Add recursion limit for ASN.1 indefinite lengths (CVE-2020-28196)

Add-recursion-limit-for-ASN.1-indefinite-lengths.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From cfd50b3ce27aebe97d13ee1f751fa8049f2ffe28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2020 17:07:05 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Add recursion limit for ASN.1 indefinite lengths
+
+The libkrb5 ASN.1 decoder supports BER indefinite lengths.  It
+computes the tag length using recursion; the lack of a recursion limit
+allows an attacker to overrun the stack and cause the process to
+crash.  Reported by Demi Obenour.
+
+CVE-2020-28196:
+
+In MIT krb5 releases 1.11 and later, an unauthenticated attacker can
+cause a denial of service for any client or server to which it can
+send an ASN.1-encoded Kerberos message of sufficient length.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 57415dda6cf04e73ffc3723be518eddfae599bfd)
+
+ticket: 8959
+version_fixed: 1.17.2
+
+(cherry picked from commit 9239fa1d0124bdf3c78c20eb70873e3af2baabb1)
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c
+index a160cf4fe..cd6b879f7 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_encode.c
+@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ make_tag(asn1buf *buf, const taginfo *t, size_t len)
+ static krb5_error_code
+ get_tag(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len, taginfo *tag_out,
+         const uint8_t **contents_out, size_t *clen_out,
+-        const uint8_t **remainder_out, size_t *rlen_out)
++        const uint8_t **remainder_out, size_t *rlen_out, int recursion)
+ {
+     krb5_error_code ret;
+     uint8_t o;
+@@ -394,9 +394,11 @@ get_tag(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len, taginfo *tag_out,
+         /* Indefinite form (should not be present in DER, but we accept it). */
+         if (tag_out->construction != CONSTRUCTED)
+             return ASN1_MISMATCH_INDEF;
++        if (recursion >= 32)
++            return ASN1_OVERFLOW;
+         p = asn1;
+         while (!(len >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0)) {
+-            ret = get_tag(p, len, &t, &c, &clen, &p, &len);
++            ret = get_tag(p, len, &t, &c, &clen, &p, &len, recursion + 1);
+             if (ret)
+                 return ret;
+         }
+@@ -613,7 +615,7 @@ split_der(asn1buf *buf, uint8_t *const *der, size_t len, taginfo *tag_out)
+     const uint8_t *contents, *remainder;
+     size_t clen, rlen;
+ 
+-    ret = get_tag(*der, len, tag_out, &contents, &clen, &remainder, &rlen);
++    ret = get_tag(*der, len, tag_out, &contents, &clen, &remainder, &rlen, 0);
+     if (ret)
+         return ret;
+     if (rlen != 0)
+@@ -1199,7 +1201,7 @@ decode_atype(const taginfo *t, const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len,
+         const uint8_t *rem;
+         size_t rlen;
+         if (!tag->implicit) {
+-            ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &inner_tag, &asn1, &len, &rem, &rlen);
++            ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &inner_tag, &asn1, &len, &rem, &rlen, 0);
+             if (ret)
+                 return ret;
+             /* Note: we don't check rlen (it should be 0). */
+@@ -1420,7 +1422,7 @@ decode_sequence(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len, const struct seq_info *seq,
+     for (i = 0; i < seq->n_fields; i++) {
+         if (len == 0)
+             break;
+-        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len);
++        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len, 0);
+         if (ret)
+             goto error;
+         /*
+@@ -1478,7 +1480,7 @@ decode_sequence_of(const uint8_t *asn1, size_t len,
+     *seq_out = NULL;
+     *count_out = 0;
+     while (len > 0) {
+-        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len);
++        ret = get_tag(asn1, len, &t, &contents, &clen, &asn1, &len, 0);
+         if (ret)
+             goto error;
+         if (!check_atype_tag(elemtype, &t)) {
+@@ -1584,7 +1586,7 @@ k5_asn1_full_decode(const krb5_data *code, const struct atype_info *a,
+ 
+     *retrep = NULL;
+     ret = get_tag((uint8_t *)code->data, code->length, &t, &contents,
+-                  &clen, &remainder, &rlen);
++                  &clen, &remainder, &rlen, 0);
+     if (ret)
+         return ret;
+     /* rlen should be 0, but we don't check it (and due to padding in

Clear-forwardable-flag-instead-of-denying-request.patch

@@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ ticket: 7871
 (cherry picked from commit 08e948cce2c79a3604066fcf7a64fc527456f83d)
 ---
  src/kdc/do_as_req.c       |  19 ++------
- src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c      |  58 +++++-----------------
+ src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c      |  56 ++++-----------------
  src/kdc/kdc_util.c        |  82 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
  src/kdc/kdc_util.h        |   9 ++--
  src/kdc/tgs_policy.c      |   8 +--
  src/tests/Makefile.in     |   1 +
  src/tests/gcred.c         |  28 ++++++++---
  src/tests/t_kdcoptions.py | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 8 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
+ 8 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
  create mode 100644 src/tests/t_kdcoptions.py
 
 diff --git a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
@@ -146,10 +146,9 @@ index 587342a6c..1da099318 100644
 -    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
 -        !isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
 -        clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
--
+ 
 -    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
 -        setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
-+
 +    if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED))
          enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
 -    } else

