diff --git a/.fmf/version b/.fmf/version
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d00491f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.fmf/version
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 0ac6ea0..98996cc 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -58,3 +58,13 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz.asc
 /openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz.asc
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
similarity index 78%
rename from openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
rename to 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
index 4dc460a..0377e8c 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@@ -1,57 +1,83 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
---- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
-@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
- 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+From b6875ceaca4be9e0de0d6d260d8fcff1772f5fb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/53] openssh-7.8p1-role-mls
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c                       |   2 +-
+ auth-pam.h                       |   2 +-
+ auth.h                           |   3 +
+ auth2-gss.c                      |  11 +-
+ auth2-hostbased.c                |   9 +
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  11 +-
+ auth2.c                          |  14 ++
+ misc.c                           |   8 +
+ monitor.c                        |  37 ++-
+ monitor.h                        |   4 +
+ monitor_wrap.c                   |  21 ++
+ monitor_wrap.h                   |   3 +
+ openbsd-compat/Makefile.in       |   3 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  37 +--
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   3 +-
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |   3 +
+ 18 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index 5591f094e..70bcae83a 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ 	char *compound;
+diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
+index 8d801c689..9dd7ae078 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.h
++++ b/auth-pam.h
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 98bb23d4c..83d07ae8b 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role = NULL;
++	char		*role;
 +#endif
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
-@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
--		if (use_privsep)
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
-+		}
- 		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
-diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
-@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+ 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 75eb4e3a3..f7898ab3e 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
  	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
 +	char *micuser;
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
-@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	u_char *p;
+@@ -300,7 +301,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
@@ -66,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
  	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+@@ -313,6 +320,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
  	sshbuf_free(b);
@@ -74,11 +100,12 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
  	free(mic.value);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
-diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index 9d8b860eb..976484fc5 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -129,7 +129,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
@@ -95,10 +122,11 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
-@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 15ad3000c..c326a69ba 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -204,9 +204,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  			goto done;
  		}
  		/* reconstruct packet */
@@ -117,47 +145,51 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
  		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	char		*service;
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
- 	char		*style;
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index b9bb46f59..1345d3257 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char		*role;
++	char *role = NULL;
 +#endif
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
- 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
- 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
---- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
-  * during the ssh authentication process.
-  */
- int
--do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- 	int ret = 1;
- 	char *compound;
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
---- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
- void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
--int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
+@@ -284,6 +287,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +321,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
+ 		userauth_banner(ssh);
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index ce77ec943..5bed34735 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ char *
  colon(char *cp)
  {
  	int flag = 0;
@@ -165,7 +197,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  
  	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
  		return NULL;
-@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+@@ -837,6 +838,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
  			return (cp);
  		if (*cp == '/')
  			return NULL;
@@ -179,10 +211,11 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
-@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -192,7 +225,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -184,6 +187,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -202,7 +235,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
+@@ -919,6 +925,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -212,7 +245,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
+@@ -993,6 +1002,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -239,16 +272,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1364,7 +1393,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
  	struct sshbuf *b;
-	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
+ 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
  	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
  	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1395,6 +1424,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -257,7 +290,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1445,7 +1476,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -266,7 +299,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1466,6 +1497,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -275,12 +308,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
---- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 3f8a9bea3..9dcd9c293 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_STATE = 51, MONITOR_ANS_STATE = 52,
  
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
@@ -289,10 +323,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
-@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 33494b73f..347eb6870 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -453,6 +453,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  
@@ -320,10 +355,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
  /* Do the password authentication */
  int
  mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index c87295388..9b42ddbcb 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
      const char *, u_int compat);
  void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
@@ -333,10 +369,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
  struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
  char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
  int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index 53c87db6d..39531ae77 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
  	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
@@ -346,79 +383,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
  
  .c.o:
  	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- 	return sc;
- }
- 
--/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
--void
--ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
--{
--	char *user_ctx = NULL;
--
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
--		return;
--
--	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
--
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
--	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
--		switch (security_getenforce()) {
--		case -1:
--			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
--		case 0:
--			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
--			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
--			break;
--		default:
--			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
--			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
--		}
--	}
--	if (user_ctx != NULL)
--		freecon(user_ctx);
--
--	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
--}
--
- /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
- void
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- 
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 
- 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
--void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..b9fbe38b7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -472,7 +442,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@@ -678,7 +647,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -752,7 +721,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@@ -840,10 +809,82 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index c1d54f38d..7426f6f79 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -109,37 +109,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+@@ -152,7 +121,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 959430de1..055c825e4 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index fd1a7a7c2..bcf1b0491 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -852,10 +893,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 8979f743b..cb4b0523d 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1306,6 +1306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
@@ -864,4 +906,7 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 		do_pam_setcred();
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
similarity index 76%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
rename to 0002-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
index 529b508..b196636 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/0002-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
- 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(127);
-+		}
-+#endif
- 		if (env != NULL)
- 			execve(av[0], av, env);
- 		else
-diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
---- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-+++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+From 5f16fff915643a515adbbd2e0cd12717938e3570 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/53] openssh-6.6p1-keycat
+
+---
+ HOWTO.ssh-keycat                 |  12 ++
+ Makefile.in                      |   8 +-
+ configure.ac                     |   6 +
+ misc.c                           |   7 +
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c |  42 +++++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   1 +
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ ssh-keycat.c                     | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 8 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+ create mode 100644 ssh-keycat.c
+
+diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..630ec628c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@@ -31,35 +34,36 @@ diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
---- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
-+++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index ba17a79f0..a3a495c1b 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
  ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
  SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
+ SSHD_AUTH=$(libexecdir)/sshd-auth
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
  SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
  LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
  LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
- AR=@AR@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@
+@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
  
  .SUFFIXES: .lo
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
  
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh_api.o \
+@@ -252,6 +254,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
  ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
  	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
@@ -69,7 +73,7 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
  ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
  	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
-@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
+@@ -439,6 +444,7 @@ install-files:
  	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -77,26 +81,69 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index db5211013..fd632a5a8 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3648,6 +3648,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
  
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
  
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
-@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+@@ -3658,6 +3659,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4883,6 +4885,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5894,6 +5897,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 5bed34735..7e27a38d1 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2921,6 +2921,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(1);
+ 		}
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(127);
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index b9fbe38b7..4d56745f7 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
  
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@@ -115,7 +162,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  /* Send audit message */
  static int
  sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -317,7 +331,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -124,14 +171,14 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -328,16 +342,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
@@ -144,7 +191,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  
  	if (role != NULL)
  		free(role);
-@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -345,6 +359,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  	return rv;
  }
  
@@ -169,7 +216,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
  void
  sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+@@ -353,7 +385,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  	int r = 0;
  	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
  
@@ -178,19 +225,23 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  		return;
  
  	if (options.use_pam) {
-@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- {
- 	security_context_t *ctx;
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 055c825e4..c004071d1 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
  
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
  
- 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index bcf1b0491..c92a0cba6 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
  {
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
@@ -199,9 +250,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
---- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
-+++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
+diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..5678be079
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh-keycat.c
 @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -444,41 +497,6 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 			PAM_MSG="yes"
- 
- 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
- 
-@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
- 					;;
- 				*)
- 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- 					;;
- 				esac
- 			fi
-@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
- 
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
- 
- echo ""
- 
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
similarity index 67%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
rename to 0003-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
index be8d340..ea11b6c 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/0003-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+From 7ffeef7e8218c544b6f4a09c5d43e9b748de5a5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/53] openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index cb4b0523d..1c72e664a 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -754,12 +754,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
  	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@@ -38,5 +48,8 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
  	}
- 	return;
  #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch b/0004-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
similarity index 54%
rename from openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
rename to 0004-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
index ece1a73..6ec8afc 100644
--- a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+++ b/0004-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
---- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
-@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+From f653eed40e15c4c521ce683a604b46ed81cade6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/53] openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man
+
+---
+ ssh.1  | 2 ++
+ sshd.8 | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 697f4e42a..db92ac9af 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ manual page for more information.
  .Nm
  exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
  if an error occurred.
@@ -10,10 +21,11 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
---- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
-@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 7fbca776a..0226a8303 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -1018,6 +1018,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
  started last).
  The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
  .El
@@ -22,3 +34,6 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0005-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/0005-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2a3714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0005-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 6ac14fb92cf0d0676f19282f30b9e427025be31b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 05/53] openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe
+
+---
+ ssh-keyscan.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
+index f9788114d..11618ae8a 100644
+--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
++++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
+@@ -776,6 +776,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
++ 
++	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
++
+ 	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+ 	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+ 		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch b/0006-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
similarity index 68%
rename from openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
rename to 0006-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
index 0a19ecb..dceef7b 100644
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/0006-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+From d6dc5be6e969ecffe30b9972706b3c92d930d81f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/53] openssh-7.2p2-x11
+
+---
+ channels.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index 80014ff34..5ce6bd400 100644
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -5169,11 +5169,13 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  }
  
  static int
@@ -14,8 +24,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
  	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock == -1)
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -5181,11 +5183,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+ 	}
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@@ -30,7 +42,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  	return -1;
  }
  
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+@@ -5193,8 +5196,18 @@ static int
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
@@ -51,3 +63,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  }
  
  #ifdef __APPLE__
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch b/0007-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
similarity index 66%
rename from openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
rename to 0007-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
index ff609da..66b351e 100644
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/0007-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+From c62cd7ce2539c1eac6d0133c07441c617cbc7bc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/53] openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
@@ -9,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+@@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -27,7 +37,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  static int
  passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  {
- 	const char *failed;
+@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
  	int buttons, default_response;
@@ -36,7 +46,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
  	GdkColor fg, bg;
  	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
-@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
  	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
@@ -45,12 +55,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 +		    FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
-		entry = gtk_entry_new();
-		if (fg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
-		if (bg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
-		gtk_box_pack_start(
+ 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ 		if (fg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ 		if (bg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ 		gtk_box_pack_start(
 -		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
 -		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
 +		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
@@ -58,7 +68,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
  		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
  		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
-@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -225,6 +242,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
  			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
  		}
@@ -81,3 +91,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  	}
  
  	/* Grab focus */
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch b/0008-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
similarity index 53%
rename from openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
rename to 0008-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
index 120ed1b..8108482 100644
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/0008-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
-@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+From d124ab0f6eea910dc5f03cdd808f6fa792bf2b7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/53] openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index cb7152dc8..bbe93d838 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
  
  	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
  	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
@@ -16,3 +26,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/cont
  	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
  
  	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch b/0009-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
similarity index 64%
rename from openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
rename to 0009-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
index 1d77f90..8e75aa5 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/0009-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
---- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+From c76607384ff077ba1c45759e749562cccaeaa335 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/53] openssh-8.7p1-redhat
+
+---
+ ssh_config            |  7 +++++++
+ ssh_config_redhat     | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config           |  8 ++++++++
+ sshd_config.0         |  6 +++---
+ sshd_config.5         |  2 +-
+ sshd_config_redhat    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config_redhat_cp |  7 +++++++
+ 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ssh_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat_cp
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index 238a0c5e3..d9324c957 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
++++ b/ssh_config
 @@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
  #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
  #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
@@ -12,10 +31,12 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
 +# included below. For more information, see manual page for
 +#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
---- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff --git a/ssh_config_redhat b/ssh_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..8b1b59021
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
 +Match final all
@@ -29,12 +50,35 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
 +# mode correctly we set this to yes.
 +	ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
++# rhbz#2352653 - export COLORTERM
++	SendEnv COLORTERM
++
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
---- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 0f4a3a724..608203e4b 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+ 
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
+index c63d729a9..8c5217c0b 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.0
++++ b/sshd_config.0
+@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
       SyslogFacility
               Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
@@ -47,10 +91,11 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
  
       TCPKeepAlive
               Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
---- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 6ae606f1e..aa9f0af76 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1941,7 +1941,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
  .It Cm SyslogFacility
  Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
  .Xr sshd 8 .
@@ -59,31 +104,15 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
  LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
  The default is AUTH.
  .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
---- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
-@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
-
-+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
-+
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
---- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat b/sshd_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..993a28d52
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sshd_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 +
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
++KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
 +
 +GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
@@ -92,13 +121,18 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
 +
 +X11Forwarding yes
 +
++# rhbz#2352653 - accept COLORTERM
++	AcceptEnv COLORTERM
++
 +# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
---- openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat_cp b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..1d592d13f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
 +# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
@@ -107,3 +141,6 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
 +# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
 +Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0010-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/0010-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..521abe4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0010-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 5f6dbc98a184ce485aef90321ae9fc1ba45293f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/53] openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 4 ++++
+ sshd_config    | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 1c72e664a..9804dc334 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1103,6 +1103,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			    "enabled authentication methods");
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
++	if (! options.use_pam)
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 608203e4b..48af6321b 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
++# problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/0011-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
similarity index 67%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
rename to 0011-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index 89bcd0d..2e5b723 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/0011-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -1,37 +1,98 @@
+From c992408da3ca7aeae129c731c7753019a16ed226 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/53] openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex
+
+---
+ Makefile.in     |   7 +-
+ auth.c          |   3 +-
+ auth2-gss.c     |  52 +++-
+ auth2-methods.c |   6 +
+ auth2.c         |   2 +
+ canohost.c      |  93 +++++++
+ canohost.h      |   3 +
+ clientloop.c    |  12 +
+ configure.ac    |  24 ++
+ gss-genr.c      | 312 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  97 ++++++-
+ gss-serv.c      | 200 ++++++++++++--
+ kex-names.c     |  60 +++-
+ kex.c           |  35 ++-
+ kex.h           |  34 +++
+ kexdh.c         |  10 +
+ kexgen.c        |   2 +-
+ kexgssc.c       | 706 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kexgsss.c       | 601 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor.c       | 147 +++++++++-
+ monitor.h       |   2 +
+ monitor_wrap.c  |  57 +++-
+ monitor_wrap.h  |   4 +-
+ readconf.c      |  70 +++++
+ readconf.h      |   6 +
+ servconf.c      |  46 ++++
+ servconf.h      |   3 +
+ session.c       |  10 +-
+ ssh-gss.h       |  64 ++++-
+ ssh.1           |   8 +
+ ssh.c           |   6 +-
+ ssh_config      |   2 +
+ ssh_config.5    |  58 ++++
+ sshconnect2.c   | 154 ++++++++++-
+ sshd-auth.c     |  55 +++-
+ sshd-session.c  |   9 +-
+ sshd.c          |   3 +-
+ sshd_config     |   2 +
+ sshd_config.5   |  31 +++
+ sshkey.c        |  72 ++++-
+ sshkey.h        |   1 +
+ 41 files changed, 2993 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
+ create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
+
 diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
+index a3a495c1b..a36eb82ed 100644
 --- a/Makefile.in
 +++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
  	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 +	kexgssc.o \
  	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
- 	sshbuf-io.o
+ 	sshbuf-io.o misc-agent.o
  
-@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ SSHD_SESSION_OBJS=sshd-session.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+ 	auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
  	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
  	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+-	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
++	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ SSHD_AUTH_OBJS=sshd-auth.o \
+ 	serverloop.o auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o auth2-chall.o \
+ 	groupaccess.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
 -	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 +	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
  	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
- 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
-@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ regress-prep:
+@@ -554,7 +555,7 @@ regress-prep:
  	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
  
  REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
--TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
-+TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+-TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) @TESTLIBS@
++TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS) @TESTLIBS@
  
  regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
  	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
-diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
---- a/auth.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth.c	2021-08-27 12:41:51.262788953 +0200
-@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index 8d9404743..d25653ee4 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -354,7 +354,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
  		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
  		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
@@ -41,118 +102,19 @@ diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
  			return 1;
  		break;
  	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-@@ -730,97 +731,6 @@ fakepw(void)
- }
- 
- /*
-- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
-- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
-- * called.
-- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
-- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
-- */
--
--static char *
--remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
--{
--	struct sockaddr_storage from;
--	socklen_t fromlen;
--	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
--	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
--	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
--
--	/* Get IP address of client. */
--	fromlen = sizeof(from);
--	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
--	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
--	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
--		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
--	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
--		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
--
--	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
--	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
--	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
--	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
--		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	/*
--	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
--	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
--	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
--	 */
--	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
--	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
--	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
--	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
--		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
--		    name, ntop);
--		freeaddrinfo(ai);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
--	lowercase(name);
--
--	/*
--	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
--	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
--	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
--	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
--	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
--	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
--	 * the domain).
--	 */
--	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
--	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
--	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
--		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
--		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
--	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
--		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
--		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
--		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
--				break;
--	}
--	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
--	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
--	if (ai == NULL) {
--		/* Address not found for the host name. */
--		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
--		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--	return xstrdup(name);
--}
--
--/*
-  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
-  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
-  * several times.
 diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
+index f7898ab3e..5b1b9cde3 100644
 --- a/auth2-gss.c
 +++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.33 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS	2048
  
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi;
+ 
+ static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+@@ -58,6 +59,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
  static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  
@@ -187,10 +149,10 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 1));
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++	    &gssbuf, &mic)))
++		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw, 1);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	free(mic.value);
@@ -201,45 +163,65 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
  /*
   * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
   * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -267,7 +310,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
  
--	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+	    authctxt->pw, 1));
+-	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ 	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
-@@ -306,7 +349,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -315,7 +358,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
  
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 0));
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
+-		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0);
  	else
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
-@@ -326,6 +370,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -333,6 +376,11 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	return 0;
  }
  
 +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+	"gssapi-keyex",
-+	NULL,
++	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
 +	userauth_gsskeyex,
-+	&options.gss_authentication
 +};
 +
  Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
+ 	userauth_gssapi,
+diff --git a/auth2-methods.c b/auth2-methods.c
+index 99637a89b..a05908cf3 100644
+--- a/auth2-methods.c
++++ b/auth2-methods.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey = {
+ 	&options.pubkey_authentication
+ };
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = {
++	"gssapi-keyex",
++	NULL,
++	&options.gss_authentication
++};
+ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi = {
  	"gssapi-with-mic",
  	NULL,
+@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ static struct authmethod_cfg *authmethod_cfgs[] = {
+ 	&methodcfg_none,
+ 	&methodcfg_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
+ 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ 	&methodcfg_passwd,
 diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
+index 1345d3257..5a4b932a9 100644
 --- a/auth2.c
 +++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
  extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
  extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -247,7 +229,7 @@ index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
  extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
  #endif
  
-@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
  	&method_none,
  	&method_pubkey,
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -256,7 +238,7 @@ index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
  #endif
  	&method_passwd,
 diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
-index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
+index 28f086e5a..875805c99 100644
 --- a/canohost.c
 +++ b/canohost.c
 @@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
@@ -360,7 +342,7 @@ index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
  ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
  {
 diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
-index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
+index 26d62855a..0cadc9f18 100644
 --- a/canohost.h
 +++ b/canohost.h
 @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
@@ -374,10 +356,10 @@ index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
  int		 get_peer_port(int);
  char		*get_local_ipaddr(int);
 diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
+index 49d048d85..33adf31dc 100644
 --- a/clientloop.c
 +++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
+@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
  
@@ -388,7 +370,7 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
  /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
  #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
  
-@@ -1379,6 +1383,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+@@ -1604,6 +1608,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
  		/* Do channel operations. */
  		channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
  
@@ -404,10 +386,10 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
  		if (conn_in_ready)
  			client_process_net_input(ssh);
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
+index fd632a5a8..adccaebd4 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -674,6 +674,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+@@ -813,6 +813,30 @@ int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
  	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
  	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
  	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
@@ -439,19 +421,10 @@ index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
  	AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
  	    AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
 diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
-index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
+index 8f1f54afb..f2d6f59e5 100644
 --- a/gss-genr.c
 +++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
+@@ -42,9 +42,33 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "log.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -485,7 +458,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
-@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -60,6 +84,169 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -554,19 +527,29 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
 +		if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
 +		    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++			EVP_MD_CTX * ctx = NULL;
++			EVP_MD *md5 = NULL; /* Here we don't use MD5 for crypto purposes */
++			unsigned int md_size = sizeof(digest);
 +
 +			deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
 +			deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+			if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
-+			    (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = ssh_digest_update(md,
-+			        gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+			        gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++			if ((md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, "MD5", "provider=default,-fips")) == NULL)
++				fatal_fr(r, "MD5 fetch failed");
++			if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++				EVP_MD_free(md5);
++				fatal_fr(r, "digest ctx failed");
++			}
++			if (EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md5) <= 0
++			    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, deroid, 2) <= 0
++			    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++				    gss_supported->elements[i].length) <= 0
++			    || EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, digest, &md_size) <= 0) {
++				EVP_MD_free(md5);
++				EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
 +				fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
-+			ssh_digest_free(md);
-+			md = NULL;
++			}
++			EVP_MD_free(md5); md5 = NULL;
++			EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL;
 +
 +			encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)
 +			    * 2);
@@ -645,7 +628,28 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+@@ -168,6 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+ 	(*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ 	(*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ 	(*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++	(*ctx)->first = 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
+@@ -193,6 +381,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+ 		gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
+ 	if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ 		gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->shared_secret);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_pubkey);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_host_key_blob);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_blob);
++	explicit_bzero((*ctx)->hash, sizeof((*ctx)->hash));
++	BN_clear_free((*ctx)->dh_client_pub);
+ 
+ 	free(*ctx);
+ 	*ctx = NULL;
+@@ -216,7 +410,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
  	}
  
  	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
@@ -654,7 +658,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
  	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
  
-@@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+@@ -245,9 +439,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
  
@@ -698,7 +702,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
  	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+@@ -255,6 +483,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
  
@@ -718,7 +722,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  void
  ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
      const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
-@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+@@ -271,11 +512,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
  }
  
  int
@@ -735,8 +739,8 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		ctx = &intctx;
  
  	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
-@@ -287,6 +519,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -285,6 +531,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
  	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
  	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
  	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
@@ -745,13 +749,13 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
 +
  	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+ 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
  		    NULL);
-@@ -296,10 +532,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+@@ -294,10 +544,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
  			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
  	}
  
--	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
  		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
  
@@ -816,7 +820,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
+index a151bc1e4..8d2b677f7 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
@@ -956,11 +960,11 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
+index b0e9c3b49..6bac42931 100644
 --- a/gss-serv.c
 +++ b/gss-serv.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.33 2025/09/29 21:30:15 dtucker Exp $ */
  
  /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -968,7 +972,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -44,17 +44,19 @@
+@@ -45,17 +45,19 @@
  #include "session.h"
  #include "misc.h"
  #include "servconf.h"
@@ -991,7 +995,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  #ifdef KRB5
  extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+@@ -141,6 +143,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
  	return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
  }
  
@@ -1012,7 +1016,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
 +	int res;
 +
-+	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++	res = !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid));
 +	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
 +
 +	return (res);
@@ -1021,7 +1025,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  /* Unprivileged */
  void
  ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
-@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+@@ -151,7 +176,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
  	gss_OID_set supported;
  
  	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
@@ -1032,7 +1036,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
  		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -276,8 +303,48 @@ OM_uint32
+@@ -277,8 +304,48 @@ OM_uint32
  ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  {
  	int i = 0;
@@ -1047,15 +1051,15 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
 +			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 +		}
-+
+ 
+-	gss_buffer_desc ename;
 +		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
 +		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
 +		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
 +			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
 +			return (ctx->major);
 +		}
- 
--	gss_buffer_desc ename;
++
 +		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
 +		    new_name, &equal);
 +
@@ -1082,7 +1086,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  
  	client->mech = NULL;
  
-@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -293,6 +360,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	if (client->mech == NULL)
  		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
  
@@ -1096,7 +1100,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
  	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -310,6 +384,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		return (ctx->major);
  	}
  
@@ -1105,7 +1109,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
  	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
  	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -320,11 +396,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  void
  ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
  {
@@ -1131,7 +1135,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  	}
  }
  
-@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+@@ -357,19 +442,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
  
  /* Privileged */
  int
@@ -1158,7 +1162,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
  			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -382,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -383,14 +472,85 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
  	return (0);
  }
  
@@ -1201,7 +1205,7 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
 +		return;
 +
-+	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
 +
 +	if (!ok)
 +		return;
@@ -1213,11 +1217,6 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
 +	 */
 +#ifdef USE_PAM	
-+	if (!use_privsep) {
-+		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
 +	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
 + 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
 +	if (ret)
@@ -1255,37 +1254,37 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
  }
  
  /* Privileged */
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@
- #include "digest.h"
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index a20ce602a..31e395aa2 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +#endif
 +
- /* prototype */
- static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
- static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-@@ -115,15 +120,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ struct kexalg {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	u_int type;
+@@ -90,9 +94,22 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
  #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1, 0 },
  };
 +static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, KEX_NOT_PQ },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, KEX_NOT_PQ },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, KEX_NOT_PQ },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, KEX_NOT_PQ },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, KEX_NOT_PQ },
 +	{ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
-+	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, KEX_NOT_PQ },
++	{ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, KEX_NOT_PQ },
 +#endif
-+	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
++	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1, 0},
 +};
  
 -char *
@@ -1293,16 +1292,9 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +static char *
 +kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
  {
- 	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
- 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ 	char *ret = NULL;
  	const struct kexalg *k;
- 
--	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- 		if (ret != NULL)
- 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
- 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
-@@ -138,6 +156,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -104,6 +121,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -1321,7 +1313,7 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
  static const struct kexalg *
  kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
  {
-@@ -147,6 +177,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+@@ -113,6 +142,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
  		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
  			return k;
  	}
@@ -1332,10 +1324,11 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
  	return NULL;
  }
  
-@@ -315,6 +349,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
+@@ -336,3 +369,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
+ 	free(ret);
  	return r;
  }
- 
++ 
 +/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
 +int
 +kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names)
@@ -1358,11 +1351,55 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +	free(s);
 +	return 1;
 +}
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 814fad947..9a2ce6d88 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -295,17 +295,37 @@ static int
+ kex_compose_ext_info_server(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+ 	int r;
++	int have_key = 0;
++	int ext_count = 2;
 +
- /*
-  * Fill out a proposal array with dynamically allocated values, which may
-  * be modified as required for compatibility reasons.
-@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	/*
++	 * Currently GSS KEX don't provide host keys as optional message, so
++	 * no reasons to announce the publickey-hostbound extension
++	 */
++	if (ssh->kex->gss == NULL)
++	    have_key = 1;
++#endif
++	ext_count += have_key;
++
+ 
+ 	if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL &&
+ 	    (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 3)) != 0 ||
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ext_count)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+-	    "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0) {
++		error_fr(r, "compose");
++		return r;
++	}
++	if (have_key) {
++	    if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
++		    error_fr(r, "compose");
++		    return r;
++		}
++	}
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
+ 		error_fr(r, "compose");
+ 		return r;
+@@ -735,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
  	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
@@ -1373,13 +1410,24 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
  	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
  	free(kex->failed_choice);
 diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
+index 55baa6a1e..206ce60ed 100644
 --- a/kex.h
 +++ b/kex.h
-@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
- 	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
+ #include "mac.h"
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++# include "ssh-gss.h" /* Gssctxt */
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -103,6 +107,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
  	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
  	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
+ 	KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256,
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
@@ -1392,11 +1440,12 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	KEX_MAX
  };
  
-@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex {
+@@ -169,6 +182,13 @@ struct kex {
  	u_int	flags;
  	int	hash_alg;
  	int	ec_nid;
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
++	Gssctxt *gss;
 +	int	gss_deleg_creds;
 +	int	gss_trust_dns;
 +	char    *gss_host;
@@ -1405,18 +1454,18 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	char	*failed_choice;
  	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
  	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
-@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex {
- 
+@@ -196,8 +216,10 @@ int	 kex_nid_from_name(const char *);
+ int	 kex_is_pq_from_name(const char *);
  int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
  char	*kex_alg_list(char);
 +char	*kex_gss_alg_list(char);
  char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
- int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
+ int	 kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *);
 +int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
+ int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
  void	 kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
      const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
- void	 kex_proposal_free_entries(char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
-@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+@@ -231,6 +253,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
@@ -1429,7 +1478,7 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  
  int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
  int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
-@@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
+@@ -269,6 +297,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
      const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
      u_char *, size_t *);
  
@@ -1443,10 +1492,10 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
  	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
 diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
-index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
+index 191bdced0..6d5a7813d 100644
 --- a/kexdh.c
 +++ b/kexdh.c
-@@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
+@@ -50,13 +50,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
  {
  	switch (kex->kex_type) {
  	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
@@ -1471,7 +1520,7 @@ index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
  		break;
  	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
 diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
-index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
+index 494d4b233..58edc79ad 100644
 --- a/kexgen.c
 +++ b/kexgen.c
 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
@@ -1485,10 +1534,10 @@ index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
      const struct sshbuf *client_version,
 diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..f6e1405e
+index 000000000..96f7b6f58
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -1538,38 +1587,206 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +
++static int input_kexgss_hostkey(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++
++static int
++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	int r;
++
++	/*
++	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++	 * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok
++	 */
++
++	/* compute shared secret */
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
++		r = kex_dh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
++		if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)] & 0x80)
++			fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!");
++		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
++		if (sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob) != 65)
++			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match "
++			      "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)",
++			      sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob));
++
++		if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
++			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04");
++
++		r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	default:
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		break;
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version,
++			 kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer,
++			 (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty),
++			 kex->client_pub, gss->server_blob, shared_secret,
++			 hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
++
++	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
++		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
++
++	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++
++	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
++		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob);
++		gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL;
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob);
++		gss->server_blob = NULL;
++	}
++out:
++	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
++	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
++	kex->client_pub = NULL;
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++kexgss_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++	gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds,
++					 token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		/* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++	}
++
++	/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++	if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr);
++
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++			fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++		/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++			fatal("Integrity check failed");
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++	 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++	 */
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		if (gss->first) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++			gss->first = 0;
++		} else {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok);
++
++		/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgss_complete);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* No data, and not complete */
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr);
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh);
++}
++
 +int
 +kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
-+	u_char *msg;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	int first = 1;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	u_char c;
 +	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
 +
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host))
 +		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
 +
 +	if (kex->gss_client &&
-+	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client))
 +		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
 +
 +	/* Step 1 */
@@ -1590,523 +1807,449 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		return r;
 +	}
++	return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
++}
 +
-+	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++static int
++input_kexgss_hostkey(int type,
++		     u_int32_t seq,
++		     struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	u_char *tmp = NULL;
++	size_t tmp_len = 0;
++	int r;
 +
-+	do {
-+		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++	debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++	if (gss->server_host_key_blob)
++		fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if ((gss->server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
++		fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
++	return 0;
++}
 +
-+		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+		    &ret_flags);
++static int
++input_kexgss_continue(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int r;
 +
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+			/* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
-+			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
-+				        SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+		}
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
 +
-+		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if  (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
++		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++	return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++}
 +
-+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++static int
++input_kexgss_complete(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	u_char c;
++	int r;
 +
-+			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+		}
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
 +
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+		 */
-+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+			if (first) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0)
-+					fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				first = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++	if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL)
++	        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+			do {
-+				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
++	/* Is there a token included? */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (c) {
++		if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++	} else {
++		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
 +
-+					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+					if (server_host_key_blob)
-+						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
-+						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
-+				}
-+			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
 +
-+			switch (type) {
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+				if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+				if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
-+				        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &msg_tok)) != 0)
-+					fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++	return kexgss_final(ssh);
++}
 +
-+				/* Is there a token included? */
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				if (c) {
-+					if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
-+					    ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
-+						fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+				} else {
-+					/* No token included */
-+					if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+				}
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
-+					fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
-+				}
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+				debug("Received Error");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
-+			default:
-+				sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+				    type);
-+			}
-+			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+		} else {
-+			/* No data, and not complete */
-+			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++static int
++input_kexgss_error(int type,
++		   u_int32_t seq,
++		   struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	u_char *msg;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Received Error");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->major)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->minor)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*******************************************************/
++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/
++/*******************************************************/
++
++int
++kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	int r;
++
++	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host))
++		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++	if (kex->gss_client &&
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client))
++		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++	debug("Doing group exchange");
++	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++	kex->nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
++
++	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, &input_kexgssgex_group);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
 +	 * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok
 +	 */
 +
-+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+	/* compute shared secret */
-+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
-+		r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
-+		if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80)
-+			fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!");
-+		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
-+		if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65)
-+			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match"
-+			    "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob));
-+
-+		if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
-+			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04");
-+
-+		r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+	if (r != 0)
++	/* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */
++	/* 8. C computes shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		goto out;
++	}
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	buf = NULL;
 +
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
-+	    kex->client_pub,
-+	    server_blob,
-+	    shared_secret,
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
 +
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version,
++			kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer,
++			(gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty),
++			kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, pub_key,
++			dh_server_pub, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
++			hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
 +
 +	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
 +
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
 +
 +	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss);
 +
 +	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
 +	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +
++	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 +
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob);
++		gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL;
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob);
++		gss->server_blob = NULL;
++	}
 +out:
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	DH_free(kex->dh);
++	kex->dh = NULL;
++	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
 +	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
-+	kex->client_pub = NULL;
 +	return r;
 +}
 +
-+int
-+kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
++static int
++kexgssgex_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		   gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf,
-+            msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+	u_char *msg;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	int first = 1;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
-+	u_char c;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags;
 +	int r;
 +
-+	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++	/* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */
++	debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
 +
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++	gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds,
++					 token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
 +
-+	if (kex->gss_client &&
-+	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		/* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++	}
 +
-+	debug("Doing group exchange");
-+	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
++	/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++	if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr);
 +
-+	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	kex->nbits = nbits;
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++			fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
 +
-+	if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++			fatal("Integrity check failed");
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++	 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++	 */
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		if (gss->first) {
++	                DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++			gss->first = 0;
++		} else {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok);
++
++		/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgssgex_complete);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* No data, and not complete */
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr);
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_group(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Received SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, NULL);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++	if (BN_num_bits(p) < kex->min || BN_num_bits(p) > kex->max)
 +		fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+		    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++		    kex->min, BN_num_bits(p), kex->max);
 +
 +	if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL)
 +		fatal("dn_new_group() failed");
 +	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 +
-+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		DH_free(kex->dh);
++		kex->dh = NULL;
++		return r;
++	}
 +
-+	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++	return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
++}
 +
-+	do {
-+		/* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */
-+		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int r;
 +
-+		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+		    &ret_flags);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
 +
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+			/* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
-+			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
-+				        SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
-+
-+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+		 */
-+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+			if (first) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				first = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+			do {
-+				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
-+					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+					if (server_host_key_blob)
-+						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
-+						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
-+				}
-+			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+			switch (type) {
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+				if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+				if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
-+				        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &msg_tok)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+				/* Is there a token included? */
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				if (c) {
-+					if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
-+					        ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+					    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+				} else {
-+					/* No token included */
-+					if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+				}
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+				debug("Received Error");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
-+			default:
-+				sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+				    type);
-+			}
-+			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+		} else {
-+			/* No data, and not complete */
-+			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+	 * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if  (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
 +		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++	return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++}
 +
-+	/* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */
-+	/* 8. C computes shared secret */
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	buf = NULL;
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_complete(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	u_char c;
++	int r;
 +
-+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
++
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++	if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL)
++	        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	/* Is there a token included? */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (c) {
++		if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++	} else {
++		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
 +	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
 +
-+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
 +
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
-+ 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
-+	    dh_p, dh_g,
-+	    pub_key,
-+	    dh_server_pub,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
-+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
-+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	DH_free(kex->dh);
-+	kex->dh = NULL;
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
-+	return r;
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh);
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
 diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..60bc02de
+index 000000000..8362081ea
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -2159,33 +2302,18 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +
++static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++
 +int
 +kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+	 */
-+
-+	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
-+	int type = 0;
 +	gss_OID oid;
 +	char *mechs;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
 +
@@ -2201,135 +2329,94 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++		fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
-+	do {
-+		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
-+		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+		switch(type) {
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
-+				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (kex->gss == NULL)
++		fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context");
 +
-+			switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
-+				r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
-+				r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
-+				r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
-+			}
-+			if (r != 0)
-+				goto out;
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgss_init);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue);
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
++	return 0;
++}
 +
-+			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++static inline void
++kexgss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		  gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
++		  gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		  OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	int r;
 +
-+			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
-+			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
-+			* buffer state->incoming_packet
-+			*/
-+			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+			    kex->hash_alg,
-+			    kex->client_version,
-+			    kex->server_version,
-+			    kex->peer,
-+			    kex->my,
-+			    empty,
-+			    client_pubkey,
-+			    server_pubkey,
-+			    shared_secret,
-+			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+				goto out;
++	gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok);
 +
-+			gssbuf.value = hash;
-+			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0)
++		fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
 +
-+			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+			client_pubkey = NULL;
++	if (gss->buf.value == NULL)
++		fatal("No client public key");
 +
-+			break;
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
-+			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+			    type);
-+		}
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	}
++}
 +
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++static inline int
++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh,
++	     gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++	     OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	int r;
 +
-+		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
 +
-+		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
-+			fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		if (send_tok->length > 0) {
 +			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 +				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +		}
 +		fatal("accept_ctx died");
 +	}
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok)))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, gss->server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++	if (send_tok->length != 0) {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0)
 +			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	} else {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
@@ -2338,13 +2425,19 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok);
++
++	hashlen = gss->hashlen;
++	memcpy(hash, gss->hash, hashlen);
++	explicit_bzero(gss->hash, sizeof(gss->hash));
++	shared_secret = gss->shared_secret;
++	gss->shared_secret = NULL;
 +
 +	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
 +	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
@@ -2353,44 +2446,126 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 * just exchanged.  */
 +	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
 +		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_pubkey);
++		gss->server_pubkey = NULL;
++	}
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
 +	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_pubkey);
 +	return r;
 +}
 +
++static int
++input_kexgss_init(int type,
++		  u_int32_t seq,
++		  struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *empty;
++	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
++		r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
++		r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
++		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return r;
++	}
++
++	/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
++	 * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
++	 * buffer state->incoming_packet
++	 */
++	gss->hashlen = sizeof(gss->hash);
++	r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version,
++			 kex->peer, kex->my, empty, client_pubkey, gss->server_pubkey,
++			 gss->shared_secret, gss->hash, &gss->hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return r;
++	}
++
++	gss->buf.value = gss->hash;
++	gss->buf.length = gss->hashlen;
++
++	kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgss_continue(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++/*******************************************************/
++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/
++/*******************************************************/
++
 +int
 +kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+	 */
-+
-+	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	int type = 0;
 +	gss_OID oid;
 +	char *mechs;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+	int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
-+	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
 +
@@ -2398,29 +2573,194 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
 +	 * into life
 +	 */
-+	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+			free(mechs);
++	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
++		mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		free(mechs);
++	}
 +
 +	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++		fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
-+	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (kex->gss == NULL)
++		fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context");
++
 +	debug("Doing group exchange");
-+	ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, &input_kexgssgex_groupreq);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static inline void
++kexgssgex_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		     gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
++		     gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		     OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	int r;
++
++	gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok);
++
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0)
++		fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++	if (gss->dh_client_pub == NULL)
++		fatal("No client public key");
++
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	}
++}
++
++static inline int
++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh,
++		gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		if (send_tok->length > 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	}
++
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++	/* calculate shared secret */
++	shared_secret = sshbuf_new();
++	if (shared_secret == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, gss->dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version,
++			kex->peer, kex->my, empty, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g,
++			gss->dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret),
++			sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok)))
++		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	if (send_tok->length != 0) {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	} else {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++
++	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
++	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
++		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++	 * just exchanged.  */
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL)
++		BN_clear_free(gss->dh_client_pub);
++
++out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	DH_free(kex->dh);
++	kex->dh = NULL;
++	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++	int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
++	int r;
++
++	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, NULL);
++
 +	/* store client proposal to provide valid signature */
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
 +	kex->nbits = nbits;
 +	kex->min = cmin;
 +	kex->max = cmax;
@@ -2428,10 +2768,11 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax);
 +	nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
 +	nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
++
 +	if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+		    min, nbits, max);
-+	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", min, nbits, max);
++
++	kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
 +	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
 +		fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found");
@@ -2448,152 +2789,73 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
-+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	do {
-+		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+		switch(type) {
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+			break;
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
-+			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+			    type);
-+		}
-+
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
-+
-+		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+		if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+			fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+		}
-+		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		DH_free(kex->dh);
++		kex->dh = NULL;
++		return r;
 +	}
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+	/* calculate shared secret */
-+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    empty,
-+	    cmin, nbits, cmax,
-+	    dh_p, dh_g,
-+	    dh_client_pub,
-+	    pub_key,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
-+		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	} else {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
-+			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	}
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
-+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
-+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+
-+	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+	 * just exchanged.  */
-+	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	DH_free(kex->dh);
-+	kex->dh = NULL;
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	return r;
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgssgex_init);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue);
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
++	return 0;
 +}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_init(int type,
++		     u_int32_t seq,
++		     struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &gss->dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++	kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
 diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
+index 85dc1b1b7..d463d6a9c 100644
 --- a/monitor.c
 +++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -2602,7 +2864,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+@@ -214,11 +216,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
@@ -2618,11 +2880,11 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
 +    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
 +#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_STATE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_state},
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
      {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- #endif
-@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- 	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+@@ -289,6 +298,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_STATE, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -2632,7 +2894,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
  	while (!authenticated) {
-@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+@@ -341,8 +354,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
  			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
  			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
@@ -2649,7 +2911,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  			if (authenticated || partial) {
  				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
  				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
-@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -429,6 +449,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -2660,7 +2922,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
-@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -1896,6 +1920,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
  # endif
@@ -2678,7 +2940,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
-@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1987,8 +2022,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	u_char *p;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2689,7 +2951,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
-@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2020,8 +2055,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
  	int r;
  
