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15 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Robbie Harwood
0bc40dc134 Save other programs from worrying about CVE-2017-11462
Resolves: #1488873
Resolves: #1488874
(cherry picked from commit 11b90e9e6e)
[rharwood@redhat.com: normal spec file conflicts]
2017-09-06 12:48:22 -04:00
Robbie Harwood
2d0291ec8e Fix CVE-2017-11368 (remote triggerable assertion failure) 2017-07-20 15:34:39 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
b67e6fbff0 Re-apply patches that got lost 2017-03-06 17:01:09 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
3b4c96eb84 Patch build by disabling failing test; will fix properly soon
[rharwood@redhat.com: Of course the spec file backport isn't clean]
[rharwood@redhat.com: Modified patch as well]
2017-03-02 22:01:19 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
ed2f4bf39f Backport fix for GSSAPI fallback realm
[rharwood@redhat.com: Unclean cherry-pick on spec file]
2017-03-02 16:26:26 -05:00
Robbie Harwood
f54367ad9d Fix backward check in kprop.service 2016-09-30 16:53:26 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
b0b1849240 Switch to using autosetup macro
Patches come from git, so it is easiest to just make a git repo
2016-09-30 16:53:26 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
4dfaa66da7 Backport getrandom() support and remove patch numbering 2016-09-30 16:53:26 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
9d1a23f6bd New upstream release and integrate with external git 2016-09-30 16:53:26 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
81983aae73 Add krb5_db_register_keytab
Resolves: #1376812
2016-09-19 16:30:07 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
250735fb67 Use responder for non-preauth AS requests
Resolves: #1370622
2016-08-29 18:48:55 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
e536b792bf Guess Samba client mutual flag using ap_option
Resolves: #1370980
2016-08-29 18:48:55 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
5ba9bf9f81 Fix KDC return code and set prompt types for OTP client preauth
Resolves: #1370072
2016-08-25 14:18:48 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
447f05ead9 Turn OFD locks back on with glibc workaround
Resolves: #1274922
2016-08-25 14:18:46 +00:00
Robbie Harwood
cb587cf505 Fix use of KKDCPP with SNI
Resolves: #1365028
2016-08-10 17:34:03 +00:00
104 changed files with 4533 additions and 33456 deletions

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161
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,50 +1,49 @@
/results_krb5
/krb5-1.3.4.tar.gz
/krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz
/krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz
/krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.4.tar.gz
/krb5-1.4.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz
/krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.5.tar.gz
/krb5-1.5.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.6.tar.gz
/krb5-1.6.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.6-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.6.1-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.6.2-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz
/krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.6.3-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.7.tar.gz
/krb5-1.7.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.7-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.7.1-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.8.tar.gz
/krb5-1.8.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz
/krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.8-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.8.1-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.8.2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.8.2-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz
/krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.8.3-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.3.4.tar.gz
krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz
krb5-1.3.5.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz
krb5-1.3.6.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.4.tar.gz
krb5-1.4.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz
krb5-1.4.1.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz
krb5-1.4.2.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz
krb5-1.4.3.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.5.tar.gz
krb5-1.5.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.6.tar.gz
krb5-1.6.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.6-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz
krb5-1.6.1.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.6.1-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz
krb5-1.6.2.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.6.2-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz
krb5-1.6.3.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.6.3-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.7.tar.gz
krb5-1.7.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.7-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz
krb5-1.7.1.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.7.1-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.8.tar.gz
krb5-1.8.tar.gz.asc
krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz
krb5-appl-1.0.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.8-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz
krb5-1.8.1.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.8.1-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.8.2.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.8.2-pdf.tar.gz
krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz
krb5-1.8.3.tar.gz.asc
krb5-1.8.3-pdf.tar.gz
/krb5-1.9-beta2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.9-beta2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.9-beta2-pdf.tar.bz2
@ -140,71 +139,3 @@
/krb5-1.14.4.tar.gz
/krb5-1.14.4.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.14.4-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.15-beta1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.15-beta1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.15-beta1-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.15-beta2-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.15-beta2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.15-beta2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.15-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.15.tar.gz
/krb5-1.15.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.15.1-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.15.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.15.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.15.2-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.15.2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.15.2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.16-beta1-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.16-beta1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.16-beta1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.16-beta2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.16-beta2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.16-beta2-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.16-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.16.tar.gz
/krb5-1.16.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.16.1-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.16.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.16.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.17-beta1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.17-beta1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.17-beta1-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.17-beta2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.17-beta2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.17-beta2-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.17-pdfs.tar
/krb5-1.17.tar.gz
/krb5-1.17.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.17.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.17.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.18-beta1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.18-beta1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.18-beta2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.18-beta2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.18.tar.gz
/krb5-1.18.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.18.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.18.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.18.2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.18.2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.18.3.tar.gz
/krb5-1.18.3.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.19-beta1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.19-beta1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.19-beta2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.19-beta2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.19.tar.gz
/krb5-1.19.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.19.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.19.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.19.2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.19.2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.20.1.tar.gz
/krb5-1.20.1.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.21.tar.gz
/krb5-1.21.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.21.2.tar.gz
/krb5-1.21.2.tar.gz.asc
/krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz
/krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz.asc

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@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
From 6f7fd964539dfe4a885068f43a91db9738661870 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2024 11:15:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Revert "Don't issue session keys with
deprecated enctypes"
This reverts commit 1b57a4d134bbd0e7c52d5885a92eccc815726463.
---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 12 ------------
doc/admin/enctypes.rst | 23 +++-------------------
src/include/k5-int.h | 4 ----
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 10 ----------
src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c | 31 +++++++++++-------------------
src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c | 10 ----------
src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py | 3 +--
src/tests/t_etype_info.py | 2 +-
src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py | 28 ++-------------------------
src/util/k5test.py | 4 ++--
10 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index ecdf917501..f22d5db11b 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -95,18 +95,6 @@ Additionally, krb5.conf may include any of the relations described in
The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
-**allow_des3**
- Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.
- In future releases, this flag will allow des3-cbc-sha1 to be used
- at all. The default value for this tag is false. (Added in
- release 1.21.)
-
-**allow_rc4**
- Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour-hmac session keys.
- In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour-hmac to be used
- at all. The default value for this tag is false. (Added in
- release 1.21.)
-
**allow_weak_crypto**
If this flag is set to false, then weak encryption types (as noted
in :ref:`Encryption_types` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`) will be filtered
diff --git a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
index dce19ad43e..694922c0d9 100644
--- a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
@@ -48,15 +48,12 @@ Session key selection
The KDC chooses the session key enctype by taking the intersection of
its **permitted_enctypes** list, the list of long-term keys for the
most recent kvno of the service, and the client's requested list of
-enctypes. Starting in krb5-1.21, all services are assumed to support
-aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, des3-cbc-sha1 and arcfour-hmac session
-keys will not be issued by default.
+enctypes.
Starting in krb5-1.11, it is possible to set a string attribute on a
service principal to control what session key enctypes the KDC may
-issue for service tickets for that principal, overriding the service's
-long-term keys and the assumption of aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 support.
-See :ref:`set_string` in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
+issue for service tickets for that principal. See :ref:`set_string`
+in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
Choosing enctypes for a service
@@ -90,20 +87,6 @@ affect how enctypes are chosen.
acceptable risk for your environment and the weak enctypes are
required for backward compatibility.
-**allow_des3**
- was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*. Unless this
- flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
- des3-cbc-sha1 session keys. In a future release, this flag will
- control whether des3-cbc-sha1 is permitted in similar fashion to
- weak enctypes.
-
-**allow_rc4**
- was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*. Unless this
- flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
- arcfour-hmac session keys. In a future release, this flag will
- control whether arcfour-hmac is permitted in similar fashion to
- weak enctypes.
-
**permitted_enctypes**
controls the set of enctypes that a service will permit for
session keys and for ticket and authenticator encryption. The KDC
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index 2f7791b775..1d1c8293f4 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -180,8 +180,6 @@ typedef unsigned char u_char;
* matches the variable name. Keep these alphabetized. */
#define KRB5_CONF_ACL_FILE "acl_file"
#define KRB5_CONF_ADMIN_SERVER "admin_server"
-#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3 "allow_des3"
-#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4 "allow_rc4"
#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO "allow_weak_crypto"
#define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL "auth_to_local"
#define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL_NAMES "auth_to_local_names"
@@ -1240,8 +1238,6 @@ struct _krb5_context {
struct _kdb_log_context *kdblog_context;
krb5_boolean allow_weak_crypto;
- krb5_boolean allow_des3;
- krb5_boolean allow_rc4;
krb5_boolean ignore_acceptor_hostname;
krb5_boolean enforce_ok_as_delegate;
enum dns_canonhost dns_canonicalize_hostname;
diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
index e54cc751f9..75e04b73db 100644
--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
@@ -1088,16 +1088,6 @@ select_session_keytype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
if (!krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, ktype[i]))
continue;
- /*
- * Prevent these deprecated enctypes from being used as session keys
- * unless they are explicitly allowed. In the future they will be more
- * comprehensively disabled and eventually removed.
- */
- if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 && !context->allow_des3)
- continue;
- if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC && !context->allow_rc4)
- continue;
-
if (dbentry_supports_enctype(context, server, ktype[i]))
return ktype[i];
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
index ea089f0fcc..1b420a3ac2 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
@@ -1582,31 +1582,22 @@ warn_pw_expiry(krb5_context context, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options,
(*prompter)(context, data, 0, banner, 0, 0);
}
-/* Display a warning via the prompter if a deprecated enctype was used for
- * either the reply key or the session key. */
+/* Display a warning via the prompter if des3-cbc-sha1 was used for either the
+ * reply key or the session key. */
static void
-warn_deprecated(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
- krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
+warn_des3(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+ krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
{
- krb5_enctype etype;
- char encbuf[128], banner[256];
+ const char *banner;
- if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
- return;
-
- if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(as_key_enctype))
- etype = as_key_enctype;
- else if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype))
- etype = ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype;
- else
+ if (as_key_enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 &&
+ ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1)
return;
-
- if (krb5_enctype_to_name(etype, FALSE, encbuf, sizeof(encbuf)) != 0)
+ if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
return;
- snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
- _("Warning: encryption type %s used for authentication is "
- "deprecated and will be disabled"), encbuf);
+ banner = _("Warning: encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 used for "
+ "authentication is weak and will be disabled");
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
(*ctx->prompter)(context, ctx->prompter_data, NULL, banner, 0, NULL);
}
@@ -1857,7 +1848,7 @@ init_creds_step_reply(krb5_context context,
ctx->complete = TRUE;
warn_pw_expiry(context, ctx->opt, ctx->prompter, ctx->prompter_data,
ctx->in_tkt_service, ctx->reply);
- warn_deprecated(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
+ warn_des3(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
cleanup:
krb5_free_pa_data(context, kdc_padata);
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
index a6c2bbeb54..87b486c53f 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
@@ -221,16 +221,6 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
goto cleanup;
ctx->allow_weak_crypto = tmp;
- retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3, 0, &tmp);
- if (retval)
- goto cleanup;
- ctx->allow_des3 = tmp;
-
- retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4, 0, &tmp);
- if (retval)
- goto cleanup;
- ctx->allow_rc4 = tmp;
-
retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_IGNORE_ACCEPTOR_HOSTNAME, 0, &tmp);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
index f5f11842e2..7494d7fcdb 100755
--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ d_rc4 = 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac'
# These tests make assumptions about the default enctype lists, so set
# them explicitly rather than relying on the library defaults.
supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
-conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4',
- 'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4'},
'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supp}}}
realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf)
shutil.copyfile(realm.ccache, os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'save'))
diff --git a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
index 38cf96ca8f..c982508d8b 100644
--- a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
from k5test import *
supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts des3-cbc-sha1 rc4-hmac'
-conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_weak_crypto': 'true'},
'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False, krb5_conf=conf)
diff --git a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
index 5a213617b5..9024aee838 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ conf3 = {'libdefaults': {
'default_tkt_enctypes': 'aes128-cts',
'default_tgs_enctypes': 'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts'}}
conf4 = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes256-cts'}}
-conf5 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'}}
-conf6 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true'}}
# Test with client request and session_enctypes preferring aes128, but
# aes256 long-term key.
realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf1, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
@@ -56,12 +54,10 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
'aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
-# 3b: Skip RC4 (as the KDC does not allow it for session keys by
-# default) and negotiate aes128-cts session key, with only an aes256
-# long-term service key.
+# 3b: Negotiate rc4-hmac session key when principal only has aes256 long-term.
realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
-test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
realm.stop()
# 4: Check that permitted_enctypes is a default for session key enctypes.
@@ -71,24 +67,4 @@ realm.run([kvno, 'user'],
expected_trace=('etypes requested in TGS request: aes256-cts',))
realm.stop()
-# 5: allow_rc4 permits negotiation of rc4-hmac session key.
-realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf5, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
-realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'rc4-hmac'])
-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
-realm.stop()
-
-# 6: allow_des3 permits negotiation of des3-cbc-sha1 session key.
-realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf6, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
-realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'des3-cbc-sha1'])
-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:des3-cbc-sha1', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
-realm.stop()
-
-# 7: default config negotiates aes256-sha1 session key for RC4-only service.
-realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False)
-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'rc4-hmac', 'server'])
-test_kvno(realm, 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac')
-realm.stop()
-
success('sesskeynego')
diff --git a/src/util/k5test.py b/src/util/k5test.py
index 8e5f5ba8e9..2a86c5cdfc 100644
--- a/src/util/k5test.py
+++ b/src/util/k5test.py
@@ -1340,14 +1340,14 @@ _passes = [
# Exercise the DES3 enctype.
('des3', None,
- {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3 aes256-sha1'}},
+ {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3'}},
{'realms': {'$realm': {
'supported_enctypes': 'des3-cbc-sha1:normal',
'master_key_type': 'des3-cbc-sha1'}}}),
# Exercise the arcfour enctype.
('arcfour', None,
- {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4 aes256-sha1'}},
+ {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4'}},
{'realms': {'$realm': {
'supported_enctypes': 'arcfour-hmac:normal',
'master_key_type': 'arcfour-hmac'}}}),
--
2.45.1

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -1,612 +0,0 @@
From 7b6453903c248a761d3ceb538dfacebbf3d3a9ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 15:12:21 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] FIPS with PRNG and RADIUS and MD4
NB: Use openssl's PRNG in FIPS mode and taint within krad.
A lot of the FIPS error conditions from OpenSSL are incredibly
mysterious (at best, things return NULL unexpectedly; at worst,
internal assertions are tripped; most of the time, you just get
ENOMEM). In order to cope with this, we need to have some level of
awareness of what we can and can't safely call.
This will slow down some calls slightly (FIPS_mode() takes multiple
locks), but not for any ciphers we care about - which is to say that
AES is fine. Shame about SPAKE though.
post6 restores MD4 (and therefore keygen-only RC4).
post7 restores MD5 and adds radius_md5_fips_override.
post8 silences a static analyzer warning.
Last-updated: krb5-1.20
---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 6 +++
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c | 15 +++++-
.../crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c | 6 +++
src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c | 13 +++++-
.../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c | 12 +++++
src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c | 6 ++-
src/lib/krad/attr.c | 46 ++++++++++++++-----
src/lib/krad/attrset.c | 5 +-
src/lib/krad/internal.h | 28 ++++++++++-
src/lib/krad/packet.c | 22 +++++----
src/lib/krad/remote.c | 10 +++-
src/lib/krad/t_attr.c | 3 +-
src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c | 4 +-
src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c | 6 +++
src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c | 6 +++
15 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index f22d5db11b..a33711d918 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -330,6 +330,12 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
qualification of shortnames, set this relation to the empty string
with ``qualify_shortname = ""``. (New in release 1.18.)
+**radius_md5_fips_override**
+ Downstream-only option to enable use of MD5 in RADIUS
+ communication (libkrad). This allows for local (or protected
+ tunnel) communication with a RADIUS server that doesn't use krad
+ (e.g., freeradius) while in FIPS mode.
+
**rdns**
If this flag is true, reverse name lookup will be used in addition
to forward name lookup to canonicalizing hostnames for use in
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
index d6b79e2dea..9e80a03d21 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
#include "crypto_int.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#endif
+
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_c_random_seed(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
{
@@ -96,9 +102,16 @@ cleanup:
static krb5_boolean
get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
-#if defined(__linux__) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
int r;
+ /* A wild FIPS mode appeared! */
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ /* The return codes on this API are not good */
+ r = RAND_bytes(buf, len);
+ return r == 1;
+ }
+
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
while (len > 0) {
/*
* Pull from the /dev/urandom pool, but require it to have been seeded.
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
index 01920e6ce1..d9f327add6 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
@@ -387,6 +387,9 @@ krb5int_camellia_cbc_mac(krb5_key key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data,
unsigned char blockY[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE], blockB[CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE];
struct iov_cursor cursor;
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
if (output->length < CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
@@ -418,6 +421,9 @@ static krb5_error_code
krb5int_camellia_init_state (const krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_keyusage usage,
krb5_data *state)
{
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
state->length = 16;
state->data = (void *) malloc(16);
if (state->data == NULL)
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
index 448d563348..ce63cb5f1b 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ k5_arcfour_docrypt(krb5_key key, const krb5_data *state, krb5_crypto_iov *data,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
struct arcfour_state *arcstate;
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
arcstate = (state != NULL) ? (void *)state->data : NULL;
if (arcstate != NULL) {
ctx = arcstate->ctx;
@@ -116,7 +119,12 @@ k5_arcfour_docrypt(krb5_key key, const krb5_data *state, krb5_crypto_iov *data,
static void
k5_arcfour_free_state(krb5_data *state)
{
- struct arcfour_state *arcstate = (void *)state->data;
+ struct arcfour_state *arcstate;
+
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return;
+
+ arcstate = (void *) state->data;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(arcstate->ctx);
free(arcstate);
@@ -128,6 +136,9 @@ k5_arcfour_init_state(const krb5_keyblock *key,
{
struct arcfour_state *arcstate;
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
/*
* The cipher state here is a saved pointer to a struct arcfour_state
* object, rather than a flat byte array as in most enc providers. The
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
index f2fbffdb29..11659908bb 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
if (ctx == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
+ if (type == EVP_md4() || type == EVP_md5()) {
+ /* See comments below in hash_md4() and hash_md5(). */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ }
+
ok = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
if (!SIGN_IOV(&data[i]))
@@ -78,6 +83,11 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
static krb5_error_code
hash_md4(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
{
+ /*
+ * MD4 is needed in FIPS mode to perform key generation for RC4 keys used
+ * by IPA. These keys are only used along a (separately) secured channel
+ * for legacy reasons when performing trusts to Active Directory.
+ */
return hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
}
@@ -90,6 +100,8 @@ const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md4 = {
static krb5_error_code
hash_md5(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
{
+ /* MD5 is needed in FIPS mode for communication with RADIUS servers. This
+ * is gated in libkrad by libdefaults->radius_md5_fips_override. */
return hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output);
}
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
index bf12b8d6a0..f21e268f7f 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
@@ -111,7 +111,11 @@ map_digest(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash)
return EVP_sha256();
else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_sha384)
return EVP_sha384();
- else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
+
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
return EVP_md5();
else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md4)
return EVP_md4();
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attr.c b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
index 9c13d9d755..42d354a3b5 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attr.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@
typedef krb5_error_code
(*attribute_transform_fn)(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth, const krb5_data *in,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *is_fips);
typedef struct {
const char *name;
@@ -51,12 +52,14 @@ typedef struct {
static krb5_error_code
user_password_encode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth, const krb5_data *in,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *is_fips);
static krb5_error_code
user_password_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth, const krb5_data *in,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *ignored);
static const attribute_record attributes[UCHAR_MAX] = {
{"User-Name", 1, MAX_ATTRSIZE, NULL, NULL},
@@ -128,7 +131,8 @@ static const attribute_record attributes[UCHAR_MAX] = {
static krb5_error_code
user_password_encode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth, const krb5_data *in,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen)
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *is_fips)
{
const unsigned char *indx;
krb5_error_code retval;
@@ -154,8 +158,15 @@ user_password_encode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
for (blck = 0, indx = auth; blck * BLOCKSIZE < len; blck++) {
memcpy(tmp.data + seclen, indx, BLOCKSIZE);
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(ctx, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, NULL, 0, &tmp,
- &sum);
+ if (kr_use_fips(ctx)) {
+ /* Skip encryption here. Taint so that we won't pass it out of
+ * the machine by accident. */
+ *is_fips = TRUE;
+ sum.contents = calloc(1, BLOCKSIZE);
+ } else {
+ retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(ctx, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, NULL, 0, &tmp,
+ &sum);
+ }
if (retval != 0) {
zap(tmp.data, tmp.length);
zap(outbuf, len);
@@ -180,7 +191,8 @@ user_password_encode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
static krb5_error_code
user_password_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth, const krb5_data *in,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen)
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *is_fips)
{
const unsigned char *indx;
krb5_error_code retval;
@@ -204,8 +216,15 @@ user_password_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
for (blck = 0, indx = auth; blck * BLOCKSIZE < in->length; blck++) {
memcpy(tmp.data + seclen, indx, BLOCKSIZE);
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(ctx, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, NULL, 0,
- &tmp, &sum);
+ if (kr_use_fips(ctx)) {
+ /* Skip encryption here. Taint so that we won't pass it out of
+ * the machine by accident. */
+ *is_fips = TRUE;
+ sum.contents = calloc(1, BLOCKSIZE);
+ } else {
+ retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(ctx, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, NULL, 0,
+ &tmp, &sum);
+ }
if (retval != 0) {
zap(tmp.data, tmp.length);
zap(outbuf, in->length);
@@ -248,7 +267,7 @@ krb5_error_code
kr_attr_encode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth, krad_attr type,
const krb5_data *in, unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE],
- size_t *outlen)
+ size_t *outlen, krb5_boolean *is_fips)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
@@ -265,7 +284,8 @@ kr_attr_encode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
return 0;
}
- return attributes[type - 1].encode(ctx, secret, auth, in, outbuf, outlen);
+ return attributes[type - 1].encode(ctx, secret, auth, in, outbuf, outlen,
+ is_fips);
}
krb5_error_code
@@ -274,6 +294,7 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
+ krb5_boolean ignored;
retval = kr_attr_valid(type, in);
if (retval != 0)
@@ -288,7 +309,8 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
return 0;
}
- return attributes[type - 1].decode(ctx, secret, auth, in, outbuf, outlen);
+ return attributes[type - 1].decode(ctx, secret, auth, in, outbuf, outlen,
+ &ignored);
}
krad_attr
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
index f309f1581c..6ec031e320 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ krad_attrset_copy(const krad_attrset *set, krad_attrset **copy)
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen)
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *is_fips)
{
unsigned char buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
krb5_error_code retval;
@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
retval = kr_attr_encode(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
- buffer, &attrlen);
+ buffer, &attrlen, is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
return retval;
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
index 7619563fc5..e123763954 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
#ifndef UCHAR_MAX
#define UCHAR_MAX 255
#endif
@@ -49,6 +51,13 @@
typedef struct krad_remote_st krad_remote;
+struct krad_packet_st {
+ char buffer[KRAD_PACKET_SIZE_MAX];
+ krad_attrset *attrset;
+ krb5_data pkt;
+ krb5_boolean is_fips;
+};
+
/* Validate constraints of an attribute. */
krb5_error_code
kr_attr_valid(krad_attr type, const krb5_data *data);
@@ -57,7 +66,8 @@ kr_attr_valid(krad_attr type, const krb5_data *data);
krb5_error_code
kr_attr_encode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
krad_attr type, const krb5_data *in,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *is_fips);
/* Decode an attribute. */
krb5_error_code
@@ -69,7 +79,8 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
const unsigned char *auth,
- unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen);
+ unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
+ krb5_boolean *is_fips);
/* Decode attributes from a buffer. */
krb5_error_code
@@ -156,4 +167,17 @@ gai_error_code(int err)
}
}
+static inline krb5_boolean
+kr_use_fips(krb5_context ctx)
+{
+ int val = 0;
+
+ if (!FIPS_mode())
+ return 0;
+
+ (void)profile_get_boolean(ctx->profile, "libdefaults",
+ "radius_md5_fips_override", NULL, 0, &val);
+ return !val;
+}
+
#endif /* INTERNAL_H_ */
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
index c597174b65..fc2d248001 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
@@ -53,12 +53,6 @@ typedef unsigned char uchar;
#define pkt_auth(p) ((uchar *)offset(&(p)->pkt, OFFSET_AUTH))
#define pkt_attr(p) ((unsigned char *)offset(&(p)->pkt, OFFSET_ATTR))
-struct krad_packet_st {
- char buffer[KRAD_PACKET_SIZE_MAX];
- krad_attrset *attrset;
- krb5_data pkt;
-};
-
typedef struct {
uchar x[(UCHAR_MAX + 1) / 8];
} idmap;
@@ -187,8 +181,14 @@ auth_generate_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
memcpy(data.data + response->pkt.length, secret, strlen(secret));
/* Hash it. */
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(ctx, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, NULL, 0, &data,
- &hash);
+ if (kr_use_fips(ctx)) {
+ /* This checksum does very little security-wise anyway, so don't
+ * taint. */
+ hash.contents = calloc(1, AUTH_FIELD_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(ctx, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, NULL, 0, &data,
+ &hash);
+ }
free(data.data);
if (retval != 0)
return retval;
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
/* Encode the attributes. */
retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len);
+ &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
/* Encode the attributes. */
retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len);
+ &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -451,6 +451,8 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
const krb5_data *
krad_packet_encode(const krad_packet *pkt)
{
+ if (pkt->is_fips)
+ return NULL;
return &pkt->pkt;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/remote.c b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
index 06ae751bc8..929f1cef67 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/remote.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ on_io_write(krad_remote *rr)
request *r;
K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &rr->list, list) {
- tmp = krad_packet_encode(r->request);
+ tmp = &r->request->pkt;
/* If the packet has already been sent, do nothing. */
if (r->sent == tmp->length)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ on_io_read(krad_remote *rr)
if (req != NULL) {
K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &rr->list, list) {
if (r->request == req &&
- r->sent == krad_packet_encode(req)->length) {
+ r->sent == req->pkt.length) {
request_finish(r, 0, rsp);
break;
}
@@ -460,6 +460,12 @@ kr_remote_send(krad_remote *rr, krad_code code, krad_attrset *attrs,
(krad_packet_iter_cb)iterator, &r, &tmp);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
+ else if (tmp->is_fips && rr->info->ai_family != AF_LOCAL &&
+ rr->info->ai_family != AF_UNIX) {
+ /* This would expose cleartext passwords, so abort. */
+ retval = ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
+ goto error;
+ }
K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &rr->list, list) {
if (r->request == tmp) {
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c
index eb2a780c89..4d285ad9de 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attr.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ main()
const char *tmp;
krb5_data in;
size_t len;
+ krb5_boolean is_fips = FALSE;
noerror(krb5_init_context(&ctx));
@@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ main()
in = string2data((char *)decoded);
retval = kr_attr_encode(ctx, secret, auth,
krad_attr_name2num("User-Password"),
- &in, outbuf, &len);
+ &in, outbuf, &len, &is_fips);
insist(retval == 0);
insist(len == sizeof(encoded));
insist(memcmp(outbuf, encoded, len) == 0);
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
index 7928335ca4..0f95762534 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ main()
krb5_context ctx;
size_t len = 0, encode_len;
krb5_data tmp;
+ krb5_boolean is_fips = FALSE;
noerror(krb5_init_context(&ctx));
noerror(krad_attrset_new(ctx, &set));
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@ main()
noerror(krad_attrset_add(set, krad_attr_name2num("User-Password"), &tmp));
/* Encode attrset. */
- noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, buffer, &encode_len));
+ noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, buffer, &encode_len,
+ &is_fips));
krad_attrset_free(set);
/* Manually encode User-Name. */
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
index 00734a13b5..a3ce22b70f 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
#include "groups.h"
#include <krb5/clpreauth_plugin.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
typedef struct reqstate_st {
krb5_pa_spake *msg; /* set in prep_questions, used in process */
krb5_keyblock *initial_key;
@@ -375,6 +377,10 @@ clpreauth_spake_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
if (maj_ver != 1)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
+
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
vt = (krb5_clpreauth_vtable)vtable;
vt->name = "spake";
vt->pa_type_list = pa_types;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
index 1a772d450f..232e78bc05 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
#include <krb5/kdcpreauth_plugin.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
/*
* The SPAKE kdcpreauth module uses a secure cookie containing the following
* concatenated fields (all integer fields are big-endian):
@@ -551,6 +553,10 @@ kdcpreauth_spake_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, int min_ver,
if (maj_ver != 1)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP;
+
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
vt = (krb5_kdcpreauth_vtable)vtable;
vt->name = "spake";
vt->pa_type_list = pa_types;
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
From 707fa7bd2be6327343dc8fc5c20dc77645524518 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2022 17:15:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Allow krad UDP/TCP localhost connection
with FIPS
libkrad allows to establish connections only to UNIX socket in FIPS
mode, because MD5 digest is not considered safe enough to be used for
network communication. However, FreeRadius requires connection on TCP or
UDP ports.
This commit allows TCP or UDP connections in FIPS mode if destination is
localhost.
Resolves: rhbz#2082189
---
src/lib/krad/remote.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/remote.c b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
index 929f1cef67..063f17a613 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/remote.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/remote.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
@@ -74,6 +75,35 @@ on_io(verto_ctx *ctx, verto_ev *ev);
static void
on_timeout(verto_ctx *ctx, verto_ev *ev);
+static in_addr_t get_in_addr(struct addrinfo *info)
+{ return ((struct sockaddr_in *)(info->ai_addr))->sin_addr.s_addr; }
+
+static struct in6_addr *get_in6_addr(struct addrinfo *info)
+{ return &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(info->ai_addr))->sin6_addr); }
+
+static bool is_inet_localhost(struct addrinfo *info)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *p;
+
+ for (p = info; p; p = p->ai_next) {
+ switch (p->ai_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (IN_LOOPBACKNET != (get_in_addr(p) & IN_CLASSA_NET
+ >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(get_in6_addr(p)))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/* Iterate over the set of outstanding packets. */
static const krad_packet *
iterator(request **out)
@@ -460,8 +490,9 @@ kr_remote_send(krad_remote *rr, krad_code code, krad_attrset *attrs,
(krad_packet_iter_cb)iterator, &r, &tmp);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
- else if (tmp->is_fips && rr->info->ai_family != AF_LOCAL &&
- rr->info->ai_family != AF_UNIX) {
+ else if (tmp->is_fips && rr->info->ai_family != AF_LOCAL
+ && rr->info->ai_family != AF_UNIX
+ && !is_inet_localhost(rr->info)) {
/* This would expose cleartext passwords, so abort. */
retval = ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
goto error;
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
From 1da88bea558348be2974470774aa688f8be634c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2022 13:22:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Make tests compatible with
sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so
The sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so plugin provided by sssd-client conflicts
with the upstream test t_discover_uri.py. The test has to be modified in
order to avoid false positive.
---
src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py b/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py
index 87bac17929..26bc95a8dc 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/t_discover_uri.py
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+from os.path import exists
from k5test import *
entries = ('URI _kerberos.TEST krb5srv::kkdcp:https://kdc1 1 1\n',
@@ -37,8 +38,14 @@ realm.env['RESOLV_WRAPPER_HOSTS'] = hosts_filename
out = realm.run(['./t_locate_kdc', 'TEST'], env=realm.env)
l = out.splitlines()
+if (exists('/usr/lib/krb5/plugins/libkrb5/sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so')
+ or exists('/usr/lib64/krb5/plugins/libkrb5/sssd_krb5_locator_plugin.so')):
+ line_range = range(6, 14)
+else:
+ line_range = range(4, 12)
+
j = 0
-for i in range(4, 12):
+for i in line_range:
if l[i].strip() != expected[j]:
fail('URI answers do not match')
j += 1
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
From 775ed8588cc21385fb16a4cec4a861f0d578ce04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2023 20:06:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Include missing OpenSSL FIPS header
The inclusion of openssl/fips.h, which provides the declaration of
FIPS_mode(), was removed from openssl/crypto.h. As a consequence, this
header file has to be included explicitly in krb5 code.
---
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c | 4 +++-
src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c | 1 +
src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c | 4 ++++
src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c | 1 +
src/lib/krad/internal.h | 4 ++++
src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c | 4 ++++
src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c | 4 ++++
7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
index 9e80a03d21..ae37c77518 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#else
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
index d9f327add6..3dd3b0624f 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/camellia.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#else
#include <openssl/modes.h>
#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
index ce63cb5f1b..6a83f10d27 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/enc_provider/rc4.c
@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
/*
* The loopback field is a pointer to the structure. If the application copies
* the state (not a valid operation, but one which happens to works with some
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
index f21e268f7f..25a419d73a 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#else
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
index e123763954..a17b6f39b1 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
#ifndef UCHAR_MAX
#define UCHAR_MAX 255
#endif
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
index a3ce22b70f..13c699071f 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_client.c
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
typedef struct reqstate_st {
krb5_pa_spake *msg; /* set in prep_questions, used in process */
krb5_keyblock *initial_key;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
index 232e78bc05..3394f8a58e 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/spake/spake_kdc.c
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
/*
* The SPAKE kdcpreauth module uses a secure cookie containing the following
* concatenated fields (all integer fields are big-endian):
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From 4fd20741afcf76085ea62eb015cd589bb9392a7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 22:39:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Do not set root as ksu file owner
Upstream Makefile uses the install command to set root as owner of the
ksu executable file. However, this is no longer supported on latest
versions of the Mock build environment.
In case of ksu, the owner, group, and mode are already set using %attr()
in the specfile.
---
src/config/pre.in | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/config/pre.in b/src/config/pre.in
index 7eaa2f351c..e9ae71471e 100644
--- a/src/config/pre.in
+++ b/src/config/pre.in
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ INSTALL_PROGRAM=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(INSTALL_STRIP)
INSTALL_SCRIPT=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@
INSTALL_DATA=@INSTALL_DATA@
INSTALL_SHLIB=@INSTALL_SHLIB@
-INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP) -m 4755 -o root
+INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL)
## This is needed because autoconf will sometimes define @exec_prefix@ to be
## ${prefix}.
prefix=@prefix@
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
From 16f90c007036789d8d9343e8a0cbabfd21853b5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 19:22:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Allow KRB5KDF, MD5, and MD4 in FIPS mode
OpenSSL's restrictions to use KRB5KDF, MD5, and MD4 in FIPS mode are
bypassed in case AES SHA-1 HMAC or RC4 encryption types are allowed by
the crypto policy.
---
.../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++--
src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
index 11659908bb..eb2e693e9f 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
@@ -44,6 +44,49 @@
#define EVP_MD_CTX_free EVP_MD_CTX_destroy
#endif
+#include <openssl/provider.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <threads.h>
+
+typedef struct ossl_lib_md_context {
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *default_provider;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *legacy_provider;
+} ossl_md_context_t;
+
+static thread_local ossl_md_context_t *ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
+
+static krb5_error_code
+init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx, const char *algo)
+{
+ ctx->libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
+ if (!ctx->libctx)
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
+ /* Load both legacy and default provider as both may be needed. */
+ ctx->default_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "default");
+ ctx->legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "legacy");
+
+ if (!(ctx->default_provider && ctx->legacy_provider))
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->legacy_provider)
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->legacy_provider);
+
+ if (ctx->default_provider)
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->default_provider);
+
+ if (ctx->libctx)
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ctx->libctx);
+}
+
+
static krb5_error_code
hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
krb5_data *output)
@@ -60,11 +103,6 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
if (ctx == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
- if (type == EVP_md4() || type == EVP_md5()) {
- /* See comments below in hash_md4() and hash_md5(). */
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- }
-
ok = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
if (!SIGN_IOV(&data[i]))
@@ -77,6 +115,43 @@ hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
return ok ? 0 : KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
}
+static krb5_error_code
+hash_legacy_evp(const char *algo, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output)
+{
+ krb5_error_code err;
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+ if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
+ ossl_md_ctx = malloc(sizeof(ossl_md_context_t));
+ if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
+ err = ENOMEM;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ err = init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_ctx, algo);
+ if (err) {
+ deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_ctx);
+ free(ossl_md_ctx);
+ ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(ossl_md_ctx->libctx, algo, NULL);
+ if (!md) {
+ err = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ err = hash_evp(md, data, num_data, output);
+
+end:
+ if (md)
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+
+ return err;
+}
#endif
#ifdef K5_OPENSSL_MD4
@@ -88,7 +163,8 @@ hash_md4(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
* by IPA. These keys are only used along a (separately) secured channel
* for legacy reasons when performing trusts to Active Directory.
*/
- return hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
+ return FIPS_mode() ? hash_legacy_evp("MD4", data, num_data, output)
+ : hash_evp(EVP_md4(), data, num_data, output);
}
const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md4 = {
@@ -100,9 +176,12 @@ const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md4 = {
static krb5_error_code
hash_md5(const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, krb5_data *output)
{
- /* MD5 is needed in FIPS mode for communication with RADIUS servers. This
- * is gated in libkrad by libdefaults->radius_md5_fips_override. */
- return hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output);
+ /*
+ * MD5 is needed in FIPS mode for communication with RADIUS servers. This
+ * is gated in libkrad by libdefaults->radius_md5_fips_override.
+ */
+ return FIPS_mode() ? hash_legacy_evp("MD5", data, num_data, output)
+ : hash_evp(EVP_md5(), data, num_data, output);
}
const struct krb5_hash_provider krb5int_hash_md5 = {
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c
index 5a43c3d9eb..8528ddc4a9 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/kdf.c
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ k5_derive_random_rfc3961(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc, krb5_key key,
goto done;
}
- kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KRB5KDF", NULL);
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "KRB5KDF", "-fips");
if (kdf == NULL) {
ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto done;
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,280 +0,0 @@
From 23b58199db429603802e338db530677b61561335 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 15:56:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Allow to set PAC ticket signature as
optional
MS-PAC states that "The ticket signature SHOULD be included in tickets
that are not encrypted to the krbtgt account". However, the
implementation of krb5_kdc_verify_ticket() will require the ticket
signature to be present in case the target of the request is a service
principal.
In gradual upgrade environments, it results in S4U2Proxy requests
against a 1.20 KDC using a service ticket generated by an older version
KDC to fail.
This commit adds a krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext() function with an extra
switch parameter to tolerate the absence of ticket signature in this
scenario. If the ticket signature is present, it has to be valid,
regardless of this parameter.
This parameter is set based on the "optional_pac_tkt_chksum" string
attribute of the TGT KDB entry.
---
doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst | 6 ++++
doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst | 1 +
src/include/kdb.h | 1 +
src/include/krb5/krb5.hin | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 32 ++++++++++++++----
src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c | 31 +++++++++++++++---
src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports | 1 +
src/man/kadmin.man | 6 ++++
8 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst b/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
index 2435b3c361..58ac79549f 100644
--- a/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst
@@ -658,6 +658,12 @@ KDC:
Directory realm when using aes-sha2 keys on the local krbtgt
entry.
+**optional_pac_tkt_chksum**
+ Boolean value defining the behavior of the KDC in case an expected
+ ticket checksum signed with one of this principal keys is not
+ present in the PAC. This is typically the case for TGS or
+ cross-realm TGS principals when processing S4U2Proxy requests.
+
This command requires the **modify** privilege.
Alias: **setstr**
diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
index d12be47c3c..9b95ebd0f9 100644
--- a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ Rarely used public interfaces
krb5_is_referral_realm.rst
krb5_kdc_sign_ticket.rst
krb5_kdc_verify_ticket.rst
+ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext.rst
krb5_kt_add_entry.rst
krb5_kt_end_seq_get.rst
krb5_kt_get_entry.rst
diff --git a/src/include/kdb.h b/src/include/kdb.h
index 745b24f351..6075349e5e 100644
--- a/src/include/kdb.h
+++ b/src/include/kdb.h
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
#define KRB5_KDB_SK_PAC_PRIVSVR_ENCTYPE "pac_privsvr_enctype"
#define KRB5_KDB_SK_SESSION_ENCTYPES "session_enctypes"
#define KRB5_KDB_SK_REQUIRE_AUTH "require_auth"
+#define KRB5_KDB_SK_OPTIONAL_PAC_TKT_CHKSUM "optional_pac_tkt_chksum"
#if !defined(_WIN32)
diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
index c5a625db8f..2d9b64dc85 100644
--- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
@@ -8329,6 +8329,46 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
const krb5_keyblock *server,
const krb5_keyblock *privsvr, krb5_pac *pac_out);
+/**
+ * Verify a PAC, possibly including ticket signature
+ *
+ * @param [in] context Library context
+ * @param [in] enc_tkt Ticket enc-part, possibly containing a PAC
+ * @param [in] server_princ Canonicalized name of ticket server
+ * @param [in] server Key to validate server checksum (or NULL)
+ * @param [in] privsvr Key to validate KDC checksum (or NULL)
+ * @paran [in] optional_tkt_chksum Whether to require a ticket checksum
+ * @param [out] pac_out Verified PAC (NULL if no PAC included)
+ *
+ * This function is an extension of krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(), adding the @a
+ * optional_tkt_chksum parameter allowing to tolerate the absence of the PAC
+ * ticket signature.
+ *
+ * If a PAC is present in @a enc_tkt, verify its signatures. If @a privsvr is
+ * not NULL and @a server_princ is not a krbtgt or kadmin/changepw service and
+ * @a optional_tkt_chksum is FALSE, require a ticket signature over @a enc_tkt
+ * in addition to the KDC signature. Place the verified PAC in @a pac_out. If
+ * an invalid PAC signature is found, return an error matching the Windows KDC
+ * protocol code for that condition as closely as possible.
+ *
+ * If no PAC is present in @a enc_tkt, set @a pac_out to NULL and return
+ * successfully.
+ *
+ * @note This function does not validate the PAC_CLIENT_INFO buffer. If a
+ * specific value is expected, the caller can make a separate call to
+ * krb5_pac_verify_ext() with a principal but no keys.
+ *
+ * @retval 0 Success; otherwise - Kerberos error codes
+ */
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+ krb5_const_principal server_princ,
+ const krb5_keyblock *server,
+ const krb5_keyblock *privsvr,
+ krb5_boolean optional_tkt_chksum,
+ krb5_pac *pac_out);
+
/** @deprecated Use krb5_kdc_sign_ticket() instead. */
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac, krb5_timestamp authtime,
diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
index fe4e48209a..93415ba862 100644
--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
@@ -560,16 +560,36 @@ cleanup:
static krb5_error_code
try_verify_pac(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_keyblock *server_key,
- const krb5_keyblock *tgt_key, krb5_pac *pac_out)
+ krb5_db_entry *tgt, const krb5_keyblock *tgt_key,
+ krb5_pac *pac_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_boolean optional_tkt_chksum;
+ char *str = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *privsvr_key;
ret = pac_privsvr_key(context, server, tgt_key, &privsvr_key);
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(context, enc_tkt, server->princ, server_key,
- privsvr_key, pac_out);
+
+ /* Check if the absence of ticket signature is tolerated for this realm */
+ ret = krb5_dbe_get_string(context, tgt,
+ KRB5_KDB_SK_OPTIONAL_PAC_TKT_CHKSUM, &str);
+ /* TODO: should be using _krb5_conf_boolean(), but os-proto.h is not
+ * available here.
+ */
+ optional_tkt_chksum = !ret && str && (strncasecmp(str, "true", 4) == 0
+ || strncasecmp(str, "t", 1) == 0
+ || strncasecmp(str, "yes", 3) == 0
+ || strncasecmp(str, "y", 1) == 0
+ || strncasecmp(str, "1", 1) == 0
+ || strncasecmp(str, "on", 2) == 0);
+
+ krb5_dbe_free_string(context, str);
+
+ ret = krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(context, enc_tkt, server->princ,
+ server_key, privsvr_key,
+ optional_tkt_chksum, pac_out);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, privsvr_key);
return ret;
}
@@ -599,7 +619,7 @@ get_verified_pac(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
server_key, NULL, pac_out);
}
- ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, tgt_key,
+ ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, tgt, tgt_key,
pac_out);
if (ret != KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED && ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE)
return ret;
@@ -613,8 +633,8 @@ get_verified_pac(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, kd, &old_key, NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, &old_key,
- pac_out);
+ ret = try_verify_pac(context, enc_tkt, server, server_key, tgt,
+ &old_key, pac_out);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &old_key);
if (!ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
index 5d1fdf1ba0..0c0e2ada68 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
@@ -594,6 +594,19 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
krb5_const_principal server_princ,
const krb5_keyblock *server,
const krb5_keyblock *privsvr, krb5_pac *pac_out)
+{
+ return krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(context, enc_tkt, server_princ, server,
+ privsvr, FALSE, pac_out);
+}
+
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext(krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
+ krb5_const_principal server_princ,
+ const krb5_keyblock *server,
+ const krb5_keyblock *privsvr,
+ krb5_boolean optional_tkt_chksum,
+ krb5_pac *pac_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_pac pac = NULL;
@@ -602,7 +615,7 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
krb5_authdata *orig, **ifrel = NULL, **recoded_ifrel = NULL;
uint8_t z = 0;
krb5_authdata zpac = { KV5M_AUTHDATA, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, 1, &z };
- krb5_boolean is_service_tkt;
+ krb5_boolean is_service_tkt, has_tkt_chksum = FALSE;
size_t i, j;
*pac_out = NULL;
@@ -667,11 +680,21 @@ krb5_kdc_verify_ticket(krb5_context context, const krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt,
ret = verify_checksum(context, pac, KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM, privsvr,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM, recoded_tkt);
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (ret) {
+ if (!optional_tkt_chksum)
+ goto cleanup;
+ else if (ret != ENOENT)
+ goto cleanup;
+ /* Otherwise ticket signature is absent but optional. Proceed... */
+ } else {
+ has_tkt_chksum = TRUE;
+ }
}
+ /* Else, we make the assumption the ticket signature is absent in case this
+ * is not a service ticket.
+ */
- ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, is_service_tkt, server, privsvr);
+ ret = verify_pac_checksums(context, pac, has_tkt_chksum, server, privsvr);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
index 4c50e935a2..d4b0455c8c 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
@@ -463,6 +463,7 @@ krb5_is_thread_safe
krb5_kdc_rep_decrypt_proc
krb5_kdc_sign_ticket
krb5_kdc_verify_ticket
+krb5_kdc_verify_ticket_ext
krb5_kt_add_entry
krb5_kt_client_default
krb5_kt_close
diff --git a/src/man/kadmin.man b/src/man/kadmin.man
index 8413e70ccd..f68eb0569d 100644
--- a/src/man/kadmin.man
+++ b/src/man/kadmin.man
@@ -724,6 +724,12 @@ encryption type. It may be necessary to set this value to
"aes256\-sha1" on the cross\-realm krbtgt entry for an Active
Directory realm when using aes\-sha2 keys on the local krbtgt
entry.
+.TP
+\fBoptional_pac_tkt_chksum\fP
+Boolean value defining the behavior of the KDC in case an expected ticket
+checksum signed with one of this principal keys is not present in the PAC. This
+is typically the case for TGS or cross-realm TGS principals when processing
+S4U2Proxy requests.
.UNINDENT
.sp
This command requires the \fBmodify\fP privilege.
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 31b9debcf2cbd558f8f315fefb69fc8206b115b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 May 2023 12:19:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Make PKINIT CMS SHA-1 signature
verification available in FIPS mode
We recommend using the SHA1 crypto-module in order to allow the
verification of SHA-1 signature for CMS messages. However, this module
does not work in FIPS mode, because the SHA-1 algorithm is absent from
the OpenSSL FIPS provider.
This commit enables the signature verification process to fetch the
algorithm from a non-FIPS OpenSSL provider.
Support for SHA-1 CMS signature is still required, especially in order
to interoperate with Active Directory. At least it is until elliptic
curve cryptography is implemented for PKINIT in MIT krb5.
---
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index cb9c79626c..17dd18e37d 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -1844,8 +1844,17 @@ cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+ /* Do not use FIPS provider (even in FIPS mode) because it keeps from
+ * allowing SHA-1 signature verification using the SHA1 crypto-module
+ */
+ cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new_ex(NULL, "-fips");
+ if (!cms)
+ goto cleanup;
+#endif
+
/* decode received CMS message */
- if ((cms = d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(NULL, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) == NULL) {
+ if (!d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(&cms, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decode CMS message"));
goto cleanup;
}
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
From c24c9faf859ddc04910a6bc591d8ddb2ada93e80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 01:21:48 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Enable PKINIT if at least one group is available
OpenSSL may no longer allow decoding of non-well-known Diffie-Hellman
group parameters as EVP_PKEY objects in FIPS mode. However, OpenSSL
does not know about MODP group 2 (1024-bit), which is considered as a
custom group. As a consequence, the PKINIT kdcpreauth module fails to
load in FIPS mode.
Allow initialization of PKINIT plugin if at least one of the MODP
well-known group parameters successfully decodes.
[ghudson@mit.edu: minor commit message and code edits]
ticket: 9096 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 509d8db922e9ad6f108883838473b6178f89874a)
---
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h | 3 +-
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 76 +++++++++++--------
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h | 3 +
5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
index 725d5bc438..ea9ba454df 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ pkinit_client_plugin_init(krb5_context context,
if (retval)
goto errout;
- retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(&ctx->cryptoctx);
+ retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(context, &ctx->cryptoctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
index 9fa315d7a0..8bdbea8e95 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ typedef struct _pkinit_cert_matching_data {
/*
* Functions to initialize and cleanup crypto contexts
*/
-krb5_error_code pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *);
+krb5_error_code pkinit_init_plg_crypto(krb5_context,
+ pkinit_plg_crypto_context *);
void pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context);
krb5_error_code pkinit_init_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context *);
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index 17dd18e37d..8cdc40bfb4 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@
static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
static void pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
-static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
+static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_dh_params(krb5_context,
+ pkinit_plg_crypto_context);
static void pkinit_fini_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx);
@@ -951,7 +952,8 @@ oerr_cert(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, X509_STORE_CTX *certctx,
}
krb5_error_code
-pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
+pkinit_init_plg_crypto(krb5_context context,
+ pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
@@ -969,7 +971,7 @@ pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
if (retval)
goto out;
- retval = pkinit_init_dh_params(ctx);
+ retval = pkinit_init_dh_params(context, ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
@@ -1278,30 +1280,36 @@ pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx)
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_kp_serverAuth);
}
-static krb5_error_code
-pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
+static int
+try_import_group(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *params,
+ const char *name, EVP_PKEY **pkey_out)
{
- krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
-
- plgctx->dh_1024 = decode_dh_params(&oakley_1024);
- if (plgctx->dh_1024 == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
-
- plgctx->dh_2048 = decode_dh_params(&oakley_2048);
- if (plgctx->dh_2048 == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+ *pkey_out = decode_dh_params(params);
+ if (*pkey_out == NULL)
+ TRACE_PKINIT_DH_GROUP_UNAVAILABLE(context, name);
+ return (*pkey_out != NULL) ? 1 : 0;
+}
- plgctx->dh_4096 = decode_dh_params(&oakley_4096);
- if (plgctx->dh_4096 == NULL)
- goto cleanup;
+static krb5_error_code
+pkinit_init_dh_params(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
+{
+ int n = 0;
- retval = 0;
+ n += try_import_group(context, &oakley_1024, "MODP 2 (1024-bit)",
+ &plgctx->dh_1024);
+ n += try_import_group(context, &oakley_2048, "MODP 14 (2048-bit)",
+ &plgctx->dh_2048);
+ n += try_import_group(context, &oakley_4096, "MODP 16 (4096-bit)",
+ &plgctx->dh_4096);
-cleanup:
- if (retval)
+ if (n == 0) {
pkinit_fini_dh_params(plgctx);
+ k5_setmsg(context, ENOMEM,
+ _("PKINIT cannot initialize any key exchange groups"));
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
- return retval;
+ return 0;
}
static void
@@ -2912,11 +2920,11 @@ client_create_dh(krb5_context context,
if (cryptoctx->received_params != NULL)
params = cryptoctx->received_params;
- else if (dh_size == 1024)
+ else if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024 != NULL && dh_size == 1024)
params = plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024;
- else if (dh_size == 2048)
+ else if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048 != NULL && dh_size == 2048)
params = plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048;
- else if (dh_size == 4096)
+ else if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096 != NULL && dh_size == 4096)
params = plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096;
else
goto cleanup;
@@ -3212,19 +3220,23 @@ pkinit_create_td_dh_parameters(krb5_context context,
krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_4096 = { dh_oid, oakley_4096 };
krb5_algorithm_identifier *alglist[4];
- if (opts->dh_min_bits > 4096) {
- ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
i = 0;
- if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048)
+ if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048 != NULL && opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048)
alglist[i++] = &alg_2048;
- alglist[i++] = &alg_4096;
- if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024)
+ if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096 != NULL && opts->dh_min_bits <= 4096)
+ alglist[i++] = &alg_4096;
+ if (plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024 != NULL && opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024)
alglist[i++] = &alg_1024;
alglist[i] = NULL;
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ k5_setmsg(context, ret,
+ _("OpenSSL has no supported key exchange groups for "
+ "pkinit_dh_min_bits=%d"), opts->dh_min_bits);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
ret = k5int_encode_krb5_td_dh_parameters(alglist, &der_alglist);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
index 1b3bf6d4d0..768a4e559f 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ pkinit_server_plugin_init_realm(krb5_context context, const char *realmname,
goto errout;
plgctx->realmname_len = strlen(plgctx->realmname);
- retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(&plgctx->cryptoctx);
+ retval = pkinit_init_plg_crypto(context, &plgctx->cryptoctx);
if (retval)
goto errout;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
index 259e95c6c2..5ee39c085c 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_TRYAGAIN(c) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client trying again with KDC-provided parameters")
+#define TRACE_PKINIT_DH_GROUP_UNAVAILABLE(c, name) \
+ TRACE(c, "PKINIT key exchange group {str} unsupported", name)
+
#define TRACE_PKINIT_OPENSSL_ERROR(c, msg) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT OpenSSL error: {str}", msg)
--
2.45.1

