diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index f760b87..7004cb5 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -62,3 +62,5 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2 /openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc /openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz /openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc +/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz +/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch index d969b5c..995e04e 100644 --- a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch +++ b/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c + } + } while (i < option_size); } - return; #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ + } diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch index d98da28..ffe0c69 100644 --- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch +++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch @@ -73,22 +73,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname)); # endif -@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con - - memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut)); - /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ -+ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ - strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user)); - strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line)); - -@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con - ut.ut_pid = getpid(); - - /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ -+ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */ - strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); - - if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) && diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c --- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100 +++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c 2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100 diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch index c884292..2c7ddc5 100644 --- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch +++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch @@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in --- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200 +++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200 @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ - kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ + kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ kexgssc.o \ sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ - sshbuf-io.o @@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "version.h" -@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +@@ -260,8 +261,44 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg; struct sshbuf *loginmsg; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ @@ -2064,6 +2064,42 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c -void demote_sensitive_data(void); +void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *); +void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *); ++ ++static int ++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) ++{ ++ switch (k->type) { ++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ case KEY_RSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_RSA: { ++ const BIGNUM *d; ++ const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey); ++ RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); ++ return d != NULL; ++ } ++ case KEY_DSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_DSA: { ++ const BIGNUM *priv_key; ++ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); ++ return priv_key != NULL; ++ } ++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ++ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: ++ case KEY_ECDSA: { ++ const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(k->pkey); ++ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdsa) != NULL; ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: ++ case KEY_ED25519: ++ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); ++ default: ++ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ ++ return 0; ++ } ++} ++ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *); /* @@ -2222,7 +2258,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { @@ -2525,7 +2593,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) - _exit(EXIT_AUTH_ATTEMPTED); + } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ - if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor()) @@ -2231,57 +2267,4 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c + mm_is_monitor()) audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif - _exit(i); -diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c ---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200 -+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200 -@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) - } - - int -+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) -+{ -+ switch (k->type) { -+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_RSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *d; -+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d); -+ return d != NULL; -+ } -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_DSA: { -+ const BIGNUM *priv_key; -+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); -+ return priv_key != NULL; -+ } -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_ECDSA: -+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; -+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: -+ case KEY_ED25519: -+ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); -+ default: -+ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ -+ return 0; -+ } -+} -+ -+int - sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) - { - if (k == NULL) -diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h ---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200 -+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200 -@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke - int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *); - - int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); -+int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); + /* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */ diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch index 6a14cb3..5d8da08 100644 --- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch +++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch @@ -427,9 +427,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c --- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200 @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ + #include + #include #include - #include - #include +#include #endif @@ -544,13 +544,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c - name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; + name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; else { - switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { + switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) { #ifdef WITH_DSA @@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); } -+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); ++ type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type); + + /* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */ + if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) { @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c + printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); -- type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); +- type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type); if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s", prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); @@ -572,31 +572,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c - key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; + key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; - type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); + type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c --- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa 2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200 +++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c 2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200 @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ + + #include #include - #include - #include +#include #include #include @@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA goto out; - - if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) { + } + if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) { + if (FIPS_mode()) + logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method"); ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } -diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c ---- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200 -+++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c 2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200 +diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c +--- openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx 2024-10-09 10:35:56.285946080 +0200 ++++ openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c 2024-10-09 10:41:52.792597194 +0200 @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" -@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh) break; #endif case KEX_C25519_SHA256: @@ -624,11 +624,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else { + r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex); + } break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t +@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t break; #endif case KEX_C25519_SHA256: @@ -649,11 +658,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c + } else { + r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, + &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, +- &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob, ++ &shared_secret); + } break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s +@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s break; #endif case KEX_C25519_SHA256: @@ -676,6 +696,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c + } else { + r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, + &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); ++ } + break; + case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256: +- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, +- &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ } else { ++ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, ++ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret); + } break; default: @@ -713,3 +744,23 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kex.c +--- openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx 2024-10-11 12:44:08.087426597 +0200 ++++ openssh-9.9p1/kex.c 2024-10-11 14:00:10.404714521 +0200 +@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + #include + #include ++#include + # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW + # include + # include +@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh + + /* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */ + if (kexalgos == NULL) +- kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ? + "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" : + "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch index fd1e59d..a666c5c 100644 --- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch +++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch @@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x +.Pp Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and their preference order. - The selected algorithm will the the first algorithm in this list that -@@ -1338,28 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa + The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that +@@ -1338,29 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa .Pp If the specified list begins with a .Sq + @@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x -.Pp -The default is: -.Bd -literal -offset indent --sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, +-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, +-mlkem768x25519-sha256, -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, @@ -517,13 +518,14 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x .Pp The supported algorithms are: .Pp -@@ -1075,16 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 +@@ -1075,17 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521 sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com .El .Pp -The default is: -.Bd -literal -offset indent --sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, +-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com, +-mlkem768x25519-sha256, -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch index c3958cd..bdc4722 100644 --- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch +++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch @@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c --- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri 2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c 2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100 -@@ -1549,10 +1549,72 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, cha +@@ -1549,10 +1549,74 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, cha idtab->nentries++; } @@ -978,6 +978,8 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c + if (provider == NULL) + return NULL; + ++ memset(canonical_provider, 0, sizeof(canonical_provider)); ++ + if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) && + strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, + strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) { @@ -1351,9 +1353,17 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-c for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { /* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || -diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c ---- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri 2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2024-01-12 14:28:09.170975480 +0100 +diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c +--- openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.xxx 2024-10-09 11:56:35.890126144 +0200 ++++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2024-10-09 11:56:48.528459585 +0200 +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT + #include "pkcs11.h" @@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo { int logged_in; }; @@ -1554,7 +1564,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c } static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; -@@ -195,6 +286,56 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method; +@@ -195,6 +286,60 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method; static int ec_key_idx = 0; #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ @@ -1571,13 +1581,17 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c + + /* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */ + switch (key->type) { -+ case KEY_RSA: -+ k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(key->rsa, rsa_idx); ++ case KEY_RSA: { ++ const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key->pkey); ++ k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx); + break; ++ } +#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW -+ case KEY_ECDSA: -+ k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, ec_key_idx); ++ case KEY_ECDSA: { ++ const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key->pkey); ++ k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx); + break; ++ } +#endif + default: + error("Unknown key type %d", key->type); @@ -1731,9 +1745,9 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c + k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; + } + - RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method); - RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11); - return (0); + if (RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method) != 1) + fatal_f("RSA_set_method failed"); + if (RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11) != 1) @@ -532,8 +683,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, return (NULL); } @@ -1764,9 +1778,9 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c + k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0; + } + - EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method); - EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11); - + if (EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method) != 1) + fatal_f("EC_KEY_set_method failed"); + if (EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11) != 1) @@ -622,7 +779,8 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ @@ -1893,7 +1907,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); @@ -810,7 +970,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_ - ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */ + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; fail: - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) @@ -1977,7 +1991,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); @@ -905,7 +1067,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr - rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */ + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; fail: - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e450c00..0000000 --- a/openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -diff --color -ruNp a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c ---- a/audit-linux.c 2024-05-09 12:38:08.843017319 +0200 -+++ b/audit-linux.c 2024-05-09 12:47:05.162267634 +0200 -@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; - const char *audit_username(void); - - static void --linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, -+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, - const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) - { - int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; -@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c - } - rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, - NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", -- username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success); -+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); - saved_errno = errno; - close(audit_fd); - -@@ -181,9 +181,11 @@ audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const - { - if (!user_login_count++) - linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); - linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); - return 0; -@@ -193,10 +195,12 @@ void - audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) - { - linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); - if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) - linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); - } -@@ -211,19 +215,27 @@ void - audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) - { - if (!user_login_count++) -- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, - li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); -- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, - li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); - } - - void - audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) - { -- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, - li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); - if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) -- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, - li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); - } - -@@ -236,6 +248,7 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e - linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event); - linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); - break; - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: -@@ -254,9 +267,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e - if (user_login_count) { - while (user_login_count--) - linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); - linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); - } -@@ -265,6 +280,7 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e - case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: - case SSH_INVALID_USER: - linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), -+ options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); - break; - default: diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch index abc6aa4..dae0932 100644 --- a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch +++ b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch @@ -94,47 +94,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen); sshbuf_reset(m); -diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh ---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck 2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100 -+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100 -@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us - cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak - cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak - --PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` -+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy -+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` - EXTRA_TYPES="" - rsa="" - -diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile ---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck 2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100 -+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile 2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100 -@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ - - tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit - --REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 -+#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping -+REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 - - # File based tests - file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS) -diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh ---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck 2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100 -+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh 2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100 -@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() { - fi - } - --SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` --SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk` -+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy -+SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'` -+SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'` - - for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do - # generate user key diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c 2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100 diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch index fbf5094..ae9550f 100644 --- a/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch +++ b/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch @@ -52,9 +52,27 @@ diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.h void audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *); void audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int); void audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *); -diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c ---- openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch 2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200 -+++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c 2022-10-24 15:21:58.165303951 +0200 +diff -up openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c +--- openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c.xxx 2024-10-15 11:49:48.092151974 +0200 ++++ openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c 2024-10-15 12:08:17.179158343 +0200 +@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; + const char *audit_username(void); + + static void +-linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, ++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, + const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) + { + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; +@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c + } + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, + NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", +- username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success); ++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; + close(audit_fd); + @@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report: } @@ -117,3 +135,112 @@ diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c out: saved_errno = errno; audit_close(audit_fd); +@@ -179,26 +211,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, + int + audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command) + { ++ char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL; + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); ++ free(audit_hostname); + return 0; + } + + void + audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command) + { ++ char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL; + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); ++ free(audit_hostname); + } + + void +@@ -211,31 +251,41 @@ void + audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) + { + if (!user_login_count++) +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + } + + void + audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) + { +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL, ++ options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname, + li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + + void + audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event) + { ++ char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL; ++ + switch(event) { + case SSH_NOLOGIN: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event); +- linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), ++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: +@@ -255,9 +305,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e + if (user_login_count) { + while (user_login_count--) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } +@@ -266,12 +318,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e + case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: + case SSH_INVALID_USER: + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), ++ audit_hostname, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + break; + default: + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + break; + } ++ free(audit_hostname); + } + + void diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0313c6f..0000000 --- a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c ---- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200 -+++ ./kexecdh.c 2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200 -@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include - - #include "sshkey.h" - #include "kex.h" - #include "sshbuf.h" - #include "digest.h" - #include "ssherr.h" -+#include "log.h" - - static int - kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key, - const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **); - -+static EC_KEY * -+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid) -+{ -+ EC_KEY *client_key = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; -+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; -+ const char *group_name; -+ -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL || -+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) -+ goto out; -+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL || -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 || -+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { -+ error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM"); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 || -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 || -+ EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 || -+ (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) { -+ error_f("Could not generate ec keys"); -+ goto out; -+ } -+out: -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); -+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); -+ return client_key; -+} -+ - int - kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex) - { -@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@ - struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; - int r; - -- if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { -- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- goto out; -- } -- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) { -+ if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@ - *server_blobp = NULL; - *shared_secretp = NULL; - -- if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { -- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- goto out; -- } -- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) { -+ if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@ - { - struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; - BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -- EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL; -- u_char *kbuf = NULL; -- size_t klen = 0; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL; -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; -+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; -+ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL; -+ size_t klen = 0, publen; -+ const char *group_name; - int r; - -+ /* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */ -+ if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) { -+ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY"); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ - *shared_secretp = NULL; - - if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@ - } - if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0) - goto out; -- if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { -+ -+ /* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED -+ * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */ -+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ sshbuf_reset(buf); -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL || -+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) { -+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 || -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 || -+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { -+ error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey"); -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 || -+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey, -+ EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 || -+ EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) { -+ error_f("Peer public key import failed"); -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -- sshbuf_reset(buf); - - #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH - fputs("public key:\n", stderr); -- sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub); -+ EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL); - #endif -- if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) { -- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ ctx = NULL; -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL || -+ EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 || -+ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 || -+ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) { -+ error_f("Failed to get derive information"); -+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; -- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || -- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen || -- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { -+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH - dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); - #endif -+ if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL || -+ (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } - if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0) - goto out; - *shared_secretp = buf; - buf = NULL; - out: -- EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey); -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); -+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); - BN_clear_free(shared_secret); - freezero(kbuf, klen); -+ freezero(pub, publen); - sshbuf_free(buf); - return r; - } diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch similarity index 50% rename from openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch rename to openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch index 8c70197..36fd1cf 100644 --- a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch +++ b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c --- openssh-9.0p1/kex.c 2023-05-25 09:24:28.731868327 +0200 +++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c 2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200 -@@ -1623,3 +1623,47 @@ +@@ -1623,3 +1623,142 @@ return r; } @@ -137,6 +137,101 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x + * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys. + * The private key can be omitted. + */ ++EVP_PKEY * ++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) ++{ ++ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) { ++ debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { ++ debug2_f("Could not build param list"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) { ++ debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed"); ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++int ++kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey) ++{ ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; ++ uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL; ++ const char *group_name; ++ const EC_POINT *pub = NULL; ++ const BIGNUM *priv = NULL; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (k == NULL) ++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL || ++ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL || ++ (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ++ group_name, ++ strlen(group_name)) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) { ++ const EC_GROUP *group; ++ size_t len; ++ ++ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); ++ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub, ++ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); ++ if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ EC_POINT_point2oct(group, ++ pub, ++ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, ++ pub_ser, ++ len, ++ bn_ctx); ++ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ++ pub_ser, ++ len) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ } ++ if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL && ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) { ++ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++out: ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); ++ free(pub_ser); ++ return ret; ++} ++ +int +kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, + const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv) @@ -281,12 +376,220 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -@@ -283,6 +286,8 @@ +@@ -283,6 +286,9@@ const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); +int kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, + const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *); ++int kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey); #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int); +diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c +--- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200 ++++ ./kexecdh.c 2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200 +@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include + + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "kex.h" + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "digest.h" + #include "ssherr.h" ++#include "log.h" + + static int + kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key, + const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **); + ++static EC_KEY * ++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid) ++{ ++ EC_KEY *client_key = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ const char *group_name; ++ ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL || ++ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) ++ goto out; ++ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 || ++ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 || ++ (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Could not generate ec keys"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++out: ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); ++ return client_key; ++} ++ + int + kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex) + { +@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@ + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + int r; + +- if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { +- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +- goto out; +- } +- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) { ++ if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@ + *server_blobp = NULL; + *shared_secretp = NULL; + +- if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { +- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +- goto out; +- } +- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) { ++ if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@ + { + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; +- EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL; +- u_char *kbuf = NULL; +- size_t klen = 0; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; ++ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; ++ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL; ++ size_t klen = 0, publen; ++ const char *group_name; + int r; + ++ /* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */ ++ if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) { ++ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY"); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + *shared_secretp = NULL; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { +@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@ + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0) + goto out; +- if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ++ ++ /* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED ++ * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */ ++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0) ++ goto out; ++ sshbuf_reset(buf); ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL || ++ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +- if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) { ++ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 || ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, ++ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 || ++ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { ++ error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey, ++ EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) { ++ error_f("Peer public key import failed"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +- sshbuf_reset(buf); + + #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + fputs("public key:\n", stderr); +- sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub); ++ EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL); + #endif +- if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) { +- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ ctx = NULL; ++ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 || ++ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) { ++ error_f("Failed to get derive information"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; +- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || +- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { ++ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen || +- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { ++ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); + #endif ++ if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL || ++ (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0) + goto out; + *shared_secretp = buf; + buf = NULL; + out: +- EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub); ++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey); ++ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); ++ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + freezero(kbuf, klen); ++ freezero(pub, publen); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return r; + } diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6a30485..0000000 --- a/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1237 +0,0 @@ -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/digest.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest.h ---- openssh-9.3p1/digest.h 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest.h 2023-06-06 15:52:25.602551466 +0200 -@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ - struct sshbuf; - struct ssh_digest_ctx; - -+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+#include -+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */ -+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type); -+#endif -+ - /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */ - int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name); - -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/digest-openssl.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest-openssl.c ---- openssh-9.3p1/digest-openssl.c 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest-openssl.c 2023-06-06 15:52:25.601551454 +0200 -@@ -64,6 +64,22 @@ - { -1, NULL, 0, NULL }, - }; - -+const EVP_MD * -+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type) -+{ -+ switch (digest_type) { -+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: -+ return EVP_sha1(); -+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: -+ return EVP_sha256(); -+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384: -+ return EVP_sha384(); -+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: -+ return EVP_sha512(); -+ } -+ return NULL; -+} -+ - static const struct ssh_digest * - ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) - { -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-dss.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-dss.c ---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-dss.c 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-dss.c 2023-06-06 15:52:25.624551743 +0200 -@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -261,11 +263,15 @@ - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, - const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat) - { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; - const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; -- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; -- size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); -+ u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; -+ size_t rlen, slen; -+ int len; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; -+ u_char *sigb = NULL; -+ const u_char *psig = NULL; - int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - - if (lenp != NULL) -@@ -276,17 +282,23 @@ - if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- if (dlen == 0) -- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - -- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, -- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) -+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0) -+ return ret; -+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len, -+ data, datalen); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ if (ret < 0) { - goto out; -+ } - -- if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { -+ psig = sigb; -+ if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -+ free(sigb); -+ sigb = NULL; - - DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); - rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); -@@ -319,7 +331,7 @@ - *lenp = len; - ret = 0; - out: -- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); -+ free(sigb); - DSA_SIG_free(sig); - sshbuf_free(b); - return ret; -@@ -331,20 +343,20 @@ - const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, - struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) - { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - DSA_SIG *dsig = NULL; - BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; -- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; -- size_t len, hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); -+ u_char *sigblob = NULL; -+ size_t len, slen; - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - char *ktype = NULL; -+ u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL; - - if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || - sig == NULL || siglen == 0) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- if (hlen == 0) -- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* fetch signature */ - if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) -@@ -386,25 +398,28 @@ - } - sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ - -- /* sha1 the data */ -- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen, -- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) -+ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(dsig, NULL)) == 0) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; -- -- switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, dsig, key->dsa)) { -- case 1: -- ret = 0; -- break; -- case 0: -- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; -+ } -+ if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; -- default: -+ } -+ psig = sigb; -+ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(dsig, &psig)) == 0) { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - -+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen, -+ sigb, slen); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ - out: -- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); -+ free(sigb); - DSA_SIG_free(dsig); - BN_clear_free(sig_r); - BN_clear_free(sig_s); -@@ -415,6 +430,65 @@ - return ret; - } - -+int -+ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey) -+{ -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub = NULL, *priv = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (k == NULL) -+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DSA", NULL)) == NULL || -+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g); -+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub, &priv); -+ -+ if (p != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (q != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (g != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (pub != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, -+ pub) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (priv != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, -+ priv) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+out: -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ return ret; -+} -+ - static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_dss_funcs = { - /* .size = */ ssh_dss_size, - /* .alloc = */ ssh_dss_alloc, -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c ---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c 2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200 -@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - - #include - -@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ - #include "digest.h" - #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL - #include "sshkey.h" -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" -+#endif - - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - -@@ -126,19 +128,29 @@ - static int - ssh_ecdsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits) - { -- EC_KEY *private; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; - - if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; -- if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) -+ -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) { -- EC_KEY_free(private); -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(k->ecdsa_nid)) <= 0 -+ || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) { -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(res); - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } -- EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); -- k->ecdsa = private; -- return 0; -+ /* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/ -+ k->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res); -+ if (k->ecdsa) -+ EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(k->ecdsa, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); -+ -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(res); -+ return (k->ecdsa) ? 0 : SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } - - static int -@@ -228,11 +240,13 @@ - const u_char *data, size_t dlen, - const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat) - { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL; -+ unsigned char *sigb = NULL; -+ const unsigned char *psig; - const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; - int hash_alg; -- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -- size_t len, hlen; -+ int len; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - -@@ -245,18 +259,33 @@ - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - -- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || -- (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) -+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen, -- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) -+ -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+ if (is_ecdsa_pkcs11(key->ecdsa)) { -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || -+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } else { -+#endif -+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0) -+ return ret; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+ } -+#endif -+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data, -+ dlen); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ if (ret < 0) { - goto out; -+ } - -- if ((esig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, hlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) { -+ psig = sigb; -+ if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&esig, &psig, len) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -- - if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; -@@ -280,7 +309,7 @@ - *lenp = len; - ret = 0; - out: -- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); -+ free(sigb); - sshbuf_free(b); - sshbuf_free(bb); - ECDSA_SIG_free(esig); -@@ -293,22 +322,21 @@ - const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, - struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) - { -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL; - BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; -- int hash_alg; -- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -- size_t hlen; -+ int hash_alg, len; - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; - char *ktype = NULL; -+ unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL; - - if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || - sig == NULL || siglen == 0) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - -- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || -- (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) -+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* fetch signature */ -@@ -344,28 +372,33 @@ - } - sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ - -- if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; -+ /* Figure out the length */ -+ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, NULL)) == 0) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen, -- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) -- goto out; -- -- switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, esig, key->ecdsa)) { -- case 1: -- ret = 0; -- break; -- case 0: -- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; -+ if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; -- default: -+ } -+ psig = sigb; -+ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, &psig)) == 0) { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - -+ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, dlen, sigb, len); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ - out: -- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); -+ free(sigb); - sshbuf_free(sigbuf); - sshbuf_free(b); - ECDSA_SIG_free(esig); -@@ -375,6 +408,79 @@ - return ret; - } - -+int -+ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey) -+{ -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; -+ uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL; -+ const char *group_name; -+ const EC_POINT *pub = NULL; -+ const BIGNUM *priv = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ -+ if (k == NULL) -+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL || -+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL || -+ (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL || -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, -+ group_name, -+ strlen(group_name)) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) { -+ const EC_GROUP *group; -+ size_t len; -+ -+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); -+ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub, -+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); -+ if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ EC_POINT_point2oct(group, -+ pub, -+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, -+ pub_ser, -+ len, -+ bn_ctx); -+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, -+ pub_ser, -+ len) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+out: -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); -+ free(pub_ser); -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* NB. not static; used by ECDSA-SK */ - const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs = { - /* .size = */ ssh_ecdsa_size, -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.c ---- openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.c 2023-06-06 15:53:36.608444190 +0200 -+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.c 2023-06-06 15:52:25.625551756 +0200 -@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - #endif - - #include "crypto_api.h" -@@ -575,6 +577,86 @@ - } - - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+int -+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp, -+ int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) -+{ -+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ u_char *sig = NULL; -+ int ret, slen; -+ size_t len; -+ -+ if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) { -+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ } -+ -+ slen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey); -+ if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) -+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ -+ len = slen; -+ if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto error; -+ } -+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), -+ NULL, pkey) != 1 || -+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 || -+ EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ *sigp = sig; -+ *lenp = len; -+ /* Now owned by the caller */ -+ sig = NULL; -+ ret = 0; -+ -+error: -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); -+ free(sig); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+int -+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data, -+ size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen) -+{ -+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ int ret; -+ -+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } -+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), -+ NULL, pkey) != 1 || -+ EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto done; -+ } -+ ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen); -+ switch (ret) { -+ case 1: -+ ret = 0; -+ break; -+ case 0: -+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; -+ break; -+ default: -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ break; -+ } -+ -+done: -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ - int - sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) -@@ -3763,3 +3845,27 @@ - return 0; - } - #endif /* WITH_XMSS */ -+ -+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+EVP_PKEY * -+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) -+{ -+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL; -+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL; -+ if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) { -+ debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) { -+ debug2_f("Could not build param list"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 || -+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) { -+ debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed"); -+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ return ret; -+} -+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.h ---- openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.h 2023-06-06 15:53:36.608444190 +0200 -+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.h 2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200 -@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - #include - #include -+#include -+#include -+#include - # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - # include - # include -@@ -266,6 +266,10 @@ - const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int, int); - char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char); -+int sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **, -+ int *, const u_char *, size_t); -+int sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *, -+ size_t, u_char *, int); - - int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); - int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); -@@ -324,6 +331,13 @@ - - void sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *); - -+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+EVP_PKEY *sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *); -+int ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **); -+int ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **); -+int ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *, int, EVP_PKEY **); -+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -+ - #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL - int sshkey_sk_fields_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b); - void sshkey_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k); -@@ -338,6 +352,10 @@ - #endif - #endif - -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+int pkcs11_get_ecdsa_idx(void); -+#endif -+ - #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) - # undef RSA - # undef DSA -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c ---- a/ssh-pkcs11.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99) -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c (date 1703110934679) -@@ -620,8 +620,24 @@ - - return (0); - } -+ -+int -+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa) -+{ -+ if (EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx) != NULL) -+ return 1; -+ return 0; -+} - #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */ - -+int -+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa) -+{ -+ if (RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx) != NULL) -+ return 1; -+ return 0; -+} -+ - /* remove trailing spaces. Note, that this does NOT guarantee the buffer - * will be null terminated if there are no trailing spaces! */ - static char * -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c ---- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99) -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (date 1703110830967) -@@ -402,8 +402,36 @@ - if (helper->nrsa == 0 && helper->nec == 0) - helper_terminate(helper); - } -+ -+int -+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa) -+{ -+ const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth; -+ ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, -+ const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey) = NULL; -+ -+ meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ecdsa); -+ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(meth, NULL, NULL, &sign_sig); -+ if (sign_sig == ecdsa_do_sign) -+ return 1; -+ return 0; -+} - #endif /* defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) */ - -+int -+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa) -+{ -+ const RSA_METHOD *meth; -+ int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from, -+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) = NULL; -+ -+ meth = RSA_get_method(rsa); -+ priv_enc = RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(meth); -+ if (priv_enc == rsa_encrypt) -+ return 1; -+ return 0; -+} -+ - /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ - static void - wrap_key(struct helper *helper, struct sshkey *k) -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h ---- a/ssh-pkcs11.h (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99) -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h (date 1703111023334) -@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ - /* Only available in ssh-pkcs11-client.c so far */ - int pkcs11_make_cert(const struct sshkey *, - const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW -+int is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa); -+#endif -+int is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa); -+ - #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) - #undef ENABLE_PKCS11 - #endif -diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c ---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c 2023-06-06 15:52:25.627551781 +0200 -@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ - - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -36,10 +36,13 @@ - #include "sshkey.h" - #include "digest.h" - #include "log.h" -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" -+#endif - - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - --static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); -+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *); - - static u_int - ssh_rsa_size(const struct sshkey *key) -@@ -131,27 +133,50 @@ - static int - ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits) - { -- RSA *private = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; - BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || - bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; -- if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL -+ || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || -- !