@@ -2700,7 +2962,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
-@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2041,6 +2076,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
@@ -2708,7 +2970,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	}
  	return (0);
  }
-@@ -1871,8 +1900,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2052,8 +2088,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	OM_uint32 ret;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2719,7 +2981,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
-@@ -1898,13 +1927,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2079,13 +2115,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  int
  mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
@@ -2731,17 +2993,17 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 -		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
 +		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
- 
--	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0)
 +		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
+ 
+-	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
 +	authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
 +	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex);
  
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
-@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2094,7 +2134,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
  
@@ -2754,7 +3016,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
  		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2102,5 +2146,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2840,10 +3102,10 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
 diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
+index 9dcd9c293..dbc7e0037 100644
 --- a/monitor.h
 +++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
  	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
  
@@ -2853,10 +3115,10 @@ index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
  
  struct ssh;
 diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
+index 347eb6870..08dc29e12 100644
 --- a/monitor_wrap.c
 +++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -993,13 +993,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+@@ -1142,13 +1142,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
  }
  
  int
@@ -2873,7 +3135,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-@@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -1161,6 +1163,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
  	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2931,11 +3193,13 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +}
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ /*
 diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
+index 9b42ddbcb..12c489c33 100644
 --- a/monitor_wrap.h
 +++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
     gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
@@ -2947,18 +3211,19 @@ index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
---- a/readconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.c	2021-08-27 12:25:42.556421509 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
- #include "uidswap.h"
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index d99205944..eab734aaf 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "version.h"
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
  
  /* Format of the configuration file:
  
-@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -159,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
  	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
  	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
  	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
@@ -2990,7 +3255,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-@@ -1113,10 +1128,42 @@ parse_time:
+@@ -1326,10 +1341,42 @@ parse_time:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3033,7 +3298,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	case oBatchMode:
  		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2306,7 +2353,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2698,7 +2745,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
  	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
  	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication = -1;
@@ -3047,7 +3312,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -2463,8 +2516,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2863,8 +2916,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
  		options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3066,7 +3331,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -3246,7 +3309,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+@@ -3692,7 +3755,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
@@ -3081,9 +3346,10 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
-diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
---- a/readconf.h.gsskex	2021-08-27 12:05:29.248142431 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.h	2021-08-27 12:22:19.270679852 +0200
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index 942149f9a..b96e3279e 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
 @@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
  	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
@@ -3098,18 +3364,19 @@ diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
  	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
---- a/servconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c	2021-08-27 12:28:15.887735189 +0200
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
- #include "auth.h"
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 48ec8c4ec..3b93ca829 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "version.h"
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
  
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-     const char *, int);
-@@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+ # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		"sshd"
+@@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
@@ -3121,7 +3388,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -356,10 +360,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -374,10 +378,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3140,15 +3407,15 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -506,6 +518,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+@@ -562,6 +574,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -587,12 +600,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -647,12 +660,22 @@ static struct {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -3171,7 +3438,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
-@@ -1576,6 +1599,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1643,6 +1666,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3182,7 +3449,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sGssCleanupCreds:
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1584,6 +1611,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1651,6 +1678,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3205,22 +3472,22 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2892,6 +2935,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3256,7 +3299,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
 +	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
 +	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
 +	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
 diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
+index 9beb90fae..c3f501400 100644
 --- a/servconf.h
 +++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -150,8 +150,11 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
@@ -3233,10 +3500,10 @@ index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
 diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
+index f265fdc3e..b8f0c1a58 100644
 --- a/session.c
 +++ b/session.c
-@@ -2678,13 +2678,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -2630,13 +2630,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  
  #ifdef KRB5
  	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
@@ -3259,18 +3526,10 @@ index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
  
  	/* remove agent socket */
 diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
+index 7b14e74a8..8ec451926 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@
+@@ -61,10 +61,36 @@
  
  #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
  
@@ -3296,6 +3555,8 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 +	KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
 +	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
++
++#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
 +
  typedef struct {
  	char *filename;
@@ -3305,7 +3566,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  	void *data;
  } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
  
-@@ -72,8 +92,11 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -72,8 +98,11 @@ typedef struct {
  	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
  	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
  	gss_cred_id_t creds;
@@ -3317,7 +3578,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  } ssh_gssapi_client;
  
  typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +107,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
  	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
  	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
  	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
@@ -3325,12 +3586,22 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  } ssh_gssapi_mech;
  
  typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +118,11 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +124,21 @@ typedef struct {
  	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
  	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
  	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
 -	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
 +	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret; /* both */
++	struct sshbuf *server_pubkey; /* server */
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob; /* client */
++	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob; /* client */
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; /* client */
++	gss_buffer_desc buf; /* both */
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; /* both */
++	size_t hashlen; /* both */
++	int first; /* client */
++	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub; /* server (gex) */
  } Gssctxt;
  
  extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
@@ -3338,7 +3609,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  
  int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
+@@ -108,6 +149,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
  
  struct sshbuf;
  int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
@@ -3346,7 +3617,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
-@@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+@@ -122,17 +164,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
      const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
@@ -3383,24 +3654,26 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
  
  #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
 diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
+index db92ac9af..6a9fbdc5b 100644
 --- a/ssh.1
 +++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -503,7 +503,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It GatewayPorts
- .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+@@ -539,9 +539,15 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It ForwardX11Timeout
+ .It ForwardX11Trusted
  .It GSSAPIAuthentication
 +.It GSSAPIKeyExchange
 +.It GSSAPIClientIdentity
  .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ .It GatewayPorts
+ .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
 +.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +.It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
 +.It GSSAPIServerIdentity
 +.It GSSAPITrustDns
  .It HashKnownHosts
  .It Host
- .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
-@@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag),
+ .It HostKeyAlgorithms
+@@ -636,6 +642,8 @@ flag),
  (supported message integrity codes),
  .Ar kex
  (key exchange algorithms),
@@ -3408,12 +3681,12 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
 +(GSSAPI key exchange algorithms),
  .Ar key
  (key types),
- .Ar key-cert
+ .Ar key-ca-sign
 diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
+index 3b03108db..8d27f6379 100644
 --- a/ssh.c
 +++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -847,6 +847,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
  			    strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
  				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
@@ -3422,7 +3695,7 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
  				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
-@@ -772,8 +774,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -877,8 +879,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
  				cp = xstrdup(
  				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
@@ -3434,7 +3707,7 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
  			if (cp == NULL)
  				fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
 diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
+index d9324c957..ca7c5853b 100644
 --- a/ssh_config
 +++ b/ssh_config
 @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
@@ -3444,13 +3717,13 @@ index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
 +#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
 +#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
  #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   CheckHostIP no
  #   AddressFamily any
 diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
+index f7066cbaa..8a4b469cf 100644
 --- a/ssh_config.5
 +++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -766,10 +766,68 @@ The default is
+@@ -976,10 +976,68 @@ The default is
  Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
@@ -3520,20 +3793,11 @@ index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
 diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
+index b3679c9d7..b253f991b 100644
 --- a/sshconnect2.c
 +++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
- #endif
- 
- /* import */
--extern char *client_version_string;
--extern char *server_version_string;
- extern Options options;
- 
- /*
-@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
+@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3544,11 +3808,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	xxx_host = host;
  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
  	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
-@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
- 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+@@ -255,6 +260,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
  	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+
+ 
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 +		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
@@ -3584,10 +3847,11 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		}
 +	}
 +#endif
- 
++
  	free(hkalgs);
  
-@@ -224,17 +256,47 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+@@ -271,15 +312,45 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
  # endif
@@ -3606,6 +3870,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
  	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3618,11 +3883,8 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +#endif
 +
  	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
+ 	kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
  
- 	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
- 	free(myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@@ -3633,10 +3895,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		free(gss);
 +	}
 +#endif
- 	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
- 
-@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+@@ -369,6 +440,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -3644,7 +3906,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif
  
  void	userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
-@@ -346,6 +409,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+@@ -385,6 +457,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
  
  Authmethod authmethods[] = {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -3656,7 +3918,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	{"gssapi-with-mic",
  		userauth_gssapi,
  		userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
-@@ -716,12 +784,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -759,12 +836,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  	OM_uint32 min;
  	int r, ok = 0;
  	gss_OID mech = NULL;
@@ -3690,7 +3952,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  
  	/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
  	while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
-@@ -730,13 +811,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -773,13 +870,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
  		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
  		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
@@ -3707,7 +3969,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	if (!ok || mech == NULL)
  		return 0;
  
-@@ -976,6 +1059,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1013,6 +1112,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	free(lang);
  	return r;
  }
@@ -3763,32 +4025,20 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
  static int
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index 9c31515de..5a4ee733c 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			break;
+ 		}
  	}
- 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
- 	if (nkeys == 0)
--		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
--	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
-+	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- }
-@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		free(fp);
- 	}
- 	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
--	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
-+	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
-+	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
- 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
-@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+-	if (!have_key)
++	if (!have_key && !options.gss_keyex)
+ 		fatal("internal error: received no hostkeys");
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+@@ -819,6 +819,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	free(hkalgs);
  
@@ -3815,7 +4065,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +	if (gss && orig)
 +		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 +	else if (gss)
-+		newstr = gss;
++		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
 +	else if (orig)
 +		newstr = orig;
 +
@@ -3825,7 +4075,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +	 * host key algorithm we support
 +	 */
 +	if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = xstrdup("null");
 +
 +	if (newstr)
 +		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
@@ -3837,11 +4087,10 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
  		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
-@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -836,6 +878,17 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
- # endif
--#endif
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 +# ifdef GSSAPI
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 +		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
@@ -3853,15 +4102,55 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
 +	}
 +# endif
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 9804dc334..6e28020e9 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -592,8 +592,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
+ 	if (nkeys == 0)
+-		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
+-	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
++	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ }
+@@ -1135,8 +1135,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (!have_key)
+-		fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys");
++	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
++	if (!have_key && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys and GSS KEX is not configured");
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+ 	new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 3c76b60b0..3ab81e268 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1676,7 +1676,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		free(fp);
+ 	}
+ 	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
+-	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
++	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
++	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
+ 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
 diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
+index 48af6321b..8db9f0fb1 100644
 --- a/sshd_config
 +++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # GSSAPI options
  #GSSAPIAuthentication no
  #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
@@ -3871,10 +4160,10 @@ index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
 diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
+index aa9f0af76..b90068bf3 100644
 --- a/sshd_config.5
 +++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+@@ -739,6 +739,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3886,7 +4175,7 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
  .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
  Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
  a client authenticates against.
-@@ -660,6 +665,32 @@ machine's default store.
+@@ -753,6 +758,32 @@ machine's default store.
  This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3920,14 +4209,13 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
  authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
+index afd7822c4..148fee2b7 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
 +++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -127,6 +127,75 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
- extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl;
- extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
- #endif
-+
+@@ -114,6 +114,75 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl;
+ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl;
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 
 +static int ssh_gss_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *)
 +{
 +	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
@@ -3996,18 +4284,19 @@ index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
 +	/* .keybits = */	0, /* FIXME */
 +	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_gss_funcs,
 +};
- 
++
  const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
  	&sshkey_ed25519_impl,
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
- 	&sshkey_xmss_impl,
- 	&sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
- #endif
+ 	&sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl,
+@@ -144,6 +213,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
+ 	&sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl,
+ 	&sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl,
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 +	&sshkey_gss_kex_impl,
  	NULL
  };
  
-@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+@@ -314,7 +384,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
  
  	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
  		impl = keyimpls[i];
@@ -4017,10 +4306,10 @@ index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
  		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
 diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
+index c3262b896..931d1f79b 100644
 --- a/sshkey.h
 +++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
  	KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
@@ -4028,3 +4317,6 @@ index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
  	KEY_UNSPEC
  };
  
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch b/0012-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
similarity index 88%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
rename to 0012-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
index 90f8322..70f75fb 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+++ b/0012-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
+From 577b0fea53270292bd0b4979eb5369619b2f5adb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 12/53] openssh-6.6p1-force_krb
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ session.c       |  23 +++++++
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 ++
+ sshd.8          |   7 +++
+ 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 413b845..54dd383 100644
+index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
@@ -12,7 +24,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
+@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@
  
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
@@ -20,7 +32,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  extern ServerOptions options;
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+@@ -55,6 +58,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
  # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
  #endif
  
@@ -34,7 +46,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	int retval;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -42,7 +54,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  
  	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
  		return 0;
-@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -98,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		return 0;
  	}
@@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  
-@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -109,6 +132,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	return retval;
  }
  
@@ -205,10 +217,10 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
 diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
+index b8f0c1a58..3eae5bdf3 100644
 --- a/session.c
 +++ b/session.c
-@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -642,6 +642,29 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		command = auth_opts->force_command;
  		forced = "(key-option)";
  	}
@@ -239,7 +251,7 @@ index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
  	if (forced != NULL) {
  		s->forced = 1;
 diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 0374c88..509109a 100644
+index 8ec451926..db34d77f4 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
 @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
@@ -254,10 +266,10 @@ index 0374c88..509109a 100644
  
  /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
+index 0226a8303..e2d8ff003 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
  The client tries to authenticate itself using
  host-based authentication,
  public key authentication,
@@ -265,7 +277,7 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  challenge-response authentication,
  or password authentication.
  .Pp
-@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+@@ -874,6 +875,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
  but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
  rlogin/rsh.
  .Pp
@@ -278,3 +290,6 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
  and authentication information.
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch b/0013-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
similarity index 78%
rename from openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
rename to 0013-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
index 544932b..89fb40d 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/0013-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
+From 1a5b32dbf550467a4ae19351667bcfdf9c52e44d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/53] openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ auth.h          |   3 +-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  42 +++-----
+ gss-serv.c      |  10 +-
+ servconf.c      |  12 ++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ session.c       |   5 +-
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 +-
+ sshd-session.c  |   2 +-
+ sshd_config.5   |   8 ++
+ 10 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  #endif
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	char *client, *platform_client;
  	const char *errmsg;
  
-@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  		goto out;
  	}
  
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
-@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  		goto out;
  #endif
  
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
  
-@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  void
  krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
@@ -126,12 +125,29 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
  		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
  		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,189 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	}
  }
  
 -#ifndef HEIMDAL
-+
+-krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
+-	mode_t old_umask;
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
 +#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
 +int
 +ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
@@ -149,7 +165,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +	old = *dsc;
 +
 +	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
++	if (i == -1) {
++		*dsc = old;
 +		free(src);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
@@ -196,8 +213,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
-+	}
-+
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
 +	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
 +		goto cleanup;
 +
@@ -232,29 +250,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
++krb5_error_code
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
- 	mode_t old_umask;
++	mode_t old_umask;
 +	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
- 
--	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
--	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
--		return ENOMEM;
--
--	old_umask = umask(0177);
--	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
--	oerrno = errno;
--	umask(old_umask);
--	if (tmpfd == -1) {
--		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
--		return oerrno;
--	}
++
 +	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
@@ -269,8 +271,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
 +		if (ret < 0)
 +			return ENOMEM;
- 
--	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++
 +		old_umask = umask(0177);
 +		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
  		oerrno = errno;
@@ -337,42 +338,32 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  }
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- }
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 83d07ae8b..10e88e11f 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
  
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
+@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
- 	char *envstr;
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
  #endif
  
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
  
@@ -381,7 +372,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  {
  	krb5_ccache ccache;
-@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
  	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -399,7 +390,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
  # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
  # endif
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -418,7 +409,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
  
-@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
  		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -427,7 +418,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  
  	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
-@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -436,7 +427,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  
  	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	    client->creds, ccache))) {
  		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -474,7 +465,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
  #endif
  
-@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  
  	client->store.data = krb_context;
  
@@ -483,10 +474,44 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  }
  
  int
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 6bac42931..d2bc03486 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -414,13 +414,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -500,9 +502,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 3b93ca829..7bf1507df 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -494,7 +519,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -376,6 +377,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
  	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@@ -503,16 +528,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ typedef enum {
-	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
-	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+@@ -558,7 +561,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
-	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -649,11 +652,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -526,7 +551,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1662,6 +1667,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -537,7 +562,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3295,6 +3304,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # ifdef USE_AFS
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
@@ -545,10 +570,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c3f501400..a4a38d6d7 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@@ -557,10 +583,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 3eae5bdf3..b8a2dae92 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -987,7 +987,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
  	 * the child's environment as they see fit
  	 */
@@ -570,7 +597,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  #endif
  
  	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+@@ -1063,7 +1064,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -579,10 +606,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index db34d77f4..a894e23c9 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 6e28020e9..028d5850e 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
  		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@@ -591,10 +641,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
-@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index b90068bf3..cae0fd0b4 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1032,6 +1032,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
  file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -607,26 +658,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch b/0014-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
similarity index 74%
rename from openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
rename to 0014-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
index 80e7678..fa07e55 100644
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/0014-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@
+From 0b19c3dabb1e23837238e90238f1ab5fa3c99df8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 14/53] openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ auth.h          |  2 ++
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.8          |  4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
+index 035032221..4910aa38a 100644
 --- a/auth-krb5.c
 +++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
+@@ -465,5 +465,21 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
  		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
  	}
  }
@@ -25,10 +37,10 @@ index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
+index 10e88e11f..391630350 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
  #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
  krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
@@ -38,10 +50,10 @@ index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
  
  #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
+index df55512d3..820f794cf 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+@@ -144,8 +144,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
  {
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
@@ -71,10 +83,10 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
+index e2d8ff003..fa33f5232 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
  These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
  Further details are described in
  .Xr ksu 1 .
@@ -85,3 +97,6 @@ index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
  .Pp
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/0015-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
similarity index 79%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
rename to 0015-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
index eaf4453..a403c7c 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/0015-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,22 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
+From d0c2e8ddde548c79144547152b523346ae9f0358 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 15/53] openssh-6.6p1-kuserok
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     |  20 ++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ servconf.c      |  13 +++++-
+ servconf.h      |   1 +
+ sshd_config     |   1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |   5 +++
+ 6 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 4910aa38a..b9c261a24 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,21 @@
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
@@ -23,7 +38,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
  static int
  krb5_init(void *context)
  {
-@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -158,8 +173,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
@@ -35,10 +50,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
  		problem = -1;
  		goto out;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 820f794cf..187faf929 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
      int);
  
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
@@ -46,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
  
-@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+@@ -91,6 +92,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
   * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
   */
  
@@ -150,7 +166,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  static int
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  {
-@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -115,7 +213,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
  	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
  	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
@@ -160,7 +176,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
  		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
  	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
@@ -172,18 +188,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
  		int saved_errno = errno;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
-@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 7bf1507df..8f4b2b43e 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -393,6 +394,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
  		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
  #endif
@@ -192,16 +209,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
-	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
-	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+@@ -561,7 +564,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
-	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -653,12 +656,14 @@ static struct {
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
  	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -216,18 +233,18 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
-		}
-		break;
-
+@@ -2431,6 +2436,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
-	case sMatch:
-		if (cmdline)
-			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2997,6 +3006,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
@@ -235,18 +252,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3305,6 +3315,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
 +	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index a4a38d6d7..11de36a23 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
  						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
@@ -254,10 +272,23 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
-@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 8db9f0fb1..ea5a878e6 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index cae0fd0b4..c360fcfff 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1040,6 +1040,10 @@ The default value
  .Cm no
  can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
  user account.
@@ -266,9 +297,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+@@ -1354,6 +1358,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm IPQoS ,
  .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
  .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
@@ -276,14 +307,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
  .Cm LogLevel ,
  .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
  .Cm MaxSessions ,
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0016-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch b/0016-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a2575e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0016-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From d755d647c33f96cd4ec7d5499d11ecd443bdb098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/53] openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote
+
+---
+ scp.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index c5f573cc1..d97a54cc4 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1148,7 +1148,10 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
++			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
++				addargs(&alist, "-t");
++			else
++				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/0017-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
similarity index 53%
rename from openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
rename to 0017-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
index 941c694..6704616 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/0017-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
+From 674851677d1e38cf6992948f8f452e46107a2014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 17/53] openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot
+
+---
+ log.c              | 11 +++++++++--
+ log.h              |  1 +
+ monitor.c          | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h          |  2 +-
+ session.c          | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ sftp-server-main.c |  2 +-
+ sftp-server.c      |  6 +++---
+ sftp.h             |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c     |  7 ++++++-
+ 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index 5969c4a16..49b0c8a68 100644
+--- a/log.c
++++ b/log.c
+@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ void
  log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
      int on_stderr)
  {
@@ -13,7 +31,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
-@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
+@@ -208,8 +213,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
  		exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -26,9 +44,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
  
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
+diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
+index 8e8dfc23f..70048a8af 100644
+--- a/log.h
++++ b/log.h
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
  typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
@@ -37,43 +56,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
-@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
- 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
-+
- 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
- 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
- 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
- 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
-+
- 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
- 	/* Log it */
- 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
--	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- 	free(msg);
-@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
- 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
- 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
- 
-+	mon->m_state = "";
-+
- 	return mon;
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index d463d6a9c..453469665 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -2007,9 +2007,22 @@ monitor_init(void)
  }
  
  void
@@ -98,14 +85,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
- 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
- 	pid_t			 m_pid;
-+	char		*m_state;
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index dbc7e0037..d4d631ddc 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct monitor {
  };
  
  struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
@@ -114,10 +98,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
  
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
@@ -125,7 +110,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
  static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -632,6 +633,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	int ret;
  	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
  	char session_type[1024];
@@ -133,7 +118,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
  		original_command = command;
-@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -691,6 +693,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  			tty += 5;
  	}
  
@@ -144,7 +129,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    session_type,
  	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1469,14 +1475,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
@@ -159,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1609,8 +1607,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  			exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -168,10 +153,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
  
  	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
+@@ -1638,9 +1634,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+ #endif
 -		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
 +		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
  	}
@@ -187,29 +172,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	fflush(NULL);
  
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
+index 2c70f89bc..bbb79f278 100644
+--- a/sftp-server-main.c
++++ b/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
  
- struct passwd;
- 
--int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 777821acd..185ad1459 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1897,7 +1897,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
  int
 -sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
  {
-	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-	ssize_t len, olen;
-@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+ 	ssize_t len, olen;
+@@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
  	extern char *__progname;
  
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
@@ -218,7 +205,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
-@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -227,21 +214,23 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	/*
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
+diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
+index 2bde8bb7f..ddf1a3968 100644
+--- a/sftp.h
++++ b/sftp.h
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
--	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 	}
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 028d5850e..4a5eaa1ff 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #endif
  
  	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
@@ -249,7 +238,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
  	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+@@ -434,6 +434,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  
  	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
@@ -261,3 +250,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
  	demote_sensitive_data();
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e50e1c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 931f22f77ab2b9cebd96e113f1e3ab179dd1b6cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 18/53] openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index d97a54cc4..e1992622f 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1866,6 +1866,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
++			errno = ENOTDIR;
++			goto bad;
++		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/0019-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
similarity index 62%
rename from openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
rename to 0019-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
index cccb3e0..4c0a60b 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/0019-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,21 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
-@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+From ef91c84a26a282adaf95e165ebcdd44a410c4328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 19/53] openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  3 +--
+ servconf.c      | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ servconf.h      |  1 +
+ sshd_config     |  1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |  6 ++++++
+ 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 187faf929..03188d9b3 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  	FILE *fp;
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	char *line = NULL;
@@ -9,7 +23,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser
  	struct stat st;
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
  	int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -18,18 +32,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser
                  return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
                                          k5login_exists);
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
-@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
  	options->use_kuserok = -1;
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -396,6 +397,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  #endif
  	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
  		options->use_kuserok = 1;
@@ -38,16 +53,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+@@ -579,7 +582,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
  	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+@@ -675,6 +678,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -55,8 +70,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #else
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -64,7 +78,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -2440,6 +2445,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -72,10 +86,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
-	case sMatch:
-		if (cmdline)
-			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -3007,6 +3016,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
@@ -83,7 +97,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3316,6 +3326,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
@@ -91,21 +105,35 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
-@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
-	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 11de36a23..c08cf6a7a 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
  	int	use_kuserok;
 +	int		enable_k5users;
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
-@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index ea5a878e6..33713c886 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c360fcfff..a0fc6064f 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -739,6 +739,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -118,14 +146,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_conf
  .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
  doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0020-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch b/0020-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed2379e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0020-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From cce18d636f4137a4e5401170538868b8b80651c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 20/53] openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output
+
+---
+ servconf.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5e40f1b00..b63a7f0b0 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -3368,7 +3368,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch b/0021-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
similarity index 72%
rename from openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
rename to 0021-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
index 1cfa309..737430d 100644
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/0021-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+From 57ae33c2f43425725345c910d90ef6fed75d3b85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/53] openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission
+
+---
+ sftp-server.8 |  7 +++++++
+ sftp-server.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+index 5311bf929..5e6e3aa44 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.8
++++ b/sftp-server.8
 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
  .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
@@ -22,10 +33,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
  .El
  .Pp
  On some systems,
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
  /* Version of client */
  static u_int version;
  
@@ -36,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
  static int init_done;
  
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -741,6 +745,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	Attrib a;
  	char *name;
  	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@@ -44,7 +56,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -750,6 +755,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
  	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
  	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@@ -55,7 +67,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
  	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
  	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -771,6 +780,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  			}
  		}
  	}
@@ -64,7 +76,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
  		send_status(id, status);
  	free(name);
-@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1890,7 +1901,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  	fprintf(stderr,
  	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
  	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
@@ -73,7 +85,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
  	    __progname, __progname);
  	exit(1);
-@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1914,7 +1925,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
  	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -82,7 +94,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'Q':
  			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1976,6 +1987,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
  				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
  			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
  			break;
@@ -98,3 +110,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  		case 'h':
  		default:
  			sftp_server_usage();
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch b/0022-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
similarity index 66%
rename from openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
rename to 0022-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
index 363538c..fa59fd6 100644
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+++ b/0022-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
@@ -1,21 +1,17 @@
-Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
-
-All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
-sshd process to handle a new client connection is
-spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
-without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
-files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
-closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
-
-Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+From 25b593f41fa85bcaf1bbdc9c368325c4af033208 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 22/53] openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom
 
 ---
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index 49a4f35ff..f61124585 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+@@ -140,7 +140,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
  	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
  	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
  		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
@@ -49,4 +45,6 @@ Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
  	}
  	(void) closedir(dirp);
  	return;
+-- 
+2.52.0
 
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/0023-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
similarity index 59%
rename from openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
rename to 0023-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
index f7cd50f..d018772 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/0023-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@@ -1,40 +1,58 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+From 4cacb1bda51a2d91cf4cc1c8058b989dfc0c58c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 23/53] openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux
+
+---
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  8 ++++--
+ misc.c                           |  5 ++--
+ misc.h                           |  2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++---------------
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  5 ++--
+ platform.c                       |  6 ++++-
+ sshconnect.c                     |  2 +-
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |  6 +++--
+ 9 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index c326a69ba..b7300ca9e 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
  
  /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
  
  static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
-@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -483,7 +485,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
+@@ -759,7 +762,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 7e27a38d1..2fd14159d 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2788,7 +2788,8 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
  pid_t
  subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
      int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
@@ -44,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
-@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+@@ -2922,7 +2923,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
  			_exit(1);
  		}
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -53,10 +71,11 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
---- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index f3c5a18c6..8cdfd7cec 100644
+--- a/misc.h
++++ b/misc.h
+@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
  pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
@@ -65,36 +84,22 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
  
  typedef struct arglist arglist;
  struct arglist {
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
- 
- int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
--void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
--int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
- void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -48,10 +48,6 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #endif
  
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
--extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  int
  sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
+@@ -221,7 +217,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
  }
  
  static void
@@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	*role = NULL;
  	*level = NULL;
-@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
+@@ -239,8 +236,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
  
  /* Return the default security context for the given username */
  static int
@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	char *sename, *lvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -248,7 +245,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  	int r = 0;
  	context_t con = NULL;
  
@@ -124,16 +129,16 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
  	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -270,7 +267,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  	if (r == 0) {
  		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
  			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
  
  			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -331,7 +328,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -143,7 +148,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+@@ -340,11 +338,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -152,12 +157,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
--	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
-@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+@@ -360,9 +358,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  }
  
  static int
@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  }
  
  static int
-@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+@@ -372,25 +371,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
  }
  
  int
@@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
  				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
-@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+@@ -406,7 +408,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -213,66 +218,51 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  	if (r >= 0) {
  		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
  		if (r < 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index c004071d1..26c5f773b 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index c92a0cba6..66d0c2a6b 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
  
- extern int use_privsep;
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
-@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+ int
+@@ -140,7 +142,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
--static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
--static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
-@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
-diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
---- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
-@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 912a520c5..babe4a982 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
  
  	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
@@ -281,3 +271,43 @@ diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
  		goto out;
  
  	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index 5a4ee733c..f3c38a7d1 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Saved arguments to main(). */
+ static char **saved_argv;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 4a5eaa1ff..d6bece941 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1337,7 +1337,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0024-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/0024-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32b56db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0024-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 503297ec6f6eef3bb4906271d170fab848e27298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 24/53] openssh-7.5p1-sandbox
+
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index a0692dd2f..e0f2d4289 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -305,6 +305,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -323,6 +326,21 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_gettid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+@@ -332,6 +350,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch b/0025-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
similarity index 51%
rename from openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
rename to 0025-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
index 8ae0948..d1eb51a 100644
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0025-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
+From e1d86d265d9543c77fa90a33acc70246e68bf3bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 25/53] openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
+index e1992622f..621131ffc 100644
 --- a/scp.c
 +++ b/scp.c
-@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -1169,7 +1169,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
@@ -13,4 +22,6 @@ index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
  			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
  			    thost, targ);
  			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+-- 
+2.52.0
 
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/0026-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
similarity index 87%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
rename to 0026-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
index 86c08db..5162ffa 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/0026-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.284590156 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.623052194 +0200
-@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@
+From 6d9e08f061451f6cd464af5ec598fa99d15acadb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 26/53] openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5  | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ sshd_config.5 | 179 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -438,17 +438,13 @@ A single argument of
  causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
  This is the default behaviour.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -24,7 +35,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
+@@ -587,20 +583,25 @@ If the option is set to
  (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -54,21 +65,21 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -479,13 +480,6 @@
+@@ -616,13 +617,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -885,6 +879,11 @@
+@@ -1022,6 +1016,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -80,7 +91,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -897,10 +896,8 @@
+@@ -1034,10 +1033,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -92,7 +103,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -919,36 +916,25 @@
+@@ -1056,36 +1053,25 @@ will not be converted automatically,
  but may be manually hashed using
  .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -137,7 +148,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Pp
  The
  .Fl Q
-@@ -1001,6 +987,17 @@
+@@ -1138,6 +1124,17 @@ to prefer their algorithms.
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
@@ -155,7 +166,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .It Cm HostKeyAlias
  Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
  real host name when looking up or saving the host key
-@@ -1232,30 +1229,25 @@
+@@ -1360,6 +1357,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -164,8 +175,11 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
+ their preference order.
+ The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
+@@ -1368,29 +1370,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@@ -181,9 +195,11 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Sq ^
  character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
+-.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@@ -191,11 +207,12 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
+ .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+@@ -1506,37 +1496,33 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -242,7 +259,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1567,39 +1555,31 @@
+@@ -1725,39 +1711,31 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -294,7 +311,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
  Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
  The argument to this keyword must be
-@@ -2265,7 +2245,9 @@
+@@ -2504,7 +2482,9 @@ for those users who do not have a configuration file.
  This file must be world-readable.
  .El
  .Sh SEE ALSO
@@ -305,10 +322,11 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Sh AUTHORS
  .An -nosplit
  OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.277590077 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.592051845 +0200
-@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@ If the argument is
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -331,7 +349,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -525,20 +521,25 @@
+@@ -533,20 +529,25 @@ The default is
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -361,21 +379,21 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -565,13 +566,6 @@
+@@ -573,13 +574,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -766,53 +760,43 @@
+@@ -774,53 +768,43 @@ For this to work
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -448,7 +466,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -879,25 +863,14 @@
+@@ -887,25 +871,14 @@ is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
  .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  environment variable.
  .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
@@ -479,7 +497,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -1044,20 +1017,25 @@
+@@ -1051,6 +1024,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -488,9 +506,12 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+ The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
+@@ -1059,16 +1037,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
@@ -506,27 +527,25 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -1089,16 +1067,6 @@
+@@ -1105,14 +1083,6 @@ sntrup761x25519-sha512
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
--diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
+@@ -1199,21 +1169,26 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -557,7 +576,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1241,15 +1214,6 @@
+@@ -1256,15 +1231,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -573,7 +592,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1633,36 +1597,25 @@
+@@ -1751,36 +1717,25 @@ or equivalent.)
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -619,7 +638,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -2131,7 +2084,9 @@
+@@ -2281,7 +2236,9 @@ This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
  .El
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
@@ -630,3 +649,6 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
  .Sh AUTHORS
  .An -nosplit
  OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0027-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch b/0027-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f7f49b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0027-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From d73633dd9770bea0c3802075842398faf3e55e30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 27/53] openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf
+
+---
+ configure.ac |   1 +
+ kex.c        | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index adccaebd4..805be4b5e 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3182,6 +3182,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 9a2ce6d88..5f9530908 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
++# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -1077,6 +1082,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
++static const char *
++digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return SN_sha1;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return SN_sha256;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return SN_sha384;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return SN_sha512;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	u_char *key = NULL;
++	int r, key_len;
++
++	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
++       char keytype = (char)id;
++
++	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (md == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (param_bld == NULL) {
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
++	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
++		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
++				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
++				hash, hashlen) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
++				&keytype, 1);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
++	if (params == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
++	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
++	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
++#endif
++	*keyp = key;
++	key = NULL;
++	r = 0;
++
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	free (key);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (r < 0) {
++		return r;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1140,6 +1246,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch b/0028-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
similarity index 62%
rename from openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
rename to 0028-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
index 89c35ef..7c5eabf 100644
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+++ b/0028-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
+From ed5e5df9ec7ac96ac2a68c5711db00ed29d4d1cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 28/53] openssh-8.2p1-visibility
+
+---
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
 diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+index 4c96e8827..4af5209db 100644
 --- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
 +++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
  #endif
  }
  