Implement-krb5_cc_remove_cred-for-remaining-types.patch

@@ -266,25 +266,13 @@ index 8419f6ebf..98723fe2e 100644
 -     * with the time offsets, skip it. */
 -    while (krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey] == krcursor->princ_id ||
 -           krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey] == krcursor->offsets_id) {
--        krcursor->currkey++;
--        /* Check if we have now reached the end */
--        if (krcursor->currkey >= krcursor->numkeys)
--            return KRB5_CC_END;
--    }
 +        /* Read the key; the right size buffer will be allocated and
 +         * returned. */
 +        psize = keyctl_read_alloc(krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey],
 +                                  &payload);
 +        if (psize != -1) {
 +            krcursor->currkey++;
- 
--    /* Read the key; the right size buffer will be allocated and returned. */
--    psize = keyctl_read_alloc(krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey], &payload);
--    if (psize == -1) {
--        DEBUG_PRINT(("Error reading key %d: %s\n",
--                     krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey],
--                     strerror(errno)));
--        return KRB5_FCC_NOFILE;
++
 +            /* Unmarshal the cred using the file ccache version 4 format. */
 +            ret = k5_unmarshal_cred(payload, psize, 4, creds);
 +            free(payload);
@@ -297,10 +285,22 @@ index 8419f6ebf..98723fe2e 100644
 +
 +        /* The current key was unlinked, probably by a remove_cred call; move
 +         * on to the next one. */
-+        krcursor->currkey++;
+         krcursor->currkey++;
+-        /* Check if we have now reached the end */
+-        if (krcursor->currkey >= krcursor->numkeys)
+-            return KRB5_CC_END;
      }
--    krcursor->currkey++;
  
+-    /* Read the key; the right size buffer will be allocated and returned. */
+-    psize = keyctl_read_alloc(krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey], &payload);
+-    if (psize == -1) {
+-        DEBUG_PRINT(("Error reading key %d: %s\n",
+-                     krcursor->keys[krcursor->currkey],
+-                     strerror(errno)));
+-        return KRB5_FCC_NOFILE;
+-    }
+-    krcursor->currkey++;
+-
 -    /* Unmarshal the credential using the file ccache version 4 format. */
 -    ret = k5_unmarshal_cred(payload, psize, 4, creds);
 -    free(payload);

Make-etype-names-in-KDC-logs-human-readable.patch

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ ticket: 8772 (new)
 (cherry picked from commit a649279727490687d54becad91fde8cf7429d951)
 ---
  src/kdc/kdc_log.c  |  42 +++++++--------
- src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
  src/kdc/kdc_util.h |   6 +--
- 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
+ 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_log.c b/src/kdc/kdc_log.c
 index 4eec50373..b160ba21a 100644
@@ -132,16 +132,57 @@ index 0155c28c6..f5c581c82 100644
 - * L10_2 = log10(2**x), rounded up; log10(2) ~= 0.301.
 - */
 -#define L10_2(x) ((int)(((x * 301) + 999) / 1000))
+-
+-/*
+- * Max length of sprintf("%ld") for an int of type T; includes leading
+- * minus sign and terminating NUL.
+- */
+-#define D_LEN(t) (L10_2(sizeof(t) * CHAR_BIT) + 2)
+-
+-void
+-ktypes2str(char *s, size_t len, int nktypes, krb5_enctype *ktype)
 +/* Wrapper of krb5_enctype_to_name() to include the PKINIT types. */
 +static krb5_error_code
 +enctype_name(krb5_enctype ktype, char *buf, size_t buflen)
-+{
+ {
+-    int i;
+-    char stmp[D_LEN(krb5_enctype) + 1];
+-    char *p;
 +    char *name;
-+
+ 
+-    if (nktypes < 0
+-        || len < (sizeof(" etypes {...}") + D_LEN(int))) {
+-        *s = '\0';
+-        return;
+-    }
 +    if (buflen == 0)
 +        return EINVAL;
 +    *buf = '\0'; /* ensure these are always valid C-strings */
-+
+ 
+-    snprintf(s, len, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
+-    for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
+-        snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp), "%s%ld", i ? " " : "", (long)ktype[i]);
+-        if (strlen(s) + strlen(stmp) + sizeof("}") > len)
+-            break;
+-        strlcat(s, stmp, len);
+-    }
+-    if (i < nktypes) {
+-        /*
+-         * We broke out of the loop. Try to truncate the list.
+-         */
+-        p = s + strlen(s);
+-        while (p - s + sizeof("...}") > len) {
+-            while (p > s && *p != ' ' && *p != '{')
+-                *p-- = '\0';
+-            if (p > s && *p == ' ') {
+-                *p-- = '\0';
+-                continue;
+-            }
+-        }
+-        strlcat(s, "...", len);
+-    }
+-    strlcat(s, "}", len);
+-    return;
 +    /* rfc4556 recommends that clients wishing to indicate support for these
 +     * pkinit algorithms include them in the etype field of the AS-REQ. */
 +    if (ktype == ENCTYPE_DSA_SHA1_CMS)
@@ -160,85 +201,47 @@ index 0155c28c6..f5c581c82 100644
 +        name = "des-ede3-cbc-EnvOID";
 +    else
 +        return krb5_enctype_to_name(ktype, FALSE, buf, buflen);
- 
--/*
-- * Max length of sprintf("%ld") for an int of type T; includes leading
-- * minus sign and terminating NUL.
-- */
--#define D_LEN(t) (L10_2(sizeof(t) * CHAR_BIT) + 2)
++
 +    if (strlcpy(name, buf, buflen) >= buflen)
 +        return ENOMEM;
 +    return 0;
-+}
- 
--void
--ktypes2str(char *s, size_t len, int nktypes, krb5_enctype *ktype)
-+char *
-+ktypes2str(krb5_enctype *ktype, int nktypes)
- {
-+    struct k5buf buf;
-     int i;
--    char stmp[D_LEN(krb5_enctype) + 1];
--    char *p;
-+    char name[64];
- 
--    if (nktypes < 0
--        || len < (sizeof(" etypes {...}") + D_LEN(int))) {
--        *s = '\0';
--        return;
--    }
-+    if (nktypes < 0)
-+        return NULL;
- 
--    snprintf(s, len, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
-+    k5_buf_init_dynamic(&buf);
-+    k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
-     for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
--        snprintf(stmp, sizeof(stmp), "%s%ld", i ? " " : "", (long)ktype[i]);
--        if (strlen(s) + strlen(stmp) + sizeof("}") > len)
--            break;
--        strlcat(s, stmp, len);
-+        enctype_name(ktype[i], name, sizeof(name));
-+        k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%s%s(%ld)", i ? ", " : "", name, (long)ktype[i]);
-     }
--    if (i < nktypes) {
--        /*
--         * We broke out of the loop. Try to truncate the list.
--         */
--        p = s + strlen(s);
--        while (p - s + sizeof("...}") > len) {
--            while (p > s && *p != ' ' && *p != '{')
--                *p-- = '\0';
--            if (p > s && *p == ' ') {
--                *p-- = '\0';
--                continue;
--            }
--        }
--        strlcat(s, "...", len);
--    }
--    strlcat(s, "}", len);
--    return;
-+    k5_buf_add(&buf, "}");
-+    return buf.data;
  }
  