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0) -+ goto out; -+ -+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ /* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/ -+ k->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res); -+ if (k->rsa) { -+ ret = 0; -+ } else { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } -- k->rsa = private; -- private = NULL; -- ret = 0; - out: -- RSA_free(private); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(res); - BN_free(f4); - return ret; - } -@@ -317,21 +342,6 @@ - return -1; - } - --static int --rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) --{ -- switch (type) { -- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: -- return NID_sha1; -- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: -- return NID_sha256; -- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: -- return NID_sha512; -- default: -- return -1; -- } --} -- - int - ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp) - { -@@ -393,11 +403,10 @@ - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, - const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat) - { -- const BIGNUM *rsa_n; -- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; -- size_t slen = 0; -- u_int hlen, len; -- int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ u_char *sig = NULL; -+ int len, slen = 0; -+ int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - - if (lenp != NULL) -@@ -409,33 +418,33 @@ - hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; - else - hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg); -+ - if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); -- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) -- return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); -- if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) -- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- -- /* hash the data */ -- nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg); -- if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) -- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, -- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) -- goto out; -+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) -+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - -- if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- goto out; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 -+ if (is_rsa_pkcs11(key->rsa)) { -+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL || -+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } else { -+#endif -+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0) -+ return ret; -+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - } -- -- if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, hlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+#endif -+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data, -+ datalen); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ if (ret < 0) { - goto out; - } -+ - if (len < slen) { - size_t diff = slen - len; - memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); -@@ -444,6 +453,7 @@ - ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto out; - } -+ - /* encode signature */ - if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -@@ -464,7 +474,6 @@ - *lenp = len; - ret = 0; - out: -- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - freezero(sig, slen); - sshbuf_free(b); - return ret; -@@ -476,10 +485,10 @@ - const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat, - struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp) - { -- const BIGNUM *rsa_n; -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - char *sigtype = NULL; - int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -- size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, hlen; -+ size_t len = 0, diff, modlen; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; - -@@ -487,8 +496,7 @@ - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || - sig == NULL || siglen == 0) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); -- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) -+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; - - if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) -@@ -540,16 +548,13 @@ - explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); - len = modlen; - } -- if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -- goto out; -- } -- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen, -- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) -+ -+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0) - goto out; - -- ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, hlen, sigblob, len, -- key->rsa); -+ ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, dlen, sigblob, len, pkey); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ - out: - freezero(sigblob, len); - free(sigtype); -@@ -558,125 +563,110 @@ - return ret; - } - --/* -- * See: -- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ -- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn -- */ -- --/* -- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } -- */ --static const u_char id_sha1[] = { -- 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ -- 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ -- 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ -- 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ -- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ -- 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ --}; -- --/* -- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html -- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) -- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) -- * id-sha256(1) } -- */ --static const u_char id_sha256[] = { -- 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */ -- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ -- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ -- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */ -- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ -- 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */ --}; -- --/* -- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html -- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) -- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) -- * id-sha256(3) } -- */ --static const u_char id_sha512[] = { -- 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */ -- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ -- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ -- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */ -- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ -- 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */ --}; -- - static int --rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp) -+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, -+ u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey) - { -- switch (hash_alg) { -- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: -- *oidp = id_sha1; -- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1); -- break; -- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: -- *oidp = id_sha256; -- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256); -- break; -- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: -- *oidp = id_sha512; -- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512); -- break; -- default: -- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- } -- return 0; --} -+ size_t rsasize = 0; -+ int ret; - --static int --openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, -- u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) --{ -- size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; -- int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch; -- const u_char *oid = NULL; -- u_char *decrypted = NULL; -- -- if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0) -- return ret; -- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -- hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); -- if (hashlen != hlen) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -- goto done; -- } -- rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); -+ rsasize = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey); - if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || - siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { - ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto done; - } -- if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -- goto done; -- } -- if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, -- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -- goto done; -- } -- if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; -- goto done; -- } -- oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; -- hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; -- if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { -- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; -- goto done; -- } -- ret = 0; -+ -+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, -+ sigbuf, siglen); -+ - done: -- freezero(decrypted, rsasize); - return ret; - } - -+int -+ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey) -+{ -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; -+ int ret = 0; -+ const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL; -+ const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL; -+ -+ if (k == NULL) -+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL || -+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, &d); -+ RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, &q); -+ RSA_get0_crt_params(k->rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp); -+ -+ if (n != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (e != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (d != NULL && -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d) != 1) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) { -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ /* setting this to param_build makes the creation process fail */ -+ if (p != NULL && -+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, p) != 1) { -+ debug2_f("failed to add 'p' param"); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (q != NULL && -+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, q) != 1) { -+ debug2_f("failed to add 'q' param"); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (dmp1 != NULL && -+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, dmp1) != 1) { -+ debug2_f("failed to add 'dmp1' param"); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (dmq1 != NULL && -+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, dmq1) != 1) { -+ debug2_f("failed to add 'dmq1' param"); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (iqmp != NULL && -+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, -+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, iqmp) != 1) { -+ debug2_f("failed to add 'iqmp' param"); -+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+out: -+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); -+ return ret; -+} -+ - static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_rsa_funcs = { - /* .size = */ ssh_rsa_size, - /* .alloc = */ ssh_rsa_alloc, diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cf512ef..0000000 --- a/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ ---- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 -+++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200 -@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ - - /* - * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status -- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0. -- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we -- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed -- * within a patch series. -+ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match. -+ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1 -+ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series. -+ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html - */ - - int -@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ - if (headerver == libver) - return 1; - -- /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */ -- if (headerver < 0x1000000f) { -- mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */ -+ /* -+ * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match. -+ */ -+ if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) { -+ mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */ - return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask); - } - - /* -- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library -- * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. -+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and -+ * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. - */ - mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */ - hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e9ac2ae..0000000 --- a/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,130 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c -index 618bb198..8ea831f4 100644 -diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c ---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve 2023-07-21 15:38:13.237276580 +0200 -+++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2023-07-21 15:41:30.269943569 +0200 -@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; - /* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */ - static char *allowed_providers; - -+/* -+ * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to -+ * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-bind@openssh.com). -+ */ -+static int remote_add_provider; -+ - /* locking */ - #define LOCK_SIZE 32 - #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 -@@ -1228,6 +1234,12 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) - if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) { - debug_f("internal provider"); - } else { -+ if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) { -+ verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": " -+ "remote addition of providers is disabled", -+ sk_provider); -+ goto out; -+ } - if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { - verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": " - "realpath: %s", sk_provider, -@@ -1368,7 +1380,7 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e) - - #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - static char * --sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider) -+sanitize_pkcs11_provider(SocketEntry *e, const char *provider) - { - struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL; - char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */ -@@ -1399,6 +1411,11 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro - module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */ - - if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */ -+ if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) { -+ verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of " -+ "providers is disabled", provider); -+ return NULL; -+ } - if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) { - verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", - module_path, strerror(errno)); -@@ -1455,7 +1472,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e - goto send; - } - -- sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); -+ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider); - if (sane_uri == NULL) - goto send; - -@@ -1516,7 +1533,7 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry - } - free(pin); - -- sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider); -+ sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider); - if (sane_uri == NULL) - goto send; - -@@ -2108,7 +2125,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - break; - case 'O': - if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0) -- restrict_websafe = 0; -+ restrict_websafe = 0; -+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0) -+ remote_add_provider = 1; - else - fatal("Unknown -O option"); - break; -diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c -index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644 ---- a/ssh-pkcs11.c -+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c -@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, - error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror()); - goto fail; - } -- if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { -- error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); -- goto fail; -- } -+ if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) -+ fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); - - p->module->handle = handle; - /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ ---- a/ssh-agent.1 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 -+++ b/ssh-agent.1 2023-07-19 21:39:17.981406432 +0200 -@@ -107,9 +107,27 @@ - .It Fl O Ar option - Specify an option when starting - .Nm . --Currently only one option is supported: -+Currently two options are supported: -+.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11 -+and - .Cm no-restrict-websafe . --This instructs -+.Pp -+The -+.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11 -+option allows clients of a forwarded -+.Nm -+to load PKCS#11 or FIDO provider libraries. -+By default only local clients may perform this operation. -+Note that signalling that a -+.Nm -+client remote is performed by -+.Xr ssh 1 , -+and use of other tools to forward access to the agent socket may circumvent -+this restriction. -+.Pp -+The -+.Cm no-restrict-websafe , -+instructs - .Nm - to permit signatures using FIDO keys that might be web authentication - requests. diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch similarity index 68% rename from openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch rename to openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch index c609a00..ef1f97e 100644 --- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch +++ b/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch @@ -1,55 +1,37 @@ -diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in -index e7549470..b68c1710 100644 ---- a/Makefile.in -+++ b/Makefile.in -@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ - kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ - kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \ - kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ -+ kexgssc.o \ - sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ - sshbuf-io.o +diff --color -ruNp a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +--- a/auth2.c 2024-09-16 11:45:56.858133241 +0200 ++++ b/auth2.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.688939755 +0200 +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif -@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ - auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ - auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ - auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \ -- monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ -+ monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ - auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ - loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ - sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ -@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ regress-prep: - ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile +@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + &method_passwd, +diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +--- a/auth2-gss.c 2024-09-16 11:45:56.858133241 +0200 ++++ b/auth2-gss.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.689939776 +0200 +@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ + #define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS 2048 - REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) --TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) -+TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS) + extern ServerOptions options; ++extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex; + extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi; - regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \ -diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c ---- a/auth.c.gsskex 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200 -+++ b/auth.c 2021-08-27 12:41:51.262788953 +0200 -@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const - case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: - if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || - strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || -- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) -+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 || -+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) - return 1; - break; - case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: -diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c -index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644 ---- a/auth2-gss.c -+++ b/auth2-gss.c -@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); - static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); + static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +@@ -59,6 +60,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complet static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+/* + /* + * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. + */ +static int @@ -91,10 +73,11 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644 + return (authenticated); +} + - /* ++/* * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know * how to check local user kuserok and the like) -@@ -260,7 +302,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + */ +@@ -267,7 +310,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); @@ -103,7 +86,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644 authctxt->postponed = 0; ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); -@@ -306,7 +349,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -315,7 +358,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))) @@ -112,16 +95,10 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644 else logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); -@@ -326,6 +370,17 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -333,6 +376,11 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple return 0; } -+struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = { -+ "gssapi-keyex", -+ NULL, -+ &options.gss_authentication -+}; -+ +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { + &methodcfg_gsskeyex, + userauth_gsskeyex, @@ -130,30 +107,45 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644 Authmethod method_gssapi = { &methodcfg_gssapi, userauth_gssapi, -diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c -index 0e776224..1c217268 100644 ---- a/auth2.c -+++ b/auth2.c -@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; - extern Authmethod method_kbdint; - extern Authmethod method_hostbased; +diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-methods.c b/auth2-methods.c +--- a/auth2-methods.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/auth2-methods.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.689939776 +0200 +@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey = + &options.pubkey_authentication + }; #ifdef GSSAPI -+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; - extern Authmethod method_gssapi; - #endif - -@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { - &method_none, - &method_pubkey, ++struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; + struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + NULL, +@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ static struct authmethod_cfg *authmethod + &methodcfg_none, + &methodcfg_pubkey, #ifdef GSSAPI -+ &method_gsskeyex, - &method_gssapi, ++ &methodcfg_gsskeyex, + &methodcfg_gssapi, #endif - &method_passwd, -diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c -index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644 ---- a/canohost.c -+++ b/canohost.c + &methodcfg_passwd, +diff --color -ruNp a/auth.c b/auth.c +--- a/auth.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/auth.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200 +@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const + case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: + if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || +- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) ++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 || ++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0) + return 1; + break; + case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: +diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.c b/canohost.c +--- a/canohost.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/canohost.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200 @@ -35,6 +35,99 @@ #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" @@ -254,10 +246,9 @@ index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644 void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) { -diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h -index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644 ---- a/canohost.h -+++ b/canohost.h +diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.h b/canohost.h +--- a/canohost.h 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/canohost.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200 @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ #ifndef _CANOHOST_H #define _CANOHOST_H @@ -268,11 +259,10 @@ index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644 char *get_peer_ipaddr(int); int get_peer_port(int); char *get_local_ipaddr(int); -diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c -index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644 ---- a/clientloop.c -+++ b/clientloop.c -@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c +--- a/clientloop.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/clientloop.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200 +@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" @@ -283,7 +273,7 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644 /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */ #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256" -@@ -1379,6 +1383,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, +@@ -1590,6 +1594,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt /* Do channel operations. */ channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active); @@ -298,11 +288,10 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644 /* Buffer input from the connection. */ if (conn_in_ready) client_process_net_input(ssh); -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -674,6 +674,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) +diff --color -ruNp a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +--- a/configure.ac 2024-09-16 11:45:56.870133497 +0200 ++++ b/configure.ac 2024-09-16 11:46:34.691939819 +0200 +@@ -774,6 +774,30 @@ int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeL [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) @@ -333,11 +322,10 @@ index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644 m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) -diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c -index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 ---- a/gss-genr.c -+++ b/gss-genr.c -@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c +--- a/gss-genr.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/gss-genr.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.708940181 +0200 +@@ -42,9 +42,33 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh2.h" @@ -371,7 +359,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */ int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) -@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) +@@ -60,6 +84,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf return 0; } @@ -531,7 +519,28 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) -@@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, +@@ -168,6 +345,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) + (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ (*ctx)->first = 1; + } + + /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */ +@@ -193,6 +371,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) + gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client); + if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->shared_secret); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_pubkey); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_host_key_blob); ++ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_blob); ++ explicit_bzero((*ctx)->hash, sizeof((*ctx)->hash)); ++ BN_clear_free((*ctx)->dh_client_pub); + + free(*ctx); + *ctx = NULL; +@@ -216,7 +400,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de } ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, @@ -540,11 +549,10 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); -@@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) - return (ctx->major); +@@ -246,8 +430,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con } -+OM_uint32 + OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) +{ + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; @@ -575,7 +583,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 + return(ctx->major); +} + - OM_uint32 ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) { + if (ctx == NULL) @@ -584,7 +592,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) +@@ -255,6 +473,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer return (ctx->major); } @@ -604,7 +612,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id) -@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, +@@ -271,11 +502,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, co } int @@ -622,7 +630,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && -@@ -500,6 +500,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) +@@ -285,6 +521,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); @@ -633,7 +641,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, NULL); -@@ -527,10 +527,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx +@@ -294,10 +534,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); } @@ -701,150 +709,9 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644 +} + #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c -index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644 ---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c -+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ - - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) - krb5_error_code problem; - krb5_principal princ; - OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -- int len; -+ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; - const char *errmsg; - - if (client->creds == NULL) { -@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) - return; - } - -- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); -+ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); -+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); -+ - client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; -- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; -- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); -- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); -+ client->store.filename = NULL; -+#else -+ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') -+ new_ccname++; -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); -+ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { -+ char *p; -+ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); -+ if (p) -+ *p = '\0'; -+ } -+ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) -+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); -+#endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) - - krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); - -+ client->store.data = krb_context; -+ - return; - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, -+ ssh_gssapi_client *client) -+{ -+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; -+ krb5_principal principal = NULL; -+ char *name = NULL; -+ krb5_error_code problem; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, -+ &principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { -+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ -+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { -+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ -+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ -+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, -+ ccache))) { -+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", - "Kerberos", -@@ -203,7 +285,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - NULL, - &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, - NULL, -- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds - }; - - #endif /* KRB5 */ -diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c -index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 ---- a/gss-serv.c -+++ b/gss-serv.c +diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c +--- a/gss-serv.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/gss-serv.