View file

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
From e92365b510a2407eaceaec90836f5c713403d75f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 13:43:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Replace ssl.wrap_socket() for tests
The ssl.wrap_socket() function was deprecated in Python 3.7 and is
removed in Python 3.12. The ssl.SSLContext.wrap_socket() method
replaces it.
Bump the required Python version for tests to 3.4 for
ssl.create_default_context().
[ghudson@mit.edu: changed minimum Python version]
(cherry picked from commit 0ceab6c363e65fb21d3312a663f2b9b569ecc415)
---
src/configure.ac | 9 ++++-----
src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
index 2561e917a2..487f393146 100644
--- a/src/configure.ac
+++ b/src/configure.ac
@@ -1157,10 +1157,9 @@ AC_SUBST(PKINIT)
# for lib/apputils
AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(daemon)
-# For Python tests. Python version 3.2.4 is required as prior
-# versions do not accept string input to subprocess.Popen.communicate
-# when universal_newlines is set.
-PYTHON_MINVERSION=3.2.4
+# For Python tests. Python version 3.4 is required for
+# ssl.create_default_context().
+PYTHON_MINVERSION=3.4
AC_SUBST(PYTHON_MINVERSION)
AC_CHECK_PROG(PYTHON,python3,python3)
if test x"$PYTHON" = x; then
@@ -1168,7 +1167,7 @@ if test x"$PYTHON" = x; then
fi
HAVE_PYTHON=no
if test x"$PYTHON" != x; then
- wantver="(sys.hexversion >= 0x30204F0)"
+ wantver="(sys.hexversion >= 0x30400F0)"
if "$PYTHON" -c "import sys; sys.exit(not $wantver and 1 or 0)"; then
HAVE_PYTHON=yes
fi
diff --git a/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py b/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py
index 58759696b6..d1d10d733c 100755
--- a/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py
+++ b/src/util/wsgiref-kdcproxy.py
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ else:
pem = '*'
server = make_server('localhost', port, kdcproxy.Application())
-server.socket = ssl.wrap_socket(server.socket, certfile=pem, server_side=True)
+sslctx = ssl.create_default_context(purpose=ssl.Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH)
+sslctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=pem)
+server.socket = sslctx.wrap_socket(server.socket, server_side=True)
os.write(sys.stdout.fileno(), b'proxy server ready\n')
server.serve_forever()
--
2.45.1

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@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
From ee66c1feedb57ce06ce51aaa823f9a61f564c58e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 19:53:07 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix two unlikely memory leaks
In gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(), one of the bounds checks (which
could probably never be triggered) leaks plain.data. Fix this leak
and use current practices for cleanup throughout the function.
In xmt_rmtcallres() (unused within the tree and likely elsewhere),
store port_ptr into crp->port_ptr as soon as it is allocated;
otherwise it could leak if the subsequent xdr_u_int32() operation
fails.
(cherry picked from commit c5f9c816107f70139de11b38aa02db2f1774ee0d)
---
src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c | 56 +++++++++++++++-------------------
src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c | 10 +++---
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
index 1fcbdfbb87..d3210c1107 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/k5sealv3.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
int conf_req_flag, int toktype)
{
size_t bufsize = 16;
- unsigned char *outbuf = 0;
+ unsigned char *outbuf = NULL;
krb5_error_code err;
int key_usage;
unsigned char acceptor_flag;
@@ -75,9 +75,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
#endif
size_t ec;
unsigned short tok_id;
- krb5_checksum sum;
+ krb5_checksum sum = { 0 };
krb5_key key;
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
+ krb5_data plain = empty_data();
+
+ token->value = NULL;
+ token->length = 0;
acceptor_flag = ctx->initiate ? 0 : FLAG_SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR;
key_usage = (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG
@@ -107,14 +111,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
#endif
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && conf_req_flag) {
- krb5_data plain;
krb5_enc_data cipher;
size_t ec_max;
size_t encrypt_size;
/* 300: Adds some slop. */
- if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length)
- return ENOMEM;
+ if (SIZE_MAX - 300 < message->length) {
+ err = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
ec_max = SIZE_MAX - message->length - 300;
if (ec_max > 0xffff)
ec_max = 0xffff;
@@ -126,20 +131,20 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
#endif
err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16 + ec);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto cleanup;
/* Get size of ciphertext. */
encrypt_size = krb5_encrypt_size(plain.length, key->keyblock.enctype);
if (encrypt_size > SIZE_MAX / 2) {
err = ENOMEM;
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
}
bufsize = 16 + encrypt_size;
/* Allocate space for header plus encrypted data. */
outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
if (outbuf == NULL) {
- free(plain.data);
- return ENOMEM;
+ err = ENOMEM;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* TOK_ID */
@@ -164,11 +169,8 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
cipher.ciphertext.length = bufsize - 16;
cipher.enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
err = krb5_k_encrypt(context, key, key_usage, 0, &plain, &cipher);
- zap(plain.data, plain.length);
- free(plain.data);
- plain.data = 0;
if (err)
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
/* Now that we know we're returning a valid token.... */
ctx->seq_send++;
@@ -181,7 +183,6 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
/* If the rotate fails, don't worry about it. */
#endif
} else if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && !conf_req_flag) {
- krb5_data plain;
size_t cksumsize;
/* Here, message is the application-supplied data; message2 is
@@ -193,21 +194,19 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
wrap_with_checksum:
err = alloc_data(&plain, message->length + 16);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto cleanup;
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
if (err)
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
assert(cksumsize <= 0xffff);
bufsize = 16 + message2->length + cksumsize;
outbuf = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize);
if (outbuf == NULL) {
- free(plain.data);
- plain.data = 0;
err = ENOMEM;
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* TOK_ID */
@@ -239,23 +238,15 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
if (message2->length)
memcpy(outbuf + 16, message2->value, message2->length);
- sum.contents = outbuf + 16 + message2->length;
- sum.length = cksumsize;
-
err = krb5_k_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, key,
key_usage, &plain, &sum);
- zap(plain.data, plain.length);
- free(plain.data);
- plain.data = 0;
if (err) {
zap(outbuf,bufsize);
- goto error;
+ goto cleanup;
}
if (sum.length != cksumsize)
abort();
memcpy(outbuf + 16 + message2->length, sum.contents, cksumsize);
- krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
- sum.contents = 0;
/* Now that we know we're actually generating the token... */
ctx->seq_send++;
@@ -285,12 +276,13 @@ gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3 (krb5_context context,
token->value = outbuf;
token->length = bufsize;
- return 0;
+ outbuf = NULL;
+ err = 0;
-error:
+cleanup:
+ krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sum);
+ zapfree(plain.data, plain.length);
gssalloc_free(outbuf);
- token->value = NULL;
- token->length = 0;
return err;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
index 434e4eea65..f55ca46c60 100644
--- a/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/pmap_rmt.c
@@ -161,12 +161,12 @@ xdr_rmtcallres(
caddr_t port_ptr;
port_ptr = (caddr_t)(void *)crp->port_ptr;
- if (xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
- (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32) &&
- xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen)) {
- crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
+ if (!xdr_reference(xdrs, &port_ptr, sizeof (uint32_t),
+ (xdrproc_t)xdr_u_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
+ crp->port_ptr = (uint32_t *)(void *)port_ptr;
+ if (xdr_u_int32(xdrs, &crp->resultslen))
return ((*(crp->xdr_results))(xdrs, crp->results_ptr));
- }
return (FALSE);
}
--
2.45.1

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@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
From 05bb6d9c729a3c6a4ba35270368bc0f6e1875ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 16:52:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Remove klist's defname global variable
Addition of a "cleanup" section in kinit's show_ccache() function as
part of commit 6c5471176f5266564fbc8a7e02f03b4b042202f8 introduced a
double-free bug, because defname is a global variable. After the
first call, successive calls may take place with a dangling pointer in
defname, which will be freed if krb5_cc_get_principal() fails.
Convert "defname" to a local variable initialized at the beginning of
show_ccache().
[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message]
(cherry picked from commit 5b00197227231943bd2305328c8260dd0b0dbcf0)
---
src/clients/klist/klist.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/clients/klist/klist.c b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
index b5ae96a843..b5808e5c93 100644
--- a/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+++ b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ int show_flags = 0, show_time = 0, status_only = 0, show_keys = 0;
int show_etype = 0, show_addresses = 0, no_resolve = 0, print_version = 0;
int show_adtype = 0, show_all = 0, list_all = 0, use_client_keytab = 0;
int show_config = 0;
-char *defname;
char *progname;
krb5_timestamp now;
unsigned int timestamp_width;
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ krb5_context context;
static krb5_boolean is_local_tgt(krb5_principal princ, krb5_data *realm);
static char *etype_string(krb5_enctype );
-static void show_credential(krb5_creds *);
+static void show_credential(krb5_creds *, const char *);
static void list_all_ccaches(void);
static int list_ccache(krb5_ccache);
@@ -473,6 +472,7 @@ show_ccache(krb5_ccache cache)
krb5_creds creds;
krb5_principal princ = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
+ char *defname = NULL;
int status = 1;
ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &princ);
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ show_ccache(krb5_ccache cache)
}
while ((ret = krb5_cc_next_cred(context, cache, &cur, &creds)) == 0) {
if (show_config || !krb5_is_config_principal(context, creds.server))
- show_credential(&creds);
+ show_credential(&creds, defname);
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
}
if (ret == KRB5_CC_END) {
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ print_config_data(int col, krb5_data *data)
}
static void
-show_credential(krb5_creds *cred)
+show_credential(krb5_creds *cred, const char *defname)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
--
2.45.1

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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From d7bcca2a215de880f4419afc450a96a747d48560 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 00:44:53 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] End connection on KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE
In sendto_kdc.c:service_fds(), if a message handler indicates that a
message should be discarded, kill the connection so we don't continue
waiting on it for more data.
ticket: 7899
(cherry picked from commit ca80f64c786341d5871ae1de18142e62af64f7b9)
---
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 0f4bf23a95..262edf09b4 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -1440,7 +1440,10 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
if (msg_handler != NULL) {
krb5_data reply = make_data(state->in.buf, state->in.pos);
- stop = (msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data) != 0);
+ if (!msg_handler(context, &reply, msg_handler_data)) {
+ kill_conn(context, state, selstate);
+ stop = 0;
+ }
}
if (stop) {
--
2.46.0

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@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
From a07b3ae29fd972c40e30b95f6bcc8fb3ed4d9991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 14:20:34 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add request_timeout configuration parameter
Add a parameter to limit the total amount of time taken for a KDC or
password change request.
ticket: 9106 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 802318cda963456b3ed7856c836e89da891483be)
---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 9 ++++++
src/include/k5-int.h | 2 ++
src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c | 14 +++++++-
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index a33711d918..65fb592d98 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -356,6 +356,15 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
(:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the default renewable lifetime
for initial ticket requests. The default value is 0.
+**request_timeout**
+ (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
+ password change requests. This timeout does not affect the
+ intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
+ fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
+ contacted. A value of 0 indicates no specific maximum, in which
+ case requests will time out if no server responds after several
+ tries. The default value is 0. (New in release 1.22.)
+
**spake_preauth_groups**
A whitespace or comma-separated list of words which specifies the
groups allowed for SPAKE preauthentication. The possible values
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index b3e07945c1..69d6a6f569 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u_char;
#define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_INDICATOR "spake_preauth_indicator"
#define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_KDC_CHALLENGE "spake_preauth_kdc_challenge"
#define KRB5_CONF_SPAKE_PREAUTH_GROUPS "spake_preauth_groups"
+#define KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT "request_timeout"
#define KRB5_CONF_TICKET_LIFETIME "ticket_lifetime"
#define KRB5_CONF_UDP_PREFERENCE_LIMIT "udp_preference_limit"
#define KRB5_CONF_UNLOCKITER "unlockiter"
@@ -1200,6 +1201,7 @@ struct _krb5_context {
kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle;
/* allowable clock skew */
krb5_deltat clockskew;
+ krb5_deltat req_timeout;
krb5_flags kdc_default_options;
krb5_flags library_options;
krb5_boolean profile_secure;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
index 2b5abcd817..582a2945ff 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
krb5_context ctx = 0;
krb5_error_code retval;
int tmp;
- char *plugin_dir = NULL;
+ char *plugin_dir = NULL, *timeout_str = NULL;
/* Verify some assumptions. If the assumptions hold and the
compiler is optimizing, this should result in no code being
@@ -240,6 +240,17 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_CLOCKSKEW, DEFAULT_CLOCKSKEW, &tmp);
ctx->clockskew = tmp;
+ retval = profile_get_string(ctx->profile, KRB5_CONF_LIBDEFAULTS,
+ KRB5_CONF_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, NULL, NULL,
+ &timeout_str);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (timeout_str != NULL) {
+ retval = krb5_string_to_deltat(timeout_str, &ctx->req_timeout);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
get_integer(ctx, KRB5_CONF_KDC_DEFAULT_OPTIONS, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK,
&tmp);
ctx->kdc_default_options = tmp;
@@ -281,6 +292,7 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
cleanup:
profile_release_string(plugin_dir);
+ profile_release_string(timeout_str);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return retval;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 262edf09b4..98247a1089 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -1395,34 +1395,41 @@ get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
static krb5_boolean
service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
- time_ms interval, struct conn_state *conns,
+ time_ms interval, time_ms timeout, struct conn_state *conns,
struct select_state *seltemp, const krb5_data *realm,
int (*msg_handler)(krb5_context, const krb5_data *, void *),
void *msg_handler_data, struct conn_state **winner_out)
{
int e, selret = 0;
- time_ms endtime;
+ time_ms curtime, interval_end, endtime;
struct conn_state *state;
*winner_out = NULL;
- e = get_curtime_ms(&endtime);
+ e = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
if (e)
return TRUE;
- endtime += interval;
+ interval_end = curtime + interval;
e = 0;
while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
- e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, get_endtime(endtime, conns),
- seltemp, &selret);
+ endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
+ /* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
+ if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
+ endtime = timeout;
+ e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
if (e == EINTR)
continue;
if (e != 0)
break;
- if (selret == 0)
- /* Timeout, return to caller. */
+ if (selret == 0) {
+ /* We timed out. Stop if we hit the overall request timeout. */
+ if (timeout && (get_curtime_ms(&curtime) || curtime >= timeout))
+ return TRUE;
+ /* Otherwise return to the caller to send the next request. */
return FALSE;
+ }
/* Got something on a socket, process it. */
for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
@@ -1495,7 +1502,7 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
void *msg_handler_data)
{
int pass;
- time_ms delay;
+ time_ms delay, timeout = 0;
krb5_error_code retval;
struct conn_state *conns = NULL, *state, **tailptr, *next, *winner;
size_t s;
@@ -1505,6 +1512,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
*reply = empty_data();
+ if (context->req_timeout) {
+ retval = get_curtime_ms(&timeout);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+ timeout += 1000 * context->req_timeout;
+ }
+
/* One for use here, listing all our fds in use, and one for
* temporary use in service_fds, for the fds of interest. */
sel_state = malloc(2 * sizeof(*sel_state));
@@ -1532,8 +1546,9 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
callback_info))
continue;
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
- realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
+ seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
+ &winner);
}
}
@@ -1545,13 +1560,13 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
callback_info))
continue;
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
}
/* Wait for two seconds at the end of the first pass. */
if (!done) {
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, conns, seltemp,
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 2000, timeout, conns, seltemp,
realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
}
@@ -1562,15 +1577,17 @@ k5_sendto(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
if (maybe_send(context, state, message, sel_state, realm,
callback_info))
continue;
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, conns, seltemp,
- realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, 1000, timeout, conns,
+ seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
+ &winner);
if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
break;
}
/* Wait for the delay backoff at the end of this pass. */
if (!done) {
- done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, conns, seltemp,
- realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data, &winner);
+ done = service_fds(context, sel_state, delay, timeout, conns,
+ seltemp, realm, msg_handler, msg_handler_data,
+ &winner);
}
if (sel_state->nfds == 0)
break;
--
2.46.0

View file

@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
From 1da153d97d7fb30a44fca35f9b71b8f4ed5385b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 16:26:42 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Wait indefinitely on KDC TCP connections
When making a KDC or password change request, wait indefinitely
(limited only by request_timeout if set) once a KDC has accepted a TCP
connection.
ticket: 9105 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 6436a3808061da787a43c6810f5f0370cdfb6e36)
---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 2 +-
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index 65fb592d98..b7284c47df 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
for initial ticket requests. The default value is 0.
**request_timeout**
- (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the maximum total time for KDC or
+ (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the maximum total time for KDC and
password change requests. This timeout does not affect the
intervals between requests, so setting a low timeout may result in
fewer requests being attempted and/or some servers not being
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 98247a1089..924f5b2d26 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ struct conn_state {
krb5_data callback_buffer;
size_t server_index;
struct conn_state *next;
- time_ms endtime;
krb5_boolean defer;
struct {
const char *uri_path;
@@ -344,15 +343,19 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
struct select_state *out, int *sret)
{
#ifndef USE_POLL
- struct timeval tv;
+ struct timeval tv, *tvp;
#endif
krb5_error_code retval;
time_ms curtime, interval;
- retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
- if (retval != 0)
- return retval;
- interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
+ if (endtime != 0) {
+ retval = get_curtime_ms(&curtime);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ return retval;
+ interval = (curtime < endtime) ? endtime - curtime : 0;
+ } else {
+ interval = -1;
+ }
/* We don't need a separate copy of the selstate for poll, but use one for
* consistency with how we use select. */
@@ -361,9 +364,14 @@ cm_select_or_poll(const struct select_state *in, time_ms endtime,
#ifdef USE_POLL
*sret = poll(out->fds, out->nfds, interval);
#else
- tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
- tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
- *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, &tv);
+ if (interval != -1) {
+ tv.tv_sec = interval / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = interval % 1000 * 1000;
+ tvp = &tv;
+ } else {
+ tvp = NULL;
+ }
+ *sret = select(out->max, &out->rfds, &out->wfds, &out->xfds, tvp);
#endif
return (*sret < 0) ? SOCKET_ERRNO : 0;
@@ -1099,11 +1107,6 @@ service_tcp_connect(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
}
conn->state = WRITING;
-
- /* Record this connection's timeout for service_fds. */
- if (get_curtime_ms(&conn->endtime) == 0)
- conn->endtime += 10000;
-
return conn->service_write(context, realm, conn, selstate);
}
@@ -1378,19 +1381,18 @@ kill_conn:
return FALSE;
}
-/* Return the maximum of endtime and the endtime fields of all currently active
- * TCP connections. */
-static time_ms
-get_endtime(time_ms endtime, struct conn_state *conns)
+/* Return true if conns contains any states with connected TCP sockets. */
+static krb5_boolean
+any_tcp_connections(struct conn_state *conns)
{
struct conn_state *state;
for (state = conns; state != NULL; state = state->next) {
- if ((state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING) &&
- state->endtime > endtime)
- endtime = state->endtime;
+ if (state->addr.transport != UDP &&
+ (state->state == READING || state->state == WRITING))
+ return TRUE;
}
- return endtime;
+ return FALSE;
}
static krb5_boolean
@@ -1413,9 +1415,9 @@ service_fds(krb5_context context, struct select_state *selstate,
e = 0;
while (selstate->nfds > 0) {
- endtime = get_endtime(interval_end, conns);
+ endtime = any_tcp_connections(conns) ? 0 : interval_end;
/* Don't wait longer than the whole request should last. */
- if (timeout && endtime > timeout)
+ if (timeout && (!endtime || endtime > timeout))
endtime = timeout;
e = cm_select_or_poll(selstate, endtime, seltemp, &selret);
if (e == EINTR)
--
2.46.0

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
From 3999883b9745bfd7065d41ff05b19e56bcb2e791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 17:18:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix various issues detected by static analysis
In klists's show_credential(), ensure that the column counter doesn't
decrease if printf() fails.
In process_k5beta7_princ(), bounds-check the e_length field.
In ndr_enc_delegation_info(), initialize b so it is always valid for
the cleanup handler.
In krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data(), change the flow control so ret is
always set by the end of the function. Return KRB5_KDB_INVALIDKEYSIZE
if there isn't enough data in the first key_data_contents field or if
the serialized key length is invalid.
In svcauth_gss_validate(), expand rpchdr to accomodate the header plus
MAX_AUTH_BYTES.
In svcudp_reply(), change slen to unsigned to match the return type of
XDR_GETPOS() and eliminate an unnecessary check for slen >= 0.
In krb5int_pthread_loaded()(), remove pthread_equal() from the weak
symbol checks. It is implemented as an inline function in some glibc
versions, which makes the comparison "&pthread_equal == 0" always
false.
[ghudson@mit.edu: further modified krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data() for
clarity; added detail to commit message]
(cherry picked from commit a96541981ee34c8642ddeb6101b98e883e41c6e5)
---
src/clients/klist/klist.c | 12 ++++-----
src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c | 5 ++++
src/kdc/ndr.c | 2 +-
src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c | 5 +++-
src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c | 13 ++++-----
src/util/support/threads.c | 2 --
7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/clients/klist/klist.c b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
index b5808e5c93..ba9539fd23 100644
--- a/src/clients/klist/klist.c
+++ b/src/clients/klist/klist.c
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ show_credential(krb5_creds *cred, const char *defname)
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
char *name = NULL, *sname = NULL, *tktsname, *flags;
- int extra_field = 0, ccol = 0, i;
+ int extra_field = 0, ccol = 0, i, r;
krb5_boolean is_config = krb5_is_config_principal(context, cred->server);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cred->client, &name);
@@ -711,11 +711,11 @@ show_credential(krb5_creds *cred, const char *defname)
fputs("config: ", stdout);
ccol = 8;
for (i = 1; i < cred->server->length; i++) {
- ccol += printf("%s%.*s%s",
- i > 1 ? "(" : "",
- (int)cred->server->data[i].length,
- cred->server->data[i].data,
- i > 1 ? ")" : "");
+ r = printf("%s%.*s%s", i > 1 ? "(" : "",
+ (int)cred->server->data[i].length,
+ cred->server->data[i].data, i > 1 ? ")" : "");
+ if (r >= 0)
+ ccol += r;
}
fputs(" = ", stdout);
ccol += 3;
diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
index 4d6cc0bdf9..feb053d834 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
+++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/dump.c
@@ -704,6 +704,11 @@ process_k5beta7_princ(krb5_context context, const char *fname, FILE *filep,
dbentry->len = u1;
dbentry->n_key_data = u4;
+
+ if (u5 > UINT16_MAX) {
+ load_err(fname, *linenop, _("invalid principal extra data size"));
+ goto fail;
+ }
dbentry->e_length = u5;
if (kp != NULL) {
diff --git a/src/kdc/ndr.c b/src/kdc/ndr.c
index d438408ee2..38be9fe42a 100644
--- a/src/kdc/ndr.c
+++ b/src/kdc/ndr.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ ndr_enc_delegation_info(struct pac_s4u_delegation_info *in, krb5_data *out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t i;
- struct k5buf b;
+ struct k5buf b = EMPTY_K5BUF;
struct encoded_wchars pt_encoded = { 0 }, *tss_encoded = NULL;
uint32_t pointer = 0;
diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c b/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
index 82bbed6312..21aa3742b1 100644
--- a/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
+++ b/src/lib/kdb/decrypt_key.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data(krb5_context context, const krb5_keyblock *mkey,
krb5_keyblock *dbkey_out,
krb5_keysalt *keysalt_out)
{
- krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
int16_t keylen;
krb5_enc_data cipher;
krb5_data plain = empty_data();
@@ -74,36 +74,38 @@ krb5_dbe_def_decrypt_key_data(krb5_context context, const krb5_keyblock *mkey,
if (mkey == NULL)
return KRB5_KDB_BADSTORED_MKEY;
- if (kd->key_data_contents[0] != NULL && kd->key_data_length[0] >= 2) {
- keylen = load_16_le(kd->key_data_contents[0]);
- if (keylen < 0)
- return EINVAL;
- cipher.enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
- cipher.ciphertext = make_data(kd->key_data_contents[0] + 2,
- kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
- ret = alloc_data(&plain, kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (kd->key_data_contents[0] == NULL || kd->key_data_length[0] < 2)
+ return KRB5_KDB_INVALIDKEYSIZE;
- ret = krb5_c_decrypt(context, mkey, 0, 0, &cipher, &plain);
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup;
+ keylen = load_16_le(kd->key_data_contents[0]);
+ if (keylen < 0)
+ return KRB5_KDB_INVALIDKEYSIZE;
- /* Make sure the plaintext has at least as many bytes as the true ke
- * length (it may have more due to padding). */
- if ((unsigned int)keylen > plain.length) {
- ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
- if (ret)
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ cipher.enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ cipher.ciphertext = make_data(kd->key_data_contents[0] + 2,
+ kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
+ ret = alloc_data(&plain, kd->key_data_length[0] - 2);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
- kb.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
- kb.enctype = kd->key_data_type[0];
- kb.length = keylen;
- kb.contents = (uint8_t *)plain.data;
- plain = empty_data();
+ ret = krb5_c_decrypt(context, mkey, 0, 0, &cipher, &plain);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Make sure the plaintext has at least as many bytes as the true key
+ * length (it may have more due to padding). */
+ if ((unsigned int)keylen > plain.length) {
+ ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ kb.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ kb.enctype = kd->key_data_type[0];
+ kb.length = keylen;
+ kb.contents = (uint8_t *)plain.data;
+ plain = empty_data();
+
/* Decode salt data. */
if (keysalt_out != NULL) {
if (kd->key_data_ver == 2) {
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c b/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
index 98d601c8ab..4f1d2911b0 100644
--- a/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/svc_auth_gss.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
struct opaque_auth *oa;
gss_buffer_desc rpcbuf, checksum;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat, qop_state;
- u_char rpchdr[128];
+ u_char rpchdr[32 + MAX_AUTH_BYTES];
int32_t *buf;
log_debug("in svcauth_gss_validate()");
@@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
return (FALSE);
buf = (int32_t *)(void *)rpchdr;
+
+ /* Write the 32 first bytes of the header. */
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_xid);
IXDR_PUT_ENUM(buf, msg->rm_direction);
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_call.cb_rpcvers);
@@ -323,6 +325,7 @@ svcauth_gss_validate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct svc_rpc_gss_data *gd, struct r
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, msg->rm_call.cb_proc);
IXDR_PUT_ENUM(buf, oa->oa_flavor);
IXDR_PUT_LONG(buf, oa->oa_length);
+
if (oa->oa_length) {
memcpy((caddr_t)buf, oa->oa_base, oa->oa_length);
buf += RNDUP(oa->oa_length) / sizeof(int32_t);
diff --git a/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c b/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
index 8ecbdf2b33..3aff277eb7 100644
--- a/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
+++ b/src/lib/rpc/svc_udp.c
@@ -248,8 +248,9 @@ static bool_t svcudp_reply(
{
struct svcudp_data *su = su_data(xprt);
XDR *xdrs = &su->su_xdrs;
- int slen;
+ u_int slen;
bool_t stat = FALSE;
+ ssize_t r;
xdrproc_t xdr_results = NULL;
caddr_t xdr_location = 0;
@@ -272,12 +273,12 @@ static bool_t svcudp_reply(
if (xdr_replymsg(xdrs, msg) &&
(!has_args ||
(SVCAUTH_WRAP(xprt->xp_auth, xdrs, xdr_results, xdr_location)))) {
- slen = (int)XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
- if (sendto(xprt->xp_sock, rpc_buffer(xprt), slen, 0,
- (struct sockaddr *)&(xprt->xp_raddr), xprt->xp_addrlen)
- == slen) {
+ slen = XDR_GETPOS(xdrs);
+ r = sendto(xprt->xp_sock, rpc_buffer(xprt), slen, 0,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&(xprt->xp_raddr), xprt->xp_addrlen);
+ if (r >= 0 && (u_int)r == slen) {
stat = TRUE;
- if (su->su_cache && slen >= 0) {
+ if (su->su_cache) {
cache_set(xprt, (uint32_t) slen);
}
}
diff --git a/src/util/support/threads.c b/src/util/support/threads.c
index be7e4c2e3f..4ded805b79 100644
--- a/src/util/support/threads.c
+++ b/src/util/support/threads.c
@@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ struct tsd_block {
# pragma weak pthread_mutex_destroy
# pragma weak pthread_mutex_init
# pragma weak pthread_self
-# pragma weak pthread_equal
# pragma weak pthread_getspecific
# pragma weak pthread_setspecific
# pragma weak pthread_key_create
@@ -151,7 +150,6 @@ int krb5int_pthread_loaded (void)
|| &pthread_mutex_destroy == 0
|| &pthread_mutex_init == 0
|| &pthread_self == 0
- || &pthread_equal == 0
/* Any program that's really multithreaded will have to be
able to create threads. */
|| &pthread_create == 0
--
2.46.0