@@ -11,7 +20,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_api_version(void)
  {
  	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
-@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -20,7 +29,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
      const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
      struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
-@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -29,7 +38,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
      const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
      uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -38,3 +47,6 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
      struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
  {
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch b/0029-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
similarity index 55%
rename from openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
rename to 0029-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
index 8b83bc3..7063d7f 100644
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/0029-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
+From c8dce0615eac6d2a724cdb3f288d7aaa1362f65b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 29/53] openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6
+
+---
+ channels.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
 diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index 5ce6bd400..26ed9945f 100644
 --- a/channels.c
 +++ b/channels.c
-@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
- 			if (x11_use_localhost)
- 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+@@ -5123,6 +5123,16 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
  				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
@@ -23,8 +28,6 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
  				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
  					close(socks[n]);
  				num_socks = 0;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- 				break;
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
similarity index 65%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
rename to 0030-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
index dbdbe93..4aa2ffb 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+++ b/0030-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors	2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c	2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
-@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+From a3b6182e1d6b69a37a6c841baa43b818251036b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 30/53] openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index 70bcae83a..70b2b8580 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -551,7 +551,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  		goto auth_fail;
  
  	if (!do_pam_account()) {
@@ -14,9 +24,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  		goto auth_fail;
  	}
  	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+@@ -608,8 +612,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
  	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
 -	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
@@ -27,18 +37,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
  		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
  	else
-@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 			plen++;
+@@ -913,9 +919,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
  			free(msg);
  			break;
-+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
-+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
 +			sshpam_account_status = 0;
 +			/* FALLTHROUGH */
  		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
 -			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -				sshpam_account_status = 0;
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
  				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
  			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch b/0031-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
similarity index 52%
rename from openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
rename to 0031-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
index 161ab2d..5c3594f 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+++ b/0031-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
@@ -1,18 +1,31 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h	2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
- #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
+From ca8b4de1019b859e2c68288a554d1905a6cf029f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 31/53] openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch
+
+---
+ pathnames.h | 1 +
+ scp.1       | 7 +++++++
+ scp.c       | 8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
+index 0dcc49552..78bba2314 100644
+--- a/pathnames.h
++++ b/pathnames.h
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
  #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
  #define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
 +#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH		SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
  
  #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
  #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
-@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index 7bce0fe6f..2bb838c7d 100644
+--- a/scp.1
++++ b/scp.1
+@@ -334,6 +334,13 @@ during download or upload.
  By default a 32KB buffer is used.
  .El
  .El
@@ -26,10 +39,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
  .Sh EXIT STATUS
  .Ex -std scp
  .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
-@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 621131ffc..3c213f83d 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -633,6 +633,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  	if (iamremote)
  		mode = MODE_SCP;
  
@@ -44,3 +58,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
  	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
  		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
  
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0032-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch b/0032-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adb5e3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0032-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+From e6478b233cd2298c9e6e6128867421892ff8f0e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 32/53] openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp
+
+---
+ scp.c         |  2 +-
+ sftp-client.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ sftp-client.h |  4 ++--
+ sftp.c        |  6 +++---
+ 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 3c213f83d..78c79a755 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
+ 			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 840170ab6..9bf9cc047 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
++++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ 
+ /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+ static char *
+-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
++sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -1047,11 +1047,43 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+-		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+-		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+-		free(errmsg);
+-		sshbuf_free(msg);
+-		return NULL;
++		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
++			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
++			if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
++			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
++					path, strlen(path));
++
++			get_msg(conn, msg);
++			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
++				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
++
++			if (id != expected_id)
++				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
++
++			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
++				free(errmsg);
++
++				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
++				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
++					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
++				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++				free(errmsg);
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++		} else {
++			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++			free(errmsg);
++			sshbuf_free(msg);
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+@@ -1076,9 +1108,9 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
++sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
+ {
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1092,9 +1124,9 @@ sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+-		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
+ 	}
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -2014,7 +2046,7 @@ sftp_download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
++	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2366,12 +2398,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ int
+ sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
++	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2826,7 +2858,7 @@ sftp_crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ 	char *from_path_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
++	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
+ 		    from_path);
+ 		return -1;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+index 873ad3849..fe58651c1 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.h
++++ b/sftp-client.h
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+ int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
++char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+ char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int sftp_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+ int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    int, int, int, int, int, int);
++    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index 3b505eea2..2a99698a8 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+ 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+ 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
+ 		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+-		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
++		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 			err = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -2241,7 +2241,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+ 	}
+ #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+ 
+-	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
++	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("Need cwd");
+ 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
+ 
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0033-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch b/0033-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcd994b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0033-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 14f25e21b4e2c5e625f266fcc9af42c2f89845de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 33/53] openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits
+
+---
+ readconf.c | 1 +
+ servconf.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index eab734aaf..3f67f4de4 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
++	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+ 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index b63a7f0b0..ac84b74d9 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0034-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch b/0034-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..803c899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0034-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From e2c0fb233119584b04d61d243cd58433072559c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 34/53] openssh-8.7p1-ibmca
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index f61124585..417c20484 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/0035-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
similarity index 77%
rename from openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
rename to 0035-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
index 748c4b6..1635f9f 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/0035-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,57 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+From c64eb340d925f3f7e29bb1c45b7d7b537ffa6197 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 35/53] openssh-7.6p1-audit
+
+---
+ Makefile.in       |   2 +-
+ audit-bsm.c       |  45 ++++++-
+ audit-linux.c     | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ audit.c           | 129 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ audit.h           |  22 +++-
+ auditstub.c       |  52 ++++++++
+ auth.c            |   3 -
+ auth.h            |   4 +
+ auth2-hostbased.c |  16 ++-
+ auth2-pubkey.c    |  16 ++-
+ auth2.c           |   3 -
+ cipher.c          |  21 +---
+ cipher.h          |  20 ++-
+ kex.c             |  61 ++++++++--
+ kex.h             |   2 +
+ mac.c             |  14 +++
+ mac.h             |   1 +
+ monitor.c         | 193 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h         |   8 +-
+ monitor_wrap.c    | 130 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ monitor_wrap.h    |  11 +-
+ packet.c          |  98 +++++++++++++--
+ packet.h          |   1 +
+ session.c         |  82 ++++++++++++-
+ session.h         |  10 +-
+ sshd-session.c    |  98 +++++++++++++--
+ sshd.c            |  10 ++
+ 27 files changed, 1251 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 auditstub.c
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index a36eb82ed..20d134c02 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexgssc.o \
+ 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+-	sshbuf-io.o misc-agent.o
++	sshbuf-io.o misc-agent.o auditstub.o
+ 
+ P11OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-client.o
+ 
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+index 4bce22c37..a6292cb8f 100644
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -373,12 +373,25 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
  #endif
  }
  
@@ -19,17 +69,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
- void
++void
 +audit_count_session_open(void)
 +{
 +	/* not necessary */
 +}
 +
-+void
+ void
  audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
  {
- 	/* not implemented */
-@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
@@ -42,8 +91,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
  void
  audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
  {
-@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 		debug_f("unhandled event %d", event);
  	}
  }
 +
@@ -71,235 +120,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
 +	/* not implemented */
 +}
  #endif /* BSM */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
-@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@
-  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
-  */
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
- ssh_audit_event_t
-@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
- const char *
- audit_username(void)
- {
--	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
--	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
-+	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
- 
--	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
-+	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- 		return (unknownuser);
--	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
--		return (invaliduser);
- 	return (the_authctxt->user);
- }
- 
-@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
-+{
-+	char *fp;
-+
-+	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
-+		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	free(fp);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-@@ -138,6 +171,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
-+ * audit_session_open.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
-+	      audit_username());
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
-  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
-  *
-@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- /*
-  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
-  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
-+ * audit_end_command.
-  */
--void
--audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+int
-+audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
- {
- 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), command);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
-+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
-+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
-+	    audit_username(), command);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
-+ *
-+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
-+ */
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d",
-+		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(),
-+		fp, rv);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
-+	       uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
-+	        (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
- }
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
- # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
- 
- #include "loginrec.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- 
- struct ssh;
- 
-@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
- 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
- };
-+
-+enum ssh_audit_kex {
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER,
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC,
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION
-+};
- typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
- 
-+int	listening_for_clients(void);
-+
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
-+void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
--void	audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
-+void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-+int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
-+void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
-+void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
-+void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
-+void	audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
-+void	audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos);
-+void	audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -33,27 +33,40 @@
+diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
+index 954eabe27..4d3e9d41e 100644
+--- a/audit-linux.c
++++ b/audit-linux.c
+@@ -33,29 +33,42 @@
  
  #include "log.h"
  #include "audit.h"
@@ -310,11 +135,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +#include "servconf.h"
  #include "canohost.h"
  #include "packet.h"
--
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +#include "channels.h"
 +#include "session.h"
-+
+ 
 +#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256
 +
 +extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -340,6 +164,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 -			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
 +			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
  	}
+         if (hostname != NULL && strcmp(hostname, "UNKNOWN") == 0)
+                 hostname = NULL;
 -	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
 +	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
  	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
@@ -348,7 +174,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  	saved_errno = errno;
  	close(audit_fd);
  
-@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
+@@ -67,9 +80,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
  		rc = 0;
  	errno = saved_errno;
  
@@ -446,7 +272,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
  
  void
-@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+@@ -78,49 +178,211 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
@@ -525,6 +351,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
 +		if (options.use_pam)
 +			break;
++	/* Fallthrough */
 +	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
@@ -554,7 +381,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
  		break;
  	default:
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 		debug_f("unhandled event %d", event);
  		break;
  	}
  }
@@ -564,7 +391,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +{
 +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
 +	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
++	static const char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
 +	char *s;
 +	int audit_fd;
 +
@@ -582,7 +409,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +#endif
 +}
 +
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++static const char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
 +
 +void
 +audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress,
@@ -661,7 +488,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +	}
 +	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
 +			buf, NULL,
-+			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), /*FIXME listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh) */
 +			NULL, 1);
 +	audit_close(audit_fd);
 +	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
@@ -669,9 +496,238 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +		error("cannot write into audit");
 +}
  #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
+index dd2f03558..d0433c3a0 100644
+--- a/audit.c
++++ b/audit.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@
+  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
+  */
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
+ ssh_audit_event_t
+@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
+ const char *
+ audit_username(void)
+ {
+-	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
+-	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
++	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
+ 
+-	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
++	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+ 		return (unknownuser);
+-	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
+-		return (invaliduser);
+ 	return (the_authctxt->user);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
++{
++	char *fp;
++
++	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	free(fp);
++}
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++	mm_audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
++{
++	mm_audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid());
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
++{
++	mm_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid());
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+@@ -137,6 +170,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
++ * audit_session_open.
++ */
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
++	      audit_username());
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ /*
+  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
+  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
++ * audit_end_command.
+  */
+-void
+-audit_run_command(const char *command)
++int
++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ 	    audit_username(), command);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
++ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
++ */
++void
++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
++	    audit_username(), command);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
++ *
++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
++ */
++int
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d",
++		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(),
++		fp, rv);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
++ */
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
++ */
++void
++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
++	       uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
++	        (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
++ */
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
++ */
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+ }
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
+index 38cb5ad31..45d66ccff 100644
+--- a/audit.h
++++ b/audit.h
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+ 
+ #include "loginrec.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ 
+ struct ssh;
+ 
+@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+ 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+ };
++
++enum ssh_audit_kex {
++	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER,
++	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC,
++	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION
++};
+ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+ 
++int	listening_for_clients(void);
++
+ void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void	audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
++void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+-void	audit_run_command(const char *);
++int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
++void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
++int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
++void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
++void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
++void	audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
++void	audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos);
++void	audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..639a798df
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/auditstub.c
 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
 +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
 +
@@ -725,32 +781,56 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
 +audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
 +{
 +}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.682061561 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
-			authctxt->valid = 0;
- 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
- 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index d25653ee4..38c34298e 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -499,9 +499,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
+ 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
+ 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+ #endif
 -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
--#endif
- 		}
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 		if (options.use_pam)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.656061361 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+-		audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
+-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 391630350..6be52d70b 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,8 @@ struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+ int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
+ int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+     u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
++int	 hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+ 
+ /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
+ int	 auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
+@@ -240,6 +242,8 @@ int	 auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *,
+     char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+ int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
+     struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
++int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+ FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ 
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index 976484fc5..e9421a868 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
- 	    chost, key)) &&
--	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
+ 	if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ 	    chost, key) &&
+-	    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++	    mm_hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
  		authenticated = 1;
  
-@@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done:
+@@ -174,6 +174,20 @@ done:
  	return authenticated;
  }
  
@@ -771,19 +851,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
  /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
  int
  hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.726061899 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index b7300ca9e..9f3371c07 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  		/* test for correct signature */
  		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
--		    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 		if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
+-		    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++		    mm_user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
  		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
  		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
-@@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done:
+ 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
+@@ -326,6 +326,20 @@ done:
  	return authenticated;
  }
  
@@ -804,43 +885,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
  static int
  match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
      struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
- 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
- #endif
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 5a4b932a9..da24f7bcb 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -310,9 +310,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			authctxt->valid = 0;
+ 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
+ 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--		audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
--#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.697061676 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_ty
- int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
- int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
-     u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
-+int	 hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- 
- /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
- const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
-@@ -239,6 +241,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
-     char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
- int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
-     struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
-+int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
+-			mm_audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
+-#endif
+ 		}
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (options.use_pam)
+diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
+index 5e096cebf..9b42ffb9a 100644
+--- a/cipher.c
++++ b/cipher.c
 @@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
  	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
  };
@@ -867,7 +929,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
  static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-@@ -422,7 +403,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *
+@@ -411,7 +392,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
  void
  cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
  {
@@ -876,9 +938,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
  		return;
  	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
  		chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
+diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
+index 6533ff2bb..2e05a0210 100644
+--- a/cipher.h
++++ b/cipher.h
 @@ -47,7 +47,25 @@
  #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
  #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
@@ -906,18 +969,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
  struct sshcipher_ctx;
  
  const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.743062030 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 5f9530908..44f350ce8 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "digest.h"
  #include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "audit.h"
  
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-@@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ /* prototype */
+ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+@@ -820,12 +821,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
  }
  
  static int
@@ -936,7 +1000,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
  		error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name);
  		free(name);
-@@ -842,8 +847,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
+@@ -846,8 +851,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
  {
  	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
  
@@ -950,7 +1014,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
  		error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name);
  		free(name);
-@@ -856,12 +865,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
+@@ -860,12 +869,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
  }
  
  static int
@@ -969,7 +1033,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  #ifdef WITH_ZLIB
  	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
  		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
-@@ -1002,7 +1015,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1029,7 +1042,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
  		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
  		nmac  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
  		ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
@@ -978,7 +1042,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  		    sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
  			kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
  			peer[nenc] = NULL;
-@@ -1017,7 +1030,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1044,7 +1057,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
  			peer[nmac] = NULL;
  			goto out;
  		}
@@ -987,7 +1051,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  		    sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
  			kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
  			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
-@@ -1040,6 +1053,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1067,6 +1080,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
  		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
  		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
  		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
@@ -998,7 +1062,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  	}
  	/* XXX need runden? */
  	kex->we_need = need;
-@@ -1297,6 +1314,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_cha
+@@ -1336,6 +1353,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len)
  }
  #endif
  
@@ -1035,10 +1099,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  /*
   * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
   * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.683061568 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 206ce60ed..cb06e85a3 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
  #endif
  
@@ -1047,10 +1112,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
  int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
  int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
      struct sshbuf **);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
+diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
+index c95f5ea06..354cfb408 100644
+--- a/mac.c
++++ b/mac.c
+@@ -230,6 +230,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
  	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
  }
  
@@ -1071,32 +1137,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
  /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
  #define	MAC_SEP	","
  int
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3
+diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h
+index 0b119d7a1..5fb593b9e 100644
+--- a/mac.h
++++ b/mac.h
+@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int,
  int	 mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
      const u_char *, size_t);
  void	 mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
 +void	 mac_destroy(struct sshmac *);
  
  #endif /* SSHMAC_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
- 	kexgssc.o \
- 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
--	sshbuf-io.o
-+	sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o
- 
- SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 453469665..b2f501790 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
  #include "compat.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
  #include "authfd.h"
@@ -1104,16 +1160,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #include "match.h"
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "sk-api.h"
-@@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+@@ -100,6 +101,8 @@ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ extern struct include_list includes;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
  
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
 +
  /* State exported from the child */
  static struct sshbuf *child_state;
  
-@@ -157,6 +160,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh
+@@ -144,6 +147,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -1125,7 +1181,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #endif
  
  static Authctxt *authctxt;
-@@ -215,6 +223,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -204,6 +212,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
  #endif
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
@@ -1136,7 +1192,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #endif
  #ifdef BSD_AUTH
      {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-@@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+@@ -239,6 +251,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
@@ -1148,7 +1204,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  #endif
      {0, 0, NULL}
  };
-@@ -1444,8 +1461,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1575,8 +1592,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
  	int encoded_ret;
  	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
@@ -1160,7 +1216,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
-@@ -1454,6 +1473,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1585,6 +1604,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
  	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
  		fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
@@ -1169,7 +1225,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  
  	/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
  	if (*sigalg == '\0') {
-@@ -1469,14 +1490,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1600,14 +1621,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	case MM_USERKEY:
  		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
  		auth_method = "publickey";
@@ -1189,16 +1245,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  		break;
  	}
  	if (!valid_data)
-@@ -1488,8 +1514,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+@@ -1619,8 +1645,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
  		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
  
 -	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
 -	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
-	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
-	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
-	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
-@@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
+ 	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
+ 	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
+ 	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+@@ -1708,13 +1732,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
  }
  
  static void
@@ -1219,7 +1275,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	session_unused(s->self);
  }
  
-@@ -1649,7 +1679,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+@@ -1781,7 +1811,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  
   error:
  	if (s != NULL)
@@ -1228,7 +1284,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
-@@ -1668,7 +1698,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, i
+@@ -1800,7 +1830,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
  	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
@@ -1237,25 +1293,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	free(tty);
  	return (0);
-@@ -1690,6 +1720,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+@@ -1822,6 +1852,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
  		sshpam_cleanup();
  #endif
  
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
  	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
  		if (errno != EINTR)
  			exit(1);
-@@ -1736,12 +1768,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1868,12 +1900,46 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
  	char *cmd;
  	int r;
 +	Session *s;
  
- 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
  	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
 -	audit_run_command(cmd);
 +	s = session_new();
@@ -1295,7 +1350,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	free(cmd);
  	return (0);
  }
-@@ -1813,6 +1880,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
+@@ -1946,6 +2012,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  void
  mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  {
@@ -1303,7 +1358,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
  
  	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-@@ -1820,6 +1888,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct
+@@ -1953,6 +2020,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
  	    child_state);
  	debug3_f("GOT new keys");
@@ -1323,7 +1378,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  
-@@ -2111,3 +2192,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ss
+@@ -2240,3 +2320,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m) {
  
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
@@ -1426,10 +1481,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index d4d631ddc..2c64f07dc 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -66,7 +66,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
@@ -1444,10 +1500,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
  
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 08dc29e12..fb44ae733 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
   */
  
  int
@@ -1456,7 +1513,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
      const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
      struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
  {
-@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
+@@ -594,7 +594,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
  		*sig_detailsp = NULL;
  	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
@@ -1466,7 +1523,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
-@@ -569,6 +570,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
+@@ -627,6 +628,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -1489,7 +1546,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  void
  mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
  {
-@@ -921,11 +938,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audi
+@@ -1043,11 +1060,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  
@@ -1502,10 +1559,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  	int r;
 +	int handle;
  
- 	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+ 	debug3_f("entering command %s", command);
  
-@@ -935,6 +953,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+@@ -1057,6 +1075,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
@@ -1535,10 +1592,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-@@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
+@@ -1305,3 +1347,83 @@ server_get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
+ 	return &ci;
  }
  
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +void
 +mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
@@ -1619,10 +1676,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +}
 +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 12c489c33..1bcbfd305 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -62,7 +62,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
      struct sshauthopt **);
  int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
      const char *, struct sshkey *);
@@ -1632,8 +1690,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
 +int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
  
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
+@@ -89,7 +91,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  #include "audit.h"
  void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
@@ -1647,10 +1705,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
  #endif
  
  struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c	2021-04-19 16:48:46.885608837 +0200
-@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 5dd8269c2..bc22b8625 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
  #endif
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -1658,7 +1717,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  #include "compat.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
  #include "cipher.h"
-@@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh
+@@ -513,6 +514,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
  	return ssh->state->connection_out;
  }
  
@@ -1672,10 +1731,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  /*
   * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
   * string must not be freed.
-@@ -583,22 +591,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
- {
+@@ -683,22 +691,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
  	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
  	u_int mode;
+ 	struct packet *p;
 +	u_int had_keys = packet_state_has_keys(state);
  
  	if (!state->initialized)
@@ -1697,10 +1756,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
 +	state->outgoing_packet = NULL;
  	sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
 +	state->incoming_packet = NULL;
- 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- 		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);	/* current keys */
- 		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
-@@ -634,8 +639,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
+ 	while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
+ 		sshbuf_free(p->payload);
+ 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
+@@ -739,8 +744,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
  #endif	/* WITH_ZLIB */
  	cipher_free(state->send_context);
  	cipher_free(state->receive_context);
@@ -1719,7 +1778,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  		free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
  		ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
  		free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
-@@ -892,6 +907,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod
+@@ -1004,6 +1019,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
  		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
  		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
  		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
@@ -1727,7 +1786,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
  	}
  	/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
-@@ -2173,6 +2189,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2345,6 +2361,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
  	return (void *)ssh->state->output;
  }
  
@@ -1800,28 +1859,29 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
  static int
  ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
-@@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s
+diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
+index 072f27425..e087d4c8a 100644
+--- a/packet.h
++++ b/packet.h
+@@ -223,4 +223,5 @@ const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp);
  # undef EC_POINT
  #endif
  
 +void	 packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int);
  #endif				/* PACKET_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.722061868 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
-@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index d034f5c65..107edcf91 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *);
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern char *__progname;
  extern int debug_flag;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern int startup_pipe;
--extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
  extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
  extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
-@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
+@@ -617,6 +618,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
  	close(ttyfd);
  
@@ -1835,35 +1895,34 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +
  	/* Enter interactive session. */
  	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
- 	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
-@@ -736,15 +744,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+ 	session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
+@@ -707,15 +716,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	    s->self);
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
 +		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
  	if (command != NULL)
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(command);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(command);
  	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
  		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
  
  		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
  			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(shell);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
  	}
 +	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
-+		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
++		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -1550,8 +1562,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1495,7 +1508,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+ 	/* remove keys from memory */
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
  	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 +	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 +	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@@ -1871,7 +1930,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  	/* Force a password change */
  	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -1763,6 +1778,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
+@@ -1710,6 +1727,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
  	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
  	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
  	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
@@ -1881,10 +1940,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
  	sessions_first_unused = id;
  }
-@@ -1843,6 +1861,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
+@@ -1788,6 +1808,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
+ 	return 1;
  }
  
- Session *
++Session *
 +session_by_id(int id)
 +{
 +	if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
@@ -1897,11 +1957,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
-+Session *
+ Session *
  session_by_tty(char *tty)
  {
- 	int i;
-@@ -2450,6 +2481,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se
+@@ -2405,6 +2438,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
  		chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
  }
  
@@ -1923,7 +1982,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +{
 +	if (s->command != NULL) {
 +		if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+			PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
++			mm_audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
 +		free(s->command);
 +		s->command = NULL;
 +		s->command_handle = -1;
@@ -1934,7 +1993,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  void
  session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  {
-@@ -2463,6 +2520,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
+@@ -2418,6 +2477,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		session_pty_cleanup(s);
@@ -1945,7 +2004,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	free(s->term);
  	free(s->display);
  	free(s->x11_chanids);
-@@ -2537,14 +2598,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -2494,14 +2557,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
  }
  
  void
@@ -1962,7 +2021,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  			else
  				session_close(ssh, s);
  		}
-@@ -2671,6 +2732,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc
+@@ -2627,6 +2690,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  	server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
  }
  
@@ -1978,18 +2037,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  void
  do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
-@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
+@@ -2690,7 +2762,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  	 * or if running in monitor.
  	 */
- 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ 	if (mm_is_monitor())
 -		session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
 +		session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
  }
  
  /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
+diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
+index 344a1ddf9..a41c6efcd 100644
+--- a/session.h
++++ b/session.h
 @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
  		char	*name;
  		char	*val;
@@ -2017,48 +2077,61 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
  Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
  void	 session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
  void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "version.h"
-@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index d6bece941..e49e4fb51 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  
  /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 -void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 -void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
-+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
- static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
++void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
  
- static char *listener_proctitle;
-@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- 	num_listen_socks = 0;
+ /* XXX reduce to stub once postauth split */
+ int
+@@ -202,6 +202,35 @@ mm_is_monitor(void)
+ 	return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
  }
  
-+/*
-+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
-+ * client connection?)
-+ */
-+int listening_for_clients(void)
++static int
++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
 +{
-+	return num_listen_socks > 0;
++      switch (k->type) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_RSA: {
++              const BIGNUM *d;
++              const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey);
++              RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
++              return d != NULL;
++          }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_ECDSA: {
++              const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(k->pkey);
++              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdsa) != NULL;
++              }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++      case KEY_ED25519:
++              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
++      default:
++              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
++              return 0;
++      }
 +}
 +
- static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
-@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
-	    ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
+ /*
+  * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
+  * As usual, this may only take signal-safe actions, even though it is
+@@ -230,18 +259,40 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+ 	_exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE);
  }
-
+ 
 -/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
 +/*
 + * Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed.  Careful,
@@ -2066,7 +2139,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 + */
  void
 -destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
++destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
  {
  	u_int i;
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -2088,12 +2161,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
 +			if (fp != NULL) {
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				if (privsep)
-+					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid));
-+				else
-+					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid);
++				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
 +#endif
 +				free(fp);
 +			}
@@ -2104,7 +2172,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
  			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
  		}
-@@ -397,20 +434,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+@@ -250,20 +301,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
  
  /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
  void
@@ -2144,43 +2212,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  		}
  		/* Certs do not need demotion */
  	}
-@@ -438,7 +493,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void)
- }
- 
- static void
--privsep_preauth_child(void)
-+privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	gid_t gidset[1];
- 
-@@ -453,7 +508,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	reseed_prngs();
- 
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
--	demote_sensitive_data();
-+	demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
-@@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- 		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
--	pid = fork();
-+	pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
- 	if (pid == -1) {
- 		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- 	} else if (pid != 0) {
-@@ -537,7 +592,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
- 		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
--		privsep_preauth_child();
-+		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- 		if (box != NULL)
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-@@ -589,7 +644,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+@@ -441,7 +510,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
@@ -2189,48 +2221,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	reseed_prngs();
  
-@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void)
-  * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
-  */
- static void
--server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
-+server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
- {
-	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
-	int i, j, ret, npfd;
-@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
- 				unlink(options.pid_file);
-@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
--		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
-+		server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1365,6 +1434,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
  
  	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 +	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
  	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
  	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
  	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1410,6 +1482,14 @@ sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
  void
  cleanup_exit(int i)
  {
 +	static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+	int is_privsep_child;
 +
 +	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
 +	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
@@ -2238,77 +2243,48 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 +	if (in_cleanup)
 +		_exit(i);
 +	in_cleanup = 1;
+ 	extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */
+ 
  	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
- 		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
- 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
-@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 			}
- 		}
+@@ -1426,7 +1506,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
  	}
-+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
-+	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
-+		destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
-+	if (the_active_state != NULL)
-+		packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
--	if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+-	if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor())
 +	if (the_active_state != NULL &&
 +	    (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
++	    mm_is_monitor())
  		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
  #endif
- 	_exit(i);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
+ 	/* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 3ab81e268..ed7faf96d 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -213,6 +213,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
+ 	num_listen_socks = 0;
  }
  
- int
-+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
++/*
++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
++ * client connection?)
++ */
++int listening_for_clients(void)
 +{
-+      switch (k->type) {
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_RSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *d;
-+              RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
-+              return d != NULL;
-+          }
-+      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_DSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-+              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
-+              return priv_key != NULL;
-+          }
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ECDSA:
-+              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ED25519:
-+              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
-+      default:
-+              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
-+              return 0;
-+      }
++	return num_listen_socks > 0;
 +}
 +
-+int
- sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
- {
- 	if (k == NULL)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int		 sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke
- int		 sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
- 
- int	 sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
-+int	 sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+ /* Allocate and initialise the children array */
+ static void
+ child_alloc(void)
+@@ -958,6 +967,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s,
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ 			    (int) received_sigterm);
++			/* destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); FIXME */
+ 			close_listen_socks();
+ 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ 				unlink(options.pid_file);
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch b/0036-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
similarity index 70%
rename from openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
rename to 0036-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
index b5895f7..863f700 100644
--- a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/0036-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
-@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+From ffa3fdb2ad2c7afc91993d9301e35d2e9a83ea47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 36/53] openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition
+
+---
+ monitor_wrap.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor_wrap.h |  2 ++
+ session.c      | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index fb44ae733..17a6c9786 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1426,4 +1426,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
@@ -52,10 +64,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
 +}
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
-@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 1bcbfd305..2b814dbd1 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
  void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
@@ -64,10 +77,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
  #endif
  
  struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
-@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
  login_cap_t *lc;
  #endif
  
@@ -78,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
  static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+@@ -358,6 +362,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -87,7 +101,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  #define USE_PIPES 1
  /*
   * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
-@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+@@ -481,6 +487,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		close(err[0]);
  #endif
  
@@ -96,7 +110,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
  		do_child(ssh, s, command);
  		/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+@@ -595,6 +603,9 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
  		close(ttyfd);
  
@@ -106,22 +120,22 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
  #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
  		do_login(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -729,6 +740,8 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	}
  	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -744,6 +757,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	 */
  	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
  
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++	if (ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@@ -136,7 +150,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	return ret;
  }
  
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1490,6 +1517,33 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
  }
  
@@ -147,12 +161,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	/* FIXME beldmit destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); */
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@@ -171,12 +184,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  /*
   * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
   * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1507,13 +1561,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
--	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	/* remove keys from memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@@ -185,3 +198,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	/* Force a password change */
  	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
  		do_setusercontext(pw);
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0037-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch b/0037-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c58a5fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0037-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+From ef05b1fceddc64cfc7eb40daac60a137634d0a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 37/53] openssh-9.0p1-audit-log
+
+---
+ audit-bsm.c   |  2 +-
+ audit-linux.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ audit.c       | 18 +++++++++---
+ audit.h       |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+index a6292cb8f..0f2ef8235 100644
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
+index 4d3e9d41e..d2bc0b526 100644
+--- a/audit-linux.c
++++ b/audit-linux.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char *audit_username(void);
+ 
+ static void
+-linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+                 hostname = NULL;
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
++	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	close(audit_fd);
+ 
+@@ -139,10 +139,12 @@ fatal_report:
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++	const char *rip;
++	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+@@ -152,14 +154,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
+ 		else
+ 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
++	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+-		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+ 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		goto out;
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
+-		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		rip, NULL, rv);
++	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		goto out;
++
++	if (cert) {
++		char *pbuf;
++
++		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
++		if (pbuf == NULL)
++			goto out;
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
++			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
++		free(pbuf);
++		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++			goto out;
++
++		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
++			if (pbuf == NULL)
++				goto out;
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
++			free(pbuf);
++			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
+ out:
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+@@ -181,26 +213,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+ int
+ audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -213,31 +253,41 @@ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
++
+ 	switch(event) {
+ 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+ 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+@@ -257,9 +307,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 		if (user_login_count) {
+ 			while (user_login_count--)
+ 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++				    audit_hostname,
+ 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++			    audit_hostname,
+ 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ 		}
+@@ -268,12 +320,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++			audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		debug_f("unhandled event %d", event);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
+index d0433c3a0..28d51a146 100644
+--- a/audit.c
++++ b/audit.c
+@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ void
+ audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
+ {
+-	char *fp;
++	char *key_fp = NULL;
++	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
++	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
++		cert = key->cert;
++		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
++										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++	}
++	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
+ 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	free(fp);
++	if (key_fp)
++		free(key_fp);
++	if (issuer_fp)
++		free(issuer_fp);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
+index 45d66ccff..05ac132cf 100644
+--- a/audit.h
++++ b/audit.h
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+ int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+-int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
+ void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/0038-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
similarity index 59%
rename from openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
rename to 0038-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
index 5351571..18ebed3 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/0038-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,33 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-05-06 12:12:10.107634472 +0200
+From d7dd45f9e19a71269828bc5f8567613a02f6feef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 14:01:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 38/53] openssh-7.7p1-fips
+
+---
+ dh.c                     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ dh.h                     |  1 +
+ kex-names.c              |  6 +++-
+ kex.c                    |  3 +-
+ kexgen.c                 | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ kexgexc.c                |  5 +++
+ myproposal.h             | 33 ++++++++++++++++++
+ readconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  3 ++
+ servconf.c               | 18 +++++++---
+ ssh-ed25519.c            |  9 +++++
+ ssh-gss.h                |  5 +++
+ ssh-keygen.c             | 20 +++++++++--
+ ssh-rsa.c                |  3 ++
+ ssh.c                    |  5 +++
+ sshconnect2.c            |  9 ++++-
+ sshd.c                   | 13 +++++++
+ sshkey.c                 | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 18 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
+--- a/dh.c
++++ b/dh.c
 @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
  
  #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -9,7 +36,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
  
  #include "dh.h"
  #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
  	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
  	struct dhgroup dhg;
  
@@ -22,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
  	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
  		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
  		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
  	return 8192;
  }
  
@@ -61,9 +88,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
 +}
 +
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-05-06 12:11:28.393298005 +0200
+diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
+index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644
+--- a/dh.h
++++ b/dh.h
 @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
  
  int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
@@ -72,18 +100,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
  
  u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
  void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index 31e395aa2..1360a4095 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
  
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
- # include <openssl/kdf.h>
-@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -208,7 +209,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
  	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
  	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
  		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
@@ -95,9 +124,149 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
  			free(s);
  			return 0;
  		}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 44f350ce8..da2a537ce 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ # include <openssl/param_build.h>
+@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+ 
+ 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
+ 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
+-		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
+ 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
+ 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
+index 58edc79ad..9a970adf1 100644
+--- a/kexgen.c
++++ b/kexgen.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
+index 097d83f30..ccbb9b580 100644
+--- a/kexgexc.c
++++ b/kexgexc.c
 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
@@ -105,8 +274,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include <sys/types.h>
  
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
  		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		goto out;
  	}
@@ -117,10 +286,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
  	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
  
  	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
+diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
+index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
+--- a/myproposal.h
++++ b/myproposal.h
+@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@
  	"rsa-sha2-512," \
  	"rsa-sha2-256"
  
@@ -138,8 +308,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
 +
  #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
  	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
+ 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
+@@ -79,6 +91,27 @@
  
  #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
  
@@ -167,9 +337,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
  /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
  #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
  	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.428926336 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 3f67f4de4..b6ad47b49 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
 @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
  #include <string.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -178,7 +349,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
  #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
  # include <glob.h>
  #else
-@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+@@ -3078,11 +3079,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
  	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@@ -200,10 +371,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
  #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
  		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.463926606 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index e0f2d4289..c52f64897 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
  #ifdef __NR_open
  	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
  #endif
@@ -213,18 +385,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-secco
  #ifdef __NR_openat
  	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.455926545 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index ac84b74d9..f78615c28 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -37,7 +37,10 @@
  #include <limits.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
  #include <errno.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
++#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
  #include <util.h>
- #endif
-@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+ # include <glob.h>
+ #else
+@@ -244,11 +247,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
  	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@@ -246,10 +422,150 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
  		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
+index c8caa2221..4bcd9ef81 100644
+--- a/ssh-ed25519.c
++++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -163,6 +164,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -244,6 +249,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..329dc9da0 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
+ 	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+ 
++#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
++	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
++
+ #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 3c582a83a..afa279097 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
++#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Default number of bits in the RSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
+@@ -195,6 +197,10 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_RSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+@@ -248,7 +254,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+ 	char *name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
++		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ 	else {
+ 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+@@ -1057,9 +1063,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && type == KEY_ED25519) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+@@ -3757,7 +3771,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
++		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+ 
+ 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
+ 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index fe1518984..9428df8d1 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 8d27f6379..7d6ba516e 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
  #endif
@@ -257,7 +573,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
-@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1664,6 +1665,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		exit(0);
  	}
  
