dist-git conversion

- rpmlint fixes

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+libcap-1.10.tar.bz2

Makefile

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# Makefile for source rpm: libcap
-# $Id$
-NAME := libcap
-SPECFILE = $(firstword $(wildcard *.spec))
-
-include ../common/Makefile.common

capfaq-0.2.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+This is the Linux kernel capabilities FAQ
+
+Its history, to the extent that I am able to reconstruct it is that
+v2.0 was posted to the Linux kernel list on 1999/04/02 by Boris
+Tobotras. Thanks to Denis Ducamp for forwarding me a copy.
+
+Cheers
+
+Andrew
+
+Linux Capabilities FAQ 0.2
+==========================
+
+1) What is a capability?
+
+The name "capabilities" as used in the Linux kernel can be confusing.
+First there are Capabilities as defined in computer science. A
+capability is a token used by a process to prove that it is allowed to
+do an operation on an object.  The capability identifies the object
+and the operations allowed on that object.  A file descriptor is a
+capability.  You create the file descriptor with the "open" call and
+request read or write permissions.  Later, when doing a read or write
+operation, the kernel uses the file descriptor as an index into a
+data structure that indicates what operations are allowed.  This is an
+efficient way to check permissions.  The necessary data structures are
+created once during the "open" call.  Later read and write calls only
+have to do a table lookup.  Operations on capabilities include copying
+capabilities, transferring capabilities between processes, modifying a
+capability, and revoking a capability.  Modifying a capability can be
+something like taking a read-write filedescriptor and making it
+read-only.  A capability often has a notion of an "owner" which is
+able to invalidate all copies and derived versions of a capability.
+Entire OSes are based on this "capability" model, with varying degrees
+of purity.  There are other ways of implementing capabilities than the
+file descriptor model - traditionally special hardware has been used,
+but modern systems also use the memory management unit of the CPU.
+
+Then there is something quite different called "POSIX capabilities"
+which is what Linux uses.  These capabilities are a partitioning of
+the all powerful root privilege into a set of distinct privileges (but
+look at securelevel emulation to find out that this isn't necessary
+the whole truth).  Users familiar with VMS or "Trusted" versions of
+other UNIX variants will know this under the name "privileges".  The
+name "capabilities" comes from the now defunct POSIX draft 1003.1e
+which used this name.
+
+2) So what is a "POSIX capability"?
+
+A process has three sets of bitmaps called the inheritable(I),
+permitted(P), and effective(E) capabilities.  Each capability is
+implemented as a bit in each of these bitmaps which is either set or
+unset.  When a process tries to do a privileged operation, the
+operating system will check the appropriate bit in the effective set
+of the process (instead of checking whether the effective uid of the
+process i 0 as is normally done).  For example, when a process tries
+to set the clock, the Linux kernel will check that the process has the
+CAP_SYS_TIME bit (which is currently bit 25) set in its effective set.
+
+The permitted set of the process indicates the capabilities the
+process can use.  The process can have capabilities set in the
+permitted set that are not in the effective set.  This indicates that
+the process has temporarily disabled this capability.  A process is
+allowed to set a bit in its effective set only if it is available in
+the permitted set.  The distinction between effective and permitted
+exists so that processes can "bracket" operations that need privilege.
+
+The inheritable capabilities are the capabilities of the current
+process that should be inherited by a program executed by the current
+process.  The permitted set of a process is masked against the
+inheritable set during exec().  Nothing special happens during fork()
+or clone().  Child processes and threads are given an exact copy of
+the capabilities of the parent process.
+
+3) What about other entities in the system? Users, Groups, Files?
+
+Files have capabilities.  Conceptually they have the same three
+bitmaps that processes have, but to avoid confusion we call them by
+other names.  Only executable files have capabilities, libraries don't
+have capabilities (yet).  The three sets are called the allowed set,
+the forced set, and the effective set.
+
+The allowed set indicates what capabilities the executable is allowed
+to receive from an execing process.  This means that during exec(),
+the capabilities of the old process are first masked against a set
+which indicates what the process gives away (the inheritable set of
+the process), and then they are masked against a set which indicates
+what capabilities the new process image is allowed to receive (the
+allowed set of the executable).
+
+The forced set is a set of capabilities created out of thin air and
+given to the process after execing the executable.  The forced set is
+similar in nature to the setuid feature.  In fact, the setuid bit from
+the filesystem is "read" as a full forced set by the kernel.
+
+The effective set indicates which bits in the permitted set of the new
+process should be transferred to the effective set of the new process.
+The effective set is best thought of as a "capability aware" set.  It
+should consist of only 1s if the executable is capability-dumb, or
+only 0s if the executable is capability-smart.  Since the effective
+set consists of only 0s or only 1s, the filesystem can implement this
+set using a single bit.
+
+NOTE: Filesystem support for capabilities is not part of Linux 2.2.
+
+Users and Groups don't have associated capabilities from the kernel's
+point of view, but it is entirely reasonable to associate users or
+groups with capabilities.  By letting the "login" program set some
+capabilities it is possible to make role users such as a backup user
+that will have the CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capability and be able to do
+backups.  This could also be implemented as a PAM module, but nobody
+has implemented one yet.