 -void
 -rep_etypes2str(char *s, size_t len, krb5_kdc_rep *rep)
 +char *
-+rep_etypes2str(krb5_kdc_rep *rep)
++ktypes2str(krb5_enctype *ktype, int nktypes)
  {
 -    char stmp[sizeof("ses=") + D_LEN(krb5_enctype)];
--
++    struct k5buf buf;
++    int i;
++    char name[64];
+ 
 -    if (len < (3 * D_LEN(krb5_enctype)
 -               + sizeof("etypes {rep= tkt= ses=}"))) {
 -        *s = '\0';
 -        return;
--    }
++    if (nktypes < 0)
++        return NULL;
++
++    k5_buf_init_dynamic(&buf);
++    k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%d etypes {", nktypes);
++    for (i = 0; i < nktypes; i++) {
++        enctype_name(ktype[i], name, sizeof(name));
++        k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%s%s(%ld)", i ? ", " : "", name, (long)ktype[i]);
+     }
++    k5_buf_add(&buf, "}");
++    return buf.data;
++}
+ 
+-    snprintf(s, len, "etypes {rep=%ld", (long)rep->enc_part.enctype);
++char *
++rep_etypes2str(krb5_kdc_rep *rep)
++{
 +    struct k5buf buf;
 +    char name[64];
 +    krb5_enctype etype;
- 
--    snprintf(s, len, "etypes {rep=%ld", (long)rep->enc_part.enctype);
++
 +    k5_buf_init_dynamic(&buf);
 +    k5_buf_add(&buf, "etypes {rep=");
 +    enctype_name(rep->enc_part.enctype, name, sizeof(name));

Put-KDB-authdata-first.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From ffbe2c82ea6d3267029ace6849661c8e4c5f5cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2020 16:13:30 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Put KDB authdata first
+
+Windows services, as well as some versions of Samba, may refuse
+tickets if the PAC is not in the first AD-IF-RELEVANT container.  In
+fetch_kdb_authdata(), change the merge order so that authdata from the
+KDB module appears first.
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment and clarified commit message]
+
+ticket: 8872 (new)
+tags: pullup
+target_version: 1.18
+target_version: 1.17-next
+
+(cherry picked from commit 331fa4bdd34263ea20667a0f51338cb84357fdaa)
+(cherry picked from commit 1678270de3fda699114122447b1f06b08fb4e53e)
+---
+ src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c b/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
+index 1b067cb0b..616c3eadc 100644
+--- a/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
++++ b/src/kdc/kdc_authdata.c
+@@ -383,11 +383,14 @@ fetch_kdb_authdata(krb5_context context, unsigned int flags,
+     if (ret)
+         return (ret == KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
+ 
+-    /* Add the KDB authdata to the ticket, without copying or filtering. */
+-    ret = merge_authdata(context, db_authdata,
+-                         &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, FALSE, FALSE);
++    /* Put the KDB authdata first in the ticket.  A successful merge places the
++     * combined list in db_authdata and releases the old ticket authdata. */
++    ret = merge_authdata(context, enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data,
++                         &db_authdata, FALSE, FALSE);
+     if (ret)
+         krb5_free_authdata(context, db_authdata);
++    else
++        enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data = db_authdata;
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 