@@ -268,9 +584,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
  	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
  	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index b253f991b..fffa66c8d 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
 @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
  #include <vis.h>
  #endif
@@ -280,95 +597,48 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+@@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
--		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
--		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
--		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
--		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
--		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
--			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
--			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
--			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
--			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				free(gss_host);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++		char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
++			 match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 +
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					free(gss_host);
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
- 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- 			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
- 
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
+ 		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ 		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ 		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
  		}
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #endif
+ 
+ 		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++		    options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
++		free(gss_kex_filtered);
++
+ 		if (gss) {
+ 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index ed7faf96d..de2baa5e4 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
+ #include <poll.h>
  #include <pwd.h>
  #include <signal.h>
 +#include <syslog.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <time.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
+@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #endif
  
-@@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1613,6 +1615,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
  			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
  			    options.host_key_files[i]);
@@ -382,7 +652,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
  		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
  			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
-@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1836,6 +1845,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
  	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
  
@@ -393,45 +663,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  	/*
  	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
  	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- 		orig = NULL;
- 
--	if (options.gss_keyex)
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
--	else
--		gss = NULL;
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 148fee2b7..394d9b105 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
 @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
  #include <openssl/pem.h>
- #include <openssl/core_names.h>
- #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #endif
  
  #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@
  #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
  #include "sshkey.h"
  #include "match.h"
 +#include "log.h"
  #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
  
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
+@@ -386,6 +388,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
  		impl = keyimpls[i];
  		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
  			continue;
@@ -450,7 +702,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
  		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
  		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
-@@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
+@@ -1418,6 +1432,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
  		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
  	}
  
@@ -471,208 +723,29 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
  	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
  	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
  	*ret = *k;
-@@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -2251,6 +2279,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
  		*lenp = 0;
  	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
-+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		}
-+		/* Fallthrough */
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++	/* Fallthrough */
  	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
  		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
  	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
-@@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -2290,6 +2323,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
  		*detailsp = NULL;
  	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
-+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		}
-	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
-	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
-@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
-diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
-@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/core_names.h>
- #include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
-		goto out;
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+-- 
+2.52.0
 
-	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
-@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
--		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
--		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
--		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
--		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
--		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
--		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
-+		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:53:41.428343304 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c	2022-07-11 16:56:09.284663661 +0200
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
- 
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
-@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *ke
- 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
- 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
- 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
- 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
- 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
diff --git a/0039-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch b/0039-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0e984d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0039-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 7167a191776dacf7e31cf8a8a2ed89887e49f4ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 39/53] openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage
+
+---
+ ssh.1 | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 6a9fbdc5b..755cdef2b 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It BatchMode
+ .It BindAddress
+ .It BindInterface
+-.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CanonicalDomains
+ .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ .It CanonicalizeHostname
+ .It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
++.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CertificateFile
+ .It ChannelTimeout
+ .It CheckHostIP
+@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
+ .It DynamicForward
++.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
+ .It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EscapeChar
+@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RevokedHostKeys
++.It SecurityKeyProvider
+ .It RequiredRSASize
+ .It RevokedHostKeys
+ .It SecurityKeyProvider
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch b/0040-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
similarity index 69%
rename from openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
rename to 0040-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
index ee3637f..29f8213 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+++ b/0040-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
---- openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx	2023-05-29 18:15:56.311236887 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2023-05-29 18:16:07.598503551 +0200
+From 53e44bd1f669ecd6a7429e94b55beec8e3c0c529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 40/53] openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs
+
+---
+ regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ sshconnect2.c            | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+index 28dcfe170..b9e716dcd 100644
+--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
++++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
 @@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
  
  ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
@@ -24,7 +35,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostke
  	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
  	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
  		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
-@@ -32,12 +48,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private
+@@ -32,12 +45,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either
  
  unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  
@@ -44,10 +55,10 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostke
  	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
  	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
  	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
-@@ -50,15 +70,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+@@ -50,15 +67,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
  done
  
- SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com' | maybe_filter_sk`
 +SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
  
  # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
@@ -63,7 +74,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostke
  	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
  	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
  	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
-@@ -70,7 +93,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >>
+@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
  ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
    cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
  
@@ -72,19 +83,20 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostke
  	verbose "cert type $k"
  	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
  	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
-diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx	2023-04-26 17:37:35.100827792 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-04-26 17:50:31.860748877 +0200
-@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index fffa66c8d..f43c81ad9 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
      const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
  {
  	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
--	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
-+	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
+-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
++	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-@@ -260,9 +260,21 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+@@ -257,10 +257,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
  	if (use_known_hosts_order)
  		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
  
@@ -100,14 +112,15 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
 +			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +	}
 +
- 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
- 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
 -	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +	    filtered_algs);
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+@@ -304,6 +316,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
  #endif
  
  	free(hkalgs);
@@ -115,3 +128,6 @@ diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
  
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0041-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24ef8e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0041-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+From 1c0d3b6e9868ef31b97be1679389e3db2616eccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 41/53] openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex
+
+---
+ dh.c      |  98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ kex.c     | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kex.h     |   6 +++
+ kexdh.c   |  52 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ kexecdh.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 5 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 8c9a29fa7..ea0a0b093 100644
+--- a/dh.c
++++ b/dh.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
++
++	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
++		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed key generation");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* reuse context for key generation */
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not create or init context");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not generate keys");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
++	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* transferred */
++	pub_key = NULL;
++	priv_key = NULL;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
++	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index da2a537ce..56c80395c 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -1613,3 +1613,142 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++/* 
++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
++ * The private key can be omitted.
++ */
++EVP_PKEY *
++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
++{
++  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
++  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
++  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
++  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
++  	const char *group_name;
++  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (k == NULL)
++    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
++     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
++                group_name,
++                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++	}
++  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
++    		const EC_GROUP *group;
++    		size_t len;
++
++		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
++		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
++		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
++		    pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len,
++		    bn_ctx);
++		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len) != 1) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++  	free(pub_ser);
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
++    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++
++	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (priv != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return r;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index cb06e85a3..6daafb159 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -316,6 +319,9 @@ int	kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
++int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
++    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
++int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
+diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
+index 6d5a7813d..b05277aa1 100644
+--- a/kexdh.c
++++ b/kexdh.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -84,9 +88,12 @@ int
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -101,24 +108,59 @@ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
++	/* import key */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* import peer key 
++	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
++	 */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not get key size");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
++	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
+index 500ec5725..1a1bae35e 100644
+--- a/kexecdh.c
++++ b/kexecdh.c
+@@ -36,17 +36,57 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++static EC_KEY *
++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
++{
++	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	const char *group_name;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
++	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
++		goto out;
++	}
++out:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	return client_key;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -56,11 +96,7 @@ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
++	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -102,11 +138,7 @@ kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
++	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -141,11 +173,21 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
++	size_t klen = 0, publen;
++	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
++	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -154,45 +196,82 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
++
++	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
++	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
++	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
++	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0042-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch b/0042-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..681d051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0042-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+From 1cd47036353899fe066f5241d3d70778f103c0e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 42/53] openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof
+
+---
+ compat.c                               |  6 ++++++
+ compat.h                               |  2 +-
+ monitor.c                              | 27 +++++++++++++++++------
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c       |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++----------
+ serverloop.c                           |  6 +++++-
+ ssh-rsa.c                              |  3 ++-
+ sshconnect2.c                          |  8 +++++++
+ sshd-session.c                         | 21 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 11 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
+index b59f0bfc0..4e611dc39 100644
+--- a/compat.c
++++ b/compat.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -125,16 +126,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
++	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
+index 1a19060fc..2e6db5bf9 100644
+--- a/compat.h
++++ b/compat.h
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index b2f501790..6c83739ee 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -754,11 +754,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	struct sshkey *pubkey, *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
+-	size_t datlen, siglen;
+-	int r, is_proof = 0, keyid;
+-	u_int compat;
++	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
++	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
++	int r, is_proof = 0;
++	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
++	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -816,18 +817,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
++		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
++	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+index 16c2f2dff..f4700deeb 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, char *cipher, char *mac,
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = mac;
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = mac;
+ 	}
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
++	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
++		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+index e412b75d8..5b06bc905 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+index d0f47d7cf..ba4d506d5 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+@@ -273,13 +273,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+index d0c46a90b..7b5e51b83 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -100,8 +103,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
++	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0)
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -118,16 +122,20 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT crypto policies */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0) {
++		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
++		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
++		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -552,7 +560,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
++	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 5d3b194d1..55411a6b4 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -721,7 +722,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
+-
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
++			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
++		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 9428df8d1..7843f3e26 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -533,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
++		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
++			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index f43c81ad9..2d98fc3da 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1434,6 +1434,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
++		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
++			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
++
++			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
++			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
++		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index e49e4fb51..a558bbc33 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1288,6 +1288,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	{
++		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
++		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
++		if (rsakey == NULL)
++			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
++
++		if (rsakey != NULL) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++		    }
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0043-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch b/0043-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60a6d4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0043-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 1799ea7ad21a579b864a536709d732f4a8e533dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 43/53] openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5 | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 8ac5e1633..a06fbfa11 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ or
+ This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
+ See
+ .Xr ssh-keysign 8
+-for more information.
++for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly.
+ .It Cm EscapeChar
+ Sets the escape character (default:
+ .Ql ~ ) .
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0044-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch b/0044-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e72647
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0044-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+From 21202362f4ddaeb630d873fb426039004ac82338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 44/53] openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem
+
+---
+ kex-names.c         |  23 +++-
+ kexmlkem768x25519.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 313 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index 1360a4095..9c96e5cb0 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,19 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1, 0},
+ };
+ 
++static int is_mlkem768_available()
++{
++	static int is_fetched = -1;
++
++	if (is_fetched == -1) {
++		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
++		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
++	}
++
++	return is_fetched;
++}
++
+ static char *
+ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ {
+@@ -116,8 +129,12 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 	char sep_str[2] = {sep, '\0'};
+ 
+-	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++)
++	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++			continue;
+ 		xextendf(&ret, sep_str, "%s", k->name);
++	}
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+@@ -139,6 +156,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
++	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++	return NULL;
++
+ 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+index 2585d1db3..ab6167221 100644
+--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+@@ -44,10 +44,127 @@
+ #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 
+ #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++static int
++mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
++	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
++	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    ret = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
++	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
+ 	size_t need;
+@@ -82,6 +199,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	u_char *cp = NULL;
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++#endif
++	cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	kex->client_pub = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -89,6 +236,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	const u_char *client_pub;
+@@ -181,12 +329,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ 	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *client_pub;
++	u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
++
++	*server_blobp = NULL;
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
++	    client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
++	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++
++	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
++	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
++	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	/* append ECDH shared key */
++	client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:",
++	    enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
++	dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*server_blobp = server_blob;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	server_blob = NULL;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
++	explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
++	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+     const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ 	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+@@ -254,6 +487,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ 	explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
++	size_t need;
++	int r;
++
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
++	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
++	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
++	    buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
++	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+ int
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0045-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch b/0045-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48aa76a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0045-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From edbbdc306c1710dae777ef315a0d2c5f43134d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 14:53:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 45/53] openssh-9.9p2-error_processing
+
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index df241379c..dc246066d 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1346,6 +1346,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
+ 	    k == NULL ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
++		if (!r) /* k == NULL */
++			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 		error_fr(r, "parse");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0046-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch b/0046-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd30967
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0046-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 0772377e00b13f5afaa1b146ce32d0218e9f0d24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 15:11:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 46/53] Provide better error for non-supported private keys
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ sshkey.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 394d9b105..eba55ef92 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -3539,6 +3539,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
+ 			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		}
+ 	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
++#ifdef ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER
++	case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
++#endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 	}
+ 	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0047-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch b/0047-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bfab92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0047-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From d458a65ccac2283563c0fc0962519bb5a9bbd315 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:52:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 47/53] Ignore bad hostkeys in known_hosts file
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ hostfile.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ hostfile.h |  1 +
+ ssh.c      |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
+index 4cec57da5..652d15762 100644
+--- a/hostfile.c
++++ b/hostfile.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
+ #include "hmac.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ 
++static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
++
++void
++hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
++{
++	required_rsa_size = size;
++}
++
+ /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+ 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+ 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ 		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
++		    l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
+ 	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+ 	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
+index a24a4e329..0e9b1a19a 100644
+--- a/hostfile.h
++++ b/hostfile.h
+@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
+     const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+ 
+ void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
++void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 7d6ba516e..320ac6834 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1409,6 +1410,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
+ 	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+ 		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+ 
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0048-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch b/0048-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..664a006
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0048-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+From 1cf5e40e14d707de2318747758b012fc7245cb7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 48/53] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
+
+RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
+associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
+name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
+to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
+may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
+issuance process.
+
+Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
+GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
+that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
+on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
+
+Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+---
+ configure.ac    |   1 +
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
+ sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 805be4b5e..9d3b19925 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -5050,6 +5050,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
++		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
+ 
+ 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
+ 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
++ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
++ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
++ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
++ */
++
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
++{
++	int ret;
++	u_int i;
++
++	/* Check indicators */
++	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
++					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
++		/* negative or positive match */
++		if (ret != 0) {
++			*matched = i;
++			return ret;
++		}
++	}
++	/* No rule matched */
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+-	int retval;
++	int retval, matched;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	if (k5login_exists &&
+ 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
+ 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
+ 		name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
+-		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
+ 	} else
+ 		retval = 0;
+ 
++	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
++		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
++		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
++		retval = 0;
++		if (client->indicators) {
++			matched = -1;
++			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
++			if (retval != 0) {
++				retval = (retval == 1);
++				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
++					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
++					client->indicators[matched],
++					(char *)client->displayname.value,
++				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
++				goto cont;
++			}
++		}
++		if (retval == 0) {
++			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
++				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
++			(char *)client->displayname.value);
++		}
++	}
++cont:
++	if (retval == 1) {
++		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
++		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
++	}
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index d2bc03486..be80e17ca 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
++    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+ 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
++
++/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
++ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
++ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
++ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
++
++#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
++
++/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
++static OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
++	gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
++	size_t count, i;
++
++	ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++				      &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
++	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
++
++	if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
++		/* No indicators in the ticket */
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		count++;
++	}
++
++	if (count == 0) {
++		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
++		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		authenticated = 0;
++		complete = 0;
++		more = -1;
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		/* retrieve all indicators */
++		while (more != 0) {
++			value.value = NULL;
++			display_value.value = NULL;
++			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
++					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
++			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
++				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
++				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
++				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
++				count++;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++out:
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++	return (ctx->major);
++}
++
++
+ /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+  * be called once for a context */
+ 
+@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
++	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
++	    ctx->client, client))) {
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
++	size_t i;
+ 
+ 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
+ 
+@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
++
++			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
++				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
++				}
++				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
++			}
++
+ 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+ 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ 			return 0;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index f78615c28..e53e8ea30 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+-	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -687,6 +688,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -696,6 +698,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1722,6 +1725,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sGssIndicators:
++		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum, keyword);
++		if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
++			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3344,6 +3356,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
++	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c08cf6a7a..c7cec5ece 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   **allow_groups;
+ 	u_int num_deny_groups;
+ 	char   **deny_groups;
++	char   *gss_indicators;
+ 
+ 	u_int num_subsystems;
+ 	char   **subsystem_name;
+@@ -308,6 +309,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
++		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 329dc9da0..1506719a9 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
++#include <gssapi_ext.h>
++#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
++#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ # ifndef HEIMDAL
+ #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+@@ -112,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
++	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c172d5aab..676d6d4d2 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
++mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
++authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
++.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
++When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
++will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
++indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
++.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
++policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
++access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
++rejected.
++.Pp
++By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
++indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
++to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
++preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
++authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
++(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
++indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
++inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
++.Pp
++Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
++particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
++FreeIPA environments:
++.Pp
++.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
++.It Cm hardened
++SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm pkinit
++smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm radius
++pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm otp
++TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
++.It Cm idp
++OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
++and device authorization grant flow
++.It Cm passkey
++FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
++.El
++.Pp
++The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ The default is handled system-wide by
+ .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0049-NIST-curves-hybrid-KEX-implementation.patch b/0049-NIST-curves-hybrid-KEX-implementation.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ce23be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0049-NIST-curves-hybrid-KEX-implementation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1216 @@
+From 3642efdf9be4d377cfd802d6a33cb083f0d846b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2025 16:07:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 49/53] NIST curves hybrid KEX implementation
+
+---
+ crypto_api.h                     |   4 +
+ kex-names.c                      |  78 +++-
+ kex.c                            |   1 +
+ kex.h                            |  19 +
+ kexgen.c                         |  56 ++-
+ kexmlkem768x25519.c              | 678 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.c                        |   2 +
+ myproposal.h                     |   4 +
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c |   4 +
+ ssh-keyscan.c                    |   2 +
+ ssh_api.c                        |   4 +
+ sshconnect2.c                    |   2 +
+ sshd-auth.c                      |   2 +
+ 13 files changed, 819 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto_api.h b/crypto_api.h
+index 693b67bbc..ec3d2f277 100644
+--- a/crypto_api.h
++++ b/crypto_api.h
+@@ -56,4 +56,8 @@ int	crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk);
+ #define crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 1088
+ #define crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES 32
+ 
++#define crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES 1568
++#define crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES 3168
++#define crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 1568
++
+ #endif /* crypto_api_h */
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index 9c96e5cb0..ceecd9312 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 	{ KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256, KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256, 0,
+ 	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, KEX_IS_PQ },
++	{ KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256, KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256, 0,
++	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, KEX_IS_PQ },
++	{ KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384, KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384, 0,
++	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, KEX_IS_PQ },
+ #endif
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1, 0 },
+@@ -109,13 +113,30 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1, 0},
+ };
+ 
++/*
++ * 0 - unavailable
++ * 1 - available in non-FIPS mode
++ * 2 - available in FIPS mode
++ */
+ static int is_mlkem768_available()
+ {
+ 	static int is_fetched = -1;
+ 
+ 	if (is_fetched == -1) {
+-		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+-		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
++		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = NULL;
++
++		if (FIPS_mode() == 1) {
++		    mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		    is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 2 : 0;
++
++		    if (is_fetched == 0) {
++		        mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", "provider=default,-fips");
++		        is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
++		    }
++		} else {
++		    mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		    is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
++		}
+ 		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -128,11 +149,32 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ 	char *ret = NULL;
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 	char sep_str[2] = {sep, '\0'};
++	int x25519mlkem_available = 0, nistmlkem_available = 0;
+ 
+-	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+-		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+-			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++	/*
++	 * FIPS provider can provide ML-KEMs and then all hybrids are available
++	 * Otherwise only NIST hybrids are available
++	 * */
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    if (is_mlkem768_available() == 2) {
++	        x25519mlkem_available = 1;
++	        nistmlkem_available = 1;
++	    } else if (is_mlkem768_available() == 1) {
++	        nistmlkem_available = 1;
++	    }
++	} else {
++	    if (is_mlkem768_available() > 0) {
++	        x25519mlkem_available = 1;
++	        nistmlkem_available = 1;
++	    }
++	}
++
++	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++		if (  (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0    && x25519mlkem_available == 0)
++		   || (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0  && nistmlkem_available == 0)
++		   || (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0 && nistmlkem_available == 0))
+ 			continue;
++
+ 		xextendf(&ret, sep_str, "%s", k->name);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -155,10 +197,30 @@ static const struct kexalg *
+ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
++	int x25519mlkem_available = 0, nistmlkem_available = 0;
+ 
+-	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+-		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
+-	return NULL;
++	/*
++	 * FIPS provider can provide ML-KEMs and then all hybrids are available
++	 * Otherwise only NIST hybrids are available
++	 * */
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    if (is_mlkem768_available() == 2) {
++	        x25519mlkem_available = 1;
++	        nistmlkem_available = 1;
++	    } else if (is_mlkem768_available() == 1) {
++	        nistmlkem_available = 1;
++	    }
++	} else {
++	    if (is_mlkem768_available() > 0) {
++	        x25519mlkem_available = 1;
++	        nistmlkem_available = 1;
++	    }
++	}
++
++	if (  (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0    && x25519mlkem_available == 0)
++	   || (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256) == 0  && nistmlkem_available == 0)
++	   || (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384) == 0 && nistmlkem_available == 0))
++	   return NULL;
+ 
+ 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 56c80395c..7dd16ba2b 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++	EVP_PKEY_free(kex->ec_hybrid_client_key);
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ 		kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 6daafb159..354f312e8 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
+ #define	KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512	"sntrup761x25519-sha512"
+ #define	KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512_OLD	"sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com"
+ #define	KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256	"mlkem768x25519-sha256"
++#define	KEX_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256     "mlkem768nistp256-sha256"
++#define	KEX_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384    "mlkem1024nistp384-sha384"
+ 
+ #define COMP_NONE	0
+ #define COMP_DELAYED	2
+@@ -110,6 +112,8 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ 	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
+ 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
+ 	KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256,
++	KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256,
++	KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
+ 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
+@@ -210,6 +214,9 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_char sntrup761_client_key[crypto_kem_sntrup761_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */
+ 	u_char mlkem768_client_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */
+ 	struct sshbuf *client_pub;
++	/* FIXME */
++	EVP_PKEY *ec_hybrid_client_key; /* NIST hybrids */
++	u_char mlkem1024_client_key[crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* ML-KEM 1024 + NIST */
+ };
+ 
+ int	 kex_name_valid(const char *);
+@@ -292,6 +299,18 @@ int	 kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+ int	 kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+     struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(struct kex *);
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **);
++
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(struct kex *);
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **);
++
+ int	 kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *);
+ int	 kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *, BIGNUM *, struct sshbuf *);
+ 
+diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
+index 9a970adf1..79faa0b3e 100644
+--- a/kexgen.c
++++ b/kexgen.c
+@@ -133,12 +133,24 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+ 		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+-		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+-		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		    EVP_KEM *mlkem = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		    if (mlkem == NULL) {
++		        logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		    } else {
++			EVP_KEM_free(mlkem);
++		        r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		    }
+ 		} else {
+ 		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
++	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(kex);
++		break;
++	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(kex);
++		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		break;
+@@ -223,13 +235,28 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+ 		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+-		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+-		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		    EVP_KEM *mlkem = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		    if (mlkem == NULL) {
++		        logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		    } else {
++			EVP_KEM_free(mlkem);
++		        r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		            &shared_secret);
++		    }
+ 		} else {
+ 		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+ 		        &shared_secret);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
++	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		break;
+@@ -283,6 +310,8 @@ out:
+ 	    sizeof(kex->sntrup761_client_key));
+ 	explicit_bzero(kex->mlkem768_client_key,
+ 	    sizeof(kex->mlkem768_client_key));
++	explicit_bzero(kex->mlkem1024_client_key,
++	    sizeof(kex->mlkem1024_client_key));
+ 	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+ 	free(signature);
+ 	sshbuf_free(tmp);
+@@ -362,13 +391,28 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+ 		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+-		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+-		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		    EVP_KEM *mlkem = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		    if (mlkem == NULL) {
++		        logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		    } else {
++			EVP_KEM_free(mlkem);
++		        r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		            &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		    }
+ 		} else {
+ 		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+ 		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ 		}
+ 		break;
++	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256:
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384:
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		break;
+diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+index ab6167221..c56d67ff4 100644
+--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+@@ -44,19 +44,33 @@
+ #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 
+ #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
++#define FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ "provider=default,-fips"
++
+ static int
+-mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
++mlkem_keypair_gen(const char *algname, unsigned char *pubkeybuf, size_t pubkey_size,
++	          unsigned char *privkeybuf, size_t privkey_size)
+ {
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+     int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
++    size_t got_pub_size = pubkey_size, got_priv_size = privkey_size;
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, algname, NULL);
++
++    if (ctx == NULL && FIPS_mode()) {
++	/* We have filtered x25519 + ML-KEM in FIPS mode earlier
++	 * so if we are in FIPS mode and ML-KEM is not available with default propq,
++	 * we can fetch it from the default provider */
++        ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, algname, FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ);
++    }
+ 
+-    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+     if (ctx == NULL) {
+ 	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 	goto err;
+@@ -68,17 +82,23 @@ mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
+-	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
++    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, NULL, &got_pub_size) <= 0
++	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, NULL, &got_priv_size) <= 0) {
+ 	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
+-	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
++    if (privkey_size != got_priv_size || pubkey_size != got_pub_size) {
+ 	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+         goto err;
+     }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &got_pub_size) <= 0
++	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &got_priv_size) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     ret = 0;
+ 
+  err:
+@@ -90,27 +110,57 @@ mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
++mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
++{
++	return mlkem_keypair_gen("mlkem768", pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
++			privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem1024_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
++{
++	return mlkem_keypair_gen("mlkem1024", pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
++			privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES);
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem_encap_secret(const char *mlkem_alg, const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
+ {
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
+-	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++    size_t outlen, expected_outlen, publen, secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++    int fips_fallback = 0;
++
++    if (strcmp(mlkem_alg, "mlkem768") == 0) {
++	    outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++	    publen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++    } else if (strcmp(mlkem_alg, "mlkem1024") == 0) {
++	    outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++	    publen = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++    } else
++	    return r;
+ 
+-    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
+-		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++    expected_outlen = outlen;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, mlkem_alg, NULL,
++		    pubkeybuf, publen);
++    if (pkey == NULL && FIPS_mode()) {
++        pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, mlkem_alg, FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ,
++		    pubkeybuf, publen);
++	fips_fallback = 1;
++    }
+     if (pkey == NULL) {
+ 	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 	goto err;
+     }
+ 
+-    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, fips_fallback ? FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ : NULL);
+     if (ctx == NULL
+ 	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
+-        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &expected_outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
+ 	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
+-	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
++	|| outlen != expected_outlen) {
+ 	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 	goto err;
+     }
+@@ -126,25 +176,45 @@ mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
++mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
++{
++	return mlkem_encap_secret("mlkem768", pubkeybuf, secret, out);
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem1024_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
++{
++	return mlkem_encap_secret("mlkem1024", pubkeybuf, secret, out);
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem_decap_secret(const char *algname,
++    const u_char *privkeybuf, size_t privkey_len,
++    const u_char *wrapped, size_t wrapped_len,
++    u_char *secret)
+ {
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
+-	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++    size_t secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++    int fips_fallback = 0;
+ 
+-    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
+-		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, algname,
++		    NULL, privkeybuf, privkey_len);
++    if (pkey == NULL && FIPS_mode()) {
++        pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, algname,
++		    FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ, privkeybuf, privkey_len);
++	fips_fallback = 1;
++    }
+     if (pkey == NULL) {
+ 	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 	goto err;
+     }
+ 
+-    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, fips_fallback ? FIPS_FALLBACK_PROPQ : NULL);
+     if (ctx == NULL
+ 	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
+-        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrapped_len) <= 0
+ 	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
+ 	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 	goto err;
+@@ -161,6 +231,20 @@ mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *s
+     return r;
+ }
+ 
++static int
++mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
++{
++	return mlkem_decap_secret("mlkem768", privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES,
++		wrapped, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES, secret);
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem1024_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
++{
++	return mlkem_decap_secret("mlkem1024", privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_SECRETKEYBYTES,
++		wrapped, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES, secret);
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -337,7 +421,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ 	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ 	size_t need;
+ 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
++	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc;
+ 
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+@@ -546,6 +630,519 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ 	return r;
+ #endif
+ }
++
++#define NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN   33
++#define NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN 65
++#define NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN   49
++#define NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN 97
++#define NIST_BUF_MAX_SIZE NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN
++
++static const char ec256[] = "P-256";
++static const char ec384[] = "P-384";
++static const char *len2curve_name(size_t len)
++{
++	switch (len) {
++		case NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN:
++		case NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN:
++			return ec256;
++			break;
++		case NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN:
++		case NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN:
++			return ec384;
++			break;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static EVP_PKEY *
++buf2nist_key(const unsigned char *pub_key_buf, size_t pub_key_len)
++{
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM params[3];
++	const char *curve_name = len2curve_name(pub_key_len);
++
++	if (curve_name == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++
++	ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
++	if (!ctx)
++		goto err;
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) <= 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, curve_name, 0);
++	params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
++			OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, (void *)pub_key_buf, pub_key_len);
++	params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) <= 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return pkey;
++
++err:
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++kex_nist_shared_key_ext(EVP_PKEY *priv_key,
++    const u_char *pub_key_buf, size_t pub_key_len, struct sshbuf *out)
++{
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL;
++	size_t shared_secret_len = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY *peer_key = buf2nist_key(pub_key_buf, pub_key_len);
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if (peer_key == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
++
++	ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, priv_key, NULL);
++	if (!ctx)
++		goto end;
++
++	if ((EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) <= 0)
++		|| EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, peer_key) <= 0
++		|| EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &shared_secret_len) <= 0)
++		goto end;
++
++	shared_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(shared_secret_len);
++	if (shared_secret == NULL)
++		goto end;
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, shared_secret, &shared_secret_len) <= 0)
++		goto end;
++
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, shared_secret, shared_secret_len)) != 0)
++		goto end;
++
++	r = 0;
++
++end:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(peer_key);
++	if (shared_secret)
++		OPENSSL_clear_free(shared_secret, shared_secret_len);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++	return r;
++}
++
++static EVP_PKEY *
++nist_pkey_keygen(size_t pub_key_len)
++{
++	const char *curve_name = len2curve_name(pub_key_len);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM params[2];
++
++	if (curve_name == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++
++	pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
++	if (!pctx)
++		return NULL;
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) {
++		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, curve_name, 0);
++	params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(pctx, params) <= 0
++	    || EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
++		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++	return pkey;
++}
++
++static size_t decompress_pub_key(void *pub, size_t compressed_len, size_t decompressed_len)
++{
++    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
++    EC_POINT *point = NULL;
++    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    size_t len = 0;
++    int group_nid = NID_undef;
++
++    switch (compressed_len) {
++    case NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN:
++         group_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
++       break;
++    case NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN:
++         group_nid = NID_secp384r1;
++       break;
++    default:
++       return 0;
++       break;
++    }
++
++    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
++    group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(group_nid);
++    if (ctx == NULL || group == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    point = EC_POINT_new(group);
++    if (point == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, point, pub, compressed_len, ctx))
++        goto err;
++
++    len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, pub, decompressed_len, ctx);
++
++err:
++    EC_POINT_free(point);
++    EC_GROUP_free(group);
++    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    return len;
++}
++
++static int
++get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)
++{
++    OSSL_PARAM params[2];
++    size_t required_len = 0, out_len = 0;
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(
++        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT,
++        "uncompressed", 0);
++    params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_set_params(pkey, params) <= 0
++	    || EVP_PKEY_get_octet_string_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++                                          buf, buf_len, &required_len) <= 0) {
++        return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    }
++
++    if (required_len != buf_len) {
++        /* Red Hat certified FIPS provider ignores OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT
++	 * We may have to perform the conversion manually */
++        if (len2curve_name(required_len) == len2curve_name(buf_len)) {
++	    out_len = decompress_pub_key(buf, required_len, buf_len);
++	    if (out_len != buf_len) {
++	        debug_f("Error decompressing the compressed public key");
++	        return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	    } else {
++		return 0;
++	    }
++	} else {
++	    debug_f("Unexpected length of uncompressed public key: expected %d, got %d", buf_len, required_len);
++	    return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	}
++    }
++
++    return 0;
++}
++/* nist_bytes_len should always be uncompressed */
++static int
++kex_kem_mlkem_nist_keypair(struct kex *kex, size_t mlkem_bytes_len, size_t nist_bytes_len)
++{
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	u_char *cp = NULL;
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	u_char *client_key = NULL;
++
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	need = mlkem_bytes_len + nist_bytes_len;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	if (mlkem_bytes_len == crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
++		client_key = kex->mlkem768_client_key;
++		r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, client_key);
++	}
++
++	if (mlkem_bytes_len == crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
++		client_key = kex->mlkem1024_client_key;
++		r = mlkem1024_keypair_gen(cp, client_key);
++	}
++
++	if (client_key == NULL)
++		goto out;
++
++	if (r != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkemXXX:", cp, mlkem_bytes_len);
++#endif
++	cp += mlkem_bytes_len;
++	if ((kex->ec_hybrid_client_key = nist_pkey_keygen(nist_bytes_len)) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++
++	if ((r = get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(kex->ec_hybrid_client_key, cp, nist_bytes_len)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key NIST:", cp, nist_bytes_len);
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	kex->client_pub = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++        if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++kex_kem_mlkem_nist_enc(struct kex *kex, const char *nist_curve,
++   const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
++   struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
++{
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *client_pub;
++	u_char server_pub[NIST_BUF_MAX_SIZE];
++	u_char enc_out[crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES];
++	u_char secret[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
++	EVP_PKEY *server_key = NULL;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t client_buf_len, mlkem_buf_len, ecdh_buf_len, server_key_len, enc_out_len;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	*server_blobp = NULL;
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	client_buf_len = sshbuf_len(client_blob);
++	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
++	if (strcmp(nist_curve, "P-256") == 0) {
++		if (crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES > client_buf_len)
++			return r;
++
++		ecdh_buf_len = client_buf_len - crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++		if (ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN &&
++			ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN)
++			return r;
++		mlkem_buf_len = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++		enc_out_len = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++		server_key_len = NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN;
++	} else if (strcmp(nist_curve, "P-384") == 0) {
++		if (crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES > client_buf_len)
++			return r;
++
++		ecdh_buf_len = client_buf_len - crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++		if (ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN &&
++			ecdh_buf_len != NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN)
++			return r;
++		mlkem_buf_len = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++		enc_out_len = crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++		server_key_len = NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN;
++	} else
++		return r;
++
++	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem:", client_pub, mlkem_buf_len);
++	dump_digest("client public key NIST:", client_pub + mlkem_buf_len, ecdh_buf_len);
++#endif
++
++	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
++	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = (mlkem_buf_len == crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) ?
++		mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, secret, enc_out) :
++		mlkem1024_encap_secret(client_pub, secret, enc_out);
++
++	if (r != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
++	server_key = nist_pkey_keygen(server_key_len);
++
++	if ((r = get_uncompressed_ec_pubkey(server_key, server_pub, server_key_len) != 0) ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(buf, secret, sizeof(secret))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc_out, enc_out_len) != 0)||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, server_key_len)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	/* append ECDH shared key */
++	client_pub += mlkem_buf_len;
++	if ((r = kex_nist_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, ecdh_buf_len, buf)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server public NIST:", server_pub, server_key_len);
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:", enc_out, enc_out_len);
++	dump_digest("server kem key:", secret, sizeof(secret));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*server_blobp = server_blob;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	server_blob = NULL;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	EVP_PKEY_free(server_key);
++	explicit_bzero(enc_out, sizeof(enc_out));
++	explicit_bzero(secret, sizeof(secret));
++	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++kex_kem_mlkem_nist_dec(struct kex *kex,
++    const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp,
++    size_t mlkem_len)
++{
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
++	int r;
++	size_t nist_len;
++
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) < mlkem_len) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	nist_len = sshbuf_len(server_blob) - mlkem_len;
++
++	switch (mlkem_len) {
++		case crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES:
++			if (nist_len != NIST_P256_COMPRESSED_LEN
++				&& nist_len != NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN) {
++				r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++				goto out;
++			}
++		break;
++		case crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES:
++			if (nist_len != NIST_P384_COMPRESSED_LEN
++				&& nist_len != NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN) {
++				r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++				goto out;
++			}
++		break;
++	}
++
++	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
++	server_pub = ciphertext + mlkem_len;
++	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, mlkem_len);
++	dump_digest("server public key NIST:", server_pub, nist_len);
++#endif
++	r = (mlkem_len == crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) ?
++		mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap) :
++		mlkem1024_decap_secret(kex->mlkem1024_client_key, ciphertext, decap);
++
++	if (r != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = kex_nist_shared_key_ext(kex->ec_hybrid_client_key, server_pub,
++		nist_len, buf)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
++	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++}
++
++int
++kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(struct kex *kex)
++{
++	return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_keypair(kex, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, NIST_P256_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN);
++}
++
++int
++kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
++    struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
++{
++	return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_enc(kex, "P-256", client_blob, server_blobp, shared_secretp);
++}
++
++int
++kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
++    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
++{
++	return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_dec(kex, server_blob, shared_secretp,
++		crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
++}
++
++int
++kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(struct kex *kex)
++{
++	return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_keypair(kex, crypto_kem_mlkem1024_PUBLICKEYBYTES, NIST_P384_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN);
++}
++
++int
++kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
++    struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
++{
++	return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_enc(kex, "P-384", client_blob, server_blobp, shared_secretp);
++}
++
++int
++kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
++    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
++{
++	return kex_kem_mlkem_nist_dec(kex, server_blob, shared_secretp,
++		crypto_kem_mlkem1024_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
++}
++
+ #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+@@ -567,4 +1164,39 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ {
+ 	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
++
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_keypair(struct kex *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem768nistp256_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_keypair(struct kex *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++int	 kex_kem_mlkem1024nistp384_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
++    struct sshbuf **)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
+ #endif /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 6c83739ee..2f154a3d7 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -2014,6 +2014,8 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ 	kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ 	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
+index 3e0ec6826..007347fc3 100644
+--- a/myproposal.h
++++ b/myproposal.h
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_SERVER_KEX	\
+ 	"mlkem768x25519-sha256," \
++	"mlkem768nistp256-sha256," \
++	"mlkem1024nistp384-sha384," \
+ 	"sntrup761x25519-sha512," \
+ 	"sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com," \
+ 	"curve25519-sha256," \
+@@ -97,6 +99,8 @@
+ 	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
+ 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
+ #define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"mlkem768nistp256-sha256," \
++	"mlkem1024nistp384-sha384," \
+ 	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+ 	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
+ 	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+index f4700deeb..99a8e3b46 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, char *cipher, char *mac,
+ 	server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++	server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++	server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key;
+ 	server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key;
+ 	server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign;
+@@ -248,6 +250,8 @@ kex_tests(void)
+ 	}
+ # ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 	do_kex("mlkem768x25519-sha256");
++	do_kex("mlkem768nistp256-sha256");
++	do_kex("mlkem1024nistp384-sha384");
+ # endif /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+ # ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+ 	do_kex("sntrup761x25519-sha512");
+diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
+index 11618ae8a..2f4037972 100644
+--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
++++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
+@@ -290,6 +290,8 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
+ 	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
++	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
++	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until
+diff --git a/ssh_api.c b/ssh_api.c
+index 7bdcee148..d20b03a00 100644
+--- a/ssh_api.c
++++ b/ssh_api.c
+@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
+ 		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ 		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
+ 		ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key;
+ 		ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key;
+ 		ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign;
+@@ -154,6 +156,8 @@ ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
+ 		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ 		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
++		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
++		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_client;
+ 		ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key;
+ 	}
+ 	*sshp = ssh;
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 2d98fc3da..88e27955a 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -347,6 +347,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
++	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
++	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index f3c38a7d1..698ef83f3 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -893,6 +893,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768NISTP256_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
++	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM1024NISTP384_SHA384] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ 	kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ 	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/0050-Provide-a-way-to-disable-GSSAPIDelegateCredentials-s.patch b/0050-Provide-a-way-to-disable-GSSAPIDelegateCredentials-s.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85c4140
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0050-Provide-a-way-to-disable-GSSAPIDelegateCredentials-s.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From 71190d3d862113d97708a42b4a7daa7aa3c4e0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 14:55:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 50/53] Provide a way to disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ server-side
+
+---
+ gss-serv.c    |  5 +++++
+ servconf.c    | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ servconf.h    |  1 +
+ sshd_config.0 |  3 +++
+ sshd_config.5 |  3 +++
+ 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index be80e17ca..165484db0 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -509,6 +509,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
++	if (options.gss_deleg_creds == 0) {
++		debug_f("delegate credential is disabled, doing nothing");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+ 		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index e53e8ea30..fb1d150cd 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+@@ -396,6 +397,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
++		options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+ 		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+ 	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+@@ -591,7 +594,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssDelegateCreds,
++	sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -693,6 +698,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1705,6 +1711,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssDelegateCreds:
++		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3352,6 +3362,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c7cec5ece..9b1a73b8d 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* If true, accept delegated GSS credentials */
+ 	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ 	int 	gss_store_rekey;
+ 	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
+index 8c5217c0b..cda9c9182 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.0
++++ b/sshd_config.0
+@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
+              cache on logout.  The default is yes.
+ 
++     GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
++             Accept delegated credentials on the server side.  The default is yes.
++
+      GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+              Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
+              acceptor a client authenticates against.  If set to yes then the
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 676d6d4d2..4ae4bebee 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -733,6 +733,9 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
++Accept delegated credentials on the server side.  The default is
++.CM yes .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
+ Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
+ access control. Further details are described in
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch b/0051-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
similarity index 52%
rename from openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
rename to 0051-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
index 2b702d4..422107c 100644
--- a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/0051-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
- 
- /* -- X11 forwarding */
--/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
--#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
-+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
-+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
- 
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
-@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+From 763c65f6f349a7bab344a58991246891700e4fa0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 15:35:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 51/53] openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays
+
+---
+ channels.c    |  9 ++++++---
+ channels.h    |  2 +-
+ servconf.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
+ servconf.h    |  2 ++
+ session.c     |  5 +++--
+ sshd_config.5 |  7 +++++++
+ 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index 26ed9945f..c26380e25 100644
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -5067,7 +5067,7 @@ rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
   */
  int
  x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
@@ -21,66 +25,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
      u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
  {
  	Channel *nc = NULL;
-@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 	if (chanids == NULL)
+@@ -5080,8 +5080,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+ 	    x11_display_offset > UINT16_MAX - X11_BASE_PORT - MAX_DISPLAYS)
  		return -1;
  