+
+4) What capabilities exist?
+
+The capabilities available in Linux are listed and documented in the
+file /usr/src/linux/include/linux/capability.h.
+
+5) Are Linux capabilities hierarchical?
+
+No, you cannot make a "subcapability" out of a Linux capability as in
+capability-based OSes.
+
+6) How can I use capabilities to make sure Mr. Evil Luser (eluser)
+can't exploit my "suid" programs?
+
+This is the general outline of how this works given filesystem
+capability support exists.  First, you have a PAM module that sets the
+inheritable capabilities of the login-shell of eluser.  Then for all
+"suid" programs on the system, you decide what capabilities they need
+and set the _allowed_ set of the executable to that set of
+capabilities.  The capability rules
+
+   new permitted = forced | (allowed & inheritable)
+
+means that you should be careful about setting forced capabilities on
+executables.  In a few cases, this can be useful though.  For example
+the login program needs to set the inheritable set of the new user and
+therefore needs an almost full permitted set.  So if you want eluser
+to be able to run login and log in as a different user, you will have
+to set some forced bits on that executable.
+
+7) What about passing capabilities between processes?
+
+Currently this is done by the system call "setcap" which can set the
+capabilities of another process.  This requires the CAP_SETPCAP
+capability which you really only want to grant a _few_ processes.
+CAP_SETPCAP was originally intended as a workaround to be able to
+implement filesystem support for capabilities using a daemon outside
+the kernel.
+
+There has been discussions about implementing socket-level capability
+passing.  This means that you can pass a capability over a socket.  No
+support for this exists in the official kernel yet.
+
+8) I see securelevel has been removed from 2.2 and are superceeded by
+capabilities.  How do I emulate securelevel using capabilities?
+
+The setcap system call can remove a capability from _all_ processes on
+the system in one atomic operation.  The setcap utility from the
+libcap distribution will do this for you.  The utility requires the
+CAP_SETPCAP privilege to do this.  The CAP_SETPCAP capability is not
+enabled by default.
+
+libcap is available from
+ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.2/
+
+9) I noticed that the capability.h file lacks some capabilities that
+are needed to fully emulate 2.0 securelevel.  Is there a patch for
+this?
+
+Actually yes - funny you should ask :-).  The problem with 2.0
+securelevel is that they for example stop root from accessing block
+devices.  At the same time they restrict the use of iopl.  These two
+changes are fundamentally different.  Blocking access to block devices
+means restricting something that usually isn't restricted.
+Restricting access to the use of iopl on the other hand means
+restricting (blocking) access to something that is already blocked.
+Emulating the parts of 2.0 securelevel that restricts things that are
+normally not restricted means that the capabilites in the kernel has
+to have a set of capabilities that are usually _on_ for a normal
+process (note that this breaks the explanation that capabilities are a
+partitioning of the root privileges).  There is an experimental patch at
+
+ftp://ftp.guardian.no/pub/free/linux/capabilities/patch-cap-exp-1
+
+which implements a set of capabilities with the "CAP_USER" prefix:
+
+cap_user_sock  - allowed to use socket()
+cap_user_dev   - allowed to open char/block devices
+cap_user_fifo  - allowed to use pipes
+
+These should be enough to emulate 2.0 securelevel (tell me if we need
+something more).
+
+10) Seems I need a CAP_SETPCAP capability that I don't have to make use
+of capabilities.  How do I enable this capability?
+
+Change the definition of CAP_INIT_EFF_SET and CAP_INIT_INH_SET to the
+following in include/linux/capability.h:
+
+#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET    { ~0 }
+#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET    { ~0 }
+
+This will start init with a full capability set and not with
+CAP_SETPCAP removed.
+
+11) How do I start a process with a limited set of capabilities?
+
+Get the libcap library and use the execcap utility.  The following
+example starts the update daemon with only the CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+capability.
+
+execcap 'cap_sys_admin=eip' update
+
+12) How do I start a process with a limited set of capabilities under
+another uid?
+
+Use the sucap utility which changes uid from root without loosing any
+capabilities.  Normally all capabilities are cleared when changing uid
+from root.  The sucap utility requires the CAP_SETPCAP capability.
+The following example starts updated under uid updated and gid updated
+with CAP_SYS_ADMIN raised in the Effective set.
+
+sucap updated updated execcap 'cap_sys_admin=eip' update
+
+[ Sucap is currently available from
+ftp://ftp.guardian.no/pub/free/linux/capabilities/sucap.c. Put it in
+the progs directory of libcap to compile.]
+
+13) What are the "capability rules"
+
+The capability rules are the rules used to set the capabilities of the
+new process image after an exec.  They work like this:
+
+        pI' = pI
+  (***) pP' = fP | (fI & pI)
+        pE' = pP' & fE          [NB. fE is 0 or ~0]
+
+  I=Inheritable, P=Permitted, E=Effective // p=process, f=file
+  ' indicates post-exec().
+
+Now to make sense of the equations think of fP as the Forced set of
+the executable, and fI as the Allowed set of the executable.  Notice
+how the Inheritable set isn't touched at all during exec().
+
+14) What are the laws for setting capability bits in the Inheritable,
+Permitted, and Effective sets?
+
+Bits can be transferred from Permitted to either Effective or
+Inheritable set.
+
+Bits can be removed from all sets.
+
+15) Where is the standard on which the Linux capabilities are based?
+
+There used to be a POSIX draft called POSIX.6 and later POSIX 1003.1e.
+However after the committee had spent over 10 years, POSIX decided
+that enough is enough and dropped the draft.  There will therefore not
+be a POSIX standard covering security anytime soon.  This may lead to
+that the POSIX draft is available for free, however.
+
+--
+        Best regards, -- Boris.
+