Remove-3des-support.patch

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ their constants.
  src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h            |   6 +-
  src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5seal.c                  |  35 +-
  src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealiov.c               |  27 +-
- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c                |  88 ++--
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c                | 102 ++---
  src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unsealiov.c             |  38 +-
  src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c              |  11 -
  .../api.current/chpass-principal-v2.exp       |   4 +-
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ their constants.
  src/tests/t_salt.py                           |   5 +-
  src/util/k5test.py                            |  10 -
  .../leash/htmlhelp/html/Encryption_Types.htm  |  13 -
- 95 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 4829 deletions(-)
+ 95 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 4836 deletions(-)
  delete mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/builtin/des/ISSUES
  delete mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/builtin/des/Makefile.in
  delete mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/builtin/des/d3_aead.c
@@ -5384,15 +5384,13 @@ index 9b183bc33..f0cc4a680 100644
 +    if (signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5) {
          *minor_status = 0;
          return(GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
-+    }
- 
+-
 -    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
 -    case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
 -        /* compute the checksum of the message */
 -
 -        /* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */
-+    /* compute the checksum of the message */
- 
+-
 -        if (! (data_ptr = xmalloc(8 + plainlen))) {
 -            if (sealalg != 0xffff)
 -                xfree(plain);
@@ -5401,9 +5399,33 @@ index 9b183bc33..f0cc4a680 100644
 -            *minor_status = ENOMEM;
 -            return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
 -        }
-+    /* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */
- 
+-
 -        (void) memcpy(data_ptr, ptr-2, 8);
+-
+-        (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);
+-
+-        plaind.length = 8 + plainlen;
+-        plaind.data = data_ptr;
+-        code = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
+-                                    ctx->seq, sign_usage,
+-                                    &plaind, &md5cksum);
+-        xfree(data_ptr);
+-
+-        if (code) {
+-            if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
+-                gssalloc_free(token.value);
+-            *minor_status = code;
+-            return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
+-        }
+-
+-        code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
+-        break;
+     }
+ 
++    /* compute the checksum of the message */
++
++    /* 8 = bytes of token body to be checksummed according to spec */
++
 +    if (! (data_ptr = xmalloc(8 + plainlen))) {
 +        if (sealalg != 0xffff)
 +            xfree(plain);
@@ -5412,40 +5434,25 @@ index 9b183bc33..f0cc4a680 100644
 +        *minor_status = ENOMEM;
 +        return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
 +    }
- 
--        (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);
++
 +    (void) memcpy(data_ptr, ptr-2, 8);
- 
--        plaind.length = 8 + plainlen;
--        plaind.data = data_ptr;
--        code = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
--                                    ctx->seq, sign_usage,
--                                    &plaind, &md5cksum);
--        xfree(data_ptr);
++
 +    (void) memcpy(data_ptr+8, plain, plainlen);
- 
--        if (code) {
--            if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
--                gssalloc_free(token.value);
--            *minor_status = code;
--            return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
--        }
++
 +    plaind.length = 8 + plainlen;
 +    plaind.data = data_ptr;
 +    code = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
 +                                ctx->seq, sign_usage,
 +                                &plaind, &md5cksum);
 +    xfree(data_ptr);
- 
--        code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
--        break;
++
 +    if (code) {
 +        if (toktype == KG_TOK_SEAL_MSG)
 +            gssalloc_free(token.value);
 +        *minor_status = code;
 +        return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
-     }
- 
++    }
++
 +    code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
 +
      krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);

Remove-Kerberos-v4-support-vestiges-from-ccapi.patch

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Remove Kerberos v4 support vestiges from ccapi
  src/ccapi/lib/ccapi_v2.c               |  34 +--
  src/ccapi/lib/win/OldCC/ccapi.h        |  20 --
  src/ccapi/server/ccs_ccache.c          |  69 +-----
- src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_ccache.c     | 227 +++-----------------
+ src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_ccache.c     | 223 +++-----------------
  src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_constants.c  |   2 -
  src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_context.c    |   3 -
  src/ccapi/test/test_ccapi_v2.c         |  89 --------
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Remove Kerberos v4 support vestiges from ccapi
  src/windows/kfwlogon/kfwlogon.h        |   2 +-
  src/windows/leashdll/leash-int.h       |   2 +-
  src/windows/lib/cacheapi.h             |  53 +----
- 15 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 873 deletions(-)
+ 15 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 871 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/ccapi/common/cci_cred_union.c b/src/ccapi/common/cci_cred_union.c
 index 4c8981610..424a93dab 100644
@@ -760,8 +760,29 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
 -		cc_ccache_destroy(ccache);
 -		ccache = NULL;
 -	}
--
--
++        // replace v5 only ccache's principal
++        if (!err) {
++            err = cc_context_create_new_ccache(context, cc_credentials_v5,
++                                               "foo@BAZ.ORG", &ccache);
++        }
++        if (!err) {
++            check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(
++                ccache, cc_credentials_v5, "foo/BAZ@BAR.ORG", ccNoError,
++                "replace v5 only ccache's principal (empty ccache)");
++        }
++        else {
++            log_error(
++                "cc_context_create_new_ccache failed, can't complete test");
++            failure_count++;
++        }
+ 
++        // bad params
++        if (!err) {
++            check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(ccache, cc_credentials_v5,
++                                               NULL, ccErrBadParam,
++                                               "NULL principal");
++        }
+ 
 -	// empty ccache
 -
 -		// replace v5 only ccache's principal
@@ -837,29 +858,6 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
 -		// replace v4 only ccache's principal
 -
 -		// add v5 principal to v4 only ccache
-+        // replace v5 only ccache's principal
-+        if (!err) {
-+            err = cc_context_create_new_ccache(context, cc_credentials_v5,
-+                                               "foo@BAZ.ORG", &ccache);
-+        }
-+        if (!err) {
-+            check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(
-+                ccache, cc_credentials_v5, "foo/BAZ@BAR.ORG", ccNoError,
-+                "replace v5 only ccache's principal (empty ccache)");
-+        }
-+        else {
-+            log_error(
-+                "cc_context_create_new_ccache failed, can't complete test");
-+            failure_count++;
-+        }
-+
-+        // bad params
-+        if (!err) {
-+            check_once_cc_ccache_set_principal(ccache, cc_credentials_v5,
-+                                               NULL, ccErrBadParam,
-+                                               "NULL principal");
-+        }
-+
 +        if (ccache) {
 +            cc_ccache_destroy(ccache);
 +            ccache = NULL;
@@ -894,7 +892,8 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
  	}
  	if (!err) {
 -		check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, &time_offset, ccNoError, "offset set for v5 but not v4");
--	}
++		check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, &time_offset, ccNoError, "offset set for v5");
+ 	}
 -	if (!err) {
 -		check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v4, &time_offset, ccErrTimeOffsetNotSet, "asking for v4 offset when only v5 is set");
 -	}
@@ -903,10 +902,9 @@ index a0fd84af1..fe63e6710 100644
 -	}
 -	if (!err) {
 -		check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v4, &time_offset, ccNoError, "asking for v4 offset when v4 and v5 are set");
-+		check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, &time_offset, ccNoError, "offset set for v5");
- 	}
- 
+-	}
 -
+ 
  	check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v5, NULL, ccErrBadParam, "NULL time_offset out param");
 -	check_once_cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset(ccache, cc_credentials_v4_v5, &time_offset, ccErrBadCredentialsVersion, "v4_v5 creds_vers in param (invalid)");
  

