c
-+++ b/src/lib/kadm5/str_conv.c
-@@ -340,9 +340,10 @@ krb5_string_to_keysalts(const char *string, const char *tupleseps,
-     while ((ksp = strtok_r(p, tseps, &tlasts)) != NULL) {
-         /* Pass a null pointer to subsequent calls to strtok_r(). */
-         p = NULL;
--        ret = string_to_keysalt(ksp, ksaltseps, &etype, &stype);
--        if (ret)
--            goto cleanup;
-+
-+        /* Discard unrecognized keysalts. */
-+        if (string_to_keysalt(ksp, ksaltseps, &etype, &stype) != 0)
-+            continue;
- 
-         /* Ignore duplicate keysalts if caller asks. */
-         if (!dups && krb5_keysalt_is_present(ksalts, nksalts, etype, stype))

Implement-GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG.patch

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-From 651b9b8084ecff5553b7ef6ee723ce7c4438a9d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Scheel <ascheel@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2017 11:38:30 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Implement GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG
-
-Define a new channel-bound GSS return flag, and set it in the krb5
-mech if the initiator sent channel bindings matching the acceptor's.
-Do not error out if the acceptor specifies channel bindings and the
-initiator does not send them.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: simplified code changes; fleshed out commit message]
-
-[iboukris: cherry-picked from another PR and reduced in scope]
-
-ticket: 8899 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 429a31146083fac21958631c2af572b08ec91022)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_ext.h      |  2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_ext.h b/src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_ext.h
-index 218456e44..c675e8ebb 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_ext.h
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_ext.h
-@@ -595,6 +595,8 @@ gss_store_cred_into(
-  * attribute (along with any applicable RFC 5587 attributes).
-  */
- 
-+#define GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG 2048 /* 0x00000800 */
-+
- OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
- gssspi_query_meta_data(
-     OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-index 70dd7fc0c..9d3e2f4fe 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@ kg_process_extension(krb5_context context,
-                          GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE |        \
-                          GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG | GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG)
- 
-+/* A zero-value channel binding, for comparison */
-+static const uint8_t null_cb[CB_MD5_LEN];
-+
- /*
-  * The krb5 GSS mech appropriates the authenticator checksum field from RFC
-  * 4120 to store structured data instead of a checksum, indicated with checksum
-@@ -435,9 +438,10 @@ kg_process_extension(krb5_context context,
-  *
-  * Interpret the checksum.  Read delegated creds into *deleg_out if it is not
-  * NULL.  Set *flags_out to the allowed subset of token flags, plus
-- * GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG if a delegated credential was present.  Process any
-- * extensions found using exts.  On error, set *code_out to a krb5_error code
-- * for use as a minor status value.
-+ * GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG if a delegated credential was present and
-+ * GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG if matching channel bindings are present.  Process
-+ * any extensions found using exts.  On error, set *code_out to a krb5_error
-+ * code for use as a minor status value.
-  */
- static OM_uint32
- process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context,
-@@ -450,7 +454,7 @@ process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context,
-     krb5_error_code code = 0;
-     OM_uint32 status, option_id, token_flags;
-     size_t cb_len, option_len;
--    krb5_boolean valid;
-+    krb5_boolean valid, token_cb_present = FALSE, cb_match = FALSE;
-     krb5_key subkey;
-     krb5_data option, empty = empty_data();
-     krb5_checksum cb_cksum;
-@@ -516,7 +520,9 @@ process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context,
-                 goto fail;
-             }
-             assert(cb_cksum.length == cb_len);
--            if (k5_bcmp(token_cb, cb_cksum.contents, cb_len) != 0) {
-+            token_cb_present = (k5_bcmp(token_cb, null_cb, cb_len) != 0);
-+            cb_match = (k5_bcmp(token_cb, cb_cksum.contents, cb_len) == 0);
-+            if (token_cb_present && !cb_match) {
-                 status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
-                 goto fail;
-             }
-@@ -525,6 +531,8 @@ process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context,
-         /* Read the token flags and accept some of them as context flags. */
-         token_flags = k5_input_get_uint32_le(&in);
-         *flags_out = token_flags & INITIATOR_FLAGS;
-+        if (cb_match)
-+            *flags_out |= GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND_FLAG;
- 
-         /* Read the delegated credential if present. */
-         if (in.len >= 4 && (token_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) {

Implement-KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT-server-side.patch

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-From bc89c6c720c4170d43010fead23550b80499c32a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 16:04:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Implement KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT (server side)
-
-Add server support for Microsoft's KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT as described in
-MS-KILE.  If the client includes the AP option in the authenticator
-authdata and the server passed channel bindings, require the bindings
-to match.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: refactored to put more logic in the helper function;
-added a comment; clarified commit message]
-
-ticket: 8900 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 4f7c77b64a048ca5e3199b26b31493698c777a9c)
----
- src/include/krb5/krb5.hin                |  1 +
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-index f8269fb17..9264bede1 100644
---- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
-@@ -1915,6 +1915,7 @@ krb5_verify_checksum(krb5_context context, krb5_cksumtype ctype,
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET        512     /**< formerly 142 in krb5 1.8 */
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_FX_ARMOR 71
- #define KRB5_AUTHDATA_AUTH_INDICATOR 97
-+#define KRB5_AUTHDATA_AP_OPTIONS 143
- /** @} */ /* end of KRB5_AUTHDATA group */
- 
- /* password change constants */
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-index 9d3e2f4fe..175a24c4e 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-@@ -430,6 +430,32 @@ kg_process_extension(krb5_context context,
- /* A zero-value channel binding, for comparison */
- static const uint8_t null_cb[CB_MD5_LEN];
- 
-+/* Look for AP_OPTIONS in authdata.  If present and the options include
-+ * KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT, set *cbt_out to true. */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+check_cbt(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata,
-+          krb5_boolean *cbt_out)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code code;
-+    uint32_t ad_ap_options;
-+    const uint32_t KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT = 0x4000;
-+
-+    *cbt_out = FALSE;
-+
-+    code = krb5_find_authdata(context, NULL, authdata,
-+                              KRB5_AUTHDATA_AP_OPTIONS, &authdata);
-+    if (code || authdata == NULL)
-+        return code;
-+    if (authdata[1] != NULL || authdata[0]->length != 4)
-+        return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE;
-+
-+    ad_ap_options = load_32_le(authdata[0]->contents);
-+    if (ad_ap_options & KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT)
-+        *cbt_out = TRUE;
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * The krb5 GSS mech appropriates the authenticator checksum field from RFC
-  * 4120 to store structured data instead of a checksum, indicated with checksum
-@@ -454,7 +480,7 @@ process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context,
-     krb5_error_code code = 0;
-     OM_uint32 status, option_id, token_flags;
-     size_t cb_len, option_len;
--    krb5_boolean valid, token_cb_present = FALSE, cb_match = FALSE;
-+    krb5_boolean valid, client_cbt, token_cb_present = FALSE, cb_match = FALSE;
-     krb5_key subkey;
-     krb5_data option, empty = empty_data();
-     krb5_checksum cb_cksum;
-@@ -582,6 +608,23 @@ process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context,
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    /*
-+     * If the client asserts the KERB_AP_OPTIONS_CBT flag (from MS-KILE) in the
-+     * authenticator authdata, and the acceptor passed channel bindings,
-+     * require matching channel bindings from the client.  The intent is to
-+     * prevent an authenticator generated for use outside of a TLS channel from
-+     * being used inside of one.
-+     */
-+    code = check_cbt(context, authenticator->authorization_data, &client_cbt);
-+    if (code) {
-+        status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+        goto fail;
-+    }
-+    if (client_cbt && acceptor_cb != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS && !cb_match) {
-+        status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
-+        goto fail;
-+    }
-+
-     status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- 
- fail:

Improve-KDC-alias-checking-for-S4U-requests.patch

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-From ed87237cdd70f72b309960a294a2bed26cef1579 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2020 14:05:50 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Improve KDC alias checking for S4U requests
-
-When processing an S4U2Self request, check for DB aliases when
-matching the TGT client against the request server.  When processing
-an S4U2Proxy request, check for DB aliases when matching the TGT
-client against the evidence ticket server.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: minor edits; rewrote commit message]
-
-ticket: 8946 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 05deeebfc096970b5d9aa67a48b14106cf1b9b56)
----
- src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-index e3352f9cc..dcb2df8dc 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-@@ -1463,6 +1463,25 @@ cleanup:
-     return code;
- }
- 
-+/* Return true if princ canonicalizes to the same principal as canon. */
-+static krb5_boolean
-+is_client_alias(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal canon,
-+                krb5_const_principal princ)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_db_entry *self;
-+    krb5_boolean is_self = FALSE;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_db_get_principal(context, princ,
-+                                KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY, &self);
-+    if (!ret) {
-+        is_self = krb5_principal_compare(context, canon, self->princ);
-+        krb5_db_free_principal(context, self);
-+    }
-+
-+    return is_self;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Protocol transition (S4U2Self)
-  */
-@@ -1481,7 +1500,6 @@ kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
- {
-     krb5_error_code             code;
-     krb5_pa_data                *pa_data;
--    int                         flags;
-     krb5_db_entry               *princ;
-     krb5_s4u_userid             *id;
- 
-@@ -1515,51 +1533,11 @@ kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-     }
-     id = &(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id;
- 
--    /*
--     * We need to compare the client name in the TGT with the requested
--     * server name. Supporting server name aliases without assuming a
--     * global name service makes this difficult to do.
--     *
--     * The comparison below handles the following cases (note that the
--     * term "principal name" below excludes the realm).
--     *
--     * (1) The requested service is a host-based service with two name
--     *     components, in which case we assume the principal name to
--     *     contain sufficient qualifying information. The realm is
--     *     ignored for the purpose of comparison.
--     *
--     * (2) The requested service name is an enterprise principal name:
--     *     the service principal name is compared with the unparsed
--     *     form of the client name (including its realm).
--     *
--     * (3) The requested service is some other name type: an exact
--     *     match is required.
--     *
--     * An alternative would be to look up the server once again with
--     * FLAG_CANONICALIZE | FLAG_CLIENT_REFERRALS_ONLY set, do an exact
--     * match between the returned name and client_princ. However, this
--     * assumes that the client set FLAG_CANONICALIZE when requesting
--     * the TGT and that we have a global name service.
--     */
--    flags = 0;
--    switch (krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server)) {
--    case KRB5_NT_SRV_HST:                   /* (1) */
--        if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2)
--            flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_IGNORE_REALM;
--        break;
--    case KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL:      /* (2) */
--        flags |= KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_ENTERPRISE;
--        break;
--    default:                                /* (3) */
--        break;
--    }
--
--    if (!krb5_principal_compare_flags(kdc_context,
--                                      request->server,
--                                      client_princ,
--                                      flags)) {
--        *status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
--        return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error code */
-+    /* If the server is local, check that the request is for self. */
-+    if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ISSUING_REFERRAL) &&
-+        !is_client_alias(kdc_context, server->princ, client_princ)) {
-+        *status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST_SERVER_MISMATCH";
-+        return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* match Windows error */
-     }
- 
-     /*
-@@ -1750,9 +1728,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, unsigned int flags,
-         }
- 
-         client_princ = *stkt_authdata_client;
--    } else if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
--                                       server->princ, /* after canon */
--                                       server_princ)) {
-+    } else if (!is_client_alias(kdc_context, server->princ, server_princ)) {
-         *status = "EVIDENCE_TICKET_MISMATCH";
-         return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
-     }

Improve-negoex_parse_token-code-hygiene.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From 4c96c8fef146337b7d3c0ebb4118a18818dd1f4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2020 16:23:37 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Improve negoex_parse_token() code hygiene
-
-If the while loop in negoex_parse_token() runs for zero iterations,
-major will be used initialized.  Currently this cannot happen, but
-only because both of the call sites check for zero-length tokens.
-Initialize major for safety.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: rewrote commit message]
-
-(cherry picked from commit 4f91b6f8fa6fe1de662b3fdac0d59b7758ec642a)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c
-index 700368456..99580fd79 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c
-@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ negoex_parse_token(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
-                    gss_const_buffer_t token,
-                    struct negoex_message **messages_out, size_t *count_out)
- {
--    OM_uint32 major;
-+    OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-     size_t count = 0;
-     struct k5input in;
-     struct negoex_message *messages = NULL, *newptr;

Minimize-usage-of-tgs_server-in-KDC.patch

@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-From 5e79319edf3836d12dbc710ec1e2dd4405c9df35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 11:12:34 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Minimize usage of tgs_server in KDC
-
-Where possible, use the realm of the request server principal
-(canonicalized via KDB lookup, if available) in preference to
-tgs_server.  This change facilitates alias realm support and potential
-future support for serving multiple realms from the same KDB.
-
-S4U2Self local user testing currently uses the uncanonicalized request
-realm after this change, which will require attention for alias realm
-support.
-
-FAST armor ticket checking is unaffected by this change (it still
-compares against tgs_server).  This check poses no issue for realm
-aliases, as both tgs_server and the armor ticket server should have
-canonical realms, but it will require attention for multi-realm KDB
-support.
-
-Remove is_local_principal() as it is no longer used.  Add an
-is_local_tgs_principal() helper and shorten is_cross_tgs_principal().
-
-Move the header ticket lineage check from kdc_process_tgs_req() to
-process_tgs_req(), where we have the canonical request server name and
-a more natural indication of whether the request was an S4U2Self
-request.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 90fedf8188fc47aa5a476a969af34671555df389)
----
- src/kdc/do_as_req.c  | 21 ++++++--------
- src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c | 16 ++++++++---
- src/kdc/kdc_util.c   | 68 ++++++++++----------------------------------
- src/kdc/kdc_util.h   |  3 +-
- src/kdc/tgs_policy.c | 16 ++++++-----
- 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-index c2dfea9b8..e0ac33649 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-@@ -620,18 +620,6 @@ process_as_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *req_pkt,
-     }
-     state->rock.client = state->client;
- 
--    /*
--     * If the backend returned a principal that is not in the local
--     * realm, then we need to refer the client to that realm.
--     */
--    if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, state->client->princ)) {
--        /* Entry is a referral to another realm */
--        state->status = "REFERRAL";
--        au_state->cl_realm = &state->client->princ->realm;
--        errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
--        goto errout;
--    }
--
-     au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC;
- 
-     s_flags = 0;
-@@ -651,6 +639,15 @@ process_as_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *req_pkt,
-         goto errout;
-     }
- 
-+    /* If the KDB module returned a different realm for the client and server,
-+     * we need to issue a client realm referral. */
-+    if (!data_eq(state->server->princ->realm, state->client->princ->realm)) {
-+        state->status = "REFERRAL";
-+        au_state->cl_realm = &state->client->princ->realm;
-+        errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
-+        goto errout;
-+    }
-+
-     errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &state->request->server->realm,
-                             state->server, &state->local_tgt,
-                             &state->local_tgt_storage, &state->local_tgt_key);
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-index d345797c4..8ea418e43 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *pkt,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
--    if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_ticket->server))
-+    if (!data_eq(header_server->princ->realm, sprinc->realm))
-         setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
-     if (is_referral)
-         setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ISSUING_REFERRAL);
-@@ -295,6 +295,15 @@ process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *pkt,
-         au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL;
-     }
- 
-+    /* Aside from cross-realm S4U2Self requests, do not accept header tickets
-+     * for local users issued by foreign realms. */
-+    if (s4u_x509_user == NULL && data_eq(cprinc->realm, sprinc->realm) &&
-+        isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
-+        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("PROCESS_TGS: failed lineage check"));
-+        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-     if (errcode)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -583,13 +592,12 @@ process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *pkt,
- 
-     /*
-      * Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
--     * it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
-+     * it is different than the server realm (cross-realm) and it is different
-      * than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
-      * implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
-      * listed).
-      */
--    /* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
--    if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
-+    if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM) ||
-         krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
-                            enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
-         /* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-index b2042862a..e0b65a87c 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-@@ -78,12 +78,6 @@ static krb5_error_code find_server_key(krb5_context,
-                                        krb5_kvno, krb5_keyblock **,
-                                        krb5_kvno *);
- 
--krb5_boolean
--is_local_principal(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_const_principal princ1)
--{
--    return krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, princ1, tgs_server);
--}
--
- /*
-  * Returns TRUE if the kerberos principal is the name of a Kerberos ticket
-  * service.
-@@ -104,13 +98,16 @@ krb5_is_tgs_principal(krb5_const_principal principal)
- krb5_boolean
- is_cross_tgs_principal(krb5_const_principal principal)
- {
--    if (!krb5_is_tgs_principal(principal))
--        return FALSE;
--    if (!data_eq(*krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 1),
--                 *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, principal)))
--        return TRUE;
--    else
--        return FALSE;
-+    return krb5_is_tgs_principal(principal) &&
-+        !data_eq(principal->data[1], principal->realm);
-+}
-+
-+/* Return true if princ is the name of a local TGS for any realm. */
-+krb5_boolean
-+is_local_tgs_principal(krb5_const_principal principal)
-+{
-+    return krb5_is_tgs_principal(principal) &&
-+        data_eq(principal->data[1], principal->realm);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -143,17 +140,6 @@ comp_cksum(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_data *source, krb5_ticket *ticket,
-     return(0);
- }
- 
--/* Return true if padata contains an entry of either S4U2Self type. */
--static inline krb5_boolean
--has_s4u2self_padata(krb5_pa_data **padata)
--{
--    if (krb5int_find_pa_data(NULL, padata, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER) != NULL)
--        return TRUE;
--    if (krb5int_find_pa_data(NULL, padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL)
--        return TRUE;
--    return FALSE;
--}
--
- /* If a header ticket is decrypted, *ticket_out is filled in even on error. */
- krb5_error_code
- kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-@@ -170,7 +156,6 @@ kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-     krb5_authdata **authdata = NULL;
-     krb5_data             scratch1;
-     krb5_data           * scratch = NULL;
--    krb5_boolean          foreign_server = FALSE;
-     krb5_auth_context     auth_context = NULL;
-     krb5_authenticator  * authenticator = NULL;
-     krb5_checksum       * his_cksum = NULL;
-@@ -199,19 +184,6 @@ kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
--    /* If the "server" principal in the ticket is not something
--       in the local realm, then we must refuse to service the request
--       if the client claims to be from the local realm.
--
--       If we don't do this, then some other realm's nasty KDC can
--       claim to be authenticating a client from our realm, and we'll
--       give out tickets concurring with it!
--
--       we set a flag here for checking below.
--    */
--    foreign_server = !is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm,
--                                         apreq->ticket->server);
--
-     if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_init(kdc_context, &auth_context)))
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -265,15 +237,6 @@ kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-         goto cleanup_authenticator;
-     }
- 
--    /* make sure the client is of proper lineage (see above) */
--    if (foreign_server && !has_s4u2self_padata(request->padata) &&
--        is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, ticket->enc_part2->client)) {
--        /* someone in a foreign realm claiming to be local */
--        krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("PROCESS_TGS: failed lineage check"));
--        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
--        goto cleanup_authenticator;
--    }
--
-     /*
-      * Check application checksum vs. tgs request
-      *
-@@ -591,12 +554,12 @@ int
- check_anon(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-            krb5_principal client, krb5_principal server)
- {
--    /* If restrict_anon is set, reject requests from anonymous to principals
--     * other than the local TGT. */
-+    /* If restrict_anon is set, reject requests from anonymous clients to
-+     * server principals other than local TGTs. */
-     if (kdc_active_realm->realm_restrict_anon &&
-         krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(kdc_context, client,
-                                          krb5_anonymous_principal()) &&
--        !krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, server, tgs_server))
-+        !is_local_tgs_principal(server))
-         return -1;
-     return 0;
- }
-@@ -1527,7 +1490,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-     /*
-      * Do not attempt to lookup principals in foreign realms.
-      */
--    if (is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, id->user)) {
-+    if (data_eq(server->princ->realm, id->user->realm)) {
-         krb5_db_entry no_server;
-         krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
- 
-@@ -1663,8 +1626,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, unsigned int flags,
-          */
-         if (isflagset(flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ISSUING_REFERRAL) ||
-             !is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) ||
--            !krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(kdc_context, server->princ,
--                                              tgs_server) ||
-+            !data_eq(server->princ->data[1], proxy->princ->realm) ||
-             !krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, client_princ, server_princ)) {
-             *status = "XREALM_EVIDENCE_TICKET_MISMATCH";
-             return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-index 04007a8f5..a6bac4388 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-@@ -37,10 +37,9 @@
- #include "reqstate.h"
- 
- krb5_error_code check_hot_list (krb5_ticket *);
--krb5_boolean is_local_principal(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
--                                krb5_const_principal princ1);
- krb5_boolean krb5_is_tgs_principal (krb5_const_principal);
- krb5_boolean is_cross_tgs_principal(krb5_const_principal);
-+krb5_boolean is_local_tgs_principal(krb5_const_principal);
- krb5_error_code
- add_to_transited (krb5_data *,
-                   krb5_data *,
-diff --git a/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c b/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c
-index 3f4fa8499..a5a00f0cc 100644
---- a/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/tgs_policy.c
-@@ -252,19 +252,21 @@ check_tgs_s4u2proxy(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
- }
- 
- static int
--check_tgs_u2u(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
--              krb5_kdc_req *req, const char **status)
-+check_tgs_u2u(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
-+              krb5_const_principal server_princ, const char **status)
- {
-+    krb5_const_principal second_server_princ;
-+
-     if (req->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
-         /* Check that second ticket is in request. */
-         if (!req->second_ticket || !req->second_ticket[0]) {
-             *status = "NO_2ND_TKT";
-             return KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
-         }
--        /* Check that second ticket is a TGT. */
--        if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
--                                    req->second_ticket[0]->server,
--                                    tgs_server)) {
-+        /* Check that second ticket is a TGT to the server realm. */
-+        second_server_princ = req->second_ticket[0]->server;
-+        if (!is_local_tgs_principal(second_server_princ) ||
-+            !data_eq(second_server_princ->data[1], server_princ->realm)) {
-             *status = "2ND_TKT_NOT_TGS";
-             return KDC_ERR_POLICY;
-         }
-@@ -353,7 +355,7 @@ validate_tgs_request(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
-         return(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT);
-     }
- 
--    errcode = check_tgs_u2u(kdc_active_realm, request, status);
-+    errcode = check_tgs_u2u(kdc_active_realm, request, server->princ, status);
-     if (errcode != 0)
-         return errcode;
- 