libcap-1.10-audit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/include/sys/capability.h.audit	2007-02-23 23:18:15.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/include/sys/capability.h	2007-02-23 23:18:54.000000000 +0100
+@@ -302,6 +302,10 @@
+ 
+ #define CAP_LEASE            28
+ 
++#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE      29
++
++#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30
++
+ #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
+ 
+ 

libcap-1.10-debian.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+--- libcap-1.10/Makefile.debian	1999-04-18 00:16:31.000000000 +0200
++++ libcap-1.10/Makefile	2007-02-21 14:56:33.000000000 +0100
+@@ -3,17 +3,20 @@
+ #
+ # Makefile for libcap
+ 
++ifndef topdir
+ topdir=$(shell pwd)
+-include Make.Rules
++endif
++include $(topdir)/Make.Rules
++DESTDIR=
+ 
+ #
+ # flags
+ #
+ 
+ all install clean: %: %-here
+-	make -C libcap $(MAKE_DEFS) $@
+-	make -C progs $(MAKE_DEFS) $@
+-	make -C doc $(MAKE_DEFS) $@
++	make -C $(topdir)/libcap $(MAKE_DEFS) $@
++	make -C $(topdir)/progs $(MAKE_DEFS) $@
++	make -C $(topdir)/doc $(MAKE_DEFS) $@
+ 
+ all-here:
+ 
+--- libcap-1.10/Make.Rules.debian	1999-11-18 07:06:02.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-1.10/Make.Rules	2007-02-21 14:56:33.000000000 +0100
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+ 
+ # common 'packaging' directoty
+ 
+-FAKEROOT=
++FAKEROOT=$(DESTDIR)
+ 
+ # Autoconf-style prefixes are activated when $(prefix) is defined.
+ # Otherwise binaries and libraraies are installed in /{lib,sbin}/,
+@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@
+ exec_prefix=$(prefix)
+ lib_prefix=$(exec_prefix)
+ inc_prefix=$(lib_prefix)
+-man_prefix=$(prefix)
++man_prefix=$(prefix)/share
+ else
+ prefix=/usr
+ exec_prefix=
+ lib_prefix=$(exec_prefix)
+ inc_prefix=$(prefix)
+-man_prefix=$(prefix)
++man_prefix=$(prefix)/share
+ endif
+ 
+ # Target directories
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/cap_sys.c.debian	1999-04-18 00:16:31.000000000 +0200
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/cap_sys.c	2007-02-21 14:56:33.000000000 +0100
+@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
+ #define __LIBRARY__
+ #include <linux/unistd.h>
+ 
++/* glibc >= 2.1 knows capset/capget. no need to define it here */
++/*
+ _syscall2(int, capget,
+ 	  cap_user_header_t, header,
+ 	  cap_user_data_t, data)
+@@ -18,6 +20,7 @@
+ _syscall2(int, capset,
+ 	  cap_user_header_t, header,
+ 	  const cap_user_data_t, data)
++*/
+ 
+ /*
+  * $Log: cap_sys.c,v $
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile.debian	2007-02-21 14:56:33.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile	2007-02-21 14:56:33.000000000 +0100
+@@ -24,12 +24,14 @@
+ #
+ # defines
+ #
++ifndef topdir
+ topdir=$(shell pwd)/..
+-include ../Make.Rules
++endif
++include $(topdir)/Make.Rules
+ #
+ # Library version
+ #
+-LIBNAME=libcap.so
++LIBNAME=libcap
+ #
+ 
+ FILES=cap_alloc cap_proc cap_extint cap_flag cap_text cap_sys
+@@ -39,10 +41,11 @@
+ 
+ INCLS=libcap.h cap_names.h $(INCS)
+ OBJS=$(addsuffix .o, $(FILES))
+-MAJLIBNAME=$(LIBNAME).$(VERSION)
++LOBJS=$(addsuffix .lo, $(FILES))
++MAJLIBNAME=$(LIBNAME).so.$(VERSION)
+ MINLIBNAME=$(MAJLIBNAME).$(MINOR)
+ 
+-all: $(MINLIBNAME)
++all: $(MINLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME).a
+ 
+ _makenames: _makenames.c cap_names.sed
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $< -o $@
+@@ -51,30 +54,38 @@
+ 	./_makenames > cap_names.h
+ 
+ cap_names.sed: Makefile /usr/include/linux/capability.h
+-	@echo "=> making cap_names.c from <linux/capability.h>"
+-	@sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define \([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < /usr/include/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed
+-#	@sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define CAP_\([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < /usr/include/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed
++cap_names.sed: Makefile include/sys/capability.h
++	@echo "=> making cap_names.c from <sys/capability.h>"
++	@sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define \([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < include/sys/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed 
++#   @sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define CAP_\([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < /usr/include/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed
+ 
+-$(MINLIBNAME): $(OBJS)
+-	$(CC) $(COPTFLAG) -Wl,-soname,$(MAJLIBNAME) -Wl,-x -shared -o $@ $(OBJS)
++$(LIBNAME).a: $(OBJS)
++	ar cruv $(LIBNAME).a $(OBJS)
++
++$(MINLIBNAME): $(LOBJS)
++	$(CC) $(COPTFLAG) -Wl,-soname,$(MAJLIBNAME) -Wl,-x -shared -fPIC -o $@ $(LOBJS)
+ 	ln -sf $(MINLIBNAME) $(MAJLIBNAME)
+-	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME)
++	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME).so
+ 
+ %.o: %.c $(INCLS)
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fpic -c $< -o $@
+ 
++%.lo: %.c $(INCLS)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
++
+ install: all
+ 	mkdir -p -m 0755 $(INCDIR)/sys
+ 	install -m 0644 include/sys/capability.h $(INCDIR)/sys
+ 	mkdir -p -m 0755 $(LIBDIR)
++	install -m 0644 $(LIBNAME).a $(LIBDIR)
+ 	install -m 0644 $(MINLIBNAME) $(LIBDIR)/$(MINLIBNAME)
+ 	ln -sf $(MINLIBNAME) $(LIBDIR)/$(MAJLIBNAME)