View file

@ -1,629 +0,0 @@
From ea02fd7bb79861b8e36517c7c95af821a16657c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:15:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Generate and verify message MACs in libkrad
Implement some of the measures specified in
draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 for mitigating the BlastRADIUS
attack (CVE-2024-3596):
* Include a Message-Authenticator MAC as the first attribute when
generating a packet of type Access-Request, Access-Reject,
Access-Accept, or Access-Challenge (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4), if
the secret is non-empty. (An empty secret indicates the use of Unix
domain socket transport.)
* Validate the Message-Authenticator MAC in received packets, if
present.
FreeRADIUS enforces Message-Authenticator as of versions 3.2.5 and
3.0.27. libkrad must generate Message-Authenticator attributes in
order to remain compatible with these implementations.
[ghudson@mit.edu: adjusted style and naming; simplified some
functions; edited commit message]
ticket: 9142 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.21-next
(cherry picked from commit 871125fea8ce0370a972bf65f7d1de63f619b06c)
---
src/include/k5-int.h | 5 +
src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c | 28 ++++
src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports | 1 +
src/lib/krad/attr.c | 17 ++
src/lib/krad/attrset.c | 59 +++++--
src/lib/krad/internal.h | 7 +-
src/lib/krad/packet.c | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c | 2 +-
src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py | 3 +-
src/lib/krad/t_packet.c | 11 ++
src/tests/t_otp.py | 3 +
11 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index 69d6a6f569..b7789a2dd8 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -2403,4 +2403,9 @@ krb5_boolean
k5_sname_compare(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal sname,
krb5_const_principal princ);
+/* Generate an HMAC-MD5 keyed checksum as specified by RFC 2104. */
+krb5_error_code
+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output);
+
#endif /* _KRB5_INT_H */
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
index ec024f3966..a809388549 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/checksum_hmac_md5.c
@@ -92,3 +92,31 @@ cleanup:
free(hash_iov);
return ret;
}
+
+krb5_error_code
+k5_hmac_md5(const krb5_data *key, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
+ krb5_data *output)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = &krb5int_hash_md5;
+ krb5_keyblock keyblock = { 0 };
+ krb5_data hashed_key;
+ uint8_t hkeybuf[16];
+ krb5_crypto_iov iov;
+
+ /* Hash the key if it is longer than the block size. */
+ if (key->length > hash->blocksize) {
+ hashed_key = make_data(hkeybuf, sizeof(hkeybuf));
+ iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov.data = *key;
+ ret = hash->hash(&iov, 1, &hashed_key);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ key = &hashed_key;
+ }
+
+ keyblock.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ keyblock.length = key->length;
+ keyblock.contents = (uint8_t *)key->data;
+ return krb5int_hmac_keyblock(hash, &keyblock, data, num_data, output);
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
index d8ffa63304..00e0ce1812 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/libk5crypto.exports
@@ -102,3 +102,4 @@ krb5_c_prfplus
krb5_c_derive_prfplus
k5_enctype_to_ssf
krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype
+k5_hmac_md5
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attr.c b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
index 42d354a3b5..65ed1d35e7 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attr.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attr.c
@@ -125,6 +125,23 @@ static const attribute_record attributes[UCHAR_MAX] = {
{"NAS-Port-Type", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
{"Port-Limit", 4, 4, NULL, NULL},
{"Login-LAT-Port", 1, MAX_ATTRSIZE, NULL, NULL},
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for tunnelling */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Reserved for Apple Remote Access Protocol */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Password-Retry */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Prompt */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Connect-Info */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* Configuration-Token */
+ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL}, /* EAP-Message */
+ {"Message-Authenticator", MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL, NULL},
};
/* Encode User-Password attribute. */
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
index 6ec031e320..e5457ebfd7 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/attrset.c
@@ -164,15 +164,44 @@ krad_attrset_copy(const krad_attrset *set, krad_attrset **copy)
return 0;
}
+/* Place an encoded attributes into outbuf at position *i. Increment *i by the
+ * length of the encoding. */
+static krb5_error_code
+append_attr(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krad_attr type, const krb5_data *data,
+ uint8_t outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *i, krb5_boolean *is_fips)
+{
+ uint8_t buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
+ size_t attrlen;
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+
+ retval = kr_attr_encode(ctx, secret, auth, type, data, buffer, &attrlen,
+ is_fips);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (attrlen > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE - *i - 2)
+ return EMSGSIZE;
+
+ outbuf[(*i)++] = type;
+ outbuf[(*i)++] = attrlen + 2;
+ memcpy(outbuf + *i, buffer, attrlen);
+ *i += attrlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
- const unsigned char *auth,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
krb5_boolean *is_fips)
{
- unsigned char buffer[MAX_ATTRSIZE];
krb5_error_code retval;
- size_t i = 0, attrlen;
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const uint8_t zeroes[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ krb5_data zerodata;
+ size_t i = 0;
attr *a;
if (set == NULL) {
@@ -180,19 +209,21 @@ kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
return 0;
}
- K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
- retval = kr_attr_encode(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
- buffer, &attrlen, is_fips);
- if (retval != 0)
+ if (add_msgauth) {
+ /* Encode Message-Authenticator as the first attribute, per
+ * draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 section 5.2. */
+ zerodata = make_data((uint8_t *)zeroes, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, msgauth_type, &zerodata,
+ outbuf, &i, is_fips);
+ if (retval)
return retval;
+ }
- if (i + attrlen + 2 > MAX_ATTRSETSIZE)
- return EMSGSIZE;
-
- outbuf[i++] = a->type;
- outbuf[i++] = attrlen + 2;
- memcpy(&outbuf[i], buffer, attrlen);
- i += attrlen;
+ K5_TAILQ_FOREACH(a, &set->list, list) {
+ retval = append_attr(set->ctx, secret, auth, a->type, &a->attr,
+ outbuf, &i, is_fips);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
}
*outlen = i;
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/internal.h b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
index a17b6f39b1..ca66f3ec68 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/internal.h
+++ b/src/lib/krad/internal.h
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
#define UCHAR_MAX 255
#endif
+#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
+
/* RFC 2865 */
#define MAX_ATTRSIZE (UCHAR_MAX - 2)
#define MAX_ATTRSETSIZE (KRAD_PACKET_SIZE_MAX - 20)
@@ -79,10 +81,11 @@ kr_attr_decode(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const unsigned char *auth,
krad_attr type, const krb5_data *in,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSIZE], size_t *outlen);
-/* Encode the attributes into the buffer. */
+/* Encode set into outbuf. If add_msgauth is true, include a zeroed
+ * Message-Authenticator as the first attribute. */
krb5_error_code
kr_attrset_encode(const krad_attrset *set, const char *secret,
- const unsigned char *auth,
+ const uint8_t *auth, krb5_boolean add_msgauth,
unsigned char outbuf[MAX_ATTRSETSIZE], size_t *outlen,
krb5_boolean *is_fips);
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
index c5446b890c..3c1a4d507e 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
typedef unsigned char uchar;
/* RFC 2865 */
+#define MSGAUTH_SIZE (2 + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
#define OFFSET_CODE 0
#define OFFSET_ID 1
#define OFFSET_LENGTH 2
@@ -222,6 +223,106 @@ packet_set_attrset(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_packet *pkt)
return kr_attrset_decode(ctx, &tmp, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), &pkt->attrset);
}
+/* Determine if a packet requires a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
+static inline krb5_boolean
+requires_msgauth(const char *secret, krad_code code)
+{
+ /* If no secret is provided, assume that the transport is a UNIX socket.
+ * Message-Authenticator is required only on UDP and TCP connections. */
+ if (*secret == '\0')
+ return FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Per draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-03 sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4,
+ * Message-Authenticator is required in Access-Request packets and all
+ * potential responses when UDP or TCP transport is used.
+ */
+ return code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Reject") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Accept") ||
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Challenge");
+}
+
+/* Check if the packet has a Message-Authenticator attribute. */
+static inline krb5_boolean
+has_pkt_msgauth(const krad_packet *pkt)
+{
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+
+ return krad_attrset_get(pkt->attrset, msgauth_type, 0) != NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return the beginning of the Message-Authenticator attribute in pkt, or NULL
+ * if no such attribute is present. */
+static const uint8_t *
+lookup_msgauth_addr(const krad_packet *pkt)
+{
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ size_t i;
+ uint8_t *p;
+
+ i = OFFSET_ATTR;
+ while (i + 2 < pkt->pkt.length) {
+ p = (uint8_t *)offset(&pkt->pkt, i);
+ if (msgauth_type == *p)
+ return p;
+ i += p[1];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the message authenticator MAC for pkt as specified in RFC 2869
+ * section 5.14, placing the result in mac_out. Use the provided authenticator
+ * auth, which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code
+calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+ const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE],
+ uint8_t mac_out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE])
+{
+ uint8_t zeroed_msgauth[MSGAUTH_SIZE];
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const uint8_t *msgauth_attr, *msgauth_end, *pkt_end;
+ krb5_crypto_iov input[5];
+ krb5_data ksecr, mac;
+
+ msgauth_attr = lookup_msgauth_addr(pkt);
+ if (msgauth_attr == NULL)
+ return EINVAL;
+ msgauth_end = msgauth_attr + MSGAUTH_SIZE;
+ pkt_end = (const uint8_t *)pkt->pkt.data + pkt->pkt.length;
+
+ /* Read code, id, and length from the packet. */
+ input[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[0].data = make_data(pkt->pkt.data, OFFSET_AUTH);
+
+ /* Read the provided authenticator. */
+ input[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[1].data = make_data((uint8_t *)auth, AUTH_FIELD_SIZE);
+
+ /* Read any attributes before Message-Authenticator. */
+ input[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[2].data = make_data(pkt_attr(pkt), msgauth_attr - pkt_attr(pkt));
+
+ /* Read Message-Authenticator with the data bytes all set to zero, per RFC
+ * 2869 section 5.14. */
+ zeroed_msgauth[0] = msgauth_type;
+ zeroed_msgauth[1] = MSGAUTH_SIZE;
+ memset(zeroed_msgauth + 2, 0, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ input[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[3].data = make_data(zeroed_msgauth, MSGAUTH_SIZE);
+
+ /* Read any attributes after Message-Authenticator. */
+ input[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ input[4].data = make_data((uint8_t *)msgauth_end, pkt_end - msgauth_end);
+
+ mac = make_data(mac_out, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ksecr = string2data((char *)secret);
+ return k5_hmac_md5(&ksecr, input, 5, &mac);
+}
+
ssize_t
krad_packet_bytes_needed(const krb5_data *buffer)
{
@@ -255,6 +356,7 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
krad_packet *pkt;
uchar id;
size_t attrset_len;
+ krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
pkt = packet_new();
if (pkt == NULL) {
@@ -274,9 +376,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
+ /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
+ msgauth_required = (*secret != '\0' &&
+ code == krad_code_name2num("Access-Request"));
+
/* Encode the attributes. */
- retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
+ retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(pkt), msgauth_required,
+ pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -285,6 +391,13 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
pkt_code_set(pkt, code);
pkt_len_set(pkt, pkt->pkt.length);
+ if (msgauth_required) {
+ /* Calculate and set the Message-Authenticator MAC. */
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* Copy the attrset for future use. */
retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
if (retval != 0)
@@ -307,14 +420,19 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
krb5_error_code retval;
krad_packet *pkt;
size_t attrset_len;
+ krb5_boolean msgauth_required;
pkt = packet_new();
if (pkt == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
+ /* Determine if Message-Authenticator is required. */
+ msgauth_required = requires_msgauth(secret, code);
+
/* Encode the attributes. */
- retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request), pkt_attr(pkt),
- &attrset_len, &pkt->is_fips);
+ retval = kr_attrset_encode(set, secret, pkt_auth(request),
+ msgauth_required, pkt_attr(pkt), &attrset_len,
+ &pkt->is_fips);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -330,6 +448,18 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
+ if (msgauth_required) {
+ /*
+ * Calculate and replace the Message-Authenticator MAC. Per RFC 2869
+ * section 5.14, use the authenticator from the request, not from the
+ * response.
+ */
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
+ pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* Copy the attrset for future use. */
retval = packet_set_attrset(ctx, secret, pkt);
if (retval != 0)
@@ -343,6 +473,34 @@ error:
return retval;
}
+/* Verify the Message-Authenticator value in pkt, using the provided
+ * authenticator (which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request). */
+static krb5_error_code
+verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+ const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE])
+{
+ uint8_t mac[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ krad_attr msgauth_type = krad_attr_name2num("Message-Authenticator");
+ const krb5_data *msgauth;
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+
+ msgauth = krad_packet_get_attr(pkt, msgauth_type, 0);
+ if (msgauth == NULL)
+ return ENODATA;
+
+ retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, auth, mac);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ if (msgauth->length != MD5_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ return EMSGSIZE;
+
+ if (k5_bcmp(mac, msgauth->data, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0)
+ return EBADMSG;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Decode a packet. */
static krb5_error_code
decode_packet(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krb5_data *buffer,
@@ -394,21 +552,35 @@ krad_packet_decode_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
krad_packet **reqpkt)
{
const krad_packet *tmp = NULL;
+ krad_packet *req;
krb5_error_code retval;
- retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, reqpkt);
- if (cb != NULL && retval == 0) {
+ retval = decode_packet(ctx, secret, buffer, &req);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
+ /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+ if (has_pkt_msgauth(req)) {
+ retval = verify_msgauth(secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
+ if (retval) {
+ krad_packet_free(req);
+ return retval;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
for (tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE); tmp != NULL; tmp = (*cb)(data, FALSE)) {
if (pkt_id_get(*reqpkt) == pkt_id_get(tmp))
break;
}
- }
- if (cb != NULL && (retval != 0 || tmp != NULL))
- (*cb)(data, TRUE);
+ if (tmp != NULL)
+ (*cb)(data, TRUE);
+ }
+ *reqpkt = req;
*duppkt = tmp;
- return retval;
+ return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
@@ -435,9 +607,17 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
break;
}
- /* If the authenticator matches, then the response is valid. */
- if (memcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) == 0)
- break;
+ /* Verify the response authenticator. */
+ if (k5_bcmp(pkt_auth(*rsppkt), auth, sizeof(auth)) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
+ if (has_pkt_msgauth(*rsppkt)) {
+ if (verify_msgauth(secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ break;
}
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
index 4cdb8b7d8e..f9c66509bd 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_attrset.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ main(void)
noerror(krad_attrset_add(set, krad_attr_name2num("User-Password"), &tmp));
/* Encode attrset. */
- noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, buffer, &encode_len,
+ noerror(kr_attrset_encode(set, "foo", auth, FALSE, buffer, &encode_len,
&is_fips));
krad_attrset_free(set);
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
index 4a3de079c7..647d4894eb 100755
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_daemon.py
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ DICTIONARY = """
ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Name\t1\tstring
ATTRIBUTE\tUser-Password\t2\toctets
ATTRIBUTE\tNAS-Identifier\t32\tstring
+ATTRIBUTE\tMessage-Authenticator\t80\toctets
"""
class TestServer(server.Server):
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ class TestServer(server.Server):
if key == "User-Password":
passwd = [pkt.PwDecrypt(x) for x in pkt[key]]
- reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt)
+ reply = self.CreateReplyPacket(pkt, message_authenticator=True)
if passwd == ['accept']:
reply.code = packet.AccessAccept
else:
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
index c22489144f..104b6507a2 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/t_packet.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
krb5_data username, password;
krb5_boolean auth = FALSE;
krb5_context ctx;
+ const krad_packet *dupreq;
+ const krb5_data *encpkt;
+ krad_packet *decreq;
username = string2data("testUser");
@@ -184,9 +187,17 @@ main(int argc, const char **argv)
password = string2data("accept");
noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]));
+ encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[ACCEPT_PACKET]);
+ noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
+ &dupreq, &decreq));
+ krad_packet_free(decreq);
password = string2data("reject");
noerror(make_packet(ctx, &username, &password, &packets[REJECT_PACKET]));
+ encpkt = krad_packet_encode(packets[REJECT_PACKET]);
+ noerror(krad_packet_decode_request(ctx, "foo", encpkt, NULL, NULL,
+ &dupreq, &decreq));
+ krad_packet_free(decreq);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
diff --git a/src/tests/t_otp.py b/src/tests/t_otp.py
index c3b820a411..dd5cdc5c26 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_otp.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_otp.py
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ ATTRIBUTE User-Name 1 string
ATTRIBUTE User-Password 2 octets
ATTRIBUTE Service-Type 6 integer
ATTRIBUTE NAS-Identifier 32 string
+ATTRIBUTE Message-Authenticator 80 octets
'''
class RadiusDaemon(Process):
@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ class RadiusDaemon(Process):
reply.code = packet.AccessReject
replyq['reply'] = False
+ reply.add_message_authenticator()
+
outq.put(replyq)
if addr is None:
sock.send(reply.ReplyPacket())
--
2.46.0

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
From 43d10f1580c033fe706470e7588c720ac7854918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 18:27:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add ecdsa-with-sha512/256 to supportedCMSTypes
Elliptic curve certificates are already supported for PKINIT
pre-authentication, but their associated signature types aren't
advertized. Add ecdsa-with-sha512 and ecdsa-with-sha256 OIDs to the
supportedCMSTypes list sent by the client.
[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message]
ticket: 9100 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 9913e5c92c4e5cb76d6ae58386f744766d2e6454)
---
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
index 10f8688ec2..905e90d29c 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
@@ -64,14 +64,52 @@ static char sha512WithRSAEncr_oid[9] = {
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0d
};
+/* RFC 3279 ecdsa-with-SHA1: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
+ * signatures(4) 1 */
+static char ecdsaWithSha1_oid[] = {
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x01
+};
+
+/* RFC 5758 ecdsa-with-SHA256: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
+ * signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 */
+static char ecdsaWithSha256_oid[] = {
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02
+};
+
+/* RFC 5758 ecdsa-with-SHA384: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
+ * signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 */
+static char ecdsaWithSha384_oid[] = {
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x03
+};
+
+/* RFC 5758 ecdsa-with-SHA512: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045)
+ * signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 */
+static char ecdsaWithSha512_oid[] = {
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04
+};
+
const krb5_data sha256WithRSAEncr_id = {
KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha256WithRSAEncr_oid), sha256WithRSAEncr_oid
};
const krb5_data sha512WithRSAEncr_id = {
KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha512WithRSAEncr_oid), sha512WithRSAEncr_oid
};
+const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha1_id = {
+ KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha1_oid), ecdsaWithSha1_oid
+};
+const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha256_id = {
+ KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha256_oid), ecdsaWithSha256_oid
+};
+const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha384_id = {
+ KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha384_oid), ecdsaWithSha384_oid
+};
+const krb5_data ecdsaWithSha512_id = {
+ KV5M_DATA, sizeof(ecdsaWithSha512_oid), ecdsaWithSha512_oid
+};
krb5_data const * const supported_cms_algs[] = {
+ &ecdsaWithSha512_id,
+ &ecdsaWithSha256_id,
&sha512WithRSAEncr_id,
&sha256WithRSAEncr_id,
NULL
--
2.47.1

View file

@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
From fba4cbf0bc50569b8ea6d1e1c3303eaab84935e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 01:07:38 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Get rid of pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
Fold pkinit_crypto_openssl.h into the one source file where it was
used. Also clean up the include of <arpa/inet.h>, as htonl() is no
longer used after commit 1c87ce6c44a9de0824580a2d72a8a202237e01f4.
(cherry picked from commit b3352945fb8836f8b4095e0b8aad04b54aca3152)
---
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps | 2 +-
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 85 +++++++++++-
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h | 121 ------------------
3 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps
index 58320aa801..b6f4476fe8 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/deps
@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ pkinit_crypto_openssl.so pkinit_crypto_openssl.po $(OUTPRE)pkinit_crypto_openssl
$(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/plugin.h $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/preauth_plugin.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/port-sockets.h $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h \
pkcs11.h pkinit.h pkinit_accessor.h pkinit_crypto.h \
- pkinit_crypto_openssl.c pkinit_crypto_openssl.h pkinit_trace.h
+ pkinit_crypto_openssl.c pkinit_trace.h
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index f6d494bd11..ae8599d5a2 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -30,20 +30,99 @@
*/
#include "k5-int.h"
-#include "pkinit_crypto_openssl.h"
#include "k5-buf.h"
#include "k5-err.h"
#include "k5-hex.h"
-#include <unistd.h>
+#include "pkinit.h"
#include <dirent.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/decoder.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#endif
+#define DN_BUF_LEN 256
+#define MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED 20
+
+struct _pkinit_cred_info {
+ char *name;
+ X509 *cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *key;
+#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+ CK_BYTE_PTR cert_id;
+ int cert_id_len;
+#endif
+};
+typedef struct _pkinit_cred_info *pkinit_cred_info;
+
+struct _pkinit_identity_crypto_context {
+ pkinit_cred_info creds[MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED+1];
+ STACK_OF(X509) *my_certs; /* available user certs */
+ char *identity; /* identity name for user cert */
+ int cert_index; /* cert to use out of available certs*/
+ EVP_PKEY *my_key; /* available user keys if in filesystem */
+ STACK_OF(X509) *trustedCAs; /* available trusted ca certs */
+ STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs; /* available intermediate ca certs */
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked; /* available crls */
+ int pkcs11_method;
+ krb5_prompter_fct prompter;
+ void *prompter_data;
+#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+ char *p11_module_name;
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotid;
+ char *token_label;
+ char *cert_label;
+ /* These are crypto-specific. */
+ struct plugin_file_handle *p11_module;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11;
+ uint8_t *cert_id;
+ size_t cert_id_len;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech;
+#endif
+ krb5_boolean defer_id_prompt;
+ pkinit_deferred_id *deferred_ids;
+};
+
+struct _pkinit_plg_crypto_context {
+ EVP_PKEY *dh_1024;
+ EVP_PKEY *dh_2048;
+ EVP_PKEY *dh_4096;
+ EVP_PKEY *ec_p256;
+ EVP_PKEY *ec_p384;
+ EVP_PKEY *ec_p521;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_authData;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_DHKeyData;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_rkeyData;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_san;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_san_upn;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPClientAuth;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPKdc;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_kp_sc_logon;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *id_kp_serverAuth;
+};
+
+struct _pkinit_req_crypto_context {
+ X509 *received_cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *client_pkey;
+};
+
static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
static void pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index b7a3358800..0000000000
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * COPYRIGHT (C) 2006,2007
- * THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
- * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
- *
- * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
- * and redistribute this software and such derivative works
- * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
- * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
- * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
- * without specific, written prior authorization. If the
- * above copyright notice or any other identification of the
- * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
- * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
- * also be included.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
- * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
- * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
- * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
- * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
- * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
- * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
- * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGES.
- */
-
-#ifndef _PKINIT_CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H
-#define _PKINIT_CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H
-
-#include "pkinit.h"
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/decoder.h>
-#endif
-
-#define DN_BUF_LEN 256
-#define MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED 20
-
-struct _pkinit_cred_info {
- char *name;
- X509 *cert;
- EVP_PKEY *key;
-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
- CK_BYTE_PTR cert_id;
- int cert_id_len;
-#endif
-};
-typedef struct _pkinit_cred_info * pkinit_cred_info;
-
-struct _pkinit_identity_crypto_context {
- pkinit_cred_info creds[MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED+1];
- STACK_OF(X509) *my_certs; /* available user certs */
- char *identity; /* identity name for user cert */
- int cert_index; /* cert to use out of available certs*/
- EVP_PKEY *my_key; /* available user keys if in filesystem */
- STACK_OF(X509) *trustedCAs; /* available trusted ca certs */
- STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs; /* available intermediate ca certs */
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked; /* available crls */
- int pkcs11_method;
- krb5_prompter_fct prompter;
- void *prompter_data;
-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
- char *p11_module_name;
- CK_SLOT_ID slotid;
- char *token_label;
- char *cert_label;
- /* These are crypto-specific */
- struct plugin_file_handle *p11_module;
- CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11;
- uint8_t *cert_id;
- size_t cert_id_len;
- CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech;
-#endif
- krb5_boolean defer_id_prompt;
- pkinit_deferred_id *deferred_ids;
-};
-
-struct _pkinit_plg_crypto_context {
- EVP_PKEY *dh_1024;
- EVP_PKEY *dh_2048;
- EVP_PKEY *dh_4096;
- EVP_PKEY *ec_p256;
- EVP_PKEY *ec_p384;
- EVP_PKEY *ec_p521;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_authData;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_DHKeyData;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_rkeyData;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_san;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_san_upn;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPClientAuth;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_pkinit_KPKdc;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_ms_kp_sc_logon;
- ASN1_OBJECT *id_kp_serverAuth;
-};
-
-struct _pkinit_req_crypto_context {
- X509 *received_cert;
- EVP_PKEY *client_pkey;
-};
-
-#endif /* _PKINIT_CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H */
--
2.47.1

View file

@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
From 1b01057df4c2223fbf92be44f1e764207208ef03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 19:03:38 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Use SoftHSMv2 for PKCS11 PKINIT tests
Instead of softpkcs11, use SoftHSMv2 to mock the PKCS11 token for
PKINIT tests. Use pkcs11-tool from OpenSC to initialize the token and
import a certificate and key. SoftHSM does not support PIN-less
tokens (see https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/480) so
remove that test for now.
(cherry picked from commit 8ab61608236883fdc5c2d43f4bd1ff2094401d19)
---
.github/workflows/build.yml | 2 +-
src/tests/t_pkinit.py | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.github/workflows/build.yml b/.github/workflows/build.yml
index 68a4788adb..d7ae86b150 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/build.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/build.yml
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
if: startsWith(matrix.os, 'ubuntu')
run: |
sudo apt-get update -qq
- sudo apt-get install -y bison gettext keyutils ldap-utils libcmocka-dev libldap2-dev libkeyutils-dev libsasl2-dev libssl-dev python3-kdcproxy python3-pip slapd tcsh
+ sudo apt-get install -y bison gettext keyutils ldap-utils libcmocka-dev libldap2-dev libkeyutils-dev libsasl2-dev libssl-dev python3-kdcproxy python3-pip slapd tcsh softhsm2 opensc
pip3 install pyrad
- name: Build
env:
diff --git a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
index f8f2debc1b..4435746429 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_pkinit.py
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
from k5test import *
+import re
# Skip this test if pkinit wasn't built.
if not pkinit_enabled:
skip_rest('PKINIT tests', 'PKINIT module not built')
-soft_pkcs11 = os.path.join(buildtop, 'tests', 'softpkcs11', 'softpkcs11.so')
-
# Construct a krb5.conf fragment configuring pkinit.
user_pem = os.path.join(pkinit_certs, 'user.pem')
privkey_pem = os.path.join(pkinit_certs, 'privkey.pem')
@@ -55,9 +54,6 @@ p12_upn2_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % user_upn2_p12
p12_upn3_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % user_upn3_p12
p12_generic_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % generic_p12
p12_enc_identity = 'PKCS12:%s' % user_enc_p12
-p11_identity = 'PKCS11:' + soft_pkcs11
-p11_token_identity = ('PKCS11:module_name=' + soft_pkcs11 +
- ':slotid=1:token=SoftToken (token)')
# Start a realm with the test kdb module for the following UPN SAN tests.
realm = K5Realm(kdc_conf=alias_kdc_conf, create_kdb=False, pkinit=True)
@@ -389,53 +385,63 @@ realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=,'],
expected_code=1, expected_msg='Preauthentication failed while')
-softpkcs11rc = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), 'testdir', 'soft-pkcs11.rc')
-realm.env['SOFTPKCS11RC'] = softpkcs11rc
+softhsm2 = '/usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so'
+if not os.path.exists(softhsm2):
+ skip_rest('PKCS11 tests', 'SoftHSMv2 required')
+pkcs11_tool = which('pkcs11-tool')
+if not pkcs11_tool:
+ skip_rest('PKCS11 tests', 'pkcs11-tool from OpenSC required')
+tool_cmd = [pkcs11_tool, '--module', softhsm2]
+
+# Prepare a SoftHSM token.
+softhsm2_conf = os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'softhsm2.conf')
+softhsm2_tokens = os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'tokens')
+os.mkdir(softhsm2_tokens)
+realm.env['SOFTHSM2_CONF'] = softhsm2_conf
+with open(softhsm2_conf, 'w') as f:
+ f.write('directories.tokendir = %s\n' % softhsm2_tokens)
+realm.run(tool_cmd + ['--init-token', '--label', 'user',
+ '--so-pin', 'sopin', '--init-pin', '--pin', 'userpin'])
+realm.run(tool_cmd + ['-w', user_pem, '-y', 'cert'])
+realm.run(tool_cmd + ['-w', privkey_pem, '-y', 'privkey',
+ '-l', '--pin', 'userpin'])
+
+# Extract the slot ID generated by SoftHSM.
+out = realm.run(tool_cmd + ['-L'])
+m = re.search(r'slot ID 0x([0-9a-f]+)\n', out)
+if not m:
+ fail('could not extract slot ID from SoftHSM token')
+slot_id = int(m.group(1), 16)
+
+p11_attr = 'X509_user_identity=PKCS11:' + softhsm2
+p11_token_identity = ('PKCS11:module_name=%s:slotid=%d:token=user' %
+ (softhsm2, slot_id))
-# PKINIT with PKCS11: identity, with no need for a PIN.
-mark('PKCS11 identity, no PIN')
-conf = open(softpkcs11rc, 'w')
-conf.write("%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n" % ('user', 'user token', user_pem, privkey_pem))
-conf.close()
-# Expect to succeed without having to supply any more information.
-realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
- flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity])
+mark('PKCS11 identity, with PIN (prompter)')
+realm.kinit(realm.user_princ, flags=['-X', p11_attr], password='userpin')
realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
realm.run([kvno, realm.host_princ])
-# PKINIT with PKCS11: identity, with a PIN supplied by the prompter.
-mark('PKCS11 identity, with PIN (prompter)')
-os.remove(softpkcs11rc)
-conf = open(softpkcs11rc, 'w')
-conf.write("%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n" % ('user', 'user token', user_pem,
- privkey_enc_pem))
-conf.close()
-# Expect failure if the responder does nothing, and there's no prompter
+mark('PKCS11 identity, unavailable PIN')
realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 0}' % p11_token_identity,
- '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity, realm.user_princ],
- expected_code=2)
-realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
- flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity],
- password='encrypted')
-realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
-realm.run([kvno, realm.host_princ])
+ '-X', p11_attr, realm.user_princ], expected_code=2)
-# Supply the wrong PIN.
mark('PKCS11 identity, wrong PIN')
expected_trace = ('PKINIT client has no configured identity; giving up',)
realm.kinit(realm.user_princ,
- flags=['-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity],
+ flags=['-X', p11_attr],
password='wrong', expected_code=1, expected_trace=expected_trace)
# PKINIT with PKCS11: identity, with a PIN supplied by the responder.
-# Supply the response in raw form.
+# Supply the response in raw form. Expect the PIN_COUNT_LOW flag (1)
+# to be set due to the previous test.
mark('PKCS11 identity, with PIN (responder)')
-realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 0}' % p11_token_identity,
- '-r', 'pkinit={"%s": "encrypted"}' % p11_token_identity,
- '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity, realm.user_princ])
+realm.run(['./responder', '-x', 'pkinit={"%s": 1}' % p11_token_identity,
+ '-r', 'pkinit={"%s": "userpin"}' % p11_token_identity,
+ '-X', p11_attr, realm.user_princ])
# Supply the response through the convenience API.
-realm.run(['./responder', '-X', 'X509_user_identity=%s' % p11_identity,
- '-p', '%s=%s' % (p11_token_identity, 'encrypted'),
+realm.run(['./responder', '-X', p11_attr,
+ '-p', '%s=%s' % (p11_token_identity, 'userpin'),
realm.user_princ])
realm.klist(realm.user_princ)
realm.run([kvno, realm.host_princ])
--
2.47.1

View file

@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
From b0315d30f066c4241fcecc33dd9e4d1c7c28b9d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 17:32:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Simplify PKINIT cert representation
In the _pkinit_identity_crypto_context structure, the my_certs field
is a stack which only ever contains one cert and is only ever used to
retrieve that one cert. The cert_index field is always 0. Replace
these fields with a my_cert field pointing directly to the X509
certificate.
Simplify crypto_cert_select_default() by making it call
crypto_cert_select() with index 0 after verifying the certificate
count.
(cherry picked from commit f95dfb7908456f9563cee66706216a21df8d791f)
---
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 74 +++++--------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index ae8599d5a2..da59cb1e02 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -73,10 +73,9 @@ typedef struct _pkinit_cred_info *pkinit_cred_info;
struct _pkinit_identity_crypto_context {
pkinit_cred_info creds[MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED+1];
- STACK_OF(X509) *my_certs; /* available user certs */
+ X509 *my_cert; /* selected user or KDC cert */
char *identity; /* identity name for user cert */
- int cert_index; /* cert to use out of available certs*/
- EVP_PKEY *my_key; /* available user keys if in filesystem */
+ EVP_PKEY *my_key; /* selected cert key if in filesystem */
STACK_OF(X509) *trustedCAs; /* available trusted ca certs */
STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs; /* available intermediate ca certs */
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked; /* available crls */
@@ -1489,8 +1488,7 @@ pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++)
ctx->creds[i] = NULL;
- ctx->my_certs = NULL;
- ctx->cert_index = 0;
+ ctx->my_cert = NULL;
ctx->my_key = NULL;
ctx->trustedCAs = NULL;
ctx->intermediateCAs = NULL;
@@ -1506,8 +1504,8 @@ pkinit_fini_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
- if (ctx->my_certs != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->my_certs, X509_free);
+ if (ctx->my_cert != NULL)
+ X509_free(ctx->my_cert);
if (ctx->my_key != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->my_key);
@@ -1696,7 +1694,6 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL;
unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0;
unsigned char *y = NULL;
- X509 *cert = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL, *oid_copy;
/* Start creating PKCS7 data. */
@@ -1715,7 +1712,7 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
- if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
+ if (id_cryptoctx->my_cert != NULL) {
X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX *certctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL;
@@ -1726,8 +1723,6 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
- cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
-
certstore = X509_STORE_new();
if (certstore == NULL)
goto cleanup;
@@ -1736,7 +1731,7 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
certctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (certctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(certctx, certstore, cert,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(certctx, certstore, id_cryptoctx->my_cert,
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs);
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs);
if (!X509_verify_cert(certctx)) {
@@ -1764,13 +1759,13 @@ cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1))
goto cleanup;
if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
- X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
+ X509_get_issuer_name(id_cryptoctx->my_cert)))
goto cleanup;
/* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do
* things the ugly way. */
ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial =
- ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
+ ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(id_cryptoctx->my_cert))))
goto cleanup;
/* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
@@ -3311,7 +3306,7 @@ pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
- X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
+ X509 *kdc_cert = id_cryptoctx->my_cert;
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
@@ -4783,7 +4778,8 @@ cleanup:
}
/*
- * Set the certificate in idctx->creds[cred_index] as the selected certificate.
+ * Set the certificate in idctx->creds[cred_index] as the selected certificate,
+ * stealing pointers from it.
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
@@ -4795,20 +4791,17 @@ crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
return ENOENT;
ci = idctx->creds[cred_index];
- /* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
- if (idctx->my_certs != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(idctx->my_certs, X509_free);
- idctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
- sk_X509_push(idctx->my_certs, ci->cert);
- free(idctx->identity);
+
+ idctx->my_cert = ci->cert;
+ ci->cert = NULL;
+
/* hang on to the selected credential name */
+ free(idctx->identity);
if (ci->name != NULL)
idctx->identity = strdup(ci->name);
else
idctx->identity = NULL;
- ci->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
- idctx->cert_index = 0;
if (idctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
idctx->my_key = ci->key;
ci->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
@@ -4837,41 +4830,14 @@ crypto_cert_select_default(krb5_context context,
retval = crypto_cert_get_count(id_cryptoctx, &cert_count);
if (retval)
- goto errout;
+ return retval;
if (cert_count != 1) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_DEFAULT_CERT(context, cert_count);
- retval = EINVAL;
- goto errout;
- }
- /* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
- if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, X509_free);
+ return EINVAL;
}
- id_cryptoctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
- sk_X509_push(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert);
- id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
- id_cryptoctx->cert_index = 0;
- /* hang on to the selected credential name */
- if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name != NULL)
- id_cryptoctx->identity = strdup(id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name);
- else
- id_cryptoctx->identity = NULL;
- if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
- id_cryptoctx->my_key = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key;
- id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
- }
-#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
- else {
- id_cryptoctx->cert_id = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id;
- id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
- id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len;
- }
-#endif
- retval = 0;
-errout:
- return retval;
+ return crypto_cert_select(context, id_cryptoctx, 0);
}
--
2.47.1