Omit-KDC-indicator-check-for-S4U2Self-requests.patch

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From f0ac5c1efef5401f669dc176e62c09b0b01fa2d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 16:03:13 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Omit KDC indicator check for S4U2Self requests
-
-As there was no initial ticket exchange from the client for an
-S4U2Self request, the auth indicator check is inapplicable (and would
-always fail if any auth indicators are required).
-
-ticket: 8902 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 183631fbf72351c2d5fc7d60b2d9fc4d09fe7465)
----
- src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c | 14 +++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-index 241f34e2a..463a9c0dd 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-@@ -392,8 +392,8 @@ process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *pkt,
-     }
-     authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
- 
--    /* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Self
--     * requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
-+    /* Extract and check auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for
-+     * S4U2Self requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
-     if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
-         errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt,
-                                       &local_tgt_key, &auth_indicators);
-@@ -401,12 +401,12 @@ process_tgs_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_data *pkt,
-             status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS";
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
--    }
- 
--    errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
--    if (errcode) {
--        status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
--        goto cleanup;
-+        errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
-+        if (errcode) {
-+            status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
-+            goto cleanup;
-+        }
-     }
- 
-     if (is_referral)

Omit-PA_FOR_USER-if-we-can-t-compute-its-checksum.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 5251097c927f476fe83ffe544b73fd2d785aaf2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2020 11:03:37 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Omit PA_FOR_USER if we can't compute its checksum
-
-OpenSSL in FIPS mode will refuse to perform hmac-md5.  Omit the legacy
-PA_FOR_USER element in this case rather than failing out.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: minor code and comment edits; wrote commit message]
-
-ticket: 8912 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit 03f122bdb22cfa53c7d855ed929c9541e56365e0)
----
- src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c
-index fc5c886d6..d8f486dc6 100644
---- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c
-+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c
-@@ -534,6 +534,13 @@ krb5_get_self_cred_from_kdc(krb5_context context,
-         if (s4u_user.user_id.user != NULL && s4u_user.user_id.user->length) {
-             code = build_pa_for_user(context, tgtptr, &s4u_user.user_id,
-                                      &in_padata[1]);
-+            /*
-+             * If we couldn't compute the hmac-md5 checksum, send only the
-+             * KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER; this will still work against modern
-+             * Windows and MIT KDCs.
-+             */
-+            if (code == KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL)
-+                code = 0;
-             if (code != 0) {
-                 krb5_free_pa_data(context, in_padata);
-                 goto cleanup;

Pass-channel-bindings-through-SPNEGO.patch

@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
-From 17d9b74328f247de5f9d820ae008726632d11d2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 18:15:55 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Pass channel bindings through SPNEGO
-
-ticket: 8907 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit d16325a24c34ec9a5f6fb4910987f162e0d4d9cd)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_negoex.h |  8 ++---
- src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_ctx.c     | 34 +++++++++++----------
- src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c    | 41 +++++++++++++-------------
- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_negoex.h b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_negoex.h
-index 44b08f523..489ab7c42 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_negoex.h
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_negoex.h
-@@ -201,10 +201,10 @@ negoex_restrict_auth_schemes(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- OM_uint32
- negoex_init(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
-             gss_name_t target_name, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req,
--            gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_buffer_t output_token,
--            OM_uint32 *time_rec);
-+            gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
-+            gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *time_rec);
- 
- OM_uint32
- negoex_accept(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
--              gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_buffer_t output_token,
--              OM_uint32 *time_rec);
-+              gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
-+              gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *time_rec);
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_ctx.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_ctx.c
-index 18d9d4147..8848ee4db 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_ctx.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_ctx.c
-@@ -276,7 +276,8 @@ static OM_uint32
- mech_init(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
-           gss_name_t target, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req,
-           struct negoex_message *messages, size_t nmessages,
--          gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
-+          gss_channel_bindings_t bindings, gss_buffer_t output_token,
-+          OM_uint32 *time_rec)
- {
-     OM_uint32 major, first_major = 0, first_minor = 0;
-     struct negoex_auth_mech *mech = NULL;
-@@ -316,10 +317,9 @@ mech_init(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
-         mech = K5_TAILQ_FIRST(&ctx->negoex_mechs);
- 
-         major = gss_init_sec_context(minor, cred, &mech->mech_context, target,
--                                     mech->oid, req_flags, time_req,
--                                     GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, input_token,
--                                     &ctx->actual_mech, output_token,
--                                     &ctx->ctx_flags, time_rec);
-+                                     mech->oid, req_flags, time_req, bindings,
-+                                     input_token, &ctx->actual_mech,
-+                                     output_token, &ctx->ctx_flags, time_rec);
- 
-         if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-             mech->complete = 1;
-@@ -351,7 +351,8 @@ mech_init(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
- static OM_uint32
- mech_accept(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
-             gss_cred_id_t cred, struct negoex_message *messages,
--            size_t nmessages, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
-+            size_t nmessages, gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
-+            gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
- {
-     OM_uint32 major, tmpmin;
-     struct negoex_auth_mech *mech;
-@@ -395,10 +396,10 @@ mech_accept(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
-         gss_release_cred(&tmpmin, &ctx->deleg_cred);
- 
-     major = gss_accept_sec_context(minor, &mech->mech_context, cred,
--                                   &msg->token, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
--                                   &ctx->internal_name, &ctx->actual_mech,
--                                   output_token, &ctx->ctx_flags,
--                                   time_rec, &ctx->deleg_cred);
-+                                   &msg->token, bindings, &ctx->internal_name,
-+                                   &ctx->actual_mech, output_token,
-+                                   &ctx->ctx_flags, time_rec,
-+                                   &ctx->deleg_cred);
- 
-     if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-         mech->complete = 1;
-@@ -609,8 +610,8 @@ make_output_token(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- OM_uint32
- negoex_init(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
-             gss_name_t target_name, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req,
--            gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_buffer_t output_token,
--            OM_uint32 *time_rec)
-+            gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
-+            gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
- {
-     OM_uint32 major, tmpmin;
-     gss_buffer_desc mech_output_token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-@@ -663,7 +664,8 @@ negoex_init(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
-     /* Process the input token and/or produce an output token.  This may prune
-      * the mech list, but on success there will be at least one mech entry. */
-     major = mech_init(minor, ctx, cred, target_name, req_flags, time_req,
--                      messages, nmessages, &mech_output_token, time_rec);
-+                      messages, nmessages, bindings, &mech_output_token,
-+                      time_rec);
-     if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-         goto cleanup;
-     assert(!K5_TAILQ_EMPTY(&ctx->negoex_mechs));
-@@ -701,8 +703,8 @@ cleanup:
- 
- OM_uint32
- negoex_accept(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
--              gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_buffer_t output_token,
--              OM_uint32 *time_rec)
-+              gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
-+              gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 *time_rec)
- {
-     OM_uint32 major, tmpmin;
-     gss_buffer_desc mech_output_token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-@@ -754,7 +756,7 @@ negoex_accept(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred,
-      * prune the list to a single mech.  Continue on error if an output token
-      * is generated, so that we send the token to the initiator.
-      */
--    major = mech_accept(minor, ctx, cred, messages, nmessages,
-+    major = mech_accept(minor, ctx, cred, messages, nmessages, bindings,
-                         &mech_output_token, time_rec);
-     if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && mech_output_token.length == 0)
-         goto cleanup;
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-index 594fc5894..4cf011143 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ init_ctx_reselect(OM_uint32 *, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t, OM_uint32,
- static OM_uint32
- init_ctx_call_init(OM_uint32 *, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t, spnego_gss_cred_id_t,
- 		   OM_uint32, gss_name_t, OM_uint32, OM_uint32, gss_buffer_t,
-+		   gss_channel_bindings_t,
- 		   gss_buffer_t, OM_uint32 *, send_token_flag *);
- 
- static OM_uint32
-@@ -144,8 +145,8 @@ acc_ctx_vfy_oid(OM_uint32 *, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t, gss_OID,
- 		OM_uint32 *, send_token_flag *);
- static OM_uint32
- acc_ctx_call_acc(OM_uint32 *, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t, spnego_gss_cred_id_t,
--		 gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *,
--		 send_token_flag *);
-+		 gss_buffer_t, gss_channel_bindings_t, gss_buffer_t,
-+		 OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *, send_token_flag *);
- 
- static gss_OID
- negotiate_mech(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t, gss_OID_set, OM_uint32 *);
-@@ -905,6 +906,7 @@ init_ctx_call_init(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
- 		   OM_uint32 req_flags,
- 		   OM_uint32 time_req,
- 		   gss_buffer_t mechtok_in,
-+		   gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
- 		   gss_buffer_t mechtok_out,
- 		   OM_uint32 *time_rec,
- 		   send_token_flag *send_token)
-@@ -921,15 +923,14 @@ init_ctx_call_init(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
- 	if (gss_oid_equal(sc->internal_mech, &negoex_mech)) {
- 		ret = negoex_init(minor_status, sc, mcred, target_name,
- 				  mech_req_flags, time_req, mechtok_in,
--				  mechtok_out, time_rec);
-+				  bindings, mechtok_out, time_rec);
- 	} else {
- 		ret = gss_init_sec_context(minor_status, mcred,
- 					   &sc->ctx_handle, target_name,
- 					   sc->internal_mech, mech_req_flags,
--					   time_req, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
--					   mechtok_in, &sc->actual_mech,
--					   mechtok_out, &sc->ctx_flags,
--					   time_rec);
-+					   time_req, bindings, mechtok_in,
-+					   &sc->actual_mech, mechtok_out,
-+					   &sc->ctx_flags, time_rec);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Bail out if the acceptor gave us an error token but the mech didn't
-@@ -981,8 +982,8 @@ init_ctx_call_init(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
- 	gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- 	tmpret = init_ctx_call_init(&tmpmin, sc, spcred, acc_negState,
- 				    target_name, req_flags, time_req,
--				    mechtok_in, mechtok_out, time_rec,
--				    send_token);
-+				    mechtok_in, bindings, mechtok_out,
-+				    time_rec, send_token);
- 	if (HARD_ERROR(tmpret))
- 		goto fail;
- 	*minor_status = tmpmin;
-@@ -1004,7 +1005,7 @@ spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
- 			gss_OID mech_type,
- 			OM_uint32 req_flags,
- 			OM_uint32 time_req,
--			gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
-+			gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
- 			gss_buffer_t input_token,
- 			gss_OID *actual_mech,
- 			gss_buffer_t output_token,
-@@ -1084,8 +1085,8 @@ spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
- 	if (!spnego_ctx->mech_complete) {
- 		ret = init_ctx_call_init(minor_status, spnego_ctx, spcred,
- 					 acc_negState, target_name, req_flags,
--					 time_req, mechtok_in, &mechtok_out,
--					 time_rec, &send_token);
-+					 time_req, mechtok_in, bindings,
-+					 &mechtok_out, time_rec, &send_token);
- 		if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
- 			goto cleanup;
- 
-@@ -1542,8 +1543,9 @@ cleanup:
- static OM_uint32
- acc_ctx_call_acc(OM_uint32 *minor_status, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc,
- 		 spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred, gss_buffer_t mechtok_in,
--		 gss_buffer_t mechtok_out, OM_uint32 *time_rec,
--		 OM_uint32 *negState, send_token_flag *tokflag)
-+		 gss_channel_bindings_t bindings, gss_buffer_t mechtok_out,
-+		 OM_uint32 *time_rec, OM_uint32 *negState,
-+		 send_token_flag *tokflag)
- {
- 	OM_uint32 ret, tmpmin;
- 	gss_OID_desc mechoid;
-@@ -1568,13 +1570,12 @@ acc_ctx_call_acc(OM_uint32 *minor_status, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc,
- 	mcred = (spcred == NULL) ? GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL : spcred->mcred;
- 	if (negoex) {
- 		ret = negoex_accept(minor_status, sc, mcred, mechtok_in,
--				    mechtok_out, time_rec);
-+				    bindings, mechtok_out, time_rec);
- 	} else {
- 		(void) gss_release_name(&tmpmin, &sc->internal_name);
- 		(void) gss_release_cred(&tmpmin, &sc->deleg_cred);
- 		ret = gss_accept_sec_context(minor_status, &sc->ctx_handle,
--					     mcred, mechtok_in,
--					     GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
-+					     mcred, mechtok_in, bindings,
- 					     &sc->internal_name,
- 					     &sc->actual_mech, mechtok_out,
- 					     &sc->ctx_flags, time_rec,
-@@ -1620,7 +1621,7 @@ spnego_gss_accept_sec_context(
- 			    gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
- 			    gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle,
- 			    gss_buffer_t input_token,
--			    gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
-+			    gss_channel_bindings_t bindings,
- 			    gss_name_t *src_name,
- 			    gss_OID *mech_type,
- 			    gss_buffer_t output_token,
-@@ -1734,8 +1735,8 @@ spnego_gss_accept_sec_context(
- 	 */
- 	if (negState != REQUEST_MIC && mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
- 		ret = acc_ctx_call_acc(minor_status, sc, spcred, mechtok_in,
--				       &mechtok_out, time_rec, &negState,
--				       &return_token);
-+				       bindings, &mechtok_out, time_rec,
-+				       &negState, &return_token);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is

Pass-gss_localname-through-SPNEGO.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From cec820485e8b854fe3ee42d0a67a77e7ad20595e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 19:55:54 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Pass gss_localname() through SPNEGO
-
-ticket: 8897 (new)
-(cherry picked from commit f7b8a6432bd289bdc528017be122305f95b8e285)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h | 8 ++++++++
- src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c    | 9 ++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
-index a93763314..066ec736f 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
-@@ -357,6 +357,14 @@ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit
- 	OM_uint32	*max_input_size
- );
- 
-+OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV spnego_gss_localname
-+(
-+	OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-+	const gss_name_t pname,
-+	const gss_const_OID mech_type,
-+	gss_buffer_t localname
-+);
-+
- OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV spnego_gss_get_mic
- (
- 	OM_uint32 *minor_status,
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-index ec0bae6a4..594fc5894 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
-@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static struct gss_config spnego_mechanism =
- 	spnego_gss_inquire_context,	/* gss_inquire_context */
- 	NULL,				/* gss_internal_release_oid */
- 	spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit,	/* gss_wrap_size_limit */
--	NULL,				/* gssd_pname_to_uid */
-+	spnego_gss_localname,
- 	NULL,				/* gss_userok */
- 	NULL,				/* gss_export_name */
- 	spnego_gss_duplicate_name,	/* gss_duplicate_name */
-@@ -2371,6 +2371,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
- 	return (ret);
- }
- 
-+OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
-+spnego_gss_localname(OM_uint32 *minor_status, const gss_name_t pname,
-+		     const gss_const_OID mech_type, gss_buffer_t localname)
-+{
-+	return gss_localname(minor_status, pname, GSS_C_NO_OID, localname);
-+}
-+
- OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
- spnego_gss_get_mic(
- 		OM_uint32 *minor_status,