+-	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBDIR)/$(LIBNAME)
++	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBDIR)/$(LIBNAME).so
+ 	-/sbin/ldconfig
+ 
+ clean:
+ 	$(LOCALCLEAN)
+-	rm -f $(OBJS) $(LIBNAME)*
++	rm -f $(OBJS) $(LOBJS) $(LIBNAME).a $(LIBNAME).so*
+ 	rm -f cap_names.h cap_names.sed _makenames
+ 	cd include/sys && $(LOCALCLEAN)
+ 
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/_makenames.c.debian	1999-05-14 06:46:15.000000000 +0200
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/_makenames.c	2007-02-21 14:56:33.000000000 +0100
+@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+-#include <linux/capability.h>
++#include <sys/capability.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * #include 'sed' generated array
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/include/sys/capability.h.debian	2007-02-21 14:56:45.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/include/sys/capability.h	2007-02-21 14:58:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -24,14 +24,286 @@
+ #include <stdint.h>
+ 
+ /*
+- * Make sure we can be included from userland by preventing
+- * capability.h from including other kernel headers
+- */
+-#define _LINUX_TYPES_H
+-#define _LINUX_FS_H
+-typedef unsigned int __u32;
++ * This is <linux/capability.h>
++ *
++ * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com>
++ * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
++ * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
++ *
++ * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
++ *
++ * ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.2/
++ */ 
++
++#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
++#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
++
++#include <linux/types.h>
++/*#include <linux/fs.h>*/
++   
++/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
++   capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
++   kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
++   it. */
++
++/* XXX - Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX to be an "opaque" pointer to
++   a set of three capability sets.  The transposition of 3*the
++   following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
++   library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
++   etc.. */
++ 
++#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  0x19980330
++
++typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
++   __u32 version;
++   int pid;
++} *cap_user_header_t;
++ 
++typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
++        __u32 effective;
++        __u32 permitted;
++        __u32 inheritable;
++} *cap_user_data_t;
++  
++#ifdef __KERNEL__
++
++/* #define STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS */
++
++#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
++
++typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
++   __u32 cap;
++} kernel_cap_t;
++
++#else
++
++typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
++
++#endif
++  
++#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (2*sizeof(__u32))
++#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
++
++#endif
++
++
++/**
++ ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities. 
++ **/
++
++/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
++   overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
++   ownership. */
++
++#define CAP_CHOWN            0
++
++/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
++   [_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
++   CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
++
++#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1
++
++/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
++   and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
++   defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
++
++#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH  2
++    
++/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
++   file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
++   is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
++
++#define CAP_FOWNER           3
++
++/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
++   shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
++   bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
++   supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
++   the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
++   cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
++
++#define CAP_FSETID           4
++
++/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
++
++#define CAP_FS_MASK          0x1f
++
++/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
++   process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
++   of the process receiving the signal. */
++
++#define CAP_KILL             5
++
++/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
++/* Allows setgroups(2) */
++/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
++
++#define CAP_SETGID           6
++
++/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */
++/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
++
++#define CAP_SETUID           7
++
++
++/**
++ ** Linux-specific capabilities
++ **/
++
++/* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
++   remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid */
++
++#define CAP_SETPCAP          8
++
++/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
++