Remove-PKINIT-draft-9-support.patch

@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ ticket: 8817 (new)
  src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_accessor.h  |   6 -
  src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c      | 231 +++-----
  src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h    |   1 -
- .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 221 ++------
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 219 ++-----
  src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c       |  65 ---
- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c       | 531 +++++-------------
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c       | 543 ++++++------------
  src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h     |   4 -
  src/tests/t_pkinit.py                         |   6 +-
- 10 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 809 deletions(-)
+ 10 files changed, 282 insertions(+), 814 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
 index fe2ec0d31..b437fd53f 100644
@@ -214,7 +214,18 @@ index 58400d555..1a642139a 100644
 -        auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
 -        auth_pack.clientPublicValue = &info;
 -        auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
--
++    memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
++    memset(&auth_pack, 0, sizeof(auth_pack));
++    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.ctime = ctsec;
++    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.cusec = cusec;
++    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.nonce = nonce;
++    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum = *cksum;
++    if (!reqctx->opts->disable_freshness)
++        auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken = reqctx->freshness_token;
++    auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
++    auth_pack.clientPublicValue = &info;
++    auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
+ 
 -        /* add List of CMS algorithms */
 -        retval = create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
 -                                               reqctx->cryptoctx,
@@ -227,18 +238,6 @@ index 58400d555..1a642139a 100644
 -        pkiDebug("as_req: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n",
 -                 (int)reqctx->pa_type);
 -        retval = -1;
-+    memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
-+    memset(&auth_pack, 0, sizeof(auth_pack));
-+    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.ctime = ctsec;
-+    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.cusec = cusec;
-+    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.nonce = nonce;
-+    auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum = *cksum;
-+    if (!reqctx->opts->disable_freshness)
-+        auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken = reqctx->freshness_token;
-+    auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
-+    auth_pack.clientPublicValue = &info;
-+    auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
-+
 +    /* add List of CMS algorithms */
 +    retval = create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
 +                                           reqctx->cryptoctx,
@@ -356,19 +355,20 @@ index 58400d555..1a642139a 100644
 -                                       &req9->signedAuthPack.data,
 -                                       &req9->signedAuthPack.length);
 -        break;
-+                                       &req->signedAuthPack.data,
-+                                       &req->signedAuthPack.length);
-+    }
-+
- #ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
+-#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
 -        print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)req9->signedAuthPack.data,
 -                         req9->signedAuthPack.length,
 -                         "/tmp/client_signed_data_draft9");
+-#endif
++                                       &req->signedAuthPack.data,
++                                       &req->signedAuthPack.length);
+     }
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
 +    print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)req->signedAuthPack.data,
 +                     req->signedAuthPack.length,
 +                     "/tmp/client_signed_data");
- #endif
--    }
++#endif
 +
      krb5_free_data(context, coded_auth_pack);
      if (retval) {
@@ -556,7 +556,13 @@ index 8aa2c5257..8c7fd0cca 100644
 -                goto cleanup2;
 -            PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
 -                                       V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid_copy);
--
++        /* create a content-type attr */
++        oid_copy = OBJ_dup(oid);
++        if (oid_copy == NULL)
++            goto cleanup2;
++        PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
++                                   V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid_copy);
+ 
 -            /* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
 -            /* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
 -            sk = p7si->auth_attr;
@@ -565,13 +571,6 @@ index 8aa2c5257..8c7fd0cca 100644
 -            if (abuf == NULL)
 -                goto cleanup2;
 -        } /* signed attributes */
-+        /* create a content-type attr */
-+        oid_copy = OBJ_dup(oid);
-+        if (oid_copy == NULL)
-+            goto cleanup2;
-+        PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
-+                                   V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid_copy);
-+
 +        /* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
 +        /* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
 +        sk = p7si->auth_attr;
@@ -1041,38 +1040,47 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
      if (retval) {
          TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_PADATA_VERIFY_FAIL(context);
          goto cleanup;
-@@ -541,117 +513,87 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
+@@ -541,118 +513,88 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
  #endif
  
      OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&authp_data, &k5data);
 -    switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
 -    case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
 -        retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
--        if (retval) {
--            pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
--            goto cleanup;
--        }
--
--        retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
--                                      auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
--        if (retval)
--            goto cleanup;
 +    retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
 +    if (retval) {
 +        pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
 +        goto cleanup;
 +    }
- 
++
++    retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
++    if (retval)
++        goto cleanup;
++
++    /* check dh parameters */
++    if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
++        retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
++                                 reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
++                                 &auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
++                                 plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
+         if (retval) {
+-            pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
++            pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
+             goto cleanup;
+         }
+-
+-        retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
+-                                      auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
+-        if (retval)
+-            goto cleanup;
+-
 -        /* check dh parameters */
 -        if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
 -            retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
 -                                     reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
 -                                     &auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
 -                                     plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
-+    retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
-+    if (retval)
-+        goto cleanup;
- 
+-
 -            if (retval) {
 -                pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
 -                goto cleanup;
@@ -1088,17 +1096,10 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
 -        der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
 -        retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL,
 -                                      0, der_req, &cksum);
-+    /* check dh parameters */
-+    if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
-+        retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
-+                                 reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
-+                                 &auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
-+                                 plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
-         if (retval) {
+-        if (retval) {
 -            pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
-+            pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
-             goto cleanup;
-         }
+-            goto cleanup;
+-        }
 -        if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
 -            k5_bcmp(cksum.contents,
 -                    auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
@@ -1170,10 +1171,7 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
 -            if (!valid_kdcPkId)
 -                pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert"
 -                         "RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
-+        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
- 
+-
 -        }
 -        /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
 -        reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
@@ -1184,24 +1182,35 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
 -        retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(&k5data, &auth_pack9);
 -        if (retval) {
 -            pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack_draft9\n");
-+    ftoken = auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken;
-+    if (ftoken != NULL) {
-+        retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, ftoken);
-+        if (retval)
-             goto cleanup;
+-            goto cleanup;
 -        }
 -        if (auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
 -            retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
 -                                     reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
 -                                     &auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
 -                                     plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
-+        valid_freshness_token = TRUE;
-+    }
- 
+-
 -            if (retval) {
 -                pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
 -                goto cleanup;
 -            }
+-        }
+-        /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
+-        reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
+-        auth_pack9 = NULL;
+-        break;
++        retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
++    ftoken = auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken;
++    if (ftoken != NULL) {
++        retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, ftoken);
++        if (retval)
++            goto cleanup;
++        valid_freshness_token = TRUE;
++    }
++
 +    /* check if kdcPkId present and match KDC's subjectIdentifier */
 +    if (reqp->kdcPkId.data != NULL) {
 +        int valid_kdcPkId = 0;
@@ -1214,18 +1223,15 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
 +        if (!valid_kdcPkId) {
 +            pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert; "
 +                     "RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
-         }
--        /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
--        reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
--        auth_pack9 = NULL;
--        break;
-     }
++        }
++    }
 +    /* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
 +    reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
 +    auth_pack = NULL;
- 
++
      if (is_signed) {
          retval = check_log_freshness(context, plgctx, request,
+                                      valid_freshness_token);
 @@ -682,21 +624,13 @@ cleanup:
              pkiDebug("pkinit_create_edata failed\n");
      }
@@ -1414,7 +1420,7 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
          }
 -        pkiDebug("%s: return checksum instead of nonce = %d\n",
 -                 __FUNCTION__, fixed_keypack);
--
+ 
 -        /* if this is an RFC reply or draft9 client requested a checksum
 -         * in the reply instead of the nonce, create an RFC-style keypack
 -         */
@@ -1424,7 +1430,7 @@ index 6aa646cc6..c44be9c74 100644
 -                retval = ENOMEM;
 -                goto cleanup;
 -            }
- 
+-
 -            retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0,
 -                                          encrypting_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
 -                                          req_pkt, &key_pack->asChecksum);

Simplify-krb5_dbe_def_search_enctype.patch

@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ kvno.
 
 (cherry picked from commit fcfb0e47c995a7e9f956c3716be3175f44ad26e0)
 ---
- src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c | 117 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
+ src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c | 111 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_default.c
 index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
@@ -59,18 +59,27 @@ index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
 -    krb5_key_data       *datap;
 -    krb5_error_code     ret;
 -    krb5_boolean        saw_non_permitted = FALSE;
--
--    ret = 0;
--    if (ktype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(kcontext, ktype))
--        return KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
--
--    if (kvno == -1 && stype == -1 && ktype == -1)
--        kvno = 0;
 +    krb5_key_data *kd;
 +    krb5_int32 db_salttype;
 +    krb5_boolean saw_non_permitted = FALSE;
 +    int i;
  