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */ @@ -877,11 +744,10 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 #ifdef KRB5 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; -@@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) - return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); +@@ -141,6 +143,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss } -+/* Unprivileged */ + /* Unprivileged */ +char * +ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) { + if (supported_oids == NULL) @@ -904,10 +770,11 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 + return (res); +} + - /* Unprivileged */ ++/* Unprivileged */ void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) -@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + { +@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o gss_OID_set supported; gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); @@ -933,15 +800,15 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 + debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } -+ + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; + if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, + ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, + NULL, NULL, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } - -- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ + ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, + new_name, &equal); + @@ -968,7 +835,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 client->mech = NULL; -@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g if (client->mech == NULL) return GSS_S_FAILURE; @@ -982,7 +849,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &client->displayname, NULL))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g return (ctx->major); } @@ -991,7 +858,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) +@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) { @@ -1017,7 +884,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 } } -@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) +@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int /* Privileged */ int @@ -1136,11 +1003,193 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644 } /* Privileged */ -diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c -index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644 ---- a/kex.c -+++ b/kex.c -@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex) +diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; +- int len; ++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype; + const char *errmsg; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { +@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') ++ new_ccname++; ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname); ++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) { ++ char *p; ++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/'); ++ if (p) ++ *p = '\0'; ++ } ++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0)) ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + ++ client->store.data = krb_context; ++ + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -203,7 +285,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff --color -ruNp a/kex.c b/kex.c +--- a/kex.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/kex.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200 +@@ -297,17 +297,37 @@ static int + kex_compose_ext_info_server(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) + { + int r; ++ int have_key = 0; ++ int ext_count = 2; ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* ++ * Currently GSS KEX don't provide host keys as optional message, so ++ * no reasons to announce the publickey-hostbound extension ++ */ ++ if (ssh->kex->gss == NULL) ++ have_key = 1; ++#endif ++ ext_count += have_key; ++ + + if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL && + (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; +- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 3)) != 0 || ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ext_count)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, +- "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0 || +- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0) { ++ error_fr(r, "compose"); ++ return r; ++ } ++ if (have_key) { ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) { ++ error_fr(r, "compose"); ++ return r; ++ } ++ } ++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "compose"); + return r; +@@ -737,6 +757,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex) sshbuf_free(kex->server_version); sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); sshbuf_free(kex->session_id); @@ -1150,185 +1199,10 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644 sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig); sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey); free(kex->failed_choice); -diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c -index ce85f043..574c7609 100644 ---- a/kex-names.c -+++ b/kex-names.c -@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ - #include "ssherr.h" - #include "xmalloc.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - struct kexalg { - char *name; - u_int type; -@@ -115,15 +120,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { - #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ - { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, - }; -+static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = { -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, -+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+ { KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -+#endif -+ { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, -+}; - --char * --kex_alg_list(char sep) -+static char * -+kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs) - { - char *ret = NULL, *tmp; - size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const struct kexalg *k; - -- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { -+ for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) { - if (ret != NULL) - ret[rlen++] = sep; - nlen = strlen(k->name); -@@ -138,6 +156,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep) - return ret; - } - -+char * -+kex_alg_list(char sep) -+{ -+ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs); -+} -+ -+char * -+kex_gss_alg_list(char sep) -+{ -+ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs); -+} -+ - static const struct kexalg * - kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) - { -@@ -147,6 +177,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) - if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) - return k; - } -+ for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { -+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) -+ return k; -+ } - return NULL; - } - -@@ -315,3 +349,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) - free(ret); - return r; - } -+ -+/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */ -+int -+kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names) -+{ -+ char *s, *cp, *p; -+ -+ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0') -+ return 0; -+ s = cp = xstrdup(names); -+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; -+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { -+ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0 -+ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { -+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); -+ free(s); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ } -+ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names); -+ free(s); -+ return 1; -+} -diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h -index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644 ---- a/kex.h -+++ b/kex.h -@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange { - KEX_ECDH_SHA2, - KEX_C25519_SHA256, - KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, -+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, -+ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, -+#endif - KEX_MAX - }; - -@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex { - u_int flags; - int hash_alg; - int ec_nid; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ int gss_deleg_creds; -+ int gss_trust_dns; -+ char *gss_host; -+ char *gss_client; -+#endif - char *failed_choice; - int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); - struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); -@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex { - int kex_nid_from_name(const char *); - int kex_names_valid(const char *); - char *kex_alg_list(char); -+char *kex_gss_alg_list(char); - char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); - int kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *); -+int kex_gss_names_valid(const char *); - int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); - void kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], - const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); -@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); - int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); - int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *); - int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *); -+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) -+int kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *); -+int kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *); -+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); -+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); -+#endif - - int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); - int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, -@@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, - const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t, - u_char *, size_t *); - -+int kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, -+ const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit, -+ const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob, -+ const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub, -+ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen); -+ - void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) - __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) - __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); -diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c -index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644 ---- a/kexdh.c -+++ b/kexdh.c -@@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex) +diff --color -ruNp a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c +--- a/kexdh.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/kexdh.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.693939862 +0200 +@@ -49,13 +49,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex) { switch (kex->kex_type) { case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: @@ -1352,10 +1226,9 @@ index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644 kex->dh = dh_new_group16(); break; case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: -diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c -index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644 ---- a/kexgen.c -+++ b/kexgen.c +diff --color -ruNp a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c +--- a/kexgen.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/kexgen.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.693939862 +0200 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh); @@ -1365,12 +1238,10 @@ index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644 kex_gen_hash( int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, -diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..f6e1405e ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kexgssc.c -@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c +--- a/kexgssc.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ b/kexgssc.c 2024-10-14 15:18:02.491798105 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * @@ -1420,38 +1291,206 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e + +#include "ssh-gss.h" + ++static int input_kexgss_hostkey(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++ ++static int ++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ /* compute shared secret */ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)] & 0x80) ++ fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); ++ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ if (sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob) != 65) ++ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match " ++ "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", ++ sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)); ++ ++ if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) ++ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); ++ ++ r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); ++ break; ++ default: ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ break; ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, ++ (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty), ++ kex->client_pub, gss->server_blob, shared_secret, ++ hash, &hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ if (r != 0) ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ ++ gss->buf.value = hash; ++ gss->buf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok))) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = gss; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob); ++ gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob); ++ gss->server_blob = NULL; ++ } ++out: ++ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); ++ kex->client_pub = NULL; ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static int ++kexgss_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds, ++ token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ /* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr); ++ ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (gss->first) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss->first = 0; ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgss_complete); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr); ++ ++ return kexgss_final(ssh); ++} ++ +int +kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -+ recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -+ gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; -+ u_char *msg; -+ int type = 0; -+ int first = 1; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ u_char c; + int r; + + /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -+ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID) + fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); + -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host)) + fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); + + if (kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client)) + fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); + + /* Step 1 */ @@ -1472,523 +1511,447 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e + fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); + } + if (r != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); + return r; + } ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); ++} + -+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++static int ++input_kexgss_hostkey(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ u_char *tmp = NULL; ++ size_t tmp_len = 0; ++ int r; + -+ do { -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (gss->server_host_key_blob) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if ((gss->server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) ++ fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); ++ return 0; ++} + -+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -+ &ret_flags); ++static int ++input_kexgss_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ int r; + -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, -+ SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); + -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); ++} + -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++static int ++input_kexgss_complete(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ u_char c; ++ int r; + -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); + -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (first) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ first = 0; -+ } else { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL) ++ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); + -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ do { -+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -+ u_char *tmp = NULL; -+ size_t tmp_len = 0; ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (c) { ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); + -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (server_host_key_blob) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) -+ fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); -+ } -+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); + -+ switch (type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ if (msg_tok.value != NULL) -+ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || -+ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &msg_tok)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ return kexgss_final(ssh); ++} + -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if (c) { -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( -+ ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ /* No token included */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { -+ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); -+ } -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); -+ default: -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ token_ptr = &recv_tok; -+ } else { -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++static int ++input_kexgss_error(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ u_char *msg; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->major)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->minor)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/*******************************************************/ ++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/ ++/*******************************************************/ ++ ++int ++kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ int r; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; ++ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ kex->nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, &input_kexgssgex_group); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* + * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the + * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok + */ + -+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ -+ /* compute shared secret */ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -+ r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80) -+ fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); -+ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65) -+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match" -+ "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob)); -+ -+ if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) -+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); -+ -+ r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); -+ break; -+ default: -+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ break; -+ } -+ if (r != 0) ++ /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */ ++ /* 8. C computes shared secret */ ++ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, gss->server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); + goto out; ++ } ++ sshbuf_free(buf); ++ buf = NULL; + -+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ kex->client_version, -+ kex->server_version, -+ kex->my, -+ kex->peer, -+ (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), -+ kex->client_pub, -+ server_blob, -+ shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -+ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ goto out; ++ } + -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, ++ kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, ++ (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty), ++ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), ++ hash, &hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ if (r != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss->buf.value = hash; ++ gss->buf.length = hashlen; + + /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok))) + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); + -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok); + + if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss); + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ gss_kex_context = gss; + else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); + ++ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob); ++ gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob); ++ gss->server_blob = NULL; ++ } +out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); -+ explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); -+ sshbuf_free(empty); -+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); -+ sshbuf_free(server_blob); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); -+ sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); -+ kex->client_pub = NULL; + return r; +} + -+int -+kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) ++static int ++kexgssgex_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -+ recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf, -+ msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *g = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; -+ u_char *msg; -+ int type = 0; -+ int first = 1; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; -+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; -+ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; -+ u_char c; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags; + int r; + -+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -+ == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); + -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) -+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds, ++ token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags); + -+ if (kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) -+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ /* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } + -+ debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr); + -+ kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; -+ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; -+ kex->nbits = nbits; -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); + -+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0) -+ fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (gss->first) { ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss->first = 0; ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgssgex_complete); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr); ++ ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_group(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("Received SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, NULL); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + -+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < kex->min || BN_num_bits(p) > kex->max) + fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); ++ kex->min, BN_num_bits(p), kex->max); + + if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) + fatal("dn_new_group() failed"); + p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ + -+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ return r; ++ } + -+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); ++} + -+ do { -+ /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ int r; + -+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -+ &ret_flags); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); + -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, -+ SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); -+ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (first) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ first = 0; -+ } else { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ do { -+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -+ u_char *tmp = NULL; -+ size_t tmp_len = 0; -+ -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (server_host_key_blob) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) -+ fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); -+ } -+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -+ -+ switch (type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ if (msg_tok.value != NULL) -+ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || -+ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &msg_tok)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if (c) { -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( -+ ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ /* No token included */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); -+ default: -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ token_ptr = &recv_tok; -+ } else { -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ /* -+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the -+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok -+ */ -+ -+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) + fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); ++} + -+ /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */ -+ /* 8. C computes shared secret */ -+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || -+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ sshbuf_free(buf); -+ buf = NULL; ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_complete(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ u_char c; ++ int r; + -+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); ++ ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL) ++ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 || ++ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ if (c) { ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) ++ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); + } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); + -+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); + -+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ if ((r = kexgex_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ kex->client_version, -+ kex->server_version, -+ kex->my, -+ kex->peer, -+ (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), -+ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, -+ dh_p, dh_g, -+ pub_key, -+ dh_server_pub, -+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), -+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ -+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ -+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) -+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); -+out: -+ sshbuf_free(buf); -+ sshbuf_free(server_blob); -+ sshbuf_free(empty); -+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); -+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); -+ sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); -+ return r; ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh); +} + +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ -diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c -new file mode 100644 -index 00000000..60bc02de ---- /dev/null -+++ b/kexgsss.c -@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c +--- a/kexgsss.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ b/kexgsss.c 2024-10-14 15:18:02.491798105 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * @@ -2041,33 +2004,18 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de + +extern ServerOptions options; + ++static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); ++ +int +kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ /* -+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -+ * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ */ -+ -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); -+ int type = 0; + gss_OID oid; + char *mechs; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ int r; + + /* Initialise GSSAPI */ + @@ -2083,135 +2031,94 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de + debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); + oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); + if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); + + debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); + -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) + fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); + -+ do { -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); -+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -+ switch(type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -+ if (gssbuf.value != NULL) -+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (kex->gss == NULL) ++ fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context"); + -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -+ r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, -+ &shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, -+ &shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, -+ &shared_secret); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ if (r != 0) -+ goto out; ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgss_init); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue); ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); ++ return 0; ++} + -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++static inline void ++kexgss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ int r; + -+ /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the -+ * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent -+ * buffer state->incoming_packet -+ */ -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ if ((r = kex_gen_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ kex->client_version, -+ kex->server_version, -+ kex->peer, -+ kex->my, -+ empty, -+ client_pubkey, -+ server_pubkey, -+ shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -+ goto out; ++ gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok); + -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); + -+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); -+ client_pubkey = NULL; ++ if (gss->buf.value == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); + -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ break; -+ default: -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, -+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ } ++} + -+ maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -+ &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++static inline int ++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ int r; + -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); + -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ -+ if (gssbuf.value == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); -+ -+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ if (send_tok->length > 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } + fatal("accept_ctx died"); + } + -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) + fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); + -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) + fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); + -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok))) + fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, gss->server_pubkey)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (send_tok->length != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ @@ -2220,13 +2127,19 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok); ++ ++ hashlen = gss->hashlen; ++ memcpy(hash, gss->hash, hashlen); ++ explicit_bzero(gss->hash, sizeof(gss->hash)); ++ shared_secret = gss->shared_secret; ++ gss->shared_secret = NULL; + + if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ gss_kex_context = gss; + else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); @@ -2235,44 +2148,126 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de + * just exchanged. */ + if (options.gss_store_rekey) + ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+out: -+ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(gss->server_pubkey); ++ gss->server_pubkey = NULL; ++ } + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); -+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); -+ sshbuf_free(server_pubkey); + return r; +} + ++static int ++input_kexgss_init(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ struct sshbuf *empty; ++ struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: ++ r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: ++ r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: ++ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ } ++ ++ /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the ++ * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent ++ * buffer state->incoming_packet ++ */ ++ gss->hashlen = sizeof(gss->hash); ++ r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, ++ kex->peer, kex->my, empty, client_pubkey, gss->server_pubkey, ++ gss->shared_secret, gss->hash, &gss->hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); ++ if (r != 0) { ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ gss->buf.value = gss->hash; ++ gss->buf.length = gss->hashlen; ++ ++ kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgss_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ ++/*******************************************************/ ++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/ ++/*******************************************************/ ++ +int +kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ /* -+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -+ * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ */ -+ -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -+ int type = 0; + gss_OID oid; + char *mechs; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; -+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; -+ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ -+ struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); -+ int r; + + /* Initialise GSSAPI */ + @@ -2280,29 +2275,194 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de + * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back + * into life + */ -+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) -+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) -+ free(mechs); ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) { ++ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ free(mechs); ++ } + + debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); + oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); + if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); + + debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); + -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) + fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); + -+ /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ if (kex->gss == NULL) ++ fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context"); ++ + debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, &input_kexgssgex_groupreq); ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static inline void ++kexgssgex_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ int r; ++ ++ gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok); ++ ++ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (gss->dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ } ++} ++ ++static inline int ++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh, ++ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, ++ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; ++ size_t hashlen; ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; ++ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; ++ int r; ++ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { ++ if (send_tok->length > 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ /* calculate shared secret */ ++ shared_secret = sshbuf_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, gss->dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); ++ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); ++ hashlen = sizeof(hash); ++ r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, ++ kex->peer, kex->my, empty, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, ++ gss->dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), ++ sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen); ++ sshbuf_free(empty); ++ if (r != 0) ++ fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss->buf.value = hash; ++ gss->buf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ if (send_tok->length != 0) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ ++ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } else { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ } ++ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = gss; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ ++ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ ++ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) ++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++ ++ if (kex->gss != NULL) ++ BN_clear_free(gss->dh_client_pub); ++ ++out: ++ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); ++ return r; ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; ++ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ ++ int r; ++ ++ /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ ++ ++ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ received"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, NULL); ++ + /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ + kex->nbits = nbits; + kex->min = cmin; + kex->max = cmax; @@ -2310,9 +2470,10 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de + max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax); + nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); + nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); ++ + if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) -+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, nbits, max); ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", min, nbits, max); ++ + kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max); + if (kex->dh == NULL) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found"); @@ -2330,152 +2491,285 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de + fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ -+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); -+ type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -+ switch(type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) -+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -+ &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ break; -+ default: -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, -+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ -+ maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -+ &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); -+ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ -+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); -+ -+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) { ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); ++ DH_free(kex->dh); ++ kex->dh = NULL; ++ return r; + } + -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ /* calculate shared secret */ -+ if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) -+ goto out; -+ -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); -+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); -+ hashlen = sizeof(hash); -+ if ((r = kexgex_hash( -+ kex->hash_alg, -+ kex->client_version, -+ kex->server_version, -+ kex->peer, -+ kex->my, -+ empty, -+ cmin, nbits, cmax, -+ dh_p, dh_g, -+ dh_client_pub, -+ pub_key, -+ sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), -+ hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -+ fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); -+ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } else { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ -+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) -+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); -+ -+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we -+ * just exchanged. */ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey) -+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+out: -+ sshbuf_free(empty); -+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); -+ sshbuf_free(shared_secret); -+ return r; ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgssgex_init); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue); ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); ++ return 0; +} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_init(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received"); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &gss->dh_client_pub)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ ++ kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ ++static int ++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type, ++ u_int32_t seq, ++ struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ int r; ++ ++ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) ++ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); ++ ++ kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); ++} ++ +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ -diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c -index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 ---- a/monitor.c -+++ b/monitor.c -@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); +diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h +--- a/kex.h 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/kex.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.710940224 +0200 +@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ + #include "mac.h" + #include "crypto_api.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++# include "ssh-gss.h" /* Gssctxt */ ++#endif ++ + #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + # include + # include +@@ -102,6 +106,15 @@ enum kex_exchange { + KEX_C25519_SHA256, + KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, + KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256, ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, ++#endif + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -164,6 +177,13 @@ struct kex { + u_int flags; + int hash_alg; + int ec_nid; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ Gssctxt *gss; ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *failed_choice; + int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); + struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); +@@ -189,8 +209,10 @@ int kex_hash_from_name(const char *); + int kex_nid_from_name(const char *); + int kex_names_valid(const char *); + char *kex_alg_list(char); ++char *kex_gss_alg_list(char); + char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); + int kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *); ++int kex_gss_names_valid(const char *); + int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); + void kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], + const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +@@ -224,6 +246,12 @@ int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); + int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); + int kex_gen_client(struct ssh *); + int kex_gen_server(struct ssh *); ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++int kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *); ++int kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *); ++int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); ++int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); ++#endif + + int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *); + int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **, +@@ -256,6 +284,12 @@ int kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbu + const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t, + u_char *, size_t *); + ++int kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version, ++ const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit, ++ const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob, ++ const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub, ++ const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen); ++ + void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); +diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c +--- a/kex-names.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/kex-names.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.694939883 +0200 +@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ + #include "ssherr.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + struct kexalg { + char *name; + u_int type; +@@ -83,15 +87,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { + #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, + }; ++static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256, ++ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++ { KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, ++#endif ++ { NULL, 0, -1, -1}, ++}; + +-char * +-kex_alg_list(char sep) ++static char * ++kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs) + { + char *ret = NULL, *tmp; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct kexalg *k; + +- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(k->name); +@@ -106,6 +123,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep) + return ret; + } + ++char * ++kex_alg_list(char sep) ++{ ++ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs); ++} ++ ++char * ++kex_gss_alg_list(char sep) ++{ ++ return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs); ++} ++ + static const struct kexalg * + kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + { +@@ -115,6 +144,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; + } ++ for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { ++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0) ++ return k; ++ } + return NULL; + } + +@@ -328,3 +361,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const c + free(ret); + return r; + } ++ ++/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */ ++int ++kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names) ++{ ++ char *s, *cp, *p; ++ ++ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0') ++ return 0; ++ s = cp = xstrdup(names); ++ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; ++ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { ++ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0 ++ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { ++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); ++ free(s); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names); ++ free(s); ++ return 1; ++} +diff --color -ruNp a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +--- a/Makefile.in 2024-09-16 11:45:56.868133454 +0200 ++++ b/Makefile.in 2024-09-16 11:46:34.695939904 +0200 +@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ + kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \ + kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \ ++ kexgssc.o \ + sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \ + sshbuf-io.o + +@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ SSHD_SESSION_OBJS=sshd-session.o auth-rh + auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ + auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \ +- monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ ++ monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \ + auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ +@@ -529,7 +530,7 @@ regress-prep: + ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile + + REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) +-TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) ++TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS) + + regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \ +diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c +--- a/monitor.c 2024-09-16 11:45:56.861133305 +0200 ++++ b/monitor.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.696939926 +0200 +@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh * int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *); @@ -2484,7 +2778,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { +@@ -219,11 +221,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, @@ -2503,7 +2797,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif -@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) +@@ -292,6 +301,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); @@ -2514,7 +2808,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { -@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s +@@ -344,8 +357,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, auth_method, auth_submethod); @@ -2531,7 +2825,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 if (authenticated || partial) { auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod); -@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) +@@ -413,6 +433,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); @@ -2542,7 +2836,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); -@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor) +@@ -1793,6 +1817,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif @@ -2560,7 +2854,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; -@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +@@ -1885,8 +1920,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *p; int r; @@ -2571,7 +2865,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse"); -@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +@@ -1918,8 +1953,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ int r; @@ -2582,7 +2876,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc"); -@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +@@ -1939,6 +1974,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); @@ -2590,7 +2884,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 } return (0); } -@@ -1871,8 +1900,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +@@ -1950,8 +1986,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, OM_uint32 ret; int r; @@ -2601,7 +2895,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) -@@ -1898,13 +1927,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +@@ -1977,13 +2013,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { @@ -2623,7 +2917,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) -@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +@@ -1992,7 +2032,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); @@ -2636,7 +2930,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); -@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +@@ -2000,5 +2044,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } @@ -2721,11 +3015,10 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644 + #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h -index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644 ---- a/monitor.h -+++ b/monitor.h -@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { +diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.h b/monitor.h +--- a/monitor.h 2024-09-16 11:45:56.861133305 +0200 ++++ b/monitor.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.696939926 +0200 +@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, @@ -2734,11 +3027,10 @@ index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644 }; struct ssh; -diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c -index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644 ---- a/monitor_wrap.c -+++ b/monitor_wrap.c -@@ -993,13 +993,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) +diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c +--- a/monitor_wrap.c 2024-09-16 11:45:56.862133326 +0200 ++++ b/monitor_wrap.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.697939947 +0200 +@@ -1075,13 +1075,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss } int @@ -2755,7 +3047,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, -@@ -1012,6 +1014,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) +@@ -1094,6 +1096,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } @@ -2815,11 +3107,10 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644 #endif /* GSSAPI */ /* -diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h -index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644 ---- a/monitor_wrap.h -+++ b/monitor_wrap.h -@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, +diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h +--- a/monitor_wrap.h 2024-09-16 11:45:56.862133326 +0200 ++++ b/monitor_wrap.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.697939947 +0200 +@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(s OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); @@ -2831,10 +3122,10 @@ index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644 #endif #ifdef USE_PAM -diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c ---- a/readconf.c.gsskex 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200 -+++ b/readconf.c 2021-08-27 12:25:42.556421509 +0200 -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +--- a/readconf.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/readconf.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.699939990 +0200 +@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" @@ -2842,7 +3133,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c /* Format of the configuration file: -@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ typedef enum { +@@ -164,6 +165,8 @@ typedef enum { oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, @@ -2851,7 +3142,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, -@@ -206,10 +209,22 @@ static struct { +@@ -210,10 +213,22 @@ static struct { /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, @@ -2874,7 +3165,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c #endif #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, -@@ -1113,10 +1128,42 @@ parse_time: +@@ -1227,10 +1242,42 @@ parse_time: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; @@ -2917,7 +3208,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; -@@ -2306,7 +2353,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) +@@ -2542,7 +2589,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; @@ -2931,7 +3222,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; -@@ -2463,8 +2516,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) +@@ -2705,8 +2758,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; @@ -2950,7 +3241,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -3246,7 +3309,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha +@@ -3533,7 +3596,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); @@ -2965,10 +3256,10 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c #endif /* GSSAPI */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); -diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h ---- a/readconf.h.gsskex 2021-08-27 12:05:29.248142431 +0200 -+++ b/readconf.h 2021-08-27 12:22:19.270679852 +0200 -@@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ typedef struct { +diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.h b/readconf.h +--- a/readconf.h 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/readconf.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.699939990 +0200 +@@ -40,7 +40,13 @@ typedef struct { int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ @@ -2982,10 +3273,10 @@ diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ -diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c ---- a/servconf.c.gsskex 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200 -+++ b/servconf.c 2021-08-27 12:28:15.887735189 +0200 -@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +--- a/servconf.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/servconf.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.700940011 +0200 +@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" @@ -2993,7 +3284,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE "sshd" -@@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions +@@ -137,8 +138,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; @@ -3005,7 +3296,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; -@@ -356,10 +360,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption +@@ -376,10 +380,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; @@ -3024,7 +3315,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -506,6 +518,7 @@ typedef enum { +@@ -558,6 +570,7 @@ typedef enum { sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, @@ -3032,7 +3323,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, -@@ -587,12 +600,22 @@ static struct { +@@ -643,12 +656,22 @@ static struct { #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, @@ -3055,7 +3346,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */ -@@ -1576,6 +1599,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO +@@ -1585,6 +1608,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; @@ -3066,7 +3357,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; -@@ -1584,6 +1611,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO +@@ -1593,6 +1620,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; goto parse_flag; @@ -3089,7 +3380,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; -@@ -2892,6 +2935,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) +@@ -3178,6 +3221,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); @@ -3100,11 +3391,10 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, -diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h -index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644 ---- a/servconf.h -+++ b/servconf.h -@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ typedef struct { +diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h +--- a/servconf.h 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/servconf.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.700940011 +0200 +@@ -149,8 +149,11 @@ typedef struct { int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if * authenticated with Kerberos. */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ @@ -3116,11 +3406,10 @@ index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644 int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ -diff --git a/session.c b/session.c -index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644 ---- a/session.c -+++ b/session.c -@@ -2678,13 +2678,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) +diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c +--- a/session.c 2024-09-16 11:45:56.866133411 +0200 ++++ b/session.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.701940032 +0200 +@@ -2674,13 +2674,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && @@ -3142,127 +3431,10 @@ index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644 #endif /* remove agent socket */ -diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h -index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644 ---- a/ssh-gss.h -+++ b/ssh-gss.h -@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@ - - #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 - -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "gss-nistp256-sha256-" -+#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "gss-curve25519-sha256-" -+ -+#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \ -+ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \ -+ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \ -+ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \ -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \ -+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID -+ - typedef struct { - char *filename; - char *envvar; - char *envval; -+ struct passwd *owner; - void *data; - } ssh_gssapi_ccache; - -@@ -72,8 +92,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_buffer_desc displayname; - gss_buffer_desc exportedname; - gss_cred_id_t creds; -+ gss_name_t name; - struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; - ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int used; -+ int updated; - } ssh_gssapi_client; - - typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { -@@ -84,6 +107,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { - int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); - int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); - void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); -+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); - } ssh_gssapi_mech; - - typedef struct { -@@ -94,10 +118,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_OID oid; /* client */ - gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ - gss_name_t client; /* server */ -- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ -+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ - } Gssctxt; - - extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; -+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; - - int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); - void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); -@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *); - - struct sshbuf; - int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *); -+int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *); - - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int, -@@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, - const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *); --int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); -+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); - - /* In the server */ -+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, -+ const char *, const char *); -+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); -+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); --int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); -+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); - void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); - void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); - const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); - -+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); -+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void); -+ -+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); -+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void); -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ -diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 -index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644 ---- a/ssh.1 -+++ b/ssh.1 -@@ -503,7 +503,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see +diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 +--- a/ssh.1 2024-09-16 11:45:56.875133603 +0200 ++++ b/ssh.1 2024-09-16 11:46:34.701940032 +0200 +@@ -536,7 +536,13 @@ For full details of the options listed b .It GatewayPorts .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication @@ -3276,7 +3448,7 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644 .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms -@@ -624,6 +624,8 @@ +@@ -624,6 +630,8 @@ flag), (supported message integrity codes), .Ar kex (key exchange algorithms), @@ -3285,11 +3457,10 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644 .Ar key (key types), .Ar key-ca-sign -diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c -index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644 ---- a/ssh.c -+++ b/ssh.c -@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) +diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +--- a/ssh.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/ssh.