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -1,599 +0,0 @@
From e43c05e7b0b93401dd68fc3ec3186c3a455b04ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 13:51:26 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Improve PKCS11 error reporting in PKINIT
Create a helper p11err() to set extended error message for failed
PKCS11 operations, and use it instead of pkiDebug() and pkcs11error().
ticket: 9113 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 98afb314d13939cbee19c69885dcb655db8460da)
---
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 262 ++++++++++--------
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h | 9 -
2 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index 4accfc2664..402bf1b9b3 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -161,9 +161,11 @@ static krb5_error_code pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers
int type, krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
-static krb5_error_code pkinit_find_private_key
-(pkinit_identity_crypto_context, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp);
+static krb5_error_code
+pkinit_find_private_key(krb5_context context,
+ pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_login
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip, const char *password);
@@ -180,6 +182,8 @@ static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len);
+
+static krb5_error_code p11err(krb5_context context, CK_RV rv, const char *op);
#endif /* WITHOUT_PKCS11 */
static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_fs
@@ -197,9 +201,6 @@ create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context,
static krb5_error_code
create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids);
-static const char *
-pkcs11err(int err);
-
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
@@ -944,8 +945,9 @@ cleanup:
#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L */
+#ifndef WITHOUT_PKC11
static struct pkcs11_errstrings {
- short code;
+ CK_RV code;
char *text;
} pkcs11_errstrings[] = {
{ 0x0, "ok" },
@@ -1035,6 +1037,7 @@ static struct pkcs11_errstrings {
{ 0x200, "function rejected" },
{ -1, NULL }
};
+#endif
MAKE_INIT_FUNCTION(pkinit_openssl_init);
@@ -1563,6 +1566,8 @@ pkinit_fini_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
free(ctx->token_label);
free(ctx->cert_id);
free(ctx->cert_label);
+ ctx->p11_module_name = ctx->token_label = ctx->cert_label = NULL;
+ ctx->cert_id = NULL;
#endif
}
@@ -3344,48 +3349,53 @@ pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type)
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
-static struct plugin_file_handle *
+static krb5_error_code
load_pkcs11_module(krb5_context context, const char *modname,
- CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p)
+ struct plugin_file_handle **handle_out,
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11_out)
{
struct plugin_file_handle *handle = NULL;
- CK_RV (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
+ CK_RV rv, (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
struct errinfo einfo = EMPTY_ERRINFO;
- const char *errmsg = NULL;
+ const char *errmsg = NULL, *failure;
void (*sym)(void);
long err;
- CK_RV rv;
TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN(context, modname);
err = krb5int_open_plugin(modname, &handle, &einfo);
if (err) {
- errmsg = k5_get_error(&einfo, err);
- TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN_FAILED(context, errmsg);
+ failure = _("Cannot load PKCS11 module");
goto error;
}
err = krb5int_get_plugin_func(handle, "C_GetFunctionList", &sym, &einfo);
if (err) {
- errmsg = k5_get_error(&einfo, err);
- TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETSYM_FAILED(context, errmsg);
+ failure = _("Cannot find C_GetFunctionList in PKCS11 module");
goto error;
}
getflist = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR))sym;
- rv = (*getflist)(p11p);
+ rv = (*getflist)(p11_out);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETFLIST_FAILED(context, pkcs11err(rv));
+ failure = _("Cannot retrieve function list in PKCS11 module");
goto error;
}
- return handle;
+ *handle_out = handle;
+ return 0;
error:
- k5_free_error(&einfo, errmsg);
+ if (err) {
+ errmsg = k5_get_error(&einfo, err);
+ k5_setmsg(context, err, _("%s: %s"), failure, errmsg);
+ } else {
+ err = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ k5_setmsg(context, err, "%s", failure);
+ }
k5_clear_error(&einfo);
if (handle != NULL)
krb5int_close_plugin(handle);
- return NULL;
+ return err;
}
static krb5_error_code
@@ -3393,12 +3403,13 @@ pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip, const char *password)
{
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
krb5_data rdat;
char *prompt;
const char *warning;
krb5_prompt kprompt;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
- int r = 0;
if (tip->flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) {
rdat.data = NULL;
@@ -3407,7 +3418,7 @@ pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
rdat.data = strdup(password);
rdat.length = strlen(password);
} else if (id_cryptoctx->prompter == NULL) {
- r = KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
+ ret = KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
rdat.data = NULL;
} else {
if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
@@ -3431,31 +3442,28 @@ pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
- r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
- NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
+ ret = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
+ NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, 0);
free(prompt);
}
- if (r == 0) {
- r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Login(id_cryptoctx->session, CKU_USER,
- (u_char *) rdat.data, rdat.length);
-
- if (r != CKR_OK) {
- TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_LOGIN_FAILED(context, pkcs11err(r));
- r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- }
+ if (!ret) {
+ rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Login(id_cryptoctx->session, CKU_USER,
+ (uint8_t *)rdat.data, rdat.length);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_Login");
}
free(rdat.data);
- return r;
+ return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx)
{
- CK_ULONG i, pret;
+ CK_ULONG i, rv;
unsigned char *cp;
size_t label_len;
CK_ULONG count = 0;
@@ -3469,30 +3477,35 @@ pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
return 0; /* session already open */
/* Load module */
- cctx->p11_module = load_pkcs11_module(context, cctx->p11_module_name,
- &cctx->p11);
- if (cctx->p11_module == NULL)
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ ret = load_pkcs11_module(context, cctx->p11_module_name, &cctx->p11_module,
+ &cctx->p11);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
/* Init */
- pret = cctx->p11->C_Initialize(NULL);
- if (pret != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_Initialize: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = cctx->p11->C_Initialize(NULL);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_Initialize");
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* Get the list of available slots */
- if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, NULL, &count) != CKR_OK)
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, NULL, &count);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetSlotList");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
if (count == 0) {
TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_NO_TOKEN(context);
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
}
- slotlist = calloc(count, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
+ slotlist = k5calloc(count, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID), &ret);
if (slotlist == NULL)
- return ENOMEM;
- if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, slotlist, &count) != CKR_OK) {
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ rv = cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, slotlist, &count);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetSlotList");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -3503,19 +3516,17 @@ pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
continue;
/* Open session */
- pret = cctx->p11->C_OpenSession(slotlist[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
- NULL, NULL, &cctx->session);
- if (pret != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_OpenSession: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = cctx->p11->C_OpenSession(slotlist[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+ NULL, NULL, &cctx->session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_OpenSession");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Get token info */
- pret = cctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(slotlist[i], &tinfo);
- if (pret != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_GetTokenInfo: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = cctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(slotlist[i], &tinfo);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetTokenInfo");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -3577,6 +3588,10 @@ pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
ret = 0;
cleanup:
+ /* On error, finalize the PKCS11 fields to ensure that we don't mistakenly
+ * short-circuit with success on the next call. */
+ if (ret)
+ pkinit_fini_pkcs11(cctx);
free(slotlist);
free(p11name);
return ret;
@@ -3598,16 +3613,17 @@ cleanup:
* If there are more than one, we just take the first one.
*/
-krb5_error_code
-pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
+static krb5_error_code
+pkinit_find_private_key(krb5_context context,
+ pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp)
{
CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4];
CK_ULONG count;
+ CK_RV rv;
unsigned int nattrs = 0;
- int r;
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE
CK_BBOOL true_false;
#endif
@@ -3637,18 +3653,21 @@ pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len;
nattrs++;
- r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs);
- if (r != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("krb5_pkinit_sign_data: C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n",
- pkcs11err(r));
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- }
+ rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs,
+ nattrs);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return p11err(context, rv, _("C_FindObjectsInit"));
- r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1, &count);
+ rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1,
+ &count);
id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session);
- pkiDebug("found %d private keys (%s)\n", (int)count, pkcs11err(r));
- if (r != CKR_OK || count < 1)
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return p11err(context, rv, _("C_FindObjects"));
+ if (count < 1) {
+ k5_setmsg(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
+ _("Found no private keys in PKCS11 token"));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ }
return 0;
}
#endif
@@ -3796,34 +3815,32 @@ pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attr;
CK_KEY_TYPE keytype;
+ CK_RV rv;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha256();
unsigned int mdlen;
uint8_t mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *dinfo = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *input;
size_t dinfo_len, input_len;
- int r;
*sig = NULL;
*sig_len = 0;
- if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
- pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
- }
+ ret = pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
p11 = id_cryptoctx->p11;
session = id_cryptoctx->session;
- ret = pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_SIGN, &obj);
+ ret = pkinit_find_private_key(context, id_cryptoctx, CKA_SIGN, &obj);
if (ret)
return ret;
attr.type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
attr.pValue = &keytype;
attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(keytype);
- r = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, &attr, 1);
- if (r) {
- pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkcs11err(r));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, &attr, 1);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetAttributeValue");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -3865,10 +3882,9 @@ pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
- r = p11->C_SignInit(session, &mech, obj);
- if (r != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_SignInit: %s\n", pkcs11err(r));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = p11->C_SignInit(session, &mech, obj);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_SignInit");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -3881,18 +3897,17 @@ pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
if (sigbuf == NULL)
goto cleanup;
- r = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
- if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || (r == CKR_OK && len >= PK_SIGLEN_GUESS)) {
+ rv = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
+ if (rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ||
+ (rv == CKR_OK && len >= PK_SIGLEN_GUESS)) {
free(sigbuf);
- pkiDebug("C_Sign realloc %d\n", (int) len);
sigbuf = k5alloc(len, &ret);
if (sigbuf == NULL)
goto cleanup;
- r = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
+ rv = p11->C_Sign(session, input, input_len, sigbuf, &len);
}
- if (r != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_Sign: %s\n", pkcs11err(r));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_Sign");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -4348,13 +4363,14 @@ reassemble_pkcs11_name(pkinit_identity_opts *idopts)
}
static krb5_error_code
-load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
- pkinit_identity_opts *idopts, pkinit_cred_info *cred_out)
+load_one_cert(krb5_context context, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11,
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
+ pkinit_cred_info *cred_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[2];
CK_BYTE_PTR cert = NULL, cert_id = NULL;
- CK_RV pret;
+ CK_RV rv;
const unsigned char *cp;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG count;
@@ -4364,8 +4380,8 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
*cred_out = NULL;
/* Look for X.509 cert. */
- pret = p11->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &count);
- if (pret != CKR_OK || count <= 0)
+ rv = p11->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &count);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK || count <= 0)
return 0;
/* Get cert and id len. */
@@ -4375,10 +4391,9 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = NULL;
attrs[1].ulValueLen = 0;
- pret = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
- if (pret != CKR_OK && pret != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetAttributeValue");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -4393,10 +4408,9 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
attrs[0].pValue = cert;
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = cert_id;
- pret = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
- if (pret != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ rv = p11->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, 2);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_GetAttributeValue");
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -4406,7 +4420,8 @@ load_one_cert(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR p11, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
cp = (unsigned char *)cert;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)attrs[0].ulValueLen);
if (x == NULL) {
- ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ ret = oerr(context, 0,
+ _("Failed to decode X509 certificate from PKCS11 token"));
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -4444,7 +4459,7 @@ pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
int i;
unsigned int nattrs;
krb5_error_code ret;
- CK_RV pret;
+ CK_RV rv;
/* Copy stuff from idopts -> id_cryptoctx */
if (idopts->p11_module_name != NULL) {
@@ -4516,16 +4531,16 @@ pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
nattrs++;
}
- pret = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs,
- nattrs);
- if (pret != CKR_OK) {
- pkiDebug("C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkcs11err(pret));
+ rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs,
+ nattrs);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ ret = p11err(context, rv, "C_FindObjectsInit");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) {
- ret = load_one_cert(id_cryptoctx->p11, id_cryptoctx->session, idopts,
- &id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
+ ret = load_one_cert(context, id_cryptoctx->p11, id_cryptoctx->session,
+ idopts, &id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] == NULL)
@@ -5510,19 +5525,26 @@ print_pubkey(BIGNUM * key, char *msg)
}
#endif
-static const char *
-pkcs11err(int err)
+#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
+static krb5_error_code
+p11err(krb5_context context, CK_RV rv, const char *op)
{
+ krb5_error_code code = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
int i;
+ const char *msg;
- for (i = 0; pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL; i++)
- if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].code == err)
+ for (i = 0; pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL; i++) {
+ if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].code == rv)
break;
- if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL)
- return (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text);
+ }
+ msg = pkcs11_errstrings[i].text;
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ msg = "unknown PKCS11 error";
- return "unknown PKCS11 error";
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, code, _("PKCS11 error (%s): %s"), op, msg);
+ return code;
}
+#endif
/*
* Add an item to the pkinit_identity_crypto_context's list of deferred
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
index 1c1ceb5a41..1faa6816d7 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
@@ -98,21 +98,12 @@
#define TRACE_PKINIT_OPENSSL_ERROR(c, msg) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT OpenSSL error: {str}", msg)
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETFLIST_FAILED(c, errstr) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS11 C_GetFunctionList failed: {str}", errstr)
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_GETSYM_FAILED(c, errstr) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT unable to find PKCS11 plugin symbol " \
- "C_GetFunctionList: {str}", errstr)
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_LOGIN_FAILED(c, errstr) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS11 C_Login failed: {str}", errstr)
#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_NO_MATCH_TOKEN(c) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 module has no matching tokens")
#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_NO_TOKEN(c) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 module shows no slots with tokens")
#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN(c, name) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT opening PKCS#11 module \"{str}\"", name)
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_OPEN_FAILED(c, errstr) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 module open failed: {str}", errstr)
#define TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS11_SLOT(c, slot, len, label) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT PKCS#11 slotid {int} token {lenstr}", \
slot, len, label)
--
2.47.1

View file

@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
From 946f7dba8cea3d2ed0e68c5e7594cbd7e1364609 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2024 10:56:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Set missing mask flags for kdb5_util operations
Set KADM5_TL_DATA for the use_mkey and update_princ_encryption
commands. (Commit c877f13c8985d820583b0d7ac1bb4c5dc36e677e did this
for the add_new_mkey and purge_mkeys commands.) Set appropriate flags
for the add_random_key command.
[ghudson@mit.edu: combined two commits; pruned out proposed mask flag
additions for values represented within key data or tl-data (like
KADM5_MKVNO), as those flags are currently only used in the kadm5
protocol, not to communicate with the KDB module]
ticket: 9158 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 4ed7da378940198cf4415f86d4eb013de6ac6455)
---
src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c | 4 +++-
src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c
index aceb0a9b80..ac5c51d05e 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c
+++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_mkey.c
@@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ kdb5_use_mkey(int argc, char *argv[])
goto cleanup_return;
}
+ master_entry->mask |= KADM5_TL_DATA;
+
if ((retval = krb5_db_put_principal(util_context, master_entry))) {
com_err(progname, retval,
_("while adding master key entry to the database"));
@@ -814,7 +816,7 @@ update_princ_encryption_1(void *cb, krb5_db_entry *ent)
goto fail;
}
- ent->mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA;
+ ent->mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_TL_DATA;
if ((retval = krb5_db_put_principal(util_context, ent))) {
com_err(progname, retval, _("while updating principal '%s' key data "
diff --git a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
index 55d529fa4c..afc817891b 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
+++ b/src/kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util.c
@@ -600,6 +600,9 @@ add_random_key(int argc, char **argv)
exit_status++;
return;
}
+
+ dbent->mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_TL_DATA;
+
ret = krb5_db_put_principal(util_context, dbent);
krb5_db_free_principal(util_context, dbent);
if (ret) {
--
2.47.1

View file

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
From 9b669dd42b28e7900f5ccac2816204e7d04ea23c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zoltan Borbely <Zoltan.Borbely@morganstanley.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 16:39:25 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent overflow when calculating ulog block size
In kdb_log.c:resize(), log an error and fail if the update size is
larger than the largest possible block size (2^16-1).
CVE-2025-24528:
In MIT krb5 release 1.7 and later with incremental propagation
enabled, an authenticated attacker can cause kadmind to write beyond
the end of the mapped region for the iprop log file, likely causing a
process crash.
[ghudson@mit.edu: edited commit message and added CVE description]
ticket: 9159 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.21-next
(cherry picked from commit 78ceba024b64d49612375be4a12d1c066b0bfbd0)
---
src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
index e9b95fce59..c805ebd988 100644
--- a/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
+++ b/src/lib/kdb/kdb_log.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ extend_file_to(int fd, unsigned int new_size)
*/
static krb5_error_code
resize(kdb_hlog_t *ulog, uint32_t ulogentries, int ulogfd,
- unsigned int recsize)
+ unsigned int recsize, const kdb_incr_update_t *upd)
{
unsigned int new_block, new_size;
@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ resize(kdb_hlog_t *ulog, uint32_t ulogentries, int ulogfd,
new_block *= ULOG_BLOCK;
new_size += ulogentries * new_block;
+ if (new_block > UINT16_MAX) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, _("ulog overflow caused by principal %.*s"),
+ upd->kdb_princ_name.utf8str_t_len,
+ upd->kdb_princ_name.utf8str_t_val);
+ return KRB5_LOG_ERROR;
+ }
if (new_size > MAXLOGLEN)
return KRB5_LOG_ERROR;
@@ -291,7 +297,7 @@ store_update(kdb_log_context *log_ctx, kdb_incr_update_t *upd)
recsize = sizeof(kdb_ent_header_t) + upd_size;
if (recsize > ulog->kdb_block) {
- retval = resize(ulog, ulogentries, log_ctx->ulogfd, recsize);
+ retval = resize(ulog, ulogentries, log_ctx->ulogfd, recsize, upd);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
--
2.48.1

View file

@ -1,327 +0,0 @@
From c617915958a5cb05463713adcf03b6a0e0512ac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:31:07 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Don't issue session keys with deprecated enctypes
A paper by Tom Tervoort noted that rc4-hmac pre-hashes the input for
its checksum and GSS operations before applying HMAC, and is therefore
potentially vulnerable to hash collision attacks if a protocol
contains a restricted signing oracle.
In light of these potential attacks, begin the functional deprecation
of DES3 and RC4 by disallowing their use as session key enctypes by
default. Add the variables allow_des3 and allow_rc4 in case
negotiability of these enctypes for session keys needs to be turned
back on, with the expectation that in future releases the enctypes
will be more comprehensively deprecated.
ticket: 9081
(cherry picked from commit 1b57a4d134bbd0e7c52d5885a92eccc815726463)
---
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 12 ++++++++++++
doc/admin/enctypes.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---
src/include/k5-int.h | 4 ++++
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 10 ++++++++++
src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c | 10 ++++++++++
src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py | 5 +++--
src/tests/t_etype_info.py | 5 +++--
src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
src/util/k5test.py | 9 ++++++++-
10 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index dca52e1426..d51fd3ce7e 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -95,6 +95,18 @@ Additionally, krb5.conf may include any of the relations described in
The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
+**allow_des3**
+ Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.
+ In future releases, this flag will allow des3-cbc-sha1 to be used
+ at all. The default value for this tag is false. (Added in
+ release 1.21.)
+
+**allow_rc4**
+ Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour-hmac session keys.
+ In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour-hmac to be used
+ at all. The default value for this tag is false. (Added in
+ release 1.21.)
+
**allow_weak_crypto**
If this flag is set to false, then weak encryption types (as noted
in :ref:`Encryption_types` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`) will be filtered
diff --git a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
index c4d5499d3b..2b4ed7da0b 100644
--- a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
@@ -48,12 +48,15 @@ Session key selection
The KDC chooses the session key enctype by taking the intersection of
its **permitted_enctypes** list, the list of long-term keys for the
most recent kvno of the service, and the client's requested list of
-enctypes.
+enctypes. Starting in krb5-1.21, all services are assumed to support
+aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, des3-cbc-sha1 and arcfour-hmac session
+keys will not be issued by default.
Starting in krb5-1.11, it is possible to set a string attribute on a
service principal to control what session key enctypes the KDC may
-issue for service tickets for that principal. See :ref:`set_string`
-in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
+issue for service tickets for that principal, overriding the service's
+long-term keys and the assumption of aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 support.
+See :ref:`set_string` in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details.
Choosing enctypes for a service
@@ -87,6 +90,20 @@ affect how enctypes are chosen.
acceptable risk for your environment and the weak enctypes are
required for backward compatibility.
+**allow_des3**
+ was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*. Unless this
+ flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
+ des3-cbc-sha1 session keys. In a future release, this flag will
+ control whether des3-cbc-sha1 is permitted in similar fashion to
+ weak enctypes.
+
+**allow_rc4**
+ was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*. Unless this
+ flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
+ arcfour-hmac session keys. In a future release, this flag will
+ control whether arcfour-hmac is permitted in similar fashion to
+ weak enctypes.
+
**permitted_enctypes**
controls the set of enctypes that a service will permit for
session keys and for ticket and authenticator encryption. The KDC
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index b7789a2dd8..d0a263aa7d 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ typedef unsigned char u_char;
* matches the variable name. Keep these alphabetized. */
#define KRB5_CONF_ACL_FILE "acl_file"
#define KRB5_CONF_ADMIN_SERVER "admin_server"
+#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3 "allow_des3"
+#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4 "allow_rc4"
#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO "allow_weak_crypto"
#define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL "auth_to_local"
#define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL_NAMES "auth_to_local_names"
@@ -1241,6 +1243,8 @@ struct _krb5_context {
struct _kdb_log_context *kdblog_context;
krb5_boolean allow_weak_crypto;
+ krb5_boolean allow_des3;
+ krb5_boolean allow_rc4;
krb5_boolean ignore_acceptor_hostname;
krb5_boolean enforce_ok_as_delegate;
enum dns_canonhost dns_canonicalize_hostname;
diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
index 93415ba862..c7b6e4090d 100644
--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
@@ -1108,6 +1108,16 @@ select_session_keytype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
if (!krb5_is_permitted_enctype(context, ktype[i]))
continue;
+ /*
+ * Prevent these deprecated enctypes from being used as session keys
+ * unless they are explicitly allowed. In the future they will be more
+ * comprehensively disabled and eventually removed.
+ */
+ if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 && !context->allow_des3)
+ continue;
+ if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC && !context->allow_rc4)
+ continue;
+
if (dbentry_supports_enctype(context, server, ktype[i]))
return ktype[i];
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
index 1b420a3ac2..ea089f0fcc 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/get_in_tkt.c
@@ -1582,22 +1582,31 @@ warn_pw_expiry(krb5_context context, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options,
(*prompter)(context, data, 0, banner, 0, 0);
}
-/* Display a warning via the prompter if des3-cbc-sha1 was used for either the
- * reply key or the session key. */
+/* Display a warning via the prompter if a deprecated enctype was used for
+ * either the reply key or the session key. */
static void
-warn_des3(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
- krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
+warn_deprecated(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
+ krb5_enctype as_key_enctype)
{
- const char *banner;
+ krb5_enctype etype;
+ char encbuf[128], banner[256];
- if (as_key_enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 &&
- ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype != ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1)
- return;
if (ctx->prompter == NULL)
return;
- banner = _("Warning: encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 used for "
- "authentication is weak and will be disabled");
+ if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(as_key_enctype))
+ etype = as_key_enctype;
+ else if (krb5int_c_deprecated_enctype(ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype))
+ etype = ctx->cred.keyblock.enctype;
+ else
+ return;
+
+ if (krb5_enctype_to_name(etype, FALSE, encbuf, sizeof(encbuf)) != 0)
+ return;
+ snprintf(banner, sizeof(banner),
+ _("Warning: encryption type %s used for authentication is "
+ "deprecated and will be disabled"), encbuf);
+
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
(*ctx->prompter)(context, ctx->prompter_data, NULL, banner, 0, NULL);
}
@@ -1848,7 +1857,7 @@ init_creds_step_reply(krb5_context context,
ctx->complete = TRUE;
warn_pw_expiry(context, ctx->opt, ctx->prompter, ctx->prompter_data,
ctx->in_tkt_service, ctx->reply);
- warn_des3(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
+ warn_deprecated(context, ctx, encrypting_key.enctype);
cleanup:
krb5_free_pa_data(context, kdc_padata);
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
index 582a2945ff..a32f8dbf03 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
@@ -220,6 +220,16 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
goto cleanup;
ctx->allow_weak_crypto = tmp;
+ retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3, 0, &tmp);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ ctx->allow_des3 = tmp;
+
+ retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4, 0, &tmp);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ ctx->allow_rc4 = tmp;
+
retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_IGNORE_ACCEPTOR_HOSTNAME, 0, &tmp);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
index 2f95d89967..e6bde47afc 100755
--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
@@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ d_rc4 = 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac'
# These tests make assumptions about the default enctype lists, so set
# them explicitly rather than relying on the library defaults.
-supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
-conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes rc4'},
+supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
+conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4',
+ 'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supp}}}
realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf)
shutil.copyfile(realm.ccache, os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'save'))
diff --git a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
index a6f538b66d..75d9621dd6 100644
--- a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
from k5test import *
-supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts rc4-hmac'
-conf = {'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
+supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts des3-cbc-sha1 rc4-hmac'
+conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+ 'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False, krb5_conf=conf)
realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-pw', 'pw', '+requires_preauth',
diff --git a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
index 9024aee838..5a213617b5 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ conf3 = {'libdefaults': {
'default_tkt_enctypes': 'aes128-cts',
'default_tgs_enctypes': 'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts'}}
conf4 = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes256-cts'}}
+conf5 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'}}
+conf6 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true'}}
# Test with client request and session_enctypes preferring aes128, but
# aes256 long-term key.
realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf1, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
@@ -54,10 +56,12 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
'aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
-# 3b: Negotiate rc4-hmac session key when principal only has aes256 long-term.
+# 3b: Skip RC4 (as the KDC does not allow it for session keys by
+# default) and negotiate aes128-cts session key, with only an aes256
+# long-term service key.
realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes',
'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts,aes256-cts'])
-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+test_kvno(realm, 'aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
realm.stop()
# 4: Check that permitted_enctypes is a default for session key enctypes.
@@ -67,4 +71,24 @@ realm.run([kvno, 'user'],
expected_trace=('etypes requested in TGS request: aes256-cts',))
realm.stop()
+# 5: allow_rc4 permits negotiation of rc4-hmac session key.
+realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf5, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
+realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'rc4-hmac'])
+test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+realm.stop()
+
+# 6: allow_des3 permits negotiation of des3-cbc-sha1 session key.
+realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf6, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
+realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'des3-cbc-sha1'])
+test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:des3-cbc-sha1', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
+realm.stop()
+
+# 7: default config negotiates aes256-sha1 session key for RC4-only service.
+realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'rc4-hmac', 'server'])
+test_kvno(realm, 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96', 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac')
+realm.stop()
+
success('sesskeynego')
diff --git a/src/util/k5test.py b/src/util/k5test.py
index d823653aa0..8e5f5ba8e9 100644
--- a/src/util/k5test.py
+++ b/src/util/k5test.py
@@ -1338,9 +1338,16 @@ _passes = [
# No special settings; exercises AES256.
('default', None, None, None),
+ # Exercise the DES3 enctype.
+ ('des3', None,
+ {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3 aes256-sha1'}},
+ {'realms': {'$realm': {
+ 'supported_enctypes': 'des3-cbc-sha1:normal',
+ 'master_key_type': 'des3-cbc-sha1'}}}),
+
# Exercise the arcfour enctype.
('arcfour', None,
- {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4'}},
+ {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4 aes256-sha1'}},
{'realms': {'$realm': {
'supported_enctypes': 'arcfour-hmac:normal',
'master_key_type': 'arcfour-hmac'}}}),
--
2.49.0

View file

@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
From b0993b57dbe584f9308cc7773b930efe76e19ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2025 15:08:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Remove 3des support (cumulative 1)
Remove mentions for the triple-DES encryption type which were added
since the previous downstream patch.
---
README | 15 +++++++--------
doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst | 6 ------
doc/admin/enctypes.rst | 11 ++---------
doc/mitK5features.rst | 5 ++---
src/include/k5-int.h | 2 --
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 2 --
src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c | 5 -----
src/man/krb5.conf.man | 6 ------
src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py | 5 ++---
src/tests/t_etype_info.py | 4 ++--
src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py | 8 --------
src/util/k5test.py | 7 -------
12 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
diff --git a/README b/README
index 6d6f7f16e3..9341bd3dd8 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -81,11 +81,11 @@ Triple-DES and RC4 transitions
------------------------------
Beginning with the krb5-1.21 release, the KDC will not issue tickets
-with triple-DES or RC4 session keys unless explicitly configured using
-the new allow_des3 and allow_rc4 variables in [libdefaults]. To
-facilitate the negotiation of session keys, the KDC will assume that
-all services can handle aes256-sha1 session keys unless the service
-principal has a session_enctypes string attribute.
+with RC4 session keys unless explicitly configured using the new
+allow_rc4 variable in [libdefaults]. To facilitate the negotiation of
+session keys, the KDC will assume that all services can handle
+aes256-sha1 session keys unless the service principal has a
+session_enctypes string attribute.
Beginning with the krb5-1.19 release, a warning will be issued if
initial credentials are acquired using the des3-cbc-sha1 encryption
@@ -164,9 +164,8 @@ Developer experience:
Protocol evolution:
-* The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 or triple-DES session
- keys unless explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4 or
- allow_des3 variables respectively.
+* The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 session keys unless
+ explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4 variable.
* The KDC will assume that all services can handle aes256-sha1 session
keys unless the service principal has a session_enctypes string
diff --git a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
index d51fd3ce7e..d20dcf18e3 100644
--- a/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst
@@ -95,12 +95,6 @@ Additionally, krb5.conf may include any of the relations described in
The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
-**allow_des3**
- Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3-cbc-sha1 session keys.
- In future releases, this flag will allow des3-cbc-sha1 to be used
- at all. The default value for this tag is false. (Added in
- release 1.21.)
-
**allow_rc4**
Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour-hmac session keys.
In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour-hmac to be used
diff --git a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
index 2b4ed7da0b..6ce4638d5e 100644
--- a/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
+++ b/doc/admin/enctypes.rst
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ The KDC chooses the session key enctype by taking the intersection of
its **permitted_enctypes** list, the list of long-term keys for the
most recent kvno of the service, and the client's requested list of
enctypes. Starting in krb5-1.21, all services are assumed to support
-aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, des3-cbc-sha1 and arcfour-hmac session
-keys will not be issued by default.
+aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96; also, arcfour-hmac session keys will not be
+issued by default.
Starting in krb5-1.11, it is possible to set a string attribute on a
service principal to control what session key enctypes the KDC may
@@ -90,13 +90,6 @@ affect how enctypes are chosen.
acceptable risk for your environment and the weak enctypes are
required for backward compatibility.
-**allow_des3**
- was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*. Unless this
- flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
- des3-cbc-sha1 session keys. In a future release, this flag will
- control whether des3-cbc-sha1 is permitted in similar fashion to
- weak enctypes.
-
**allow_rc4**
was added in release 1.21 and defaults to *false*. Unless this
flag is set to *true*, the KDC will not issue tickets with
diff --git a/doc/mitK5features.rst b/doc/mitK5features.rst
index cad0855724..64d746b0af 100644
--- a/doc/mitK5features.rst
+++ b/doc/mitK5features.rst
@@ -659,9 +659,8 @@ Release 1.21
* Protocol evolution:
- - The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 or triple-DES
- session keys unless explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4
- or allow_des3 variables respectively.
+ - The KDC will no longer issue tickets with RC4 session keys unless
+ explicitly configured with the new allow_rc4 variable.
- The KDC will assume that all services can handle aes256-sha1
session keys unless the service principal has a session_enctypes
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index d0a263aa7d..82a763298d 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ typedef unsigned char u_char;
* matches the variable name. Keep these alphabetized. */
#define KRB5_CONF_ACL_FILE "acl_file"
#define KRB5_CONF_ADMIN_SERVER "admin_server"
-#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3 "allow_des3"
#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4 "allow_rc4"
#define KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO "allow_weak_crypto"
#define KRB5_CONF_AUTH_TO_LOCAL "auth_to_local"
@@ -1243,7 +1242,6 @@ struct _krb5_context {
struct _kdb_log_context *kdblog_context;
krb5_boolean allow_weak_crypto;
- krb5_boolean allow_des3;
krb5_boolean allow_rc4;
krb5_boolean ignore_acceptor_hostname;
krb5_boolean enforce_ok_as_delegate;
diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
index c7b6e4090d..bafcf5f728 100644
--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
@@ -1113,8 +1113,6 @@ select_session_keytype(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *server,
* unless they are explicitly allowed. In the future they will be more
* comprehensively disabled and eventually removed.
*/
- if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 && !context->allow_des3)
- continue;
if (ktype[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC && !context->allow_rc4)
continue;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
index a32f8dbf03..82aba64c5e 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/init_ctx.c
@@ -220,11 +220,6 @@ krb5_init_context_profile(profile_t profile, krb5_flags flags,
goto cleanup;
ctx->allow_weak_crypto = tmp;
- retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_DES3, 0, &tmp);
- if (retval)
- goto cleanup;
- ctx->allow_des3 = tmp;
-
retval = get_boolean(ctx, KRB5_CONF_ALLOW_RC4, 0, &tmp);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
diff --git a/src/man/krb5.conf.man b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
index 6c0e9aff8c..4b53988712 100644
--- a/src/man/krb5.conf.man
+++ b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
@@ -178,12 +178,6 @@ kdc.conf(5), but it is not a recommended practice.
The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations:
.INDENT 0.0
.TP
-\fBallow_des3\fP
-Permit the KDC to issue tickets with des3\-cbc\-sha1 session keys.
-In future releases, this flag will allow des3\-cbc\-sha1 to be used
-at all. The default value for this tag is false. (Added in
-release 1.21.)
-.TP
\fBallow_rc4\fP
Permit the KDC to issue tickets with arcfour\-hmac session keys.
In future releases, this flag will allow arcfour\-hmac to be used
diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
index e6bde47afc..1bb8c40b6b 100755
--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_enctypes.py
@@ -10,9 +10,8 @@ d_rc4 = 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac'
# These tests make assumptions about the default enctype lists, so set
# them explicitly rather than relying on the library defaults.
-supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
-conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes des3 rc4',
- 'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+supp='aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal rc4-hmac:normal'
+conf = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes rc4', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supp}}}
realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf)
shutil.copyfile(realm.ccache, os.path.join(realm.testdir, 'save'))
diff --git a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
index 75d9621dd6..e82ff7ff07 100644
--- a/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_etype_info.py
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
from k5test import *
-supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts des3-cbc-sha1 rc4-hmac'
-conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true', 'allow_rc4': 'true'},
+supported_enctypes = 'aes128-cts rc4-hmac'
+conf = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'},
'realms': {'$realm': {'supported_enctypes': supported_enctypes}}}
realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False, krb5_conf=conf)
diff --git a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
index 5a213617b5..c7dba0ff5b 100755
--- a/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
+++ b/src/tests/t_sesskeynego.py
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ conf3 = {'libdefaults': {
'default_tgs_enctypes': 'rc4-hmac,aes128-cts'}}
conf4 = {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'aes256-cts'}}
conf5 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_rc4': 'true'}}
-conf6 = {'libdefaults': {'allow_des3': 'true'}}
# Test with client request and session_enctypes preferring aes128, but
# aes256 long-term key.
realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf1, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
@@ -78,13 +77,6 @@ realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'rc4-hmac'])
test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:arcfour-hmac', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
realm.stop()
-# 6: allow_des3 permits negotiation of des3-cbc-sha1 session key.
-realm = K5Realm(krb5_conf=conf6, create_host=False, get_creds=False)
-realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'aes256-cts', 'server'])
-realm.run([kadminl, 'setstr', 'server', 'session_enctypes', 'des3-cbc-sha1'])
-test_kvno(realm, 'DEPRECATED:des3-cbc-sha1', 'aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96')
-realm.stop()
-
# 7: default config negotiates aes256-sha1 session key for RC4-only service.
realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False)
realm.run([kadminl, 'addprinc', '-randkey', '-e', 'rc4-hmac', 'server'])
diff --git a/src/util/k5test.py b/src/util/k5test.py
index 8e5f5ba8e9..b953827018 100644
--- a/src/util/k5test.py
+++ b/src/util/k5test.py
@@ -1338,13 +1338,6 @@ _passes = [
# No special settings; exercises AES256.
('default', None, None, None),
- # Exercise the DES3 enctype.
- ('des3', None,
- {'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'des3 aes256-sha1'}},
- {'realms': {'$realm': {
- 'supported_enctypes': 'des3-cbc-sha1:normal',
- 'master_key_type': 'des3-cbc-sha1'}}}),
-
# Exercise the arcfour enctype.
('arcfour', None,
{'libdefaults': {'permitted_enctypes': 'rc4 aes256-sha1'}},
--
2.49.0