 +	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
 +	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
 +
  	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
--	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+-	    display_number < x11_display_offset + MAX_DISPLAYS;
 +	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
  	    display_number++) {
--		port = 6000 + display_number;
-+		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
-+		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
-+			break;
+ 		port = X11_BASE_PORT + display_number;
  		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -5146,7 +5149,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  		if (num_socks > 0)
  			break;
  	}
--	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
-+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
+-	if (display_number >= x11_display_offset + MAX_DISPLAYS) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_BASE_PORT ) {
  		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
  		return -1;
  	}
-@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
-+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
- 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 			close(sock);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	}
- 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- 	if (!ai) {
--		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
-+		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	set_nodelay(sock);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
+index 7456541f8..754bd98ee 100644
+--- a/channels.h
++++ b/channels.h
+@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
  
  void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
  int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
@@ -88,11 +59,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
  void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
  	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
-@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ int      x11_channel_used_recently(struct ssh *ssh);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->print_lastlog = -1;
  	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
  	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
@@ -100,7 +72,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
  	options->permit_tty = -1;
  	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
-@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -357,6 +358,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
  	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
  		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
@@ -109,16 +81,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
  		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
  	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
-	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+@@ -582,7 +585,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 -	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 +	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
  	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
  	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
  	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -725,6 +728,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -126,7 +98,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -1775,6 +1779,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  			*intptr = value;
  		break;
  
@@ -137,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	case sX11UseLocalhost:
  		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+@@ -3037,6 +3045,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
@@ -145,7 +117,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
-@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3332,6 +3341,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
  	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
@@ -153,10 +125,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
  	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 9b1a73b8d..6bfdf6305 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  
  #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
  #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
@@ -164,7 +137,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  
  /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
  #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
-@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
  	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
  					 * searching at */
@@ -172,13 +145,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
  	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
  	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 80282dfd8..e53d044a0 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -2681,8 +2681,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  		return 0;
  	}
-	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+ 	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
 -	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
 -	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
 +	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
@@ -187,10 +161,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
  		return 0;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 4ae4bebee..3dbce55fc 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1403,6 +1403,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
  .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
  .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
@@ -198,7 +173,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
  .Cm X11Forwarding
  and
  .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
-@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+@@ -2112,6 +2113,12 @@ Specifies the first display number available for
  X11 forwarding.
  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
  The default is 10.
@@ -211,3 +186,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
  .It Cm X11Forwarding
  Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
  The argument must be
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/0052-openssh-10.2p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
similarity index 80%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
rename to 0052-openssh-10.2p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
index 551351c..b486fee 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/0052-openssh-10.2p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,116 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.646699953 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2021-08-30 13:07:43.662700088 +0200
-@@ -1985,12 +1985,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+From f32f2a8a37e8585c1259fea2a970319d229e2cc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 14:24:07 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 52/53] openssh-10.2p1-pkcs11-uri
+
+---
+ Makefile.in                      |  24 +-
+ configure.ac                     |  37 ++
+ regress/Makefile                 |   4 +-
+ regress/pkcs11.sh                | 349 ++++++++++++++
+ regress/unittests/Makefile       |   2 +-
+ regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c | 353 ++++++++++++++
+ ssh-add.c                        |  48 +-
+ ssh-agent.c                      | 104 ++++-
+ ssh-keygen.c                     |   7 +-
+ ssh-pkcs11-client.c              |  17 +
+ ssh-pkcs11-uri.c                 | 437 ++++++++++++++++++
+ ssh-pkcs11-uri.h                 |  43 ++
+ ssh-pkcs11.c                     | 760 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ ssh-pkcs11.h                     |   4 +
+ ssh.c                            | 104 ++++-
+ ssh_config.5                     |  15 +
+ 16 files changed, 2039 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 regress/pkcs11.sh
+ create mode 100644 regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+ create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
+ create mode 100644 ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 20d134c02..f8cbd545d 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+ 	sshbuf-io.o misc-agent.o auditstub.o
+ 
+-P11OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-client.o
++P11OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-client.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o
+ 
+ SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
+ 
+@@ -161,11 +161,11 @@ SSHADD_OBJS=	ssh-add.o $(P11OBJS) $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+ SSHAGENT_OBJS=	ssh-agent.o $(P11OBJS) $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+-SSHKEYGEN_OBJS=	ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS)
++SSHKEYGEN_OBJS=	ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+ SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS=ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(P11OBJS) $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+-P11HELPER_OBJS=	ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS)
++P11HELPER_OBJS=	ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o $(SKOBJS)
+ 
+ SKHELPER_OBJS=	ssh-sk-helper.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o
+ 
+@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT)
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation/ssh-verify-attestation$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -369,6 +371,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
++	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+@@ -549,6 +553,7 @@ regress-prep:
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
++	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
+ 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/ssh-verify-attestation
+ 	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
+@@ -724,6 +729,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
+ 	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+ 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+ 
++UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\
++	regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o
++
++regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT): \
++    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS} ssh-pkcs11-uri.o \
++    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \
++	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
++	    ssh-pkcs11-uri.o -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS) -lm
++
+ # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
+ SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
+ 	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
+@@ -769,7 +784,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
+ 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
+ 	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+ 	regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
+-	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
++	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
++	regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \
+ 
+ tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests extra-tests unit
+ 	echo all tests passed
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 9d3b19925..e33462027 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2246,12 +2246,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
  	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
  ])
  
@@ -16,7 +125,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
  		fi
  	]
  )
-@@ -2019,6 +2021,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
+@@ -2281,6 +2283,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
  AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
  
@@ -57,7 +166,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
  # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
  	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
-@@ -5624,6 +5660,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support
+@@ -5904,6 +5940,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
  echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
  echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
  echo "                   PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
@@ -65,87 +174,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
  echo "                  U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
  
  echo ""
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.571699324 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
- 	ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
--	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
-+	ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- 	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
- 	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
- 	hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \
-@@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT)
- 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
- 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
-@@ -339,6 +341,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
- 	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
-+	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11
-	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
-	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
-	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
-@@ -513,6 +517,7 @@ regress-prep:
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
-+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/pkcs11
- 	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
- 	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
- 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
-@@ -685,6 +690,16 @@
- 	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
- 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
- 
-+UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\
-+	regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o
-+
-+regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT): \
-+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS} \
-+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \
-+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS)
-+
- # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
- SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
- 	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
-@@ -711,7 +726,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(RE
- 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
- 	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
- 	regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
--	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
-+	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
-+	regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \
- 
- tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
- 	echo all tests passed
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ else
- 	done
- 
- 	trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
--	echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
-+	${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
- 	r=$?
- 	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- 		fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
+diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
+index ece093a2b..a851549f6 100644
+--- a/regress/Makefile
++++ b/regress/Makefile
+@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \
  		known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
  		modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
  		pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
@@ -155,21 +188,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefil
  		rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
  		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
  		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
-@@ -252,8 +253,9 @@ unit:
- 		V="" ; \
- 		test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
- 		    V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
--		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
--		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
-+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 ; \
-+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
-+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
- 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
- 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \
- 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
+@@ -288,6 +289,7 @@ unit unit-bench:
+ 		test "x${UNITTEST_VERBOSE}" = "x" || ARGS="$$ARGS -v"; \
+ 		test "x${UNITTEST_BENCH_DETAIL}" = "x" || ARGS="$$ARGS -B"; \
+ 		test "x${UNITTEST_BENCH_ONLY}" = "x" || ARGS="$$ARGS -O ${UNITTEST_BENCH_ONLY}"; \
++		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 ; \
+ 		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf $${ARGS}; \
+ 		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
+ 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata $${ARGS}; \
+diff --git a/regress/pkcs11.sh b/regress/pkcs11.sh
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..a91aee94f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/regress/pkcs11.sh
 @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
 +#
 +#  Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -520,21 +551,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/pkcs11
 +	trace "kill agent"
 +	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
 +fi
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/Makefile	2021-08-30 13:07:43.663700096 +0200
-@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile b/regress/unittests/Makefile
+index e370900e4..d6c89c129 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/Makefile
++++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ #	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.13 2023/09/24 08:14:13 claudio Exp $
  
- REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
  SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion
 -SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig
 +SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig pkcs11
  
  .include <bsd.subdir.mk>
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..89ba45c4e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -881,23 +915,35 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1
 +	test_parse_invalid();
 +	test_generate_valid();
 +}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
++
++void
++benchmarks(void)
++{
++	printf("no benchmarks\n");
++}
++
+diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
+index 2d5bec89c..aae82a794 100644
+--- a/ssh-add.c
++++ b/ssh-add.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
  #include "ssh-sk.h"
  #include "sk-api.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
 +#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
  
- /* argv0 */
- extern char *__progname;
-@@ -229,6 +230,34 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
- 	return ret;
+ #define CERT_EXPIRY_GRACE	(5*60)
+ 
+@@ -257,6 +258,38 @@ check_cert_lifetime(const struct sshkey *cert, int cert_lifetime)
+ 	return MINIMUM(cert_lifetime, (int)n);
  }
  
 +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+static int update_card(int, int, const char *, int, struct dest_constraint **, size_t, char *);
++static int
++update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag,
++    int key_only, int cert_only,
++    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints,
++    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin);
 +
 +int
 +update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri, int qflag,
@@ -919,32 +965,35 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c
 +	}
 +	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
 +
-+	return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, 
-+	           dest_constraints, ndest_constraints, pin);
++	return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, 1, 0,
++	           dest_constraints, ndest_constraints, NULL, 0, pin);
 +}
 +#endif
 +
  static int
- add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag,
-     const char *skprovider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
-@@ -445,12 +472,11 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
- 
- static int
+ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int cert_only,
+     int qflag, int Nflag, const char *skprovider,
+@@ -447,15 +480,14 @@ static int
  update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag,
--    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
-+    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints, char *pin)
+     int key_only, int cert_only,
+     struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints,
+-    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts)
++    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin)
  {
 -	char *pin = NULL;
  	int r, ret = -1;
  
+ 	if (key_only)
+ 		ncerts = 0;
+ 
 -	if (add) {
 +	if (add && pin == NULL) {
  		if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
  		    RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
  			return -1;
-@@ -630,6 +656,14 @@ static int
-     const char *skprovider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
-     size_t ndest_constraints)
+@@ -637,6 +669,14 @@ do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, int cert_only,
+     char *file, int qflag, int Nflag, const char *skprovider,
+     struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
  {
 +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 +	if (strlen(file) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
@@ -955,24 +1004,25 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-add.c
 +	}
 +#endif
  	if (deleting) {
- 		if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
- 			return -1;
-@@ -813,7 +846,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 	if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+ 		if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only,
+ 		    cert_only, qflag) == -1)
+@@ -1009,7 +1049,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  		if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider,
--		    qflag, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1)
-+		    qflag, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints, NULL) == -1)
+ 		    qflag, key_only, cert_only,
+ 		    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints,
+-		    certs, ncerts) == -1)
++		    certs, ncerts, NULL) == -1)
  			ret = 1;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -847,10 +847,72 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+ 		for (n = 0; n < ncerts; n++)
+ 			sshkey_free(certs[n]);
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index dc246066d..c3e94e2b1 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1540,10 +1540,75 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, char *comment, const char *provider,
+ 	idtab->nentries++;
  }
  
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 +static char *
 +sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
 +{
@@ -983,6 +1033,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
 +	if (provider == NULL)
 +		return NULL;
 +
++	memset(canonical_provider, 0, sizeof(canonical_provider));
++
 +	if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
 +	    strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
 +	    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
@@ -995,6 +1047,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
 +
 +		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
 +			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
 +			return NULL;
 +		}
 +		/* validate also provider from URI */
@@ -1043,8 +1096,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
  	char **comments = NULL;
  	int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
  	u_int seconds = 0;
-@@ -869,33 +931,28 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
- 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+@@ -1572,25 +1637,18 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 		    "providers is disabled", provider);
  		goto send;
  	}
 -	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
@@ -1055,13 +1108,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
 -	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
 -		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
 -		    "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
-+
 +	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
 +	if (sane_uri == NULL)
  		goto send;
 -	}
 -	debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
-+
  	if (lifetime && !death)
  		death = monotime() + lifetime;
  
@@ -1069,31 +1120,38 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
 +	debug_f("add %.100s", sane_uri);
 +	count = pkcs11_add_provider(sane_uri, pin, &keys, &comments);
  	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- 		k = keys[i];
- 		if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
- 			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
- 			id->key = k;
- 			keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
--			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
-+			id->provider = xstrdup(sane_uri);
- 			if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
- 				id->comment = comments[i];
- 				comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
- 			} else {
--				id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
-+				id->comment = xstrdup(sane_uri);
- 			}
- 			id->death = death;
- 			id->confirm = confirm;
-@@ -910,6 +967,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 		if (comments[i] == NULL || comments[i][0] == '\0') {
+ 			free(comments[i]);
+-			comments[i] = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
++			comments[i] = xstrdup(sane_uri);
+ 		}
+ 		for (j = 0; j < ncerts; j++) {
+ 			if (!sshkey_is_cert(certs[j]))
+@@ -1600,13 +1658,13 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ 			if (pkcs11_make_cert(keys[i], certs[j], &k) != 0)
+ 				continue;
+ 			add_p11_identity(k, xstrdup(comments[i]),
+-			    canonical_provider, death, confirm,
++			    sane_uri, death, confirm,
+ 			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+ 			success = 1;
+ 		}
+ 		if (!cert_only && lookup_identity(keys[i]) == NULL) {
+ 			add_p11_identity(keys[i], comments[i],
+-			    canonical_provider, death, confirm,
++			    sane_uri, death, confirm,
+ 			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+ 			keys[i] = NULL;		/* transferred */
+ 			comments[i] = NULL;	/* transferred */
+@@ -1619,6 +1677,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
  send:
  	free(pin);
  	free(provider);
 +	free(sane_uri);
  	free(keys);
  	free(comments);
-	free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
-@@ -918,7 +976,7 @@ send:
+ 	free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+@@ -1631,7 +1690,7 @@ send:
  static void
  process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
  {
@@ -1102,7 +1160,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
  	int r, success = 0;
  	Identity *id, *nxt;
  
-@@ -930,30 +988,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
+@@ -1643,30 +1702,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
  	}
  	free(pin);
  
@@ -1139,185 +1197,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
  	send_status(e, success);
  }
  #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.578699383 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-08-30 13:07:43.664700104 +0200
-@@ -1111,6 +1111,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
- .Cm CertificateFile
- in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
- the identity.
-+.Pp
-+The authentication identity can be also specified in a form of PKCS#11 URI
-+starting with a string
-+.Cm pkcs11: .
-+There is supported a subset of the PKCS#11 URI as defined
-+in RFC 7512 (implemented path arguments
-+.Cm id ,
-+.Cm manufacturer ,
-+.Cm object ,
-+.Cm token
-+and query arguments
-+.Cm module-path
-+and
-+.Cm pin-value
-+). The URI can not be in quotes.
- .It Cm IgnoreUnknown
- Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
- encountered in configuration parsing.
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.578699383 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -826,6 +826,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
- 			break;
- 		case 'i':
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+			if (strlen(optarg) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+			    strncmp(optarg, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
-+			    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+				add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1);
-+				break;
-+			}
-+#endif
- 			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
- 			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
- 				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
-@@ -1681,6 +1689,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- 	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
- #endif
-+	pkcs11_terminate();
- 
-  skip_connect:
- 	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
-@@ -2197,6 +2206,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const stru
- 	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+static void
-+load_pkcs11_identity(char *pkcs11_uri, char *identity_files[],
-+    struct sshkey *identity_keys[], int *n_ids)
-+{
-+	int nkeys, i;
-+	struct sshkey **keys;
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+
-+	debug("identity file '%s' from pkcs#11", pkcs11_uri);
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (pkcs11_uri_parse(pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0)
-+	fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI %s", pkcs11_uri);
-+
-+	/* we need to merge URI and provider together */
-+	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && uri->module_path == NULL)
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
-+
-+	if (options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
-+	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, NULL, &keys, NULL)) > 0) {
-+		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
-+			if (*n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
-+				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+			identity_keys[*n_ids] = keys[i];
-+			identity_files[*n_ids] = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+			(*n_ids)++;
-+		}
-+		free(keys);
-+	}
-+
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
-+}
-+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-+
- /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
- static void
- load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
-@@ -2211,11 +2259,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
- 	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
- 	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
- 	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
--#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
--	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
--	char **comments = NULL;
--	int nkeys;
--#endif /* PKCS11 */
- 
- 	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
- 	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
-@@ -2228,33 +2271,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
- 	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
--	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
--	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
--	    (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
--	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
--	    &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
--		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
--			if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
--				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
--				free(comments[i]);
--				continue;
--			}
--			identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
--			identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
--			n_ids++;
--		}
--		free(keys);
--		free(comments);
-+	/* handle fallback from PKCS11Provider option */
-+	pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode);
-+
-+	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL) {
-+		struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+
-+		uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+		if (uri == NULL)
-+			fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+		/* Construct simple PKCS#11 URI to simplify access */
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
-+
-+		/* Add it as any other IdentityFile */
-+		cp = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+		add_identity_file(&options, NULL, cp, 1);
-+		free(cp);
-+
-+		pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 	}
- #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
-+		char *name = options.identity_files[i];
- 		if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
--		    strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
-+		    strcasecmp(name, "none") == 0) {
- 			free(options.identity_files[i]);
- 			options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
- 			continue;
- 		}
--		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+		if (strlen(name) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+		    strncmp(name, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
-+		    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+			load_pkcs11_identity(name, identity_files,
-+			    identity_keys, &n_ids);
-+			free(options.identity_files[i]);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid());
- 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
- 		free(cp);
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -860,8 +860,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index afa279097..7af08fcdf 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -831,8 +831,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
  			free(fp);
  		} else {
  			(void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
@@ -1331,1311 +1215,52 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		}
  		free(comments[i]);
  		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
- 	u_int nkeys, i;
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+index 85afb62ac..7b7eaf533 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+@@ -378,6 +378,19 @@ pkcs11_start_helper(const char *path)
+ 	return helper;
+ }
+ 
++int
++pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
++{
++	int nkeys = 0;
++	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++
++	debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri);
++
++	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(provider_uri, pin, keyp, labelsp);
++
++	return nkeys;
++}
++
+ int
+ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+     char ***labelsp)
+@@ -389,6 +403,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
  	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	struct helper *helper;
  