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.702940054 +0200 +@@ -827,6 +827,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); @@ -3298,7 +3469,7 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644 else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) -@@ -772,8 +774,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) +@@ -857,8 +859,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { cp = xstrdup( "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n" @@ -3309,10 +3480,9 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644 } if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); -diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config -index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644 ---- a/ssh_config -+++ b/ssh_config +diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config b/ssh_config +--- a/ssh_config 2024-09-16 11:45:56.884133795 +0200 ++++ b/ssh_config 2024-09-16 11:46:34.702940054 +0200 @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no @@ -3322,11 +3492,10 @@ index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644 # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP no # AddressFamily any -diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 -index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644 ---- a/ssh_config.5 -+++ b/ssh_config.5 -@@ -766,10 +766,68 @@ The default is +diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +--- a/ssh_config.5 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 2024-09-16 11:46:34.703940075 +0200 +@@ -938,10 +938,68 @@ The default is Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Cm no . @@ -3395,11 +3564,10 @@ index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644 .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 -diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c -index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 ---- a/sshconnect2.c -+++ b/sshconnect2.c -@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) +diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +--- a/sshconnect2.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/sshconnect2.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.703940075 +0200 +@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL; int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; @@ -3411,11 +3579,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; xxx_conn_info = cinfo; -@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) - options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs, +@@ -255,6 +260,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st compression_alg_list(options.compression), hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms); -+ + +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + if (options.gss_keyex) { + /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this @@ -3451,10 +3618,11 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 + } + } +#endif - ++ free(hkalgs); -@@ -224,14 +256,44 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + /* start key exchange */ +@@ -271,15 +312,45 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif @@ -3473,6 +3641,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) @@ -3500,7 +3669,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || -@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +@@ -368,6 +439,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int typ static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); @@ -3508,7 +3677,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 #endif void userauth(struct ssh *, char *); -@@ -346,6 +409,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); +@@ -384,6 +456,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI @@ -3520,7 +3689,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, userauth_gssapi_cleanup, -@@ -716,12 +784,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -755,12 +832,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) OM_uint32 min; int r, ok = 0; gss_OID mech = NULL; @@ -3554,7 +3723,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count && -@@ -730,13 +811,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -769,13 +866,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, @@ -3571,7 +3740,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 if (!ok || mech == NULL) return 0; -@@ -976,6 +1059,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -1009,6 +1108,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p free(lang); return r; } @@ -3627,11 +3796,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644 #endif /* GSSAPI */ static int -diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c -index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644 ---- a/sshd.c -+++ b/sshd.c -@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) +diff --color -ruNp a/sshd.c b/sshd.c +--- a/sshd.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/sshd.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200 +@@ -1551,7 +1551,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) free(fp); } accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); @@ -3641,95 +3809,10 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } -diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c -index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644 ---- a/sshd-session.c -+++ b/sshd-session.c -@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) - } - debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys); - if (nkeys == 0) -- fatal_f("no hostkeys"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ debug3_f("no hostkeys"); -+ else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); - sshbuf_free(buf); - } -@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) - - free(hkalgs); - -+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) -+ { -+ char *orig; -+ char *gss = NULL; -+ char *newstr = NULL; -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising -+ * the other key exchange algorithms -+ */ -+ -+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) -+ orig = NULL; -+ -+ if (options.gss_keyex) -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -+ else -+ gss = NULL; -+ -+ if (gss && orig) -+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ else if (gss) -+ newstr = gss; -+ else if (orig) -+ newstr = orig; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host -+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only -+ * host key algorithm we support -+ */ -+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; -+ -+ if (newstr) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; -+ else -+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* start key exchange */ - if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) - fatal_r(r, "kex_setup"); -@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) - #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; - #endif --#endif -+# ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+# endif -+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; - kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; - kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; -diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config -index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644 ---- a/sshd_config -+++ b/sshd_config -@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys +diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config b/sshd_config +--- a/sshd_config 2024-09-16 11:45:56.888133880 +0200 ++++ b/sshd_config 2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200 +@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes @@ -3738,11 +3821,10 @@ index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will -diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 -index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644 ---- a/sshd_config.5 -+++ b/sshd_config.5 -@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache +diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +--- a/sshd_config.5 2024-09-16 11:45:56.885133816 +0200 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200 +@@ -739,6 +739,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr on logout. The default is .Cm yes . @@ -3754,7 +3836,7 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644 .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor a client authenticates against. -@@ -660,6 +665,32 @@ machine's default store. +@@ -753,6 +758,32 @@ machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. The default is .Cm yes . @@ -3787,15 +3869,235 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. -diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c -index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644 ---- a/sshkey.c -+++ b/sshkey.c -@@ -127,6 +127,75 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { - extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl; +diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c +--- a/sshd-session.c 2024-09-16 11:45:56.888133880 +0200 ++++ b/sshd-session.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.705940118 +0200 +@@ -660,8 +660,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) + } + debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys); + if (nkeys == 0) +- fatal_f("no hostkeys"); +- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) ++ debug3_f("no hostkeys"); ++ else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); + sshbuf_free(buf); + } +@@ -1180,8 +1180,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + break; + } + } +- if (!have_key) +- fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys"); ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ ++ if (!have_key && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys and GSS KEX is not configured"); + + /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ + new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; +@@ -1462,6 +1463,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + + free(hkalgs); + ++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"); ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = xstrdup("null"); ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "kex_setup"); +@@ -1479,7 +1522,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; + #endif +-#endif ++# ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++# endif ++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; +diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h +--- a/ssh-gss.h 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/ssh-gss.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.710940224 +0200 +@@ -61,10 +61,36 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "gss-group14-sha256-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "gss-group16-sha512-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "gss-nistp256-sha256-" ++#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "gss-curve25519-sha256-" ++ ++#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \ ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID ++ ++#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */ ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -72,8 +98,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -84,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -94,10 +124,21 @@ typedef struct { + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ ++ struct sshbuf *shared_secret; /* both */ ++ struct sshbuf *server_pubkey; /* server */ ++ struct sshbuf *server_blob; /* client */ ++ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob; /* client */ ++ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; /* client */ ++ gss_buffer_desc buf; /* both */ ++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; /* both */ ++ size_t hashlen; /* both */ ++ int first; /* client */ ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub; /* server (gex) */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -108,6 +149,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported( + + struct sshbuf; + int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *); ++int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *); + + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int, +@@ -122,17 +164,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, + const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *, const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); ++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void); ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ +diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c +--- a/sshkey.c 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/sshkey.c 2024-09-16 11:46:34.706940139 +0200 +@@ -131,6 +131,75 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_x extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl; #endif -+ + +static int ssh_gss_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) +{ + return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; @@ -3864,10 +4166,11 @@ index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644 + /* .keybits = */ 0, /* FIXME */ + /* .funcs = */ &sshkey_gss_funcs, +}; - ++ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = { &sshkey_ed25519_impl, -@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { + &sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl, +@@ -169,6 +238,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpl &sshkey_xmss_impl, &sshkey_xmss_cert_impl, #endif @@ -3875,7 +4178,7 @@ index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644 NULL }; -@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep) +@@ -324,7 +394,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) { impl = keyimpls[i]; @@ -3884,11 +4187,10 @@ index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644 continue; if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly) continue; -diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h -index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644 ---- a/sshkey.h -+++ b/sshkey.h -@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum sshkey_types { +diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h +--- a/sshkey.h 2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/sshkey.h 2024-09-16 11:46:34.706940139 +0200 +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ enum sshkey_types { KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, KEY_ED25519_SK, KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, @@ -3896,47 +4198,3 @@ index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644 KEY_UNSPEC }; -diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h ---- a/packet.h (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99) -+++ b/packet.h (date 1703172586447) -@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ - int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *); - - int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *); -+int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type); - int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); - int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len); - int ssh_packet_process_read(struct ssh *, int); -diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c ---- a/packet.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99) -+++ b/packet.c (date 1703172586447) -@@ -1425,6 +1416,29 @@ - return type; - } - -+/* -+ * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches -+ * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. -+ */ -+ -+int -+ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) -+{ -+ int r; -+ u_char type; -+ -+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) -+ return r; -+ if (type != expected_type) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, -+ "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", -+ expected_type, type)) != 0) -+ return r; -+ return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ - static int - ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) - { diff --git a/openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch b/openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0f2eabb..0000000 --- a/openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1965 +0,0 @@ -diff --color -ruNp a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c ---- a/gss-genr.c 2024-05-16 15:49:43.999411060 +0200 -+++ b/gss-genr.c 2024-06-26 12:17:55.586856954 +0200 -@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) - (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; - (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME; - (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -+ (*ctx)->first = 1; - } - - /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */ -@@ -371,6 +372,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) - gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client); - if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) - gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds); -+ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->shared_secret); -+ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_pubkey); -+ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_host_key_blob); -+ sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_blob); -+ explicit_bzero((*ctx)->hash, sizeof((*ctx)->hash)); -+ BN_clear_free((*ctx)->dh_client_pub); - - free(*ctx); - *ctx = NULL; -diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c ---- a/kexgssc.c 2024-05-16 15:49:43.820407648 +0200 -+++ b/kexgssc.c 2024-07-02 16:26:25.628746744 +0200 -@@ -47,566 +47,658 @@ - - #include "ssh-gss.h" - --int --kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) -+static int input_kexgss_hostkey(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgss_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgss_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgssgex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgssgex_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+ -+static int -+kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh) - { - struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -- recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -- gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; -- Gssctxt *ctxt; -- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -- struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; -+ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; - struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; -- u_char *msg; -- int type = 0; -- int first = 1; -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; - u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - size_t hashlen; -- u_char c; - int r; - -- /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -- if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -- == GSS_C_NO_OID) -- fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); -- -- if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) -- fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); -- -- if (kex->gss_client && -- ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) -- fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); -- -- /* Step 1 */ -- switch (kex->kex_type) { -- case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -- case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -- case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -- case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -- r = kex_dh_keypair(kex); -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -- r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex); -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -- r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); -- break; -- default: -- fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); -- } -- if (r != 0) { -- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -- return r; -- } -- -- token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; -- -- do { -- debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -- -- maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -- kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -- &ret_flags); -- -- if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -- /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ -- if (send_tok.length != 0) { -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, -- SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -- send_tok.length)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- } -- fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -- } -- -- /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -- if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); -- -- if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -- /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -- fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -- -- /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -- fatal("Integrity check failed"); -- } -- -- /* -- * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -- * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -- */ -- if (send_tok.length != 0) { -- if (first) { -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -- send_tok.length)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0) -- fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- first = 0; -- } else { -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -- send_tok.length)) != 0) -- fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- } -- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -- -- /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -- do { -- type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -- if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -- u_char *tmp = NULL; -- size_t tmp_len = 0; -- -- debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -- if (server_host_key_blob) -- fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) -- fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) -- fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); -- } -- } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -- -- switch (type) { -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -- debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -- if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &recv_tok)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- break; -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -- debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -- if (msg_tok.value != NULL) -- fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || -- (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &msg_tok)) != 0) -- fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- -- /* Is there a token included? */ -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- if (c) { -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( -- ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) -- fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -- if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); -- } else { -- /* No token included */ -- if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -- } -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { -- fatal("Expecting end of packet."); -- } -- break; -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -- debug("Received Error"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); -- default: -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -- type); -- } -- token_ptr = &recv_tok; -- } else { -- /* No data, and not complete */ -- if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -- } -- } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -- - /* - * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the - * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok - */ - -- if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -- fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -- - /* compute shared secret */ - switch (kex->kex_type) { - case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: - case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: - case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: - case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -- r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); -+ r = kex_dh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); - break; - case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -- if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80) -+ if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)] & 0x80) - fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!"); -- r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); -+ r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); - break; - case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -- if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65) -- fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match" -- "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob)); -+ if (sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob) != 65) -+ fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match " -+ "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", -+ sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)); - -- if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) -+ if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) - fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04"); - -- r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret); -+ r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret); - break; - default: - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - break; - } -- if (r != 0) -+ if (r != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - goto out; -+ } - - if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - - hashlen = sizeof(hash); -- if ((r = kex_gen_hash( -- kex->hash_alg, -- kex->client_version, -- kex->server_version, -- kex->my, -- kex->peer, -- (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), -- kex->client_pub, -- server_blob, -- shared_secret, -- hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -+ r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, -+ kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, -+ (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty), -+ kex->client_pub, gss->server_blob, shared_secret, -+ hash, &hashlen); -+ sshbuf_free(empty); -+ if (r != 0) - fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); - -- gssbuf.value = hash; -- gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ gss->buf.value = hash; -+ gss->buf.length = hashlen; - - /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok))) - sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); - -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok); - - if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -- ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss); - - if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -- gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ gss_kex_context = gss; - else -- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - - if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) - r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); - -+ if (kex->gss != NULL) { -+ sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob); -+ gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL; -+ sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob); -+ gss->server_blob = NULL; -+ } - out: -- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); - explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); -- sshbuf_free(empty); -- sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); -- sshbuf_free(server_blob); -+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); - sshbuf_free(shared_secret); - sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub); - kex->client_pub = NULL; - return r; - } - -+static int -+kexgss_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, -+ gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags; -+ int r; -+ -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -+ -+ gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds, -+ token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { -+ /* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr); -+ -+ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (gss->first) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss->first = 0; -+ } else { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgss_complete); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr); -+ -+ return kexgss_final(ssh); -+} -+ - int --kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) -+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) - { - struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -- recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf, -- msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr; -- Gssctxt *ctxt; -- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -- struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -- BIGNUM *p = NULL; -- BIGNUM *g = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL; -- BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; -- u_char *msg; -- int type = 0; -- int first = 1; -- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -- size_t hashlen; -- const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; -- int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; -- struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; -- u_char c; - int r; - - /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -- if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -- == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID) - fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); - -- if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host)) - fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); - - if (kex->gss_client && -- ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client)) - fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); - -- debug("Doing group exchange"); -- nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); -+ /* Step 1 */ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -+ r = kex_dh_keypair(kex); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ if (r != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ return r; -+ } -+ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); -+} - -- kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; -- kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; -- kex->nbits = nbits; -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+static int -+input_kexgss_hostkey(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ u_char *tmp = NULL; -+ size_t tmp_len = 0; -+ int r; -+ -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (gss->server_host_key_blob) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if ((gss->server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) -+ fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); -+ return 0; -+} - -- if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0) -- fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+static int -+input_kexgss_continue(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ int r; - -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 || -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); -+ -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); -+} - -- if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) -- fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", -- min, BN_num_bits(p), max); -+static int -+input_kexgss_complete(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ u_char c; -+ int r; - -- if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) -- fatal("dn_new_group() failed"); -- p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); -+ -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL) -+ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 || -+ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if (c) { -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); - -- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) -- goto out; -- DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); - -- token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; -+ return kexgss_final(ssh); -+} - -- do { -- /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ -- debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -- -- maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -- kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -- &ret_flags); -- -- if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -- /* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */ -- if (send_tok.length != 0) { -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, -- SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -- send_tok.length)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- } -- fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -- } -+static int -+input_kexgss_error(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ u_char *msg; -+ int r; - -- /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -- if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); -- -- if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -- /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -- fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -- -- /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -- fatal("Integrity check failed"); -- } -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->major)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->minor)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); -+ return 0; -+} - -- /* -- * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -- * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -- */ -- if (send_tok.length != 0) { -- if (first) { -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, -- send_tok.length)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- first = 0; -- } else { -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value, -- send_tok.length)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- } -- if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -- -- /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -- do { -- type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -- if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -- u_char *tmp = NULL; -- size_t tmp_len = 0; -- -- debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -- if (server_host_key_blob) -- fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL) -- fatal("sshbuf_from failed"); -- } -- } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -- -- switch (type) { -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -- debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -- if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &recv_tok)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- break; -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -- debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -- if (msg_tok.value != NULL) -- fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 || -- (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &msg_tok)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- -- /* Is there a token included? */ -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- if (c) { -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc( -- ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -- if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); -- } else { -- /* No token included */ -- if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -- } -- break; -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -- debug("Received Error"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */ -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg); -- default: -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -- type); -- } -- token_ptr = &recv_tok; -- } else { -- /* No data, and not complete */ -- if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -- fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -- } -- } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+/*******************************************************/ -+/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/ -+/*******************************************************/ -+ -+int -+kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ int r; -+ -+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); -+ -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host)) -+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); -+ -+ if (kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client)) -+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); -+ -+ debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; -+ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; -+ kex->nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); -+ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP"); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, &input_kexgssgex_group); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int -+kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; -+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* - * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the -- * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok -+ * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok - */ - -- if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -- fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -- - /* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */ - /* 8. C computes shared secret */ - if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || -- (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 || -- (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) -+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, gss->server_blob)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - goto out; -+ } - sshbuf_free(buf); - buf = NULL; - - if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - -- if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) -+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - goto out; -+ } -+ - if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); - DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); - hashlen = sizeof(hash); -- if ((r = kexgex_hash( -- kex->hash_alg, -- kex->client_version, -- kex->server_version, -- kex->my, -- kex->peer, -- (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty), -- kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, -- dh_p, dh_g, -- pub_key, -- dh_server_pub, -- sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), -- hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -+ r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, -+ kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer, -+ (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty), -+ kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, pub_key, -+ dh_server_pub, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), -+ hash, &hashlen); -+ sshbuf_free(empty); -+ if (r != 0) - fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r)); - -- gssbuf.value = hash; -- gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ gss->buf.value = hash; -+ gss->buf.length = hashlen; - - /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok))) - sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify"); - -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok); - - if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -- ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss); - - if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -- gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ gss_kex_context = gss; - else -- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - - /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ - if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) - r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); -+ -+ if (kex->gss != NULL) { -+ sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob); -+ gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL; -+ sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob); -+ gss->server_blob = NULL; -+ } - out: -- sshbuf_free(buf); -- sshbuf_free(server_blob); -- sshbuf_free(empty); - explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); - DH_free(kex->dh); - kex->dh = NULL; - BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); - sshbuf_free(shared_secret); -- sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob); - return r; - } - -+static int -+kexgssgex_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, -+ gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags; -+ int r; -+ -+ /* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */ -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -+ -+ gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds, -+ token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { -+ /* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr); -+ -+ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (gss->first) { -+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss->first = 0; -+ } else { -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgssgex_complete); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr); -+ -+ return kexgssgex_final(ssh); -+} -+ -+static int -+input_kexgssgex_group(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *g = NULL; -+ int r; -+ -+ debug("Received SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP"); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, NULL); -+ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < kex->min || BN_num_bits(p) > kex->max) -+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ kex->min, BN_num_bits(p), kex->max); -+ -+ if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) -+ fatal("dn_new_group() failed"); -+ p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ -+ -+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ return r; -+ } -+ -+ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); -+} -+ -+static int -+input_kexgssgex_continue(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ int r; -+ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); -+ -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); -+} -+ -+static int -+input_kexgssgex_complete(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ u_char c; -+ int r; -+ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL); -+ -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL) -+ fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 || -+ (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ if (c) { -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0) -+ fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("Expecting end of packet."); -+ -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok); -+ -+ return kexgssgex_final(ssh); -+} -+ - #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ -diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c ---- a/kexgsss.c 2024-05-16 15:49:43.820407648 +0200 -+++ b/kexgsss.c 2024-07-02 16:29:05.744790839 +0200 -@@ -50,33 +50,18 @@ - - extern ServerOptions options; - -+static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgssgex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -+ - int - kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - { - struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -- -- /* -- * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -- * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -- * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -- * activating this non-standard behaviour. -- */ -- -- OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -- gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok; -- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -- Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); -- int type = 0; - gss_OID oid; - char *mechs; -- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -- size_t hashlen; -- int r; - - /* Initialise GSSAPI */ - -@@ -92,135 +77,91 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); - oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); - if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -- fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); - - debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) - fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); - -- do { -- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); -- type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -- switch(type) { -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -- if (gssbuf.value != NULL) -- fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &recv_tok)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ if (kex->gss == NULL) -+ fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context"); -+ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgss_init); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue); -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); -+ return 0; -+} - -- switch (kex->kex_type) { -- case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -- case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -- case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -- case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -- r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, -- &shared_secret); -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -- r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, -- &shared_secret); -- break; -- case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -- r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey, -- &shared_secret); -- break; -- default: -- fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); -- } -- if (r != 0) -- goto out; -- -- /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -- -- /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the -- * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent -- * buffer state->incoming_packet -- */ -- hashlen = sizeof(hash); -- if ((r = kex_gen_hash( -- kex->hash_alg, -- kex->client_version, -- kex->server_version, -- kex->peer, -- kex->my, -- empty, -- client_pubkey, -- server_pubkey, -- shared_secret, -- hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -- goto out; -- -- gssbuf.value = hash; -- gssbuf.length = hashlen; -- -- sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); -- client_pubkey = NULL; -- -- break; -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &recv_tok)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- break; -- default: -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, -- "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -- type); -- } -+static inline void -+kexgss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, -+ gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, -+ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, -+ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ int r; - -- maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -- &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok); - -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); -+ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); - -- if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -- fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ if (gss->buf.value == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); - -- if (gssbuf.value == NULL) -- fatal("No client public key"); -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); -+ } -+} - -- if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -- debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -- } -- } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+static inline int -+kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh, -+ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, -+ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; -+ int r; -+ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -- if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { -+ if (send_tok->length > 0) { - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - } - fatal("accept_ctx died"); - } - -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) - fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); - -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) - fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok))) - fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); - - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, gss->server_pubkey)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) - fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - -- if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (send_tok->length != 0) { - if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0) - fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - } else { - if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ -@@ -229,59 +170,139 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh) - if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok); - - if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -- gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ gss_kex_context = gss; - else -- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - -- if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) -+ if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, gss->hash, gss->hashlen, gss->shared_secret)) == 0) - r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); - - /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we - * just exchanged. */ - if (options.gss_store_rekey) - ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); --out: -- sshbuf_free(empty); -- explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); -- sshbuf_free(shared_secret); -- sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); -- sshbuf_free(server_pubkey); -+ -+ if (kex->gss != NULL) { -+ explicit_bzero(gss->hash, sizeof(gss->hash)); -+ sshbuf_free(gss->shared_secret); -+ gss->shared_secret = NULL; -+ sshbuf_free(gss->server_pubkey); -+ gss->server_pubkey = NULL; -+ } - return r; - } - --int --kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) -+static int -+input_kexgss_init(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) - { - struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; -+ struct sshbuf *empty; -+ struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ int r; -+ -+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received"); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); - -- /* -- * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -- * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -- * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -- * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512: -+ r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256: -+ r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256: -+ r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ if (r != 0) { -+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ return r; -+ } -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ -+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ } -+ -+ /* Calculate the hash early so we can free the -+ * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent -+ * buffer state->incoming_packet - */ -+ gss->hashlen = sizeof(gss->hash); -+ r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, -+ kex->peer, kex->my, empty, client_pubkey, gss->server_pubkey, -+ gss->shared_secret, gss->hash, &gss->hashlen); -+ sshbuf_free(empty); -+ sshbuf_free(client_pubkey); -+ if (r != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ return r; -+ } -+ -+ gss->buf.value = gss->hash; -+ gss->buf.length = gss->hashlen; -+ -+ kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return 0; - -+ return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+} -+ -+static int -+input_kexgss_continue(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -- gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; -- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -- Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -- struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -- int type = 0; -+ int r; -+ -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return 0; -+ -+ return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+} -+ -+/*******************************************************/ -+/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/ -+/*******************************************************/ -+ -+int -+kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; - gss_OID oid; - char *mechs; -- u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -- size_t hashlen; -- BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; -- const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; -- int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; -- int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ -- struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new(); -- int r; - - /* Initialise GSSAPI */ - -@@ -289,153 +310,125 @@ kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) - * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back - * into life - */ -- if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) -- if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) -- free(mechs); -+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) { -+ mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -+ free(mechs); -+ } - - debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name); - oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); - if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -- fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); - - debug2_f("Acquiring credentials"); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid))) - fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); - -- /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ -- debug("Doing group exchange"); -- ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -- /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */ -- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- kex->nbits = nbits; -- kex->min = cmin; -- kex->max = cmax; -- min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin); -- max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax); -- nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); -- nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); -- if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) -- fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", -- min, nbits, max); -- kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max); -- if (kex->dh == NULL) { -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found"); -- fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found"); -- } -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ if (kex->gss == NULL) -+ fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context"); - -- DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- -- if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- -- /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ -- if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) -- goto out; -+ debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, &input_kexgssgex_groupreq); -+ return 0; -+} - -- do { -- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); -- type = ssh_packet_read(ssh); -- switch(type) { -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -- if (dh_client_pub != NULL) -- fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &recv_tok)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+static inline void -+kexgssgex_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, -+ gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, -+ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, -+ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ int r; - -- /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -- break; -- case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -- if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, -- &recv_tok)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- break; -- default: -- sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, -- "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -- type); -- } -+ gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok); - -- maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -- &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); - -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok); -+ if (gss->dh_client_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); - -- if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -- fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); -+ } -+} - -- if (dh_client_pub == NULL) -- fatal("No client public key"); -+static inline int -+kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh, -+ gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, -+ OM_uint32 *ret_flags) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; -+ size_t hashlen; -+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; -+ struct sshbuf *empty = NULL; -+ int r; - -- if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -- debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -- if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -- } -- } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -- if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) { -+ if (send_tok->length > 0) { - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 || -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - } - fatal("accept_ctx died"); - } - -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) - fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); - -- if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) - fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); - - /* calculate shared secret */ -- if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ shared_secret = sshbuf_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } -- if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) -+ if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, gss->dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -+ goto out; -+ } - - DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); - DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); - hashlen = sizeof(hash); -- if ((r = kexgex_hash( -- kex->hash_alg, -- kex->client_version, -- kex->server_version, -- kex->peer, -- kex->my, -- empty, -- cmin, nbits, cmax, -- dh_p, dh_g, -- dh_client_pub, -- pub_key, -- sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), -- hash, &hashlen)) != 0) -+ r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version, -+ kex->peer, kex->my, empty, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, -+ gss->dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), -+ sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen); -+ sshbuf_free(empty); -+ if (r != 0) - fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - -- gssbuf.value = hash; -- gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ gss->buf.value = hash; -+ gss->buf.length = hashlen; - -- if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok))) - fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); - - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 || -@@ -443,24 +436,24 @@ kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) - (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0) - fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - -- if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (send_tok->length != 0) { - if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */ -- (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0) -+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0) - fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - } else { - if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */ - fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - } - if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -- fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -- gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok); - - if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -- gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ gss_kex_context = gss; - else -- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); - - /* Finally derive the keys and send them */ - if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) -@@ -470,13 +463,128 @@ kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) - * just exchanged. */ - if (options.gss_store_rekey) - ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+ -+ if (kex->gss != NULL) -+ BN_clear_free(gss->dh_client_pub); -+ - out: -- sshbuf_free(empty); - explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); - DH_free(kex->dh); - kex->dh = NULL; -- BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); - sshbuf_free(shared_secret); - return r; - } -+ -+static int -+input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; -+ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; -+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; -+ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */ -+ int r; -+ -+ /* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */ -+ -+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ received"); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, NULL); -+ -+ /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */ -+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ kex->nbits = nbits; -+ kex->min = cmin; -+ kex->max = cmax; -+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin); -+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax); -+ nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); -+ nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); -+ -+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) -+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", min, nbits, max); -+ -+ kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max); -+ if (kex->dh == NULL) { -+ sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found"); -+ fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found"); -+ } -+ -+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); -+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ -+ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) { -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss); -+ DH_free(kex->dh); -+ kex->dh = NULL; -+ return r; -+ } -+ -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgssgex_init); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue); -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT"); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int -+input_kexgssgex_init(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ int r; -+ -+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received"); -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL); -+ -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &gss->dh_client_pub)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ -+ kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return 0; -+ -+ return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+} -+ -+static int -+input_kexgssgex_continue(int type, -+ u_int32_t seq, -+ struct ssh *ssh) -+{ -+ Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ int r; -+ -+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 || -+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) -+ fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); -+ -+ kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+ if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) -+ return 0; -+ -+ return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags); -+} -+ - #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */ -diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h ---- a/kex.h 2024-05-16 15:49:43.986410812 +0200 -+++ b/kex.h 2024-06-18 12:19:48.580347469 +0200 -@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ - #include "mac.h" - #include "crypto_api.