View file

@ -1,692 +0,0 @@
From 9d03713af124c2096d071ba36893018da8d71655 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 13:31:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add PKINIT paChecksum2 from MS-PKCA v20230920
In 2023, Microsoft updated MS-PKCA to add the optional paChecksum2
element in the PKAuthenticator sequence. This checksum accepts SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 digests.
In Windows Server 2025, this checksum becomes mandatory when using
PKINIT with FFDH (but strangely not with ECDH if SHA-1 is configured as
allowed).
[ghudson@mit.edu: refactored crypto interfaces to reduce complexity of
calling code]
ticket: 9166 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 310793ba63782af5ffa3a95d20e41f8f03ca7e00)
---
src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h | 25 ++--
src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c | 18 ++-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h | 1 +
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c | 41 +++----
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c | 42 +++++--
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h | 24 +++-
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c | 4 +-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c | 16 ++-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 38 ++----
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h | 5 +-
src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c | 2 +-
src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c | 7 +-
src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c | 2 +-
src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out | 2 +-
src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out | 2 +-
16 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h b/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h
index 915904e518..cf6b1f99c5 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int-pkinit.h
@@ -36,21 +36,28 @@
* pkinit structures
*/
-/* PKAuthenticator */
-typedef struct _krb5_pk_authenticator {
- krb5_int32 cusec; /* (0..999999) */
- krb5_timestamp ctime;
- krb5_int32 nonce; /* (0..4294967295) */
- krb5_checksum paChecksum;
- krb5_data *freshnessToken;
-} krb5_pk_authenticator;
-
/* AlgorithmIdentifier */
typedef struct _krb5_algorithm_identifier {
krb5_data algorithm; /* OID */
krb5_data parameters; /* Optional */
} krb5_algorithm_identifier;
+/* PAChecksum2 */
+typedef struct _krb5_pachecksum2 {
+ krb5_data checksum;
+ krb5_algorithm_identifier algorithmIdentifier;
+} krb5_pachecksum2;
+
+/* PKAuthenticator */
+typedef struct _krb5_pk_authenticator {
+ krb5_int32 cusec; /* (0..999999) */
+ krb5_timestamp ctime;
+ krb5_int32 nonce; /* (0..4294967295) */
+ krb5_data paChecksum;
+ krb5_data *freshnessToken; /* Optional */
+ krb5_pachecksum2 *paChecksum2; /* Optional */
+} krb5_pk_authenticator;
+
/** AuthPack from RFC 4556*/
typedef struct _krb5_auth_pack {
krb5_pk_authenticator pkAuthenticator;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c
index 5378b5c23b..cf7b500837 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/asn.1/asn1_k_encode.c
@@ -1394,20 +1394,30 @@ DEFSEQTYPE(pkinit_supp_pub_info, krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info,
MAKE_ENCODER(encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info, pkinit_supp_pub_info);
MAKE_ENCODER(encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info, sp80056a_other_info);
-/* A krb5_checksum encoded as an OCTET STRING, for PKAuthenticator. */
-DEFCOUNTEDTYPE(ostring_checksum, krb5_checksum, contents, length, octetstring);
+DEFFIELD(pachecksum2_0, krb5_pachecksum2, checksum, 0, ostring_data);
+DEFFIELD(pachecksum2_1, krb5_pachecksum2, algorithmIdentifier, 1,
+ algorithm_identifier);
+static const struct atype_info *pachecksum2_fields[] = {
+ &k5_atype_pachecksum2_0, &k5_atype_pachecksum2_1
+};
+DEFSEQTYPE(pachecksum2, krb5_pachecksum2, pachecksum2_fields);
+
+DEFPTRTYPE(pachecksum2_ptr, pachecksum2);
+DEFOPTIONALZEROTYPE(opt_pachecksum2_ptr, pachecksum2_ptr);
DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_0, krb5_pk_authenticator, cusec, 0, int32);
DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_1, krb5_pk_authenticator, ctime, 1, kerberos_time);
DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_2, krb5_pk_authenticator, nonce, 2, int32);
DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_3, krb5_pk_authenticator, paChecksum, 3,
- ostring_checksum);
+ ostring_data);
DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_4, krb5_pk_authenticator, freshnessToken, 4,
opt_ostring_data_ptr);
+DEFFIELD(pk_authenticator_5, krb5_pk_authenticator, paChecksum2, 5,
+ opt_pachecksum2_ptr);
static const struct atype_info *pk_authenticator_fields[] = {
&k5_atype_pk_authenticator_0, &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_1,
&k5_atype_pk_authenticator_2, &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_3,
- &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_4
+ &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_4, &k5_atype_pk_authenticator_5
};
DEFSEQTYPE(pk_authenticator, krb5_pk_authenticator, pk_authenticator_fields);
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
index 7ba7155bb4..a1564b6df2 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit.h
@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ void free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(krb5_external_principal_identifier
void free_krb5_algorithm_identifiers(krb5_algorithm_identifier ***in);
void free_krb5_algorithm_identifier(krb5_algorithm_identifier *in);
void free_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(krb5_kdc_dh_key_info **in);
+void free_pachecksum2(krb5_context context, krb5_pachecksum2 **in);
krb5_error_code pkinit_copy_krb5_data(krb5_data *dst, const krb5_data *src);
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
index b08022a214..433f477538 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
@@ -56,10 +56,9 @@ use_content_info(krb5_context context, pkinit_req_context req,
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context, pkinit_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_context reqctx, krb5_timestamp ctsec,
- krb5_int32 cusec, krb5_ui_4 nonce,
- const krb5_checksum *cksum,
- krb5_principal client, krb5_principal server,
- krb5_data **as_req);
+ krb5_int32 cusec, krb5_ui_4 nonce, const krb5_data *cksum,
+ const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2, krb5_principal client,
+ krb5_principal server, krb5_data **as_req);
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_as_rep_parse(krb5_context context, pkinit_context plgctx,
@@ -89,7 +88,8 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
krb5_timestamp ctsec = 0;
krb5_int32 cusec = 0;
krb5_ui_4 nonce = 0;
- krb5_checksum cksum;
+ krb5_data cksum = empty_data();
+ krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2 = NULL;
krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
krb5_pa_data **return_pa_data = NULL;
@@ -118,15 +118,10 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
goto cleanup;
}
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, der_req,
- &cksum);
+ retval = crypto_generate_checksums(context, der_req, &cksum, &cksum2);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
- TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUM(context, &cksum);
-#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
- pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n", der_req->length);
- print_buffer(der_req->data, der_req->length);
-#endif
+ TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUMS(context, &cksum, cksum2);
retval = cb->get_preauth_time(context, rock, TRUE, &ctsec, &cusec);
if (retval)
@@ -140,7 +135,8 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
nonce = request->nonce;
retval = pkinit_as_req_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, ctsec, cusec,
- nonce, &cksum, request->client, request->server, &out_data);
+ nonce, &cksum, cksum2, request->client,
+ request->server, &out_data);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("error %d on pkinit_as_req_create; aborting PKINIT\n",
(int) retval);
@@ -168,23 +164,19 @@ pa_pkinit_gen_req(krb5_context context,
cleanup:
krb5_free_data(context, der_req);
- krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &cksum);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &cksum);
+ free_pachecksum2(context, &cksum2);
krb5_free_data(context, out_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(context, return_pa_data);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
-pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context,
- pkinit_context plgctx,
- pkinit_req_context reqctx,
- krb5_timestamp ctsec,
- krb5_int32 cusec,
- krb5_ui_4 nonce,
- const krb5_checksum * cksum,
- krb5_principal client,
- krb5_principal server,
- krb5_data ** as_req)
+pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context, pkinit_context plgctx,
+ pkinit_req_context reqctx, krb5_timestamp ctsec,
+ krb5_int32 cusec, krb5_ui_4 nonce, const krb5_data *cksum,
+ const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2, krb5_principal client,
+ krb5_principal server, krb5_data **as_req)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
krb5_data spki = empty_data(), *coded_auth_pack = NULL;
@@ -202,6 +194,7 @@ pkinit_as_req_create(krb5_context context,
auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum = *cksum;
if (!reqctx->opts->disable_freshness)
auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken = reqctx->freshness_token;
+ auth_pack.pkAuthenticator.paChecksum2 = (krb5_pachecksum2 *)cksum2;
auth_pack.clientDHNonce.length = 0;
auth_pack.supportedKDFs = (krb5_data **)supported_kdf_alg_ids;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
index 905e90d29c..a32b373c32 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_constants.c
@@ -34,25 +34,49 @@
/* RFC 8636 id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1: iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
* internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) kdf(6) sha1(1) */
-static char sha1_oid[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x01 };
+static char kdf_sha1[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x01 };
/* RFC 8636 id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256: iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
* internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) kdf(6) sha256(2) */
-static char sha256_oid[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x02 };
+static char kdf_sha256[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x02 };
/* RFC 8636 id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512: iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
* internet(1) security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit(3) kdf(6) sha512(3) */
-static char sha512_oid[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x03 };
+static char kdf_sha512[8] = { 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03, 0x06, 0x03 };
-const krb5_data sha1_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha1_oid), sha1_oid };
-const krb5_data sha256_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha256_oid), sha256_oid };
-const krb5_data sha512_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(sha512_oid), sha512_oid };
+const krb5_data kdf_sha1_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(kdf_sha1), kdf_sha1 };
+const krb5_data kdf_sha256_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(kdf_sha256), kdf_sha256 };
+const krb5_data kdf_sha512_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(kdf_sha512), kdf_sha512 };
krb5_data const * const supported_kdf_alg_ids[] = {
- &sha256_id,
- &sha1_id,
- &sha512_id,
+ &kdf_sha256_id,
+ &kdf_sha1_id,
+ &kdf_sha512_id,
NULL
};
+/* RFC 3370 sha-1: iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
+ * algorithm(2) 26 */
+static char cms_sha1[] = { 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a };
+/* RFC 5754 id-sha256: joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
+ * gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 */
+static char cms_sha256[] = {
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
+};
+/* RFC 5754 id-sha384: joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
+ * gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 */
+static char cms_sha384[] = {
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
+};
+/* RFC 5754 id-sha512: joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
+ * gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 */
+static char cms_sha512[] = {
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
+};
+
+const krb5_data cms_sha1_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha1), cms_sha1 };
+const krb5_data cms_sha256_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha256), cms_sha256 };
+const krb5_data cms_sha384_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha384), cms_sha384 };
+const krb5_data cms_sha512_id = { KV5M_DATA, sizeof(cms_sha512), cms_sha512 };
+
/* RFC 4055 sha256WithRSAEncryption: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
* rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 11 */
static char sha256WithRSAEncr_oid[9] = {
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
index fd876e4850..3b12e904b1 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
@@ -562,9 +562,13 @@ pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
krb5_keyblock *key_block);
-extern const krb5_data sha1_id;
-extern const krb5_data sha256_id;
-extern const krb5_data sha512_id;
+extern const krb5_data kdf_sha1_id;
+extern const krb5_data kdf_sha256_id;
+extern const krb5_data kdf_sha512_id;
+extern const krb5_data cms_sha1_id;
+extern const krb5_data cms_sha256_id;
+extern const krb5_data cms_sha384_id;
+extern const krb5_data cms_sha512_id;
extern const krb5_data oakley_1024;
extern const krb5_data oakley_2048;
extern const krb5_data oakley_4096;
@@ -597,4 +601,18 @@ crypto_req_cert_matching_data(krb5_context context,
int parse_dh_min_bits(krb5_context context, const char *str);
+/* Generate a SHA-1 checksum over body in *cksum1_out and a SHA-256 checksum
+ * over body in *cksum2_out with appropriate metadata. */
+krb5_error_code
+crypto_generate_checksums(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *body,
+ krb5_data *cksum1_out,
+ krb5_pachecksum2 **cksum2_out);
+
+/* Verify the SHA-1 checksum in cksum1 and the tagged checksum in cksum2.
+ * cksum2 may be NULL, in which case only cksum1 is verified. */
+krb5_error_code
+crypto_verify_checksums(krb5_context context, krb5_data *body,
+ const krb5_data *cksum1,
+ const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2);
+
#endif /* _PKINIT_CRYPTO_H */
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index 402bf1b9b3..429b7d202c 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -2616,11 +2616,11 @@ cleanup:
static const EVP_MD *
algid_to_md(const krb5_data *alg_id)
{
- if (data_eq(*alg_id, sha1_id))
+ if (data_eq(*alg_id, kdf_sha1_id))
return EVP_sha1();
- if (data_eq(*alg_id, sha256_id))
+ if (data_eq(*alg_id, kdf_sha256_id))
return EVP_sha256();
- if (data_eq(*alg_id, sha512_id))
+ if (data_eq(*alg_id, kdf_sha512_id))
return EVP_sha512();
return NULL;
}
@@ -5663,3 +5663,113 @@ parse_dh_min_bits(krb5_context context, const char *str)
TRACE_PKINIT_DH_INVALID_MIN_BITS(context, str);
return PKINIT_DEFAULT_DH_MIN_BITS;
}
+
+/* Return the OpenSSL message digest type matching the given CMS OID, or NULL
+ * if it doesn't match any of the CMS OIDs we know about. */
+static const EVP_MD *
+md_from_cms_oid(const krb5_data *alg_id)
+{
+ if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha1_id))
+ return EVP_sha1();
+ if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha256_id))
+ return EVP_sha256();
+ if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha384_id))
+ return EVP_sha384();
+ if (data_eq(*alg_id, cms_sha512_id))
+ return EVP_sha512();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Compute a message digest of the given type over body, placing the result in
+ * *digest_out in allocated storage. Return true on success. */
+static krb5_boolean
+make_digest(const krb5_data *body, const EVP_MD *md, krb5_data *digest_out)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_data d;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return FALSE;
+ ret = alloc_data(&d, EVP_MD_size(md));
+ if (ret)
+ return FALSE;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(body->data, body->length, (uint8_t *)d.data, &d.length, md,
+ NULL)) {
+ free(d.data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ *digest_out = d;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Return true if digest verifies for the given body and message digest
+ * type. */
+static krb5_boolean
+check_digest(const krb5_data *body, const EVP_MD *md, const krb5_data *digest)
+{
+ unsigned int digest_len;
+ uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return FALSE;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(body->data, body->length, buf, &digest_len, md, NULL))
+ return FALSE;
+ return (digest->length == digest_len &&
+ CRYPTO_memcmp(digest->data, buf, digest_len) == 0);
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+crypto_generate_checksums(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *body,
+ krb5_data *cksum1_out, krb5_pachecksum2 **cksum2_out)
+{
+ krb5_data cksum1 = empty_data();
+ krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2 = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ if (!make_digest(body, EVP_sha1(), &cksum1))
+ goto fail;
+
+ cksum2 = k5alloc(sizeof(*cksum2), &ret);
+ if (cksum2 == NULL)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (!make_digest(body, EVP_sha256(), &cksum2->checksum))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (krb5int_copy_data_contents(context, &cms_sha256_id,
+ &cksum2->algorithmIdentifier.algorithm))
+ goto fail;
+
+ cksum2->algorithmIdentifier.parameters = empty_data();
+
+ *cksum1_out = cksum1;
+ *cksum2_out = cksum2;
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &cksum1);
+ free_pachecksum2(context, &cksum2);
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+crypto_verify_checksums(krb5_context context, krb5_data *body,
+ const krb5_data *cksum1,
+ const krb5_pachecksum2 *cksum2)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ /* RFC 4556 doesn't say what error to return if the checksum doesn't match.
+ * Windows returns this one. */
+ if (!check_digest(body, EVP_sha1(), cksum1))
+ return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
+
+ if (cksum2 == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ md = md_from_cms_oid(&cksum2->algorithmIdentifier.algorithm);
+ if (!check_digest(body, md, &cksum2->checksum))
+ return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c
index 99c93ac128..dd6e8d7503 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_kdf_test.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
/* TEST 1: SHA-1/AES */
/* set up algorithm id */
- alg_id.algorithm = sha1_id;
+ alg_id.algorithm = kdf_sha1_id;
enctype = enctype_aes;
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
/* TEST 2: SHA-256/AES */
/* set up algorithm id */
- alg_id.algorithm = sha256_id;
+ alg_id.algorithm = kdf_sha256_id;
enctype = enctype_aes;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
index 25965eb5d2..891f47fd26 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_lib.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
* SUCH DAMAGES.
*/
+#include "k5-int.h"
#include "pkinit.h"
#define FAKECERT
@@ -119,8 +120,9 @@ free_krb5_auth_pack(krb5_auth_pack **in)
{
if ((*in) == NULL) return;
krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, &(*in)->clientPublicValue);
- free((*in)->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents);
+ free((*in)->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.data);
krb5_free_data(NULL, (*in)->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken);
+ free_pachecksum2(NULL, &(*in)->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum2);
if ((*in)->supportedCMSTypes != NULL)
free_krb5_algorithm_identifiers(&((*in)->supportedCMSTypes));
if ((*in)->supportedKDFs) {
@@ -196,6 +198,18 @@ free_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info(krb5_kdc_dh_key_info **in)
free(*in);
}
+void
+free_pachecksum2(krb5_context context, krb5_pachecksum2 **in)
+{
+ if (*in == NULL)
+ return;
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &(*in)->checksum);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &(*in)->algorithmIdentifier.algorithm);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &(*in)->algorithmIdentifier.parameters);
+ free(*in);
+ *in = NULL;
+}
+
void
init_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(krb5_pa_pk_as_req **in)
{
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
index e22bcb195b..f558308483 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
@@ -428,11 +428,12 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_data authp_data = {0, 0, NULL}, krb5_authz = {0, 0, NULL};
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack *auth_pack = NULL;
+ krb5_pk_authenticator *pka;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL;
krb5_checksum cksum = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
- krb5_data k5data, *ftoken;
+ krb5_data k5data;
int is_signed = 1;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
@@ -524,8 +525,9 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
+ pka = &auth_pack->pkAuthenticator;
- retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
+ retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context, pka->ctime);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
@@ -548,36 +550,14 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
goto cleanup;
}
der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, NULL, 0, der_req,
- &cksum);
- if (retval) {
- pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
- goto cleanup;
- }
- if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
- k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
- cksum.length) != 0) {
- pkiDebug("failed to match the checksum\n");
-#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
- pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n", req_pkt->length);
- print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
- pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ",
- auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.checksum_type,
- auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
- print_buffer(auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
- auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
- pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ",
- cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length);
- print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length);
-#endif
- retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
+ retval = crypto_verify_checksums(context, der_req, &pka->paChecksum,
+ pka->paChecksum2);
+ if (retval)
goto cleanup;
- }
- ftoken = auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.freshnessToken;
- if (ftoken != NULL) {
- retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, ftoken);
+ if (pka->freshnessToken != NULL) {
+ retval = cb->check_freshness_token(context, rock, pka->freshnessToken);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
valid_freshness_token = TRUE;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
index 1faa6816d7..7b68d4b3b1 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_trace.h
@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client verified DH reply")
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REP_DH_FAIL(c) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client could not verify DH reply")
-#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUM(c, cksum) \
- TRACE(c, "PKINIT client computed kdc-req-body checksum {cksum}", cksum)
+#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_CHECKSUMS(c, ck1, ck2) \
+ TRACE(c, "PKINIT client computed checksums: {hexdata} {hexdata}", \
+ ck1, &(ck2)->checksum)
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_REQ_DH(c) \
TRACE(c, "PKINIT client making DH request")
#define TRACE_PKINIT_CLIENT_SAN_CONFIG_DNSNAME(c, host) \
diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c b/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c
index 2fa6dce8eb..f47849abad 100644
--- a/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c
+++ b/src/tests/asn.1/krb5_decode_test.c
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
/* decode_krb5_auth_pack */
{
setup(krb5_auth_pack,ktest_make_sample_auth_pack);
- decode_run("krb5_auth_pack","","30 81 85 A0 35 30 33 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 06 04 04 31 32 33 34 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61",
+ decode_run("krb5_auth_pack","","30 81 89 A0 39 30 37 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61",
acc.decode_krb5_auth_pack,
ktest_equal_auth_pack,ktest_free_auth_pack);
ktest_empty_auth_pack(&ref);
diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c
index d37e4fa7e6..7f54aa3184 100644
--- a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c
+++ b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest.c
@@ -700,9 +700,7 @@ ktest_make_sample_pk_authenticator(krb5_pk_authenticator *p)
p->cusec = SAMPLE_USEC;
p->ctime = SAMPLE_TIME;
p->nonce = SAMPLE_NONCE;
- ktest_make_sample_checksum(&p->paChecksum);
- /* We don't encode the checksum type, only the contents. */
- p->paChecksum.checksum_type = 0;
+ ktest_make_sample_data(&p->paChecksum);
p->freshnessToken = ealloc(sizeof(krb5_data));
ktest_make_sample_data(p->freshnessToken);
}
@@ -1604,8 +1602,7 @@ ktest_empty_pa_otp_req(krb5_pa_otp_req *p)
static void
ktest_empty_pk_authenticator(krb5_pk_authenticator *p)
{
- ktest_empty_checksum(&p->paChecksum);
- p->paChecksum.contents = NULL;
+ ktest_empty_data(&p->paChecksum);
krb5_free_data(NULL, p->freshnessToken);
p->freshnessToken = NULL;
}
diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c
index b48a0285d2..13786dd1e5 100644
--- a/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c
+++ b/src/tests/asn.1/ktest_equal.c
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ ktest_equal_pk_authenticator(krb5_pk_authenticator *ref,
p = p && scalar_equal(cusec);
p = p && scalar_equal(ctime);
p = p && scalar_equal(nonce);
- p = p && struct_equal(paChecksum, ktest_equal_checksum);
+ p = p && data_eq(ref->paChecksum, var->paChecksum);
return p;
}
diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out
index 6ec7aaa36a..a764182e15 100644
--- a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out
+++ b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_encode.out
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req: 30 38 80 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 22 30 20 30 1E 80 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 81 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 82 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 82 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(dhInfo): A0 28 30 26 80 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A2 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
encode_krb5_pa_pk_as_rep(encKeyPack): 81 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
-encode_krb5_auth_pack: 30 81 85 A0 35 30 33 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 06 04 04 31 32 33 34 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
+encode_krb5_auth_pack: 30 81 89 A0 39 30 37 A0 05 02 03 01 E2 40 A1 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A A2 03 02 01 2A A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 08 04 06 70 76 61 6C 75 65 A2 24 30 22 30 13 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 04 06 70 61 72 61 6D 73 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A3 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A4 10 30 0E 30 0C A0 0A 06 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
encode_krb5_kdc_dh_key_info: 30 25 A0 0B 03 09 00 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61 A1 03 02 01 2A A2 11 18 0F 31 39 39 34 30 36 31 30 30 36 30 33 31 37 5A
encode_krb5_reply_key_pack: 30 26 A0 13 30 11 A0 03 02 01 01 A1 0A 04 08 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 A1 0F 30 0D A0 03 02 01 01 A1 06 04 04 31 32 33 34
encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info: 30 81 81 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02 A0 32 04 30 30 2E A0 10 1B 0E 41 54 48 45 4E 41 2E 4D 49 54 2E 45 44 55 A1 1A 30 18 A0 03 02 01 01 A1 11 30 0F 1B 06 68 66 74 73 61 69 1B 05 65 78 74 72 61 A1 32 04 30 30 2E A0 10 1B 0E 41 54 48 45 4E 41 2E 4D 49 54 2E 45 44 55 A1 1A 30 18 A0 03 02 01 01 A1 11 30 0F 1B 06 68 66 74 73 61 69 1B 05 65 78 74 72 61 A2 0A 04 08 6B 72 62 35 64 61 74 61
diff --git a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out
index 46f4a34108..c47bd71f67 100644
--- a/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out
+++ b/src/tests/asn.1/pkinit_trval.out
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ encode_krb5_auth_pack:
. . [0] [Integer] 123456
. . [1] [Generalized Time] "19940610060317Z"
. . [2] [Integer] 42
-. . [3] [Octet String] "1234"
+. . [3] [Octet String] "krb5data"
. . [4] [Octet String] "krb5data"
. [1] [Octet String] "pvalue"
. [2] [Sequence/Sequence Of]
--
2.49.0

View file

@ -1,381 +0,0 @@
From 33afd2a6cfdf87d153170b41fbabfb92be49c422 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Rische <jrische@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 10:04:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] Do not block HMAC-MD4/5 in FIPS mode
To ensure RC4 HMAC-MD5 was not used in FIPS mode, access to HMAC-MD4/5
was not allowed in this mode. However, since we provide the
"radius_md5_fips_override" configuration parameter to allow using RADIUS
regardless to the FIPS restrictions, we should allow HMAC-MD5 to be used
too in this case, because it is required for the newly supported
Message-Authenticator attribute.
A FIPS mode check is added in calculate_mac() which will fail if
"radius_md5_fips_override" is not true. It will not affect interactions
between krb5kdc and ipa-otpd, because the Message-Authenticator
attribute is not generated in this case.
---
src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h | 9 +++
src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in | 9 ++-
src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
.../crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c | 62 ++------------
src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c | 15 ++--
src/lib/krad/packet.c | 19 +++--
6 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h b/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
index 1ee4b30e02..ff67b6bd35 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+
+#include <openssl/provider.h>
+
/*
* OpenSSL 3.0 relegates MD4 and RC4 to the legacy provider, which must be
* explicitly loaded into a library context. Performing this loading within a
@@ -660,4 +663,10 @@ iov_cursor_advance(struct iov_cursor *c, size_t nblocks)
c->out_pos += nblocks * c->block_size;
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+
+krb5_error_code k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX **libctx);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */
+
#endif /* CRYPTO_INT_H */
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in
index 8e4cdb8bbf..cc131000bd 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/Makefile.in
@@ -8,21 +8,24 @@ STLIBOBJS=\
hmac.o \
kdf.o \
pbkdf2.o \
- sha256.o
+ sha256.o \
+ common.o
OBJS=\
$(OUTPRE)cmac.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)hmac.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)kdf.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)pbkdf2.$(OBJEXT) \
- $(OUTPRE)sha256.$(OBJEXT)
+ $(OUTPRE)sha256.$(OBJEXT) \
+ $(OUTPRE)common.$(OBJEXT)
SRCS=\
$(srcdir)/cmac.c \
$(srcdir)/hmac.c \
$(srcdir)/kdf.c \
$(srcdir)/pbkdf2.c \
- $(srcdir)/sha256.c
+ $(srcdir)/sha256.c \
+ $(srcdir)/common.c
SUBDIROBJLISTS= md4/OBJS.ST \
md5/OBJS.ST sha1/OBJS.ST sha2/OBJS.ST \
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ced43fd54c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#include "crypto_int.h"
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+
+#include <openssl/provider.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <threads.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+typedef struct ossl_legacy_context {
+ bool initialized;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *default_provider;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *legacy_provider;
+} ossl_legacy_context_t;
+
+static thread_local ossl_legacy_context_t g_ossl_legacy_ctx;
+
+static krb5_error_code
+init_ossl_legacy_ctx(ossl_legacy_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
+ if (!ctx->libctx)
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
+ /* Load both legacy and default provider as both may be needed. */
+ ctx->default_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "default");
+ ctx->legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "legacy");
+
+ if (!(ctx->default_provider && ctx->legacy_provider))
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
+ ctx->initialized = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+deinit_ossl_legacy_ctx(ossl_legacy_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->legacy_provider)
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->legacy_provider);
+
+ if (ctx->default_provider)
+ OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->default_provider);
+
+ if (ctx->libctx)
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ctx->libctx);
+
+ ctx->initialized = false;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX **libctx)
+{
+ krb5_error_code err;
+
+ if (!FIPS_mode()) {
+ if (libctx)
+ *libctx = NULL;
+ err = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!g_ossl_legacy_ctx.initialized) {
+ err = init_ossl_legacy_ctx(&g_ossl_legacy_ctx);
+ if (err) {
+ deinit_ossl_legacy_ctx(&g_ossl_legacy_ctx);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (libctx)
+ *libctx = g_ossl_legacy_ctx.libctx;
+ err = 0;
+
+end:
+ return err;
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L */
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
index eb2e693e9f..2fd5d383d6 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hash_provider/hash_evp.c
@@ -44,48 +44,7 @@
#define EVP_MD_CTX_free EVP_MD_CTX_destroy
#endif
-#include <openssl/provider.h>
#include <openssl/fips.h>
-#include <threads.h>
-
-typedef struct ossl_lib_md_context {
- OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
- OSSL_PROVIDER *default_provider;
- OSSL_PROVIDER *legacy_provider;
-} ossl_md_context_t;
-
-static thread_local ossl_md_context_t *ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
-
-static krb5_error_code
-init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx, const char *algo)
-{
- ctx->libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
- if (!ctx->libctx)
- return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-
- /* Load both legacy and default provider as both may be needed. */
- ctx->default_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "default");
- ctx->legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(ctx->libctx, "legacy");
-
- if (!(ctx->default_provider && ctx->legacy_provider))
- return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void
-deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_context_t *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx->legacy_provider)
- OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->legacy_provider);
-
- if (ctx->default_provider)
- OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ctx->default_provider);
-
- if (ctx->libctx)
- OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ctx->libctx);
-}
-
static krb5_error_code
hash_evp(const EVP_MD *type, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
@@ -120,25 +79,14 @@ hash_legacy_evp(const char *algo, const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
krb5_data *output)
{
krb5_error_code err;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_libctx;
EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
- ossl_md_ctx = malloc(sizeof(ossl_md_context_t));
- if (!ossl_md_ctx) {
- err = ENOMEM;
- goto end;
- }
-
- err = init_ossl_md_ctx(ossl_md_ctx, algo);
- if (err) {
- deinit_ossl_ctx(ossl_md_ctx);
- free(ossl_md_ctx);
- ossl_md_ctx = NULL;
- goto end;
- }
- }
+ err = k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(&ossl_libctx);
+ if (err)
+ goto end;
- md = EVP_MD_fetch(ossl_md_ctx->libctx, algo, NULL);
+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(ossl_libctx, algo, NULL);
if (!md) {
err = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto end;
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
index 25a419d73a..8f9e88fec9 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/openssl/hmac.c
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
#else
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#endif
@@ -112,11 +111,7 @@ map_digest(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash)
return EVP_sha256();
else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_sha384)
return EVP_sha384();
-
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return NULL;
-
- if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
+ else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md5)
return EVP_md5();
else if (hash == &krb5int_hash_md4)
return EVP_md4();
@@ -138,13 +133,19 @@ krb5int_hmac_keyblock(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
size_t i = 0, md_len;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_libctx;
+ krb5_error_code err;
if (md == NULL || keyblock->length > hash->blocksize)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
if (output->length < hash->hashsize)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
- mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL);
+ err = k5_get_ossl_legacy_libctx(&ossl_libctx);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ossl_libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
if (mac == NULL)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
diff --git a/src/lib/krad/packet.c b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
index 3c1a4d507e..b95c99df65 100644
--- a/src/lib/krad/packet.c
+++ b/src/lib/krad/packet.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ lookup_msgauth_addr(const krad_packet *pkt)
* auth, which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request.
*/
static krb5_error_code
-calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+calculate_mac(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE],
uint8_t mac_out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE])
{
@@ -288,6 +288,10 @@ calculate_mac(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
krb5_crypto_iov input[5];
krb5_data ksecr, mac;
+ /* Do not use HMAC-MD5 if not explicitly allowed */
+ if (kr_use_fips(ctx))
+ return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+
msgauth_attr = lookup_msgauth_addr(pkt);
if (msgauth_attr == NULL)
return EINVAL;
@@ -393,7 +397,8 @@ krad_packet_new_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
if (msgauth_required) {
/* Calculate and set the Message-Authenticator MAC. */
- retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt), pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
+ retval = calculate_mac(ctx, secret, pkt, pkt_auth(pkt),
+ pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
}
@@ -454,7 +459,7 @@ krad_packet_new_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, krad_code code,
* section 5.14, use the authenticator from the request, not from the
* response.
*/
- retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
+ retval = calculate_mac(ctx, secret, pkt, pkt_auth(request),
pkt_attr(pkt) + 2);
if (retval != 0)
goto error;
@@ -476,7 +481,7 @@ error:
/* Verify the Message-Authenticator value in pkt, using the provided
* authenticator (which may be from pkt or from a corresponding request). */
static krb5_error_code
-verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
+verify_msgauth(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
const uint8_t auth[AUTH_FIELD_SIZE])
{
uint8_t mac[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
@@ -488,7 +493,7 @@ verify_msgauth(const char *secret, const krad_packet *pkt,
if (msgauth == NULL)
return ENODATA;
- retval = calculate_mac(secret, pkt, auth, mac);
+ retval = calculate_mac(ctx, secret, pkt, auth, mac);
if (retval)
return retval;
@@ -561,7 +566,7 @@ krad_packet_decode_request(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
/* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
if (has_pkt_msgauth(req)) {
- retval = verify_msgauth(secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
+ retval = verify_msgauth(ctx, secret, req, pkt_auth(req));
if (retval) {
krad_packet_free(req);
return retval;
@@ -613,7 +618,7 @@ krad_packet_decode_response(krb5_context ctx, const char *secret,
/* Verify Message-Authenticator if present. */
if (has_pkt_msgauth(*rsppkt)) {
- if (verify_msgauth(secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
+ if (verify_msgauth(ctx, secret, *rsppkt, pkt_auth(tmp)) != 0)
continue;
}
--
2.49.0

View file

@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
From 1761e06398e4f043e4f540f57131c37fcc53a1b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2025 10:42:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix strchr() conformance to C23
C23 7.28.5.1 specifies search functions such as strchr() as generic,
returning const char * if the first argument is of type const char *.
Fix uses of strchr() to conform to this change.
[jrische@redhat.com: altered changes to avoid casts; fixed an
additional case]
[ghudson@mit.edu: condensed some declarations; rewrote commit message]
ticket: 9191 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 6cd8580d823585d50ee4f30efd9f7e855823a369)
---
src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c | 4 ++--
src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c | 3 ++-
src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c | 15 +++++++--------
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h | 2 +-
.../preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c | 6 +++---
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c | 2 +-
src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c | 2 +-
src/tests/responder.c | 3 +--
8 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c
index 5a01320832..1aada91b5e 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccbase.c
@@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ krb5_cc_register(krb5_context context, const krb5_cc_ops *ops,
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_cc_resolve (krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_ccache *cache)
{
- char *pfx, *cp;
- const char *resid;
+ char *pfx;
+ const char *cp, *resid;
unsigned int pfxlen;
krb5_error_code err;
const krb5_cc_ops *ops;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c
index 5cbccf08c8..6569b8820b 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/expand_path.c
@@ -454,7 +454,8 @@ k5_expand_path_tokens_extra(krb5_context context, const char *path_in,
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct k5buf buf;
- char *tok_begin, *tok_end, *tok_val, **extra_tokens = NULL, *path;
+ const char *tok_begin, *tok_end;
+ char *tok_val, **extra_tokens = NULL, *path;
const char *path_left;
size_t nargs = 0, i;
va_list ap;
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c
index edca5ac7eb..47e15c849f 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/locate_kdc.c
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ oom:
}
static void
-parse_uri_if_https(const char *host_or_uri, k5_transport *transport,
- const char **host, const char **uri_path)
+parse_uri_if_https(char *host_or_uri, k5_transport *transport,
+ char **host, const char **uri_path)
{
char *cp;
@@ -229,8 +229,7 @@ locate_srv_conf_1(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
k5_transport transport, int udpport)
{
const char *realm_srv_names[4];
- char **hostlist = NULL, *realmstr = NULL, *host = NULL;
- const char *hostspec;
+ char **hostlist = NULL, *realmstr = NULL, *host = NULL, *hostspec;
krb5_error_code code;
int i, default_port;
@@ -535,8 +534,8 @@ prof_locate_server(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
* Return a NULL *host_out if there are any problems parsing the URI.
*/
static void
-parse_uri_fields(const char *uri, k5_transport *transport_out,
- const char **host_out, int *primary_out)
+parse_uri_fields(char *uri, k5_transport *transport_out,
+ char **host_out, int *primary_out)
{
k5_transport transport;
@@ -604,8 +603,8 @@ locate_uri(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *realm,
krb5_error_code ret;
k5_transport transport, host_trans;
struct srv_dns_entry *answers, *entry;
- char *host;
- const char *host_field, *path;
+ char *host, *host_field;
+ const char *path;
int port, def_port, primary;
ret = k5_make_uri_query(context, realm, req_service, &answers);
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
index 3b12e904b1..99e2394040 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto.h
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ krb5_error_code crypto_load_cas_and_crls
defines the storage type (file, directory, etc) */
int catype, /* IN
defines the ca type (anchor, intermediate, crls) */
- char *id); /* IN
+ const char *id); /* IN
defines the location (filename, directory name, etc) */
/*
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
index 429b7d202c..6013080afc 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
@@ -4956,7 +4956,7 @@ load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
- char *filename)
+ const char *filename)
{
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
@@ -5114,7 +5114,7 @@ load_cas_and_crls_dir(krb5_context context,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
- char *dirname)
+ const char *dirname)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
DIR *d = NULL;
@@ -5166,7 +5166,7 @@ crypto_load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int idtype,
int catype,
- char *id)
+ const char *id)
{
switch (idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
index a5a979f279..b06d519c66 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_identity.c
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ process_option_ca_crl(krb5_context context,
const char *value,
int catype)
{
- char *residual;
+ const char *residual;
unsigned int typelen;
int idtype;
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c
index b42485a50a..5a7f2ba3fa 100644
--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_matching.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ parse_rule_component(krb5_context context,
char err_buf[128];
int ret;
struct keyword_desc *kw, *nextkw;
- char *nk;
+ const char *nk;
int found_next_kw = 0;
char *value = NULL;
size_t len;
diff --git a/src/tests/responder.c b/src/tests/responder.c
index 82f870ea5d..4221a20283 100644
--- a/src/tests/responder.c
+++ b/src/tests/responder.c
@@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ responder(krb5_context ctx, void *rawdata, krb5_responder_context rctx)
/* Provide a particular response for an OTP challenge. */
if (data->otp_answer != NULL) {
if (krb5_responder_otp_get_challenge(ctx, rctx, &ochl) == 0) {
- key = strchr(data->otp_answer, '=');
- if (key != NULL) {
+ if (strchr(data->otp_answer, '=') != NULL) {
/* Make a copy of the answer that we can chop up. */
key = strdup(data->otp_answer);
if (key == NULL)
--
2.51.1

View file

@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
From 3baf9b93dc1dfe38585722c71d7268304cb4a01a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2025 11:14:51 +0300
Subject: libkrb5: in case PKINIT is configured, attempt Anonymous
PKINIT for FAST
If auto_fast_armor is configured for the realm or globally, optimistically
assume that Anonymous PKINIT is supported as well and try to obtain it for
FAST use in case no pre-made FAST channel was established by the caller.
This behavior will automatically enable use of passwordless pre-authentication
methods which rely on FAST channel presence in deployments such as FreeIPA.
Notably, Microsoft Active Directory KDCs do not support Anonymous PKINIT. For
these deployments only a machine account (host keytab) can be used to build a
FAST channel. However, libkrb5 does not have access to /etc/krb5.keytab in a
general case.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
---
src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h | 2 +
src/man/krb5.conf.man | 13 +++++
3 files changed, 133 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c
index 62c9f0841..ee2e08189 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.c
@@ -168,6 +168,109 @@ krb5int_fast_prep_req_body(krb5_context context,
return retval;
}
+static krb5_boolean
+fast_is_pkinit_allowed(krb5_context context, krb5_data *realm)
+{
+ int value;
+ krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
+ char realmstr[1024];
+ const char *option = "auto_fast_armor";
+ const int def_value = FALSE;
+
+ if (realm != NULL && realm->length > sizeof(realmstr)-1)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ if (realm != NULL) {
+ strncpy(realmstr, realm->data, realm->length);
+ realmstr[realm->length] = '\0';
+
+ retval = profile_get_boolean(context->profile,
+ KRB5_CONF_REALMS, realmstr,
+ option, def_value, &value);
+ }
+
+ return retval ? FALSE : value;
+
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+fast_acquire_pkinit_armor(krb5_context context,
+ struct krb5int_fast_request_state *state,
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, krb5_kdc_req *request)
+{
+ krb5_context ctx;
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+ krb5_data *target_realm = &request->server->realm;
+ krb5_creds creds;
+ krb5_principal anon_princ = NULL;
+ krb5_ccache out_cc;
+
+ /* short circuit, we are asked to perform Anonymous PKINIT already */
+ if (opt->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ANONYMOUS) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* skip realms which do not allow use of automated FAST armor */
+ if (!fast_is_pkinit_allowed(context, target_realm)) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_init_context(&ctx);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ return retval;
+ }
+ retval = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(ctx, &options);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous(options, 1);
+ retval = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, "MEMORY", NULL, &out_cc);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_out_ccache(ctx, options, out_cc);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(ctx, &anon_princ,
+ target_realm->length, target_realm->data,
+ strlen(KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAMESTR),
+ KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAMESTR,
+ strlen(KRB5_ANONYMOUS_PRINCSTR),
+ KRB5_ANONYMOUS_PRINCSTR, 0);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, anon_princ, 0,
+ NULL /* no prompter */, NULL,
+ 0, NULL /* service name */,
+ options);
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ state->fast_state_flags |= KRB5INT_FAST_OWN_ARMOR;
+ state->armor_ccache = out_cc;
+ }
+cleanup:
+ if (retval != 0 && out_cc != NULL) {
+ (void) krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, out_cc);
+ }
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &creds);
+ }
+ if (options != NULL) {
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(ctx, options);
+ }
+ if (anon_princ != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_principal(ctx, anon_princ);
+ }
+ krb5_free_context(ctx);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
krb5_error_code
krb5int_fast_as_armor(krb5_context context,
struct krb5int_fast_request_state *state,
@@ -178,10 +281,20 @@ krb5int_fast_as_armor(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal target_principal = NULL;
krb5_data *target_realm;
const char *ccname = k5_gic_opt_get_fast_ccache_name(opt);
+ char *fast_ccname = NULL;
krb5_flags fast_flags;
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
target_realm = &request->server->realm;
+ if (ccname == NULL) {
+ retval = fast_acquire_pkinit_armor(context, state, opt, request);
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ retval = krb5_cc_get_full_name(context, state->armor_ccache, &fast_ccname);
+ if (retval == 0 && fast_ccname != NULL)
+ ccname = fast_ccname;
+ }
+ retval = 0;
+ }
if (ccname != NULL) {
TRACE_FAST_ARMOR_CCACHE(context, ccname);
state->fast_state_flags |= KRB5INT_FAST_ARMOR_AVAIL;
@@ -220,6 +333,8 @@ krb5int_fast_as_armor(krb5_context context,
krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
if (target_principal)
krb5_free_principal(context, target_principal);
+ if (fast_ccname)
+ free(fast_ccname);
return retval;
}
@@ -615,6 +730,9 @@ krb5int_fast_free_state(krb5_context context,
/*We are responsible for none of the store in the fast_outer_req*/
krb5_free_keyblock(context, state->armor_key);
krb5_free_fast_armor(context, state->armor);
+ if (state->fast_state_flags & KRB5INT_FAST_OWN_ARMOR) {
+ krb5_cc_destroy(context, state->armor_ccache);
+ }
free(state);
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h
index 7156ea203..e5fe8bd54 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/fast.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct krb5int_fast_request_state {
krb5_kdc_req fast_outer_request;
krb5_keyblock *armor_key; /*non-null means fast is in use*/
krb5_fast_armor *armor;
+ krb5_ccache armor_ccache;
krb5_ui_4 fast_state_flags;
krb5_ui_4 fast_options;
krb5_int32 nonce;
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ struct krb5int_fast_request_state {
#define KRB5INT_FAST_DO_FAST (1l<<0) /* Perform FAST */
#define KRB5INT_FAST_ARMOR_AVAIL (1l<<1)
+#define KRB5INT_FAST_OWN_ARMOR (1l<<2)
krb5_error_code
krb5int_fast_prep_req_body(krb5_context context,
diff --git a/src/man/krb5.conf.man b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
index d4caa2bd3..ac7649647 100644
--- a/src/man/krb5.conf.man
+++ b/src/man/krb5.conf.man
@@ -650,6 +650,19 @@ primary KDC, in case the user\(aqs password has just been changed, and
the updated database has not been propagated to the replica
servers yet. New in release 1.19.
.TP
+\fBauto_fast_armor\fP
+If this flag is true, then initial ticket request will use Anonymous
+PKINIT to protect the communication as a FAST channel in case an application
+did not provide its own FAST channel. This is useful for deployments where
+pre-authentication methods require use of the FAST channel, such as
+passwordless methods provided by FreeIPA. Microsoft Active Directory
+implementation of PKINIT does not support Anonymous PKINIT feature.
+As a result, \fIauto_fast_armor\fP defaults to false.
+.sp
+Use of \fIauto_fast_armor = true\fP requires properly configured PKINIT and
+WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS principal defined on the KDC side. Consult KDC documentation
+for details.
+.TP
\fBv4_instance_convert\fP
This subsection allows the administrator to configure exceptions
to the \fBdefault_domain\fP mapping rule. It contains V4 instances
--
2.51.0