Refactor-KDC-authdata-list-management-helpers.patch

@@ -1,335 +0,0 @@
-From 9335481c00cd15170adec244ccff0a00a014bbab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2020 18:46:11 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Refactor KDC authdata list management helpers
-
-Remove the unused concat_authorization_data().  Split merge_authdata()
-into two helpers, one to destructively merge without filtering and one
-to add copied elements while filtering out KDC-only authdata types.
-Remove context parameters where they aren't needed (taking advantage
-of knowledge that some libkrb5 functions don't use their context
-parameters).
-
-(cherry picked from commit b2190fdc253de6024001e0f1ff9fe56c31042bb7)
----
- src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
- src/kdc/kdc_util.c     |  50 ---------------
- src/kdc/kdc_util.h     |   5 --
- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c b/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
-index 1ebe87246..010922c27 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
-@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ unload_authdata_plugins(krb5_context context)
- /* Return true if authdata should be filtered when copying from untrusted
-  * authdata.  If desired_type is non-zero, look only for that type. */
- static krb5_boolean
--is_kdc_issued_authdatum(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata *authdata,
-+is_kdc_issued_authdatum(krb5_authdata *authdata,
-                         krb5_authdatatype desired_type)
- {
-     krb5_boolean result = FALSE;
-@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ is_kdc_issued_authdatum(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata *authdata,
-     krb5_authdatatype *ad_types, *containee_types = NULL;
- 
-     if (authdata->ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT) {
--        if (krb5int_get_authdata_containee_types(context, authdata, &count,
-+        if (krb5int_get_authdata_containee_types(NULL, authdata, &count,
-                                                  &containee_types) != 0)
-             goto cleanup;
-         ad_types = containee_types;
-@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ cleanup:
- /* Return true if authdata contains any elements which should only come from
-  * the KDC.  If desired_type is non-zero, look only for that type. */
- static krb5_boolean
--has_kdc_issued_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata,
-+has_kdc_issued_authdata(krb5_authdata **authdata,
-                         krb5_authdatatype desired_type)
- {
-     int i;
-@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ has_kdc_issued_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata,
-     if (authdata == NULL)
-         return FALSE;
-     for (i = 0; authdata[i] != NULL; i++) {
--        if (is_kdc_issued_authdatum(context, authdata[i], desired_type))
-+        if (is_kdc_issued_authdatum(authdata[i], desired_type))
-             return TRUE;
-     }
-     return FALSE;
-@@ -181,66 +181,71 @@ has_mandatory_for_kdc_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata)
-     return FALSE;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * Add the elements of in_authdata to out_authdata.  If copy is false,
-- * in_authdata is invalid on successful return.  If ignore_kdc_issued is true,
-- * KDC-issued authdata is not copied.
-- */
-+/* Add elements from *new_elements to *existing_list, reallocating as
-+ * necessary.  On success, release *new_elements and set it to NULL. */
- static krb5_error_code
--merge_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **in_authdata,
--               krb5_authdata ***out_authdata, krb5_boolean copy,
--               krb5_boolean ignore_kdc_issued)
-+merge_authdata(krb5_authdata ***existing_list, krb5_authdata ***new_elements)
- {
--    krb5_error_code ret;
--    size_t i, j, nadata = 0;
--    krb5_authdata **in_copy = NULL, **authdata = *out_authdata;
-+    size_t count = 0, ncount = 0;
-+    krb5_authdata **list = *existing_list, **nlist = *new_elements;
- 
--    if (in_authdata == NULL || in_authdata[0] == NULL)
-+    if (nlist == NULL)
-         return 0;
- 
--    if (authdata != NULL) {
--        for (nadata = 0; authdata[nadata] != NULL; nadata++)
--            ;
--    }
-+    for (count = 0; list != NULL && list[count] != NULL; count++);
-+    for (ncount = 0; nlist[ncount] != NULL; ncount++);
- 
--    for (i = 0; in_authdata[i] != NULL; i++)
--        ;
--
--    if (copy) {
--        ret = krb5_copy_authdata(context, in_authdata, &in_copy);
--        if (ret)
--            return ret;
--        in_authdata = in_copy;
--    }
--
--    authdata = realloc(authdata, (nadata + i + 1) * sizeof(krb5_authdata *));
--    if (authdata == NULL) {
--        krb5_free_authdata(context, in_copy);
-+    list = realloc(list, (count + ncount + 1) * sizeof(*list));
-+    if (list == NULL)
-         return ENOMEM;
-+
-+    memcpy(list + count, nlist, ncount * sizeof(*nlist));
-+    list[count + ncount] = NULL;
-+    free(nlist);
-+
-+    if (list[0] == NULL) {
-+        free(list);
-+        list = NULL;
-     }
- 
--    for (i = 0, j = 0; in_authdata[i] != NULL; i++) {
--        if (ignore_kdc_issued &&
--            is_kdc_issued_authdatum(context, in_authdata[i], 0)) {
--            free(in_authdata[i]->contents);
--            free(in_authdata[i]);
-+    *new_elements = NULL;
-+    *existing_list = list;
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/* Add a copy of new_elements to *existing_list, omitting KDC-issued
-+ * authdata. */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+add_filtered_authdata(krb5_authdata ***existing_list,
-+                      krb5_authdata **new_elements)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_authdata **copy;
-+    size_t i, j;
-+
-+    if (new_elements == NULL)
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    ret = krb5_copy_authdata(NULL, new_elements, &copy);
-+    if (ret)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    /* Remove KDC-issued elements from copy. */
-+    j = 0;
-+    for (i = 0; copy[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+        if (is_kdc_issued_authdatum(copy[i], 0)) {
-+            free(copy[i]->contents);
-+            free(copy[i]);
-         } else {
--            authdata[nadata + j++] = in_authdata[i];
-+            copy[j++] = copy[i];
-         }
-     }
-+    copy[j] = NULL;
- 
--    authdata[nadata + j] = NULL;
--
--    free(in_authdata);
--
--    if (authdata[0] == NULL) {
--        free(authdata);
--        authdata = NULL;
--    }
--
--    *out_authdata = authdata;
--
--    return 0;
-+    /* Destructively merge the filtered copy into existing_list. */
-+    ret = merge_authdata(existing_list, &copy);
-+    krb5_free_authdata(NULL, copy);
-+    return ret;
- }
- 
- /* Copy TGS-REQ authorization data into the ticket authdata. */
-@@ -289,10 +294,7 @@ copy_request_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *client_key,
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
- 
--    /* Add a copy of the requested authdata to the ticket, ignoring KDC-issued
--     * types. */
--    ret = merge_authdata(context, req->unenc_authdata, tkt_authdata, TRUE,
--                         TRUE);
-+    ret = add_filtered_authdata(tkt_authdata, req->unenc_authdata);
- 
- cleanup:
-     free(plaintext.data);
-@@ -307,9 +309,7 @@ copy_tgt_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_req *request,
-     if (has_mandatory_for_kdc_authdata(context, tgt_authdata))
-         return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
- 
--    /* Add a copy of the TGT authdata to the ticket, ignoring KDC-issued
--     * types. */
--    return merge_authdata(context, tgt_authdata, tkt_authdata, TRUE, TRUE);
-+    return add_filtered_authdata(tkt_authdata, tgt_authdata);
- }
- 
- /* Fetch authorization data from KDB module. */
-@@ -374,8 +374,7 @@ fetch_kdb_authdata(krb5_context context, unsigned int flags,
- 
-     /* Put the KDB authdata first in the ticket.  A successful merge places the
-      * combined list in db_authdata and releases the old ticket authdata. */
--    ret = merge_authdata(context, enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data,
--                         &db_authdata, FALSE, FALSE);
-+    ret = merge_authdata(&db_authdata, &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data);
-     if (ret)
-         krb5_free_authdata(context, db_authdata);
-     else
-@@ -404,8 +403,7 @@ make_signedpath_data(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal client,
-             return ret;
- 
-         for (i = 0, j = 0; authdata[i] != NULL; i++) {
--            if (is_kdc_issued_authdatum(context, authdata[i],
--                                        KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET))
-+            if (is_kdc_issued_authdatum(authdata[i], KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET))
-                 continue;
- 
-             sign_authdata[j++] = authdata[i];
-@@ -635,12 +633,8 @@ make_signedpath(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ,
-     if (ret)
-         goto cleanup;
- 
--    /* Add the authdata to the ticket, without copying or filtering. */
--    ret = merge_authdata(context, if_relevant,
--                         &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, FALSE, FALSE);
--    if (ret)
--        goto cleanup;
--    if_relevant = NULL;         /* merge_authdata() freed */
-+    /* Add the signedpath authdata to the ticket. */
-+    ret = merge_authdata(&enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, &if_relevant);
- 
- cleanup:
-     free(sp.delegated);
-@@ -665,7 +659,7 @@ free_deleg_path(krb5_context context, krb5_principal *deleg_path)
- static krb5_boolean
- has_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata)
- {
--    return has_kdc_issued_authdata(context, authdata, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC);
-+    return has_kdc_issued_authdata(authdata, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC);
- }
- 
- /* Verify AD-SIGNTICKET authdata if we need to, and insert an AD-SIGNEDPATH
-@@ -746,11 +740,7 @@ add_auth_indicators(krb5_context context, krb5_data *const *auth_indicators,
-         goto cleanup;
- 
-     /* Add the wrapped authdata to the ticket, without copying or filtering. */
--    ret = merge_authdata(context, cammac, &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data,
--                         FALSE, FALSE);
--    if (ret)
--        goto cleanup;
--    cammac = NULL;              /* merge_authdata() freed */
-+    ret = merge_authdata(&enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, &cammac);
- 
- cleanup:
-     krb5_free_data(context, der_indicators);
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-index 6330387d0..a4a05b9fa 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-@@ -78,56 +78,6 @@ static krb5_error_code find_server_key(krb5_context,
-                                        krb5_kvno, krb5_keyblock **,
-                                        krb5_kvno *);
- 
--/*
-- * concatenate first two authdata arrays, returning an allocated replacement.
-- * The replacement should be freed with krb5_free_authdata().
-- */
--krb5_error_code
--concat_authorization_data(krb5_context context,
--                          krb5_authdata **first, krb5_authdata **second,
--                          krb5_authdata ***output)
--{
--    int i, j;
--    krb5_authdata **ptr, **retdata;
--
--    /* count up the entries */
--    i = 0;
--    if (first)
--        for (ptr = first; *ptr; ptr++)
--            i++;
--    if (second)
--        for (ptr = second; *ptr; ptr++)
--            i++;
--
--    retdata = (krb5_authdata **)malloc((i+1)*sizeof(*retdata));
--    if (!retdata)
--        return ENOMEM;
--    retdata[i] = 0;                     /* null-terminated array */
--    for (i = 0, j = 0, ptr = first; j < 2 ; ptr = second, j++)
--        while (ptr && *ptr) {
--            /* now walk & copy */
--            retdata[i] = (krb5_authdata *)malloc(sizeof(*retdata[i]));
--            if (!retdata[i]) {
--                krb5_free_authdata(context, retdata);
--                return ENOMEM;
--            }
--            *retdata[i] = **ptr;
--            if (!(retdata[i]->contents =
--                  (krb5_octet *)malloc(retdata[i]->length))) {
--                free(retdata[i]);
--                retdata[i] = 0;
--                krb5_free_authdata(context, retdata);
--                return ENOMEM;
--            }
--            memcpy(retdata[i]->contents, (*ptr)->contents, retdata[i]->length);
--
--            ptr++;
--            i++;
--        }
--    *output = retdata;
--    return 0;
--}
--
- krb5_boolean
- is_local_principal(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_const_principal princ1)
- {
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-index 2c9d8cf69..42b7ee208 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.h
-@@ -52,11 +52,6 @@ compress_transited (krb5_data *,
-                     krb5_principal,
-                     krb5_data *);
- krb5_error_code
--concat_authorization_data (krb5_context,
--                           krb5_authdata **,
--                           krb5_authdata **,
--                           krb5_authdata ***);
--krb5_error_code
- fetch_last_req_info (krb5_db_entry *, krb5_last_req_entry ***);
- 
- krb5_error_code

Refactor-krb5-GSS-checksum-handling.patch

@@ -1,479 +0,0 @@
-From c90cef2ebfbefc595798dd5dbb805575e1be0fbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Scheel <ascheel@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 16:03:01 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Refactor krb5 GSS checksum handling
-
-Separate out checksum handling from kg_accept_krb5() into a new helper
-process_checksum().
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: simplified checksum processing and made it use
-k5-input.h instead of TREAD_ macros; moved more flag handling into
-helper]
-
-[iboukris: adjusted helper function arguments, allowing access to the
-full authenticator for subsequent changes]
-
-(cherry picked from commit 64d56233f9816a2a93f6e8d3030c8ed6ce397735)
-[rharwood@redhat.com: problem with typo fix commit, I think]
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c | 383 +++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 179 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-index c5bddb1e8..70dd7fc0c 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
-@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
-  */
- 
- #include "k5-int.h"
-+#include "k5-input.h"
- #include "gssapiP_krb5.h"
- #ifdef HAVE_MEMORY_H
- #include <memory.h>
-@@ -413,6 +414,174 @@ kg_process_extension(krb5_context context,
-     return code;
- }
- 
-+/* The length of the MD5 channel bindings in an 0x8003 checksum */
-+#define CB_MD5_LEN 16
-+
-+/* The minimum length of an 0x8003 checksum value (4-byte channel bindings
-+ * length, 16-byte channel bindings, 4-byte flags) */
-+#define MIN_8003_LEN (4 + CB_MD5_LEN + 4)
-+
-+/* The flags we accept from the initiator's authenticator checksum. */
-+#define INITIATOR_FLAGS (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG |           \
-+                         GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG |        \
-+                         GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE |        \
-+                         GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG | GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG)
-+
-+/*
-+ * The krb5 GSS mech appropriates the authenticator checksum field from RFC
-+ * 4120 to store structured data instead of a checksum, indicated with checksum
-+ * type 0x8003 (see RFC 4121 section 4.1.1).  Some implementations instead send
-+ * no checksum, or a regular checksum over empty data.
-+ *
-+ * Interpret the checksum.  Read delegated creds into *deleg_out if it is not
-+ * NULL.  Set *flags_out to the allowed subset of token flags, plus
-+ * GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG if a delegated credential was present.  Process any
-+ * extensions found using exts.  On error, set *code_out to a krb5_error code
-+ * for use as a minor status value.
-+ */
-+static OM_uint32
-+process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context,
-+                 gss_channel_bindings_t acceptor_cb,
-+                 krb5_auth_context auth_context, krb5_flags ap_req_options,
-+                 krb5_authenticator *authenticator, krb5_gss_ctx_ext_t exts,
-+                 krb5_gss_cred_id_t *deleg_out, krb5_ui_4 *flags_out,
-+                 krb5_error_code *code_out)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code code = 0;
-+    OM_uint32 status, option_id, token_flags;
-+    size_t cb_len, option_len;
-+    krb5_boolean valid;
-+    krb5_key subkey;
-+    krb5_data option, empty = empty_data();
-+    krb5_checksum cb_cksum;
-+    const uint8_t *token_cb, *option_bytes;
-+    struct k5input in;
-+    const krb5_checksum *cksum = authenticator->checksum;
-+
-+    cb_cksum.contents = NULL;
-+
-+    if (cksum == NULL) {
-+        /*
-+         * Some SMB client implementations use handcrafted GSSAPI code that
-+         * does not provide a checksum.  MS-KILE documents that the Microsoft
-+         * implementation considers a missing checksum acceptable; the server
-+         * assumes all flags are unset in this case, and does not check channel
-+         * bindings.
-+         */
-+        *flags_out = 0;
-+    } else if (cksum->checksum_type != CKSUMTYPE_KG_CB) {
-+        /* Samba sends a regular checksum. */
-+        code = krb5_auth_con_getkey_k(context, auth_context, &subkey);
-+        if (code) {
-+            status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+            goto fail;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* Verifying the checksum ensures that this authenticator wasn't
-+         * replayed from one with a checksum over actual data. */
-+        code = krb5_k_verify_checksum(context, subkey,
-+                                      KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, &empty,
-+                                      cksum, &valid);
-+        krb5_k_free_key(context, subkey);
-+        if (code || !valid) {
-+            status = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-+            goto fail;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* Use ap_options from the request to guess the mutual flag. */
-+        *flags_out = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
-+        if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)
-+            *flags_out |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
-+    } else {
-+        /* The checksum must contain at least a fixed 24-byte part. */
-+        if (cksum->length < MIN_8003_LEN) {
-+            status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
-+            goto fail;
-+        }
-+
-+        k5_input_init(&in, cksum->contents, cksum->length);
-+        cb_len = k5_input_get_uint32_le(&in);
-+        if (cb_len != CB_MD5_LEN) {
-+            code = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
-+            status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+            goto fail;
-+        }
-+
-+        token_cb = k5_input_get_bytes(&in, cb_len);
-+        if (acceptor_cb != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) {
-+            code = kg_checksum_channel_bindings(context, acceptor_cb,
-+                                                &cb_cksum);
-+            if (code) {
-+                status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
-+                goto fail;
-+            }
-+            assert(cb_cksum.length == cb_len);
-+            if (k5_bcmp(token_cb, cb_cksum.contents, cb_len) != 0) {
-+                status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
-+                goto fail;
-+            }
-+        }
-+
-+        /* Read the token flags and accept some of them as context flags. */
-+        token_flags = k5_input_get_uint32_le(&in);
-+        *flags_out = token_flags & INITIATOR_FLAGS;
-+
-+        /* Read the delegated credential if present. */
-+        if (in.len >= 4 && (token_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) {
-+            option_id = k5_input_get_uint16_le(&in);
-+            option_len = k5_input_get_uint16_le(&in);
-+            option_bytes = k5_input_get_bytes(&in, option_len);
-+            option = make_data((uint8_t *)option_bytes, option_len);
-+            if (in.status) {
-+                code = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
-+                status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+                goto fail;
-+            }
-+            if (option_id != KRB5_GSS_FOR_CREDS_OPTION) {
-+                status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+                goto fail;
-+            }
-+
-+            /* Store the delegated credential. */
-+            code = rd_and_store_for_creds(context, auth_context, &option,
-+                                          deleg_out);
-+            if (code) {
-+                status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+                goto fail;
-+            }
-+            *flags_out |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* Process any extensions at the end of the checksum.  Extensions use
-+         * 4-byte big-endian tag and length instead of 2-byte little-endian. */
-+        while (in.len > 0) {
-+            option_id = k5_input_get_uint32_be(&in);
-+            option_len = k5_input_get_uint32_be(&in);
-+            option_bytes = k5_input_get_bytes(&in, option_len);
-+            option = make_data((uint8_t *)option_bytes, option_len);
-+            if (in.status) {
-+                code = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
-+                status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+                goto fail;
-+            }
-+
-+            code = kg_process_extension(context, auth_context, option_id,
-+                                        &option, exts);
-+            if (code) {
-+                status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-+                goto fail;
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+
-+fail:
-+    free(cb_cksum.contents);
-+    *code_out = code;
-+    return status;
-+}
-+
- static OM_uint32
- kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-                verifier_cred_handle, input_token,
-@@ -433,17 +602,13 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-     krb5_gss_ctx_ext_t exts;
- {
-     krb5_context context;
--    unsigned char *ptr, *ptr2;
-+    unsigned char *ptr;
-     char *sptr;
--    OM_uint32 tmp;
--    size_t md5len;
-     krb5_gss_cred_id_t cred = 0;
-     krb5_data ap_rep, ap_req;
--    unsigned int i;
-     krb5_error_code code;
-     krb5_address addr, *paddr;
-     krb5_authenticator *authdat = 0;
--    krb5_checksum reqcksum;
-     krb5_gss_name_t name = NULL;
-     krb5_ui_4 gss_flags = 0;
-     krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx = NULL;
-@@ -451,8 +616,6 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-     gss_buffer_desc token;
-     krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
-     krb5_ticket * ticket = NULL;
--    int option_id;
--    krb5_data option;
-     const gss_OID_desc *mech_used = NULL;
-     OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-     OM_uint32 tmp_minor_status;
-@@ -463,7 +626,6 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-     krb5int_access kaccess;
-     int cred_rcache = 0;
-     int no_encap = 0;
--    int token_deleg_flag = 0;
-     krb5_flags ap_req_options = 0;
-     krb5_enctype negotiated_etype;
-     krb5_authdata_context ad_context = NULL;
-@@ -489,7 +651,6 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-     output_token->length = 0;
-     output_token->value = NULL;
-     token.value = 0;
--    reqcksum.contents = 0;
-     ap_req.data = 0;
-     ap_rep.data = 0;
- 
-@@ -654,195 +815,16 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
- 
-     krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, auth_context, &authdat);
- 
--    if (authdat->checksum == NULL) {
--        /*
--         * Some SMB client implementations use handcrafted GSSAPI code that
--         * does not provide a checksum.  MS-KILE documents that the Microsoft
--         * implementation considers a missing checksum acceptable; the server
--         * assumes all flags are unset in this case, and does not check channel
--         * bindings.
--         */
--        gss_flags = 0;
--    } else if (authdat->checksum->checksum_type != CKSUMTYPE_KG_CB) {
--        /* Samba does not send 0x8003 GSS-API checksums */
--        krb5_boolean valid;
--        krb5_key subkey;
--        krb5_data zero;
-+    major_status = process_checksum(minor_status, context, input_chan_bindings,
-+                                    auth_context, ap_req_options,
-+                                    authdat, exts,
-+                                    delegated_cred_handle ? &deleg_cred : NULL,
-+                                    &gss_flags, &code);
- 
--        code = krb5_auth_con_getkey_k(context, auth_context, &subkey);
--        if (code) {
--            major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--            goto fail;
--        }
-+    if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+        goto fail;
- 
--        zero.length = 0;
--        zero.data = "";
--
--        code = krb5_k_verify_checksum(context,
--                                      subkey,
--                                      KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
--                                      &zero,
--                                      authdat->checksum,
--                                      &valid);
--        krb5_k_free_key(context, subkey);
--        if (code || !valid) {
--            major_status = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
--            goto fail;
--        }
--
--        /* Use ap_options from the request to guess the mutual flag. */
--        gss_flags = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
--        if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)
--            gss_flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
--    } else {
--        /* gss krb5 v1 */
--
--        /* stash this now, for later. */
--        code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, &md5len);
--        if (code) {
--            major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--            goto fail;
--        }
--
--        /* verify that the checksum is correct */
--
--        /*
--          The checksum may be either exactly 24 bytes, in which case
--          no options are specified, or greater than 24 bytes, in which case
--          one or more options are specified. Currently, the only valid
--          option is KRB5_GSS_FOR_CREDS_OPTION ( = 1 ).
--        */
--
--        if ((authdat->checksum->checksum_type != CKSUMTYPE_KG_CB) ||
--            (authdat->checksum->length < 24)) {
--            code = 0;
--            major_status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
--            goto fail;
--        }
--
--        ptr = (unsigned char *) authdat->checksum->contents;
--
--        TREAD_INT(ptr, tmp, 0);
--
--        if (tmp != md5len) {
--            code = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
--            major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--            goto fail;
--        }
--
--        /*
--          The following section of code attempts to implement the
--          optional channel binding facility as described in RFC2743.
--
--          Since this facility is optional channel binding may or may
--          not have been provided by either the client or the server.
--
--          If the server has specified input_chan_bindings equal to
--          GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS then we skip the check.  If
--          the server does provide channel bindings then we compute
--          a checksum and compare against those provided by the
--          client.         */
--
--        if ((code = kg_checksum_channel_bindings(context,
--                                                 input_chan_bindings,
--                                                 &reqcksum))) {
--            major_status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
--            goto fail;
--        }
--
--        /* Always read the clients bindings - eventhough we might ignore them */
--        TREAD_STR(ptr, ptr2, reqcksum.length);
--
--        if (input_chan_bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ) {
--            if (memcmp(ptr2, reqcksum.contents, reqcksum.length) != 0) {
--                xfree(reqcksum.contents);
--                reqcksum.contents = 0;
--                code = 0;
--                major_status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
--                goto fail;
--            }
--
--        }
--
--        xfree(reqcksum.contents);
--        reqcksum.contents = 0;
--
--        /* Read the token flags.  Remember if GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG was set, but
--         * mask it out until we actually read a delegated credential. */
--        TREAD_INT(ptr, gss_flags, 0);
--        token_deleg_flag = (gss_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG);
--        gss_flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
--
--        /* if the checksum length > 24, there are options to process */
--
--        i = authdat->checksum->length - 24;
--        if (i && token_deleg_flag) {
--            if (i >= 4) {
--                TREAD_INT16(ptr, option_id, 0);
--                TREAD_INT16(ptr, option.length, 0);
--                i -= 4;
--
--                if (i < option.length) {
--                    code = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
--                    major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--                    goto fail;
--                }
--
--                /* have to use ptr2, since option.data is wrong type and
--                   macro uses ptr as both lvalue and rvalue */
--
--                TREAD_STR(ptr, ptr2, option.length);
--                option.data = (char *) ptr2;
--
--                i -= option.length;
--
--                if (option_id != KRB5_GSS_FOR_CREDS_OPTION) {
--                    major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--                    goto fail;
--                }
--
--                /* store the delegated credential */
--
--                code = rd_and_store_for_creds(context, auth_context, &option,
--                                              (delegated_cred_handle) ?
--                                              &deleg_cred : NULL);
--                if (code) {
--                    major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--                    goto fail;
--                }
--
--                gss_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
--            } /* if i >= 4 */
--            /* ignore any additional trailing data, for now */
--        }
--        while (i > 0) {
--            /* Process Type-Length-Data options */
--            if (i < 8) {
--                code = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
--                major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--                goto fail;
--            }
--            TREAD_INT(ptr, option_id, 1);
--            TREAD_INT(ptr, option.length, 1);
--            i -= 8;
--            if (i < option.length) {
--                code = KG_BAD_LENGTH;
--                major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--                goto fail;
--            }
--            TREAD_STR(ptr, ptr2, option.length);
--            option.data = (char *)ptr2;
--
--            i -= option.length;
--
--            code = kg_process_extension(context, auth_context,
--                                        option_id, &option, exts);
--            if (code != 0) {
--                major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
--                goto fail;
--            }
--        }
--    }
-+    major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
- 
-     if (exts->iakerb.conv && !exts->iakerb.verified) {
-         major_status = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-@@ -869,12 +851,7 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle,
-     ctx->mech_used = (gss_OID) mech_used;
-     ctx->auth_context = auth_context;
-     ctx->initiate = 0;
--    ctx->gss_flags = (GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG |
--                      ((gss_flags) & (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG |
--                                      GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG |
--                                      GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG |
--                                      GSS_C_DCE_STYLE | GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG |
--                                      GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG)));
-+    ctx->gss_flags = gss_flags | GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
-     ctx->seed_init = 0;
-     ctx->cred_rcache = cred_rcache;
- 
-@@ -1161,8 +1138,6 @@ fail:
- 
-         krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
-     }
--    if (reqcksum.contents)
--        xfree(reqcksum.contents);
-     if (ap_rep.data)
-         krb5_free_data_contents(context, &ap_rep);
-     if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE ||