 +	debug_f("called, name = %s", name);
 +
- 	if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
- 		return (-1);
- 
-@@ -342,6 +344,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
+ 	if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) == NULL &&
+ 	    (helper = pkcs11_start_helper(name)) == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -413,6 +429,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
  		*keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
  		if (labelsp)
  			*labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *));
 +		debug_f("nkeys = %u", nkeys);
  		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
  			/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
- 			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2021-08-30 13:12:27.709084157 +0200
-@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
- 	int			logged_in;
- };
- 
--struct pkcs11_provider {
--	char			*name;
-+struct pkcs11_module {
-+	char			*module_path;
- 	void			*handle;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*function_list;
- 	CK_INFO			info;
-@@ -65,6 +65,13 @@ struct pkcs11_provider {
- 	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*slotinfo;
- 	int			valid;
- 	int			refcount;
-+};
-+
-+struct pkcs11_provider {
-+	char			*name;
-+	struct pkcs11_module	*module; /* can be shared between various providers */
-+	int			refcount;
-+	int			valid;
- 	TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
- };
- 
-@@ -75,6 +82,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
- 	CK_ULONG		slotidx;
- 	char			*keyid;
- 	int			keyid_len;
-+	char			*label;
- };
- 
- int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
-@@ -106,26 +114,61 @@ pkcs11_init(int interactive)
-  * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
-  */
- static void
--pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
-+pkcs11_module_finalize(struct pkcs11_module *m)
- {
- 	CK_RV rv;
- 	CK_ULONG i;
- 
--	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d",
--	    p->name, p->refcount, p->valid);
--	if (!p->valid)
-+	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid);
-+	if (!m->valid)
- 		return;
--	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
--		if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
--		    (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
--		    p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
-+	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
-+		if (m->slotinfo[i].session &&
-+		    (rv = m->function_list->C_CloseSession(
-+		    m->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
- 			error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
- 	}
--	if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
-+	if ((rv = m->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
- 		error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
-+	m->valid = 0;
-+	m->function_list = NULL;
-+	dlclose(m->handle);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * remove a reference to the pkcs11 module.
-+ * called when a provider is unregistered.
-+ */
-+static void
-+pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m)
-+{
-+	debug_f("%p refcount %d", m, m->refcount);
-+	if (--m->refcount <= 0) {
-+		pkcs11_module_finalize(m);
-+		if (m->valid)
-+			error_f("%p still valid", m);
-+		free(m->slotlist);
-+		free(m->slotinfo);
-+		free(m->module_path);
-+		free(m);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
-+ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
-+ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
-+ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
-+ */
-+static void
-+pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
-+{
-+	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid);
-+	if (!p->valid)
-+		return;
-+	pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
-+	p->module = NULL;
- 	p->valid = 0;
--	p->function_list = NULL;
--	dlclose(p->handle);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -137,11 +180,9 @@ pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_prov
- {
- 	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount);
- 	if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
--		if (p->valid)
--			error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name);
- 		free(p->name);
--		free(p->slotlist);
--		free(p->slotinfo);
-+		if (p->module)
-+			pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
- 		free(p);
- 	}
- }
-@@ -159,6 +200,20 @@ pkcs11_terminate(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+/* lookup provider by module path */
-+static struct pkcs11_module *
-+pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(char *module_path)
-+{
-+	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
-+
-+	TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
-+		debug("check %p %s (%s)", p, p->name, p->module->module_path);
-+		if (!strcmp(module_path, p->module->module_path))
-+			return (p->module);
-+	}
-+	return (NULL);
-+}
-+
- /* lookup provider by name */
- static struct pkcs11_provider *
- pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
-@@ -173,19 +228,55 @@ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id
- 	return (NULL);
- }
- 
-+int pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *);
-+
- /* unregister provider by name */
- int
- pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
- {
-+	int rv;
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+
-+	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
-+
-+      if (provider_id == NULL)
-+          return 0;
-+
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
-+			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+	} else {
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
-+	}
-+
-+	rv = pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(uri);
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+/* unregister provider by PKCS#11 URI */
-+int
-+pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
-+{
- 	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
-+	int rv = -1;
-+	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
- 
--	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
-+	debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri);
-+
-+	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) {
- 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
- 		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
- 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
--		return (0);
-+		rv = 0;
- 	}
--	return (-1);
-+	free(provider_uri);
-+	return rv;
- }
- 
- static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
-@@ -195,6 +286,56 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
- static int ec_key_idx = 0;
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
- 
-+/*
-+ * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on
-+ * PKCS#11 structures in ssh-agent (using client-helper communication)
-+ */
-+int
-+pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
-+{
-+	char *p = NULL;
-+	struct pkcs11_uri uri;
-+	struct pkcs11_key *k11;
-+
-+	/* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */
-+	switch (key->type) {
-+	case KEY_RSA:
-+		k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(key->rsa, rsa_idx);
-+		break;
-+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
-+	case KEY_ECDSA:
-+		k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, ec_key_idx);
-+		break;
-+#endif
-+	default:
-+		error("Unknown key type %d", key->type);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	if (k11 == NULL) {
-+		error("Failed to get ex_data for key type %d", key->type);
-+		return (-1);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* omit type -- we are looking for private-public or private-certificate pairs */
-+	uri.id = k11->keyid;
-+	uri.id_len = k11->keyid_len;
-+	uri.token = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.label;
-+	uri.object = k11->label;
-+	uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path;
-+	uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID;
-+	uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID;
-+	uri.serial = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.serialNumber;
-+
-+	p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri);
-+	/* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */
-+	if (p == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	fprintf(f, " %s", p);
-+	free(p);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* release a wrapped object */
- static void
- pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
-@@ -208,6 +348,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr,
- 	if (k11->provider)
- 		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
- 	free(k11->keyid);
-+	free(k11->label);
- 	free(k11);
- }
- 
-@@ -222,8 +363,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C
- 	CK_RV			rv;
- 	int			ret = -1;
- 
--	f = p->function_list;
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
- 	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
- 		return (-1);
-@@ -260,14 +403,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
- 	if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
- 		verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
- 	else {
--		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
-+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%.32s': ",
- 		    si->token.label);
--		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
-+		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) {
- 			debug_f("no pin specified");
- 			return (-1);	/* bail out */
- 		}
- 	}
--	rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
-+	rv = provider->module->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
- 	    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
- 	if (pin != NULL)
- 		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
-@@ -297,13 +438,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
- static int
- pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
- {
--	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
-+	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid ||
-+	    k11->provider->module == NULL || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
- 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
- 	return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
--	    &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
-+	    &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -319,13 +461,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs
- 
- 	*val = 0;
- 
--	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
-+	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
-+	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
- 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 
- 	attr.type = type;
- 	attr.pValue = &flag;
-@@ -356,13 +499,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, C
- 	int			 always_auth = 0;
- 	int			 did_login = 0;
- 
--	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
-+	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
-+	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
- 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 
- 	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
- 		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
-@@ -439,8 +583,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 	tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
- 
- 	/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
-@@ -484,7 +628,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
- /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
- static int
- pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
-+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, RSA *rsa)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
- 
-@@ -502,6 +646,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *
- 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
-+		k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
-+		memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen);
-+		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
- 	RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
- 	return (0);
-@@ -532,8 +682,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 
--	f = k11->provider->function_list;
--	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
-+	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
-+	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
- 
- 	siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
- 	sig = xmalloc(siglen);
-@@ -598,7 +748,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
- 
- static int
- pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
-+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, CK_ATTRIBUTE *label_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
- 
-@@ -614,6 +764,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
- 		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
- 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
-	}
-+	if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
-+		k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
-+		memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen);
-+		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
- 	EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
- 
-@@ -622,7 +779,8 @@
- }
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
- 
--/* remove trailing spaces */
-+/* remove trailing spaces. Note, that this does NOT guarantee the buffer
-+ * will be null terminated if there are no trailing spaces! */
- static void
- rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
- {
-@@ -630,8 +788,8 @@
- 
- 	if (!len)
- 		return;
--	for (i = len - 1;  i > 0; i--)
--		if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ')
-+	for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
-+		if (buf[i] == ' ')
- 			buf[i] = '\0';
- 		else
- 			break;
-@@ -650,8 +806,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
- 	int			login_required, ret;
- 
--	f = p->function_list;
--	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
-+	si = &p->module->slotinfo[slotidx];
- 
- 	login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
- 
-@@ -661,9 +817,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
- 		error("pin required");
- 		return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
- 	}
--	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
-+	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->module->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
- 	    CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
--		error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
-+		error("C_OpenSession failed for slot %lu: %lu", slotidx, rv);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
-@@ -699,7 +855,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
- pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
-     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
- {
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
-+	int			 nattr = 4;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -713,14 +870,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 
- 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
- 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
--	key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
--	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
-+	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
-+	key_attr[3].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
- 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		return (NULL);
-@@ -731,19 +889,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
- 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
- 	 */
--	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
--	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
-+	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
- 		error("invalid attribute length");
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
- 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
- 
- 	/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -755,8 +913,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
--	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
-+	attrp = key_attr[3].pValue;
-+	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[3].ulValueLen);
- 	if (group == NULL) {
- 		ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -767,13 +925,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
-+	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen <= 2) {
- 		error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
--	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
-+	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
-+	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
- 	if (octet == NULL) {
- 		ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -790,7 +948,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec))
-+	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], ec))
- 		goto fail;
- 
- 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -806,7 +964,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 	ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
- 
- fail:
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
- 	if (ec)
- 		EC_KEY_free(ec);
-@@ -823,7 +981,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
- pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
-     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
- {
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
-+	int			 nattr = 4;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -834,14 +993,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 
- 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
- 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
--	key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
--	key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
-+	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+	key_attr[2].type = CKA_MODULUS;
-+	key_attr[3].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
- 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		return (NULL);
-@@ -852,19 +1012,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
- 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
- 	 */
--	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
--	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
-+	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
- 		error("invalid attribute length");
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
- 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
- 
- 	/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -876,8 +1036,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
--	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
-+	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
-+	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[3].pValue, key_attr[3].ulValueLen, NULL);
- 	if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
- 		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -886,7 +1046,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 		fatal_f("set key");
- 	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
-+	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], &key_attr[1], rsa))
- 		goto fail;
- 
- 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -901,7 +1061,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 	rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
- 
- fail:
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
- 	RSA_free(rsa);
- 
-@@ -912,7 +1072,8 @@ static int
- pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
-     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
- {
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[3];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[4];
-+	int			 nattr = 4;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -936,14 +1097,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 
- 	memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
- 	cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
--	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
--	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
-+	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
-+	cert_attr[3].type = CKA_VALUE;
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
- 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		return -1;
-@@ -955,18 +1117,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
- 	 */
- 	if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
--	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
-+	    cert_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
- 		error("invalid attribute length");
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
- 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
- 			cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
- 
- 	/* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
--	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
-+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto out;
-@@ -980,8 +1143,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 		subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
- 	X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
- 
--	cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
--	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
-+	cp = cert_attr[3].pValue;
-+	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[3].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
- 		error("d2i_x509 failed");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -1001,7 +1164,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 
--		if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa))
-+		if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], rsa))
- 			goto out;
- 
- 		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1031,7 +1194,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 
--		if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec))
-+		if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], &cert_attr[1], ec))
- 			goto out;
- 
- 		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1051,7 +1214,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-  out:
--	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
-+	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
- 		free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
- 	X509_free(x509);
- 	RSA_free(rsa);
-@@ -1102,11 +1265,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_U
-  */
- static int
- pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
-+    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
- {
- 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
- 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[1];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	int			 nattr = 1;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1123,10 +1287,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provide
- 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
- 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	if (uri->id != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
-+	if (uri->object != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
-+
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
- 
--	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
-+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -1207,11 +1384,12 @@ fail:
-  */
- static int
- pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
--    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
-+    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
- {
- 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
- 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
--	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[2];
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
-+	int			 nattr = 1;
- 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
- 	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1227,10 +1405,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider
- 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
- 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
- 
--	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
--	f = p->function_list;
-+	if (uri->id != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
-+	if (uri->object != NULL) {
-+		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
-+		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
-+		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
-+		nattr++;
-+	}
- 
--	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
-+
-+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
- 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
-@@ -1499,16 +1690,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct
- }
- #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
- 
--/*
-- * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
-- * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
-- */
- static int
--pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
--    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
--    struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
-+pkcs11_initialize_provider(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp)
- {
--	int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
-+	int need_finalize = 0;
- 	int ret = -1;
- 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
- 	void *handle = NULL;
-@@ -1517,164 +1702,305 @@
- 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
- 	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
- 	CK_ULONG i;
-+	char *provider_module = NULL;
-+	struct pkcs11_module *m = NULL;
- 
--	if (providerp == NULL)
-+	/* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */
-+	if (uri->module_path == NULL) {
-+#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER
-+		provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER);
-+#else
-+		error_f("No module path provided");
- 		goto fail;
--	*providerp = NULL;
-+#endif
-+	} else {
-+		provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path);
-+	}
- 
--	if (keyp != NULL)
--		*keyp = NULL;
--	if (labelsp != NULL)
--		*labelsp = NULL;
-+	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
-+	p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
- 
--	if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
--		debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
--		goto fail;
-+	if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL
-+	   && m->valid) {
-+		debug_f("provider module already initialized: %s", provider_module);
-+		free(provider_module);
-+		/* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */
-+		m->refcount++;
-+		p->module = m;
-+		p->valid = 1;
-+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
-+		p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
-+		*providerp = p;
-+		return 0;
-+	} else {
-+		m = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*m));
-+		p->module = m;
-+		m->refcount++;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* open shared pkcs11-library */
--	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
--		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
-+	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_module, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
-+		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
- 		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
--	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
--	p->handle = handle;
-+
-+	p->module->handle = handle;
- 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
- 	if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p->function_list = f;
-+	m->function_list = f;
- 	if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 	need_finalize = 1;
--	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
-+	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&m->info)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
--	rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
--	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
--	    " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
--	    provider_id,
--	    p->info.manufacturerID,
--	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
--	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
--	    p->info.libraryDescription,
--	    p->info.libraryVersion.major,
--	    p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
--	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
-+	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
-+	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
-+	    strncmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID, 32)) {
-+		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
-+		    m->info.manufacturerID);
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
-+	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.32s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
-+	    " libraryDescription <%.32s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
-+	    provider_module,
-+	    m->info.manufacturerID,
-+	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
-+	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
-+	    m->info.libraryDescription,
-+	    m->info.libraryVersion.major,
-+	    m->info.libraryVersion.minor);
-+
-+	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &m->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	if (p->nslots == 0) {
--		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id);
-+	if (m->nslots == 0) {
-+		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_module);
- 		ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
--	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
-+	m->slotlist = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
-+	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, m->slotlist, &m->nslots))
- 	    != CKR_OK) {
- 		error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
-+		    provider_module, rv);
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
- 	p->valid = 1;
--	nkeys = 0;
--	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
--		token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
--		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
-+	m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
-+	m->valid = 1;
-+	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
-+		token = &m->slotinfo[i].token;
-+		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token))
- 		    != CKR_OK) {
- 			error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
--			    "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv);
--			continue;
--		}
--		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
--			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
--			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i);
-+			    "failed: %lu", provider_module, (u_long)i, rv);
-+			token->flags = 0;
- 			continue;
- 		}
- 		rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
- 		rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
- 		rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
- 		rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
--		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> "
--		    "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx",
--		    provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
-+	}
-+	m->module_path = provider_module;
-+	provider_module = NULL;
-+
-+	/* insert unconditionally -- remove if there will be no keys later */
-+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
-+	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
-+	*providerp = p;
-+	return 0;
-+
-+fail:
-+	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
-+		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
-+		    provider_module, rv);
-+	free(provider_module);
-+	if (m) {
-+		free(m->slotlist);
-+		free(m);
-+	}
-+	if (p) {
-+		free(p->name);
-+		free(p);
-+	}
-+	if (handle)
-+		dlclose(handle);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
-+ * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
-+    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp,
-+    CK_ULONG user)
-+{
-+	int nkeys;
-+	int ret = -1;
-+	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
-+	CK_ULONG i;
-+	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
-+	char *provider_uri = NULL;
-+
-+	if (providerp == NULL)
-+		goto fail;
-+	*providerp = NULL;
-+
-+	if (keyp != NULL)
-+		*keyp = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((ret = pkcs11_initialize_provider(uri, &p)) != 0) {
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+	if (pin == NULL && uri->pin != NULL) {
-+		pin = uri->pin;
-+	}
-+	nkeys = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) {
-+		token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token;
-+		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
-+			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_uri, (u_long)i);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		if (uri->token != NULL &&
-+		    strncmp(token->label, uri->token, 32) != 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%.32s) "
-+			    "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu",
-+			    token->label, (unsigned long)i);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		if (uri->manuf != NULL &&
-+		    strncmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf, 32) != 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
-+			    "manufacturerID (%.32s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
-+			    "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		if (uri->serial != NULL &&
-+		    strncmp(token->serialNumber, uri->serial, 16) != 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
-+			    "serialNumber (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
-+			    "slot %lu", token->serialNumber, (unsigned long)i);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.32s> manufacturerID <%.32s> "
-+		    "model <%.16s> serial <%.16s> flags 0x%lx",
-+		    provider_uri, (unsigned long)i,
- 		    token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
- 		    token->serialNumber, token->flags);
- 		/*
--		 * open session, login with pin and retrieve public
--		 * keys (if keyp is provided)
-+		 * open session if not yet openend, login with pin and
-+		 * retrieve public keys (if keyp is provided)
- 		 */
--		if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
-+		if ((p->module->slotinfo[i].session != 0 ||
-+		    (ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0) && /* ??? */
- 		    keyp == NULL)
- 			continue;
--		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
--		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
--		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
-+		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->module->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
- 		    pkcs11_interactive) {
- 			/*
- 			 * Some tokens require login before they will
- 			 * expose keys.
- 			 */
--			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
-+			debug3_f("Trying to login as there were no keys found");
-+			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->module->slotinfo[i],
- 			    CKU_USER) < 0) {
- 				error("login failed");
- 				continue;
- 			}
--			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
--			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
-+			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+		}
-+		if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) {
-+			debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%.32s) ",
-+			    uri->object);
-+			/* Try once more without the label filter */
-+			char *label = uri->object;
-+			uri->object = NULL; /* XXX clone uri? */
-+			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
-+			uri->object = label;
- 		}
- 	}
-+	pin = NULL; /* Will be cleaned up with URI */
- 
- 	/* now owned by caller */
- 	*providerp = p;
- 
--	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
--	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
--
-+	free(provider_uri);
- 	return (nkeys);
- fail:
--	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
--		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
--		    provider_id, rv);
- 	if (p) {
--		free(p->name);
--		free(p->slotlist);
--		free(p->slotinfo);
--		free(p);
-+ 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
-+		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
- 	}
--	if (handle)
--		dlclose(handle);
- 	if (ret > 0)
- 		ret = -1;
- 	return (ret);
- }
- 
--/*
-- * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
-- * fails if provider already exists
-- */
-+static int
-+pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
-+    char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
-+{
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
-+
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
-+			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+	} else {
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
-+	}
-+
-+	r = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, providerp, user);
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
-+
-+	return r;
-+}
-+
- int
--pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
--    char ***labelsp)
-+pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
-+    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
- 	int nkeys;
-+	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
-+
-+	debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri);
- 
--	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
--	    &p, CKU_USER);
-+	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER);
- 
- 	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
- 	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
-@@ -1684,7 +2012,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, c
- 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
- 	}
- 	if (nkeys == 0)
--		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id);
-+		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_uri);
-+
-+	free(provider_uri);
-+	return nkeys;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
-+ * fails if provider already exists
-+ */
-+int
-+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
-+    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
-+{
-+	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
-+	int nkeys;
-+
-+	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
-+	if (uri == NULL)
-+		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
-+
-+	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
-+	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
-+			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+	} else {
-+		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
-+	}
-+
-+	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp);
-+	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 
- 	return (nkeys);
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2021-08-30 13:07:43.666700121 +0200
-@@ -22,10 +22,14 @@
- #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		4
- #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED		5
- 
-+#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
-+
- int	pkcs11_init(int);
- void	pkcs11_terminate(void);
- int	pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
-+int	pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
- int	pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
-+int	pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
- #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
- struct sshkey *
- 	pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
+ 			if ((r = sshkey_froms(msg, &k)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..8bd97e9e2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
 @@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -3074,9 +1699,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h	2021-08-30 13:07:43.667700130 +0200
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..29e9f7327
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
 @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -3121,3 +1748,1506 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +struct	 pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init();
 +char	*pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri);
 +
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index c88179473..1a443824d 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -61,8 +63,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
+ 	int			logged_in;
+ };
+ 
+-struct pkcs11_provider {
+-	char			*name;
++struct pkcs11_module {
++	char			*module_path;
+ 	void			*handle;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*function_list;
+ 	CK_INFO			info;
+@@ -71,6 +73,13 @@ struct pkcs11_provider {
+ 	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*slotinfo;
+ 	int			valid;
+ 	int			refcount;
++};
++
++struct pkcs11_provider {
++	char			*name;
++	struct pkcs11_module	*module; /* can be shared between various providers */
++	int			refcount;
++	int			valid;
+ 	TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
+ };
+ 
+@@ -82,6 +91,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
+ 	CK_ULONG		slotidx;
+ 	char			*keyid;
+ 	int			keyid_len;
++	char			*label;
+ 	TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_key)	next;
+ };
+ 
+@@ -108,26 +118,61 @@ ossl_error(const char *msg)
+  * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
+  */
+ static void
+-pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
++pkcs11_module_finalize(struct pkcs11_module *m)
+ {
+ 	CK_RV rv;
+ 	CK_ULONG i;
+ 
+-	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d",
+-	    p->name, p->refcount, p->valid);
+-	if (!p->valid)
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", m, m->refcount, m->valid);
++	if (!m->valid)
+ 		return;
+-	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+-		if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
+-		    (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
+-		    p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
++	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
++		if (m->slotinfo[i].session &&
++		    (rv = m->function_list->C_CloseSession(
++		    m->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
+ 			error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
+ 	}
+-	if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
++	if ((rv = m->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+ 		error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
++	m->valid = 0;
++	m->function_list = NULL;
++	dlclose(m->handle);
++}
++
++/*
++ * remove a reference to the pkcs11 module.
++ * called when a provider is unregistered.
++ */
++static void
++pkcs11_module_unref(struct pkcs11_module *m)
++{
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d", m, m->refcount);
++	if (--m->refcount <= 0) {
++		pkcs11_module_finalize(m);
++		if (m->valid)
++			error_f("%p still valid", m);
++		free(m->slotlist);
++		free(m->slotinfo);
++		free(m->module_path);
++		free(m);
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
++ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
++ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
++ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
++ */
++static void
++pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
++{
++	debug_f("%p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid);
++	if (!p->valid)
++		return;
++	pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
++	p->module = NULL;
+ 	p->valid = 0;
+-	p->function_list = NULL;
+-	dlclose(p->handle);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -139,15 +184,27 @@ pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
+ {
+ 	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount);
+ 	if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
+-		if (p->valid)
+-			error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name);
+ 		free(p->name);
+-		free(p->slotlist);
+-		free(p->slotinfo);
++		if (p->module)
++			pkcs11_module_unref(p->module);
+ 		free(p);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++/* lookup provider by module path */
++static struct pkcs11_module *
++pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(char *module_path)
++{
++	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
++
++	TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
++		debug("check %p %s (%s)", p, p->name, p->module->module_path);
++		if (!strcmp(module_path, p->module->module_path))
++			return (p->module);
++	}
++	return (NULL);
++}
++
+ /* lookup provider by name */
+ static struct pkcs11_provider *
+ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
+@@ -162,19 +219,55 @@ pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
+ 	return (NULL);
+ }
+ 
++int pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *);
++
+ /* unregister provider by name */
+ int
+ pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
++{
++	int rv;
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++
++	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
++
++      if (provider_id == NULL)
++          return 0;
++
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++	} else {
++		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
++	}
++
++	rv = pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(uri);
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
++	return rv;
++}
++
++/* unregister provider by PKCS#11 URI */
++int
++pkcs11_del_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
++	int rv = -1;
++	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
+ 
+-	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
++	debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri);
++
++	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) {
+ 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ 		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+ 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+-		return (0);
++		rv = 0;
+ 	}
+-	return (-1);
++	free(provider_uri);
++	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+ /* release a wrapped object */
+@@ -186,6 +279,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(struct pkcs11_key *k11)
+ 	if (k11->provider)
+ 		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+ 	free(k11->keyid);
++	free(k11->label);
+ 	sshbuf_free(k11->keyblob);
+ 	free(k11);
+ }
+@@ -201,8 +295,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
+ 	CK_RV			rv;
+ 	int			ret = -1;
+ 
+-	f = p->function_list;
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+ 	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
+ 		return (-1);
+@@ -239,14 +333,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
+ 	if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+ 		verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
+ 	else {
+-		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
++		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%.32s': ",
+ 		    si->token.label);
+-		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
++		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) {
+ 			debug_f("no pin specified");
+ 			return (-1);	/* bail out */
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
++	rv = provider->module->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
+ 	    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
+ 	if (pin != NULL)
+ 		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+@@ -276,13 +370,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
+ static int
+ pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
+ {
+-	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
++	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid ||
++	    k11->provider->module == NULL || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
+ 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
+-	    &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
++	    &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -298,13 +393,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj,
+ 
+ 	*val = 0;
+ 
+-	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
++	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
++	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
+ 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	attr.type = type;
+ 	attr.pValue = &flag;
+@@ -335,13 +431,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type)
+ 	int			 always_auth = 0;
+ 	int			 did_login = 0;
+ 
+-	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
++	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid ||
++	    !k11->provider->module || !k11->provider->module->valid) {
+ 		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
+ 		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
+@@ -440,6 +537,12 @@ pkcs11_record_key(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
+ 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+ 	}
++	if (keyid_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
++		k11->label = xmalloc(keyid_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
++		memcpy(k11->label, keyid_attrib->pValue, keyid_attrib->ulValueLen);
++		k11->label[keyid_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keys, k11, next);
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -467,6 +570,42 @@ pkcs11_lookup_key(struct sshkey *key)
+ 	return found;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on
++ * PKCS#11 structures in ssh-agent (using client-helper communication)
++ */
++int
++pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
++{
++	char *p = NULL;
++	struct pkcs11_uri uri;
++	struct pkcs11_key *k11 = pkcs11_lookup_key(key);
++
++	if (k11 == NULL) {
++		error("Failed to get ex_data for key type %d", key->type);
++		return (-1);
++	}
++
++	/* omit type -- we are looking for private-public or private-certificate pairs */
++	uri.id = k11->keyid;
++	uri.id_len = k11->keyid_len;
++	uri.token = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.label;
++	uri.object = k11->label;
++	uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path;
++	uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID;
++	uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID;
++	uri.serial = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.serialNumber;
++
++	p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri);
++	/* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */
++	if (p == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	fprintf(f, " %s", p);
++	free(p);
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /*
+  * See:
+@@ -571,8 +710,8 @@ pkcs11_sign_rsa(struct sshkey *key,
+ 		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	if ((siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(key->pkey)) <= 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -661,8 +800,8 @@ pkcs11_sign_ecdsa(struct sshkey *key,
+ 	debug3_f("sign using provider %s slotidx %lu",
+ 	    k11->provider->name, (u_long)k11->slotidx);
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	/* Prepare digest to be signed */
+ 	if ((hashalg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+@@ -746,8 +885,8 @@ pkcs11_sign_ed25519(struct sshkey *key,
+ 	debug3_f("sign using provider %s slotidx %lu",
+ 	    k11->provider->name, (u_long)k11->slotidx);
+ 
+-	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+-	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
++	f = k11->provider->module->function_list;
++	si = &k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+ 
+ 	xdata = xmalloc(datalen);
+ 	memcpy(xdata, data, datalen);
+@@ -775,7 +914,8 @@ pkcs11_sign_ed25519(struct sshkey *key,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-/* remove trailing spaces */
++/* remove trailing spaces. Note, that this does NOT guarantee the buffer
++ * will be null terminated if there are no trailing spaces! */
+ static char *
+ rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -807,8 +947,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
+ 	int			login_required, ret;
+ 
+-	f = p->function_list;
+-	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
++	f = p->module->function_list;
++	si = &p->module->slotinfo[slotidx];
+ 
+ 	login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
+ 
+@@ -818,9 +958,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
+ 		error("pin required");
+ 		return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
+ 	}
+-	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
++	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->module->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
+ 	    CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
+-		error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
++		error("C_OpenSession failed for slot %lu: %lu", slotidx, rv);
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 	if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
+@@ -857,7 +997,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+ {
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
++	int			 nattr = 4;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -870,14 +1011,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 
+ 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+-	key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
+-	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
++	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
++	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
++	key_attr[3].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		return (NULL);
+@@ -888,19 +1030,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ 	 */
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ 		error("invalid attribute length");
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+ 
+ 	/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -912,8 +1054,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
+-	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
++	attrp = key_attr[3].pValue;
++	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[3].ulValueLen);
+ 	if (group == NULL) {
+ 		ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -924,13 +1066,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen <= 2) {
+ 		error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
+-	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
++	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
++	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
+ 	if (octet == NULL) {
+ 		ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -992,7 +1134,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+ {
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
++	int			 nattr = 4;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -1003,14 +1146,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 
+ 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+-	key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
+-	key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
++	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
++	key_attr[2].type = CKA_MODULUS;
++	key_attr[3].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		return (NULL);
+@@ -1021,19 +1165,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ 	 */
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ 		error("invalid attribute length");
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+ 
+ 	/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -1045,8 +1189,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
+-	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
++	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
++	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[3].pValue, key_attr[3].ulValueLen, NULL);
+ 	if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
+ 		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -1078,7 +1222,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	/* success */
+ 	success = 0;
+ fail:
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+ 	RSA_free(rsa);
+ 	if (success != 0) {
+@@ -1093,7 +1237,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+ pkcs11_fetch_ed25519_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+ {
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[4];
++	int			 nattr = 4;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -1113,14 +1258,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ed25519_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 
+ 	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+ 	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+-	key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT; /* XXX or CKA_VALUE ? */
+-	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
++	key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
++	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_POINT; /* XXX or CKA_VALUE ? */
++	key_attr[3].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		return (NULL);
+@@ -1131,28 +1277,28 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ed25519_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+ 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ 	 */
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ 		error("invalid attribute length");
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++) {
+ 		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ 			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Expect one of the supported identifiers in CKA_EC_PARAMS */
+-	d = (u_char *)key_attr[2].pValue;
+-	len = key_attr[2].ulValueLen;
++	d = (u_char *)key_attr[3].pValue;
++	len = key_attr[3].ulValueLen;
+ 	if ((len != sizeof(id1) || memcmp(d, id1, sizeof(id1)) != 0) &&
+ 	    (len != sizeof(id2) || memcmp(d, id2, sizeof(id2)) != 0)) {
+ 		hex = tohex(d, len);
+@@ -1164,16 +1310,16 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ed25519_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * Expect either a raw 32 byte pubkey or an OCTET STRING with
+ 	 * a 32 byte pubkey in CKA_VALUE
+ 	 */
+-	d = (u_char *)key_attr[1].pValue;
+-	len = key_attr[1].ulValueLen;
++	d = (u_char *)key_attr[2].pValue;
++	len = key_attr[2].ulValueLen;
+ 	if (len == ED25519_PK_SZ + 2 && d[0] == 0x04 && d[1] == ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+ 		d += 2;
+ 		len -= 2;
+ 	}
+ 	if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+-		hex = tohex(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
++		hex = tohex(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
+ 		logit_f("CKA_EC_POINT invalid octet str: %s (len %lu)",
+-		    hex, (u_long)key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
++		    hex, (u_long)key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1193,7 +1339,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ed25519_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		key = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 	free(hex);
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+ 	return key;
+ }
+@@ -1203,7 +1349,8 @@ static int
+ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
+ {
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[3];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[4];
++	int			 nattr = 4;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -1229,14 +1376,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 
+ 	memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
+ 	cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+-	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
+-	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
++	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
++	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
++	cert_attr[3].type = CKA_VALUE;
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+ 	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -1248,18 +1396,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
++	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	    cert_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
+ 		error("invalid attribute length");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+ 			cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+ 
+ 	/* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
+-	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
++	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1273,8 +1422,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
+ 	X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
+ 
+-	cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
+-	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
++	cp = cert_attr[3].pValue;
++	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[3].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("d2i_x509 failed");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -1384,7 +1533,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+  out:
+-	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
++	for (i = 0; i < nattr; i++)
+ 		free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
+ 	X509_free(x509);
+ 	RSA_free(rsa);
+@@ -1427,11 +1576,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, const char *context,
+  */
+ static int
+ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+-    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
++    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
+ {
+ 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+ 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[1];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	int			 nattr = 1;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -1448,10 +1598,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+ 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	if (uri->id != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
++		nattr++;
++	}
++	if (uri->object != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
++		nattr++;
++	}
+ 
+-	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
++
++	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -1533,11 +1696,12 @@ fail:
+  */
+ static int
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+-    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
++    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys, struct pkcs11_uri *uri)
+ {
+ 	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+ 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
+-	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[2];
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
++	int			 nattr = 1;
+ 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+ 	CK_RV			 rv;
+@@ -1553,10 +1717,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+ 	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+ 
+-	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+-	f = p->function_list;
++	if (uri->id != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_ID;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->id;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = uri->id_len;
++		nattr++;
++	}
++	if (uri->object != NULL) {
++		key_attr[nattr].type = CKA_LABEL;
++		key_attr[nattr].pValue = uri->object;
++		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
++		nattr++;
++	}
++
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
+ 
+-	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
++	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
+ 	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -1844,16 +2021,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
+ 
+-/*
+- * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
+- * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
+- */
+ static int
+-pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+-    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
+-    struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
++pkcs11_initialize_provider(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp)
+ {
+-	int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
++	int need_finalize = 0;
+ 	int ret = -1;
+ 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ 	void *handle = NULL;
+@@ -1862,128 +2033,126 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+ 	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
+ 	CK_ULONG i;
++	char *provider_module = NULL;
++	struct pkcs11_module *m = NULL;
++
++	/* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */
++	if (uri->module_path == NULL) {
++#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER
++		provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER);
++#else
++		error_f("No module path provided");
++ 		goto fail;
++#endif
++	} else {
++		provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path);
++	}
++	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
++	p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
+ 
+-	if (providerp == NULL)
+-		goto fail;
+-	*providerp = NULL;
+-
+-	if (keyp != NULL)
+-		*keyp = NULL;
+-	if (labelsp != NULL)
+-		*labelsp = NULL;
+-
+-	if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
+-		debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
++	if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_module, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) {
++		error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_module);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_id, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) {
+-		error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_id);
+-		goto fail;
++	if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL
++	   && m->valid) {
++		debug_f("provider module already initialized: %s", provider_module);
++		free(provider_module);
++		/* Skip the initialization of PKCS#11 module */
++		m->refcount++;
++		p->module = m;
++		p->valid = 1;
++		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
++		p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
++		*providerp = p;
++		return 0;
++	} else {
++		m = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*m));
++		p->module = m;
++		m->refcount++;
+ 	}
++
+ 	/* open shared pkcs11-library */
+-	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+-		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
++	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_module, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
++		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+-	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+-	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
+-	p->handle = handle;
++	p->module->handle = handle;
+ 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
+ 	if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	p->function_list = f;
++	m->function_list = f;
+ 	if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 	need_finalize = 1;
+-	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
++	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&m->info)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.*s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
+-	    " libraryDescription <%.*s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
+-	    provider_id,
+-	    RMSPACE(p->info.manufacturerID),
+-	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
+-	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
+-	    RMSPACE(p->info.libraryDescription),
+-	    p->info.libraryVersion.major,
+-	    p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
+-	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
++	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
++	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
++	    strncmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID, 32)) {
++		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
++		    m->info.manufacturerID);
++ 		goto fail;
++ 	}
++	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
++	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.32s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
++	    " libraryDescription <%.32s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
++	    provider_module,
++	    m->info.manufacturerID,
++	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
++	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
++	    m->info.libraryDescription,
++	    m->info.libraryVersion.major,
++	    m->info.libraryVersion.minor);
++
++	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &m->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if (p->nslots == 0) {
+-		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id);
++	if (m->nslots == 0) {
++		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_module);
+ 		ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
+-	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
++	m->slotlist = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
++	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, m->slotlist, &m->nslots))
+ 	    != CKR_OK) {
+ 		error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
++	m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
+ 	p->valid = 1;
+-	nkeys = 0;
+-	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+-		token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
+-		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
++	m->valid = 1;
++	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
++		token = &m->slotinfo[i].token;
++		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(m->slotlist[i], token))
+ 		    != CKR_OK) {
+ 			error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
+-			    "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv);
+-			continue;
+-		}
+-		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
+-			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
+-			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i);
++			    "failed: %lu", provider_module, (u_long)i, rv);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.*s> "
+ 		    "manufacturerID <%.*s> model <%.*s> serial <%.*s> "
+ 		    "flags 0x%lx",
+-		    provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
++		    provider_module, (unsigned long)i,
+ 		    RMSPACE(token->label), RMSPACE(token->manufacturerID),
+ 		    RMSPACE(token->model), RMSPACE(token->serialNumber),
+ 		    token->flags);
+-		/*
+-		 * open session, login with pin and retrieve public
+-		 * keys (if keyp is provided)
+-		 */
+-		if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
+-		    keyp == NULL)
+-			continue;
+-		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+-		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+-#endif
+-		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
+-		    pkcs11_interactive) {
+-			/*
+-			 * Some tokens require login before they will
+-			 * expose keys.
+-			 */
+-			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
+-			    CKU_USER) < 0) {
+-				error("login failed");
+-				continue;
+-			}
+-			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+-			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+-#endif
+-		}
+ 	}
++	m->module_path = provider_module;
++	provider_module = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* now owned by caller */
+ 	*providerp = p;
+@@ -1991,21 +2160,22 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ 	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+ 	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
+ 
+-	return (nkeys);
++	return 0;
+ fail:
+ 	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+ 		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
+-		    provider_id, rv);
++		    provider_module, rv);
++	free(provider_module);
++	if (m) {
++		free(m->slotlist);
++		free(m);
++	}
+ 	if (p) {
+ 		free(p->name);
+-		free(p->slotlist);
+-		free(p->slotinfo);
+ 		free(p);
+ 	}
+ 	if (handle)
+ 		dlclose(handle);
+-	if (ret > 0)
+-		ret = -1;
+ 	return (ret);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2041,18 +2211,161 @@ pkcs11_terminate(void)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
+- * fails if provider already exists
++ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
++ * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
+  */
++static int
++pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
++    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp,
++    CK_ULONG user)
++{
++	int nkeys;
++	int ret = -1;
++	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
++	CK_ULONG i;
++	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
++	char *provider_uri = NULL;
++
++	if (providerp == NULL)
++		goto fail;
++	*providerp = NULL;
++
++	if (keyp != NULL)
++		*keyp = NULL;
++
++	if ((ret = pkcs11_initialize_provider(uri, &p)) != 0) {
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++	if (pin == NULL && uri->pin != NULL) {
++		pin = uri->pin;
++	}
++	nkeys = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < p->module->nslots; i++) {
++		token = &p->module->slotinfo[i].token;
++		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
++			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_uri, (u_long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		if (uri->token != NULL &&
++		    strncmp(token->label, uri->token, 32) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%.32s) "
++			    "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu",
++			    token->label, (unsigned long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		if (uri->manuf != NULL &&
++		    strncmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf, 32) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
++			    "manufacturerID (%.32s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
++			    "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		if (uri->serial != NULL &&
++		    strncmp(token->serialNumber, uri->serial, 16) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
++			    "serialNumber (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
++			    "slot %lu", token->serialNumber, (unsigned long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.32s> manufacturerID <%.32s> "
++		    "model <%.16s> serial <%.16s> flags 0x%lx",
++		    provider_uri, (unsigned long)i,
++		    token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
++		    token->serialNumber, token->flags);
++		/*
++		 * open session if not yet opened, login with pin and
++		 * retrieve public keys (if keyp is provided)
++		 */
++		if ((p->module->slotinfo[i].session != 0 ||
++		    (ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0) && /* ??? */
++		    keyp == NULL)
++			continue;
++		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->module->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
++		    pkcs11_interactive) {
++			/*
++			 * Some tokens require login before they will
++			 * expose keys.
++			 */
++			debug3_f("Trying to login as there were no keys found");
++			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->module->slotinfo[i],
++			    CKU_USER) < 0) {
++				error("login failed");
++				continue;
++			}
++			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++		}
++		if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) {
++			debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%.32s) ",
++			    uri->object);
++			/* Try once more without the label filter */
++			char *label = uri->object;
++			uri->object = NULL; /* XXX clone uri? */
++			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
++			uri->object = label;
++		}
++	}
++	pin = NULL; /* Will be cleaned up with URI */
++
++	/* now owned by caller */
++	*providerp = p;
++
++	free(provider_uri);
++	return (nkeys);
++ fail:
++	if (p) {
++		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
++	     	pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
++	}
++	if (ret > 0)
++		ret = -1;
++	return (ret);
++}
++
++static int
++pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
++    char ***labelsp, struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
++{
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	debug_f("called, provider_id = %s", provider_id);
++
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++	} else {
++		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
++	}
++
++	r = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, providerp, user);
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
++
++	return r;
++}
++
+ int
+-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+-    char ***labelsp)
++pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *uri, char *pin,
++    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+ 	int nkeys;
++	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++
++	debug_f("called, provider_uri = %s", provider_uri);
+ 
+-	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
+-	    &p, CKU_USER);
++	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp, &p, CKU_USER);
+ 
+ 	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
+ 	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
+@@ -2061,11 +2374,38 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+ 		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+ 	}
+ 	if (nkeys == 0)
+-		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id);
++		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_uri);
+ 
++	free(provider_uri);
+ 	return (nkeys);
+ }
+ 
++int
++pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
++    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp)
++{
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++	int nkeys;
++
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (strlen(provider_id) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++	    strncmp(provider_id, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME, strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider_id, uri) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++	} else {
++		uri->module_path = strdup(provider_id);
++	}
++
++	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, pin, keyp, labelsp);
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
++
++ 	return (nkeys);
++}
++
++
+ int
+ pkcs11_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+     u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h
+index d86c506c1..32f2d0ccf 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.h
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h
+@@ -22,12 +22,16 @@
+ #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		4
+ #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED		5
+ 
++#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
++
+ struct sshkey;
+ 
+ int	pkcs11_init(int);
+ void	pkcs11_terminate(void);
+ int	pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
++int	pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(struct pkcs11_uri *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
+ int	pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
++int	pkcs11_uri_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
+ int	pkcs11_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ 	    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
+ 	    const char *, u_int);
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 320ac6834..14965a4f1 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -904,6 +904,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'i':
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++			if (strlen(optarg) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++			    strncmp(optarg, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
++			    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++				add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1);
++				break;
++			}
++#endif
+ 			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
+ 			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
+ 				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
+@@ -1872,6 +1880,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
+ #endif
++	pkcs11_terminate();
+ 
+  skip_connect:
+ 	if (addrs != NULL)
+@@ -2387,6 +2396,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++static void
++load_pkcs11_identity(char *pkcs11_uri, char *identity_files[],
++    struct sshkey *identity_keys[], int *n_ids)
++{
++	int nkeys, i;
++	struct sshkey **keys;
++	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++
++	debug("identity file '%s' from pkcs#11", pkcs11_uri);
++	uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++	if (uri == NULL)
++		fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++	if (pkcs11_uri_parse(pkcs11_uri, uri) != 0)
++	fatal("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI %s", pkcs11_uri);
++
++	/* we need to merge URI and provider together */
++	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && uri->module_path == NULL)
++		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
++
++	if (options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
++	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider_by_uri(uri, NULL, &keys, NULL)) > 0) {
++		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
++			if (*n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
++				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
++				continue;
++			}
++			identity_keys[*n_ids] = keys[i];
++			identity_files[*n_ids] = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++			(*n_ids)++;
++		}
++		free(keys);
++	}
++
++	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
++}
++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
++
+ /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
+ static void
+ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+@@ -2401,11 +2449,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+ 	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+ 	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+-	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+-	char **comments = NULL;
+-	int nkeys;
+-#endif /* PKCS11 */
+ 
+ 	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
+ 	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
+@@ -2418,33 +2461,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+-	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
+-	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+-	    (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
+-	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
+-	    &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
+-		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+-			if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
+-				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+-				free(comments[i]);
+-				continue;
+-			}
+-			identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
+-			identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
+-			n_ids++;
+-		}
+-		free(keys);
+-		free(comments);
++	/* handle fallback from PKCS11Provider option */
++	pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode);
++
++	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL) {
++		struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
++
++		uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
++		if (uri == NULL)
++			fatal("Failed to init PKCS#11 URI");
++
++		/* Construct simple PKCS#11 URI to simplify access */
++		uri->module_path = strdup(options.pkcs11_provider);
++
++		/* Add it as any other IdentityFile */
++		cp = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++		add_identity_file(&options, NULL, cp, 1);
++		free(cp);
++
++		pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 	}
+ #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
++		char *name = options.identity_files[i];
+ 		if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
+-		    strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
++		    strcasecmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ 			free(options.identity_files[i]);
+ 			options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+-		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++		if (strlen(name) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
++		    strncmp(name, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
++		    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
++			load_pkcs11_identity(name, identity_files,
++			    identity_keys, &n_ids);
++			free(options.identity_files[i]);
++			continue;
++		}
++#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
++		cp = tilde_expand_filename(name, getuid());
+ 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ 		free(cp);
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index a06fbfa11..717b0938a 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1260,6 +1260,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
+ .Cm CertificateFile
+ in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
+ the identity.
++.Pp
++The authentication identity can be also specified in a form of PKCS#11 URI
++starting with a string
++.Cm pkcs11: .
++There is supported a subset of the PKCS#11 URI as defined
++in RFC 7512 (implemented path arguments
++.Cm id ,
++.Cm manufacturer ,
++.Cm object ,
++.Cm token
++and query arguments
++.Cm module-path
++and
++.Cm pin-value
++). The URI can not be in quotes.
+ .It Cm IgnoreUnknown
+ Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
+ encountered in configuration parsing.
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/1000-openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/1000-openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40c298e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1000-openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+From aecc5861e1cf7094a32f893ae4bfd8409b77e5cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 14:25:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 53/53] openssh-6.7p1-coverity
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c                   | 2 ++
+ gss-genr.c                    | 3 ++-
+ krl.c                         | 3 +++
+ loginrec.c                    | 2 ++
+ misc.c                        | 3 +++
+ monitor.c                     | 4 ++--
+ openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c  | 8 ++++----
+ readconf.c                    | 1 +
+ servconf.c                    | 5 +++--
+ serverloop.c                  | 2 +-
+ 11 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index b9c261a24..a37be93c3 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -434,6 +435,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index f2d6f59e5..91602e045 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
++++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -178,8 +178,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index bea5b1b98..4dd8a24a9 100644
+--- a/krl.c
++++ b/krl.c
+@@ -1205,6 +1205,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1215,6 +1216,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1226,6 +1228,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
+index 7d1c9dd43..a017e173b 100644
+--- a/loginrec.c
++++ b/loginrec.c
+@@ -677,9 +677,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 2fd14159d..d4c4e4164 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -1573,6 +1573,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2773,6 +2775,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 2f154a3d7..f959e0124 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	/* Wait for the child's exit status */
+@@ -1819,7 +1819,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+index 346c7fe56..f42792fde 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+index 26bdc3e08..8e2939b95 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index b6ad47b49..75e1c953c 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -2170,6 +2170,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 956205f6d..1093dcbac 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2307,8 +2307,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 55411a6b4..acc721cd1 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+-- 
+2.52.0
+
diff --git a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 554e346..0000000
--- a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
---- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
-	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
- 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
- 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
-+ 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-+
-	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
-	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
-		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
- 
diff --git a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch b/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a7d849..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
- 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
--			addargs(&alist, "-n");
-+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
-+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
-+			else
-+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
- 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
- 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bb55c0b..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
---- a/scp.c	
-+++ a/scp.c	
-@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- 			free(vect[0]);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
-+			errno = ENOTDIR;
-+			goto bad;
-+		}
- 		omode = mode;
- 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
--- 
diff --git a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fa9d591..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
- void
- sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- {
--	security_context_t *ctx;
-+	char *ctx;
- 
- 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
-@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
-+	const char *contexts_path;
-+	FILE *contexts_file;
-+	struct stat sb;
-+
-+	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
-+	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
-+	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else");
-+		fclose(contexts_file);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
-+		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
-+		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
-+			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
-+				break;
-+			line[len] = '\0';
-+		}
-+
-+		if (line[0] == '\0')
-+			continue;
-+
-+		cp = line;
-+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+
-+		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
-+				fclose(contexts_file);
-+				return;
-+			}
-+			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	fclose(contexts_file);
-+
-+	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
-+	free(preauth_context);
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
--	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
- 	    oldctx, newctx);
- 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
-		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Demote the child */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8047fc3..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3_f("done");
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
-+		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
- 
--	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
- 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
-@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
-			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
-			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
-			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (in_chroot == 0)
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		fprintf(stderr,
- 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		setexeccon(NULL);
--#endif
- #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
- 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
- 		    (char *)NULL);
-@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
--#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
-@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Demote the child */
- 	if (privsep_chroot) {
- 		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
- #endif
diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1dca99c..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
- 		umask(old_umask);
- 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
- 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 
-@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- 			close(tmpfd);
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
- 		return r;
- 	}
- 	/* success */
-+	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
-@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
- 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
--
-+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
- 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+#pragma pop
- 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
- 	sshkey_free(key);
- 	sshbuf_free(copy);
- 	sshbuf_free(sect);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
-@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
- 	 */
- 
- 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
- # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
- # endif
-@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 
- 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
- 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
- 
-@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
- 
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
- 
- 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
-@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
- 	}
- 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(nullfd);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- }
- 
- char *
-@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
- 	}
- 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(devnull);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
-@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
- 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- 
- 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
--
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
- 	return (0);
- 
-  error:
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
-@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
- static void
- pselect_notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2_f("reading");
- 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
-@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
- 			} else if (r != 0) {
- 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
- 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
-+				free(arg2);
- 				goto out;
- 			}
- 			free(arg2);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
-@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
-@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		debug_f("invalid tun");
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- 	pid = sshpid;
- 	if (pid > 1) {
- 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
- 
- 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
- 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 			return NULL;
- 		}
- 		/* validate also provider from URI */
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
- 		close(muxserver_sock);
- 		muxserver_sock = -1;
- 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
-+		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
- 		muxclient(options.control_path);
- 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
- 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
-@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
--		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (newstr)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
--	else
-+	else {
- 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+		free(gss);
-+	     }
-+	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
- 	}
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
-@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
- 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
- 			if (r != 0)
- 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
-+			freezero(blob, blen);
-+			blob = NULL;
-+			blen = 0;
- 		} else {
- 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
- 				cp += 4;
diff --git a/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch b/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 156e66d..0000000
--- a/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
---- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
-+++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
-@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
--	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
- 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
diff --git a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch b/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1242aac..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- AC_SUBST([CHANNELLIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 90640a0..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
-and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
-implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
-crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
-this is only need on s390 architecture.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
- #endif
-@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
--- 
-1.9.1
-
-getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
-crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
-Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
--- 1.9.1
-1.9.1
-diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
-@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_gettid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-
diff --git a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a94419e..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
-@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, &includes, NULL, rexeced_flag);
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
-+
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
-+# problems.
- #UsePAM no
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3117a7a..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol	2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
-@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
- 		lnum++;
- 		cp = line;
--		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
-+		cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
- 		/* Trim leading space and comments */
- 		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
- 		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d76a4f..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
-
-    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 		HMAC_CTX_init \
- 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
- 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
- 	])
- 
- 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+static const EVP_MD *
-+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-+{
-+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *key = NULL;
-+	int r, key_len;
-+
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
-+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
-+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
-+#endif
-+	*keyp = key;
-+	key = NULL;
-+	r = 0;
-+
-+out:
-+	free (key);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else
- static int
- derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- 	return r;
- }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
- 
- #define NKEYS	6
- int
-
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 88914bf..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c.orig	2022-04-12 15:47:03.815044607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c	2022-04-12 15:48:12.464963511 +0200
-@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
--#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
-+#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ed59a3..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index 7f26c680..42be690b 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
- 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
-	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
-+	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
- 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
- 
- 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 29df0463..423772b1 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -676,6 +680,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
- 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7fea800..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.338710923 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.357711165 +0100
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ void
- compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
- {
- 	int i;
-+	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
- 	static struct {
- 		char	*pat;
- 		int	bugs;
-@@ -145,16 +146,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 	};
- 
- 	/* process table, return first match */
-+	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
- 	ssh->compat = 0;
- 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
- 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
- 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
- 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
- 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
- 			return;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
- }
- 
- /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
-@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
- #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
--/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
-+#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
- #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
- /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
- #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.279676981 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2023-01-20 15:01:07.007821379 +0100
-@@ -660,11 +660,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
- 	struct sshkey *key;
- 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
--	char *alg = NULL;
-+	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
- 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
- 	int r, is_proof = 0;
- 	u_int keyid, compat;
- 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
-+	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
- 
- 	debug3_f("entering");
- 
-@@ -719,18 +720,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
--		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
-+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
-+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
-+		} else {
-+			effective_alg = alg;
-+		}
-+		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
- 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
- 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
- 	    auth_sock > 0) {
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
-+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
-+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
-+		} else {
-+			effective_alg = alg;
-+		}
- 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
--		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
-+		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
- 	} else
- 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
- 
--	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
-+	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
- 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
- 
- 	sshbuf_reset(m);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh	2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
-@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
- cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
- 
--PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
-+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
-+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
- EXTRA_TYPES=""
- rsa=""
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
-@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
- 
- tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
- 
--REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
-+#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
-+REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
- 
- # File based tests
- file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
-@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
- 	fi
- }
- 
--SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
--SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
-+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
-+SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
-+SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
- 
- for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
- 	# generate user key
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
-@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype,
- 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
- 	if (kex != NULL)
- 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
--	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
-+	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
-+		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
- 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
-@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ do_kex(char *kex)
- {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
--	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
-+	/* do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); */
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
-@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
- 	sshkey_free(k2);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
-@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
- 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
- 	sshkey_free(k2);
--	TEST_DONE();
-+	TEST_DONE(); */
- 
- 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:10:37.533168013 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c	2023-01-26 12:15:35.637631860 +0100
-@@ -333,13 +333,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
- 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
--	TEST_DONE();
-+	TEST_DONE();*/
- 
- 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
- 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
-@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
- 	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
-@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
- 	TEST_DONE();
-+	*/
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
-@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
- 	u_char *sigblob;
- 	size_t siglen;
- 
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
-+
- 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
-@@ -101,8 +104,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
--	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
--	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
-+	if (expected == 0)
-+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
- 
- 	free(sigblob);
- 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
-@@ -119,16 +123,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct
- {
- 	size_t len;
- 	u_char *sig;
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
-+	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
-+		expected = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
--	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
--	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
--	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
--	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
--	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
--	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
--	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
--	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
-+	if (expected == 0) {
-+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
-+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
-+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
-+		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
-+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+	}
- 	free(sig);
- }
- 
-@@ -514,7 +524,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
- 	    NULL), 0);
- 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
--	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
-+	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
- 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
- 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:19:23.659513651 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c	2023-01-26 12:20:28.021044803 +0100
-@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ tests(void)
- 	check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("check DSA signature");
- 	check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
- 	TEST_DONE();
-+	*/
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "serverloop.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "compat.h"
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
-@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
- 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
- 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
- 		}
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
-+			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
-+		}
- 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
- 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-01-25 15:59:34.225364883 +0100
-@@ -1461,6 +1464,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_cha
- 			retried = 1;
- 			goto retry_pin;
- 		}
-+		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
-+			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
-+
-+			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
-+			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
-+				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
-+		}
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.355711140 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
-@@ -1640,6 +1651,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	Authctxt *authctxt;
- 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
- 	sigset_t sigmask;
-+	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
-@@ -1938,6 +1950,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		    key = NULL;
- 		    continue;
- 		}
-+		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA_CERT)) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			verbose_f("sshd: SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
-+		    	forbid_ssh_rsa = 1;
-+		    }
-+		}
-+		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			logit_f("sshd: ssh-dss is disabled, skipping key file %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
-+			key = NULL;
-+			continue;
-+		    }
-+		}
- 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
- 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
- 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
-@@ -2275,6 +2306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	check_ip_options(ssh);
- 
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
-+
- 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
- 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
- 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
-@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
--		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
-+		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
-+			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
- 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f0d9b0f..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2022-02-07 12:31:07.407740407 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.409740424 +0100
-@@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
- 
- 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
- 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
--		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
-+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
-			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
-			errs = 1;
-		}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c	2022-02-07 12:47:59.117516131 +0100
-@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 
- /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
- static char *
--do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
-+do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *msg;
- 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -1033,11 +1033,43 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
--		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
--		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
--		free(errmsg);
--		sshbuf_free(msg);
--		return NULL;
-+		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
-+			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
-+			if ((r = do_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
-+				sshbuf_free(msg);
-+				return NULL;
-+			}
-+			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
-+			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
-+					path, strlen(path));
-+
-+			get_msg(conn, msg);
-+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
-+				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
-+
-+			if (id != expected_id)
-+				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
-+
-+			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
-+				free(errmsg);
-+
-+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
-+					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
-+				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
-+				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
-+				free(errmsg);
-+				sshbuf_free(msg);
-+				return NULL;
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
-+			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
-+			free(errmsg);
-+			sshbuf_free(msg);
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
- 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
- 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
-@@ -1039,9 +1067,9 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
- }
- 
- char *
--do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
-+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
- {
--	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
-+	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
- }
- 
- int
-@@ -1055,9 +1083,9 @@ do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, c
- {
- 	if (!can_expand_path(conn)) {
- 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
--		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
-+		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
- 	}
--	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
-+	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
- }
- 
- int
-@@ -1807,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
- 	char *src_canon;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
-		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
-		return -1;
-	}
-@@ -2115,12 +2143,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- int
- upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
--    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
- {
- 	char *dst_canon;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
-		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
-		return -1;
-	}
-@@ -2557,7 +2585,7 @@ crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, st
- 	char *from_path_canon;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
-		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
-		    from_path);
-		return -1;
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h	2022-02-07 12:31:07.410740433 +0100
-@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, cons
- int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
- 
- /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
--char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
- char *do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
- int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
--    int, int, int, int, int, int);
-+    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.411740442 +0100
-@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
-@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn
- 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
- 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
- 		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
--		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
-+		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
- 			err = 1;
- 			break;
- 		}
-@@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn,
- 	}
- #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
- 
--	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
-+	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".", 0);
- 	if (remote_path == NULL)
- 		fatal("Need cwd");
- 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c7f6f1e..0000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
---- a/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:47:51.307295880 +0200
-+++ b/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:50:28.793363263 +0200
-@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@
- .It AddressFamily
- .It BatchMode
- .It BindAddress
-+.It BindInterface
- .It CanonicalDomains
- .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- .It CanonicalizeHostname
-@@ -510,6 +511,7 @@
- .It ControlPath
- .It ControlPersist
- .It DynamicForward
-+.It EnableSSHKeysign
- .It EnableEscapeCommandline
- .It EscapeChar
- .It ExitOnForwardFailure
-@@ -538,6 +540,8 @@
- .It IdentitiesOnly
- .It IdentityAgent
- .It IdentityFile
-+.It IgnoreUnknown
-+.It Include
- .It IPQoS
- .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
- .It KbdInteractiveDevices
-@@ -546,6 +550,7 @@
- .It LocalCommand
- .It LocalForward
- .It LogLevel
-+.It LogVerbose
- .It MACs
- .It Match
- .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -566,6 +571,8 @@
- .It RemoteCommand
- .It RemoteForward
- .It RequestTTY
-+.It RevokedHostKeys
-+.It SecurityKeyProvider
- .It RequiredRSASize
- .It SendEnv
- .It ServerAliveInterval
-@@ -575,6 +582,7 @@
- .It StreamLocalBindMask
- .It StreamLocalBindUnlink
- .It StrictHostKeyChecking
-+.It SyslogFacility
- .It TCPKeepAlive
- .It Tunnel
- .It TunnelDevice
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fbf5094..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2022-10-24 14:51:43.685766639 +0200
-@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- }
- 
- int
--audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.c
---- openssh-9.0p1/audit.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1/audit.c	2022-10-24 15:20:38.854548226 +0200
-@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- void
- audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
- {
--	char *fp;
-+	char *key_fp = NULL;
-+	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
-+	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
- 
--	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
-+	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
-+		cert = key->cert;
-+		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
-+										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
-+	}
-+	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
- 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	free(fp);
-+	if (key_fp)
-+		free(key_fp);
-+	if (issuer_fp)
-+		free(issuer_fp);
- }
- 
- void
-diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.h
---- openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1/audit.h	2022-10-24 14:58:20.887565518 +0200
-@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininf
- int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
--int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
-+int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
- void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
- void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
- void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
-diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c	2022-10-24 15:21:58.165303951 +0200
-@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
- }
- 
- int
--audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
- {
- 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+	const char *rip;
-+	u_int i;
- 
- 	audit_fd = audit_open();
- 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host
- 		else
- 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
-+	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
- 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
--		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
- 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
- 		goto out;
--	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
- 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
--		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+		rip, NULL, rv);
-+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	if (cert) {
-+		char *pbuf;
-+
-+		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
-+		if (pbuf == NULL)
-+			goto out;
-+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
-+			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
-+		free(pbuf);
-+		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
-+		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+			goto out;
-+
-+		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
-+			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
-+			if (pbuf == NULL)
-+				goto out;
-+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
-+			free(pbuf);
-+			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
-+			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
- out:
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d0470d9..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/dh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c
---- openssh-9.0p1/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.730868316 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
- int
- dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
- {
--	int pbits;
--	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
-+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	int pbits, r = 0;
- 
--	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
- 
- 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
- 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
-@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 	if (need < 256)
- 		need = 256;
-+
-+	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	/*
- 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
- 	 * so double requested need here.
- 	 */
--	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
--		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--
--	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
--	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--	return 0;
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
-+		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed key generation");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* reuse context for key generation */
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not create or init context");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate keys");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
-+	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
-+	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* transferred */
-+	pub_key = NULL;
-+	priv_key = NULL;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
-+	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
-+	return r;
- }
- 
- DH *
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c
---- openssh-9.0p1/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.731868327 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
-@@ -1623,3 +1623,47 @@
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+/* 
-+ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
-+ * The private key can be omitted.
-+ */
-+int
-+kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
-+    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int r = 0;
-+
-+	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (priv != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return r;
-+}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c
---- openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.674867692 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:25:28.494533889 +0200
-@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
-@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
- kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
- {
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- 	size_t klen = 0;
--	int kout, r;
-+	int kout, r = 0;
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
-@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
- 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
-+
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
-+	/* import key */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* import peer key 
-+	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
-+	 */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not get key size");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
--	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
-+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not derive key");
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
--	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
- 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
-  out:
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.h openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h
---- openssh-9.0p1/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:24:28.725868260 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
-@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
- # include <openssl/bn.h>
- # include <openssl/dh.h>
- # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-+# include <openssl/evp.h>
-+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #  include <openssl/ec.h>
- # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-@@ -283,6 +286,8 @@
-     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-+int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
-+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
- 
- #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
- void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0313c6f..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
---- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
-@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
- #include <signal.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- 
- static int
- kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
-     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
- 
-+static EC_KEY *
-+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
-+{
-+	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	const char *group_name;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+out:
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	return client_key;
-+}
-+
- int
- kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- {
-@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
--	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto out;
--	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
- 	*server_blobp = NULL;
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
--	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto out;
--	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
--	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
--	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
--	size_t klen = 0;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
-+	size_t klen = 0, publen;
-+	const char *group_name;
- 	int r;
- 
-+	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
-+	if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
- 	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-+
-+	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
-+	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	sshbuf_reset(buf);
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
--	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
- #endif
--	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
--	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
--	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
--	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
-+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	*shared_secretp = buf;
- 	buf = NULL;
-  out:
--	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
-+	freezero(pub, publen);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
- }
diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 95d86c3..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1236 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/digest.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest.h
---- openssh-9.3p1/digest.h	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest.h	2023-06-06 15:52:25.602551466 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
- 
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/digest-openssl.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest-openssl.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/digest-openssl.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest-openssl.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.601551454 +0200
-@@ -64,6 +64,22 @@
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-+const EVP_MD *
-+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static const struct ssh_digest *
- ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
- {
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-dss.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-dss.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-dss.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-dss.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.624551743 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dsa.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -261,11 +263,15 @@
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
--	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-+	size_t rlen, slen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const u_char *psig = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -276,17 +282,23 @@
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
-+    		return ret;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
-+	    data, datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	free(sigb);
-+	sigb = NULL;
- 
- 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
- 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -319,7 +331,7 @@
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -331,20 +343,20 @@
-     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
-     struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *dsig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
--	size_t len, hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
-+	size_t len, slen;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (hlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -386,25 +398,28 @@
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	/* sha1 the data */
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(dsig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
--
--	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, dsig, key->dsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(dsig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen,
-+	    sigb, slen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(dsig);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-@@ -415,6 +430,65 @@
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+int
-+ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub = NULL, *priv = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+
-+  	if (k == NULL)
-+  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	  	goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
-+  	DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub, &priv);
-+
-+  	if (p != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (q != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (g != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (pub != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+	        pub) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (priv != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
-+	        priv) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+
- static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_dss_funcs = {
- 	/* .size = */		ssh_dss_size,
- 	/* .alloc = */		ssh_dss_alloc,
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
- #include <openssl/ec.h>
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include <string.h>
- 
-@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@
- #include "digest.h"
- #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- #include "sshkey.h"
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
-@@ -126,19 +128,29 @@
- static int
- ssh_ecdsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
- {
--	EC_KEY *private;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
--	if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
--		EC_KEY_free(private);
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(k->ecdsa_nid)) <= 0
-+	   || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+		EVP_PKEY_free(res);
- 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 	}
--	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
--	k->ecdsa = private;
--	return 0;
-+	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
-+	k->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res);
-+	if (k->ecdsa)
-+		EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(k->ecdsa, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
-+
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
-+ 	return (k->ecdsa) ? 0 : SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -228,11 +240,13 @@
-     const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
-     const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const unsigned char *psig;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- 	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t len, hlen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -245,18 +259,33 @@
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+	if (is_ecdsa_pkcs11(key->ecdsa)) {
-+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+		    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	} else {
-+#endif
-+		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
-+			return ret;
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    dlen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((esig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, hlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&esig, &psig, len) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--
- 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -280,7 +309,7 @@
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
-@@ -293,22 +322,21 @@
-     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
-     struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t hlen;
-+	int hash_alg, len;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -344,28 +372,33 @@
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
--
--	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, esig, key->ecdsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+  	if (ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, dlen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
-@@ -375,6 +408,79 @@
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+int
-+ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-+  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL; 
-+  	const char *group_name;
-+  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (k == NULL)
-+    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
-+     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
-+                group_name,
-+                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+	}
-+  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
-+    		const EC_GROUP *group;
-+    		size_t len;
-+
-+		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
-+		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
-+		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
-+		    pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len,
-+		    bn_ctx);
-+		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len) != 1) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-+  	free(pub_ser);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* NB. not static; used by ECDSA-SK */
- const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs = {
- 	/* .size = */		ssh_ecdsa_size,
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.c	2023-06-06 15:53:36.608444190 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.625551756 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -575,6 +577,86 @@
- }
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen;
-+	size_t len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-@@ -3763,3 +3845,27 @@
- 	return 0;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_XMSS */
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+EVP_PKEY *
-+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
-+  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
-+  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.h
---- openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.h	2023-06-06 15:53:36.608444190 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.h	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
-@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
- #include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #  include <openssl/ec.h>
- #  include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-@@ -268,6 +271,10 @@
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-@@ -324,6 +331,13 @@
- 
- void	 sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+EVP_PKEY  *sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *);
-+int   ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
-+int   ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
-+int   ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *, int, EVP_PKEY **);
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+
- #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- int	sshkey_sk_fields_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b);
- void	sshkey_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k);
-@@ -338,6 +352,10 @@
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+int pkcs11_get_ecdsa_idx(void);
-+#endif
-+
- #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- # undef RSA
- # undef DSA
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-06-06 15:53:36.592443989 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
-@@ -777,8 +777,24 @@
- 
- 	return (0);
- }
-+
-+int
-+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
-+{
-+	if (EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx) != NULL)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
- 
-+int
-+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
-+{
-+	if (RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx) != NULL)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* remove trailing spaces. Note, that this does NOT guarantee the buffer
-  * will be null terminated if there are no trailing spaces! */
- static void
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-06-06 15:53:36.591443976 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
-@@ -225,8 +225,36 @@
- static RSA_METHOD	*helper_rsa;
- #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
- static EC_KEY_METHOD	*helper_ecdsa;
-+
-+int
-+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
-+{
-+	const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
-+	ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
-+		const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey) = NULL;
-+
-+	meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ecdsa);
-+	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(meth, NULL, NULL, &sign_sig);
-+	if (sign_sig == ecdsa_do_sign)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
- 
-+int
-+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
-+{
-+	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
-+	int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+        	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) = NULL;
-+
-+	meth = RSA_get_method(rsa);
-+	priv_enc = RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(meth);
-+	if (priv_enc == rsa_encrypt)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
- static void
- wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-06-06 15:53:36.592443989 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
- 	    u_int32_t *);
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
-+int is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa);
-+#endif
-+int is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa);
-+
- #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
- #undef ENABLE_PKCS11
- #endif
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.627551781 +0200
-@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -36,10 +36,13 @@
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "log.h"
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-+#endif
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
--static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
-+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
- 
- static u_int
- ssh_rsa_size(const struct sshkey *key)
-@@ -131,27 +133,50 @@
- static int
- ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
- {
--	RSA *private = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
- 	    bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
--	if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL
-+		|| (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
--	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
-+	k->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res);
-+	if (k->rsa) {
-+		ret = 0;
-+	} else {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	k->rsa = private;
--	private = NULL;
--	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	RSA_free(private);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
- 	BN_free(f4);
- 	return ret;
- }
-@@ -317,21 +342,6 @@
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
--static int
--rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
--{
--	switch (type) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		return NID_sha1;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		return NID_sha256;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		return NID_sha512;
--	default:
--		return -1;
--	}
--}
--
- int
- ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
- {
-@@ -393,11 +403,10 @@
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
--	size_t slen = 0;
--	u_int hlen, len;
--	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int len, slen = 0;
-+	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -409,33 +418,33 @@
- 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- 	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg);
-+
- 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
--		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
--	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--
--	/* hash the data */
--	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
--	if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto out;
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+	if (is_rsa_pkcs11(key->rsa)) {
-+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+		    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	} else {
-+#endif
-+		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
-+			return ret;
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- 	}
--
--	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, hlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+#endif
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	if (len < slen) {
- 		size_t diff = slen - len;
- 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -444,6 +453,7 @@
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* encode signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -464,7 +474,6 @@
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- 	freezero(sig, slen);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -476,10 +485,10 @@
-     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
-     struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	char *sigtype = NULL;
- 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, hlen;
-+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
- 
-@@ -487,8 +496,7 @@
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -540,16 +548,13 @@
- 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
--	if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--		goto out;
--	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, hlen, sigblob, len,
--	    key->rsa);
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, dlen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
- 	freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -558,125 +563,110 @@
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * See:
-- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
-- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
-- */
--
--/*
-- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
--	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
--	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
--	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
--	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(1) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
--	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(3) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
--	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
--};
--
- static int
--rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
-+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
--	switch (hash_alg) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		*oidp = id_sha1;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		*oidp = id_sha256;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		*oidp = id_sha512;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
--		break;
--	default:
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	}
--	return 0;
--}
-+	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	int ret;
- 
--static int
--openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
--    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
--{
--	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
--	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
--	const u_char *oid = NULL;
--	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
--
--	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
--		return ret;
--	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
--	if (hashlen != hlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
-+	rsasize = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
--	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
--	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
--	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
-+	    sigbuf, siglen);
-+
- done:
--	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+int
-+ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+  	const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
-+
-+  	if (k == NULL)
-+  	  	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	  	goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
-+  	RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, &q);
-+  	RSA_get0_crt_params(k->rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
-+
-+  	if (n != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n) != 1) {
-+  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (e != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (d != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	/* setting this to param_build makes the creation process fail */
-+  	if (p != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, p) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'p' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (q != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, q) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'q' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (dmp1 != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
-+  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, dmp1) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmp1' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (dmq1 != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
-+  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, dmq1) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmq1' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (iqmp != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
-+  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, iqmp) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'iqmp' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+
- static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_rsa_funcs = {
- 	/* .size = */		ssh_rsa_size,
- 	/* .alloc = */		ssh_rsa_alloc,
diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cf512ef..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
---- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
-@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
- 
- /*
-  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
-- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
-- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
-- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
-- * within a patch series.
-+ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
-+ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
-+ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
-+ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
-  */
- 
- int
-@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
- 	if (headerver == libver)
- 		return 1;
- 
--	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
--	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
--		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
-+	/*
-+	 * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
-+	 */
-+	if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
-+		mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
- 		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
--	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
--	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
-+	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
-+	 * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
- 	 */
- 	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
- 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e9ac2ae..0000000
--- a/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index 618bb198..8ea831f4 100644
-diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve	2023-07-21 15:38:13.237276580 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2023-07-21 15:41:30.269943569 +0200
-@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
- /* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
- static char *allowed_providers;
- 
-+/*
-+ * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to
-+ * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-bind@openssh.com).
-+ */
-+static int remote_add_provider;
-+
- /* locking */
- #define LOCK_SIZE	32
- #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
-@@ -1228,6 +1234,12 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
- 		if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
- 			debug_f("internal provider");
- 		} else {
-+			if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
-+				verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": "
-+				    "remote addition of providers is disabled",
-+				    sk_provider);
-+				goto out;
-+			}
- 			if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
- 				verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
- 				    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
-@@ -1368,7 +1380,7 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- static char *
--sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
-+sanitize_pkcs11_provider(SocketEntry *e, const char *provider)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
- 	char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */
-@@ -1399,6 +1411,11 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
- 		module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */
- 
- 	if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */
-+		if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
-+			verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of "
-+			    "providers is disabled", provider);
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
- 			verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
- 			    module_path, strerror(errno));
-@@ -1455,7 +1472,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
- 		goto send;
- 	}
- 
--	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
-+	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
- 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
- 		goto send;
- 
-@@ -1516,7 +1533,7 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
- 	}
- 	free(pin);
- 
--	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
-+	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
- 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
- 		goto send;
- 
-@@ -2108,7 +2125,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			break;
- 		case 'O':
- 			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
--				restrict_websafe  = 0;
-+				restrict_websafe = 0;
-+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0)
-+				remote_add_provider = 1;
- 			else
- 				fatal("Unknown -O option");
- 			break;
-diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
---- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
-+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
- 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
--		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
--		goto fail;
--	}
-+	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
-+		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 
- 	p->module->handle = handle;
- 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
---- a/ssh-agent.1	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/ssh-agent.1	2023-07-19 21:39:17.981406432 +0200
-@@ -107,9 +107,27 @@
- .It Fl O Ar option
- Specify an option when starting
- .Nm .
--Currently only one option is supported:
-+Currently two options are supported:
-+.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
-+and
- .Cm no-restrict-websafe .
--This instructs
-+.Pp
-+The
-+.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
-+option allows clients of a forwarded
-+.Nm
-+to load PKCS#11 or FIDO provider libraries.
-+By default only local clients may perform this operation.
-+Note that signalling that a
-+.Nm
-+client remote is performed by
-+.Xr ssh 1 ,
-+and use of other tools to forward access to the agent socket may circumvent
-+this restriction.
-+.Pp
-+The
-+.Cm no-restrict-websafe ,
-+instructs
- .Nm
- to permit signatures using FIDO keys that might be web authentication
- requests.
diff --git a/openssh.rpmlintrc b/openssh.rpmlintrc
index 2404235..7031b2b 100644
--- a/openssh.rpmlintrc
+++ b/openssh.rpmlintrc
@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
 addFilter(r'openssh-askpass.x86_64: W: non-conffile-in-etc /etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.c?sh')
 