View file

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From ff580d9cf86202d45454a6b6f53accc22cb40b62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2025 18:14:29 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] bail if prompter is not specified but required
GSSAPI gss_init_sec_context() may trigger credential re-initialization
if the cred in ccache is expired. If automatic FAST armor is in use,
we'd request Anonymous PKINIT and use it as an armor and this will
enable seeing pre-authentication methods which require armor presence.
OTP is one of such methods and its use requires prompter to be set,
but GSSAPI cannot specify a prompter and thus we should fail any
pre-auth where a prompter wasn't passed.
PKINIT PKCS11 and SAM-2 preauth methods use KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD while PKINIT
and gic_pwd.c use EIO. Use EIO here because we technically attempt to read a
PIN rather than a password.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
---
src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
index 07ffc15c2..48003da62 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
@@ -479,6 +479,9 @@ doprompt(krb5_context context, krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data,
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
+ if (prompter == NULL)
+ return EIO;
+
if (prompttxt == NULL || out == NULL)
return EINVAL;
--
2.51.0

202
2010-007-patch.txt Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
Index: krb5-1.8/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c (working copy)
@@ -691,8 +691,7 @@
krb5_reply_key_pack *key_pack = NULL;
krb5_reply_key_pack_draft9 *key_pack9 = NULL;
krb5_data *encoded_key_pack = NULL;
- unsigned int num_types;
- krb5_cksumtype *cksum_types = NULL;
+ krb5_cksumtype cksum_type;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx;
@@ -882,14 +881,25 @@
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
- /* retrieve checksums for a given enctype of the reply key */
- retval = krb5_c_keyed_checksum_types(context,
- encrypting_key->enctype, &num_types, &cksum_types);
- if (retval)
- goto cleanup;
- /* pick the first of acceptable enctypes for the checksum */
- retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, cksum_types[0],
+ switch (encrypting_key->enctype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ cksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES;
+ break;
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ cksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES;
+ break;
+ default:
+ retval = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(context,
+ encrypting_key->enctype,
+ &cksum_type);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, cksum_type,
encrypting_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
req_pkt, &key_pack->asChecksum);
if (retval) {
@@ -1033,7 +1043,6 @@
krb5_free_data(context, encoded_key_pack);
free(dh_pubkey);
free(server_key);
- free(cksum_types);
switch ((int)padata->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
Index: krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/cksumtypes.c (working copy)
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
{ CKSUMTYPE_MD5_HMAC_ARCFOUR,
"md5-hmac-rc4", { 0 }, "Microsoft MD5 HMAC",
- NULL, &krb5int_hash_md5,
+ &krb5int_enc_arcfour, &krb5int_hash_md5,
krb5int_hmacmd5_checksum, NULL,
16, 16, 0 },
};
Index: krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/keyed_checksum_types.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/keyed_checksum_types.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/keyed_checksum_types.c (working copy)
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@
{
if (ctp->flags & CKSUM_UNKEYED)
return FALSE;
+ /* Stream ciphers do not play well with RFC 3961 key derivation, so be
+ * conservative with RC4. */
+ if ((ktp->etype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC ||
+ ktp->etype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP) &&
+ ctp->ctype != CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR &&
+ ctp->ctype != CKSUMTYPE_MD5_HMAC_ARCFOUR)
+ return FALSE;
return (!ctp->enc || ktp->enc == ctp->enc);
}
Index: krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/dk/derive.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/dk/derive.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/lib/crypto/krb/dk/derive.c (working copy)
@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@
blocksize = enc->block_size;
keybytes = enc->keybytes;
+ if (blocksize == 1)
+ return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
Index: krb5-1.8/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/util_crypt.c (working copy)
@@ -119,10 +119,22 @@
if (code != 0)
return code;
- code = (*kaccess.mandatory_cksumtype)(context, subkey->keyblock.enctype,
- cksumtype);
- if (code != 0)
- return code;
+ switch (subkey->keyblock.enctype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ *cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES;
+ break;
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ *cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES;
+ break;
+ default:
+ code = (*kaccess.mandatory_cksumtype)(context,
+ subkey->keyblock.enctype,
+ cksumtype);
+ if (code != 0)
+ return code;
+ break;
+ }
switch (subkey->keyblock.enctype) {
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
Index: krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c (working copy)
@@ -582,6 +582,8 @@
checksum.checksum_type = load_32_le(p);
checksum.length = checksum_data.length - PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
checksum.contents = p + PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH;
+ if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(checksum.checksum_type))
+ return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
pac_data.length = pac->data.length;
pac_data.data = malloc(pac->data.length);
Index: krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth2.c (working copy)
@@ -1578,7 +1578,9 @@
cksum = sc2->sam_cksum;
- while (*cksum) {
+ for (; *cksum; cksum++) {
+ if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum((*cksum)->checksum_type))
+ continue;
/* Check this cksum */
retval = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, as_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_CHALLENGE_CKSUM,
@@ -1592,7 +1594,6 @@
}
if (valid_cksum)
break;
- cksum++;
}
if (!valid_cksum) {
Index: krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_safe.c
===================================================================
--- krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_safe.c (revision 24455)
+++ krb5-1.8/src/lib/krb5/krb/mk_safe.c (working copy)
@@ -215,10 +215,28 @@
for (i = 0; i < nsumtypes; i++)
if (auth_context->safe_cksumtype == sumtypes[i])
break;
- if (i == nsumtypes)
- i = 0;
- sumtype = sumtypes[i];
krb5_free_cksumtypes (context, sumtypes);
+ if (i < nsumtypes)
+ sumtype = auth_context->safe_cksumtype;
+ else {
+ switch (enctype) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ sumtype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES;
+ break;
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ sumtype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES;
+ break;
+ default:
+ retval = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(context, enctype,
+ &sumtype);
+ if (retval) {
+ CLEANUP_DONE();
+ goto error;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
if ((retval = krb5_mk_safe_basic(context, userdata, key, &replaydata,
plocal_fulladdr, premote_fulladdr,

View file

@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
From 21330cb3db69fc5a004844a1e4dec8998eb50068 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 18:53:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add KDC pre-send and post-receive KDC hooks
Add two new APIs, krb5_set_kdc_send_hook() and
krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(), which can be used to inspect and override
messages sent to KDCs.
[ghudson@mit.edu: style and documentation changes]
ticket: 8386 (new)
---
doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst | 2 +
doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst | 2 +
src/include/k5-int.h | 6 +++
src/include/krb5/krb5.hin | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports | 2 +
src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++-
src/lib/krb5_32.def | 4 ++
7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
index 8df351d..e97cbca 100644
--- a/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst
@@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ Rarely used public interfaces
krb5_server_decrypt_ticket_keytab.rst
krb5_set_default_tgs_enctypes.rst
krb5_set_error_message.rst
+ krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook.rst
+ krb5_set_kdc_send_hook.rst
krb5_set_real_time.rst
krb5_string_to_cksumtype.rst
krb5_string_to_deltat.rst
diff --git a/doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst b/doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst
index 51c4093..dc414cf 100644
--- a/doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst
+++ b/doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ Public
krb5_pa_svr_referral_data.rst
krb5_pa_data.rst
krb5_pointer.rst
+ krb5_post_recv_fn.rst
+ krb5_pre_send_fn.rst
krb5_preauthtype.rst
krb5_principal.rst
krb5_principal_data.rst
diff --git a/src/include/k5-int.h b/src/include/k5-int.h
index 6b7b2e3..045abfc 100644
--- a/src/include/k5-int.h
+++ b/src/include/k5-int.h
@@ -1238,6 +1238,12 @@ struct _krb5_context {
krb5_trace_callback trace_callback;
void *trace_callback_data;
+ krb5_pre_send_fn kdc_send_hook;
+ void *kdc_send_hook_data;
+
+ krb5_post_recv_fn kdc_recv_hook;
+ void *kdc_recv_hook_data;
+
struct plugin_interface plugins[PLUGIN_NUM_INTERFACES];
char *plugin_base_dir;
};
diff --git a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
index c93a0f2..2b0d59e 100644
--- a/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
+++ b/src/include/krb5/krb5.hin
@@ -8300,6 +8300,110 @@ krb5_set_trace_callback(krb5_context context, krb5_trace_callback fn,
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_set_trace_filename(krb5_context context, const char *filename);
+
+/**
+ * Hook function for inspecting or modifying messages sent to KDCs.
+ *
+ * If the hook function returns an error code, the KDC communication will be
+ * aborted and the error code will be returned to the library operation which
+ * initiated the communication.
+ *
+ * If the hook function sets @a reply_out, @a message will not be sent to the
+ * KDC, and the given reply will used instead.
+ *
+ * If the hook function sets @a new_message_out, the given message will be sent
+ * to the KDC in place of @a message.
+ *
+ * If the hook function returns successfully without setting either output,
+ * @a message will be sent to the KDC normally.
+ *
+ * The hook function should use krb5_copy_data() to construct the value for
+ * @a new_message_out or @a reply_out, to ensure that it can be freed correctly
+ * by the library.
+ *
+ * @param [in] context Library context
+ * @param [in] data Callback data
+ * @param [in] realm The realm the message will be sent to
+ * @param [in] message The original message to be sent to the KDC
+ * @param [out] new_message_out Optional replacement message to be sent
+ * @param [out] reply_out Optional synthetic reply
+ *
+ * @retval 0 Success
+ * @return A Kerberos error code
+ */
+typedef krb5_error_code
+(KRB5_CALLCONV *krb5_pre_send_fn)(krb5_context context, void *data,
+ const krb5_data *realm,
+ const krb5_data *message,
+ krb5_data **new_message_out,
+ krb5_data **new_reply_out);
+
+/**
+ * Hook function for inspecting or overriding KDC replies.
+ *
+ * If @a code is zero, @a reply contains the reply received from the KDC. The
+ * hook function may return an error code to simulate an error, may synthesize
+ * a different reply by setting @a new_reply_out, or may simply return
+ * successfully to do nothing.
+ *
+ * If @a code is non-zero, KDC communication failed and @a reply should be
+ * ignored. The hook function may return @a code or a different error code, or
+ * may synthesize a reply by setting @a new_reply_out and return successfully.
+ *
+ * The hook function should use krb5_copy_data() to construct the value for
+ * @a new_reply_out, to ensure that it can be freed correctly by the library.
+ *
+ * @param [in] context Library context
+ * @param [in] data Callback data
+ * @param [in] code Status of KDC communication
+ * @param [in] realm The realm the reply was received from
+ * @param [in] message The message sent to the realm's KDC
+ * @param [in] reply The reply received from the KDC
+ * @param [out] new_reply_out Optional replacement reply
+ *
+ * @retval 0 Success
+ * @return A Kerberos error code
+ */
+typedef krb5_error_code
+(KRB5_CALLCONV *krb5_post_recv_fn)(krb5_context context, void *data,
+ krb5_error_code code,
+ const krb5_data *realm,
+ const krb5_data *message,
+ const krb5_data *reply,
+ krb5_data **new_reply_out);
+
+/**
+ * Set a KDC pre-send hook function.
+ *
+ * @a send_hook will be called before messages are sent to KDCs by library
+ * functions such as krb5_get_credentials(). The hook function may inspect,
+ * override, or synthesize its own reply to the message.
+ *
+ * @param [in] context Library context
+ * @param [in] send_hook Hook function (or NULL to disable the hook)
+ * @param [in] data Callback data to be passed to @a send_hook
+ */
+void KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_set_kdc_send_hook(krb5_context context, krb5_pre_send_fn send_hook,
+ void *data);
+
+/**
+ * Set a KDC post-receive hook function.
+ *
+ * @a recv_hook will be called after a reply is received from a KDC during a
+ * call to a library function such as krb5_get_credentials(). The hook
+ * function may inspect or override the reply. This hook will not be executed
+ * if the pre-send hook returns a synthetic reply.
+ *
+ * @param [in] context The library context.
+ * @param [in] recv_hook Hook function (or NULL to disable the hook)
+ * @param [in] data Callback data to be passed to @a recv_hook
+ */
+void KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(krb5_context context, krb5_post_recv_fn recv_hook,
+ void *data);
+
+
#if TARGET_OS_MAC
# pragma pack(pop)
#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
index c623409..ea6982d 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/libkrb5.exports
@@ -581,6 +581,8 @@ krb5_set_password
krb5_set_password_using_ccache
krb5_set_principal_realm
krb5_set_real_time
+krb5_set_kdc_send_hook
+krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook
krb5_set_time_offsets
krb5_set_trace_callback
krb5_set_trace_filename
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
index 6231de2..be00b8f 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/os/sendto_kdc.c
@@ -403,6 +403,22 @@ check_for_svc_unavailable (krb5_context context,
return 1;
}
+void
+krb5_set_kdc_send_hook(krb5_context context, krb5_pre_send_fn send_hook,
+ void *data)
+{
+ context->kdc_send_hook = send_hook;
+ context->kdc_send_hook_data = data;
+}
+
+void
+krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(krb5_context context, krb5_post_recv_fn recv_hook,
+ void *data)
+{
+ context->kdc_recv_hook = recv_hook;
+ context->kdc_recv_hook_data = data;
+}
+
/*
* send the formatted request 'message' to a KDC for realm 'realm' and
* return the response (if any) in 'reply'.
@@ -416,13 +432,16 @@ check_for_svc_unavailable (krb5_context context,
krb5_error_code
krb5_sendto_kdc(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
- const krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *reply, int *use_master,
+ const krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *reply_out, int *use_master,
int no_udp)
{
krb5_error_code retval, err;
struct serverlist servers;
int server_used;
k5_transport_strategy strategy;
+ krb5_data reply = empty_data(), *hook_message = NULL, *hook_reply = NULL;
+
+ *reply_out = empty_data();
/*
* find KDC location(s) for realm
@@ -467,9 +486,26 @@ krb5_sendto_kdc(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
if (retval)
return retval;
+ if (context->kdc_send_hook != NULL) {
+ retval = context->kdc_send_hook(context, context->kdc_send_hook_data,
+ realm, message, &hook_message,
+ &hook_reply);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (hook_reply != NULL) {
+ *reply_out = *hook_reply;
+ free(hook_reply);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (hook_message != NULL)
+ message = hook_message;
+ }
+
err = 0;
retval = k5_sendto(context, message, realm, &servers, strategy, NULL,
- reply, NULL, NULL, &server_used,
+ &reply, NULL, NULL, &server_used,
check_for_svc_unavailable, &err);
if (retval == KRB5_KDC_UNREACH) {
if (err == KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE) {
@@ -480,9 +516,23 @@ krb5_sendto_kdc(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
realm->length, realm->data);
}
}
+
+ if (context->kdc_recv_hook != NULL) {
+ retval = context->kdc_recv_hook(context, context->kdc_recv_hook_data,
+ retval, realm, message, &reply,
+ &hook_reply);
+ }
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
+ if (hook_reply != NULL) {
+ *reply_out = *hook_reply;
+ free(hook_reply);
+ } else {
+ *reply_out = reply;
+ reply = empty_data();
+ }
+
/* Set use_master to 1 if we ended up talking to a master when we didn't
* explicitly request to. */
if (*use_master == 0) {
@@ -492,6 +542,8 @@ krb5_sendto_kdc(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *message,
}
cleanup:
+ krb5_free_data(context, hook_message);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &reply);
k5_free_serverlist(&servers);
return retval;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5_32.def b/src/lib/krb5_32.def
index 3734e9b..8d58ea1 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5_32.def
+++ b/src/lib/krb5_32.def
@@ -463,3 +463,7 @@ EXPORTS
krb5_vwrap_error_message @430
krb5_c_prfplus @431
krb5_c_derive_prfplus @432
+
+; new in 1.15
+ krb5_set_kdc_send_hook @433
+ krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook @434
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
From 5d38da6d4eb29bf87e98a5cb4577b870dbf405ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 16:12:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add OS prng intended for use with getrandom()
Add the prng_os.c module, using the name previously occupied by what
is now prng_device.c. Unlike prng_device.c, this PRNG module
maintains no file descriptor and just uses k5_os_random(), which is
most efficient on platforms which have a getrandom() system call.
[ghudson@mit.edu: expanded on commit message]
ticket: 8499
(cherry picked from commit 0be7642b2b6f7b9e0acebb2c3d60aa6c3f7543aa)
---
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 72 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ea13e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
+/* lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c - OS PRNG implementation */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
+ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file implements a PRNG module which relies on the system's PRNG. An
+ * OS packager can select this module given sufficient confidence in the
+ * operating system's native PRNG quality.
+ */
+
+#include "crypto_int.h"
+
+int
+k5_prng_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+k5_prng_cleanup(void)
+{
+}
+
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_add_entropy(krb5_context context, unsigned int randsource,
+ const krb5_data *indata)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_make_octets(krb5_context context, krb5_data *outdata)
+{
+ krb5_boolean res;
+
+ res = k5_get_os_entropy((uint8_t *)outdata->data, outdata->length, 0);
+ return res ? 0 : KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_os_entropy(krb5_context context, int strong, int *success)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 3a8bf57bd3008b2f5338bbd8ba1db5e9e2622c92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 16:10:34 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add getrandom to k5_get_os_entropy() using syscall
ticket: 8499
(cherry picked from commit a9a48392c088b53d8dd86b8008b4059ab78a3679)
---
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
index 9ad24c1..22948a4 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int strong)
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
#include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#endif /* __linux__ */
/* Open device, ensure that it is not a regular file, and read entropy. Return
* true on success, false on failure. */
@@ -96,6 +99,33 @@ krb5_boolean
k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int strong)
{
const char *device;
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
+ int r;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Pull from the /dev/urandom pool, but it to have been seeded. This
+ * ensures strong randomness while only blocking during first system
+ * boot.
+ *
+ * glibc does not currently provide a binding for getrandom:
+ * https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17252
+ */
+ errno = 0;
+ r = syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, len, 0);
+ if (r <= 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+
+ /* ENOSYS or other unrecoverable failure */
+ break;
+ }
+ len -= r;
+ buf += r;
+ }
+ if (len == 0)
+ return TRUE;
+#endif /* defined(__linux__) && defined(SYS_getrandom) */
device = strong ? "/dev/random" : "/dev/urandom";
return read_entropy_from_device(device, buf, len);
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 4514bc6f0b32471d1a9081ee3677d41eb373d3ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 18:33:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add krb5_db_register_keytab()
Add a public libkdb5 function to register the KDB keytab type. This
functionality is needed for out-of-tree KDC servers such as the Samba
kpasswd service.
[ghudson@mit.edu: edited comments, whitespace, commit message]
ticket: 8494 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 2e99582062d9d6a70f2adb00fd8fe58a1f95b9b7)
---
src/include/kdb.h | 7 +++++++
src/lib/kdb/keytab.c | 6 ++++++
src/lib/kdb/libkdb5.exports | 1 +
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/include/kdb.h b/src/include/kdb.h
index 9d3bf9d..048327c 100644
--- a/src/include/kdb.h
+++ b/src/include/kdb.h
@@ -797,6 +797,13 @@ krb5_dbe_free_strings(krb5_context, krb5_string_attr *, int count);
void
krb5_dbe_free_string(krb5_context, char *);
+/*
+ * Register the KDB keytab type, allowing "KDB:" to be used as a keytab name.
+ * For this type to work, the context used for keytab operations must have an
+ * associated database handle (via krb5_db_open()).
+ */
+krb5_error_code krb5_db_register_keytab(krb5_context context);
+
#define KRB5_KDB_DEF_FLAGS 0
#define KDB_MAX_DB_NAME 128
diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c b/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c
index b85b67d..c6aa100 100644
--- a/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c
+++ b/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c
@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ typedef struct krb5_ktkdb_data {
} krb5_ktkdb_data;
krb5_error_code
+krb5_db_register_keytab(krb5_context context)
+{
+ return krb5_kt_register(context, &krb5_kt_kdb_ops);
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
krb5_ktkdb_resolve(context, name, id)
krb5_context context;
const char * name;
diff --git a/src/lib/kdb/libkdb5.exports b/src/lib/kdb/libkdb5.exports
index cb4c3df..e5d1045 100644
--- a/src/lib/kdb/libkdb5.exports
+++ b/src/lib/kdb/libkdb5.exports
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ krb5_db_delete_policy
krb5_db_free_policy
krb5_def_store_mkey_list
krb5_db_promote
+krb5_db_register_keytab
ulog_add_update
ulog_init_header
ulog_map
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
From db601cd51030a1e48f38078dd706e95db069ead7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 17:59:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add tests for send and receive sendto_kdc hooks
[ghudson@mit.edu: style changes]
ticket: 8386
Conflicts:
src/tests/Makefile.in
[rharwood@redhat.com: fix cherry-pick merge conflicts]
[rharwood@redhat.com: delete .gitignore]
---
src/tests/Makefile.in | 12 ++-
src/tests/deps | 10 ++
src/tests/hooks.c | 253 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/tests/t_hooks.py | 9 ++
4 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/tests/hooks.c
create mode 100755 src/tests/t_hooks.py
diff --git a/src/tests/Makefile.in b/src/tests/Makefile.in
index b24e197..0fc0ea9 100644
--- a/src/tests/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/tests/Makefile.in
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ SUBDIRS = resolve asn.1 create hammer verify gssapi dejagnu shlib \
RUN_DB_TEST = $(RUN_SETUP) KRB5_KDC_PROFILE=kdc.conf KRB5_CONFIG=krb5.conf \
LC_ALL=C $(VALGRIND)
-OBJS= adata.o etinfo.o gcred.o hist.o hrealm.o kdbtest.o plugorder.o \
+OBJS= adata.o etinfo.o gcred.o hist.o hooks.o hrealm.o kdbtest.o plugorder.o \
t_init_creds.o t_localauth.o rdreq.o responder.o s2p.o s4u2proxy.o
-EXTRADEPSRCS= adata.c etinfo.c gcred.c hist.c hrealm.c kdbtest.c plugorder.c \
+EXTRADEPSRCS= adata.c etinfo.c gcred.c hist.c hooks.c hrealm.c kdbtest.c plugorder.c \
t_init_creds.c t_localauth.c rdreq.o responder.c s2p.c s4u2proxy.c
TEST_DB = ./testdb
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ gcred: gcred.o $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
hist: hist.o $(KDB5_DEPLIBS) $(KADMSRV_DEPLIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
$(CC_LINK) -o $@ hist.o $(KDB5_LIBS) $(KADMSRV_LIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_LIBS)
+hooks: hooks.o $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
+ $(CC_LINK) -o $@ hooks.o $(KRB5_BASE_LIBS)
+
hrealm: hrealm.o $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
$(CC_LINK) -o $@ hrealm.o $(KRB5_BASE_LIBS)
@@ -107,9 +110,10 @@ kdb_check: kdc.conf krb5.conf
$(RUN_DB_TEST) ../kadmin/dbutil/kdb5_util $(KADMIN_OPTS) destroy -f
$(RM) $(TEST_DB)* stash_file
-check-pytests:: adata etinfo gcred hist hrealm kdbtest plugorder rdreq
+check-pytests:: adata etinfo gcred hist hooks hrealm kdbtest plugorder rdreq
check-pytests:: responder s2p s4u2proxy t_init_creds t_localauth unlockiter
$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_general.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
+ $(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_hooks.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_dump.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_iprop.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_kprop.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
@@ -159,7 +163,7 @@ check-pytests:: responder s2p s4u2proxy t_init_creds t_localauth unlockiter
$(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_tabdump.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
clean::
- $(RM) gcred hist hrealm kdbtest plugorder rdreq responder s2p
+ $(RM) gcred hist hooks hrealm kdbtest plugorder rdreq responder s2p
$(RM) adata etinfo gcred hist hrealm kdbtest plugorder rdreq responder
$(RM) s2p s4u2proxy t_init_creds t_localauth krb5.conf kdc.conf
$(RM) -rf kdc_realm/sandbox ldap
diff --git a/src/tests/deps b/src/tests/deps
index de33c55..3634dc4 100644
--- a/src/tests/deps
+++ b/src/tests/deps
@@ -50,6 +50,16 @@ $(OUTPRE)hist.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/authdata_plugin.h $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/plugin.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/port-sockets.h $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h \
hist.c
+$(OUTPRE)hooks.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
+ $(BUILDTOP)/include/krb5/krb5.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/osconf.h \
+ $(BUILDTOP)/include/profile.h $(COM_ERR_DEPS) $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-buf.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-err.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-gmt_mktime.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-int-pkinit.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-int.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-platform.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-plugin.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-thread.h $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-trace.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5.h $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/authdata_plugin.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/krb5/plugin.h $(top_srcdir)/include/port-sockets.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/socket-utils.h hooks.c
$(OUTPRE)hrealm.$(OBJEXT): $(BUILDTOP)/include/autoconf.h \
$(BUILDTOP)/include/krb5/krb5.h $(BUILDTOP)/include/osconf.h \
$(BUILDTOP)/include/profile.h $(COM_ERR_DEPS) $(top_srcdir)/include/k5-buf.h \
diff --git a/src/tests/hooks.c b/src/tests/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fabdb89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tests/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
+/* tests/hooks.c - test harness for KDC send and recv hooks */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
+ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "k5-int.h"
+
+static krb5_context ctx;
+
+static void
+check_code(krb5_error_code code, const char *file, int line)
+{
+ const char *errmsg;
+
+ if (code) {
+ errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(ctx, code);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d -- %s (code=%d)\n", file, line, errmsg,
+ (int)code);
+ krb5_free_error_message(ctx, errmsg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
+#define check(code) check_code((code), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+/* Verify that the canonicalize bit is set in an AS-REQ and remove it. */
+static krb5_error_code
+test_send_as_req(krb5_context context, void *data, const krb5_data *realm,
+ const krb5_data *message, krb5_data **new_message_out,
+ krb5_data **reply_out)
+{
+ krb5_kdc_req *as_req;
+ int cmp;
+
+ assert(krb5_is_as_req(message));
+ check(decode_krb5_as_req(message, &as_req));
+
+ assert(as_req->msg_type == KRB5_AS_REQ);
+ assert(as_req->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE);
+ assert(as_req->client->realm.length == realm->length);
+ cmp = memcmp(as_req->client->realm.data, realm->data, realm->length);
+ assert(cmp == 0);
+
+ /* Remove the canonicalize flag and create a new message. */
+ as_req->kdc_options &= ~KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE;
+ check(encode_krb5_as_req(as_req, new_message_out));
+
+ krb5_free_kdc_req(context, as_req);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Verify that reply is an AS-REP with kvno 1 and a valid enctype. */
+static krb5_error_code
+test_recv_as_rep(krb5_context context, void *data, krb5_error_code code,
+ const krb5_data *realm, const krb5_data *message,
+ const krb5_data *reply, krb5_data **new_reply)
+{
+ krb5_kdc_rep *as_rep;
+
+ assert(code == 0);
+ assert(krb5_is_as_rep(reply));
+ check(decode_krb5_as_rep(reply, &as_rep));
+
+ assert(as_rep->msg_type == KRB5_AS_REP);
+ assert(as_rep->ticket->enc_part.kvno == 1);
+ assert(krb5_c_valid_enctype(as_rep->ticket->enc_part.enctype));
+
+ krb5_free_kdc_rep(context, as_rep);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Create a fake error reply. */
+static krb5_error_code
+test_send_error(krb5_context context, void *data, const krb5_data *realm,
+ const krb5_data *message, krb5_data **new_message_out,
+ krb5_data **reply_out)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_error err;
+ krb5_principal client, server;
+ char *realm_str, *princ_str;
+ int r;
+
+ realm_str = k5memdup0(realm->data, realm->length, &ret);
+ check(ret);
+
+ r = asprintf(&princ_str, "invalid@%s", realm_str);
+ assert(r > 0);
+ check(krb5_parse_name(ctx, princ_str, &client));
+ free(princ_str);
+
+ r = asprintf(&princ_str, "krbtgt@%s", realm_str);
+ assert(r > 0);
+ check(krb5_parse_name(ctx, princ_str, &server));
+ free(princ_str);
+ free(realm_str);
+
+ err.magic = KV5M_ERROR;
+ err.ctime = 1971196337;
+ err.cusec = 0;
+ err.susec = 97008;
+ err.stime = 1458219390;
+ err.error = 6;
+ err.client = client;
+ err.server = server;
+ err.text = string2data("CLIENT_NOT_FOUND");
+ err.e_data = empty_data();
+ check(encode_krb5_error(&err, reply_out));
+
+ krb5_free_principal(ctx, client);
+ krb5_free_principal(ctx, server);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+test_recv_error(krb5_context context, void *data, krb5_error_code code,
+ const krb5_data *realm, const krb5_data *message,
+ const krb5_data *reply, krb5_data **new_reply)
+{
+ /* The send hook created a reply, so this hook should not be executed. */
+ abort();
+}
+
+/* Modify an AS-REP reply, change the msg_type to KRB5_TGS_REP. */
+static krb5_error_code
+test_recv_modify_reply(krb5_context context, void *data, krb5_error_code code,
+ const krb5_data *realm, const krb5_data *message,
+ const krb5_data *reply, krb5_data **new_reply)
+{
+ krb5_kdc_rep *as_rep;
+
+ assert(code == 0);
+ assert(krb5_is_as_rep(reply));
+ check(decode_krb5_as_rep(reply, &as_rep));
+
+ as_rep->msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
+ check(encode_krb5_as_rep(as_rep, new_reply));
+
+ krb5_free_kdc_rep(context, as_rep);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return an error given by the callback data argument. */
+static krb5_error_code
+test_send_return_value(krb5_context context, void *data,
+ const krb5_data *realm, const krb5_data *message,
+ krb5_data **new_message_out, krb5_data **reply_out)
+{
+ assert(data != NULL);
+ return *(krb5_error_code *)data;
+}
+
+/* Return an error given by the callback argument. */
+static krb5_error_code
+test_recv_return_value(krb5_context context, void *data, krb5_error_code code,
+ const krb5_data *realm, const krb5_data *message,
+ const krb5_data *reply, krb5_data **new_reply)
+{
+ assert(data != NULL);
+ return *(krb5_error_code *)data;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ const char *principal, *password;
+ krb5_principal client;
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts;
+ krb5_creds creds;
+ krb5_error_code ret, test_return_code;
+
+ if (argc != 3) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s princname password\n", argv[0]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ principal = argv[1];
+ password = argv[2];
+
+ check(krb5_init_context(&ctx));
+ check(krb5_parse_name(ctx, principal, &client));
+
+ /* Use a send hook to modify an outgoing AS-REQ. The library will detect
+ * the modification in the reply. */
+ check(krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(ctx, &opts));
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(opts, 1);
+ krb5_set_kdc_send_hook(ctx, test_send_as_req, NULL);
+ krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(ctx, test_recv_as_rep, NULL);
+ ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, client, password, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, opts);
+ assert(ret == KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED);
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(ctx, opts);
+
+ /* Use a send hook to synthesize a KRB-ERROR reply. */
+ krb5_set_kdc_send_hook(ctx, test_send_error, NULL);
+ krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(ctx, test_recv_error, NULL);
+ ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, client, password, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ assert(ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
+
+ /* Use a recv hook to modify a KDC reply. */
+ krb5_set_kdc_send_hook(ctx, NULL, NULL);
+ krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(ctx, test_recv_modify_reply, NULL);
+ ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, client, password, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ assert(ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE);
+
+ /* Verify that the user data pointer works in the send hook. */
+ test_return_code = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ krb5_set_kdc_send_hook(ctx, test_send_return_value, &test_return_code);
+ krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(ctx, NULL, NULL);
+ ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, client, password, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ assert(ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED);
+
+ /* Verify that the user data pointer works in the recv hook. */
+ test_return_code = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
+ krb5_set_kdc_send_hook(ctx, NULL, NULL);
+ krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook(ctx, test_recv_return_value, &test_return_code);
+ ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &creds, client, password, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ assert(ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY);
+
+ krb5_free_principal(ctx, client);
+ krb5_free_context(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/tests/t_hooks.py b/src/tests/t_hooks.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..58dff3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tests/t_hooks.py
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python
+from k5test import *
+
+# Test that KDC send and recv hooks work correctly.
+realm = K5Realm(create_host=False, get_creds=False)
+realm.run(['./hooks', realm.user_princ, password('user')])
+realm.stop()
+
+success('send and recv hook tests')
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From 709ed799a4f266de9846adb3393ec9f59e6bdecd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 18:03:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Change KDC error for encrypted timestamp preauth
When encrypted timestamp pre-authentication fails, respond with error
code KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, rather than KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY, for
consistency with other Kerberos implementations.
[ghudson@mit.edu: clarified commit message and comment]
ticket: 8471 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 2653d69e0705a925597dff10083a24a77e2a20af)
---
src/kdc/kdc_preauth_encts.c | 16 ++++------------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_preauth_encts.c b/src/kdc/kdc_preauth_encts.c
index 65f7c36..e80dc12 100644
--- a/src/kdc/kdc_preauth_encts.c
+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_preauth_encts.c
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ enc_ts_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_key_data * client_key;
krb5_int32 start;
krb5_timestamp timenow;
- krb5_error_code decrypt_err = 0;
scratch.data = (char *)pa->contents;
scratch.length = pa->length;
@@ -74,7 +73,6 @@ enc_ts_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
goto cleanup;
start = 0;
- decrypt_err = 0;
while (1) {
if ((retval = krb5_dbe_search_enctype(context, rock->client,
&start, enc_data->enctype,
@@ -92,8 +90,6 @@ enc_ts_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
if (retval == 0)
break;
- else
- decrypt_err = retval;
}
if ((retval = decode_krb5_pa_enc_ts(&enc_ts_data, &pa_enc)) != 0)
@@ -119,14 +115,10 @@ cleanup:
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &enc_ts_data);
if (pa_enc)
free(pa_enc);
- /*
- * If we get NO_MATCHING_KEY and decryption previously failed, and
- * we failed to find any other keys of the correct enctype after
- * that failed decryption, it probably means that the password was
- * incorrect.
- */
- if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NO_MATCHING_KEY && decrypt_err != 0)
- retval = decrypt_err;
+ /* If we get NO_MATCHING_KEY, it probably means that the password was
+ * incorrect. */
+ if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NO_MATCHING_KEY)
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
(*respond)(arg, retval, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From 6b126bfc40ba416746e4d30edb0b6b72c21c8b10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:58:44 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Create KDC and kadmind log files with mode 0640
In krb5_klog_init(), use open() and fdopen() to open log files so that
we can specify a mode. Specify a mode which doesn't include the
group-write, other-read, or other-write bits even if the process umask
allows them.
[ghudson@mit.edu: wrote commit message, de-indented post-open setup
code]
[rharwood@redhat.com: backport not clean due to SELinux patching]
ticket: 8344 (new)
---
src/lib/kadm5/logger.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c b/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c
index 64f9641..0517efe 100644
--- a/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c
+++ b/src/lib/kadm5/logger.c
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ krb5_klog_init(krb5_context kcontext, char *ename, char *whoami, krb5_boolean do
const char *logging_profent[3];
const char *logging_defent[3];
char **logging_specs;
- int i, ngood;
+ int i, ngood, fd, append;
char *cp, *cp2;
char savec = '\0';
int error;
@@ -422,18 +422,21 @@ krb5_klog_init(krb5_context kcontext, char *ename, char *whoami, krb5_boolean do
/*
* Check for append/overwrite, then open the file.
*/
- if (cp[4] == ':' || cp[4] == '=') {
- f = WRITABLEFOPEN(&cp[5], (cp[4] == ':') ? "a" : "w");
- if (f) {
- set_cloexec_file(f);
- log_control.log_entries[i].lfu_filep = f;
- log_control.log_entries[i].log_type = K_LOG_FILE;
- log_control.log_entries[i].lfu_fname = &cp[5];
- } else {
+ append = (cp[4] == ':') ? O_APPEND : 0;
+ if (append || cp[4] == '=') {
+ fd = THREEPARAMOPEN(&cp[5], O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | append,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP);
+ if (fd != -1)
+ f = fdopen(fd, append ? "a" : "w");
+ if (fd == -1 || f == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,"Couldn't open log file %s: %s\n",
&cp[5], error_message(errno));
continue;
}
+ set_cloexec_file(f);
+ log_control.log_entries[i].lfu_filep = f;
+ log_control.log_entries[i].log_type = K_LOG_FILE;
+ log_control.log_entries[i].lfu_fname = &cp[5];
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
From dd0c141bfc858caa8470271205220a968db7ab51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 12:25:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Don't feed OS RNG output into the OS RNG
krb5_c_random_os_entropy() now must be provided by PRNG modules.
ticket: 8499
(cherry picked from commit 0bbbc2bd3a42cfbd9e6eb34c273da8aaa077c29f)
---
src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h | 3 +-
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c | 60 +++++----------------------------------
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_fortuna.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++-
src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c | 6 ++++
4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h b/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
index c054144..a205e3f 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/crypto_int.h
@@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ void krb5int_crypto_impl_cleanup(void);
* PRNG modules must implement the following APIs from krb5.h:
* krb5_c_random_add_entropy
* krb5_c_random_make_octets
+ * krb5_c_random_os_entropy
*
* PRNG modules should implement these functions. They are called from the
* crypto library init and cleanup functions, and can be used to setup and tear
@@ -517,7 +518,7 @@ int k5_prng_init(void);
void k5_prng_cleanup(void);
/* Used by PRNG modules to gather OS entropy. Returns true on success. */
-krb5_boolean k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+krb5_boolean k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int strong);
/*** Inline helper functions ***/
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
index e478b19..9ad24c1 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
@@ -36,11 +36,13 @@ krb5_c_random_seed(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
#if defined(_WIN32)
krb5_boolean
-k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int strong)
{
krb5_boolean result;
HCRYPTPROV provider;
+ /* CryptGenRandom is always considered strong. */
+
if (!CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT))
return FALSE;
@@ -49,22 +51,6 @@ k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
return result;
}
-krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-krb5_c_random_os_entropy(krb5_context context, int strong, int *success)
-{
- int oursuccess = 0;
- char buf[1024];
- krb5_data data = make_data(buf, sizeof(buf));
-
- if (k5_get_os_entropy(buf, sizeof(buf)) &&
- krb5_c_random_add_entropy(context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_OSRAND,
- &data) == 0)
- oursuccess = 1;
- if (success != NULL)
- *success = oursuccess;
- return 0;
-}
-
#else /* not Windows */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -107,44 +93,12 @@ cleanup:
}
krb5_boolean
-k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+k5_get_os_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int strong)
{
- return read_entropy_from_device("/dev/urandom", buf, len);
-}
+ const char *device;
-/* Read entropy from device and contribute it to the PRNG. Returns true on
- * success. */
-static krb5_boolean
-add_entropy_from_device(krb5_context context, const char *device)
-{
- krb5_data data;
- unsigned char buf[64];
-
- if (!read_entropy_from_device(device, buf, sizeof(buf)))
- return FALSE;
- data = make_data(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return (krb5_c_random_add_entropy(context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_OSRAND,
- &data) == 0);
-}
-
-krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-krb5_c_random_os_entropy(krb5_context context, int strong, int *success)
-{
- int unused;
- int *oursuccess = (success != NULL) ? success : &unused;
-
- *oursuccess = 0;
- /* If we are getting strong data then try that first. We are
- guaranteed to cause a reseed of some kind if strong is true and
- we have both /dev/random and /dev/urandom. We want the strong
- data included in the reseed so we get it first.*/
- if (strong) {
- if (add_entropy_from_device(context, "/dev/random"))
- *oursuccess = 1;
- }
- if (add_entropy_from_device(context, "/dev/urandom"))
- *oursuccess = 1;
- return 0;
+ device = strong ? "/dev/random" : "/dev/urandom";
+ return read_entropy_from_device(device, buf, len);
}
#endif /* not Windows */
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_fortuna.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_fortuna.c
index e70ffa3..017a119 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_fortuna.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_fortuna.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ k5_prng_init(void)
#else
last_pid = getpid();
#endif
- if (k5_get_os_entropy(osbuf, sizeof(osbuf))) {
+ if (k5_get_os_entropy(osbuf, sizeof(osbuf), 0)) {
generator_reseed(&main_state, osbuf, sizeof(osbuf));
have_entropy = TRUE;
}
@@ -443,4 +443,28 @@ krb5_c_random_make_octets(krb5_context context, krb5_data *outdata)
return 0;
}
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_os_entropy(krb5_context context, int strong, int *success)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_data data;
+ uint8_t buf[64];
+ int status = 0;
+
+ if (!k5_get_os_entropy(buf, sizeof(buf), strong))
+ goto done;
+
+ data = make_data(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ret = krb5_c_random_add_entropy(context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_OSRAND, &data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto done;
+
+ status = 1;
+
+done:
+ if (success != NULL)
+ *success = status;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* not TEST */
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
index 730ed2e..ecfe351 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
@@ -91,3 +91,9 @@ krb5_c_random_make_octets(krb5_context context, krb5_data *outdata)
}
return 0;
}
+
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_os_entropy(krb5_context context, int strong, int *success)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
From 748617c1b8d1550284157a79bc7aeb6295a27bf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 14:54:11 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix impersonate_name to work with interposers
This follows the same modifications applied to
gss_acquire_cred_with_password() when interposer plugins were
introduced.
[ghudson@mit.edu: minor whitespace changes; initialize out_mcred in
spnego_gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name() since it is released in the
cleanup handler]
ticket: 8280 (new)
---
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_acquire_cred_imp_name.c | 58 +++++++++++++++--------
src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c | 35 +++++++-------
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_acquire_cred_imp_name.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_acquire_cred_imp_name.c
index 0dd4f87..9eab25e 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_acquire_cred_imp_name.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_acquire_cred_imp_name.c
@@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ gss_add_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t cred = NULL;
gss_OID new_mechs_array = NULL;
gss_cred_id_t * new_cred_array = NULL;
+ gss_OID_set target_mechs = GSS_C_NO_OID_SET;
+ gss_OID selected_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
status = val_add_cred_impersonate_name_args(minor_status,
input_cred_handle,
@@ -350,7 +352,12 @@ gss_add_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism(desired_mech);
+ status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, desired_mech,
+ &selected_mech);
+ if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return status;
+
+ mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech);
if (!mech)
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
else if (!mech->gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name)
@@ -367,27 +374,26 @@ gss_add_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
} else {
union_cred = (gss_union_cred_t)input_cred_handle;
- if (gssint_get_mechanism_cred(union_cred, desired_mech) !=
+ if (gssint_get_mechanism_cred(union_cred, selected_mech) !=
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
return (GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT);
}
mech_impersonator_cred =
gssint_get_mechanism_cred((gss_union_cred_t)impersonator_cred_handle,
- desired_mech);
+ selected_mech);
if (mech_impersonator_cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
return (GSS_S_NO_CRED);
/* may need to create a mechanism specific name */
union_name = (gss_union_name_t)desired_name;
if (union_name->mech_type &&
- g_OID_equal(union_name->mech_type,
- &mech->mech_type))
+ g_OID_equal(union_name->mech_type, selected_mech))
internal_name = union_name->mech_name;
else {
if (gssint_import_internal_name(minor_status,
- &mech->mech_type, union_name,
- &allocated_name) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ selected_mech, union_name,
+ &allocated_name) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (GSS_S_BAD_NAME);
internal_name = allocated_name;
}
@@ -402,11 +408,21 @@ gss_add_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
else
time_req = 0;
+ status = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, &target_mechs);
+ if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto errout;
+
+ status = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status,
+ gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech),
+ &target_mechs);
+ if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto errout;
+
status = mech->gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(minor_status,
mech_impersonator_cred,
internal_name,
time_req,
- GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET,
+ target_mechs,
cred_usage,
&cred,
NULL,
@@ -445,19 +461,15 @@ gss_add_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
new_cred_array[union_cred->count] = cred;
if ((new_mechs_array[union_cred->count].elements =
- malloc(mech->mech_type.length)) == NULL)
+ malloc(selected_mech->length)) == NULL)
goto errout;
- g_OID_copy(&new_mechs_array[union_cred->count],
- &mech->mech_type);
+ g_OID_copy(&new_mechs_array[union_cred->count], selected_mech);
if (actual_mechs != NULL) {
- gss_OID_set_desc oids;
-
- oids.count = union_cred->count + 1;
- oids.elements = new_mechs_array;
-
- status = generic_gss_copy_oid_set(minor_status, &oids, actual_mechs);
+ status = gssint_make_public_oid_set(minor_status, new_mechs_array,
+ union_cred->count + 1,
+ actual_mechs);
if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
free(new_mechs_array[union_cred->count].elements);
goto errout;
@@ -486,10 +498,12 @@ gss_add_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
/* We're done with the internal name. Free it if we allocated it. */
if (allocated_name)
- (void) gssint_release_internal_name(&temp_minor_status,
- &mech->mech_type,
+ (void) gssint_release_internal_name(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech,
&allocated_name);
+ if (target_mechs)
+ (void) gss_release_oid_set(&temp_minor_status, &target_mechs);
+
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
errout:
@@ -503,8 +517,10 @@ errout:
if (allocated_name)
(void) gssint_release_internal_name(&temp_minor_status,
- &mech->mech_type,
- &allocated_name);
+ selected_mech, &allocated_name);
+
+ if (target_mechs)
+ (void) gss_release_oid_set(&temp_minor_status, &target_mechs);
if (input_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && union_cred)
free(union_cred);
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
index 07435d8..99e374f 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
@@ -2620,10 +2620,10 @@ spnego_gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_OID_set *actual_mechs,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
- OM_uint32 status;
+ OM_uint32 status, tmpmin;
gss_OID_set amechs = GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t imp_spcred = NULL, out_spcred = NULL;
- gss_cred_id_t imp_mcred, out_mcred;
+ gss_cred_id_t imp_mcred, out_mcred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
dsyslog("Entering spnego_gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name\n");
@@ -2635,31 +2635,30 @@ spnego_gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
imp_spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)impersonator_cred_handle;
imp_mcred = imp_spcred ? imp_spcred->mcred : GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- if (desired_mechs == GSS_C_NO_OID_SET) {
- status = gss_inquire_cred(minor_status, imp_mcred, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, &amechs);
- if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
- return status;
-
- desired_mechs = amechs;
- }
+ status = gss_inquire_cred(minor_status, imp_mcred, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, &amechs);
+ if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ return status;
status = gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(minor_status, imp_mcred,
desired_name, time_req,
- desired_mechs, cred_usage,
+ amechs, cred_usage,
&out_mcred, actual_mechs,
time_rec);
-
- if (amechs != GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET)
- (void) gss_release_oid_set(minor_status, &amechs);
+ if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto cleanup;
status = create_spnego_cred(minor_status, out_mcred, &out_spcred);
- if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- gss_release_cred(minor_status, &out_mcred);
- return (status);
- }
+ if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ out_mcred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
*output_cred_handle = (gss_cred_id_t)out_spcred;
+cleanup:
+ (void) gss_release_oid_set(&tmpmin, &amechs);
+ (void) gss_release_cred(&tmpmin, &out_mcred);
+
dsyslog("Leaving spnego_gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name\n");
return (status);
}
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 79d626dde9e7e38da79da1911338e18998e348df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 13:28:43 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Improve bad password inference in kinit
kinit currently outputs "Password incorrect" if it sees a
bad-integrity error code, which results if the KDC reply couldn't be
decrypted, or when encrypted timestamp preauth fails against an MIT
krb5 1.14 or earlier KDC. Expand this check to include general
preauth failures reported by the KDC, but only if a password was
prompted for.
ticket: 8465 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 1a83ffad4d8e405ce696536c06d9bce1f8100595)
---
src/clients/kinit/kinit.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c b/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c
index eba36b9..990fd11 100644
--- a/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c
+++ b/src/clients/kinit/kinit.c
@@ -700,9 +700,18 @@ kinit_prompter(
krb5_prompt prompts[]
)
{
- krb5_error_code rc =
- krb5_prompter_posix(ctx, data, name, banner, num_prompts, prompts);
- return rc;
+ krb5_boolean *pwprompt = data;
+ krb5_prompt_type *ptypes;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Make a note if we receive a password prompt. */
+ ptypes = krb5_get_prompt_types(ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
+ if (ptypes != NULL && ptypes[i] == KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PASSWORD)
+ *pwprompt = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return krb5_prompter_posix(ctx, data, name, banner, num_prompts, prompts);
}
static int
@@ -715,6 +724,7 @@ k5_kinit(opts, k5)
krb5_creds my_creds;
krb5_error_code code = 0;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options = NULL;
+ krb5_boolean pwprompt = FALSE;
int i;
memset(&my_creds, 0, sizeof(my_creds));
@@ -819,7 +829,7 @@ k5_kinit(opts, k5)
switch (opts->action) {
case INIT_PW:
code = krb5_get_init_creds_password(k5->ctx, &my_creds, k5->me,
- 0, kinit_prompter, 0,
+ 0, kinit_prompter, &pwprompt,
opts->starttime,
opts->service_name,
options);
@@ -856,11 +866,15 @@ k5_kinit(opts, k5)
break;
}
- if (code == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY)
+ /* If reply decryption failed, or if pre-authentication failed and we
+ * were prompted for a password, assume the password was wrong. */
+ if (code == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY ||
+ (pwprompt && code == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED)) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Password incorrect while %s\n"), progname,
doing);
- else
+ } else {
com_err(progname, code, _("while %s"), doing);
+ }
goto cleanup;
}
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,413 @@
From d730a62c2d3f6f75a0fa28b7a8c952fb29dd7aa0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 13:02:46 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
(cherry picked from commit 56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf)
---
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c | 14 ++++++++------
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c | 4 ++++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c | 4 ++++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c | 2 ++
src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c | 8 ++++++++
17 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c
index ddaf87412..f28e2b14a 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c
@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
} else {
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
selected_mech = union_ctx_id->mech_type;
+ if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* Now create a new context if we didn't get one. */
@@ -234,9 +236,6 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
free(union_ctx_id);
return (status);
}
-
- /* set the new context handle to caller's data */
- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
}
/*
@@ -277,8 +276,10 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
d_cred ? &tmp_d_cred : NULL);
/* If there's more work to do, keep going... */
- if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+ if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ }
/* if the call failed, return with failure */
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
@@ -364,14 +365,22 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
*mech_type = gssint_get_public_oid(actual_mech);
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = temp_ret_flags;
- return (status);
+ *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
} else {
status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
}
error_out:
- if (union_ctx_id) {
+ /*
+ * RFC 2744 5.1 requires that we not create a context on a failed first
+ * call to accept, and recommends that on a failed subsequent call we
+ * make the caller responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context.
+ * Even if the mech deleted its context, keep the union context around
+ * for the caller to delete.
+ */
+ if (union_ctx_id && *context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type) {
if (union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements)
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
@@ -384,7 +393,6 @@ error_out:
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
free(union_ctx_id);
- *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (src_name)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c
index 918155130..4bcb47e84 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ gss_complete_auth_token (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech != NULL) {
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c
index 2ff8d0996..c947e7646 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ OM_uint32 * time_rec;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c
index 4bf0dec5c..574ff0294 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c
@@ -87,12 +87,14 @@ gss_buffer_t output_token;
if (GSSINT_CHK_LOOP(ctx))
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status,
- ctx->mech_type,
- &ctx->internal_ctx_id,
- output_token);
- if (status)
- return status;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+ status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status,
+ ctx->mech_type,
+ &ctx->internal_ctx_id,
+ output_token);
+ if (status)
+ return status;
+ }
/* now free up the space for the union context structure */
free(ctx->mech_type->elements);
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c
index b63745299..1d7990b1c 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c
index 9f154b893..e2df1ce26 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c
@@ -192,8 +192,13 @@ OM_uint32 * time_rec;
/* copy the supplied context handle */
union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- } else
+ } else {
union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
+ if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+ status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
/*
* get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
@@ -224,15 +229,13 @@ OM_uint32 * time_rec;
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
/*
- * The spec says the preferred method is to delete all context info on
- * the first call to init, and on all subsequent calls make the caller
- * responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context. However, if the
- * mechanism decided to delete the internal context, we should also
- * delete the union context.
+ * RFC 2744 5.19 requires that we not create a context on a failed
+ * first call to init, and recommends that on a failed subsequent call
+ * we make the caller responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context.
+ * Even if the mech deleted its context, keep the union context around
+ * for the caller to delete.
*/
map_error(minor_status, mech);
- if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
- *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c
index 6f1c71eed..6c0d98dd3 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c
@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ gss_inquire_context(
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech || !mech->gss_inquire_context || !mech->gss_display_name ||
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c
index fcca3e44c..9e168adfe 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ gss_pseudo_random (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech != NULL) {
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c
index bc260aeb1..3968b5d9c 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c
index f17241c90..3db1ee095 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ gss_wrap( OM_uint32 *minor_status,
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
@@ -226,6 +228,8 @@ gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c
index 86d641aa2..03fbd8c01 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ gss_buffer_t msg_token;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c
index 3e8053c6e..c208635b6 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ gss_qop_t * qop_state;
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c
index e78bff2d3..0682bd899 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c
@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ gss_qop_t *qop_state;
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c
index c0dd314b1..599be2c7b 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ int iov_count;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
@@ -128,6 +130,8 @@ gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
/* Select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and call it. */
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(ctx->mech_type);
if (mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c
index 1578ae111..8996fce8d 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ gss_qop_t * qop_state;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c
index 96cdf3ce6..7fe3b7b35 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c
@@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (!mech)
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c
index 40cd98fc9..14447c4ee 100644
--- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c
+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ int iov_count;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ int iov_count;
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
@@ -190,6 +194,8 @@ gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
/* Select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and call it. */
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(ctx->mech_type);
if (mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
@@ -218,6 +224,8 @@ gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
/* Select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and call it. */
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism(ctx->mech_type);
if (mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;