Refresh-manually-acquired-creds-from-client-keytab.patch

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-From 7316aaa0e9249a88e919f2596d881f78970548bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 18:27:17 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Refresh manually acquired creds from client keytab
-
-If a client keytab is present but credentials are acquired manually,
-the credentials would not be refreshed because no refresh_time config
-var is set in the cache.  Change kg_cred_time_to_refresh() to attempt
-a refresh from the client keytab on any credentials which will expire
-in the next 30 seconds.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: adjused code and added test case]
-
-ticket: 7976
-(cherry picked from commit 729896467e3c77904666019d6cbbda583ae49b95)
----
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/acquire_cred.c  | 14 +++++++++++---
- src/tests/gssapi/t_client_keytab.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/acquire_cred.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/acquire_cred.c
-index acc1868f8..4062f4741 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/acquire_cred.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/acquire_cred.c
-@@ -557,15 +557,23 @@ set_refresh_time(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache ccache,
- krb5_boolean
- kg_cred_time_to_refresh(krb5_context context, krb5_gss_cred_id_rec *cred)
- {
--    krb5_timestamp now;
-+    krb5_timestamp now, soon;
- 
-     if (krb5_timeofday(context, &now))
-         return FALSE;
-+    soon = ts_incr(now, 30);
-     if (cred->refresh_time != 0 && !ts_after(cred->refresh_time, now)) {
--        set_refresh_time(context, cred->ccache,
--                         ts_incr(cred->refresh_time, 30));
-+        set_refresh_time(context, cred->ccache, soon);
-         return TRUE;
-     }
-+
-+    /* If the creds will expire soon, try to refresh even if they weren't
-+     * acquired with a client keytab. */
-+    if (ts_after(soon, cred->expire)) {
-+        set_refresh_time(context, cred->ccache, soon);
-+        return TRUE;
-+    }
-+
-     return FALSE;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_client_keytab.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_client_keytab.py
-index e474a27c7..7847b3ecd 100755
---- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_client_keytab.py
-+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_client_keytab.py
-@@ -124,4 +124,22 @@ realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, password('user'))
- realm.run(['./t_ccselect', phost], env=bad_cktname,
-           expected_msg=realm.user_princ)
- 
-+mark('refresh of manually acquired creds')
-+
-+# Test 17: no name/ccache specified, manually acquired creds which
-+# will expire soon.  Verify that creds are refreshed using the current
-+# client name, with refresh_time set in the refreshed ccache.
-+realm.kinit('bob', password('bob'), ['-l', '15s'])
-+realm.run(['./t_ccselect', phost], expected_msg='bob')
-+realm.run([klist, '-C'], expected_msg='refresh_time = ')
-+
-+# Test 18: no name/ccache specified, manually acquired creds with a
-+# client principal not present in the client keytab.  A refresh is
-+# attempted but fails, and an expired ticket error results.
-+realm.kinit(realm.admin_princ, password('admin'), ['-l', '-1s'])
-+msgs = ('Getting initial credentials for user/admin@KRBTEST.COM',
-+        '/Matching credential not found')
-+realm.run(['./t_ccselect', phost], expected_code=1,
-+          expected_msg='Ticket expired', expected_trace=msgs)
-+
- success('Client keytab tests')

Remove-resolver-test-utility.patch

@@ -1,547 +0,0 @@
-From 3e75969e0c0a52ec3ca8195200fcdadaa63b324f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:41:02 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Remove resolver test utility
-
-tests/resolve is no longer used after the previous commit.
-
-[rharwood@redhat.com: .gitignore]
----
- src/configure.ac                       |   5 +-
- src/tests/Makefile.in                  |   4 +-
- src/tests/resolve/Makefile.in          |  28 ---
- src/tests/resolve/addrinfo-test.c      | 306 -------------------------
- src/tests/resolve/deps                 |  14 --
- src/tests/resolve/fake-addrinfo-test.c |   3 -
- src/tests/resolve/resolve.c            | 115 ----------
- 7 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 471 deletions(-)
- delete mode 100644 src/tests/resolve/Makefile.in
- delete mode 100644 src/tests/resolve/addrinfo-test.c
- delete mode 100644 src/tests/resolve/deps
- delete mode 100644 src/tests/resolve/fake-addrinfo-test.c
- delete mode 100644 src/tests/resolve/resolve.c
-
-diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index aafc462f9..00b5ea4c5 100644
---- a/src/configure.ac
-+++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -1540,7 +1540,6 @@ V5_AC_OUTPUT_MAKEFILE(.
- 	appl/simple appl/simple/client appl/simple/server
- 	appl/gss-sample appl/user_user
- 
--	tests tests/resolve tests/asn.1 tests/create tests/hammer
--	tests/verify tests/gssapi tests/dejagnu tests/threads tests/shlib
--	tests/gss-threads tests/misc
-+	tests tests/asn.1 tests/create tests/hammer tests/verify tests/gssapi
-+	tests/dejagnu tests/threads tests/shlib tests/gss-threads tests/misc
- )
-diff --git a/src/tests/Makefile.in b/src/tests/Makefile.in
-index 3f88f1713..6b7749129 100644
---- a/src/tests/Makefile.in
-+++ b/src/tests/Makefile.in
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- mydir=tests
- BUILDTOP=$(REL)..
--SUBDIRS = resolve asn.1 create hammer verify gssapi dejagnu shlib \
--	gss-threads misc threads softpkcs11
-+SUBDIRS = asn.1 create hammer verify gssapi dejagnu shlib gss-threads misc \
-+	threads softpkcs11
- 
- RUN_DB_TEST = $(RUN_SETUP) KRB5_KDC_PROFILE=kdc.conf KRB5_CONFIG=krb5.conf \
- 	GSS_MECH_CONFIG=mech.conf LC_ALL=C $(VALGRIND)
-diff --git a/src/tests/resolve/Makefile.in b/src/tests/resolve/Makefile.in
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 1f5954089..000000000
---- a/src/tests/resolve/Makefile.in
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
--mydir=tests$(S)resolve
--BUILDTOP=$(REL)..$(S)..
--
--OBJS=resolve.o addrinfo-test.o fake-addrinfo-test.o
--SRCS=$(srcdir)/resolve.c $(srcdir)/addrinfo-test.c \
--	$(srcdir)/fake-addrinfo-test.c
--
--all: resolve addrinfo-test fake-addrinfo-test
--
--resolve: resolve.o
--	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ resolve.o $(SUPPORT_LIB) $(LIBS)
--
--addrinfo-test: addrinfo-test.o
--	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ addrinfo-test.o $(SUPPORT_LIB) $(LIBS)
--
--fake-addrinfo-test: fake-addrinfo-test.o
--	$(CC_LINK) -o $@ fake-addrinfo-test.o $(SUPPORT_LIB) $(LIBS)
--
--check: resolve addrinfo-test fake-addrinfo-test
--	$(RUN_TEST) ./resolve
--	$(RUN_TEST) ./addrinfo-test -p telnet
--	$(RUN_TEST) ./fake-addrinfo-test -p telnet
--
--install:
--
--clean:
--	$(RM) resolve addrinfo-test fake-addrinfo-test
--
-diff --git a/src/tests/resolve/addrinfo-test.c b/src/tests/resolve/addrinfo-test.c
-deleted file mode 100644
-index e77640b62..000000000
---- a/src/tests/resolve/addrinfo-test.c
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,306 +0,0 @@
--/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
--/* tests/resolve/addrinfo-test.c */
--/*
-- * Copyright 2004 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
-- * All Rights Reserved.
-- *
-- * Export of this software from the United States of America may
-- *   require a specific license from the United States Government.
-- *   It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
-- *   export to obtain such a license before exporting.
-- *
-- * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
-- * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
-- * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
-- * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
-- * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
-- * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
-- * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
-- * permission.  Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
-- * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
-- * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
-- * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
-- * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
-- * or implied warranty.
-- */
--
--/*
-- * A simple program to test the functionality of the getaddrinfo function.
-- *
-- * Usage:
-- *   addrinfo-test [-t|-u|-R|-I] [-d|-s|-r] [-p port] [-P] [hostname]
-- *
-- *   When invoked with no arguments, NULL is used for the node name,
-- *   which (at least with a non-null "port") means a socket address
-- *   is desired that can be used with connect() or bind() (depending
-- *   on whether "-P" is given).
-- */
--
--#include <k5-platform.h>
--#include <sys/types.h>
--#include <sys/socket.h>
--#include <netdb.h>
--#include <netinet/in.h> /* needed for IPPROTO_* on NetBSD */
--#ifdef USE_FAKE_ADDRINFO
--#include "fake-addrinfo.h"
--#endif
--
--static const char *protoname (int p) {
--    static char buf[30];
--
--#define X(N) if (p == IPPROTO_ ## N) return #N
--
--    X(TCP);
--    X(UDP);
--    X(ICMP);
--#ifdef IPPROTO_IPV6
--    X(IPV6);
--#endif
--#ifdef IPPROTO_GRE
--    X(GRE);
--#endif
--#ifdef IPPROTO_NONE
--    X(NONE);
--#endif
--    X(RAW);
--#ifdef IPPROTO_COMP
--    X(COMP);
--#endif
--
--    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), " %-2d", p);
--    return buf;
--}
--
--static const char *socktypename (int t) {
--    static char buf[30];
--    switch (t) {
--    case SOCK_DGRAM: return "DGRAM";
--    case SOCK_STREAM: return "STREAM";
--    case SOCK_RAW: return "RAW";
--    case SOCK_RDM: return "RDM";
--    case SOCK_SEQPACKET: return "SEQPACKET";
--    }
--    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), " %-2d", t);
--    return buf;
--}
--
--static char *whoami;
--
--static void usage () {
--    fprintf(stderr,
--            "usage:\n"
--            "\t%s [ options ] [host]\n"
--            "options:\n"
--            "\t-t\tspecify protocol IPPROTO_TCP\n"
--            "\t-u\tspecify protocol IPPROTO_UDP\n"
--            "\t-R\tspecify protocol IPPROTO_RAW\n"
--            "\t-I\tspecify protocol IPPROTO_ICMP\n"
--            "\n"
--            "\t-d\tspecify socket type SOCK_DGRAM\n"
--            "\t-s\tspecify socket type SOCK_STREAM\n"
--            "\t-r\tspecify socket type SOCK_RAW\n"
--            "\n"
--            "\t-4\tspecify address family AF_INET\n"
--#ifdef AF_INET6
--            "\t-6\tspecify address family AF_INET6\n"
--#endif
--            "\n"
--            "\t-p P\tspecify port P (service name or port number)\n"
--            "\t-N\thostname is numeric, skip DNS query\n"
--            "\t-n\tservice/port is numeric (sets AI_NUMERICSERV)\n"
--            "\t-P\tset AI_PASSIVE\n"
--            "\n"
--            "default: protocol 0, socket type 0, address family 0, null port\n"
--            ,
--            whoami);
--    /* [ -t | -u | -R | -I ] [ -d | -s | -r ] [ -p port ] */
--    exit (1);
--}
--
--static const char *familyname (int f) {
--    static char buf[30];
--    switch (f) {
--    default:
--        snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "AF %d", f);
--        return buf;
--    case AF_INET: return "AF_INET";
--#ifdef AF_INET6
--    case AF_INET6: return "AF_INET6";
--#endif
--    }
--}
--
--#define eaistr(X) (X == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(X))
--
--int main (int argc, char *argv[])
--{
--    struct addrinfo *ap, *ap2;
--    int err, numerichost = 0, numericserv = 0;
--    char *hname, *port = 0, *sep;
--    struct addrinfo hints;
--
--    whoami = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
--    if (whoami == 0)
--        whoami = argv[0];
--    else
--        whoami = whoami+1;
--
--    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
--    hints.ai_flags = 0;
--    hints.ai_socktype = 0;
--
--    hname = 0;
--    hints.ai_family = 0;
--
--    if (argc == 1)
--        usage ();
--
--    while (++argv, --argc > 0) {
--        char *arg;
--        arg = *argv;
--
--        if (*arg != '-')
--            hname = arg;
--        else if (arg[1] == 0 || arg[2] != 0)
--            usage ();
--        else
--            switch (arg[1]) {
--            case 'u':
--                hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
--                break;
--            case 't':
--                hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
--                break;
--            case 'R':
--                hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_RAW;
--                break;
--            case 'I':
--                hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_ICMP;
--                break;
--            case 'd':
--                hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
--                break;
--            case 's':
--                hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--                break;
--            case 'r':
--                hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_RAW;
--                break;
--            case 'p':
--                if (argv[1] == 0 || argv[1][0] == 0 || argv[1][0] == '-')
--                    usage ();
--                port = argv[1];
--                argc--, argv++;
--                break;
--            case '4':
--                hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
--                break;
--#ifdef AF_INET6
--            case '6':
--                hints.ai_family = AF_INET6;
--                break;
--#endif
--            case 'N':
--                numerichost = 1;
--                break;
--            case 'n':
--                numericserv = 1;
--                break;
--            case 'P':
--                hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
--                break;
--            default:
--                usage ();
--            }
--    }
--
--    if (hname && !numerichost)
--        hints.ai_flags |= AI_CANONNAME;
--    if (numerichost) {
--#ifdef AI_NUMERICHOST
--        hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
--#else
--        fprintf(stderr, "AI_NUMERICHOST not defined on this platform\n");
--        exit(1);
--#endif
--    }
--    if (numericserv) {
--#ifdef AI_NUMERICSERV
--        hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICSERV;
--#else
--        fprintf(stderr, "AI_NUMERICSERV not defined on this platform\n");
--        exit(1);
--#endif
--    }
--
--    printf("getaddrinfo(hostname %s, service %s,\n"
--           "            hints { ",
--           hname ? hname : "(null)", port ? port : "(null)");
--    sep = "";
--#define Z(FLAG) if (hints.ai_flags & AI_##FLAG) printf("%s%s", sep, #FLAG), sep = "|"
--    Z(CANONNAME);
--    Z(PASSIVE);
--#ifdef AI_NUMERICHOST
--    Z(NUMERICHOST);
--#endif
--#ifdef AI_NUMERICSERV
--    Z(NUMERICSERV);
--#endif
--    if (sep[0] == 0)
--        printf ("no-flags");
--    if (hints.ai_family)
--        printf(" %s", familyname(hints.ai_family));
--    if (hints.ai_socktype)
--        printf(" SOCK_%s", socktypename(hints.ai_socktype));
--    if (hints.ai_protocol)
--        printf(" IPPROTO_%s", protoname(hints.ai_protocol));
--    printf(" }):\n");
--
--    err = getaddrinfo(hname, port, &hints, &ap);
--    if (err) {
--        printf("\terror => %s\n", eaistr(err));
--        return 1;
--    }
--
--    for (ap2 = ap; ap2; ap2 = ap2->ai_next) {
--        char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST], pbuf[NI_MAXSERV];
--        /* If we don't do this, even AIX's own getnameinfo will reject
--           the sockaddr structures.  The sa_len field doesn't get set
--           either, on AIX, but getnameinfo won't complain.  */
--        if (ap2->ai_addr->sa_family == 0) {
--            printf("BAD: sa_family zero! fixing...\n");
--            ap2->ai_addr->sa_family = ap2->ai_family;
--        } else if (ap2->ai_addr->sa_family != ap2->ai_family) {
--            printf("BAD: sa_family != ai_family! fixing...\n");
--            ap2->ai_addr->sa_family = ap2->ai_family;
--        }
--        if (getnameinfo(ap2->ai_addr, ap2->ai_addrlen, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf),
--                        pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV)) {
--            strlcpy(hbuf, "...", sizeof(hbuf));
--            strlcpy(pbuf, "...", sizeof(pbuf));
--        }
--        printf("%p:\n"
--               "\tfamily = %s\tproto = %-4s\tsocktype = %s\n",
--               (void *) ap2, familyname(ap2->ai_family),
--               protoname (ap2->ai_protocol),
--               socktypename (ap2->ai_socktype));
--        if (ap2->ai_canonname) {
--            if (ap2->ai_canonname[0])
--                printf("\tcanonname = %s\n", ap2->ai_canonname);
--            else
--                printf("BAD: ai_canonname is set but empty!\n");
--        } else if (ap2 == ap && (hints.ai_flags & AI_CANONNAME)) {
--            printf("BAD: first ai_canonname is null!\n");
--        }
--        printf("\taddr = %-28s\tport = %s\n", hbuf, pbuf);
--
--        err = getnameinfo(ap2->ai_addr, ap2->ai_addrlen, hbuf, sizeof (hbuf),
--                          pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), NI_NAMEREQD);
--        if (err)
--            printf("\tgetnameinfo(NI_NAMEREQD): %s\n", eaistr(err));
--        else
--            printf("\tgetnameinfo => %s, %s\n", hbuf, pbuf);
--    }
--    freeaddrinfo(ap);
--    return 0;
--}
-diff --git a/src/tests/resolve/deps b/src/tests/resolve/deps
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 762d9adab..000000000
---- a/src/tests/resolve/deps
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
--#
--# Generated makefile dependencies follow.
--#
--$(OUTPRE)resolve.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
--  $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-platform.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-thread.h \
--  resolve.c
--$(OUTPRE)addrinfo-test.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
--  $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-platform.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-thread.h \
--  addrinfo-test.c
--$(OUTPRE)fake-addrinfo-test.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
--  $(top_srcdir)/include/fake-addrinfo.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-platform.h \
--  $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-thread.h $(top_srcdir)/include/port-sockets.h \
--  $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h addrinfo-test.c \
--  fake-addrinfo-test.c
-diff --git a/src/tests/resolve/fake-addrinfo-test.c b/src/tests/resolve/fake-addrinfo-test.c
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 86365a5ba..000000000
---- a/src/tests/resolve/fake-addrinfo-test.c
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
--#define USE_FAKE_ADDRINFO
--#include "addrinfo-test.c"
-diff --git a/src/tests/resolve/resolve.c b/src/tests/resolve/resolve.c
-deleted file mode 100644
-index ea0239113..000000000
---- a/src/tests/resolve/resolve.c
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
--/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
--/* tests/resolve/resolve.c */
--/*
-- * Copyright 1995 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
-- * All Rights Reserved.
-- *
-- * Export of this software from the United States of America may
-- *   require a specific license from the United States Government.
-- *   It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
-- *   export to obtain such a license before exporting.
-- *
-- * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
-- * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
-- * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
-- * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
-- * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
-- * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
-- * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
-- * permission.  Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
-- * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
-- * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
-- * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
-- * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
-- * or implied warranty.
-- */
--
--/*
-- * A simple program to test the functionality of the resolver library.
-- * It simply will try to get the IP address of the host, and then look
-- * up the name from the address. If the resulting name does not contain the
-- * domain name, then the resolve library is broken.
-- *
-- * Warning: It is possible to fool this program into thinking everything is
-- * alright by a clever use of /etc/hosts - but this is better than nothing.
-- *
-- * Usage:
-- *   resolve [hostname]
-- *
-- *   When invoked with no arguments, gethostname is used for the local host.
-- *
-- */
--
--/* This program tests the resolve library and sees if it is broken... */
--
--#include "k5-platform.h"
--#include <sys/types.h>
--#include <sys/socket.h>
--#include <arpa/inet.h>
--#include <netdb.h>
--#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
--#include <sys/param.h>
--#endif
--
--int
--main(int argc, char **argv)
--{
--    struct addrinfo *ai = NULL, hint;
--    char myname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1], namebuf[NI_MAXHOST], abuf[256];
--    const char *addrstr;
--    int err, quiet = 0;
--
--    argc--; argv++;
--    while (argc) {
--        if ((strcmp(*argv, "--quiet") == 0) ||
--            (strcmp(*argv, "-q") == 0)) {
--            quiet++;
--        } else
--            break;
--        argc--; argv++;
--    }
--
--    if (argc >= 1) {
--        strlcpy(myname, *argv, sizeof(myname));
--    } else {
--        if(gethostname(myname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
--            perror("gethostname failure");
--            exit(1);
--        }
--    }
--
--    myname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = '\0';  /* for safety */
--
--    /* Look up the address... */
--    if (!quiet)
--        printf("Hostname:  %s\n", myname);
--
--    memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint));
--    hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
--    err = getaddrinfo(myname, 0, &hint, &ai);
--    if (err) {
--        fprintf(stderr,
--                "Could not look up address for hostname '%s' - fatal\n",
--                myname);
--        exit(2);
--    }
--
--    if (!quiet) {
--        addrstr = inet_ntop(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_addr, abuf, sizeof(abuf));
--        if (addrstr != NULL)
--            printf("Host address: %s\n", addrstr);
--    }
--
--    err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf),
--                      NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
--    if (err && !quiet)
--        fprintf(stderr, "Error looking up IP address\n");
--
--    printf("%s%s\n", quiet ? "" : "FQDN: ", err ? ai->ai_canonname : namebuf);
--
--    if (!quiet)
--        printf("Resolve library appears to have passed the test\n");
--
--    freeaddrinfo(ai);
--    return 0;
--}