++#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE  9
++
++/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
++/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
++
++#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10
++
++/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
++
++#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST    11
++
++/* Allow interface configuration */
++/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
++/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
++/* Allow modification of routing tables */
++/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
++   sockets */
++/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
++/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
++/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
++/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
++/* Allow multicasting */
++/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
++/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
++
++#define CAP_NET_ADMIN        12
++
++/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
++/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
++
++#define CAP_NET_RAW          13
++
++/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
++/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
++   with IPC) */
++
++#define CAP_IPC_LOCK         14
++
++/* Override IPC ownership checks */
++
++#define CAP_IPC_OWNER        15
++
++/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
++/* Modify cap_bset */
++#define CAP_SYS_MODULE       16
++
++/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
++/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO        17
++
++/* Allow use of chroot() */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT       18
++
++/* Allow ptrace() of any process */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE       19
++
++/* Allow configuration of process accounting */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_PACCT        20
++
++/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
++/* Allow administration of the random device */
++/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
++/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
++/* Allow setting the domainname */
++/* Allow setting the hostname */
++/* Allow calling bdflush() */
++/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
++/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
++/* Allow nfsservctl */
++/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
++/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
++/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
++/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
++/* Allow removing semaphores */
++/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
++   and shared memory */
++/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
++/* Allow turning swap on/off */
++/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
++/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
++/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
++/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
++/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
++   extra ioctls) */
++/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
++/* Allow access to the nvram device */
++/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
++/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
++/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
++/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
++/* Allow setting up serial ports */
++/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
++/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
++   arbitrary SCSI commands */
++/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN        21
++
++/* Allow use of reboot() */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_BOOT         22
++
++/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
++   UID) processes */
++/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
++   processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
++   process. */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_NICE         23
++
++/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
++/* Override quota limits. */
++/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
++/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so 
++   you can override using fsuid too */
++/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
++/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
++/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
++/* Override max number of keymaps */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE     24
++
++/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
++/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
++/* Allow setting the real-time clock */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_TIME         25
++
++/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
++/* Allow vhangup() of tty */
++
++#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG   26
++
++/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
++
++#define CAP_MKNOD            27
++
++/* Allow taking of leases on files */
++
++#define CAP_LEASE            28
++
++#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
+ 
+-#include <linux/capability.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * POSIX capability types