View file

@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
From af6570ad6c306fe8e2bf425810236dd8c6271885 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 12:14:20 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
(cherry picked from commit a860385dd8fbd239fdb31b347e07f4e6b2fbdcc2)
---
src/kdc/do_as_req.c | 4 ++--
src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c | 3 ++-
src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 10 ++++++++--
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
index 712ccb794..a4bf91b1b 100644
--- a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
+++ b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
@@ -365,8 +365,8 @@ finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
did_log = 1;
egress:
- if (errcode != 0)
- assert (state->status != 0);
+ if (errcode != 0 && state->status == NULL)
+ state->status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
au_state->status = state->status;
au_state->reply = &state->reply;
diff --git a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
index 547a41441..339259fd1 100644
--- a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
+++ b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
@@ -823,7 +823,8 @@ process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
- assert(status != NULL);
+ if (status == NULL)
+ status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
index 29f9dbbf0..30c501c67 100644
--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
@@ -1220,8 +1220,10 @@ kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
- if (code)
+ if (code) {
+ *status = "DECODE_PA_FOR_USER";
return code;
+ }
code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
if (code) {
@@ -1320,8 +1322,10 @@ kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
- if (code)
+ if (code) {
+ *status = "DECODE_PA_S4U_X509_USER";
return code;
+ }
code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
@@ -1624,6 +1628,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
+ *status = "INVALID_S4U2PROXY_OPTIONS";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
@@ -1631,6 +1636,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
server->princ, /* after canon */
server_princ)) {
+ *status = "EVIDENCE_TICKET_MISMATCH";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 8ca87ac2ab358d9fa6756636a6c5280858a72e3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 12:53:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Rename prng_os.c to prng_device.c
ticket: 8499
(cherry picked from commit 5e54525fbe40d56f44368e216c92938403cad96d)
---
src/lib/crypto/krb/{prng_os.c => prng_device.c} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename src/lib/crypto/krb/{prng_os.c => prng_device.c} (97%)
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_device.c
similarity index 97%
rename from src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
rename to src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_device.c
index ecfe351..bef5b37 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng_device.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
-/* lib/crypto/krb/prng_os.c - OS-native PRNG implementation */
+/* lib/crypto/krb/prng_device.c - OS device-based PRNG implementation */
/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
* All rights reserved.
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From 59ffbc2016ae2e164a0da7bacc5449bd9898337c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 13:23:31 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Set prompt type for OTP preauth prompt
Add k5_set_prompt_type() calls around the prompter invocation in
preauth_otp.c, and add the comment we conventionally put before
prompter invocations.
ticket: 8464 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 7d497a56279dcb59b6be9f8994257e76788d2e89)
---
src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
index 37f98b2..48fcbb5 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/preauth_otp.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include "k5-int.h"
#include "k5-json.h"
#include "int-proto.h"
+#include "os-proto.h"
#include <krb5/clpreauth_plugin.h>
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -475,6 +476,7 @@ doprompt(krb5_context context, krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data,
krb5_prompt prompt;
krb5_data prompt_reply;
krb5_error_code retval;
+ krb5_prompt_type prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
if (prompttxt == NULL || out == NULL)
return EINVAL;
@@ -486,7 +488,10 @@ doprompt(krb5_context context, krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data,
prompt.prompt = (char *)prompttxt;
prompt.hidden = 1;
+ /* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
+ k5_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
retval = (*prompter)(context, prompter_data, NULL, banner, 1, &prompt);
+ k5_set_prompt_types(context, NULL);
if (retval != 0)
return retval;
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 1b6ea00bd6ac23020251bdeaf115a073c65c85d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 17:46:22 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Use GSSAPI fallback skiptest
Also-authored-by: Matt Rogers <mrogers@redhat.com>
[rharwood@redhat.com: Adjusted patch to apply]
[rharwood@redhat.com: Adjusted patch again to apply]
---
src/appl/gss-sample/Makefile.in | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/appl/gss-sample/Makefile.in b/src/appl/gss-sample/Makefile.in
index 0f67c0c05..e2434901c 100644
--- a/src/appl/gss-sample/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/appl/gss-sample/Makefile.in
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ OBJS= gss-client.o gss-misc.o gss-server.o
all-unix:: gss-server gss-client
+LBITS = $(shell /usr/bin/getconf LONG_BIT)
+
##WIN32##VERSIONRC = $(BUILDTOP)\windows\version.rc
##WIN32##RCFLAGS=$(CPPFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir) -D_WIN32 -DRES_ONLY
@@ -43,7 +45,9 @@ clean-unix::
$(RM) gss-server gss-client
check-pytests::
- $(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_gss_sample.py $(PYTESTFLAGS)
+ if ! [ $(LBITS) -eq 32 ]; then \
+ $(RUNPYTEST) $(srcdir)/t_gss_sample.py $(PYTESTFLAGS); \
+ fi
install-unix::
$(INSTALL_PROGRAM) gss-client $(DESTDIR)$(CLIENT_BINDIR)/gss-client
--
2.11.0

View file

@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
From d903c706a378c521ae38d57d95e43fb10469b03f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Rogers <mrogers@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2017 12:53:42 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Use fallback realm for GSSAPI ccache selection
In krb5_cc_select(), if the server principal has an empty realm, use
krb5_get_fallback_host_realm() and set the server realm to the first
fallback found. This helps with the selection of a non-default ccache
when there is no [domain_realms] configuration for the server domain.
Modify t_ccselect.py tests to account for fallback behavior.
ticket: 8549 (new)
(cherry picked from commit 234b64bd6139d5b75dadd5abbd5bef5a162e298a)
[rharwood@redhat.com conflicts t_ccselect.py]
---
src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccselect.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
src/tests/gssapi/t_ccselect.py | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccselect.c b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccselect.c
index 2f3071a27..ee4b83a9b 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccselect.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/ccselect.c
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ krb5_cc_select(krb5_context context, krb5_principal server,
struct ccselect_module_handle **hp, *h;
krb5_ccache cache;
krb5_principal princ;
+ krb5_principal srvcp = NULL;
+ char **fbrealms = NULL;
*cache_out = NULL;
*princ_out = NULL;
@@ -139,7 +141,27 @@ krb5_cc_select(krb5_context context, krb5_principal server,
if (context->ccselect_handles == NULL) {
ret = load_modules(context);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to use the fallback host realm for the server if there is no
+ * authoritative realm. */
+ if (krb5_is_referral_realm(&server->realm) &&
+ server->type == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST && server->length == 2) {
+ ret = krb5_get_fallback_host_realm(context, &server->data[1],
+ &fbrealms);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Make a copy with the first fallback realm. */
+ ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, server, &srvcp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
+ ret = krb5_set_principal_realm(context, srvcp, fbrealms[0]);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ server = srvcp;
}
/* Consult authoritative modules first, then heuristic ones. */
@@ -155,20 +177,25 @@ krb5_cc_select(krb5_context context, krb5_principal server,
princ);
*cache_out = cache;
*princ_out = princ;
- return 0;
+ goto cleanup;
} else if (ret == KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND) {
TRACE_CCSELECT_MODNOTFOUND(context, h->vt.name, server, princ);
*princ_out = princ;
- return ret;
+ goto cleanup;
} else if (ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE) {
TRACE_CCSELECT_MODFAIL(context, h->vt.name, ret, server);
- return ret;
+ goto cleanup;
}
}
}
TRACE_CCSELECT_NOTFOUND(context, server);
- return KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND;
+ ret = KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND;
+
+cleanup:
+ krb5_free_principal(context, srvcp);
+ krb5_free_host_realm(context, fbrealms);
+ return ret;
}
void
diff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_ccselect.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_ccselect.py
index 6be6b4ec0..c6201ca41 100755
--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_ccselect.py
+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_ccselect.py
@@ -31,12 +31,18 @@ r2 = K5Realm(create_user=False, realm='KRBTEST2.COM', portbase=62000,
host1 = 'p:' + r1.host_princ
host2 = 'p:' + r2.host_princ
+foo = 'foo.krbtest.com'
+foo2 = 'foo.krbtest2.com'
-# gsserver specifies the target as a GSS name. The resulting
-# principal will have the host-based type, but the realm won't be
-# known before the client cache is selected (since k5test realms have
-# no domain-realm mapping by default).
-gssserver = 'h:host@' + hostname
+# These strings specify the target as a GSS name. The resulting
+# principal will have the host-based type, with the referral realm
+# (since k5test realms have no domain-realm mapping by default).
+# krb5_cc_select() will use the fallback realm, which is either the
+# uppercased parent domain, or the default realm if the hostname is a
+# single component.
+gssserver = 'h:host@' + foo
+gssserver2 = 'h:host@' + foo2
+gsslocal = 'h:host@localhost'
# refserver specifies the target as a principal in the referral realm.
# The principal won't be treated as a host principal by the
@@ -67,6 +73,16 @@ r1.addprinc(alice, password('alice'))
r1.addprinc(bob, password('bob'))
r2.addprinc(zaphod, password('zaphod'))
+# Create host principals and keytabs for fallback realm tests.
+r1.addprinc('host/localhost')
+r2.addprinc('host/localhost')
+r1.addprinc('host/' + foo)
+r2.addprinc('host/' + foo2)
+r1.extract_keytab('host/localhost', r1.keytab)
+r2.extract_keytab('host/localhost', r2.keytab)
+r1.extract_keytab('host/' + foo, r1.keytab)
+r2.extract_keytab('host/' + foo2, r2.keytab)
+
# Get tickets for one user in each realm (zaphod will be primary).
r1.kinit(alice, password('alice'))
r2.kinit(zaphod, password('zaphod'))
@@ -94,10 +110,24 @@ if output != (zaphod + '\n'):
fail('zaphod not chosen as default initiator name for server in r1')
# Check that primary cache is used if server realm is unknown.
-output = r2.run(['./t_ccselect', gssserver])
+output = r2.run(['./t_ccselect', refserver])
if output != (zaphod + '\n'):
fail('zaphod not chosen via primary cache for unknown server realm')
-r1.run(['./t_ccselect', gssserver], expected_code=1)
+r1.run(['./t_ccselect', gssserver2], expected_code=1)
+# Check ccache selection using a fallback realm.
+output = r1.run(['./t_ccselect', gssserver])
+if output != (alice + '\n'):
+ fail('alice not chosen via parent domain fallback')
+output = r2.run(['./t_ccselect', gssserver2])
+if output != (zaphod + '\n'):
+ fail('zaphod not chosen via parent domain fallback')
+# Check ccache selection using a fallback realm (default realm).
+output = r1.run(['./t_ccselect', gsslocal])
+if output != (alice + '\n'):
+ fail('alice not chosen via default realm fallback')
+output = r2.run(['./t_ccselect', gsslocal])
+if output != (zaphod + '\n'):
+ fail('zaphod not chosen via default realm fallback')
# Get a second cred in r1 (bob will be primary).
r1.kinit(bob, password('bob'))
@@ -105,20 +135,21 @@ r1.kinit(bob, password('bob'))
# Try some cache selections using .k5identity.
k5id = open(os.path.join(r1.testdir, '.k5identity'), 'w')
k5id.write('%s realm=%s\n' % (alice, r1.realm))
-k5id.write('%s service=ho*t host=%s\n' % (zaphod, hostname))
+k5id.write('%s service=ho*t host=localhost\n' % zaphod)
k5id.write('noprinc service=bogus')
k5id.close()
output = r1.run(['./t_ccselect', host1])
if output != (alice + '\n'):
fail('alice not chosen via .k5identity realm line.')
-output = r2.run(['./t_ccselect', gssserver])
+output = r2.run(['./t_ccselect', gsslocal])
if output != (zaphod + '\n'):
fail('zaphod not chosen via .k5identity service/host line.')
output = r1.run(['./t_ccselect', refserver])
if output != (bob + '\n'):
fail('bob not chosen via primary cache when no .k5identity line matches.')
-output = r1.run(['./t_ccselect', 'h:bogus@' + hostname], expected_code=1)
if 'Can\'t find client principal noprinc' not in output:
fail('Expected error not seen when k5identity selects bad principal.')
+r1.run(['./t_ccselect', 'h:bogus@' + foo2], expected_code=1,
+ expected_msg="Can't find client principal noprinc")
success('GSSAPI credential selection tests')

1
ci.fmf
View file

@ -1 +0,0 @@
resultsdb-testcase: separate

View file

@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
--- !Policy
product_versions:
- fedora-*
decision_contexts:
- bodhi_update_push_stable
subject_type: koji_build
rules:
- !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: fedora-ci.koji-build./plans/tests.functional}

View file

@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
[Unit]
Description=Kerberos 5 Password-changing and Administration
Wants=network-online.target
After=syslog.target network.target network-online.target
After=syslog.target network.target
AssertPathExists=!/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kpropd.acl
[Service]
Type=forking
PIDFile=/run/kadmind.pid
PIDFile=/var/run/kadmind.pid
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/kadmin
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/kadmind -P /run/kadmind.pid $KADMIND_ARGS
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/kadmind -P /var/run/kadmind.pid $KADMIND_ARGS
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
[Install]

View file

@ -4,6 +4,6 @@
monthly
rotate 12
postrotate
systemctl reload kadmin.service || true
/bin/kill -HUP `cat /var/run/kadmind.pid 2>/dev/null` 2> /dev/null || true
endscript
}

View file

@ -1,20 +1,12 @@
[libdefaults]
# Allow RC4 HMAC-MD5 for session keys (see CVE-2022-37966)
#allow_rc4 = true
[kdcdefaults]
kdc_ports = 88
kdc_tcp_ports = 88
spake_preauth_kdc_challenge = edwards25519
kdc_ports = 88
kdc_tcp_ports = 88
[realms]
EXAMPLE.COM = {
master_key_type = aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192
acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
default_principal_flags = +preauth
admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128:normal aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal camellia256-cts-cmac:normal camellia128-cts-cmac:normal arcfour-hmac-md5:normal
# Supported encryption types for FIPS mode:
#supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128:normal
}
EXAMPLE.COM = {
#master_key_type = aes256-cts
acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal des-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-md5:normal des-cbc-crc:normal
}

1
kerberos-adm.portreserve Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
kerberos-adm/tcp

View file

@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
[Unit]
Description=Kerberos 5 Propagation
Wants=network-online.target
After=syslog.target network.target network-online.target
After=syslog.target network.target
AssertPathExists=/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kpropd.acl
[Service]
Type=forking
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/kprop
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/kpropd $KPROPD_ARGS
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/kpropd
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

View file

@ -1 +0,0 @@
KPROPD_ARGS=

View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
From 61389fb098b36c1927ad01e4efa51f38da39176a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:52:01 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.11-kpasswdtest.patch
---
src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto b/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto
index e9702bb..482fda6 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto
+++ b/src/kadmin/testing/proto/krb5.conf.proto
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
__REALM__ = {
kdc = __KDCHOST__:1750
admin_server = __KDCHOST__:1751
+ kpasswd_server = __KDCHOST__:1752
database_module = foobar_db2_module_blah
}
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 8f81af0f10a917a000a12c9b344b3f801c939666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:49:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.11-run_user_0.patch
A hack: if we're looking at creating a ccache directory directly below
the /run/user/0 directory, and /run/user/0 doesn't exist, try to create
it, too.
---
src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c
index 73f0fe6..4850c0d 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_dir.c
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#include <dirent.h>
+#define ROOT_SPECIAL_DCC_PARENT "/run/user/0"
+
extern const krb5_cc_ops krb5_dcc_ops;
extern const krb5_cc_ops krb5_fcc_ops;
@@ -237,6 +239,18 @@ verify_dir(krb5_context context, const char *dirname)
if (stat(dirname, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ if (strncmp(dirname, ROOT_SPECIAL_DCC_PARENT "/",
+ sizeof(ROOT_SPECIAL_DCC_PARENT)) == 0 &&
+ stat(ROOT_SPECIAL_DCC_PARENT, &st) < 0 &&
+ errno == ENOENT) {
+#ifdef USE_SELINUX
+ selabel = krb5int_push_fscreatecon_for(ROOT_SPECIAL_DCC_PARENT);
+#endif
+ status = mkdir(ROOT_SPECIAL_DCC_PARENT, S_IRWXU);
+#ifdef USE_SELINUX
+ krb5int_pop_fscreatecon(selabel);
+#endif
+ }
#ifdef USE_SELINUX
selabel = krb5int_push_fscreatecon_for(dirname);
#endif
--
2.9.3

40
krb5-1.12-api.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
From 9ca4f0e1081e667ebc9150097559f5fe85595e33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:47:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.12-api.patch
Reference docs don't define what happens if you call krb5_realm_compare() with
malformed krb5_principal structures. Define a behavior which keeps it from
crashing if applications don't check ahead of time.
---
src/lib/krb5/krb/princ_comp.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/princ_comp.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/princ_comp.c
index a693610..0ed7883 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/princ_comp.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/princ_comp.c
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ realm_compare_flags(krb5_context context,
const krb5_data *realm1 = &princ1->realm;
const krb5_data *realm2 = &princ2->realm;
+ if (princ1 == NULL || princ2 == NULL)
+ return FALSE;
+ if (realm1 == NULL || realm2 == NULL)
+ return FALSE;
if (realm1->length != realm2->length)
return FALSE;
if (realm1->length == 0)
@@ -88,6 +92,9 @@ krb5_principal_compare_flags(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal upn2 = NULL;
krb5_boolean ret = FALSE;
+ if (princ1 == NULL || princ2 == NULL)
+ return FALSE;
+
if (flags & KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_ENTERPRISE) {
/* Treat UPNs as if they were real principals */
if (princ1->type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
--
2.9.3

73
krb5-1.12-buildconf.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From 1df0a74f88f044f1e538e3d4fda13bbceb76e68b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:45:26 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.12-buildconf.patch
Build binaries in this package as RELRO PIEs, libraries as partial RELRO,
and install shared libraries with the execute bit set on them. Prune out
the -L/usr/lib* and PIE flags where they might leak out and affect
apps which just want to link with the libraries. FIXME: needs to check and
not just assume that the compiler supports using these flags.
---
src/build-tools/krb5-config.in | 7 +++++++
src/config/pre.in | 2 +-
src/config/shlib.conf | 5 +++--
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in b/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
index c17cb5e..1891dea 100755
--- a/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
+++ b/src/build-tools/krb5-config.in
@@ -226,6 +226,13 @@ if test -n "$do_libs"; then
-e 's#\$(PTHREAD_CFLAGS)#'"$PTHREAD_CFLAGS"'#' \
-e 's#\$(CFLAGS)##'`
+ if test `dirname $libdir` = /usr ; then
+ lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-L$libdir##" -e "s#$RPATH_FLAG$libdir##"`
+ fi
+ lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-fPIE##g" -e "s#-pie##g"`
+ lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-Wl,-z,relro##g"`
+ lib_flags=`echo $lib_flags | sed -e "s#-Wl,-z,now##g"`
+
if test $library = 'kdb'; then
lib_flags="$lib_flags -lkdb5 $KDB5_DB_LIB"
library=krb5
diff --git a/src/config/pre.in b/src/config/pre.in
index 63271e7..c100fef 100644
--- a/src/config/pre.in
+++ b/src/config/pre.in
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ INSTALL_PROGRAM=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(INSTALL_STRIP)
INSTALL_SCRIPT=@INSTALL_PROGRAM@
INSTALL_DATA=@INSTALL_DATA@
INSTALL_SHLIB=@INSTALL_SHLIB@
-INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP) -m 4755 -o root
+INSTALL_SETUID=$(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP) -m 4755
## This is needed because autoconf will sometimes define @exec_prefix@ to be
## ${prefix}.
prefix=@prefix@
diff --git a/src/config/shlib.conf b/src/config/shlib.conf
index 55f16be..f4a762c 100644
--- a/src/config/shlib.conf
+++ b/src/config/shlib.conf
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ mips-*-netbsd*)
SHLIBEXT=.so
# Linux ld doesn't default to stuffing the SONAME field...
# Use objdump -x to examine the fields of the library
- LDCOMBINE='$(CC) -shared -fPIC -Wl,-h,$(LIBPREFIX)$(LIBBASE)$(SHLIBSEXT),--no-undefined'
+ LDCOMBINE='$(CC) -shared -fPIC -Wl,-h,$(LIBPREFIX)$(LIBBASE)$(SHLIBSEXT),--no-undefined -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,--warn-shared-textrel'
#
LDCOMBINE_TAIL='-Wl,--version-script binutils.versions && $(PERL) -w $(top_srcdir)/util/export-check.pl $(SHLIB_EXPORT_FILE) $@'
SHLIB_EXPORT_FILE_DEP=binutils.versions
@@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ mips-*-netbsd*)
SHLIB_EXPFLAGS='$(SHLIB_RPATH_FLAGS) $(SHLIB_DIRS) $(SHLIB_EXPLIBS)'
PROFFLAGS=-pg
PROG_RPATH_FLAGS='$(RPATH_FLAG)$(PROG_RPATH)'
- CC_LINK_SHARED='$(CC) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(PROG_RPATH_FLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'
+ CC_LINK_SHARED='$(CC) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(PROG_RPATH_FLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now $(LDFLAGS)'
+ INSTALL_SHLIB='${INSTALL} -m755'
CC_LINK_STATIC='$(CC) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'
CXX_LINK_SHARED='$(CXX) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(PROG_RPATH_FLAGS) $(CXXFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'
CXX_LINK_STATIC='$(CXX) $(PROG_LIBPATH) $(CXXFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)'
--
2.9.3

25
krb5-1.12-ksu-path.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
From a33c34eabf9cd4d98d633994bfcf19359ff087a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:32:09 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.12-ksu-path.patch
Set the default PATH to the one set by login.
---
src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in b/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
index ad2406a..1379c4a 100644
--- a/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
mydir=clients$(S)ksu
BUILDTOP=$(REL)..$(S)..
-DEFINES = -DGET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD -DPRINC_LOOK_AHEAD -DCMD_PATH='"/bin /local/bin"'
+DEFINES = -DGET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD -DPRINC_LOOK_AHEAD -DCMD_PATH='"/usr/local/sbin /usr/local/bin /sbin /bin /usr/sbin /usr/bin"'
KSU_LIBS=@KSU_LIBS@
PAM_LIBS=@PAM_LIBS@
--
2.9.3