 # The ssh-keysign is not supposed to have standard permissions
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 2555')
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: setgid-binary /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys 2555')
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: W: non-standard-gid /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 4555')
 
 # The -cavs subpackage is internal without documentation
 # The -askpass is not intended to be used directly so it is missing documentation
diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec
index 3076ac0..ff38f4b 100644
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@
 # Do we want libedit support
 %global libedit 1
 
-# Whether to build pam_ssh_agent_auth
-%if 0%{?!nopam:1}
-%global pam_ssh_agent 1
-%else
-%global pam_ssh_agent 0
-%endif
-
 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
 # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
 %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1}
@@ -45,24 +38,17 @@
 # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
 
-# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
-%global openssh_ver 9.3p1
-%global openssh_rel 13
-%global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
-%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 9
+%global openssh_ver 10.2p1
 
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.1
+Release: 1%{?dist}
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
-#URL1: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source2: sshd.pam
 Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
-Source4: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.gz
-Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
 Source6: ssh-keycat.pam
 Source7: sshd.sysconfig
 Source9: sshd@.service
@@ -76,164 +62,123 @@ Source17: ssh-agent.socket
 Source19: openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
 Source20: ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
 Source21: ssh-host-keys-migration.service
-
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
-Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
-
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
-# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
-Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
-# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
-Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
-Patch202: openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
-
-# --- pam_ssh-agent ---
-# make it build reusing the openssh sources
-Patch300: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
-# check return value of seteuid()
-# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/23/
-Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
-# explicitly make pam callbacks visible
-Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
-# update to current version of agent structure
-Patch305: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
-# remove prefixes to be able to build against current openssh library
-Patch306: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
-# Fix NULL dereference from getpwuid() return value
-# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/22/
-Patch307: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2070113
-Patch308: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch
-Patch309: pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch
+Source22: parallel_test.sh
+Source23: parallel_test.Makefile
 
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX)
-Patch400: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
-#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634
-Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
-#?
-Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
-
+Patch0001: 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+Patch0002: 0002-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644
-Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+Patch0003: 0003-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
 #(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925
-Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
-#?
-Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789
-Patch609: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
-
-#?
-Patch700: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
-#?
-Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+Patch0004: 0004-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+Patch0005: 0005-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+Patch0006: 0006-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+Patch0007: 0007-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
 #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332
-Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+Patch0008: 0008-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX)
-Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+Patch0009: 0009-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
 # warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
-Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
-
+Patch0010: 0010-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
 # GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
-# from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
-# and
-# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
-# upstream MR:
-# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
-Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+Patch0011: 0011-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
 #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
-Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
-# CVE-2014-9278
-Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+Patch0012: 0012-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
 # Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494)
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775
-Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+Patch0013: 0013-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
 # Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
-Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
-
-
+Patch0014: 0014-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
-Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+Patch0015: 0015-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
 # Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650)
-Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
-# privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580)
-Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+Patch0016: 0016-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
 # log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681)
-Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+Patch0017: 0017-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
 # scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223)
-Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+Patch0018: 0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
+# CVE-2014-9278
+Patch0019: 0019-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
 # apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521)
-Patch922: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+Patch0020: 0020-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
 # Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055)
-Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+Patch0021: 0021-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
 # make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom
-Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
-# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
-Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-# Help systemd to track the running service
-Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+Patch0022: 0022-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
 # Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
-Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+Patch0023: 0023-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
 # Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
-Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
-# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration)
-# https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11
-# git show > ~/devel/fedora/openssh/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
-Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+Patch0024: 0024-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
 # Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
-Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+Patch0025: 0025-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
 # clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
-Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
-# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
-# TODO fix the comment above ^
-Patch963: openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
+Patch0026: 0026-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
 # Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
-Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+Patch0027: 0027-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 # sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
-Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+Patch0028: 0028-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
-Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
-# ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
-Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+Patch0029: 0029-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
 # sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
-Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
-
+Patch0030: 0030-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
 # Implement kill switch for SCP protocol
-Patch977: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
-
+Patch0031: 0031-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
 # Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854
 # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299
 # downstream only
-Patch981: openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
-# https://github.com/djmdjm/openssh-wip/pull/13
-Patch982: openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+Patch0032: 0032-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+# Downstream alias for MinRSABits
+Patch0033: 0033-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
 # downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix
 # From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14
-Patch984: openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
-
+Patch0034: 0034-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
+# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
+Patch0035: 0035-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
+Patch0036: 0036-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
+Patch0037: 0037-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+Patch0038: 0038-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
 # Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage
 # upstream bug:
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455
-Patch1002: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
-
+Patch0039: 0039-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
 # Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation
 # upstream MR:
 # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
-Patch1006: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
-
-Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
-Patch1013: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
-Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
-Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
-# upstream b7afd8a4ecaca8afd3179b55e9db79c0ff210237
-Patch1016: openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
+Patch0040: 0040-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+Patch0041: 0041-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
+Patch0042: 0042-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+Patch0043: 0043-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
+Patch0044: 0044-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
+# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/02/22/1
+Patch0045: 0045-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/564
+Patch0046: 0046-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/567
+Patch0047: 0047-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500
+Patch0048: 0048-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
+Patch0049: 0049-NIST-curves-hybrid-KEX-implementation.patch
+# landed upstream, to be removed after 10.3
+Patch0050: 0050-Provide-a-way-to-disable-GSSAPIDelegateCredentials-s.patch
+# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
+Patch0051: 0051-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, seriously reworked on rebasing to 10.2)
+# https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11
+Patch0052: 0052-openssh-10.2p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
+Patch1000: 1000-openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
 
 License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
+Requires: openssl-libs >= 3.5.0
 
 %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
 BuildRequires: libX11-devel
@@ -248,13 +193,14 @@ BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl-interpreter, perl-generators, zlib-devel
 BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5
 BuildRequires: util-linux, groff
 BuildRequires: pam-devel
-BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 3.5.0
 BuildRequires: perl-podlators
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
 BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 BuildRequires: gcc make
 BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
 BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
+BuildRequires: libxcrypt-devel
 Recommends: p11-kit
 Obsoletes: openssh-ldap < 8.3p1-4
 Obsoletes: openssh-cavs < 8.4p1-5
@@ -283,6 +229,10 @@ Summary: An open source SSH client applications
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
 
+%package keysign
+Summary: A helper program used for host-based authentication
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+
 %package server
 Summary: An open source SSH server daemon
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
@@ -303,12 +253,6 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Summary: OpenSSH SK driver for test purposes
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 
-%package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
-Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
-Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.1
-License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant AND OpenSSL
-
 %description
 SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
 commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
@@ -328,6 +272,11 @@ OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
 the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
 
+%description keysign
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. ssh-keysign is a
+helper program used for host-based authentication disabled by default.
+
 %description server
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
@@ -346,108 +295,14 @@ an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
 %description sk-dummy
 This package contains a test SK driver used for OpenSSH test purposes
 
-%description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
-This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate
-users using ssh keys stored in a ssh-agent. Through the use of the
-forwarding of ssh-agent connection it also allows to authenticate with
-remote ssh-agent instance.
-
-The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks.
-
 %prep
 gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
-%setup -q -a 4
-
-%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-%patch -P 300 -p2 -b .psaa-build
-%patch -P 301 -p2 -b .psaa-seteuid
-%patch -P 302 -p2 -b .psaa-visibility
-%patch -P 306 -p2 -b .psaa-compat
-%patch -P 305 -p2 -b .psaa-agent
-%patch -P 307 -p2 -b .psaa-deref
-%patch -P 308 -p2 -b .rsasha2
-%patch -P 309 -p1 -b .psaa-configure-c99
-# Remove duplicate headers and library files
-rm -f $(cat %{SOURCE5})
-popd
-%endif
-
-%patch -P 400 -p1 -b .role-mls
-%patch -P 404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux
-
-%patch -P 502 -p1 -b .keycat
-
-%patch -P 601 -p1 -b .ip-opts
-%patch -P 606 -p1 -b .ipv6man
-%patch -P 607 -p1 -b .sigpipe
-%patch -P 609 -p1 -b .x11
-%patch -P 702 -p1 -b .progress
-%patch -P 703 -p1 -b .grab-info
-%patch -P 707 -p1 -b .redhat
-%patch -P 711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
-# 
-%patch -P 800 -p1 -b .gsskex
-%patch -P 801 -p1 -b .force_krb
-%patch -P 804 -p1 -b .ccache_name
-%patch -P 805 -p1 -b .k5login
-# 
-%patch -P 901 -p1 -b .kuserok
-%patch -P 906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
-%patch -P 916 -p1 -b .contexts
-%patch -P 918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot
-%patch -P 919 -p1 -b .scp
-%patch -P 802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users
-%patch -P 922 -p1 -b .sshdt
-%patch -P 926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
-%patch -P 939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
-%patch -P 944 -p1 -b .x11max
-%patch -P 948 -p1 -b .systemd
-%patch -P 949 -p1 -b .refactor
-%patch -P 950 -p1 -b .sandbox
-%patch -P 951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
-%patch -P 953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
-%patch -P 962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
-%patch -P 963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
-%patch -P 964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
-%patch -P 965 -p1 -b .visibility
-%patch -P 966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
-%patch -P 974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
-%patch -P 975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
-
-%patch -P 977 -p1 -b .kill-scp
-
-%patch -P 981 -p1 -b .scp-sftpdirs
-%patch -P 982 -p1 -b .minrsabits
-%patch -P 984 -p1 -b .ibmca
-
-%patch -P 200 -p1 -b .audit
-%patch -P 201 -p1 -b .audit-race
-%patch -P 202 -p1 -b .audit-log
-%patch -P 700 -p1 -b .fips
-
-%patch -P 1002 -p1 -b .ssh-manpage
-
-%patch -P 1006 -p1 -b .negotiate-supported-algs
-
-%patch -P 1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-dh
-%patch -P 1013 -p1 -b .evp-fips-ecdh
-%patch -P 1014 -p1 -b .nosha1hostproof
-%patch -P 1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
-%patch -P 1016 -p1 -b .ossl-version
-
-%patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity
+%autosetup -T -b 0 -p1
 
 autoreconf
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-autoreconf
-popd
 
 %build
 %set_build_flags
-# the -fvisibility=hidden is needed for clean build of the pam_ssh_agent_auth
-# it is needed for lib(open)ssh build too since it is linked to the pam module too
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden"; export CFLAGS
 %if %{pie}
 %ifarch s390 s390x sparc sparcv9 sparc64
 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
@@ -481,16 +336,14 @@ fi
 	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
 	--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
 	--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
-	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin \
-	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
 	--with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \
 	--disable-strip \
 	--without-zlib-version-check \
-	--with-ssl-engine \
 	--with-ipaddr-display \
 	--with-pie=no \
 	--without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \
-	--with-systemd \
 	--with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \
 	--with-security-key-builtin=yes \
 	--with-pam \
@@ -538,22 +391,9 @@ fi
 popd
 %endif
 
-%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-LDFLAGS="$SAVE_LDFLAGS"
-%configure --with-selinux \
-	--libexecdir=/%{_libdir}/security \
-	--with-mantype=man \
-	--without-openssl-header-check `# The check is broken`
-%make_build
-popd
-%endif
-
 %check
-#to run tests use "--with check"
-%if %{?_with_check:1}%{!?_with_check:0}
-make tests
-%endif
+OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null %{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23}  # ./parallel_tests.sh parallel_tests.Makefile
+#make tests
 
 %install
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
@@ -611,12 +451,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
 
 perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
 
-%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-%make_install
-popd
-%endif
-
 install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest/
 install -m 755 regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest
 
@@ -667,8 +501,6 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
-%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
 
 %files clients
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
@@ -696,9 +528,15 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket
 
+%files keysign
+%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+
 %files server
 %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-session
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-auth
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
@@ -730,20 +568,184 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %files askpass
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
 %endif
 
 %files sk-dummy
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/sshtest/sk-dummy.so
 