Replace-gssrpc-tests-with-a-Python-script.patch

@@ -1,861 +0,0 @@
-From 404cc1152880a567fc27bb7c691a1a732692bbf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Sat, 15 Feb 2020 20:34:23 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Replace gssrpc tests with a Python script
-
-Replace the dejagnu RPC test framework with a short Python script to
-do the same tests as fullrun.exp and gsserr.exp.  Modify the server
-test program to facilitate use by k5test.py.
-
-expire.exp, together with a comment in the client test program, was
-designed to test a libdb2 btree bug via the gssrpc server-side
-authentication code.  That code was subsequently changed not to use
-libdb2, before it was merged into the main krb5 tree (in revision 1.23
-of svc_auth_gssapi.c, according to the changelog removed in commit
-2a43d772be1e45faa8e488d436b6e867371563fb).  Remove the comment and do
-not replace that test sequence.
-
-[rharwood@redhat.com: .gitignore]
----
- src/configure.ac                             |   2 -
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/Makefile.in            |  36 +--
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/client.c               |  26 ---
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/config/unix.exp        | 176 --------------
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/lib/helpers.exp        | 234 -------------------
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/expire.exp  |  49 ----
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/fullrun.exp |  91 --------
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/gsserr.exp  |  30 ---
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/server.c               |  13 +-
- src/lib/rpc/unit-test/t_rpc.py               |  29 +++
- 10 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 645 deletions(-)
- delete mode 100644 src/lib/rpc/unit-test/config/unix.exp
- delete mode 100644 src/lib/rpc/unit-test/lib/helpers.exp
- delete mode 100644 src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/expire.exp
- delete mode 100644 src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/fullrun.exp
- delete mode 100644 src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/gsserr.exp
- create mode 100644 src/lib/rpc/unit-test/t_rpc.py
-
-diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index 29be532cb..aafc462f9 100644
---- a/src/configure.ac
-+++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -1102,8 +1102,6 @@ extern void endrpcent();],
- AC_MSG_RESULT($k5_cv_type_endrpcent)
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ENDRPCENT_TYPE, $k5_cv_type_endrpcent, [Define as return type of endrpcent])
- K5_GEN_FILE(include/gssrpc/types.h:include/gssrpc/types.hin)
--PASS=tcp
--AC_SUBST(PASS)
- 
- # for pkinit
- AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkinit],
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/Makefile.in b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/Makefile.in
-index 0b6e5203d..309ae2b21 100644
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/Makefile.in
-+++ b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/Makefile.in
-@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@ server: server.o rpc_test_svc.o $(GSSRPC_DEPLIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
- 
- client.o server.o: rpc_test.h
- 
--runenv.exp: Makefile
--	$(RUN_SETUP); for i in $(RUN_VARS); do \
--		eval echo "set env\($$i\) \$$$$i"; done > runenv.exp
--
- # If rpc_test.h and rpc_test_*.c do not work on your system, you can
- # try using rpcgen by uncommenting these lines (be sure to uncomment
- # then in the generated not Makefile.in).
-@@ -34,37 +30,9 @@ runenv.exp: Makefile
- # 	rm -f rpc_test.h rpc_test_clnt.c rpc_test_svc.c
- # 
- 
--check unit-test: unit-test-@DO_TEST@
--
--unit-test-:
--	@echo "+++"
--	@echo "+++ WARNING: lib/rpc unit tests not run."
--	@echo "+++ Either tcl, runtest, or Perl is unavailable."
--	@echo "+++"
--	@echo 'Skipped rpc tests: runtest or Perl not found' >> $(SKIPTESTS)
--
--unit-test-ok: unit-test-body
--
--PASS=@PASS@
--unit-test-body: runenv.sh runenv.exp
--	$(RM) krb5cc_rpc_test_*
--	$(ENV_SETUP) $(VALGRIND) $(START_SERVERS)
--	RPC_TEST_KEYTAB=/tmp/rpc_test_keytab.$$$$ ; export RPC_TEST_KEYTAB ; \
--	trap "echo Failed, cleaning up... ; rm -f $$RPC_TEST_KEYTAB ; $(ENV_SETUP) $(STOP_SERVERS) ; trap '' 0 ; exit 1" 0 1 2 3 14 15 ; \
--	if $(ENV_SETUP) \
--		$(RUNTEST) SERVER=./server CLIENT=./client \
--		KINIT=$(BUILDTOP)/clients/kinit/kinit \
--		KDESTROY=$(BUILDTOP)/clients/kdestroy/kdestroy \
--		PRIOCNTL_HACK=@PRIOCNTL_HACK@ VALGRIND="$(VALGRIND)" \
--		PASS="$(PASS)" --tool rpc_test $(RUNTESTFLAGS) ; \
--	then \
--		echo Cleaning up... ; \
--		rm -f $$RPC_TEST_KEYTAB krb5cc_rpc_test_* ; \
--		$(ENV_SETUP) $(STOP_SERVERS) ; \
--		trap 0 ; exit 0 ; \
--	else exit 1 ; fi
-+check-pytests:
-+	$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_rpc.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
- 
- clean:
- 	$(RM) server client
--	$(RM) dbg.log rpc_test.log rpc_test.sum runenv.exp
- 
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/client.c b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/client.c
-index 5edde49df..c9a812bc5 100644
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/client.c
-+++ b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/client.c
-@@ -231,32 +231,6 @@ main(argc, argv)
-      else
- 	  gssrpc_xdr_free(xdr_wrapstring, echo_resp);
- 
--     /*
--      * Test fix for secure-rpc/586, part 1: btree keys must be
--      * unique.  Create another context from the same credentials; it
--      * should have the same expiration time and will cause the server
--      * to abort if the clients are not differentiated.
--      *
--      * Test fix for secure-rpc/586, part 2: btree keys cannot be
--      * mutated in place.  To test this: a second client, *with a
--      * later expiration time*, must be run.  The second client should
--      * destroy itself *after* the first one; if the key-mutating bug
--      * is not fixed, the second client_data will be in the btree
--      * before the first, but its key will be larger; thus, when the
--      * first client calls AUTH_DESTROY, the server won't find it in
--      * the btree and call abort.
--      *
--      * For unknown reasons, running just a second client didn't
--      * tickle the bug; the btree code seemed to guess which node to
--      * look at first.  Running a total of three clients does ticket
--      * the bug.  Thus, the full test sequence looks like this:
--      *
--      * 	kinit -l 20m user && client server test@ddn 200
--      * 	sleep 1
--      * 	kini -l 30m user && client server test@ddn 300
--      * 	sleep 1
--      * 	kinit -l 40m user && client server test@ddn 400
--      */
-      if (! auth_once) {
- 	  tmp_auth = clnt->cl_auth;
- 	  clnt->cl_auth = auth_gssapi_create_default(clnt, target);
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/config/unix.exp b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/config/unix.exp
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 18da62be4..000000000
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/config/unix.exp
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
--#
--# $Id$
--#
--
--source runenv.exp
--
--set kill /bin/kill
--set sleep /bin/sleep
--set kinit $KINIT
--set kdestroy $KDESTROY
--
--set hostname [exec hostname]
--
--# Hack around Solaris 9 kernel race condition that causes last output
--# from a pty to get dropped.
--if { $PRIOCNTL_HACK } {
--    catch {exec priocntl -s -c FX -m 30 -p 30 -i pid [getpid]}
--    rename spawn oldspawn
--    proc spawn { args } {
--	upvar 1 spawn_id spawn_id
--	set newargs {}
--	set inflags 1
--	set eatnext 0
--	foreach arg $args {
--	    if { $arg == "-ignore" \
--		     || $arg == "-open" \
--		     || $arg == "-leaveopen" } {
--		lappend newargs $arg
--		set eatnext 1
--		continue
--	    }
--	    if [string match "-*" $arg] {
--		lappend newargs $arg
--		continue
--	    }
--	    if { $eatnext } {
--		set eatnext 0
--		lappend newargs $arg
--		continue
--	    }
--	    if { $inflags } {
--		set inflags 0
--		set newargs [concat $newargs {priocntl -e -c FX -p 0}]
--	    }
--	    lappend newargs $arg
--	}
--	set pid [eval oldspawn $newargs]
--	return $pid
--    }
--}
--
--if { [string length $VALGRIND] } {
--    rename spawn valgrind_aux_spawn
--    proc spawn { args } {
--	global VALGRIND
--	upvar 1 spawn_id spawn_id
--	set newargs {}
--	set inflags 1
--	set eatnext 0
--	foreach arg $args {
--	    if { $arg == "-ignore" \
--		     || $arg == "-open" \
--		     || $arg == "-leaveopen" } {
--		lappend newargs $arg
--		set eatnext 1
--		continue
--	    }
--	    if [string match "-*" $arg] {
--		lappend newargs $arg
--		continue
--	    }
--	    if { $eatnext } {
--		set eatnext 0
--		lappend newargs $arg
--		continue
--	    }
--	    if { $inflags } {
--		set inflags 0
--		# Only run valgrind for local programs, not
--		# system ones.
--#&&![string match "/bin/sh" $arg] sh is used to start kadmind!
--		if [string match "/" [string index $arg 0]]&&![string match "/bin/ls" $arg]&&![regexp {/kshd$} $arg] {
--		    set newargs [concat $newargs $VALGRIND]
--		} elseif [string match "." [string index $arg 0]] {
--		    set newargs [concat $newargs $VALGRIND]
--		}
--	    }
--	    lappend newargs $arg
--	}
--	set pid [eval valgrind_aux_spawn $newargs]
--	return $pid
--    }
--}
--
--# this will initialize the database and keytab
--load_lib "helpers.exp"
--
--proc rpc_test_version {} {
--	global CLIENT
--	global SERVER
--
--	clone_output "$CLIENT version <unknown>"
--	clone_output "$SERVER version <unknown>"
--}
--
--proc rpc_test_load {} {
--	#
--}
--
--# rpc_test_exit -- clean up and exit
--proc rpc_test_exit {} {
--	global server_id
--	global server_pid
--	global server_started
--	global kill
--
-- 	if {[catch {
--		expect {
--			-i $server_id
--			eof { 
--				fail "server exited!"
--				verbose $expect_out(buffer) 1
--			}
--			timeout { pass "server survived" }
--		}
--	} tmp]} {
--		fail "server exited! (expect failed)"
--	}
--}
--
--#
--# rpc_test_start -- start the rpc_test server running
--#
--proc rpc_test_start { } {
-- 	global SERVER PROT
--	global server_id
--	global server_pid
--	global server_started
--	global server_port
--	global env
--
--	if [info exists server_pid] { rpc_test_exit }
--
--	set env(KRB5_KTNAME) FILE:$env(RPC_TEST_KEYTAB)
--
-- 	verbose "% $SERVER" 1
--	set server_pid [spawn $SERVER $PROT]
--	set server_id $spawn_id
--        set server_started 1
--	set server_port -1
--
--	unset env(KRB5_KTNAME)
--
--	set timeout 30
--
--	expect {
--		-re "port: (\[0-9\]*)\r\n" {
--			set server_port $expect_out(1,string)
--		}
--		"running" { }
--		eof { 
--			send_error "server exited!"
--			verbose $expect_out(buffer) 1
--		}
--		timeout { 
--			send_error "server didn't start in $timeout seconds"
--			verbose $expect_out(buffer) 1
--		}
--	}
--
--}
--
--set MULTIPASS {
--    {tcp PROT=-t dummy=[rpc_test_start]}
--    {udp PROT=-u dummy=[rpc_test_start]}
--}
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/lib/helpers.exp b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/lib/helpers.exp
-deleted file mode 100644
-index eb2797c53..000000000
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/lib/helpers.exp
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
--if {[info commands exp_version] != {}} {
--	set exp_version_4 [regexp {^4} [exp_version]]
--} else {
--	set exp_version_4 [regexp {^4} [expect_version]]
--}
--
--# Backward compatibility until we're using expect 5 everywhere
--if {$exp_version_4} {
--	global wait_error_index wait_errno_index wait_status_index
--	set wait_error_index 0
--	set wait_errno_index 1
--	set wait_status_index 1
--} else {
--	set wait_error_index 2
--	set wait_errno_index 3
--	set wait_status_index 3
--}
--				
--proc set_from_env {varname default_value} {
--    global env
--    upvar $varname v
--
--    if [info exists env($varname)] {
--	set v $env($varname)
--    } else {
--	set v $default_value
--    }
--}
--proc expect_tcl_prompt {} {
--    global kadmin_tcl_spawn_id
--    expect {
--	-i $kadmin_tcl_spawn_id
--	-re "^% $" { }
--	-re . { perror "unexpected output {$expect_out(buffer)} from subprocess, expecting tcl prompt" }
--	timeout { perror "timeout waiting for tcl prompt" }
--	eof { perror "eof from subprocess when expecting tcl prompt" }
--    }
--}
--proc send_tcl_cmd_await_echo {cmd} {
--    global kadmin_tcl_spawn_id
--    send -i $kadmin_tcl_spawn_id "$cmd\n"
--    expect {
--	-i $kadmin_tcl_spawn_id
--	-ex "$cmd\r\n" { }
--	timeout { perror "timeout waiting for tcl subprocess to echo input" }
--	eof { perror "eof waiting for tcl subprocess to echo input" }
--    }
--}
--proc expect_kadm_ok {} {
--    global kadmin_tcl_spawn_id
--    expect {
--	-i $kadmin_tcl_spawn_id
--	-re "^OK KADM5_OK \[^\n\]*\n" {}
--	-re "^ERROR \[^\n\]*\n" { perror "kadmin tcl subprocess reported unexpected error" }
--	-re "^marshall_new_creds: \[^\n\]*\n" { exp_continue }
--	-re "^gssapi_\[^\n\]*\n" { exp_continue }
--	-re "^\r?\n" { exp_continue }
--	eof	{ perror "kadmin tcl subprocess died" }
--	default { perror "didn't get ok back" }
--    }
--}
--proc setup_database {} {
--    global env spawn_id kadmin_tcl_spawn_id TESTDIR CANON_HOST
--
--    # XXXXX
--    set_from_env TOP {/x/x/x/x/x}
--    send_user "TOP=$TOP\n"
--
--    set_from_env TESTDIR $env(TOP)/testing
--    set_from_env CLNTTCL $TESTDIR/util/kadm5_clnt_tcl
--    set_from_env TCLUTIL $TESTDIR/tcl/util.t
--    set env(TCLUTIL) $TCLUTIL
--    set env(PATH) "$TOP/install/admin:$env(PATH)"
--
--    # $VERBOSE ?
--
--    if [info exists spawn_id] { set x $spawn_id }
--    spawn $CLNTTCL
--    set kadmin_tcl_spawn_id $spawn_id
--    if [info exists x] { set spawn_id $x }
--
--    expect_tcl_prompt
--    # tcl 8.4 for some reason screws up autodetection of output EOL
--    # translation.  Work around it for now.
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo "if { \[info commands fconfigure\] != \"\" } { fconfigure stdout -translation lf }"
--    expect_tcl_prompt
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo "source {$TCLUTIL}"
--    expect_tcl_prompt
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo "set h {$CANON_HOST}"
--    expect {
--	-ex "$CANON_HOST\r\n" { }
--	timeout { perror "timeout waiting for subprocess" }
--	eof { perror "eof from subprocess" }
--    }
--    expect_tcl_prompt
--
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo {kadm5_init admin admin $KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE null $KADM5_STRUCT_VERSION $KADM5_API_VERSION_2 server_handle}
--    expect_kadm_ok
--    expect "^% "
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo {kadm5_create_principal $server_handle [simple_principal server/$h] {KADM5_PRINCIPAL} admin}
--    expect_kadm_ok
--    expect "^% "
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo {kadm5_randkey_principal $server_handle server/$h key null}
--    expect_kadm_ok
--    expect "^% "
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo {kadm5_create_principal $server_handle [simple_principal notserver/$h] {KADM5_PRINCIPAL} admin}
--    expect_kadm_ok
--    expect "^% "
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo {kadm5_randkey_principal $server_handle notserver/$h key null}
--    expect_kadm_ok
--    expect "^% "
--    send_tcl_cmd_await_echo {kadm5_destroy $server_handle}
--    expect_kadm_ok
--    expect "^% "
--    wait -nowait -i $spawn_id
--    close -i $spawn_id
--}
--
--if ![info exists CANON_HOST] {
--    set CANON_HOST $env(QUALNAME)
--    setup_database
--    file delete $env(RPC_TEST_KEYTAB)
--    exec $env(TOP)/cli/kadmin -p admin -w admin ktadd -k $env(RPC_TEST_KEYTAB) server/$CANON_HOST
--}
--
--
--proc kinit {princ pass lifetime} {
--	global kinit
--	global wait_error_index wait_errno_index wait_status_index
--
--	spawn -noecho $kinit -5 -l $lifetime $princ
--	expect {
--		-re "Password for $princ.*: " { send "$pass\n"; expect eof }
--		timeout { perror "Timeout waiting for kinit"; close }
--		eof
--	}
--
--	set ret [wait]
--	if {[lindex $ret $wait_error_index] == -1} {
--	 	perror \
--	    "wait(kinit $princ) returned error [lindex $ret $wait_errno_index]"
--	} else {
--		if {[lindex $ret $wait_status_index] != 0} {
--			perror \
--		    "kinit $princ failed with [lindex $ret $wait_status_index]"
--		}
--	}
--}
--
--proc flush_server {} {
--	global server_id
--	global expect_out
--
--	verbose "flushing server output" 1
--
--	while {1} {
--		set timeout 5
--
--		expect {
--			-i $server_id
--			-re "^.+$" {
--			    verbose "server output: $expect_out(buffer)"
--			}
--			timeout { break }
--		}
--	}
--}
--
--proc start_client {testname ccname user password lifetime count
--		  {target ""}} {
--	global env CLIENT PROT hostname server_port spawn_id verbose
--
--	if {$target == ""} {
--		set target "server@$hostname"
--	}
--
--	set env(KRB5CCNAME) FILE:[pwd]/krb5cc_rpc_test_$ccname
--	kinit $user $password $lifetime
--
--	if {$verbose > 0} {
--		spawn $CLIENT -a 1 -s 1 -m 1 $PROT $hostname $server_port $target $count
--	} else {
--		spawn $CLIENT $PROT $hostname $server_port $target $count
--	}
--
--	verbose "$testname: client $ccname started"
--
--	unset env(KRB5CCNAME)
--}
--
--proc eof_client {testname ccname id status} {
--	verbose "$testname: eof'ing for client $ccname" 1
--
--	expect {
--		-i $id
--		-re "^marshall_new_creds\[^\n\]*\n" { exp_continue }
--		-re "^gssapi_\[^\n\]*\n" { exp_continue }
--		-re "^\r?\n" { exp_continue }
--		eof { verbose $expect_out(buffer) 1 }
--		timeout { 
--			fail "$testname: timeout waiting for client $ccname to exit"
--		}
--	}
--	wait_client $testname $ccname $id $status
--}
--
--
--proc wait_client {testname ccname id status} {
--	global env
--	global kill
--	global kdestroy
--	global wait_error_index wait_errno_index wait_status_index
--
--	verbose "$testname: waiting for client $ccname" 1
--
--	set ret [wait -i $id]
--	if {[lindex $ret $wait_error_index] == -1} {
--		fail \
--       "$testname: wait $ccname returned error [lindex $ret $wait_errno_index]"
--	} else {
--		if {[lindex $ret $wait_status_index] == $status} {
--			pass "$testname: client $ccname"
--		} else {
--			fail "$testname: client $ccname: unexpected return status [lindex $ret $wait_status_index], should be $status."
--		}
--	}
--
--	set env(KRB5CCNAME) FILE:[pwd]/krb5cc_rpc_test_$ccname
-- 	if {[catch "exec $kdestroy -5"] != 0} {
-- 		perror "$testname: cannot destroy client $ccname ccache"
-- 	}
--
--	unset env(KRB5CCNAME)
--}
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/expire.exp b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/expire.exp
-deleted file mode 100644
-index e19cca0ef..000000000
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/expire.exp
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
--set timeout 40
--
--load_lib "helpers.exp"
--
--global server_started
--
--proc expired {} {
--    global spawn_id server_id
--
--    start_client expired expired testuser notathena -1m 100
--    eof_client expired expired $spawn_id 2
--
--    expect {
--	-i $server_id
--	-re "rpc_test server: Authen.*failed:.*credential.*expired" { pass "expired" }
--	timeout { fail "expired: timeout waiting for expired creds error" }
--    }
--
--    flush_server
--}
--
--# This test doesn't work after #6948, because the client won't try to
--# authenticate using an expired TGT.
--#if { $server_started } {expired }
--
--proc overlap {} {
--    global spawn_id
--
--    start_client expire 1 testuser notathena 20m 100
--    set client1_id $spawn_id
--    flush_server
--    
--    start_client expire 2 testuser notathena 40m 300
--    set client2_id $spawn_id
--    flush_server
--    
--    start_client expire 3 testuser notathena 60m 500
--    set client3_id $spawn_id
--    flush_server
--    
--    eof_client expire 1 $client1_id 0
--    eof_client expire 2 $client2_id 0
--    eof_client expire 3 $client3_id 0
--
--    flush_server
--}
--if { $server_started } {overlap} 
--
--
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/fullrun.exp b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/fullrun.exp
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 73083de1f..000000000
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/fullrun.exp
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
--set timeout 120
--
--load_lib "helpers.exp"
--
--global spawn_id
--global server_id
--global server_started
--
--if { !$server_started } {return} 
--
--# Start the client and do a full run
--start_client "full run" fullrun testuser notathena 8h 1026
--set client_id $spawn_id
--
--#
--# test: did we get 11 dots?
--#
--verbose "Starting RPC echo test.  This will take about 50 seconds.\n"
--
--set ver_line "rpc_test server: bad verifier\[^\r\n\]*\[\r\n]+"
--
--set dots 0
--set server_lines 0
--while {1} {
--	expect {
--		-i $server_id
--		-re $ver_line {
--			verbose "Got line from server."
--			incr server_lines
--		}
--		default {
--			exp_continue
--		}
--
--		-i $client_id
--		. { 
--			incr dots
--			verbose "$expect_out(buffer)" 1
--			if ($dots==11) { break }
--		}
--		eof {
--			#
--			# test: was the exit status right?
--			#
--			wait_client "full run" fullrun $client_id 0
--			break
--		}
--
--		timeout { 
--			verbose "Timeout waiting for dot\n" 1
--			fail "full run: timeout waiting for dot"
--			break
--		}
--	}
--}
--if {$dots==11} {
--	pass "fullrun: echo test"
--} else {
--	fail "fullrun: echo test: expected 11 dots, got $dots"
--}
--
--#
--# test: server logged four bad verifiers?
--#
--verbose "full run: checking server output"
--
--# Small timeout, since the server should have already printed everything
--set timeout 5
--
--while {$server_lines < 4} {
--	expect {
--		-i $server_id
--		-re $ver_line {
--			incr server_lines
--		}
--		-re ".+\r\n" {
--			verbose "Unexpected server output: $expect_out(buffer)"
--		}
--		default {
--			break
--		}
--	}
--}
--
--if {$server_lines == 4} {
--	pass "fullrun: bad verifiers"
--} else {
--	fail "fullrun: expected four bad verifiers, got $server_lines"
--}
--
--flush_server
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/gsserr.exp b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/gsserr.exp
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 005971989..000000000
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/rpc_test.0/gsserr.exp
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
--set timeout 30
--
--load_lib "helpers.exp"
--
--global spawn_id
--global server_id
--global server_started
--global hostname
--
--if { !$server_started } {return} 
--
--start_client "gss err" gsserr testuser notathena 8h 1026 notserver@$hostname
--
--eof_client "gss err" gsserr $spawn_id 2
--
--#
--# test: server logged an authentication attempted failed?
--#
--verbose "gss err: checking server output"
--
--expect {
--	-i $server_id
--	-re "rpc_test server: Authent.*failed: .* not found in keytab" {
--	    pass "gss err: server logged auth error"
--	}
--	eof { fail "gss err: server exited" }
--	timeout { fail "gss err: timeout waiting for server output" }
--}
--
--flush_server
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/server.c b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/server.c
-index 13e99bb06..c3bbcbf8c 100644
---- a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/server.c
-+++ b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/server.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static void rpc_test_badverf(gss_name_t client, gss_name_t server,
- 			     caddr_t data);
- 
- #ifndef SERVICE_NAME
--#define SERVICE_NAME "server"
-+#define SERVICE_NAME "host"
- #endif
- 
- static void usage()
-@@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		  prot == IPPROTO_TCP ? "tcp" : "udp");
- 	  exit(1);
-      }
--     printf("port: %d\n", (int)transp->xp_port);
- 
-      if (svcauth_gssapi_set_names(names, 0) == FALSE) {
- 	  fprintf(stderr, "unable to set gssapi names\n");
-@@ -144,6 +143,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-      signal(SIGTERM, handlesig);
- #endif
-      printf("running\n");
-+     printf("port: %d\n", (int)transp->xp_port);
-+     fflush(stdout);
- 
-      svc_run();
-      fprintf(stderr, "svc_run returned");
-@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ static void rpc_test_badverf(gss_name_t client, gss_name_t server,
- 	    inet_ntoa(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_raddr.sin_addr),
- 	    ntohs(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_raddr.sin_port),
- 	    (int) server_name.length, (char *) server_name.value);
-+     fflush(stdout);
- 
-      (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
-      (void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &server_name);
-@@ -211,6 +213,7 @@ void rpc_test_badauth(OM_uint32 major, OM_uint32 minor,
-      printf("rpc_test server: Authentication attempt failed: %s", a);
-      log_badauth_display_status(major, minor);
-      printf("\n");
-+     fflush(stdout);
- }
- 
- void log_miscerr(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg,
-@@ -220,6 +223,7 @@ void log_miscerr(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg,
- 
-      a = inet_ntoa(rqst->rq_xprt->xp_raddr.sin_addr);
-      printf("Miscellaneous RPC error: %s, %s\n", a, error);
-+     fflush(stdout);
- }
- 
- void log_badauth_display_status(OM_uint32 major, OM_uint32 minor)
-@@ -243,10 +247,12 @@ void log_badauth_display_status_1(OM_uint32 code, int type, int rec)
- 		    log_badauth_display_status_1(gssstat,GSS_C_GSS_CODE,1);
- 		    log_badauth_display_status_1(minor_stat,
- 						 GSS_C_MECH_CODE, 1);
--	       } else
-+	       } else {
- 		    printf("GSS-API authentication error %.*s: "
- 			   "recursive failure!\n", (int) msg.length,
- 			   (char *)msg.value);
-+	       }
-+	       fflush(stdout);
- 	       return;
- 	  }
- 
-@@ -256,4 +262,5 @@ void log_badauth_display_status_1(OM_uint32 code, int type, int rec)
- 	  if (!msg_ctx)
- 	       break;
-      }
-+     fflush(stdout);
- }
-diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/t_rpc.py b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/t_rpc.py
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..4e565d25c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/lib/rpc/unit-test/t_rpc.py
-@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
-+import re
-+
-+from k5test import *
-+
-+realm = K5Realm()
-+
-+server = realm.start_server(['./server', '-t'], 'running')
-+line = server.stdout.readline()
-+portstr = re.match(r'^port: (\d+)$', line).group(1)
-+
-+realm.run(['./client', '-t', hostname, portstr, 'host@' + hostname, '1026'],
-+          expected_msg='...........')
-+
-+for i in range(4):
-+    line = server.stdout.readline()
-+    if 'rpc_test server: bad verifier from user@KRBTEST.COM at ' not in line:
-+        fail('unexpected server message: ' + line)
-+    output(line)
-+
-+realm.addprinc('nokey/' + hostname)
-+
-+realm.run(['./client', '-t', hostname, portstr, 'nokey@' + hostname, '1026'],
-+          expected_code=2)
-+
-+line = server.stdout.readline()
-+if 'rpc_test server: Authentication attempt failed: ' not in line:
-+    fail('unexpected server message: ' + line)
-+
-+success('gssrpc auth_gssapi tests')