369
krb5-1.12-ktany.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
From f02d4a098b5e94df15ae39e9fad79e861e6c6483 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:33:53 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.12-ktany.patch
Adds an "ANY" keytab type which is a list of other keytab locations to search
when searching for a specific entry. When iterated through, it only presents
the contents of the first keytab.
---
src/lib/krb5/keytab/Makefile.in | 3 +
src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_any.c | 292 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/lib/krb5/keytab/ktbase.c | 7 +-
3 files changed, 301 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_any.c
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/keytab/Makefile.in b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/Makefile.in
index 28485d5..c17ab82 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/keytab/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/Makefile.in
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ STLIBOBJS= \
ktfr_entry.o \
ktremove.o \
ktfns.o \
+ kt_any.o \
kt_file.o \
kt_memory.o \
kt_srvtab.o \
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ OBJS= \
$(OUTPRE)ktfr_entry.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)ktremove.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)ktfns.$(OBJEXT) \
+ $(OUTPRE)kt_any.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)kt_file.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)kt_memory.$(OBJEXT) \
$(OUTPRE)kt_srvtab.$(OBJEXT) \
@@ -36,6 +38,7 @@ SRCS= \
$(srcdir)/ktfr_entry.c \
$(srcdir)/ktremove.c \
$(srcdir)/ktfns.c \
+ $(srcdir)/kt_any.c \
$(srcdir)/kt_file.c \
$(srcdir)/kt_memory.c \
$(srcdir)/kt_srvtab.c \
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_any.c b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_any.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b9b776
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/kt_any.c
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+/*
+ * lib/krb5/keytab/kt_any.c
+ *
+ * Copyright 1998, 1999 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may
+ * require a specific license from the United States Government.
+ * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
+ * export to obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ *
+ *
+ * krb5_kta_ops
+ */
+
+#include "k5-int.h"
+
+typedef struct _krb5_ktany_data {
+ char *name;
+ krb5_keytab *choices;
+ int nchoices;
+} krb5_ktany_data;
+
+typedef struct _krb5_ktany_cursor_data {
+ int which;
+ krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
+} krb5_ktany_cursor_data;
+
+static krb5_error_code krb5_ktany_resolve
+ (krb5_context,
+ const char *,
+ krb5_keytab *);
+static krb5_error_code krb5_ktany_get_name
+ (krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab id,
+ char *name,
+ unsigned int len);
+static krb5_error_code krb5_ktany_close
+ (krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab id);
+static krb5_error_code krb5_ktany_get_entry
+ (krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab id,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ krb5_kvno kvno,
+ krb5_enctype enctype,
+ krb5_keytab_entry *entry);
+static krb5_error_code krb5_ktany_start_seq_get
+ (krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab id,
+ krb5_kt_cursor *cursorp);
+static krb5_error_code krb5_ktany_next_entry
+ (krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab id,
+ krb5_keytab_entry *entry,
+ krb5_kt_cursor *cursor);
+static krb5_error_code krb5_ktany_end_seq_get
+ (krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab id,
+ krb5_kt_cursor *cursor);
+static void cleanup
+ (krb5_context context,
+ krb5_ktany_data *data,
+ int nchoices);
+
+struct _krb5_kt_ops krb5_kta_ops = {
+ 0,
+ "ANY", /* Prefix -- this string should not appear anywhere else! */
+ krb5_ktany_resolve,
+ krb5_ktany_get_name,
+ krb5_ktany_close,
+ krb5_ktany_get_entry,
+ krb5_ktany_start_seq_get,
+ krb5_ktany_next_entry,
+ krb5_ktany_end_seq_get,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static krb5_error_code
+krb5_ktany_resolve(context, name, id)
+ krb5_context context;
+ const char *name;
+ krb5_keytab *id;
+{
+ const char *p, *q;
+ char *copy;
+ krb5_error_code kerror;
+ krb5_ktany_data *data;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Allocate space for our data and remember a copy of the name. */
+ if ((data = (krb5_ktany_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_ktany_data))) == NULL)
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ if ((data->name = (char *)malloc(strlen(name) + 1)) == NULL) {
+ free(data);
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ }
+ strcpy(data->name, name);
+
+ /* Count the number of choices and allocate memory for them. */
+ data->nchoices = 1;
+ for (p = name; (q = strchr(p, ',')) != NULL; p = q + 1)
+ data->nchoices++;
+ if ((data->choices = (krb5_keytab *)
+ malloc(data->nchoices * sizeof(krb5_keytab))) == NULL) {
+ free(data->name);
+ free(data);
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ /* Resolve each of the choices. */
+ i = 0;
+ for (p = name; (q = strchr(p, ',')) != NULL; p = q + 1) {
+ /* Make a copy of the choice name so we can terminate it. */
+ if ((copy = (char *)malloc(q - p + 1)) == NULL) {
+ cleanup(context, data, i);
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ }
+ memcpy(copy, p, q - p);
+ copy[q - p] = 0;
+
+ /* Try resolving the choice name. */
+ kerror = krb5_kt_resolve(context, copy, &data->choices[i]);
+ free(copy);
+ if (kerror) {
+ cleanup(context, data, i);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ if ((kerror = krb5_kt_resolve(context, p, &data->choices[i]))) {
+ cleanup(context, data, i);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate and fill in an ID for the caller. */
+ if ((*id = (krb5_keytab)malloc(sizeof(**id))) == NULL) {
+ cleanup(context, data, i);
+ return(ENOMEM);
+ }
+ (*id)->ops = &krb5_kta_ops;
+ (*id)->data = (krb5_pointer)data;
+ (*id)->magic = KV5M_KEYTAB;
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+krb5_ktany_get_name(context, id, name, len)
+ krb5_context context;
+ krb5_keytab id;
+ char *name;
+ unsigned int len;
+{
+ krb5_ktany_data *data = (krb5_ktany_data *)id->data;
+
+ if (len < strlen(data->name) + 1)
+ return(KRB5_KT_NAME_TOOLONG);
+ strcpy(name, data->name);
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+krb5_ktany_close(context, id)
+ krb5_context context;
+ krb5_keytab id;
+{
+ krb5_ktany_data *data = (krb5_ktany_data *)id->data;
+
+ cleanup(context, data, data->nchoices);
+ id->ops = 0;
+ free(id);
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+krb5_ktany_get_entry(context, id, principal, kvno, enctype, entry)
+ krb5_context context;
+ krb5_keytab id;
+ krb5_const_principal principal;
+ krb5_kvno kvno;
+ krb5_enctype enctype;
+ krb5_keytab_entry *entry;
+{
+ krb5_ktany_data *data = (krb5_ktany_data *)id->data;
+ krb5_error_code kerror = KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < data->nchoices; i++) {
+ if ((kerror = krb5_kt_get_entry(context, data->choices[i], principal,
+ kvno, enctype, entry)) != ENOENT)
+ return kerror;
+ }
+ return kerror;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+krb5_ktany_start_seq_get(context, id, cursorp)
+ krb5_context context;
+ krb5_keytab id;
+ krb5_kt_cursor *cursorp;
+{
+ krb5_ktany_data *data = (krb5_ktany_data *)id->data;
+ krb5_ktany_cursor_data *cdata;
+ krb5_error_code kerror = ENOENT;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((cdata = (krb5_ktany_cursor_data *)
+ malloc(sizeof(krb5_ktany_cursor_data))) == NULL)
+ return(ENOMEM);
+
+ /* Find a choice which can handle the serialization request. */
+ for (i = 0; i < data->nchoices; i++) {
+ if ((kerror = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, data->choices[i],
+ &cdata->cursor)) == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (kerror != ENOENT) {
+ free(cdata);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (i == data->nchoices) {
+ /* Everyone returned ENOENT, so no go. */
+ free(cdata);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
+
+ cdata->which = i;
+ *cursorp = (krb5_kt_cursor)cdata;
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+krb5_ktany_next_entry(context, id, entry, cursor)
+ krb5_context context;
+ krb5_keytab id;
+ krb5_keytab_entry *entry;
+ krb5_kt_cursor *cursor;
+{
+ krb5_ktany_data *data = (krb5_ktany_data *)id->data;
+ krb5_ktany_cursor_data *cdata = (krb5_ktany_cursor_data *)*cursor;
+ krb5_keytab choice_id;
+
+ choice_id = data->choices[cdata->which];
+ return(krb5_kt_next_entry(context, choice_id, entry, &cdata->cursor));
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+krb5_ktany_end_seq_get(context, id, cursor)
+ krb5_context context;
+ krb5_keytab id;
+ krb5_kt_cursor *cursor;
+{
+ krb5_ktany_data *data = (krb5_ktany_data *)id->data;
+ krb5_ktany_cursor_data *cdata = (krb5_ktany_cursor_data *)*cursor;
+ krb5_keytab choice_id;
+ krb5_error_code kerror;
+
+ choice_id = data->choices[cdata->which];
+ kerror = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, choice_id, &cdata->cursor);
+ free(cdata);
+ return(kerror);
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup(context, data, nchoices)
+ krb5_context context;
+ krb5_ktany_data *data;
+ int nchoices;
+{
+ int i;
+
+ free(data->name);
+ for (i = 0; i < nchoices; i++)
+ krb5_kt_close(context, data->choices[i]);
+ free(data->choices);
+ free(data);
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/keytab/ktbase.c b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/ktbase.c
index 0d39b29..6534d7c 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/keytab/ktbase.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/keytab/ktbase.c
@@ -57,14 +57,19 @@ extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_ktf_ops;
extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_ktf_writable_ops;
extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_kts_ops;
extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_mkt_ops;
+extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_kta_ops;
struct krb5_kt_typelist {
const krb5_kt_ops *ops;
const struct krb5_kt_typelist *next;
};
+static struct krb5_kt_typelist krb5_kt_typelist_any = {
+ &krb5_kta_ops,
+ NULL
+};
const static struct krb5_kt_typelist krb5_kt_typelist_srvtab = {
&krb5_kts_ops,
- NULL
+ &krb5_kt_typelist_any
};
const static struct krb5_kt_typelist krb5_kt_typelist_memory = {
&krb5_mkt_ops,
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From de4205c45e310ceaaa7cd7958af7293322fa43a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 74b07bf5a3c73f2d46ddfa4a03baa76b19ee1681 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:29:58 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] ksu pam integration
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.12.1-pam.patch
Modify ksu so that it performs account and session management on behalf of
the target user account, mimicking the action of regular su. The default
@ -16,28 +16,25 @@ When enabled, ksu gains a dependency on libpam.
Originally RT#5939, though it's changed since then to perform the account
and session management before dropping privileges, and to apply on top of
changes we're proposing for how it handles cache collections.
Last-updated: krb5-1.18-beta1
---
src/aclocal.m4 | 69 +++++++
src/aclocal.m4 | 67 ++++++++
src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in | 8 +-
src/clients/ksu/main.c | 88 +++++++-
src/clients/ksu/pam.c | 389 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/clients/ksu/pam.h | 57 ++++++
src/configure.ac | 2 +
6 files changed, 610 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/clients/ksu/main.c | 88 +++++++++-
src/clients/ksu/pam.c | 389 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/clients/ksu/pam.h | 57 +++++++
src/configure.in | 2 +
6 files changed, 608 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/clients/ksu/pam.c
create mode 100644 src/clients/ksu/pam.h
diff --git a/src/aclocal.m4 b/src/aclocal.m4
index 3d66a876b3..ce3c5a9bac 100644
index dbb7db2..ce045ab 100644
--- a/src/aclocal.m4
+++ b/src/aclocal.m4
@@ -1458,3 +1458,72 @@ if test "$with_ldap" = yes; then
OPENLDAP_PLUGIN=yes
fi
@@ -1672,3 +1672,70 @@ AC_DEFUN(KRB5_AC_PERSISTENT_KEYRING,[
]))
])dnl
+dnl
dnl
+dnl
+dnl Use PAM instead of local crypt() compare for checking local passwords,
+dnl and perform PAM account, session management, and password-changing where
@ -105,13 +102,12 @@ index 3d66a876b3..ce3c5a9bac 100644
+AC_SUBST(PAM_MAN)
+AC_SUBST(NON_PAM_MAN)
+])dnl
+
diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in b/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
index 8b4edce4d8..9d58f29b5d 100644
index c705fda..ad2406a 100644
--- a/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/clients/ksu/Makefile.in
@@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ BUILDTOP=$(REL)..$(S)..
DEFINES = -DGET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD -DPRINC_LOOK_AHEAD -DCMD_PATH='"/usr/local/sbin /usr/local/bin /sbin /bin /usr/sbin /usr/bin"'
DEFINES = -DGET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD -DPRINC_LOOK_AHEAD -DCMD_PATH='"/bin /local/bin"'
KSU_LIBS=@KSU_LIBS@
+PAM_LIBS=@PAM_LIBS@
@ -133,7 +129,7 @@ index 8b4edce4d8..9d58f29b5d 100644
heuristic.o \
xmalloc.o @SETENVOBJ@
all: ksu
all:: ksu
ksu: $(OBJS) $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIBS)
- $(CC_LINK) -o $@ $(OBJS) $(KRB5_BASE_LIBS) $(KSU_LIBS)
@ -142,14 +138,14 @@ index 8b4edce4d8..9d58f29b5d 100644
+pam.o: pam.c
+ $(CC) $(ALL_CFLAGS) -c $<
clean:
clean::
$(RM) ksu
diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/main.c b/src/clients/ksu/main.c
index af12861729..931f054041 100644
index 2f8d8e1..1b2ca83 100644
--- a/src/clients/ksu/main.c
+++ b/src/clients/ksu/main.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
* KSU was written by: Ari Medvinsky, ari@isi.edu
* KSU was writen by: Ari Medvinsky, ari@isi.edu
*/
+#include "autoconf.h"
@ -175,7 +171,7 @@ index af12861729..931f054041 100644
/***********/
#define KS_TEMPORARY_CACHE "MEMORY:_ksu"
@@ -536,6 +542,23 @@ main (argc, argv)
@@ -514,6 +520,23 @@ main (argc, argv)
prog_name,target_user,client_name,
source_user,ontty());
@ -199,7 +195,7 @@ index af12861729..931f054041 100644
/* Run authorization as target.*/
if (krb5_seteuid(target_uid)) {
com_err(prog_name, errno, _("while switching to target for "
@@ -596,6 +619,24 @@ main (argc, argv)
@@ -574,6 +597,24 @@ main (argc, argv)
exit(1);
}
@ -224,7 +220,7 @@ index af12861729..931f054041 100644
}
if( some_rest_copy){
@@ -653,6 +694,30 @@ main (argc, argv)
@@ -631,6 +672,30 @@ main (argc, argv)
exit(1);
}
@ -255,7 +251,7 @@ index af12861729..931f054041 100644
/* set permissions */
if (setgid(target_pwd->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("ksu: setgid");
@@ -750,7 +815,7 @@ main (argc, argv)
@@ -728,7 +793,7 @@ main (argc, argv)
fprintf(stderr, "program to be execed %s\n",params[0]);
}
@ -264,7 +260,7 @@ index af12861729..931f054041 100644
execv(params[0], params);
com_err(prog_name, errno, _("while trying to execv %s"), params[0]);
sweep_up(ksu_context, cc_target);
@@ -780,16 +845,35 @@ main (argc, argv)
@@ -758,16 +823,35 @@ main (argc, argv)
if (ret_pid == -1) {
com_err(prog_name, errno, _("while calling waitpid"));
}
@ -303,7 +299,7 @@ index af12861729..931f054041 100644
}
diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/pam.c b/src/clients/ksu/pam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cbfe487047
index 0000000..cbfe487
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/clients/ksu/pam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
@ -698,7 +694,7 @@ index 0000000000..cbfe487047
+#endif
diff --git a/src/clients/ksu/pam.h b/src/clients/ksu/pam.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ab76569cb
index 0000000..0ab7656
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/clients/ksu/pam.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
@ -759,11 +755,11 @@ index 0000000000..0ab76569cb
+int appl_pam_cred_init(void);
+void appl_pam_cleanup(void);
+#endif
diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac
index 77be7a2025..587221936e 100644
--- a/src/configure.ac
+++ b/src/configure.ac
@@ -1399,6 +1399,8 @@ AC_SUBST([VERTO_VERSION])
diff --git a/src/configure.in b/src/configure.in
index b2a8675..8846ca0 100644
--- a/src/configure.in
+++ b/src/configure.in
@@ -1327,6 +1327,8 @@ AC_SUBST([VERTO_VERSION])
AC_PATH_PROG(GROFF, groff)
@ -773,5 +769,5 @@ index 77be7a2025..587221936e 100644
if test "${localedir+set}" != set; then
localedir='$(datadir)/locale'
--
2.45.1
2.9.3

View file

@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
From f7538a0621d6b593e31f2031570a6f4678940241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:47:44 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.13-dirsrv-accountlock.patch
Treat 'nsAccountLock: true' the same as 'loginDisabled: true'. Updated from
original version filed as RT#5891.
---
src/aclocal.m4 | 9 +++++++++
src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_misc.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/aclocal.m4 b/src/aclocal.m4
index ed343c5..f67eef7 100644
--- a/src/aclocal.m4
+++ b/src/aclocal.m4
@@ -1653,6 +1653,15 @@ if test "$with_ldap" = yes; then
AC_MSG_NOTICE(enabling OpenLDAP database backend module support)
OPENLDAP_PLUGIN=yes
fi
+AC_ARG_WITH([dirsrv-account-locking],
+[ --with-dirsrv-account-locking compile 389/Red Hat/Fedora/Netscape Directory Server database backend module],
+[case "$withval" in
+ yes | no) ;;
+ *) AC_MSG_ERROR(Invalid option value --with-dirsrv-account-locking="$withval") ;;
+esac], with_dirsrv_account_locking=no)
+if test $with_dirsrv_account_locking = yes; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DIRSRV_ACCOUNT_LOCKING,1,[Define if LDAP KDB interface should heed 389 DS's nsAccountLock attribute.])
+fi
])dnl
dnl
dnl If libkeyutils exists (on Linux) include it and use keyring ccache
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_misc.c b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_misc.c
index aca8f31..0a0968c 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_misc.c
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_misc.c
@@ -1545,6 +1545,23 @@ populate_krb5_db_entry(krb5_context context, krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context,
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(context, entry, &userinfo_tl_data);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
+#ifdef HAVE_DIRSRV_ACCOUNT_LOCKING
+ {
+ krb5_timestamp expiretime=0;
+ char *is_login_disabled=NULL;
+
+ /* LOGIN DISABLED */
+ ret = krb5_ldap_get_string(ld, ent, "nsAccountLock", &is_login_disabled,
+ &attr_present);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (attr_present == TRUE) {
+ if (strcasecmp(is_login_disabled, "TRUE")== 0)
+ entry->attributes |= KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX;
+ free (is_login_disabled);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
ret = krb5_read_tkt_policy(context, ldap_context, entry, tktpolname);
if (ret)
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal.c b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal.c
index 6a06f55..1f87e21 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal.c
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/ldap_principal.c
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ char *principal_attributes[] = { "krbprincipalname",
"krbLastFailedAuth",
"krbLoginFailedCount",
"krbLastSuccessfulAuth",
+#ifdef HAVE_DIRSRV_ACCOUNT_LOCKING
+ "nsAccountLock",
+#endif
"krbLastPwdChange",
"krbLastAdminUnlock",
"krbExtraData",
--
2.9.3

25
krb5-1.3.1-dns.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
From 95b7e75522dd905eea23e853f062d89749a17799 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:46:21 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.3.1-dns.patch
We want to be able to use --with-netlib and --enable-dns at the same time.
---
src/aclocal.m4 | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/aclocal.m4 b/src/aclocal.m4
index 311f099..ed343c5 100644
--- a/src/aclocal.m4
+++ b/src/aclocal.m4
@@ -701,6 +701,7 @@ AC_HELP_STRING([--with-netlib=LIBS], use user defined resolver library),
LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
AC_MSG_RESULT("netlib will use \'$withval\'")
fi
+ KRB5_AC_ENABLE_DNS
],dnl
[AC_LIBRARY_NET]
)])dnl
--
2.9.3

View file

@ -1,20 +1,18 @@
From 393830d96000ed692aa9a99ef87187d6f2863931 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 3743c3636fd23e62f996b119a1536ecd882a5e80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:49:25 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] [downstream] fix debuginfo with y.tab.c
Subject: [PATCH] krb5-1.9-debuginfo.patch
We want to keep these y.tab.c files around because the debuginfo points to
them. It would be more elegant at the end to use symbolic links, but that
could mess up people working in the tree on other things.
Last-updated: krb5-1.9
---
src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in | 5 +++++
src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in | 2 +-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in b/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in
index adfea6e2b5..d1327e400b 100644
index 789c597..7e7a148 100644
--- a/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/kadmin/cli/Makefile.in
@@ -37,3 +37,8 @@ clean-unix::
@ -27,7 +25,7 @@ index adfea6e2b5..d1327e400b 100644
+ $(YACC.y) $<
+ $(CP) y.tab.c $@
diff --git a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in
index 8669c2436c..a22f23c02c 100644
index b9ea339..060f500 100644
--- a/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/plugins/kdb/ldap/ldap_util/Makefile.in
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ $(PROG): $(OBJS) $(KADMSRV_DEPLIBS) $(KRB5_BASE_DEPLIB) $(GETDATE)
@ -37,8 +35,8 @@ index 8669c2436c..a22f23c02c 100644
- $(MV) y.tab.c getdate.c
+ $(CP) y.tab.c getdate.c
install:
install::
$(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $(PROG) ${DESTDIR}$(ADMIN_BINDIR)/$(PROG)
--
2.45.1
2.9.3

View file

@ -1 +1 @@
d /run/krb5kdc 0755 root root
d /var/run/krb5kdc 0755 root root

View file

@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -e
export RPM_PACKAGE_NAME={{ name }}
export RPM_PACKAGE_VERSION={{ version }}
export RPM_PACKAGE_RELEASE={{ release }}
export RPM_ARCH={{ arch }}
export RPM_BUILD_NCPUS="$(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN)"
testdir="$(mktemp -d)"
trap "rm -rf ${testdir}" EXIT
build_flags="$(eval "echo $(rpm --eval '%{_smp_mflags}')")"
mkdir "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests"
cp -rp /usr/share/{{ name }}-tests/{{ arch }} "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests/"
make -C "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests/{{ arch }}/" $build_flags
keyctl session - make -C "${testdir}/{{ name }}-tests/{{ arch }}/" check

View file

@ -3,26 +3,22 @@
includedir /etc/krb5.conf.d/
[logging]
default = FILE:/var/log/krb5libs.log
kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log
admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log
default = FILE:/var/log/krb5libs.log
kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log
admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log
[libdefaults]
dns_lookup_realm = false
ticket_lifetime = 24h
renew_lifetime = 7d
forwardable = true
rdns = false
pkinit_anchors = FILE:/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
spake_preauth_groups = edwards25519
dns_canonicalize_hostname = fallback
qualify_shortname = ""
# default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
dns_lookup_realm = false
ticket_lifetime = 24h
renew_lifetime = 7d
forwardable = true
rdns = false
# default_realm = EXAMPLE.COM
[realms]
# EXAMPLE.COM = {
# kdc = kerberos.example.com
# admin_server = kerberos.example.com
# kdc = kerberos.example.com
# admin_server = kerberos.example.com
# }
[domain_realm]

View file

@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
addFilter(r'spelling-error .* en_US (unencrypted)')
addFilter(r'hidden-file-or-dir /usr/share/man/man5/.k5identity.5.gz')
addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-in-var kerberos')
addFilter(r'explicit-lib-dependency libverto-module-base')
addFilter(r'shared-lib-calls-exit')
addFilter(r'dir-or-file-in-var-run /var/run/krb5kdc')
addFilter(r'devel-file-in-non-devel-package /usr/lib64/libkadm5(clnt|srv)_mit.so')
addFilter(r'non-readable /var/kerberos/krb5kdc')
addFilter(r'devel-file-in-non-devel-package /usr/lib64/libkdb_ldap.so')
addFilter(r'/usr/bin/ksu')
addFilter(r'no-documentation')
addFilter(r'invalid-directory-reference .*pkgconfig')
addFilter(r'incoherent-logrotate-file /etc/logrotate.d/k')
addFilter(r'library-not-linked-against-libc')

2241
krb5.spec

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

1
krb5_prop.portreserve Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
krb5_prop/tcp

View file

@ -4,6 +4,6 @@
monthly
rotate 12
postrotate
systemctl reload krb5kdc.service || true
/bin/kill -HUP `cat /var/run/krb5kdc.pid 2>/dev/null` 2> /dev/null || true
endscript
}

View file

@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
[Unit]
Description=Kerberos 5 KDC
Wants=network-online.target
After=syslog.target network.target network-online.target
After=syslog.target network.target
[Service]
Type=forking
PIDFile=/run/krb5kdc.pid
PIDFile=/var/run/krb5kdc.pid
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/krb5kdc
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/krb5kdc -P /run/krb5kdc.pid $KRB5KDC_ARGS
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/krb5kdc -P /var/run/krb5kdc.pid $KRB5KDC_ARGS
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
[Install]

111
noport.c Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
static int
port_is_okay(unsigned short port)
{
char *p, *q;
long l;
p = getenv("NOPORT");
while ((p != NULL) && (*p != '\0')) {
l = strtol(p, &q, 10);
if ((q == NULL) || (q == p)) {
break;
}
if ((*q == '\0') || (*q == ',')) {
if (port == l) {
errno = ECONNREFUSED;
return -1;
}
}
p = q;
p += strspn(p, ",");
}
return 0;
}
int
connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
{
unsigned short port;
static int (*next_connect)(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
if (next_connect == NULL) {
next_connect = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "connect");
if (next_connect == NULL) {
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
}
if (getenv("NOPORT") == NULL) {
return next_connect(sockfd, addr, addrlen);
}
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_port);
if (port_is_okay(port) != 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
case AF_INET6:
port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr)->sin6_port);
if (port_is_okay(port) != 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return next_connect(sockfd, addr, addrlen);
}
ssize_t
sendto(int sockfd, const void *buf, size_t len, int flags,
const struct sockaddr *dest_addr, socklen_t addrlen)
{
unsigned short port;
static int (*next_sendto)(int, const void *, size_t, int,
const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
if (next_sendto == NULL) {
next_sendto = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "sendto");
if (next_sendto == NULL) {
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
}
if (getenv("NOPORT") == NULL) {
return next_sendto(sockfd, buf, len, flags, dest_addr, addrlen);
}
if (dest_addr != NULL) {
switch (dest_addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)dest_addr)->sin_port;
port = ntohs(port);
if (port_is_okay(port) != 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
case AF_INET6:
port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)dest_addr)->sin6_port;
port = ntohs(port);
if (port_is_okay(port) != 0) {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return next_sendto(sockfd, buf, len, flags, dest_addr, addrlen);
}

View file

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
summary: Tests
discover:
how: fmf
execute:
how: tmt

View file

@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
---
inspections:
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1956479
badfuncs: off
# Not a Java package
javabytecode: off
# I need to be able to *add* functions, and also we export internal
# functions that are not considered part of our ABI.
abidiff: off
# These just flag when things change "too much"
changedfiles: off
filesize: off
patches: off
upstream: off

View file

@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
SHA512 (krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz) = 87bc06607f4d95ff604169cea22180703a42d667af05f66f1569b8bd592670c42820b335e5c279e8b4f066d1e7da20f1948a1e4def7c5d295c170cbfc7f49c71
SHA512 (krb5-1.21.3.tar.gz.asc) = 8992a5f5247315b9846aa73be4ee1ea223c0231a52d5c6c28718b1f3e3b45d62e2dad4aa5543a83163d1369bb79886b6c1c22766f22d8aa2f6b2575c54d0075c
ba90f5701fc2dda76133c1f34ba4ee80 krb5-1.14.4.tar.gz
1d91e165f25519bbb60b4715bcabda0f krb5-1.14.4.tar.gz.asc
c2385c39dfed8ecad41052abd09a49c9 krb5-1.14.4-pdfs.tar

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@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
gef config gef.disable_color True
got-audit --all

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@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
[kdcdefaults]
kdc_ports = 88
kdc_tcp_ports = 88
[realms]
${krb5REALM1} = {
#master_key_type = aes256-cts
acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal des-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-md5:normal des-cbc-crc:normal
}

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@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
# To opt out of the system crypto-policies configuration of krb5, remove the
# symlink at /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies which will not be recreated.
includedir /etc/krb5.conf.d/
[logging]
default = FILE:/var/log/krb5libs.log
kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log
admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log
[libdefaults]
default_realm = ${krb5REALM1}
dns_lookup_realm = false
ticket_lifetime = 24h
renew_lifetime = 7d
forwardable = true
rdns = false
default_ccache_name = KEYRING:persistent:%{uid}
[realms]
${krb5REALM1} = {
kdc = localhost.localdomain
admin_server = localhost.localdomain
}
[domain_realm]
${krb5HostName} = ${krb5REALM1}
[capaths]
${krb5REALM1} = .

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@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
summary: Audit the GOT for signs of tampering
description: |
Pointers in the server process GOT will be checked to ensure that
each function pointer's value is within a shared object file
that exports a symbol of that name, and that no shared object
files export conflicting symbols.
contact: Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com>
require+:
- gdb-gef # needed to test got-audit
- krb5-server
test: ./runtest.sh
framework: beakerlib

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@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# vim: dict+=/usr/share/beakerlib/dictionary.vim cpt=.,w,b,u,t,i,k
# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#
# runtest.sh of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/got-audit
# Description: Check pointers in the server process GOT for signs of tampering
# Author: Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com>
#
# Include Beaker environment
. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
krb5REALM1='TEST1.REDHAT.COM'
krb5HostName=`hostname`
krb5DomainName=`hostname -d`
krb5User='alice'
krb5UserPass='alice'
krb5UserKrbPass='aaa'
krb5User2='bob'
krb5User3='carl'
krb5KDCPass='qwe'
krb5RootPass='rrr'
krb5conf="/etc/krb5.conf"
krb5confdir="/etc/krb5.conf.d"
krb5kdcconf="/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
krb5kadmacl="/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl"
rlJournalStart
rlPhaseStartSetup
rlServiceStart sshd
rlRun "TestDir=\$(pwd)"
rlRun "TmpDir=\$(mktemp -d)" 0 "Creating tmp directory"
rlRun "pushd $TmpDir"
rlRun "auditfile=\$(mktemp --tmpdir=${TmpDir})"
rlPhaseEnd
rlPhaseStartSetup "KDC and kadmind setup"
# Stop and backup
rlRun "rlServiceStop kadmin krb5kdc"
rlRun "rm -f /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal* /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/.k5*"
rlFileBackup $krb5conf /var/kerberos/krb5kdc /etc/sysconfig/{kadmin,krb5kdc} /etc/hosts
rlFileBackup --clean /root/.k5login
[ -e /etc/krb5.keytab ] && rlFileBackup /etc/krb5.keytab
[ -e $krb5confdir ] && rlFileBackup $krb5confdir
# Basic setup of KDC and krb5.conf
rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[libdefaults\]/[libdefaults]\n default_realm = $krb5REALM1/\" $krb5conf"
rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[realms\]/[realms]\n $krb5REALM1 = {\n kdc = $krb5HostName\n admin_server = $krb5HostName\n }/\" $krb5conf"
if [ "$krb5DomainName" ]; then
rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[domain_realm\]/[domain_realm]\n .$krb5DomainName = $krb5REALM1\n $krb5DomainName = $krb5REALM1/\" $krb5conf"
else
rlRun "sed -i \"s/\[domain_realm\]/[domain_realm]\n $krb5HostName = $krb5REALM1/\" $krb5conf"
fi
rlRun "sed -i s/EXAMPLE.COM/$krb5REALM1/ $krb5kdcconf"
# Configure the kadmin ACL
rlRun "echo \"*/master@$krb5REALM1 *\" > $krb5kadmacl"
if rlIsFedora '>=31';then
rlLog "Modify supported_enctypes for Fedora >=31. Remove *DES ciphers."
rlRun "sed -i \"s/supported_enctypes.*/supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal/\" /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
elif rlIsRHEL '8' && [ `rpm -q --qf '%{VERSION}' krb5-server | cut -d"." -f2` -lt 18 ];then
rlLog "Modify supported_enctypes for RHEL-8."
rlRun "sed -i \"s/supported_enctypes.*/supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal/\" /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
else
#RHEL-8 Bug 1802334 - [Rebase] krb5: rebase to 1.18:
#- Removal of *DES encryption types
#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1802334
rlLog "Modify supported_enctypes for RHEL-8 with krb-1.18. Remove *DES ciphers."
rlRun "sed -i \"s/supported_enctypes.*/supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal/\" /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kdc.conf"
fi
# Create the realm databases
rlRun "rngd -r /dev/urandom"
rlRun "kdb5_util create -s -r $krb5REALM1 -P $krb5KDCPass"
rlRun "rlServiceStart kadmin krb5kdc"
rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"addprinc -pw $krb5RootPass root/master\""
rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"addprinc -pw $krb5UserKrbPass $krb5User\""
rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"addprinc -randkey host/$krb5HostName\""
rlRun "kadmin.local -r $krb5REALM1 -q \"ktadd host/$krb5HostName\""
# Create test system user
[ $krb5User != "root" ] && rlRun "useradd $krb5User"
rlRun "echo $krb5UserPass | passwd --stdin $krb5User"
rlPhaseEnd
rlPhaseStartTest "Run GEF got-audit"
rlRun "systemctl restart krb5kdc.service"
rlRun "systemctl restart kadmin.service"
rlRun "systemctl --no-pager status krb5kdc.service"
rlRun "systemctl --no-pager status kadmin.service"
rlRun "SERVICE_PID=\$( systemctl show --property=MainPID krb5kdc.service | cut -f2 -d= )"
rlRun "echo SERVICE_PID is '$SERVICE_PID'"
[ -n "$SERVICE_PID" ] || rlFail "No service pid was found"
rlRun "gdb-gef --pid '$SERVICE_PID' --command='$TestDir'/got-audit.gdb --batch > '$auditfile'"
# Basic test: ensure that at least one symbol is found in libc.so,
# to verify that the report looks plausible.
rlAssertGrep " : /.*/libc.so" "$auditfile"
# Ensure the got-audit did not report any errors
rlAssertNotGrep " :: ERROR" "$auditfile"
rlRun "cp '$auditfile' '$TMT_TEST_DATA'/krb5kdc-got-audit.txt"
rlRun "SERVICE_PID=\$( systemctl show --property=MainPID kadmin.service | cut -f2 -d= )"
rlRun "echo SERVICE_PID is '$SERVICE_PID'"
[ -n "$SERVICE_PID" ] || rlFail "No service pid was found"
rlRun "gdb-gef --pid '$SERVICE_PID' --command='$TestDir'/got-audit.gdb --batch > '$auditfile'"
# Basic test: ensure that at least one symbol is found in libc.so,
# to verify that the report looks plausible.
rlAssertGrep " : /.*/libc.so" "$auditfile"
# Ensure the got-audit did not report any errors
rlAssertNotGrep " :: ERROR" "$auditfile"
rlRun "cp '$auditfile' '$TMT_TEST_DATA'/kadmin-got-audit.txt"
rlPhaseEnd
rlPhaseStartCleanup
rlRun "rm -rf /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/* /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/.k5* /etc/krb5* /etc/sysconfig/{kadmin,krb5kdc}"
rlFileRestore
rlServiceRestore krb5kdc kadmin
[ $krb5User != "root" ] && rlRun "userdel -r -f $krb5User"
rlRun "popd"
rlRun "rm -r $TmpDir" 0 "Removing tmp directory"
rlPhaseEnd
rlJournalPrintText
rlJournalEnd

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@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#
# Makefile of /CoreOS/krb5/Sanity/inplace-upgrade-sanity-test
# Description: Verifies basic scenarios which should work after inplace upgrade.
# Author: Patrik Kis <pkis@redhat.com>
#
# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#
# Copyright (c) 2014 Red Hat, Inc.
#
# This copyrighted material is made available to anyone wishing
# to use, modify, copy, or redistribute it subject to the terms
# and conditions of the GNU General Public License version 2.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
# useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
# warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
# PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
# License along with this program; if not, write to the Free
# Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
# Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
#
# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
export TEST=/CoreOS/krb5/Sanity/inplace-upgrade-sanity-test
export TESTVERSION=1.0
BUILT_FILES=
FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile PURPOSE
.PHONY: all install download clean
run: $(FILES) build
./runtest.sh
build: $(BUILT_FILES)
test -x runtest.sh || chmod a+x runtest.sh
clean:
rm -f *~ $(BUILT_FILES)
include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
$(METADATA): Makefile
@echo "Owner: Patrik Kis <pkis@redhat.com>" > $(METADATA)
@echo "Name: $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "TestVersion: $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Path: $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Description: Verifies basic scenarios which should work after inplace upgrade." >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Type: Sanity" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "TestTime: 20m" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "RunFor: krb5" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Requires: expect krb5-server krb5-workstation openssh-clients openssh-server rng-tools" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Requires: setools-console" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Priority: Normal" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "License: GPLv2" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Confidential: no" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Destructive: no" >> $(METADATA)
@echo "Releases: -RHEL4 -RHELClient5 -RHELServer5" >> $(METADATA)
rhts-lint $(METADATA)

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@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
PURPOSE of /CoreOS/krb5/Sanity/inplace-upgrade-sanity-test
Description: Verifies basic scenarios which should work after inplace upgrade.
Author: Patrik Kis <pkis@redhat.com>

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@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
tag:
- CI-Tier-1
- CI-Tier-1-krb5
- Fedora 31
- Fedora 32
- FedoraReady
- IDM-CI-gating
- NoRHEL4
- NoRHEL5
- TIPpass
- TIPpass_Security
- Tier1
- Tier1security
- rhel_upgrade
tier: '1'
adjust:
- enabled: false
when: distro == rhel-4, rhel-5
continue: false
extra-nitrate: TC#0378369
extra-summary: /CoreOS/krb5/Sanity/inplace-upgrade-sanity-test

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@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
link:
- relates: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1394908
tag:
- NoRHEL4
- NoRHEL5
- TIPpass
- TIPpass_Security
- Tier2
tier: '2'
adjust:
- enabled: false
when: distro == rhel-4, rhel-5, rhel-6
continue: false
environment:
TEST_ENTROPY_SOURCE: yes
extra-nitrate: TC#0552039
extra-summary: 'BZ#1394908: Enable faster getrandom-based entropy system'

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@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
tag:
- Fedora 31
- Fedora 32
- FedoraReady
- NoRHEL4
- NoRHEL5
- rhel_upgrade
adjust:
- enabled: false
when: distro == rhel-4, rhel-5
continue: false
manual: true
extra-nitrate: TC#0608992
extra-summary: /CoreOS/krb5/Sanity/inplace-upgrade-sanity-test-manual

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@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
[kdcdefaults]
kdc_ports = 88
kdc_tcp_ports = 88
[realms]
${krb5REALM1} = {
#master_key_type = aes256-cts
acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal des-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-md5:normal des-cbc-crc:normal
}
${krb5REALM2} = {
#master_key_type = aes256-cts
acl_file = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl
dict_file = /usr/share/dict/words
admin_keytab = /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab
supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal arcfour-hmac:normal camellia256-cts:normal camellia128-cts:normal des-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-md5:normal des-cbc-crc:normal
}

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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# To opt out of the system crypto-policies configuration of krb5, remove the
# symlink at /etc/krb5.conf.d/crypto-policies which will not be recreated.
includedir /etc/krb5.conf.d/
[logging]
default = FILE:/var/log/krb5libs.log
kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log
admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log
[libdefaults]
default_realm = ${krb5REALM1}
dns_lookup_realm = false
ticket_lifetime = 24h
renew_lifetime = 7d
forwardable = true
rdns = false
default_ccache_name = KEYRING:persistent:%{uid}
[realms]
${krb5REALM1} = {
kdc = localhost.localdomain
admin_server = localhost.localdomain
}
${krb5REALM2} = {
kdc = localhost.localdomain
admin_server = localhost.localdomain
}
[domain_realm]
${krb5HostName} = ${krb5REALM1}
${krb5HostName} = ${krb5REALM2}
[capaths]
${krb5REALM1} = {
${krb5REALM2} = .
}

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