-%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
-%files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
-%license pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/security/pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/pam_ssh_agent_auth.8*
-%endif
-
 %changelog
+* Wed Dec 17 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.2p1-1
+- Rebase to OpenSSH 10.2p1
+
+* Wed Dec 10 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-10
+- Update gssapi-keyex patch to not abort KEX without hostkey
+
+* Mon Dec 01 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-9
+- rebuilt
+
+* Mon Nov 03 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-8
+- Implement mlkem768nistp256-sha256 and mlkem1024nistp384-sha384 KEX methods
+
+* Mon Sep 15 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-7
+- rebuilt
+
+* Thu Aug 28 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-6
+- Enable GSS KEX in FIPS mode
+
+* Thu Jul 24 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 10.0p1-5
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jun 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-4
+- Update sshd@.service to follow upstream, mostly support ephemeral sshd keys
+  Submitted by Allison Karlitskaya (https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/101)
+  Needs a SELinux counterpart.
+  Related: rhbz#2374928
+
+* Mon Jun 09 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-3
+- Apply patches forgot in previous respin
+
+* Mon May 19 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-2
+- Provide better diagnostics for non-supported private keys
+  (https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/564)
+- Ignore too short hostkeys in known_hosts file
+  (https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/567)
+- Switch to systemd-socket activation for ssh-agent
+  Resolves: rhbz#2181353
+
+* Fri May 16 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-1
+- Rebase to OpenSSH 10.0p1
+
+* Thu Apr 17 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-15
+- Require OpenSSL 3.5 to support PQ crypto
+- Suppress systemd warning on restart sshd
+
+* Tue Mar 18 2025 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek  <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 9.9p1-14
+- Remove /usr/local/sbin from the default path too
+
+* Tue Mar 18 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-13
+- Remove /usr/sbin from the default path
+  Resolves: rhbz#2352387
+- Export and accept COLORTERM
+  Resolves: rhbz#2352653
+
+* Thu Mar 06 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-12
+- Update ssh-keysign permission for RPM linter
+
+* Wed Mar 05 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-11
+- Use OpenSSL ML-KEM implementation instead of the native one
+
+* Tue Feb 25 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-10
+- Some minor fixes from Rocky Linux
+  https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/02/22/1
+
+* Tue Feb 18 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-9
+- Fix regression of Match directive processing
+- Fix missing error codes set and invalid error code checks in OpenSSH. It
+  prevents memory exhaustion attack and a MITM attack when VerifyHostKeyDNS
+  is on (CVE-2025-26465, CVE-2025-26466).
+
+* Sat Feb 01 2025 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 9.9p1-8.1
+- Add explicit BR: libxcrypt-devel
+
+* Wed Jan 29 2025 FeRD (Frank Dana) <ferdnyc@gmail.com> - 9.9p1-8
+- Replace deprecated (since 8.7) ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+  with KbdInteractiveAuthentication, in redhat sshd config
+
+* Mon Jan 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-7
+- Fix regression of Match directive processing
+  Resolves: rhbz#2341769
+
+* Mon Jan 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-6
+- Remove pam-ssh-agent subcomponent
+  Resolves: rhbz#2338440
+
+* Fri Jan 17 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.9p1-5.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Oct 28 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-5
+- Fix MLKEM for BE platforms
+
+* Wed Oct 16 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-4
+- Resolve memory management issues after rebase
+- Define OPTIONS env in systemd modules (https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/92)
+
+* Fri Oct 11 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-3
+- Separate ssh-keysign to a dedicated package
+- Use FIPS KEX defaults in FIPS mode
+
+* Thu Oct 10 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-2
+- Update version of pam_ssh_agent_auth
+
+* Tue Oct 08 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-1
+- Update to OpenSSH 9.9p1
+
+* Tue Sep 03 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-4
+- Synchronize patches from Red Hat
+
+* Mon Aug 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-3
+- Sshd now proposes to enter password again when a non-existing user is specified
+
+* Fri Jul 26 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-2
+- Change default key type in FIPS mode
+
+* Mon Jul 22 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-1
+- Update to OpenSSH 9.8p1
+
+* Thu Jul 18 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-1.14
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jul 02 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.13
+- rebuilt
+
+* Mon Jul 01 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com> - 9.6p1-12
+- Patch 9.6p1 for CVE-2024-6387
+
+* Mon Jul 01 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com> - 9.6p1-11
+- Shorten paths used for parallel tests to fix BZ#2295117
+
+* Thu May 09 2024 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-10
+- Correctly audit hostname and IP address
+- Make default key sizes configurable in sshd-keygen
+
+* Wed Apr 24 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.9
+- Use OpenSSL SSH KDF implementation - s390x fixup
+
+* Wed Apr 24 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.8
+- Use OpenSSL SSH KDF implementation
+
+* Wed Apr 17 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.7
+- Only set PAM_RHOST if the remote host is not "UNKNOWN"
+  https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/71
+  Patch by Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>
+- Some spec cleanup
+  https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/74
+  by Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+
+* Thu Apr 04 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.6
+- rebuilt
+
+* Thu Apr 04 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.5
+- rebuilt
+
+* Tue Apr 02 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com> - 9.6p1-1.4
+- Build OpenSSH without libsystemd dependency, using reference implementation
+
+* Wed Mar 13 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.3
+- Build OpenSSH without engine support
+- Make tests run at build phase (using parallel run mechanism by Alexander Sosedkin)
+
+* Thu Jan 25 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-1.2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sun Jan 21 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-1.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Dec 26 2023 Daniel Milnes <daniel@daniel-milnes.uk> - 9.6p1-1
+- Update to OpenSSH 9.6
+  Original patches from https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/63
+  Tuned by Dmitry Belyavskiy for GSS and PKCS#11 URI processing
+
 * Fri Dec 22 2023 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 9.3p1-13.1
 - Fix type errors in downstream gssapi-keyex patch
 
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch b/pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bc40434..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
-configure.ac: Improve C99 compatibility
-
-Future compilers will not support implicit declarations and implicit
-ints by default.  This means that configure probes which rely on them
-will fail unconditionally, without actually testing anything.
-
-The changes mostly mirror what has been implemented in the openssh
-repository, but had to be adapted somewhat because of drift between
-the two versions of configure.ac.
-
-Sam James has submitted similar fixes upstream:
-
-  <https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pull/41>
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 6496679..d927b62 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -500,10 +500,10 @@ int main(void) { exit(0); }
- 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUNDLE, 1, [Define if your system uses bundles instead of ELF shared objects])
- 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have working getaddrinfo)
- 	AC_TRY_RUN([#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
--main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
--		exit(0);
-+int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
-+		return 0;
- 	else
--		exit(1);
-+		return 1;
- }], [AC_MSG_RESULT(working)],
- 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(buggy)
- 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO, 1, [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])],
-@@ -917,8 +917,8 @@ AC_SUBST(LDFLAGS_SHARED)
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(compiler and flags for sanity)
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([
--#include <stdio.h>
--int main(){exit(0);}
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+int main(void){exit(0);}
- 	])],
- 	[	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
- 	[
-@@ -951,9 +951,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
-     strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
-     s = dirname(buf);
-     if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
--	exit(1);
-+	return 1;
-     } else {
--	exit(0);
-+	return 0;
-     }
- }
- 				]])],
-@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <dirent.h>
--int main(void){struct dirent d;exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));}
-+int main(void){struct dirent d;return sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char);}
- 	]])],
- 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
- 	[
-@@ -1327,8 +1327,10 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresuid, [
- 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresuid seems to work)
- 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
- int main(){errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0);}
- 		]])],
- 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-@@ -1344,8 +1346,10 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresgid, [
- 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresgid seems to work)
- 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
- int main(){errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0);}
- 		]])],
- 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-@@ -1384,7 +1388,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
- 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
- #include <stdio.h>
--int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");exit(b[4]!='\0');}
-+int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");return b[4]!='\0';}
- 		]])],
- 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
- 		[
-@@ -1418,7 +1422,7 @@ int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
- int main(void)
- {
- 	char x[1];
--	exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1);
-+	return x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1;
- } ]])],
- 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
- 		[
-@@ -1467,7 +1471,8 @@ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
- #include <stdlib.h>
--main() { char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+int main(void) { char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
- if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
- 	exit(1);
- unlink(template); exit(0);
-@@ -1492,10 +1497,14 @@ if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
- 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if openpty correctly handles controlling tty)
- 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-+#include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <sys/fcntl.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/wait.h>
-+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
-+#include <pty.h>
-+#endif
- 
- int
- main()
-@@ -1543,6 +1552,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
- 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
- #include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
- #include <netdb.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-@@ -1748,6 +1758,7 @@ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC(RAND_add, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL, 1,
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
- AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
-+#include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-@@ -1794,12 +1805,12 @@ int main(void) {
- 
- 	fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
- 	if(fd == NULL)
--		exit(1);
-+		return 1;
- 
- 	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
--		exit(1);
-+		return 1;
- 
--	exit(0);
-+	return 0;
- }
- 	]])],
- 	[
-@@ -1829,7 +1840,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
- #include <string.h>
- #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
--int main(void) { exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); }
-+int main(void) { return SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1; }
- 	]])],
- 	[
- 		AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-@@ -2598,7 +2609,7 @@ dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
--main()
-+int main(void)
- {
- 	char buf[50];
- 	char expected_out[50];
-@@ -2611,11 +2622,11 @@ main()
- 	strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
- 	snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
- 	if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
--		exit(1);
--	exit(0);
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
- }
- #else
--main() { exit(0); }
-+int main(void) { return 0; }
- #endif
- 		]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) ],
- 		AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
-@@ -2746,11 +2757,11 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
- int main() {
- #ifdef msg_accrights
- #error "msg_accrights is a macro"
--exit(1);
-+return 1;
- #endif
- struct msghdr m;
- m.msg_accrights = 0;
--exit(0);
-+return 0;
- }
- 		])],
- 		[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
-@@ -2773,11 +2784,11 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
- int main() {
- #ifdef msg_control
- #error "msg_control is a macro"
--exit(1);
-+return 1;
- #endif
- struct msghdr m;
- m.msg_control = 0;
--exit(0);
-+return 0;
- }
- 		])],
- 		[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
-@@ -2791,7 +2802,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
- fi
- 
- AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
--	AC_TRY_LINK([],
-+	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
- 		[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ],
- 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
- 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]
-@@ -2871,7 +2882,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
- fi
- 
- AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
--	AC_TRY_LINK([],
-+	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
- 		[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);],
- 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
- 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]
-@@ -2884,7 +2895,7 @@ fi
- 
- 
- AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
--	AC_TRY_LINK([],
-+	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
- 		[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);],
- 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
- 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders b/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
deleted file mode 100644
index ab5899f..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-authfd.c
-authfd.h
-atomicio.c
-atomicio.h
-bufaux.c
-bufbn.c
-buffer.h
-buffer.c
-cleanup.c
-cipher.h
-compat.h
-entropy.c
-entropy.h
-fatal.c
-includes.h
-kex.h
-key.c
-key.h
-log.c
-log.h
-match.h
-misc.c
-misc.h
-pathnames.h
-platform.h
-rsa.h
-ssh-dss.c
-ssh-rsa.c
-ssh.h
-ssh2.h
-uidswap.c
-uidswap.h
-uuencode.c
-uuencode.h
-xmalloc.c
-xmalloc.h
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0822b61..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,992 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
-  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
-  */
- 
-+#include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
-                 case EOF:
-                 case '\0':
-                     if (len > 0) { 
--                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
--                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-+                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
-+                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
-                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
-                         len = 0;
-@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
- {
-     size_t i;
-     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
-+        free(argv[i]);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
-+    free(argv);
-     return;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- 
-@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
--    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
-+    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
-     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
-     int tried;
-     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
- 
-+#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
-+
- /* 
-  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
-  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
-@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
-     if (count == 0)
-         return NULL;
-    
--    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-+    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
-         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
-@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- }
- 
- void
--agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
-+agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-     size_t i;
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
-+    int r;
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
-+    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     }
- }
- 
- 
--void
--pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-+static void
-+pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-     u_char *cookie = NULL;
-@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
-     size_t count = 0;
-     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
--    Buffer action_agentbuf;
-+    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
-     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
-     char * retc;
-     int32_t reti;
-+    int r;
- 
--    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+    rnd = arc4random();
-     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
-     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
-         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
-     }
- 
--    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
-+    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
--            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+            rnd = arc4random();
-         }
-         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     }
-     else {
-         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-     }
-     
-     /*
-@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
-     time(&ts);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
-+    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
--    if(retc)
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
--    else
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    if (retc) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    }
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     if (free_logbuf) { 
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
-+        free(action_logbuf);
-+        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
-+    }
-+    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
-+    if (reti >= 0) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     }
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
--    if(reti >= 0)
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
--    else
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
-+    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     free(cookie);
-     return;
-@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- 
- 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
- 	auth->fd = sock;
--	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	auth->howmany = 0;
- 
- 	return auth;
-@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
--    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
--    Key *key;
-+    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
-     char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-+        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-         {
-             if(key != NULL) {
--                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-+                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-                 id->key = key;
-                 id->filename = comment;
-                 id->ac = ac;
--                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
-+                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
--                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
--                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
--                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
-+                free(id->filename);
-+                key_free(id->key);
-+                free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
-             }
-         }
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
-+        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-     }
-     else {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-+        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-     }
--    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
-     EVP_cleanup();
-     return retval;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
-@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-  * a patch 8-)
-  */
- #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
--    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
-+    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
- #endif
- 
-     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
-@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #endif
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-+    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
-+    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
- 
-     if(ruser_ptr) {
-         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
-         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
-             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-+            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-         } else
- #endif
-         {
-             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-+                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-                 goto cleanexit;
-             }
-             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- 
-     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
-     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
-     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
- 
-@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-          */
-         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
-     } else {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
--        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-     }
- 
-     /*
-@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-      */
- 
-     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
- 
-         /*
-          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
-@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
-         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
-         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
-+            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
-             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
-                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
--                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-                 goto cleanexit;
-             }
-         }
-@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
-          */
-         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
-         } else {
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-         }
-     } else {
--        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-+        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-     }
- 
- cleanexit:
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- 
--#include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
- 
- extern char *authorized_keys_file;
-@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-         } else {
-             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
-             if(!slash_ptr)
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal
-+                fatal
-                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
- 
-             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
-             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
-+                fatal("Username too long");
- 
-             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
-             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
-@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
-         }
-         authorized_keys_file =
--            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-+            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
-         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
-                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-+        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-                                                               percent_expand
-                                                               later, we'd step
-                                                               on this, so free
-@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
- #endif
-     authorized_keys_file =
--        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-+        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
-                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
- }
- 
- int
--pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
-+pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     return
-         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
--int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
-+int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
- void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
--
--#include "identity.h"
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- /* return 1 if user allows given key */
- /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
- static int
--pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
-+pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
- {
--    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char *line = NULL;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     u_long linenum = 0;
--    Key *found;
-+    struct sshkey *found;
-     char *fp;
-+    size_t linesize = 0;
- 
-     found_key = 0;
--    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
-+    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
- 
--    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-+    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
-         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
- 
-+        linenum++;
-         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-             continue;
- 
--        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-+        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
-             int quoted = 0;
- 
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-+            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-             /* key_options = cp; */
-             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-             }
-             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
--            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-+            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-+                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
-                 continue;
-             }
-         }
--        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
-+        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
-             found_key = 1;
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-+            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-                                   linenum);
--            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
--                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
--            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
-+            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
-+            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
-+                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
-+            free(fp);
-             break;
-         }
-     }
--    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
-+    free(line);
-+    sshkey_free(found);
-     if(!found_key)
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
-+        verbose("key not found");
-     return found_key;
- }
- 
-@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-  */
- int
--pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
-+pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     struct stat st;
--    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char buf[256];
- 
-     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
-+    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
- 
-     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
-     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-+        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- 
-     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
-         fclose(f);
--        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-+        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- int
- pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
-                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
--                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
-+                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int ok, found_key = 0;
-@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
-     else {
-         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
-         if(pw == NULL) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-+            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
-             return 0;
-         }
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror
-+        error
-             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
-        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-+        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
-     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-+    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
- 
-     /* 
-      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-      * run cleanup_exit() code.
-      */
--    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
- 
-     switch ((pid = fork())) {
-     case -1:                                              /* error */
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         close(p[1]);
-         return 0;
-@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
-         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
-            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
- #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
-@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- #endif
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-+            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- #endif
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-+            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
-            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         _exit(127);
-     default:                                              /* parent */
-         break;
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     close(p[1]);
-     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         /* Don't leave zombie child */
-         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-         if(errno != EINTR) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-+            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             goto out;
-         }
-     }
-     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
-         goto out;
-     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     found_key = ok;
-   out:
--    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
-     return found_key;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
--int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
--int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- 
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 	int comparehome = 0;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
-+    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
- 
- 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
- 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
-@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
- 			return -1;
- 		}
--		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
- 
--		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
-+		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
- 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
- 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 
- 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
- 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
--			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
-+			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
- 			    buf);
- 			break;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
-@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
- 
-+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
-+
- /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
- extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
-  */
- 
- int
--userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
-+userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
- {
--    Buffer          b = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
-     char           *pkalg = NULL;
-     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
--    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
--    int             authenticated = 0;
-+    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
-+    int             r, authenticated = 0;
- 
--    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
-+    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
- 
-     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
-     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
--        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
--    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
--        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
-     /* construct packet to sign and test */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
-+    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
--    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */
--    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
-+    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
-         authenticated = 1;
- 
-   user_auth_clean_exit:
-     /* if(&b != NULL) */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
-+    sshbuf_free(b);
-+  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
-     if(sig != NULL)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
-+        free(sig);
-     if(pkblob != NULL)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
-+        free(pkblob);
-     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
-     return authenticated;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
- #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- 
--#include <identity.h>
--int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
-+#include "identity.h"
-+int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
- 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- 	*p = '\0';
- 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
--	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
-+	xfree(encoded);
- 	return len;
- }
- 
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
- 		return;
- 	}
--	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
-+	buf = malloc(2*len);
- 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
- 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
-@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 	}
- 	if (i % 70 != 69)
- 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
--	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
-+	free(buf);
- }
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
- #include <string.h>
- 
- #include "defines.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include <includes.h>
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "log.h"
- 
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
-@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
-     int authenticated = 0;
-     const char method[] = "publickey ";
- 
--    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
-+    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
-     char* saveptr;
- 
-     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
-     while (auth_line != NULL) {
-         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
-             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
--            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-+            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-             if (key == NULL) {
-                 continue;
-             }
--            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
-+            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
-             if (r == 1) {
-                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
-                     authenticated = 1;
--                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
-+                    sshkey_free(key);
-                     break;
-                 }
-             } else {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
-+                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
-             }
--            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
-+            sshkey_free(key);
-         }
-         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
-     }
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bf49c37..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
- int
- pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-+    struct passwd *pw;
-     return
--        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
--                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
--        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
--                                             authorized_keys_file)
-+        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-+        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
-                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
-                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index be1f8e5..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
-@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
- 	}
- 
- 	errno = 0; 
--	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
--	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
--	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
- 		close(sock);
--        if(errno == EACCES)
--		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
-+		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		sock = -1;
-+		if(errno == EACCES)
-+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+	}
- 
--	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
--
-+	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
-+		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 	return sock;
- }
- 
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c8815bb..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2 openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2	2022-07-15 15:08:12.865585410 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2022-07-15 15:16:25.164282372 +0200
-@@ -87,8 +87,13 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
-         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
--    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
--        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+    if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA
-+	&& ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), "rsa-sha2-256", 0) == 0) {
-+	/* Do nothing */
-+    } else {
-+        if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
-+            goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+    }
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */
-     if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aea068d..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
-@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
- extern char    *__progname;
- #endif
- 
--PAM_EXTERN int
-+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
- pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- {
-     char          **argv_ptr;
-@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
- }
- 
- 
--PAM_EXTERN int
-+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
- pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- {
-     UNUSED(pamh);
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f2c02c..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
- typedef struct identity Identity;
- typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+       int     fd;
-+       struct sshbuf *identities;
-+       int     howmany;
-+}      AuthenticationConnection;
-+
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
- {
-     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
--    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
--    char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
-+    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
-+    int r;
-+    unsigned int i;
- 
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
--        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
--        {
--            if(key != NULL) {
-+        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
-+            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
-+               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
-+                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
-+        } else {
-+            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
-+            {
-+              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
-                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
--                id->key = key;
--                id->filename = comment;
-+                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
-+                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
-                 id->ac = ac;
-                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
--                free(id->filename);
--                key_free(id->key);
-                 free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
--            }
--        }
-+              }
-+            }
--        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
--        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-+            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-+            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
-+        }
-+        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
-+        free(ac);
-     }
-     else {
-         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
-@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
-         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
--    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4018c4d..0000000
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
-@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "ssh.h"
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/socket.h>
-+#include <sys/un.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
- 
- #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
- 
-+/* 
-+ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
-+ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
-+ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. 
-+ *
-+ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that 
-+ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a 
-+ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
-+ */
-+
- static char *
- log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
- pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
--    char *cookie = NULL;
-+    u_char *cookie = NULL;
-     uint8_t i = 0;
-     uint32_t rnd = 0;
-     uint8_t cookie_len;
-@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
-             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-         }
--        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
-+        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-     }
- 
-@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
- }
- 
- int
-+ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	const char *authsocket;
-+	int sock;
-+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-+	struct stat sock_st;
-+
-+	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
-+	if (!authsocket)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	/* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
-+	if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
-+		if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
-+			fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* 
-+	 * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody 
-+	 * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
-+	 */
-+	if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
-+		error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-+
-+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+	if (sock < 0)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	/* close on exec */
-+	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	errno = 0; 
-+	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+		close(sock);
-+        if(errno == EACCES)
-+		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+
-+	return sock;
-+}
-+
-+AuthenticationConnection *
-+ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
-+	int sock;
-+
-+	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
-+	 * exited due to a timeout.
-+	 */
-+	if (sock < 0)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
-+	auth->fd = sock;
-+	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+	auth->howmany = 0;
-+
-+	return auth;
-+}
-+
-+int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
--    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
-+    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-         {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
- CC=@CC@
- LD=@LD@
- CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
--CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
- LIBS=@LIBS@
- AR=@AR@
- AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
- PERL=@PERL@
- SED=@SED@
- ENT=@ENT@
--LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
--LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
-+LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
-+LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
- EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
- 
- ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
- 
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
- 
- 
- MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
- 
--LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
-+LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
- $(LIBCOMPAT): always
- 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
- always:
- 
--pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
--	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
-+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
- 
- $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
diff --git a/parallel_test.Makefile b/parallel_test.Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f49df30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/parallel_test.Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# just a Makefile parallel_test.sh uses to run stuff in parallel with make
+%:
+	$(MAKE) -j1 -C .t/$* $*
+
+t-exec-%:
+	$(MAKE) -j1 -C ".t/t-exec-$*" \
+		TEST_SSH_PORT=10$*0 \
+		SKIP_LTESTS="$(shell cat .ltests/not-in/$*)" \
+		BUILDDIR="$(shell pwd)/.t/t-exec-$*" \
+		TEST_SHELL=sh \
+		MAKE=make \
+		TEST_SSH_TRACE=yes \
+		TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL=yes \
+		t-exec \
diff --git a/parallel_test.sh b/parallel_test.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..682c7e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/parallel_test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash
+set -uexo pipefail
+
+# The custom %check script to run the OpenSSH upstream testsuite in parallel.
+#
+# The upstream testsuite is serial,
+# so the idea here is to split the testsuite into several $PARTS:
+# * file-tests
+# * interop-tests
+# * unit
+# * ltests-00
+# * ltests-01
+# * ...
+# * ltests-23
+# and run them in parallel, using make, each in its own build subtree.
+
+PARALLEL_MAKEFILE=$1
+
+SPLIT=24
+PARTS='file-tests interop-tests unit '
+for ((i = 1; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
+    PARTS+="t-exec-$ii "
+done
+
+# work around a selinux restriction:
+chcon -t unconfined_exec_t ssh-sk-helper || :
+
+# work around something else that only crops up in brew
+export TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
+
+# create a .test directory to store all our files in:
+mkdir -p .t .ltests/{in,not-in}
+
+# patch testsuite: use different ports to avoid port collisions
+grep -REi 'port=[2-9][0-9]*' regress
+sed -i 's|PORT=4242|PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/test-exec.sh*
+sed -i 's|^P=3301  # test port|P=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/multiplex.sh*
+sed -i 's|^fwdport=3301|fwdport=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/cfgmatch.sh* regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh*
+sed -i 's|^LFWD_PORT=.*|LFWD_PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
+    regress/forward-control.sh*
+sed -i 's|^RFWD_PORT=.*|RFWD_PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 2)|' \
+    regress/forward-control.sh*
+( ! grep -REi 'port=[2-9][0-9]*' regress)  # try to find more of those
+
+# patch testsuite: speed up
+sed -i 's|sleep 1$|sleep .25|' regress/forward-control.sh
+
+# extract LTESTS list to .tests/ltests/all:
+grep -Ex 'tests:[[:space:]]*file-tests t-exec interop-tests extra-tests unit' Makefile
+echo -ne '\necho-ltests:\n\techo ${LTESTS}' >> regress/Makefile
+make -s -C regress echo-ltests | tr ' ' '\n' > .ltests/all
+
+# separate ltests into $SPLIT roughly equal .tests/ltests/in/$ii parts:
+grep -qFx connect .ltests/all
+( ! grep -qFx nonex .ltests/all )
+split -d -a2 --number=l/$SPLIT .ltests/all .ltests/in/
+wc -l .ltests/in/*
+grep -qFx connect .ltests/in/*
+
+# generate the inverses of them --- .ltests/not-in/$ii:
+( ! grep -qFx nonex .ltests/in/* )
+for ((i = 0; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
+    while read -r tname; do
+        if ! grep -qFx "$tname" ".ltests/in/$ii"; then
+            echo -n "$tname " >> ".ltests/not-in/$ii"
+        fi
+    done < .ltests/all
+done
+grep . .ltests/not-in/*
+( ! grep -q ^connect .ltests/not-in/0 )
+for ((i = 1; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
+    grep -q ^connect .ltests/not-in/$ii
+done
+
+# prepare several test directories:
+for PART in $PARTS; do
+    mkdir .t/${PART}
+    cp -ra * .t/${PART}/
+    sed -i "s|abs_top_srcdir=.*|abs_top_srcdir=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
+        .t/${PART}/Makefile
+    sed -i "s|abs_top_builddir=.*|abs_top_builddir=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
+        .t/${PART}/Makefile
+    sed -i "s|^BUILDDIR=.*|BUILDDIR=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
+        .t/${PART}/Makefile
+done
+
+# finally, run tests $PARTS in parallel in their own subtrees:
+time make -f "$PARALLEL_MAKEFILE" -j$(nproc) $PARTS
diff --git a/plans/main.fmf b/plans/main.fmf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae0c305
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plans/main.fmf
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+summary: Run all tests
+execute:
+  how: tmt
+discover:
+  how: fmf
+
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index 585760a..318e485 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz) = 087ff6fe5f6caab4c6c3001d906399e02beffad7277280f11187420c2939fd4befdcb14643862a657ce4cad2f115b82a0a1a2c99df6ee54dcd76b53647637c19
-SHA512 (openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz.asc) = 6222378eb24a445c6c1db255392b405f5369b1af0e92f558d4ba05b0d83ab0d084cb8f4b91d7ae8636f333d970638a6635e2bc7af885135dd34992d87f2ef1f4
-SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
+SHA512 (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz) = 66f3dd646179e71aaf41c33b6f14a207dc873d71d24f11c130a89dee317ee45398b818e5b94887b5913240964a38630d7bca3e481e0f1eff2e41d9e1cfdbdfc5
+SHA512 (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz.asc) = f1f71700b1b0b2117aed505488b98b7ebb51ce26e53184b08df0b07aa2c5a1e54dc4d3cbcbe871b5ad849a2a0e22b02af318ff22a68c980ab53b04be03c9bf3c
 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21
diff --git a/ssh-agent.service b/ssh-agent.service
index 812303c..d0c38dd 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.service
+++ b/ssh-agent.service
@@ -8,9 +8,7 @@ Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1) man:ssh-add(1) man:ssh(1)
 Requires=ssh-agent.socket
 
 [Service]
-Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket
-ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/rm -f $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -D -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -D
 PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID
 SuccessExitStatus=2
 Type=simple
diff --git a/sshd-keygen b/sshd-keygen
index 170ada0..b15fc8c 100644
--- a/sshd-keygen
+++ b/sshd-keygen
@@ -9,8 +9,14 @@ case $KEYTYPE in
 		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
 			exit 0
 		fi ;;
-	"rsa") ;; # always ok
-	"ecdsa") ;;
+	"rsa")
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_RSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_RSA_BITS"
+		fi ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa") 
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_ECDSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_ECDSA_BITS"
+		fi ;;
 	*) # wrong argument
 		exit 12 ;;
 esac
@@ -25,7 +31,7 @@ fi
 rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
 
 # create new keys
-if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE $SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
 	exit 1
 fi
 
diff --git a/sshd-keygen@.service b/sshd-keygen@.service
index f27f729..aee1303 100644
--- a/sshd-keygen@.service
+++ b/sshd-keygen@.service
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key
 
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i
 
diff --git a/sshd.service b/sshd.service
index 0cb2a26..350624d 100644
--- a/sshd.service
+++ b/sshd.service
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=notify
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
diff --git a/sshd.sysconfig b/sshd.sysconfig
index a217ce7..be40d08 100644
--- a/sshd.sysconfig
+++ b/sshd.sysconfig
@@ -5,3 +5,7 @@
 # example using  systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
 # of DSA key or  systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
 # creation.
+
+#SSH_RSA_BITS=3072
+#SSH_ECDSA_BITS=256
+OPTIONS=""
diff --git a/sshd@.service b/sshd@.service
index be6d3b9..4f12190 100644
--- a/sshd@.service
+++ b/sshd@.service
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ After=sshd-keygen.target
 Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
+# Set option as empty variable to avoid warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys"
 StandardInput=socket
+ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all
diff --git a/tests/main.fmf b/tests/main.fmf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..339889b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/main.fmf
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+test: ./runtest.sh
+framework: beakerlib
+require:
+  - iproute           # needs ip command
+  - procps-ng         # needs ps and pgrep commands
+  - initscripts       # needs service command
+  - openssh-clients   # needs ssh command
+  - findutils         # needs find command
+  - net-tools         # needs netstat command
+  - libselinux-utils  # needs selinuxenabled command
+  - nmap-ncat         # needs nc command
diff --git a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile
index f77eb4d..7b75039 100644
--- a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile
+++ b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export TESTVERSION=1.0
 
 BUILT_FILES=
 
-FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile PURPOSE pam_save_ssh_var.c
+FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile pam_save_ssh_var.c
 
 .PHONY: all install download clean
 
diff --git a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/PURPOSE b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/PURPOSE
deleted file mode 100644
index 59557de..0000000
--- a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/PURPOSE
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-PURPOSE of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
-Description: This is basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-
-Created as a response to rhbz#1251777 and previous one rhbz#1225106.
-The code of pam module is outdated and compiled with current openssh
-version which went through quite enough refactoring.
diff --git a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/main.fmf b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/main.fmf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5820055
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/main.fmf
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+summary: Basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
+description: |
+  Created as a response to rhbz#1251777 and previous one rhbz#1225106.
+  The code of pam module is outdated and compiled with current openssh
+  version which went through quite enough refactoring.
+contact: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+require+:
+  - pam_ssh_agent_auth
+  - gcc               # needs to test pam_ssh_agent_auth
+  - pam-devel         # needs to test pam_ssh_agent_auth
+  - expect            # needs to test pam_ssh_agent_auth
diff --git a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/runtest.sh b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/runtest.sh
index 297be39..7587269 100755
--- a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/runtest.sh
+++ b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/runtest.sh
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
 # ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 # Include Beaker environment
-. /usr/bin/rhts-environment.sh || exit 1
 . /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
 
 PACKAGE="openssh"
@@ -48,6 +47,8 @@ rlJournalStart
         rlAssertRpm pam_ssh_agent_auth
         rlImport distribution/fips
         rlServiceStart sshd
+        # The following line is a temporary fix for https://pagure.io/releng/issue/12187
+        rlRun "rpm --restore filesystem"
         rlRun "TmpDir=\$(mktemp -d)" 0 "Creating tmp directory"
         rlRun "cp ${PAM_MODULE}.c $TmpDir/"
         rlRun "pushd $TmpDir"
@@ -62,10 +63,6 @@ auth       sufficient   pam_ssh_agent_auth.so file=$AUTH_KEYS' $PAM_SUDO"
         rlRun "echo $PASS |passwd --stdin $USER"
     rlPhaseEnd
 
-    if ! fipsIsEnabled; then
-        KEYS+=("dsa")
-    fi
-
     for KEY in "${KEYS[@]}"; do
         rlPhaseStartTest "Test with key type $KEY"
             rlRun "su $USER -c 'ssh-keygen -t $KEY -f ~/.ssh/my_id_$KEY -N \"\"'" 0
@@ -179,6 +176,9 @@ _EOF
         rlRun "userdel -fr $USER"
         rlFileRestore
         rlServiceRestore sshd
+        # Collect journal data.  If the test fails, the log probably
+        # explains why, which may be difficult to determine without logs.
+        rlRun "journalctl -b 0 > '$TMT_TEST_DATA'/journalctl.txt"
     rlPhaseEnd
 rlJournalPrintText
 rlJournalEnd
diff --git a/tests/port-forwarding/Makefile b/tests/port-forwarding/Makefile
index d325bdd..d92f24d 100644
--- a/tests/port-forwarding/Makefile
+++ b/tests/port-forwarding/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export TESTVERSION=1.0
 
 BUILT_FILES=
 
-FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile PURPOSE
+FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile
 
 .PHONY: all install download clean
 
diff --git a/tests/port-forwarding/PURPOSE b/tests/port-forwarding/PURPOSE
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a8bc87..0000000
--- a/tests/port-forwarding/PURPOSE
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-PURPOSE of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/port-forwarding
-Description: Testing port forwarding (ideally all possibilities: -L, -R, -D)
-Author: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
diff --git a/tests/port-forwarding/main.fmf b/tests/port-forwarding/main.fmf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f29286
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/port-forwarding/main.fmf
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+summary: Testing port forwarding
+description: |
+  Testing port forwarding (ideally all possibilities: -L, -R, -D)
+contact: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
diff --git a/tests/port-forwarding/runtest.sh b/tests/port-forwarding/runtest.sh
index f18f2ae..d690270 100755
--- a/tests/port-forwarding/runtest.sh
+++ b/tests/port-forwarding/runtest.sh
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ rlJournalStart
         rlRun "su - $USER -c \"mkdir .ssh; chmod 700 .ssh; cd .ssh; ssh-keygen -N '' -f id_rsa; cat id_rsa.pub >authorized_keys; chmod 600 authorized_keys\""
         rlRun "echo 'LogLevel DEBUG' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
         rlServiceStart sshd
+        # Rate limit service restarts by sleeping
+        rlRun "sleep 3s"
         rlRun "IP=\$( ip a |grep 'scope global' |grep -w inet |cut -d'/' -f1 |awk '{ print \$2 }' |tail -1 )"
         rlRun "echo 'IP=$IP'"
         rlRun "TmpDir=\$(mktemp -d)" 0 "Creating tmp directory"
@@ -98,6 +100,8 @@ forwarding_test() {
         rlRun "echo 'PermitOpen any' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
         rlRun "echo '$IP anyhost1 anyhost2' >>/etc/hosts"
         rlRun "service sshd restart"
+        # Rate limit service restarts by sleeping
+        rlRun "sleep 3s"
         for i in `seq 3`; do
             forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED anyhost1 $LISTEN
             forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED anyhost2 $LISTEN
@@ -114,6 +118,8 @@ forwarding_test() {
             rlRun "echo 'PermitOpen wildportallow:*' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
             rlRun "echo '$IP wildportallow wildportdeny' >>/etc/hosts"
             rlRun "service sshd restart"
+            # Rate limit service restarts by sleeping
+            rlRun "sleep 3s"
             forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED wildportallow $LISTEN
             ((FORWARDED+=1))
             ((LISTEN+=1))
@@ -122,6 +128,8 @@ forwarding_test() {
             ((LISTEN+=1))
             rlFileRestore --namespace port_wildcard
             rlRun "service sshd restart"
+            # Rate limit service restarts by sleeping
+            rlRun "sleep 3s"
         rlPhaseEnd
     fi
 
@@ -131,6 +139,8 @@ forwarding_test() {
             rlRun "echo 'PermitOpen *:$LISTEN' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
             rlRun "echo '$IP wildhost1 wildhost2' >>/etc/hosts"
             rlRun "service sshd restart"
+            # Rate limit service restarts by sleeping
+            rlRun "sleep 3s"
             forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED wildhost1 $LISTEN
             ((FORWARDED+=1))
             forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED wildhost2 $LISTEN
@@ -147,6 +157,9 @@ forwarding_test() {
         rlFileRestore
         rlServiceRestore sshd
         rlRun "rm -r $TmpDir" 0 "Removing tmp directory"
+        # Collect journal data.  If the test fails, the log probably
+        # explains why, which may be difficult to determine without logs.
+        rlRun "journalctl -b 0 > '$TMT_TEST_DATA'/journalctl.txt"
     rlPhaseEnd
 rlJournalPrintText
 rlJournalEnd
diff --git a/tests/tests.yml b/tests/tests.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8086af2..0000000
--- a/tests/tests.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
----
-# Tests for docker container
-- hosts: localhost
-  tags:
-    - container
-  # no compatible tests
-
-# Tests for classic environment and Atomic Host
-- hosts: localhost
-  tags:
-    - all
-    - classic
-    - atomic
-  roles:
-  - role: standard-test-beakerlib
-    tests:
-    - port-forwarding
-    - pam_ssh_agent_auth
-    required_packages:
-    - iproute           # needs ip command
-    - procps-ng         # needs ps and pgrep commands
-    - initscripts       # needs service command
-    - openssh-clients   # needs ssh command
-    - findutils         # needs find command
-    - net-tools         # needs netstat command
-    - libselinux-utils  # needs selinuxenabled command
-    - nmap-ncat         # needs nc command
-    - pam_ssh_agent_auth
-    - gcc               # needs to test pam_ssh_agent_auth
-    - pam-devel         # needs to test pam_ssh_agent_auth
-    - expect            # needs to test pam_ssh_agent_auth