Unify-kvno-option-documentation.patch

@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-From 52e3695cc5ef00766e12adfe8ed276c2885e71bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 17:49:29 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Unify kvno option documentation
-
-Add missing kvno options to the kvno.rst synopsis and option
-descriptions, and to the kvno usage message.  Remove mention of '-h'
-(help text), from kvno.rst as it is an implicit option.  Note that the
-three new caching options were added in release 1.19.
-
-Indicate the two exclusions (-u/-S and --u2u with the S4U2Self options)
-and dependency (-P on S4U2Self) where they are missing.
-
-Switch xusage() to print only a single localized string, rather than
-running each line of output through localization separately.
-
-Leave kvno -C undocumented for now, as the semantics of
-KRB5_GC_CANONICALIZE are minimally useful and likely to change.
-
-[ghudson@mit.edu: edited documentation and commit message]
-
-ticket: 7476
-tags: pullup
-target_version: 1.18-next
-
-(cherry picked from commit becd1ad6830b526d08ddaf5b2b6f213154c6446c)
----
- doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
- src/clients/kvno/kvno.c         | 15 +++++++++------
- src/man/kvno.man                | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst b/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst
-index 718313576..65c44e1c0 100644
---- a/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst
-+++ b/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst
-@@ -10,13 +10,9 @@ SYNOPSIS
- [**-c** *ccache*]
- [**-e** *etype*]
- [**-q**]
--[**-h**]
-+[**-u** | **-S** *sname*]
- [**-P**]
--[**-S** *sname*]
--[**-I** *for_user*]
--[**-U** *for_user*]
--[**-F** *cert_file*]
--[**--u2u** *ccache*]
-+[[{**-F** *cert_file* | {**-I** | **-U**} *for_user*} [**-P**]] | **--u2u** *ccache*]
- *service1 service2* ...
- 
- 
-@@ -39,13 +35,18 @@ OPTIONS
-     of all the services named on the command line.  This is useful in
-     certain backward compatibility situations.
- 
-+**-k** *keytab*
-+    Decrypt the acquired tickets using *keytab* to confirm their
-+    validity.
-+
- **-q**
-     Suppress printing output when successful.  If a service ticket
-     cannot be obtained, an error message will still be printed and
-     kvno will exit with nonzero status.
- 
--**-h**
--    Prints a usage statement and exits.
-+**-u**
-+    Use the unknown name type in requested service principal names.
-+    This option Cannot be used with *-S*.
- 
- **-P**
-     Specifies that the *service1 service2* ...  arguments are to be
-@@ -76,16 +77,17 @@ OPTIONS
- 
- **--cached-only**
-     Only retrieve credentials already present in the cache, not from
--    the KDC.
-+    the KDC.  (Added in release 1.19.)
- 
- **--no-store**
-     Do not store retrieved credentials in the cache.  If
-     **--out-cache** is also specified, credentials will still be
--    stored into the output credential cache.
-+    stored into the output credential cache.  (Added in release 1.19.)
- 
- **--out-cache** *ccache*
-     Initialize *ccache* and store all retrieved credentials into it.
--    Do not store acquired credentials in the input cache.
-+    Do not store acquired credentials in the input cache.  (Added in
-+    release 1.19.)
- 
- **--u2u** *ccache*
-     Requests a user-to-user ticket.  *ccache* must contain a local
-diff --git a/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c b/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c
-index 9d85864f6..c5f6bf700 100644
---- a/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c
-+++ b/src/clients/kvno/kvno.c
-@@ -38,15 +38,18 @@
- static char *prog;
- static int quiet = 0;
- 
-+#define XUSAGE_BREAK "\n\t"
-+
- static void
- xusage()
- {
--    fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [-C] [-u] [-c ccache] [-e etype]\n"), prog);
--    fprintf(stderr, _("\t[-k keytab] [-S sname] [{-I | -U} for_user | "
--                      "[-F cert_file] [-P]]\n"));
--    fprintf(stderr, _("\t[--cached-only] [--no-store] [--out-cache ccache] "
--                      "[--u2u ccache]\n"));
--    fprintf(stderr, _("\tservice1 service2 ...\n"));
-+    fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [-c ccache] [-e etype] [-k keytab] [-q] "
-+                      "[-u | -S sname]" XUSAGE_BREAK
-+                      "[[{-F cert_file | {-I | -U} for_user} [-P]] | "
-+                      "--u2u ccache]" XUSAGE_BREAK
-+                      "[--cached-only] [--no-store] [--out-cache] "
-+                      "service1 service2 ...\n"),
-+            prog);
-     exit(1);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/man/kvno.man b/src/man/kvno.man
-index b9f6739eb..22318324d 100644
---- a/src/man/kvno.man
-+++ b/src/man/kvno.man
-@@ -36,13 +36,9 @@ level margin: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]
- [\fB\-c\fP \fIccache\fP]
- [\fB\-e\fP \fIetype\fP]
- [\fB\-q\fP]
--[\fB\-h\fP]
-+[\fB\-u\fP | \fB\-S\fP \fIsname\fP]
- [\fB\-P\fP]
--[\fB\-S\fP \fIsname\fP]
--[\fB\-I\fP \fIfor_user\fP]
--[\fB\-U\fP \fIfor_user\fP]
--[\fB\-F\fP \fIcert_file\fP]
--[\fB\-\-u2u\fP \fIccache\fP]
-+[[{\fB\-F\fP \fIcert_file\fP | {\fB\-I\fP | \fB\-U\fP} \fIfor_user\fP} [\fB\-P\fP]] | \fB\-\-u2u\fP \fIccache\fP]
- \fIservice1 service2\fP ...
- .SH DESCRIPTION
- .sp
-@@ -60,13 +56,18 @@ Specifies the enctype which will be requested for the session key
- of all the services named on the command line.  This is useful in
- certain backward compatibility situations.
- .TP
-+\fB\-k\fP \fIkeytab\fP
-+Decrypt the acquired tickets using \fIkeytab\fP to confirm their
-+validity.
-+.TP
- \fB\-q\fP
- Suppress printing output when successful.  If a service ticket
- cannot be obtained, an error message will still be printed and
- kvno will exit with nonzero status.
- .TP
--\fB\-h\fP
--Prints a usage statement and exits.
-+\fB\-u\fP
-+Use the unknown name type in requested service principal names.
-+This option Cannot be used with \fI\-S\fP\&.
- .TP
- \fB\-P\fP
- Specifies that the \fIservice1 service2\fP ...  arguments are to be
-@@ -97,16 +98,17 @@ certificate file must be in PEM format.
- .TP
- \fB\-\-cached\-only\fP
- Only retrieve credentials already present in the cache, not from
--the KDC.
-+the KDC.  (Added in release 1.19.)
- .TP
- \fB\-\-no\-store\fP
- Do not store retrieved credentials in the cache.  If
- \fB\-\-out\-cache\fP is also specified, credentials will still be
--stored into the output credential cache.
-+stored into the output credential cache.  (Added in release 1.19.)
- .TP
- \fB\-\-out\-cache\fP \fIccache\fP
- Initialize \fIccache\fP and store all retrieved credentials into it.
--Do not store acquired credentials in the input cache.
-+Do not store acquired credentials in the input cache.  (Added in
-+release 1.19.)
- .TP
- \fB\-\-u2u\fP \fIccache\fP
- Requests a user\-to\-user ticket.  \fIccache\fP must contain a local