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+# include "ssh-gss.h" /* Gssctxt */ -+#endif -+ - #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - # include - # include -@@ -177,6 +181,7 @@ struct kex { - int hash_alg; - int ec_nid; - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ Gssctxt *gss; - int gss_deleg_creds; - int gss_trust_dns; - char *gss_host; -diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h ---- a/ssh-gss.h 2024-05-16 15:49:43.837407972 +0200 -+++ b/ssh-gss.h 2024-06-27 14:12:48.659866937 +0200 -@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds; - KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \ - KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID - -+#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */ -+ - typedef struct { - char *filename; - char *envvar; -@@ -127,6 +129,16 @@ typedef struct { - gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ - gss_name_t client; /* server */ - gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ -+ struct sshbuf *shared_secret; /* both */ -+ struct sshbuf *server_pubkey; /* server */ -+ struct sshbuf *server_blob; /* client */ -+ struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob; /* client */ -+ gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; /* client */ -+ gss_buffer_desc buf; /* both */ -+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; /* both */ -+ size_t hashlen; /* both */ -+ int first; /* client */ -+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub; /* server (gex) */ - } Gssctxt; - - extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45a021e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c +--- a/session.c 2025-04-29 11:20:59.475107377 +0200 ++++ b/session.c 2025-04-29 11:23:16.638538968 +0200 +@@ -2284,7 +2284,8 @@ session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__); + if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag || +- !options.allow_agent_forwarding) { ++ !options.allow_agent_forwarding || ++ options.disable_forwarding) { + debug_f("agent forwarding disabled"); + return 0; + } +@@ -2709,7 +2710,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Se + ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options."); + return 0; + } +- if (!options.x11_forwarding) { ++ if (!options.x11_forwarding || options.disable_forwarding) { + debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); + return 0; + } diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73ea964 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch @@ -0,0 +1,471 @@ +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index afdf5142..1b4b55c5 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ rtrim(char *s) + } + } + ++/* ++ * returns pointer to character after 'prefix' in 's' or otherwise NULL ++ * if the prefix is not present. ++ */ ++const char * ++strprefix(const char *s, const char *prefix, int ignorecase) ++{ ++ size_t prefixlen; ++ ++ if ((prefixlen = strlen(prefix)) == 0) ++ return s; ++ if (ignorecase) { ++ if (strncasecmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0) ++ return NULL; ++ } else { ++ if (strncmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0) ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ return s + prefixlen; ++} ++ + /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ + int + set_nonblock(int fd) +diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h +index 11340389..efecdf1a 100644 +--- a/misc.h ++++ b/misc.h +@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct ForwardOptions { + char *chop(char *); + void rtrim(char *); + void skip_space(char **); ++const char *strprefix(const char *, const char *, int); + char *strdelim(char **); + char *strdelimw(char **); + int set_nonblock(int); +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index 3d9cc6db..9f559269 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, + int final_pass, int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum) + { +- char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *host, *criteria; ++ char *arg, *oattrib = NULL, *attrib = NULL, *cmd, *host, *criteria; + const char *ruser; + int r, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; + +@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + + debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s", + full_line, host, original_host); +- while ((oattrib = attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) { ++ while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) { ++ attrib = oattrib = xstrdup(attrib); + /* Terminate on comment */ + if (*attrib == '#') { + argv_consume(acp); +@@ -777,9 +778,23 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib); + continue; + } ++ ++ /* Keep this list in sync with below */ ++ if (strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "originalhost=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "localuser=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "localnetwork=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "tagged=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "exec=", 1) != NULL) { ++ arg = strchr(attrib, '='); ++ *(arg++) = '\0'; ++ } else { ++ arg = argv_next(acp, avp); ++ } ++ + /* All other criteria require an argument */ +- if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL || +- *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { ++ if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { + error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); + result = -1; + goto out; +@@ -856,6 +871,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + criteria == NULL ? "" : criteria, + criteria == NULL ? "" : "\""); + free(criteria); ++ free(oattrib); ++ oattrib = attrib = NULL; + } + if (attributes == 0) { + error("One or more attributes required for Match"); +@@ -865,6 +882,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + out: + if (result != -1) + debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); ++ free(oattrib); + free(host); + return result; + } +diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c +index 89b8413e..dd774f46 100644 +--- a/servconf.c ++++ b/servconf.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.418 2024/09/15 03:09:44 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.419 2024/09/25 01:24:04 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved +@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + int line, struct connection_info *ci) + { + int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; +- char *arg, *attrib; ++ char *arg, *attrib = NULL, *oattrib; + + if (ci == NULL) + debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", full_line); +@@ -1047,7 +1047,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); + } + +- while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) { ++ while ((oattrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) { ++ attrib = xstrdup(oattrib); + /* Terminate on comment */ + if (*attrib == '#') { + argv_consume(acp); /* mark all arguments consumed */ +@@ -1062,16 +1063,20 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) { + error("'all' cannot be combined with other " + "Match attributes"); +- return -1; ++ result = -1; ++ goto out; + } + if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#') + argv_consume(acp); /* consume remaining args */ +- return 1; ++ result = 1; ++ goto out; + } + /* Criterion "invalid-user" also has no argument */ + if (strcasecmp(attrib, "invalid-user") == 0) { +- if (ci == NULL) ++ if (ci == NULL) { ++ result = 0; + continue; ++ } + if (ci->user_invalid == 0) + result = 0; + else +@@ -1078,11 +1081,26 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + debug("matched invalid-user at line %d", line); + continue; + } ++ ++ /* Keep this list in sync with below */ ++ if (strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "group=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "address=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "localaddress=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "localport=", 1) != NULL || ++ strprefix(attrib, "rdomain=", 1) != NULL) { ++ arg = strchr(attrib, '='); ++ *(arg++) = '\0'; ++ } else { ++ arg = argv_next(acp, avp); ++ } ++ + /* All other criteria require an argument */ +- if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL || +- *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { ++ if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') { + error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); +- return -1; ++ result = -1; ++ goto out; + } + if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { + if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) { +@@ -1105,7 +1123,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user"); + switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { + case -1: +- return -1; ++ result = -1; ++ goto out; + case 0: + result = 0; + } +@@ -1141,7 +1160,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + result = 0; + break; + case -2: +- return -1; ++ result = -1; ++ goto out; + } + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ + if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) { +@@ -1166,13 +1186,15 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + result = 0; + break; + case -2: +- return -1; ++ result = -1; ++ goto out; + } + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { + if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { + error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", + arg); +- return -1; ++ result = -1; ++ goto out; + } + if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) { + result = 0; +@@ -1200,16 +1222,21 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp, + debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at " + "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line); + } else { +- error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); +- return -1; ++ error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", oattrib); ++ result = -1; ++ goto out; + } ++ free(attrib); ++ attrib = NULL; + } + if (attributes == 0) { + error("One or more attributes required for Match"); + return -1; + } +- if (ci != NULL) ++ out: ++ if (ci != NULL && result != -1) + debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); ++ free(attrib); + return result; + } + +diff --git a/regress/cfginclude.sh b/regress/cfginclude.sh +index d442cdd6..97fd816f 100644 +--- a/regress/cfginclude.sh ++++ b/regress/cfginclude.sh +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $ ++# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $ + # Placed in the Public Domain. + + tid="config include" +@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF + Match host a + Hostname aa + +-Match host b # comment ++Match host=b # comment + Hostname bb + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Match host c + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + Hostname cc + +-Match host m ++Match host=m !user xxxyfake + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # comment + + Host d +@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Match host xxxxxx + _EOF + + cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF +-Match host a ++Match host=a + Hostname aaa + + Match host b +@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF + Match host a + Hostname aaaa + +-Match host b ++Match host=b !user blahblahfake + Hostname bbbb + +-Match host c ++Match host=c + Hostname cccc + + Host d +@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ trial a aa + + # cleanup + rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out +-# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $ ++# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $ + # Placed in the Public Domain. + + tid="config include" +diff --git a/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/regress/cfgmatch.sh +index 05a66685..2737a5f9 100644 +--- a/regress/cfgmatch.sh ++++ b/regress/cfgmatch.sh +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.13 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $ ++# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.14 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $ + # Placed in the Public Domain. + + tid="sshd_config match" +@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ start_client() + kill $client_pid + fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh" + fi +- done ++ done + } + + stop_client() +@@ -119,40 +119,42 @@ stop_client + # requires knowledge of actual group memberships user running the test). + params="user:user:u1 host:host:h1 address:addr:1.2.3.4 \ + localaddress:laddr:5.6.7.8 rdomain:rdomain:rdom1" +-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config +-echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config +-for i in $params; do +- config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:` +- criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:` +- value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:` +- cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config </dev/null || \ ++ fail "validate config for w/out spec" ++ ++ # Test matching each criteria. ++ for i in $params; do ++ testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:` ++ expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:` ++ spec="" ++ for j in $params; do ++ config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:` ++ criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:` ++ value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:` ++ if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then ++ spec="$criteria=$value,$spec" ++ else ++ spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec" ++ fi ++ done ++ trace "test spec $spec" ++ result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \ ++ awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'` ++ if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then ++ fail "match $config expected $expected got $result" + fi + done +- trace "test spec $spec" +- result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \ +- awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'` +- if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then +- fail "match $config expected $expected got $result" +- fi + done +diff --git a/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/regress/servcfginclude.sh +index 518a703d..f67c3caa 100644 +--- a/regress/servcfginclude.sh ++++ b/regress/servcfginclude.sh +@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ tid="server config include" + + cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF + HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519 +-Match host a ++Match host=a + Banner /aa + + Match host b + Banner /bb + Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment + +-Match host c ++Match host=c + Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment + Banner /cc + +@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Match Host e + Banner /ee + Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* + +-Match Host f ++Match Host=f + Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* + Banner /ff + +@@ -47,13 +47,13 @@ Match host b + Match host c + Banner /ccc + +-Match Host d ++Match Host=d + Banner /ddd + + Match Host e + Banner /eee + +-Match Host f ++Match Host=f + Banner /fff + _EOF + +@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF + Match host a + Banner /aaaa + +-Match host b ++Match host=b + Banner /bbbb + + Match host c # comment + Banner /cccc + +-Match Host d ++Match Host=d + Banner /dddd + + Match Host e diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa0c26c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c +index 679446e9..2b5d3960 100644 +--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c ++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:59 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2023 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * +@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H ++# include ++#endif + + #include "sshkey.h" + #include "kex.h" +diff --git a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h +index a82d60e8..b8ac1436 100644 +--- a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h ++++ b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h +@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $ */ ++ + /* Extracted from libcrux revision 84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35 */ + + /* +@@ -160,18 +161,19 @@ static inline void Eurydice_slice_to_array3(uint8_t *dst_tag, char *dst_ok, + // CORE STUFF (conversions, endianness, ...) + + static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes(uint64_t v, uint8_t buf[8]) { ++ v = htole64(v); + memcpy(buf, &v, sizeof(v)); + } + static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[8]) { + uint64_t v; + memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v)); +- return v; ++ return le64toh(v); + } + + static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[4]) { + uint32_t v; + memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v)); +- return v; ++ return le32toh(v); + } + + static inline uint32_t core_num__u8_6__count_ones(uint8_t x0) { +diff --git a/mlkem768.sh b/mlkem768.sh +index 2fdc2831..3d12b2ed 100644 +--- a/mlkem768.sh ++++ b/mlkem768.sh +@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ + #!/bin/sh +-# $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.2 2024/09/04 05:11:33 djm Exp $ ++# $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.3 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $ + # Placed in the Public Domain. + # + +-WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main" ++#WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main" ++WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35" + + FILES=" + libcrux/libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h +@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ echo '#define KRML_NOINLINE __attribute__((noinline, unused))' + echo '#define KRML_HOST_EPRINTF(...)' + echo '#define KRML_HOST_EXIT(x) fatal_f("internal error")' + echo ++ + for i in $FILES; do + echo "/* from $i */" + # Changes to all files: +@@ -56,11 +58,16 @@ for i in $FILES; do + -e 's/[ ]*$//' \ + $i | \ + case "$i" in +- # XXX per-file handling goes here. ++ */libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h) ++ # Replace endian functions with versions that work. ++ perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes.*\n)([^}]*\n)/\1 v = htole64(v);\n\2/' | ++ perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le64toh(v);/s' | ++ perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le32toh(v);/s' ++ ;; + # Default: pass through. + *) +- cat +- ;; ++ cat ++ ;; + esac + echo + done diff --git a/openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch b/openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff0e35f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5.xxx 2024-10-11 12:01:14.260566303 +0200 ++++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5 2024-10-11 12:01:59.725654775 +0200 +@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ or + This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. + See + .Xr ssh-keysign 8 +-for more information. ++for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly. + .It Cm EscapeChar + Sets the escape character (default: + .Ql ~ ) . diff --git a/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch b/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..692c6ac --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c +index e2efdf06..0d0f6953 100644 +--- a/krl.c ++++ b/krl.c +@@ -674,6 +674,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + error_f("insane bitmap gap"); + goto out; + } +@@ -1059,6 +1060,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp) + } + + if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + error_f("alloc failed"); + goto out; + } +diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c +index 486f8515..9dea2cfc 100644 +--- a/packet.c ++++ b/packet.c +@@ -1864,6 +1864,14 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &d, &len)) != 0) + return r; + DBG(debug("Received SSH2_MSG_PING len %zu", len)); ++ if (!ssh->state->after_authentication) { ++ DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING in preauth")); ++ break; ++ } ++ if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { ++ DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING during KEX")); ++ break; ++ } + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_PONG)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, d, len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) +diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c +index 48973b2c..c27c5a95 100644 +--- a/ssh-agent.c ++++ b/ssh-agent.c +@@ -1220,6 +1220,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp, + "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) { + if (*dcsp != NULL) { + error_f("%s already set", ext_name); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) { +@@ -1229,6 +1230,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp, + while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) { + error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + *dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1, +@@ -1246,6 +1248,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp, + } + if (*certs != NULL) { + error_f("%s already set", ext_name); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &v)) != 0 || +@@ -1257,6 +1260,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp, + while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + if (*ncerts >= AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS) { + error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + *certs = xrecallocarray(*certs, *ncerts, *ncerts + 1, +@@ -1757,6 +1761,7 @@ process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e) + /* record new key/sid */ + if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) { + error_f("too many session IDs recorded"); ++ r = -1; + goto out; + } + e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids, +diff --git a/ssh-sk-client.c b/ssh-sk-client.c +index 321fe53a..06fad221 100644 +--- a/ssh-sk-client.c ++++ b/ssh-sk-client.c +@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device, + } + if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) { + error_f("calloc failed"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + srk->key = key; +@@ -450,6 +451,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device, + if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1, + sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) { + error_f("recallocarray keys failed"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks, +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index a69c4da1..1ee6000a 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) + options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key"); + if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey, +- xxx_conn_info) == -1) ++ xxx_conn_info) != 0) + fatal("Host key verification failed."); + return 0; + } +@@ -699,6 +699,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + + if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { + debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { +@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch " + "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)", + key->type, pktype); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto done; + } + +@@ -728,6 +730,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s", + sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "" : fp); ++ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto done; + } + ident = format_identity(id); +diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c +index 6e03c0b0..3da005d6 100644 +--- a/sshsig.c ++++ b/sshsig.c +@@ -879,6 +879,7 @@ cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum, + } + if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) { + error_f("buffer error"); ++ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* success */ diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec index bd36728..9acb25c 100644 --- a/openssh.spec +++ b/openssh.spec @@ -46,10 +46,10 @@ %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1} # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1 -%global openssh_ver 9.8p1 -%global openssh_rel 3 +%global openssh_ver 9.9p1 +%global openssh_rel 4 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4 -%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 10 +%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 13 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2 Name: openssh @@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947 Patch202: openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch -# Correctly audit hostname and IP address -Patch203: openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch # --- pam_ssh-agent --- # make it build reusing the openssh sources @@ -145,7 +143,7 @@ Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch # Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures # upstream MR: # https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21 -Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch +Patch800: openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch # add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843) @@ -156,8 +154,6 @@ Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch # Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243) Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch -# Rewriting OpenSSH GSS KEX to use new packet API -Patch806: openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780 Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch @@ -190,9 +186,6 @@ Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325) # clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch -# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485) -# TODO fix the comment above ^ -Patch963: openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch # Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761) Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch # sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work @@ -228,11 +221,22 @@ Patch1002: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323 Patch1006: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch -Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch -Patch1013: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch +Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch Patch1015: openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch +Patch1016: openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch +# upstream cf3e48ee8ba1beeccddd2f203b558fa102be67a2 +# upstream 0c3927c45f8a57b511c874c4d51a8c89414f74ef +Patch1017: openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch +# upstream 3f02368e8e9121847727c46b280efc280e5eb615 +# upstream 67a115e7a56dbdc3f5a58c64b29231151f3670f5 +Patch1020: openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch +# upstream 6ce00f0c2ecbb9f75023dbe627ee6460bcec78c2 +# upstream 0832aac79517611dd4de93ad0a83577994d9c907 +Patch1021: openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch +# upstream fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367 +Patch1022: openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant Requires: /sbin/nologin @@ -285,6 +289,10 @@ Summary: An open source SSH client applications Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1 +%package keysign +Summary: A helper program used for host-based authentication +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} + %package server Summary: An open source SSH server daemon Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} @@ -330,6 +338,11 @@ OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. +%description keysign +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. ssh-keysign is a +helper program used for host-based authentication disabled by default. + %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains @@ -393,7 +406,6 @@ popd %patch -P 801 -p1 -b .force_krb %patch -P 804 -p1 -b .ccache_name %patch -P 805 -p1 -b .k5login -%patch -P 806 -p1 -b .gsskex-new-api # %patch -P 901 -p1 -b .kuserok %patch -P 906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote @@ -410,7 +422,6 @@ popd %patch -P 951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri %patch -P 953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6 %patch -P 962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies -%patch -P 963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp %patch -P 964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf %patch -P 965 -p1 -b .visibility %patch -P 966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6 @@ -426,7 +437,6 @@ popd %patch -P 200 -p1 -b .audit %patch -P 201 -p1 -b .audit-race %patch -P 202 -p1 -b .audit-log -%patch -P 203 -p1 -b .audit-hostname %patch -P 700 -p1 -b .fips %patch -P 1002 -p1 -b .ssh-manpage @@ -434,9 +444,13 @@ popd %patch -P 1006 -p1 -b .negotiate-supported-algs %patch -P 1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-dh -%patch -P 1013 -p1 -b .evp-fips-ecdh %patch -P 1014 -p1 -b .nosha1hostproof %patch -P 1015 -p1 -b .pam-rhost +%patch -P 1016 -p1 -b .sep-keysign +%patch -P 1017 -p1 -b .mlkembe +%patch -P 1020 -p1 -b .match +%patch -P 1021 -p1 -b .errcode_set +%patch -P 1022 -p1 -b .disable-forwarding %patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity @@ -552,7 +566,7 @@ popd %endif %check -%{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23} # ./parallel_tests.sh parallel_tests.Makefile +OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null %{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23} # ./parallel_tests.sh parallel_tests.Makefile %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT @@ -666,8 +680,6 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh -%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign -%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %files clients %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh @@ -695,6 +707,10 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket +%files keysign +%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* + %files server %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd @@ -744,6 +760,28 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ %endif %changelog +* Mon May 19 2025 Zoltan Fridrich - 9.9p1-4 +- CVE-2025-32728: Fix logic error in DisableForwarding option + Resolves: rhbz#2358778 + +* Tue Feb 18 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 9.9p1-3 +- Fix regression of Match directive processing +- Fix missing error codes set and invalid error code checks in OpenSSH. It + prevents memory exhaustion attack and a MITM attack when VerifyHostKeyDNS + is on (CVE-2025-26465, CVE-2025-26466). + +* Mon Jan 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 9.9p1-2 +- Fix regression of Match directive processing + Resolves: rhbz#2341769 + +* Fri Jan 17 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 9.9p1-1 +- Backport rebase to OpenSSH 9.9p1 from rawhide +- Fix MLKEM for BE platforms +- Separate ssh-keysign to a dedicated package + +* Tue Sep 03 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 9.8p1-3.1 +- Synchronize patches from Red Hat + * Mon Aug 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 9.8p1-3 - Sshd now proposes to enter password again when a non-existing user is specified diff --git a/sources b/sources index dc4d818..b273b63 100644 --- a/sources +++ b/sources @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -SHA512 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = 95dec2f18e58eb47994f3de4430253e0665e185564b65088ca5f4108870e05feddef8cda8d3c0a4b75f18b98cc2c024df0e27de53b48c1a16da8da483cb8292a -SHA512 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc) = 4df1f1be2c6ab7f3aebaedd0a773b0e8c8929abb30cd3415873ad55d012cfa113f792e888e5e772dd468c394aeb7e35d62893a514dbc0ab1a03acd79918657f7 +SHA512 (openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz) = 3cc0ed97f3e29ecbd882eca79239f02eb5a1606fce4f3119ddc3c5e86128aa3ff12dc85000879fccc87b60e7d651cfe37376607ac66075fede2118deaa685d6d +SHA512 (openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc) = 916e975c54eb68c0b2f0b0006522b241cbe54c4caa88d31537a6278490c93d9d732c2ab3a080ac084bf75cbdd5402901ec68583cbe7c7cde4a8e40e7a8b78c28 SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21 diff --git a/sshd-keygen@.service b/sshd-keygen@.service index f27f729..aee1303 100644 --- a/sshd-keygen@.service +++ b/sshd-keygen@.service @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key [Service] Type=oneshot +# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line +# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty. +Environment=OPTIONS= EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i diff --git a/sshd.service b/sshd.service index 0cb2a26..350624d 100644 --- a/sshd.service +++ b/sshd.service @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service [Service] Type=notify +# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line +# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty. +Environment=OPTIONS= EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID diff --git a/sshd@.service b/sshd@.service index be6d3b9..c077be2 100644 --- a/sshd@.service +++ b/sshd@.service @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ After=sshd-keygen.target Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service [Service] +# Set option as empty variable to avoid warnings upon expanding the command line +# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty. +Environment=OPTIONS= EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS StandardInput=socket