libcap-1.10-fPIC.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile.rh2	2007-02-21 15:21:12.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile	2007-02-21 15:22:00.000000000 +0100
+@@ -65,10 +65,10 @@
+ 	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME).so
+ 
+ %.o: %.c $(INCLS)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fpic -c $< -o $@
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fPIC -c $< -o $@
+ 
+ %.lo: %.c $(INCLS)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fPIC -c $< -o $@
+ 
+ install: all
+ 	mkdir -p -m 0755 $(INCDIR)/sys

libcap-1.10-ia64.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/cap_sys.c.ia64	Mon May 21 16:23:27 2001
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/cap_sys.c	Mon May 21 16:24:09 2001
+@@ -11,14 +11,6 @@
+ #define __LIBRARY__
+ #include <linux/unistd.h>
+ 
+-_syscall2(int, capget,
+-	  cap_user_header_t, header,
+-	  cap_user_data_t, data)
+-
+-_syscall2(int, capset,
+-	  cap_user_header_t, header,
+-	  const cap_user_data_t, data)
+-
+ /*
+  * $Log: libcap-1.10-ia64.patch,v $
+  * Revision 1.1  2004/09/09 07:21:23  cvsdist
+  * auto-import changelog data from libcap-1.10-4.src.rpm
+  * * Tue Jul 10 2001 Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
+  * - don't build libcap.so.1 with ld -shared, but gcc -shared
+  *
+  * * Wed Jun 20 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrød <teg@redhat.com>
+  * - Rebuild - it was missing for alpha
+  *
+  * * Wed Jun 06 2001 Florian La Roche <Florian.LaRoche@redhat.de>
+  * - add s390/s390x support
+  *
+  * * Thu May 17 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 1.10-1
+  * - initial RPM
+  * - fix build on ia64
+  *
+  * Revision 1.1.1.1  1999/04/17 22:16:31  morgan
+--- libcap-1.10/Make.Rules.ia64	Mon May 21 16:22:08 2001
++++ libcap-1.10/Make.Rules	Mon May 21 16:22:32 2001
+@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@
+ CC=gcc
+ COPTFLAGS=-O2
+ DEBUG=-g #-DDEBUG
+-WARNINGS=-ansi -D_POSIX_SOURCE -Wall -Wwrite-strings \
++WARNINGS=-D_POSIX_SOURCE -Wall -Wwrite-strings \
+         -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wcast-align \
+         -Wtraditional -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes \
+-        -Wnested-externs -Winline -Wshadow -pedantic
++        -Wnested-externs -Winline -Wshadow
+ LD=ld
+ LDFLAGS=-s #-g
+ 

libcap-1.10-nostaticlib.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile.rh1	2007-02-21 15:00:01.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile	2007-02-21 15:00:53.000000000 +0100
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
+ MAJLIBNAME=$(LIBNAME).so.$(VERSION)
+ MINLIBNAME=$(MAJLIBNAME).$(MINOR)
+ 
+-all: $(MINLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME).a
++all: $(MINLIBNAME)
+ 
+ _makenames: _makenames.c cap_names.sed
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $< -o $@
+@@ -59,9 +59,6 @@
+ 	@sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define \([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < include/sys/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed 
+ #   @sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define CAP_\([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < /usr/include/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed
+ 
+-$(LIBNAME).a: $(OBJS)
+-	ar cruv $(LIBNAME).a $(OBJS)
+-
+ $(MINLIBNAME): $(LOBJS)
+ 	$(CC) $(COPTFLAG) -Wl,-soname,$(MAJLIBNAME) -Wl,-x -shared -fPIC -o $@ $(LOBJS)
+ 	ln -sf $(MINLIBNAME) $(MAJLIBNAME)
+@@ -77,7 +74,6 @@
+ 	mkdir -p -m 0755 $(INCDIR)/sys
+ 	install -m 0644 include/sys/capability.h $(INCDIR)/sys
+ 	mkdir -p -m 0755 $(LIBDIR)
+-	install -m 0644 $(LIBNAME).a $(LIBDIR)
+ 	install -m 0644 $(MINLIBNAME) $(LIBDIR)/$(MINLIBNAME)
+ 	ln -sf $(MINLIBNAME) $(LIBDIR)/$(MAJLIBNAME)
+ 	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBDIR)/$(LIBNAME).so
+@@ -85,7 +81,7 @@
+ 
+ clean:
+ 	$(LOCALCLEAN)
+-	rm -f $(OBJS) $(LOBJS) $(LIBNAME).a $(LIBNAME).so*
++	rm -f $(OBJS) $(LOBJS) $(LIBNAME).so*
+ 	rm -f cap_names.h cap_names.sed _makenames
+ 	cd include/sys && $(LOCALCLEAN)
+ 