Use-two-queues-for-concurrent-t_otp.py-daemons.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 3e0d464f55320b393e32285f31710c24758a9101 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2020 17:18:51 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Use two queues for concurrent t_otp.py daemons
-
-t_otp.py occasionally fails during the #8708 regression test, reading
-a true answer instead of the expected false answer during the first
-verify() call.  Most likely the daemons are writing their answers to
-the shared queue out of order.  Use a separate queue for the second
-daemon to ensure correct correlation of results.
-
-(cherry picked from commit c03f67eefec05db19e84e889fab7c25904929633)
----
- src/tests/t_otp.py | 7 ++++---
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/tests/t_otp.py b/src/tests/t_otp.py
-index cba871a0f..c3b820a41 100755
---- a/src/tests/t_otp.py
-+++ b/src/tests/t_otp.py
-@@ -256,16 +256,17 @@ verify(daemon, queue, True, realm.user_princ, 'accept')
- ## tokens configured, with the first rejecting and the second
- ## accepting.  With the bug, the KDC incorrectly rejects the request
- ## and then performs invalid memory accesses, most likely crashing.
-+queue2 = Queue()
- daemon1 = UDPRadiusDaemon(args=(server_addr, secret_file, 'accept1', queue))
--daemon2 = UnixRadiusDaemon(args=(socket_file, None, 'accept2', queue))
-+daemon2 = UnixRadiusDaemon(args=(socket_file, None, 'accept2', queue2))
- daemon1.start()
- queue.get()
- daemon2.start()
--queue.get()
-+queue2.get()
- oconf = '[' + otpconfig_1('udp') + ', ' + otpconfig_1('unix') + ']'
- realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', realm.user_princ, 'otp', oconf])
- realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, 'accept2', flags=flags)
- verify(daemon1, queue, False, realm.user_princ.split('@')[0], 'accept2')
--verify(daemon2, queue, True, realm.user_princ, 'accept2')
-+verify(daemon2, queue2, True, realm.user_princ, 'accept2')
- 
- success('OTP tests')

ci.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+resultsdb-testcase: separate

downstream-Adjust-build-configuration.patch

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-From 30ece66508c8e10f704cd2860dfd421ebee15897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:45:26 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Adjust build configuration
-
-Build binaries in this package as RELRO PIEs, libraries as partial RELRO,
-and install shared libraries with the execute bit set on them.  Prune out
-the -L/usr/lib* and PIE flags where they might leak out and affect
-apps which just want to link with the libraries. FIXME: needs to check and
-not just assume that the compiler supports using these flags.
-
-Last-updated: krb5-1.15-beta1
----
- src/build-tools/krb5-config.in | 7 +++++++
- src/config/pre.in              | 2 +-
- src/config/shlib.conf          | 5 +++--
- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in b/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
-index c17cb5eb5..1891dea99 100755
---- a/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
-+++ b/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
-@@ -226,6 +226,13 @@ if test -n "$do_libs"; then
- 	    -e 's#\$(PTHREAD_CFLAGS)#'"$PTHREAD_CFLAGS"'#' \
- 	    -e 's#\$(CFLAGS)##'`
- 
-+    if test `dirname $libdir` = /usr ; then
-+        lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-L$libdir##" -e "s#$RPATH_FLAG$libdir##"`
-+    fi
-+    lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-fPIE##g" -e "s#-pie##g"`
-+    lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-Wl,-z,relro##g"`
-+    lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-Wl,-z,now##g"`
-+
-     if test $library = 'kdb'; then
- 	lib_flags="$lib_flags -lkdb5 $KDB5_DB_LIB"
- 	library=krb5
-diff --git a/src/config/pre.in b/src/config/pre.in
-index 917357df9..a8540ae2a 100644
---- a/src/config/pre.in
-+++ b/src/config/pre.in
-@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ INSTALL_PROGRAM=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(INSTALL_STRIP)
- INSTALL_SCRIPT=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@
- INSTALL_DATA=@INSTALL_DATA@
- INSTALL_SHLIB=@INSTALL_SHLIB@
--INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP) -m 4755 -o root
-+INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP) -m 4755
- ## This is needed because autoconf will sometimes define @exec_prefix@ to be
- ## ${prefix}.
- prefix=@prefix@
-diff --git a/src/config/shlib.conf b/src/config/shlib.conf
-index 3e4af6c02..2b20c3fda 100644
---- a/src/config/shlib.conf
-+++ b/src/config/shlib.conf
-@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ mips-*-netbsd*)
- 	# Linux ld doesn't default to stuffing the SONAME field...
- 	# Use objdump -x to examine the fields of the library
- 	# UNDEF_CHECK is suppressed by --enable-asan
--	LDCOMBINE='$(CC) -shared -fPIC -Wl,-h,$(LIBPREFIX)$(LIBBASE)$(SHLIBSEXT) $(UNDEF_CHECK)'
-+	LDCOMBINE='$(CC) -shared -fPIC -Wl,-h,$(LIBPREFIX)$(LIBBASE)$(SHLIBSEXT) $(UNDEF_CHECK)  -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,--warn-shared-textrel'
- 	UNDEF_CHECK='-Wl,--no-undefined'
- 	# $(EXPORT_CHECK) runs export-check.pl when in maintainer mode.
- 	LDCOMBINE_TAIL='-Wl,--version-script binutils.versions $(EXPORT_CHECK)'
-@@ -435,7 +435,8 @@ mips-*-netbsd*)
- 	SHLIB_EXPFLAGS='$(SHLIB_RPATH_FLAGS) $(SHLIB_DIRS) $(SHLIB_EXPLIBS)'
- 	PROFFLAGS=-pg
- 	PROG_RPATH_FLAGS='$(RPATH_FLAG)$(PROG_RPATH)'
--	CC_LINK_SHARED='$(CC) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(PROG_RPATH_FLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'
-+	CC_LINK_SHARED='$(CC) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(PROG_RPATH_FLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now $(LDFLAGS)'
-+	INSTALL_SHLIB='${INSTALL} -m755'
- 	CC_LINK_STATIC='$(CC) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'
- 	CXX_LINK_SHARED='$(CXX) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(PROG_RPATH_FLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'
- 	CXX_LINK_STATIC='$(CXX) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(CXXFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'

downstream-Use-backported-version-of-OpenSSL-3-KDF-i.patch

@@ -1,752 +0,0 @@
-From 040dd62418b918adc993b9cc3e1e80fc232286c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 20:05:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Use backported version of OpenSSL-3 KDF
- interface
-
-Last-updated: krb5-1.17
----
- src/configure.ac                              |   4 +
- src/lib/crypto/krb/derive.c                   | 356 +++++++++++++-----
- .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 257 ++++++++-----
- 3 files changed, 428 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
-index d4e4da525..29be532cb 100644
---- a/src/configure.ac
-+++ b/src/configure.ac
-@@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ AC_SUBST(CRYPTO_IMPL)
- AC_SUBST(CRYPTO_IMPL_CFLAGS)
- AC_SUBST(CRYPTO_IMPL_LIBS)
- 
-+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id EVP_KDF_ctrl EVP_KDF_derive,
-+               AC_DEFINE(OSSL_KDFS, 1, [Define if using OpenSSL KDFs]),
-+               AC_MSG_ERROR([backported OpenSSL KDFs not found]))
-+
- AC_ARG_WITH([prng-alg],
- AC_HELP_STRING([--with-prng-alg=ALG], [use specified PRNG algorithm. @<:@fortuna@:>@]),
- [PRNG_ALG=$withval
-diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/derive.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/derive.c
-index 6707a7308..915a173dd 100644
---- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/derive.c
-+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/derive.c
-@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@
- 
- #include "crypto_int.h"
- 
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+#else
-+#error "Refusing to build without OpenSSL KDFs!"
-+#endif
-+
- static krb5_key
- find_cached_dkey(struct derived_key *list, const krb5_data *constant)
- {
-@@ -77,55 +84,193 @@ cleanup:
-     return ENOMEM;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
- static krb5_error_code
--derive_random_rfc3961(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
--                      krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
--                      const krb5_data *in_constant)
-+openssl_kbdkf_counter_hmac(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
-+                           krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-+                           const krb5_data *label, const krb5_data *context)
- {
--    size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
-+    krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    const EVP_MD *digest;
-+
-+    if (!strcmp(hash->hash_name, "SHA1"))
-+        digest = EVP_sha1();
-+    else if (!strcmp(hash->hash_name, "SHA-256"))
-+        digest = EVP_sha256();
-+    else if (!strcmp(hash->hash_name, "SHA-384"))
-+        digest = EVP_sha384();
-+    else
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB);
-+    if (!ctx)
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE,
-+                     EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_HMAC) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, inkey->keyblock.contents,
-+                     inkey->keyblock.length) != 1 ||
-+        (context->length > 0 &&
-+         EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_INFO, context->data,
-+                      context->length) != 1) ||
-+        (label->length > 0 &&
-+         EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, label->data,
-+                      label->length) != 1) ||
-+        EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, (unsigned char *)outrnd->data,
-+                       outrnd->length) != 1)
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    ret = 0;
-+done:
-+    if (ret)
-+        zap(outrnd->data, outrnd->length);
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static krb5_error_code
-+openssl_kbkdf_feedback_cmac(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
-+                            krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-+                            const krb5_data *in_constant)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+    static unsigned char zeroes[16];
-+
-+    memset(zeroes, 0, sizeof(zeroes));
-+
-+    if (enc->keylength == 16)
-+        cipher = EVP_camellia_128_cbc();
-+    else if (enc->keylength == 32)
-+        cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
-+    else
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KB);
-+    if (!ctx)
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MODE,
-+                     EVP_KDF_KB_MODE_FEEDBACK) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_MAC_TYPE,
-+                     EVP_KDF_KB_MAC_TYPE_CMAC) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, cipher) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, inkey->keyblock.contents,
-+                     inkey->keyblock.length) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, in_constant->data,
-+                     in_constant->length) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KB_SEED, zeroes,
-+                     sizeof(zeroes)) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, (unsigned char *)outrnd->data,
-+                       outrnd->length) != 1)
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    ret = 0;
-+done:
-+    if (ret)
-+        zap(outrnd->data, outrnd->length);
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static krb5_error_code
-+openssl_krb5kdf(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc, krb5_key inkey,
-+                krb5_data *outrnd, const krb5_data *in_constant)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+
-+    if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength ||
-+        outrnd->length != enc->keybytes) {
-+        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (enc->encrypt == krb5int_aes_encrypt && enc->keylength == 16)
-+        cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
-+    else if (enc->encrypt == krb5int_aes_encrypt && enc->keylength == 32)
-+        cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
-+    else if (enc->keylength == 24)
-+        cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
-+    else
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_KRB5KDF);
-+    if (ctx == NULL)
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CIPHER, cipher) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, inkey->keyblock.contents,
-+                     inkey->keyblock.length) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KRB5KDF_CONSTANT,
-+                     in_constant->data, in_constant->length) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, (unsigned char *)outrnd->data,
-+                       outrnd->length) != 1)
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    ret = 0;
-+done:
-+    if (ret)
-+        zap(outrnd->data, outrnd->length);
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+#else /* OSSL_KDFS */
-+
-+/*
-+ * NIST SP800-108 KDF in counter mode (section 5.1).
-+ * Parameters:
-+ *   - HMAC (with hash as the hash provider) is the PRF.
-+ *   - A block counter of four bytes is used.
-+ *   - Four bytes are used to encode the output length in the PRF input.
-+ *
-+ * There are no uses requiring more than a single PRF invocation.
-+ */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+builtin_sp800_108_counter_hmac(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
-+                               krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-+                               const krb5_data *label,
-+                               const krb5_data *context)
-+{
-+    krb5_crypto_iov iov[5];
-     krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_data block = empty_data();
-+    krb5_data prf;
-+    unsigned char ibuf[4], lbuf[4];
- 
--    blocksize = enc->block_size;
--    keybytes = enc->keybytes;
--
--    if (blocksize == 1)
--        return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
--    if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
-+    if (hash == NULL || outrnd->length > hash->hashsize)
-         return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
- 
-     /* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
--    ret = alloc_data(&block, blocksize);
-+    ret = alloc_data(&prf, hash->hashsize);
-     if (ret)
-         return ret;
- 
--    /* Initialize the input block. */
--    if (in_constant->length == blocksize) {
--        memcpy(block.data, in_constant->data, blocksize);
--    } else {
--        krb5int_nfold(in_constant->length * 8,
--                      (unsigned char *) in_constant->data,
--                      blocksize * 8, (unsigned char *) block.data);
--    }
-+    /* [i]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the block counter (1) */
-+    iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[0].data = make_data(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf));
-+    store_32_be(1, ibuf);
-+    /* Label */
-+    iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[1].data = *label;
-+    /* 0x00: separator byte */
-+    iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[2].data = make_data("", 1);
-+    /* Context */
-+    iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[3].data = *context;
-+    /* [L]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the output length */
-+    iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
-+    iov[4].data = make_data(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf));
-+    store_32_be(outrnd->length * 8, lbuf);
- 
--    /* Loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated. */
--    n = 0;
--    while (n < keybytes) {
--        ret = encrypt_block(enc, inkey, &block);
--        if (ret)
--            goto cleanup;
--
--        if ((keybytes - n) <= blocksize) {
--            memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, (keybytes - n));
--            break;
--        }
--
--        memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, blocksize);
--        n += blocksize;
--    }
--
--cleanup:
--    zapfree(block.data, blocksize);
-+    ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, inkey, iov, 5, &prf);
-+    if (!ret)
-+        memcpy(outrnd->data, prf.data, outrnd->length);
-+    zapfree(prf.data, prf.length);
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -139,9 +284,9 @@ cleanup:
-  *   - Four bytes are used to encode the output length in the PRF input.
-  */
- static krb5_error_code
--derive_random_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
--                                      krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
--                                      const krb5_data *in_constant)
-+builtin_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
-+                                krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-+                                const krb5_data *in_constant)
- {
-     size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
-     krb5_crypto_iov iov[6];
-@@ -204,56 +349,94 @@ cleanup:
-     return ret;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * NIST SP800-108 KDF in counter mode (section 5.1).
-- * Parameters:
-- *   - HMAC (with hash as the hash provider) is the PRF.
-- *   - A block counter of four bytes is used.
-- *   - Four bytes are used to encode the output length in the PRF input.
-- *
-- * There are no uses requiring more than a single PRF invocation.
-- */
-+static krb5_error_code
-+builtin_derive_random_rfc3961(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
-+                              krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-+                              const krb5_data *in_constant)
-+{
-+    size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
-+    krb5_error_code ret;
-+    krb5_data block = empty_data();
-+
-+    blocksize = enc->block_size;
-+    keybytes = enc->keybytes;
-+
-+    if (blocksize == 1)
-+        return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
-+    if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
-+        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-+
-+    /* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
-+    ret = alloc_data(&block, blocksize);
-+    if (ret)
-+        return ret;
-+
-+    /* Initialize the input block. */
-+    if (in_constant->length == blocksize) {
-+        memcpy(block.data, in_constant->data, blocksize);
-+    } else {
-+        krb5int_nfold(in_constant->length * 8,
-+                      (unsigned char *) in_constant->data,
-+                      blocksize * 8, (unsigned char *) block.data);
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated. */
-+    n = 0;
-+    while (n < keybytes) {
-+        ret = encrypt_block(enc, inkey, &block);
-+        if (ret)
-+            goto cleanup;
-+
-+        if ((keybytes - n) <= blocksize) {
-+            memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, (keybytes - n));
-+            break;
-+        }
-+
-+        memcpy(outrnd->data + n, block.data, blocksize);
-+        n += blocksize;
-+    }
-+
-+cleanup:
-+    zapfree(block.data, blocksize);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+#endif /* OSSL_KDFS */
-+
- krb5_error_code
- k5_sp800_108_counter_hmac(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
-                           krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-                           const krb5_data *label, const krb5_data *context)
- {
--    krb5_crypto_iov iov[5];
--    krb5_error_code ret;
--    krb5_data prf;
--    unsigned char ibuf[4], lbuf[4];
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
-+    return openssl_kbdkf_counter_hmac(hash, inkey, outrnd, label, context);
-+#else
-+    return builtin_sp800_108_counter_hmac(hash, inkey, outrnd, label,
-+                                          context);
-+#endif
-+}
- 
--    if (hash == NULL || outrnd->length > hash->hashsize)
--        return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-+static krb5_error_code
-+k5_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
-+                           krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-+                           const krb5_data *in_constant)
-+{
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
-+    return openssl_kbkdf_feedback_cmac(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
-+#else
-+    return builtin_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
-+#endif
-+}
- 
--    /* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
--    ret = alloc_data(&prf, hash->hashsize);
--    if (ret)
--        return ret;
--
--    /* [i]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the block counter (1) */
--    iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
--    iov[0].data = make_data(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf));
--    store_32_be(1, ibuf);
--    /* Label */
--    iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
--    iov[1].data = *label;
--    /* 0x00: separator byte */
--    iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
--    iov[2].data = make_data("", 1);
--    /* Context */
--    iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
--    iov[3].data = *context;
--    /* [L]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the output length */
--    iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
--    iov[4].data = make_data(lbuf, sizeof(lbuf));
--    store_32_be(outrnd->length * 8, lbuf);
--
--    ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, inkey, iov, 5, &prf);
--    if (!ret)
--        memcpy(outrnd->data, prf.data, outrnd->length);
--    zapfree(prf.data, prf.length);
--    return ret;
-+static krb5_error_code
-+k5_derive_random_rfc3961(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
-+                         krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
-+                         const krb5_data *in_constant)
-+{
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
-+    return openssl_krb5kdf(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
-+#else
-+    return builtin_derive_random_rfc3961(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
-+#endif
- }
- 
- krb5_error_code
-@@ -266,10 +449,9 @@ krb5int_derive_random(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
- 
-     switch (alg) {
-     case DERIVE_RFC3961:
--        return derive_random_rfc3961(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
-+        return k5_derive_random_rfc3961(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
-     case DERIVE_SP800_108_CMAC:
--        return derive_random_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(enc, inkey, outrnd,
--                                                     in_constant);
-+        return k5_sp800_108_feedback_cmac(enc, inkey, outrnd, in_constant);
-     case DERIVE_SP800_108_HMAC:
-         return k5_sp800_108_counter_hmac(hash, inkey, outrnd, in_constant,
-                                          &empty);
-diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
-index 52976895b..dd718c2be 100644
---- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
-+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@
- #include <dirent.h>
- #include <arpa/inet.h>
- 
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+#else
-+#error "Refusing to build without OpenSSL KDFs!"
-+#endif
-+
- static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
- static void pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
- 
-@@ -2331,11 +2338,51 @@ pkinit_alg_values(krb5_context context,
-     }
- } /* pkinit_alg_values() */
- 
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
-+static krb5_error_code
-+openssl_sskdf(krb5_context context, size_t hash_bytes, krb5_data *key,
-+              krb5_data *info, char *out, size_t out_len)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    const EVP_MD *digest;
- 
--/* pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() --
-- * This function generates a key using the KDF described in
-- * draft_ietf_krb_wg_pkinit_alg_agility-04.txt.  The algorithm is
-- * described as follows:
-+    /* RFC 8636 defines a SHA384 variant, but we don't use it. */
-+    if (hash_bytes == 20) {
-+        digest = EVP_sha1();
-+    } else if (hash_bytes == 32) {
-+        digest = EVP_sha256();
-+    } else if (hash_bytes == 64) {
-+        digest = EVP_sha512();
-+    } else {
-+        krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Bad hash type for SSKDF");
-+        goto done;
-+    }
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SS);
-+    if (!ctx) {
-+        oerr(context, ret, _("Failed to instantiate SSKDF"));
-+        goto done;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, key->data,
-+                     key->length) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO, info->data,
-+                     info->length) != 1 ||
-+        EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, (unsigned char *)out, out_len) != 1)
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    ret = 0;
-+done:
-+    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+#else
-+/*
-+ * Generate a key using the KDF described in RFC 8636, also known as SSKDF
-+ * (single-step kdf).  Our caller precomputes `reps`, but otherwise the
-+ * algorithm is as follows:
-  *
-  *     1.  reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H)
-  *
-@@ -2349,95 +2396,16 @@ pkinit_alg_values(krb5_context context,
-  *
-  *     4.  Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes.
-  */
--krb5_error_code
--pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
--                       krb5_data *secret,
--                       krb5_data *alg_oid,
--                       krb5_const_principal party_u_info,
--                       krb5_const_principal party_v_info,
--                       krb5_enctype enctype,
--                       krb5_data *as_req,
--                       krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
--                       krb5_keyblock *key_block)
-+static krb5_error_code
-+builtin_sskdf(krb5_context context, unsigned int reps, size_t hash_len,
-+              const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void), krb5_data *secret,
-+              krb5_data *other_info, char *out, size_t out_len)
- {
-     krb5_error_code retval = 0;
- 
--    unsigned int reps = 0;
--    uint32_t counter = 1;       /* Does this type work on Windows? */
-+    uint32_t counter = 1;
-     size_t offset = 0;
--    size_t hash_len = 0;
--    size_t rand_len = 0;
--    size_t key_len = 0;
--    krb5_data random_data;
--    krb5_sp80056a_other_info other_info_fields;
--    krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info supp_pub_info_fields;
--    krb5_data *other_info = NULL;
--    krb5_data *supp_pub_info = NULL;
--    krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_id;
-     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
--    const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void);
--
--    /* initialize random_data here to make clean-up safe */
--    random_data.length = 0;
--    random_data.data = NULL;
--
--    /* allocate and initialize the key block */
--    key_block->magic = 0;
--    key_block->enctype = enctype;
--    if (0 != (retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, enctype, &rand_len,
--                                         &key_len)))
--        goto cleanup;
--
--    random_data.length = rand_len;
--    key_block->length = key_len;
--
--    if (NULL == (key_block->contents = malloc(key_block->length))) {
--        retval = ENOMEM;
--        goto cleanup;
--    }
--
--    memset (key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length);
--
--    /* If this is anonymous pkinit, use the anonymous principle for party_u_info */
--    if (party_u_info && krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, party_u_info,
--                                                         krb5_anonymous_principal()))
--        party_u_info = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
--
--    if (0 != (retval = pkinit_alg_values(context, alg_oid, &hash_len, &EVP_func)))
--        goto cleanup;
--
--    /* 1.  reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H) */
--    reps = key_block->length/hash_len;
--
--    /* ... and round up, if necessary */
--    if (key_block->length > (reps * hash_len))
--        reps++;
--
--    /* Allocate enough space in the random data buffer to hash directly into
--     * it, even if the last hash will make it bigger than the key length. */
--    if (NULL == (random_data.data = malloc(reps * hash_len))) {
--        retval = ENOMEM;
--        goto cleanup;
--    }
--
--    /* Encode the ASN.1 octet string for "SuppPubInfo" */
--    supp_pub_info_fields.enctype = enctype;
--    supp_pub_info_fields.as_req = *as_req;
--    supp_pub_info_fields.pk_as_rep = *pk_as_rep;
--    if (0 != ((retval = encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info(&supp_pub_info_fields,
--                                                         &supp_pub_info))))
--        goto cleanup;
--
--    /* Now encode the ASN.1 octet string for "OtherInfo" */
--    memset(&alg_id, 0, sizeof alg_id);
--    alg_id.algorithm = *alg_oid; /*alias*/
--
--    other_info_fields.algorithm_identifier = alg_id;
--    other_info_fields.party_u_info = (krb5_principal) party_u_info;
--    other_info_fields.party_v_info = (krb5_principal) party_v_info;
--    other_info_fields.supp_pub_info = *supp_pub_info;
--    if (0 != (retval = encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info(&other_info_fields, &other_info)))
--        goto cleanup;
- 
-     /* 2.  Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
-      * 3.  For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
-@@ -2471,8 +2439,9 @@ pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
- 
--        /* 4.  Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes. */
--        if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (uint8_t *)random_data.data + offset, &s)) {
-+        /* 4.  Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K
-+         * bytes. */
-+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)out + offset, &s)) {
-             krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
-                                    "Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
-             retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-@@ -2484,26 +2453,110 @@ pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
-         EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-         ctx = NULL;
-     }
--
--    retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, enctype, &random_data,
--                                  key_block);
--
- cleanup:
-     EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    return retval;
-+} /* builtin_sskdf() */
-+#endif /* OSSL_KDFS */
- 
--    /* If this has been an error, free the allocated key_block, if any */
--    if (retval) {
--        krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
-+/* id-pkinit-kdf family, as specified by RFC 8636. */
-+krb5_error_code
-+pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context, krb5_data *secret,
-+                       krb5_data *alg_oid, krb5_const_principal party_u_info,
-+                       krb5_const_principal party_v_info,
-+                       krb5_enctype enctype, krb5_data *as_req,
-+                       krb5_data *pk_as_rep, krb5_keyblock *key_block)
-+{
-+    krb5_error_code retval;
-+    size_t hash_len = 0, rand_len = 0, key_len = 0;
-+    const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void);
-+    krb5_sp80056a_other_info other_info_fields;
-+    krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info supp_pub_info_fields;
-+    krb5_data *other_info = NULL, *supp_pub_info = NULL;
-+    krb5_data random_data = empty_data();
-+    krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_id;
-+    unsigned int reps;
-+
-+    /* Allocate and initialize the key block. */
-+    key_block->magic = 0;
-+    key_block->enctype = enctype;
-+
-+    /* Use separate variables to avoid alignment restriction problems. */
-+    retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, enctype, &rand_len, &key_len);
-+    if (retval)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    random_data.length = rand_len;
-+    key_block->length = key_len;
-+
-+    key_block->contents = k5calloc(key_block->length, 1, &retval);
-+    if (key_block->contents == NULL)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    /* If this is anonymous pkinit, use the anonymous principle for
-+     * party_u_info. */
-+    if (party_u_info &&
-+        krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, party_u_info,
-+                                         krb5_anonymous_principal())) {
-+        party_u_info = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
-     }
- 
--    /* free other allocated resources, either way */
--    if (random_data.data)
--        free(random_data.data);
-+    retval = pkinit_alg_values(context, alg_oid, &hash_len, &EVP_func);
-+    if (retval)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    /* 1.  reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H) */
-+    reps = key_block->length / hash_len;
-+
-+    /* ... and round up, if necessary. */
-+    if (key_block->length > (reps * hash_len))
-+        reps++;
-+
-+    /* Allocate enough space in the random data buffer to hash directly into
-+     * it, even if the last hash will make it bigger than the key length. */
-+    random_data.data = k5alloc(reps * hash_len, &retval);
-+    if (random_data.data == NULL)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    /* Encode the ASN.1 octet string for "SuppPubInfo". */
-+    supp_pub_info_fields.enctype = enctype;
-+    supp_pub_info_fields.as_req = *as_req;
-+    supp_pub_info_fields.pk_as_rep = *pk_as_rep;
-+    retval = encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info(&supp_pub_info_fields,
-+                                              &supp_pub_info);
-+    if (retval)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    /* Now encode the ASN.1 octet string for "OtherInfo". */
-+    memset(&alg_id, 0, sizeof(alg_id));
-+    alg_id.algorithm = *alg_oid;
-+    other_info_fields.algorithm_identifier = alg_id;
-+    other_info_fields.party_u_info = (krb5_principal)party_u_info;
-+    other_info_fields.party_v_info = (krb5_principal)party_v_info;
-+    other_info_fields.supp_pub_info = *supp_pub_info;
-+    retval = encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info(&other_info_fields, &other_info);
-+    if (retval)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+#ifdef OSSL_KDFS
-+    retval = openssl_sskdf(context, hash_len, secret, other_info,
-+                           random_data.data, key_block->length);
-+#else
-+    retval = builtin_sskdf(context, reps, hash_len, EVP_func, secret,
-+                           other_info, random_data.data, key_block->length);
-+#endif
-+    if (retval)
-+        goto cleanup;
-+
-+    retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, enctype, &random_data, key_block);
-+cleanup:
-+    if (retval)
-+        krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
-+
-+    zapfree(random_data.data, random_data.length);
-     krb5_free_data(context, other_info);
-     krb5_free_data(context, supp_pub_info);
--
-     return retval;
--} /*pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() */
-+}
- 
- /* Call DH_compute_key() and ensure that we left-pad short results instead of
-  * leaving junk bytes at the end of the buffer. */

