Upstream fix for CVE-2021-41617

Moving the fix to the proper file
Resolves: rhbz#2008292

openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
---- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
+@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
+@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
  	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -266,11 +266,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",

openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch

@@ -2159,12 +2159,13 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -717,18 +874,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+@@ -717,19 +874,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
- 	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 -	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 +	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
  		error("invalid attribute length");
  		return (NULL);
@@ -2259,12 +2260,13 @@ index a302c79c..879fe917 100644
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -838,18 +998,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+@@ -838,19 +998,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ 	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
- 	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+-	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 -	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
-+	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
++	if (key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0 ||
 +	    key_attr[3].ulValueLen == 0) {
  		error("invalid attribute length");
  		return (NULL);

openssh-8.4p1-cve-2021-28041.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c.cve-2021-28041 openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c.cve-2021-28041	2021-06-17 13:15:58.691479334 +0200
++++ openssh-8.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2021-06-17 13:17:16.573118348 +0200
+@@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+ 				goto err;
+ 			}
+ 			free(ext_name);
++			ext_name = NULL;
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype);

openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ # include <paths.h>
+ #endif
+ #include <pwd.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+ #include <login.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 		}
+ 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ 
++		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
++		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
++			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
++			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
+		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+ 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,

openssh.spec

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 
 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
 %global openssh_ver 8.4p1
-%global openssh_rel 4
+%global openssh_rel 8
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
 %global pam_ssh_agent_rel 1
 
@@ -201,6 +201,10 @@ Patch967: openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
 Patch968: openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
 Patch969: openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+# https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/6.8/common/015_sshagent.patch.sig
+Patch970: openssh-8.4p1-cve-2021-28041.patch
+# CVE-2021-41617
+Patch978: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
 
 License: BSD
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@@ -387,6 +391,8 @@ popd
 %patch967 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
 %patch968 -p1 -b .seccomp
 %patch969 -p0 -b .debian
+%patch970 -p1 -b .cve-2021-28041
+%patch978 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@@ -669,6 +675,18 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Sep 29 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-8
+- CVE-2021-41617 fix (#2008292)
+
+* Thu Jun 17 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-7
+- Add fix to CVE-2021-28041
+
+* Mon May 24 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-6
+- Hostbased ssh authentication fails if session ID contains a '/' (#1963059)
+
+* Wed Feb 03 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-5 + 0.10.4-1
+- Accept empty labels for keys from PKCS#11 (#1919007)
+
 * Tue Dec 01 2020 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-4 + 0.10.4-1
 - Remove "PasswordAuthentication yes" from vendor configuration as it is
   already default and it might be hard to override.