libcap-1.10-shared.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--- libcap-1.11/libcap/Makefile.shared	1999-04-17 18:16:31.000000000 -0400
++++ libcap-1.11/libcap/Makefile	2002-07-19 06:24:23.000000000 -0400
+@@ -56,12 +56,12 @@ cap_names.sed: Makefile /usr/include/lin
+ #	@sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define CAP_\([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < /usr/include/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed
+ 
+ $(MINLIBNAME): $(OBJS)
+-	$(LD) -soname $(MAJLIBNAME) -x -shared -o $@ $(OBJS)
++	$(CC) -Wl,-soname,$(MAJLIBNAME) -Wl,-x -shared -o $@ $(OBJS)
+ 	ln -sf $(MINLIBNAME) $(MAJLIBNAME)
+ 	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME)
+ 
+ %.o: %.c $(INCLS)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fpic -c $< -o $@
+ 
+ install: all
+ 	mkdir -p -m 0755 $(INCDIR)/sys

libcap-1.10-useCFLAGSwithCC.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile.BAD	2006-07-13 20:42:35.000000000 -0400
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/Makefile	2006-07-13 20:42:53.000000000 -0400
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
+ #	@sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define CAP_\([^ \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^ \t]*\)/  \{ \2, \"\1\" \},/;y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/;p;}' < /usr/include/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed
+ 
+ $(MINLIBNAME): $(OBJS)
+-	$(CC) -Wl,-soname,$(MAJLIBNAME) -Wl,-x -shared -o $@ $(OBJS)
++	$(CC) $(COPTFLAG) -Wl,-soname,$(MAJLIBNAME) -Wl,-x -shared -o $@ $(OBJS)
+ 	ln -sf $(MINLIBNAME) $(MAJLIBNAME)
+ 	ln -sf $(MAJLIBNAME) $(LIBNAME)
+ 
+--- libcap-1.10/progs/Makefile.BAD	2006-07-13 20:48:44.000000000 -0400
++++ libcap-1.10/progs/Makefile	2006-07-13 20:48:54.000000000 -0400
+@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
+ all: $(PROGS)
+ 
+ $(PROGS): %: %.o
+-	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBS)
++	$(CC) $(COPTFLAG) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBS)
+ 
+ %.o: %.c $(INCS)
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@

libcap-1.10-userland.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+--- libcap-1.10/libcap/include/sys/capability.h.foo	Fri Nov  9 16:26:25 2001
++++ libcap-1.10/libcap/include/sys/capability.h	Fri Nov  9 16:28:47 2001
+@@ -21,6 +21,16 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
++#include <stdint.h>
++
++/*
++ * Make sure we can be included from userland by preventing
++ * capability.h from including other kernel headers
++ */
++#define _LINUX_TYPES_H
++#define _LINUX_FS_H
++typedef unsigned int __u32;
++
+ #include <linux/capability.h>
+ 
+ /*