+-    ret = 0;
+-    if (ktype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(kcontext, ktype))
++    *kd_out = NULL;
++
++    if (enctype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, enctype))
+         return KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
++    if (ent->n_key_data == 0)
++        return KRB5_KDB_NO_MATCHING_KEY;
+ 
+-    if (kvno == -1 && stype == -1 && ktype == -1)
+-        kvno = 0;
++    /* Match the highest kvno if kvno is 0.  Key data is sorted in descending
++     * order of kvno. */
++    if (kvno == 0)
++        kvno = ent->key_data[0].key_data_kvno;
+ 
 -    if (kvno == 0) {
 -        /* Get the max key version */
 -        for (i = 0; i < dbentp->n_key_data; i++) {
@@ -79,7 +88,10 @@ index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
 -            }
 -        }
 -    }
-+    *kd_out = NULL;
++    for (i = *start; i < ent->n_key_data; i++) {
++        kd = &ent->key_data[i];
++        db_salttype = (kd->key_data_ver > 1) ? kd->key_data_type[1] :
++            KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
  
 -    maxkvno = -1;
 -    idx = -1;
@@ -104,28 +116,13 @@ index a1021f13a..231a0d8b4 100644
 -                continue;
 -        }
 -        if (stype >= 0 && db_stype != stype)
-+    if (enctype != -1 && !krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, enctype))
-+        return KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
-+    if (ent->n_key_data == 0)
-+        return KRB5_KDB_NO_MATCHING_KEY;
-+
-+    /* Match the highest kvno if kvno is 0.  Key data is sorted in descending
-+     * order of kvno. */
-+    if (kvno == 0)
-+        kvno = ent->key_data[0].key_data_kvno;
-+
-+    for (i = *start; i < ent->n_key_data; i++) {
-+        kd = &ent->key_data[i];
-+        db_salttype = (kd->key_data_ver > 1) ? kd->key_data_type[1] :
-+            KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL;
-+
 +        /* Match this entry against the arguments.  Stop searching if we have
 +         * passed the entries for the requested kvno. */
 +        if (enctype != -1 && kd->key_data_type[0] != enctype)
-+            continue;
-+        if (salttype >= 0 && db_salttype != salttype)
              continue;
 -        if (kvno >= 0 && dbentp->key_data[i].key_data_kvno != kvno)
++        if (salttype >= 0 && db_salttype != salttype)
++            continue;
 +        if (kvno >= 0 && kd->key_data_kvno < kvno)
 +            break;
 +        if (kvno >= 0 && kd->key_data_kvno != kvno)

Simply-OpenSSL-PKCS7-decryption-code.patch

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ a larger refactoring]
 
 (cherry picked from commit 210356653a2f963ffe9a8a1b1627c64fb8ca7a3d)
 ---
- .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 211 +++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)
+ .../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c    | 213 ++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 150 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
 index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
@@ -144,17 +144,6 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 -    X509_ALGOR *enc_alg=NULL;
 -    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
 -    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
--
--    p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
--
--    rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
--    enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
--    data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
--    evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
--    if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
--        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
--        goto cleanup;
--    }
 +    krb5_error_code ret;
 +    int ok = 0, plaintext_len = 0, final_len;
 +    unsigned int keylen = 0, eklen = 0, blocksize;
@@ -166,13 +155,24 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 +    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
 +    PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
  
+-    p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
++    *data_out = NULL;
++    *len_out = 0;
+ 
+-    rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+-    enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+-    data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+-    evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+-    if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+-        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
+-        goto cleanup;
+-    }
+-
 -    if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
 -        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
 -        goto cleanup;
 -    }
-+    *data_out = NULL;
-+    *len_out = 0;
- 
+-
 -    /* It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key
 -     * with the private key */
 +    p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -195,14 +195,14 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 -    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,evp_cipher,NULL,NULL,NULL,0) <= 0)
 +    evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
 +    if (evp_cipher == NULL)
-+        goto cleanup;
+         goto cleanup;
+-    if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
 +    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher);
 +    blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher);
 +
 +    evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 +    if (evp_ctx == NULL)
-         goto cleanup;
--    if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
++        goto cleanup;
 +    if (!EVP_DecryptInit(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL) ||
 +        EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) <= 0)
          goto cleanup;
@@ -212,9 +212,7 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 -    tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
 -    tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
 -    if (tkey == NULL)
-+    tkey = malloc(keylen);
-+    if (tkey == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey))
-         goto cleanup;
+-        goto cleanup;
 -    if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
 -        goto cleanup;
 -    if (ek == NULL) {
@@ -222,7 +220,7 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 -        eklen = tkeylen;
 -        tkey = NULL;
 -    }
- 
+-
 -    if (eklen != (unsigned)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
 -        /* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
 -         * and effective key length. The key length is
@@ -235,18 +233,29 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 -        }
 -    }
 -    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,ek,NULL,0) <= 0)
--        goto cleanup;
-+    /* Decrypt the secret key with the private key. */
-+    ret = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
-+                             ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ri->enc_key),
-+                             ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &ek, &eklen);
-+    use_key = (ret || eklen != keylen) ? tkey : ek;
++    tkey = malloc(keylen);
++    if (tkey == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey))
+         goto cleanup;
  
 -    if (out == NULL)
 -        out=etmp;
 -    else
 -        BIO_push(out,etmp);
 -    etmp=NULL;
++    /* Decrypt the secret key with the private key. */
++    ret = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
++                             ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ri->enc_key),
++                             ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &ek, &eklen);
++    use_key = (ret || eklen != keylen) ? tkey : ek;
+ 
+-    if (data_body->length > 0)
+-        bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
+-    else {
+-        bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+-        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0);
+-    }
+-    BIO_push(out,bio);
+-    bio=NULL;
 +    /* Allocate a plaintext buffer and decrypt data_body into it. */
 +    plaintext = malloc(data_body->length + blocksize);
 +    if (plaintext == NULL)
@@ -260,19 +269,6 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 +        goto cleanup;
 +    plaintext_len += final_len;
  