downstream-netlib-and-dns.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-From 4254bee1b97edeb0848efce635bcf1b56306f968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:46:21 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] netlib and dns
-
-We want to be able to use --with-netlib and --enable-dns at the same time.
-
-Last-updated: krb5-1.3.1
----
- src/aclocal.m4 | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/aclocal.m4 b/src/aclocal.m4
-index 6796fec53..c4358988a 100644
---- a/src/aclocal.m4
-+++ b/src/aclocal.m4
-@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ AC_HELP_STRING([--with-netlib=LIBS], use user defined resolver library),
- 	LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
- 	AC_MSG_RESULT("netlib will use \'$withval\'")
-   fi
-+  KRB5_AC_ENABLE_DNS
- ],dnl
- [AC_LIBRARY_NET]
- )])dnl

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+- fedora-*
+decision_contexts:
+- bodhi_update_push_stable
+subject_type: koji_build
+rules:
+- !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: fedora-ci.koji-build./plans/tests.functional}

kadmin.service

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ AssertPathExists=!/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kpropd.acl
 
 [Service]
 Type=forking
-PIDFile=/var/run/kadmind.pid
+PIDFile=/run/kadmind.pid
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/kadmin
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/kadmind -P /var/run/kadmind.pid $KADMIND_ARGS
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/kadmind -P /run/kadmind.pid $KADMIND_ARGS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 
 [Install]

kdc.conf

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+[libdefaults]
+# Allow RC4 HMAC-MD5 for session keys (see CVE-2022-37966)
+#allow_rc4 = true
+
 [kdcdefaults]
     kdc_ports = 88
     kdc_tcp_ports = 88
@@ -5,10 +9,12 @@
 
 [realms]
 EXAMPLE.COM = {
-     #master_key_type = aes256-cts
+     master_key_type = aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192
      acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
      dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
      default_principal_flags = +preauth
      admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
-     supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal
+     supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128:normal aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal camellia256-cts-cmac:normal camellia128-cts-cmac:normal arcfour-hmac-md5:normal
+     # Supported encryption types for FIPS mode:
+     #supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128:normal
 }

krb5-krb5kdc.conf

@@ -1 +1 @@
-d /var/run/krb5kdc 0755 root root
+d /run/krb5kdc 0755 root root

krb5-tests

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+
+export RPM_PACKAGE_NAME={{ name }}
+export RPM_PACKAGE_VERSION={{ version }}
+export RPM_PACKAGE_RELEASE={{ release }}
+export RPM_ARCH={{ arch }}
+export RPM_BUILD_NCPUS="$(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN)"
+
+testdir="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap "rm -rf ${testdir}" EXIT
+
+build_flags="$(eval "echo $(rpm --eval '%{_smp_mflags}')")"
+
+mkdir "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests"
+cp -rp /usr/share/{{ name }}-tests/{{ arch }} "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests/"
+make -C "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests/{{ arch }}/" $build_flags
+keyctl session - make -C "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests/{{ arch }}/" check

krb5kdc.service

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ After=syslog.target network.target network-online.target
 
 [Service]
 Type=forking
-PIDFile=/var/run/krb5kdc.pid
+PIDFile=/run/krb5kdc.pid
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/krb5kdc
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/krb5kdc -P /var/run/krb5kdc.pid $KRB5KDC_ARGS
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/krb5kdc -P /run/krb5kdc.pid $KRB5KDC_ARGS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 
 [Install]

plans/tests.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+summary: Tests
+discover:
+  how: fmf
+execute:
+  how: tmt

rpminspect.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+inspections:
+  # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1956479
+  badfuncs: off
+
+  # Not a Java package
+  javabytecode: off
+
+  # I need to be able to *add* functions, and also we export internal
+  # functions that are not considered part of our ABI.
+  abidiff: off
+  
+  # These just flag when things change "too much"
+  changedfiles: off
+  filesize: off
+  patches: off
+  upstream: off

sources

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SHA512 (krb5-1.18.2.tar.gz) = 7cbb1b28e677fea3e0794e93951f3caaa2c49bb1175dd187951e72a466cc69d96c3b833d838000fe911c1a437d96a558e550f27c53a8b332fb9dfc7cbb7ec44c
-SHA512 (krb5-1.18.2.tar.gz.asc) = 70775a06104b4d792d278da2efa92e94ddacb4ea319bfe2b253f5afcfec27f3bc5ddd12560294a265e3cf3d4fc74bcbfc3f5eeff8634d66c00d67e18dc93a74a
+SHA512 (krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz) = 87bc06607f4d95ff604169cea22180703a42d667af05f66f1569b8bd592670c42820b335e5c279e8b4f066d1e7da20f1948a1e4def7c5d295c170cbfc7f49c71
+SHA512 (krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz.asc) = 8992a5f5247315b9846aa73be4ee1ea223c0231a52d5c6c28718b1f3e3b45d62e2dad4aa5543a83163d1369bb79886b6c1c22766f22d8aa2f6b2575c54d0075c

tests/got-audit/got-audit.gdb

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+gef config gef.disable_color True
+got-audit --all

tests/got-audit/kdc.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+[kdcdefaults]
+    kdc_ports = 88
+    kdc_tcp_ports = 88
+
+[realms]
+    ${krb5REALM1} = {
+        #master_key_type = aes256-cts
+        acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
+        dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
+        admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
+        supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal des-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-md5:normal des-cbc-crc:normal
+    }

tests/got-audit/krb5.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# To opt out of the system crypto-policies configuration of krb5, remove the
+# symlink at /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies which will not be recreated.
+includedir /etc/krb5.conf.d/
+
+[logging]
+    default = FILE:/var/log/krb5libs.log
+    kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log
+    admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log
+
+[libdefaults]
+    default_realm = ${krb5REALM1}
+    dns_lookup_realm = false
+    ticket_lifetime = 24h
+    renew_lifetime = 7d
+    forwardable = true
+    rdns = false
+    default_ccache_name = KEYRING:persistent:%{uid}
+
+[realms]
+    ${krb5REALM1} = {
+        kdc = localhost.localdomain
+        admin_server = localhost.localdomain
+    }
+
+[domain_realm]
+    ${krb5HostName} = ${krb5REALM1}
+
+[capaths]
+    ${krb5REALM1} = .

tests/got-audit/main.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+summary: Audit the GOT for signs of tampering
+description: |
+  Pointers in the server process GOT will be checked to ensure that
+  each function pointer's value is within a shared object file
+  that exports a symbol of that name, and that no shared object
+  files export conflicting symbols.
+contact: Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com>
+require+:
+  - gdb-gef           # needed to test got-audit
+  - krb5-server
+test: ./runtest.sh
+framework: beakerlib

tests/got-audit/runtest.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# vim: dict+=/usr/share/beakerlib/dictionary.vim cpt=.,w,b,u,t,i,k
+# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+#
+#   runtest.sh of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/got-audit
+#   Description: Check pointers in the server process GOT for signs of tampering
+#   Author: Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com>
+#
+
+# Include Beaker environment
+. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
+
+krb5REALM1='TEST1.REDHAT.COM'
+krb5HostName=`hostname`
+krb5DomainName=`hostname -d`
+krb5User='alice'
+krb5UserPass='alice'
+krb5UserKrbPass='aaa'
+krb5User2='bob'
+krb5User3='carl'
+krb5KDCPass='qwe'
+krb5RootPass='rrr'
+
+krb5conf="/etc/krb5.conf"
+krb5confdir="/etc/krb5.conf.d"
+krb5kdcconf="/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
+krb5kadmacl="/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl"
+
+rlJournalStart
+    rlPhaseStartSetup
+        rlServiceStart sshd
+        rlRun "TestDir=\$(pwd)"
+        rlRun "TmpDir=\$(mktemp -d)" 0 "Creating tmp directory"
+        rlRun "pushd $TmpDir"
+        rlRun "auditfile=\$(mktemp --tmpdir=${TmpDir})"
+    rlPhaseEnd
+
+    rlPhaseStartSetup "KDC and kadmind setup"
+        # Stop and backup
+        rlRun "rlServiceStop kadmin krb5kdc"
+        rlRun "rm -f /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal* /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/.k5*"
+        rlFileBackup $krb5conf /var/kerberos/krb5kdc /etc/sysconfig/{kadmin,krb5kdc} /etc/hosts
+        rlFileBackup --clean /root/.k5login
+        [ -e /etc/krb5.keytab ] && rlFileBackup /etc/krb5.keytab
+        [ -e $krb5confdir ] && rlFileBackup $krb5confdir
+        # Basic setup of KDC and krb5.conf
+        rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[libdefaults\]/[libdefaults]\n default_realm = $krb5REALM1/\" $krb5conf"
+        rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[realms\]/[realms]\n $krb5REALM1 = {\n  kdc = $krb5HostName\n  admin_server = $krb5HostName\n }/\" $krb5conf"
+        if [ "$krb5DomainName" ]; then
+            rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[domain_realm\]/[domain_realm]\n .$krb5DomainName = $krb5REALM1\n $krb5DomainName = $krb5REALM1/\" $krb5conf"
+        else
+            rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[domain_realm\]/[domain_realm]\n $krb5HostName = $krb5REALM1/\" $krb5conf"
+        fi
+        rlRun "sed -i s/EXAMPLE.COM/$krb5REALM1/ $krb5kdcconf"
+        # Configure the kadmin ACL
+        rlRun "echo \"*/master@$krb5REALM1  *\" > $krb5kadmacl"
+        if rlIsFedora '>=31';then
+            rlLog "Modify supported_enctypes for Fedora >=31. Remove *DES ciphers."
+            rlRun "sed -i \"s/supported_enctypes.*/supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal/\" /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
+        elif rlIsRHEL '8' && [ `rpm -q --qf '%{VERSION}' krb5-server | cut -d"." -f2` -lt 18 ];then
+            rlLog "Modify supported_enctypes for RHEL-8."
+            rlRun "sed -i \"s/supported_enctypes.*/supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal/\" /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
+        else
+            #RHEL-8 Bug 1802334 - [Rebase] krb5: rebase to 1.18:
+            #- Removal of *DES encryption types
+            #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1802334
+            rlLog "Modify supported_enctypes for RHEL-8 with krb-1.18. Remove *DES ciphers."
+            rlRun "sed -i \"s/supported_enctypes.*/supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal/\" /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
+        fi
+        # Create the realm databases
+        rlRun "rngd -r /dev/urandom"
+        rlRun "kdb5_util create -s -r $krb5REALM1 -P $krb5KDCPass"
+        rlRun "rlServiceStart kadmin krb5kdc"
+        rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"addprinc -pw $krb5RootPass root/master\""
+        rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"addprinc -pw $krb5UserKrbPass $krb5User\""
+        rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"addprinc -randkey host/$krb5HostName\""
+        rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"ktadd host/$krb5HostName\""
+        # Create test system user 
+        [ $krb5User != "root" ] && rlRun "useradd $krb5User"
+        rlRun "echo $krb5UserPass | passwd --stdin $krb5User"
+    rlPhaseEnd
+
+    rlPhaseStartTest "Run GEF got-audit"
+        rlRun "systemctl restart krb5kdc.service"
+        rlRun "systemctl restart kadmin.service"
+        rlRun "systemctl --no-pager status krb5kdc.service"
+        rlRun "systemctl --no-pager status kadmin.service"
+
+        rlRun "SERVICE_PID=\$( systemctl show --property=MainPID krb5kdc.service | cut -f2 -d= )"
+        rlRun "echo SERVICE_PID is '$SERVICE_PID'"
+        [ -n "$SERVICE_PID" ] || rlFail "No service pid was found"
+        rlRun "gdb-gef --pid '$SERVICE_PID' --command='$TestDir'/got-audit.gdb --batch > '$auditfile'"
+        # Basic test: ensure that at least one symbol is found in libc.so,
+        #  to verify that the report looks plausible.
+        rlAssertGrep " : /.*/libc.so" "$auditfile"
+        # Ensure the got-audit did not report any errors
+        rlAssertNotGrep " :: ERROR" "$auditfile"
+        rlRun "cp '$auditfile' '$TMT_TEST_DATA'/krb5kdc-got-audit.txt"
+
+        rlRun "SERVICE_PID=\$( systemctl show --property=MainPID kadmin.service | cut -f2 -d= )"
+        rlRun "echo SERVICE_PID is '$SERVICE_PID'"
+        [ -n "$SERVICE_PID" ] || rlFail "No service pid was found"
+        rlRun "gdb-gef --pid '$SERVICE_PID' --command='$TestDir'/got-audit.gdb --batch > '$auditfile'"
+        # Basic test: ensure that at least one symbol is found in libc.so,
+        #  to verify that the report looks plausible.
+        rlAssertGrep " : /.*/libc.so" "$auditfile"
+        # Ensure the got-audit did not report any errors
+        rlAssertNotGrep " :: ERROR" "$auditfile"
+        rlRun "cp '$auditfile' '$TMT_TEST_DATA'/kadmin-got-audit.txt"
+    rlPhaseEnd
+
+    rlPhaseStartCleanup
+        rlRun "rm -rf /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/* /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/.k5* /etc/krb5* /etc/sysconfig/{kadmin,krb5kdc}"
+        rlFileRestore
+        rlServiceRestore krb5kdc kadmin
+        [ $krb5User != "root" ] && rlRun "userdel -r -f $krb5User"
+        rlRun "popd"
+        rlRun "rm -r $TmpDir" 0 "Removing tmp directory"
+    rlPhaseEnd
+rlJournalPrintText
+rlJournalEnd

tests/inplace-upgrade-sanity/Makefile

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ $(METADATA): Makefile
 	@echo "TestTime:        20m" >> $(METADATA)
 	@echo "RunFor:          krb5" >> $(METADATA)
 	@echo "Requires:        expect krb5-server krb5-workstation openssh-clients openssh-server rng-tools" >> $(METADATA)
+    @echo "Requires:        setools-console" >> $(METADATA)
 	@echo "Priority:        Normal" >> $(METADATA)
 	@echo "License:         GPLv2" >> $(METADATA)
 	@echo "Confidential:    no" >> $(METADATA)

tests/inplace-upgrade-sanity/TC#0378369.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+tag:
+  - CI-Tier-1
+  - CI-Tier-1-krb5
+  - Fedora 31
+  - Fedora 32
+  - FedoraReady
+  - IDM-CI-gating
+  - NoRHEL4
+  - NoRHEL5
+  - TIPpass
+  - TIPpass_Security
+  - Tier1
+  - Tier1security
+  - rhel_upgrade
+tier: '1'
+adjust:
+  - enabled: false
+    when: distro == rhel-4, rhel-5
+    continue: false
+extra-nitrate: TC#0378369
+extra-summary: /CoreOS/krb5/Sanity/inplace-upgrade-sanity-test