libcap.spec

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+Name: libcap
+Version: 1.10
+Release: 29
+Summary: Library for getting and setting POSIX.1e capabilities
+Source: ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/%{name}-%{version}.tar.bz2
+Source1: http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt
+URL: http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/
+License: BSD-like and LGPL
+Patch1: libcap-1.10-userland.patch
+Patch2: libcap-1.10-shared.patch
+Patch3: libcap-1.10-useCFLAGSwithCC.patch
+Patch4: libcap-1.10-debian.patch
+Patch5: libcap-1.10-nostaticlib.patch
+Patch6: libcap-1.10-fPIC.patch
+Patch7: libcap-1.10-audit.patch
+Group: System Environment/Libraries
+BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
+Requires(post):   /sbin/ldconfig
+Requires(postun): /sbin/ldconfig
+
+%description
+libcap is a library for getting and setting POSIX.1e (formerly POSIX 6)
+draft 15 capabilities.
+
+%package devel
+Summary: Development files for libcap
+Group: Development/Libraries
+Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
+
+%description devel
+Development files (Headers, libraries for static linking, etc) for libcap.
+
+libcap is a library for getting and setting POSIX.1e (formerly POSIX 6)
+draft 15 capabilities.
+
+Install libcap-devel if you want to develop or compile applications using
+libcap.
+
+%prep
+%setup -q
+%patch1 -p1
+%patch2 -p1
+%patch3 -p1
+%patch4 -p1
+%patch5 -p1
+%patch6 -p1
+%patch7 -p1
+
+%build
+make PREFIX=%{_prefix} LIBDIR=%{_libdir} SBINDIR=%{_sbindir} \
+     INCDIR=%{_includedir} MANDIR=%{_mandir} COPTFLAG="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
+     %{?_smp_mflags}
+
+%install
+rm -rf ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}
+make install DESTDIR=${RPM_BUILD_ROOT} \
+             LIBDIR=${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_lib} \
+             SBINDIR=${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_sbindir} \
+             INCDIR=${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_includedir} \
+             MANDIR=${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_mandir}/ \
+             COPTFLAG="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
+mkdir -p ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_mandir}/man{2,3,8}
+mv -f doc/*.2 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_mandir}/man2/
+mv -f doc/*.3 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_mandir}/man3/
+cp %{SOURCE1} doc/
+
+chmod +x ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_lib}/*.so.*
+
+%post -p /sbin/ldconfig
+%postun -p /sbin/ldconfig
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+/%{_lib}/*.so.*
+%{_sbindir}/*
+%doc doc/capability.notes  doc/capfaq-0.2.txt
+
+%files devel
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%{_includedir}/*
+/%{_lib}/*.so
+%{_mandir}/man2/*
+%{_mandir}/man3/*
+
+%clean
+rm -rf ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}
+
+%changelog
+* Fri Feb 23 2007 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.com> 1.10-29
+- add CAP_AUDIT_WRITE and CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (#229833)
+
+* Wed Feb 21 2007 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.com> 1.10-28
+- drop obsolete ia64 patch
+- rpmlint fixes
+
+* Wed Feb 21 2007 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.com> 1.10-27
+- misc. review fixes
+- add debian patch to make it build with a recent glibc
+- remove static lib
+
+* Wed Jul 19 2006 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.de> 1.10-25
+- add patch to support COPTFLAG (#199365)
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 1.10-24.2.1
+- rebuild
+
+* Fri Feb 10 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 1.10-24.2
+- bump again for double-long bug on ppc(64)
+
+* Tue Feb 07 2006 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com> - 1.10-24.1
+- rebuilt for new gcc4.1 snapshot and glibc changes
+
+* Mon Dec 19 2005 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.de> 1.10-24
+- added development manpages
+- as there are no manpages for the executables available, added at least
+  a FAQ (#172324)
+
+* Fri Dec 09 2005 Jesse Keating <jkeating@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Mon Oct 31 2005 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 1.10-23
+- rebuild to pick up audit capabilities
+
+* Wed Mar 02 2005 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.de> 1.10-22
+- build with gcc-4
+
+* Wed Feb 09 2005 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.de> 1.10-21
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue Aug 31 2004 Phil Knirsch <pknirsch@redhat.com> 1.10-20
+- Fix wrong typedef in userland patch (#98801)
+
+* Tue Jun 15 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue Mar 02 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Fri Feb 13 2004 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue Jan 27 2004 Karsten Hopp <karsten@redhat.de> 1.10-17
+- use _manpath
+
+* Wed Jun 04 2003 Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Wed Jan 22 2003 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- rebuilt
+
+* Sat Jan  4 2003 Jeff Johnson <jbj@redhat.com> 1.10-14
+- set execute bits on library so that requires are generated.
+
+* Thu Nov 21 2002 Mike A. Harris <mharris@redhat.com> 1.10-13
+- Removed %%name macro sillyness from package Summary, description text, etc.
+- Removed archaic Prefix: tag
+- lib64 fixes everywhere to use _lib, _libdir, etc
+- Removed deletion of RPM_BUILD_DIR from %%clean section
+- Added -q flag to setup macro
+- Severely cleaned up spec file, and removed usage of perl
+
+* Fri Jul 19 2002 Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> 1.10-12
+- CFLAGS was using COPTFLAG variable, not COPTFLAGS
+- build with -fpic
+- apply the IA-64 patch everywhere, use capget/capset from glibc,
+  not directly as _syscall (as it is broken on IA-32 with -fpic)
+- reenable alpha
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2002 Tim Powers <timp@redhat.com>
+- automated rebuild
+
+* Wed May 29 2002 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 1.10-10
+- Exclude alpha for now, apparent gcc bug.
+
+* Fri Nov  9 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 1.10-6
+- Fix sys/capabilities.h header (#55727)
+- Move to /lib, some applications seem to be using this rather early
+  (#55733)
+
+* Mon Jul 16 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrød <teg@redhat.com>
+- Add post,postun scripts
+
+* Tue Jul 10 2001 Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
+- don't build libcap.so.1 with ld -shared, but gcc -shared
+
+* Wed Jun 20 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrød <teg@redhat.com>
+- Rebuild - it was missing for alpha
+
+* Wed Jun 06 2001 Florian La Roche <Florian.LaRoche@redhat.de>
+- add s390/s390x support
+
+* Thu May 17 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 1.10-1
+- initial RPM
+- fix build on ia64

sources

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+4426a413128142cab89eb2e6f13d8571  libcap-1.10.tar.bz2