--    if (data_body->length > 0)
--        bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
--    else {
--        bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
--        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio,0);
--    }
--    BIO_push(out,bio);
--    bio=NULL;
-+    *len_out = plaintext_len;
-+    *data_out = plaintext;
-+    plaintext = NULL;
-+    ok = 1;
- 
 -    if (0) {
 -    cleanup:
 -        if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out);
@@ -289,6 +285,11 @@ index 5ff81d8cf..8aa2c5257 100644
 -        OPENSSL_free(tkey);
 -    }
 -    return(out);
++    *len_out = plaintext_len;
++    *data_out = plaintext;
++    plaintext = NULL;
++    ok = 1;
++
 +cleanup:
 +    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
 +    zapfree(plaintext, plaintext_len);

Update-test-suite-to-avoid-single-DES-enctypes.patch

@@ -1931,7 +1931,7 @@ index c061d764e..e8adee234 100644
      }
      {
  	all-enctypes
-@@ -248,114 +207,7 @@ set passes {
+@@ -248,115 +207,8 @@ set passes {
  	{allow_weak_crypto(server)=false}
  	{dummy=[verbose -log "all default enctypes"]}
      }
@@ -1960,8 +1960,8 @@ index c061d764e..e8adee234 100644
 -	{dummy=[verbose -log \
 -		"DES3 TGT, KDC permitting only des-cbc-crc"]}
 -    }
--}
--
+ }
+ 
 -# des.md5-tgt is set as unused, since it won't trigger the error case
 -# if SUPPORT_DESMD5 isn't honored.
 -
@@ -2041,11 +2041,12 @@ index c061d764e..e8adee234 100644
 -	{master_key_type=aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96}
 -	{dummy=[verbose -log "AES via TCP"]}
 -    }
- }
+-}
 -#	{supported_enctypes=des-cbc-md5:normal des-cbc-crc:normal twofish256-hmac-sha1:normal }
- 
+-
  # This shouldn't be necessary on dejagnu-1.4 and later, but 1.3 seems
  # to need it because its runtest.exp doesn't deal with PASS at all.
+ if [info exists PASS] {
 @@ -1095,7 +947,7 @@ proc setup_kerberos_db { standalone } {
      global REALMNAME KDB5_UTIL KADMIN_LOCAL KEY
      global tmppwd hostname

Use-secure_getenv-where-appropriate.patch

@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ ticket: 8800
  src/lib/krb5/os/trace.c                      |  2 +-
  src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_base.c                |  4 ++--
  src/lib/krb5/rcache/rc_io.c                  |  4 ++--
- src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c | 11 +++--------
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c | 13 ++++---------
  src/plugins/tls/k5tls/openssl.c              |  2 +-
  src/util/profile/prof_file.c                 |  2 +-
- 12 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+ 12 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/alt_prof.c b/src/lib/kadm5/alt_prof.c
 index 3f6b53651..5531a10fb 100644
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c b/src/plugins/preauth/
 index 8cd3fc640..b89c5d015 100644
 --- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
 +++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
-@@ -29,16 +29,10 @@
+@@ -29,15 +29,9 @@
   * SUCH DAMAGES.
   */
  
@@ -192,16 +192,16 @@ index 8cd3fc640..b89c5d015 100644
 -#include <string.h>
 -#include <stdio.h>
 -#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include "pkinit.h"
- #include <dlfcn.h>
+-#include <dlfcn.h>
 -#include <unistd.h>
- #include <dirent.h>
- 
--#include "pkinit.h"
+-#include <dirent.h>
 -
+ #include "pkinit.h"
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#include <dirent.h>
+ 
  static void
  free_list(char **list)
- {
 @@ -430,7 +424,8 @@ process_option_identity(krb5_context context,
      switch (idtype) {
      case IDTYPE_ENVVAR:

krb5.spec

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Summary: The Kerberos network authentication system
 Name: krb5
 Version: 1.17
 # for prerelease, should be e.g., 0.% {prerelease}.1% { ?dist } (without spaces)
-Release: 45%{?dist}
+Release: 47%{?dist}
 
 # lookaside-cached sources; two downloads and a build artifact
 Source0: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/1.17/krb5-%{version}%{prerelease}.tar.gz
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ Patch162: Simplify-krb5_dbe_def_search_enctype.patch
 Patch163: Squash-apparent-forward-null-in-clnttcp_create.patch
 Patch164: Remove-null-check-in-krb5_gss_duplicate_name.patch
 Patch165: Fix-KDC-crash-when-logging-PKINIT-enctypes.patch
+Patch166: Put-KDB-authdata-first.patch
+Patch167: Add-recursion-limit-for-ASN.1-indefinite-lengths.patch
 
 License: MIT
 URL: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
@@ -730,6 +732,12 @@ exit 0
 %{_libdir}/libkadm5srv_mit.so.*
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Nov 05 2020 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.17-47
+- Add recursion limit for ASN.1 indefinite lengths (CVE-2020-28196)
+
+* Thu Feb 06 2020 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.17-46
+- Put KDB authdata first
+
 * Wed Sep 25 2019 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 1.17-45
 - Fix KDC crash when logging PKINIT enctypes (CVE-2019-14844)