The code is compiling

Based on Damien Milnes' PR
https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/63

Also rebasing openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch to 9.6 by Dmitry Belyavskiy

.fmf/version

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1

.gitignore

@@ -60,11 +60,3 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz.asc
 /openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz.asc

0005-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From 6ac14fb92cf0d0676f19282f30b9e427025be31b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 05/53] openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe
-
----
- ssh-keyscan.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
-index f9788114d..11618ae8a 100644
---- a/ssh-keyscan.c
-+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
-@@ -776,6 +776,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
- 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
- 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
-+ 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-+
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
- 	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
- 		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0010-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 5f6dbc98a184ce485aef90321ae9fc1ba45293f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 10/53] openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning
-
----
- sshd-session.c | 4 ++++
- sshd_config    | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 1c72e664a..9804dc334 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1103,6 +1103,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			    "enabled authentication methods");
- 	}
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
-+
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 608203e4b..48af6321b 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
-+# problems.
- #UsePAM no
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0016-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From d755d647c33f96cd4ec7d5499d11ecd443bdb098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 16/53] openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote
-
----
- scp.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index c5f573cc1..d97a54cc4 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1148,7 +1148,10 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
- 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
--			addargs(&alist, "-n");
-+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
-+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
-+			else
-+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
- 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
- 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 931f22f77ab2b9cebd96e113f1e3ab179dd1b6cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 18/53] openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory
-
----
- scp.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index d97a54cc4..e1992622f 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1866,6 +1866,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
- 			free(vect[0]);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
-+			errno = ENOTDIR;
-+			goto bad;
-+		}
- 		omode = mode;
- 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0020-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From cce18d636f4137a4e5401170538868b8b80651c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 20/53] openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output
-
----
- servconf.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 5e40f1b00..b63a7f0b0 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -3368,7 +3368,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
--	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
- 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0024-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From 503297ec6f6eef3bb4906271d170fab848e27298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 24/53] openssh-7.5p1-sandbox
-
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index a0692dd2f..e0f2d4289 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -305,6 +305,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
- #endif
-@@ -323,6 +326,21 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_gettid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-@@ -332,6 +350,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0027-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-From d73633dd9770bea0c3802075842398faf3e55e30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 27/53] openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf
-
----
- configure.ac |   1 +
- kex.c        | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index adccaebd4..805be4b5e 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -3182,6 +3182,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 		HMAC_CTX_init \
- 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
- 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
- 	])
- 
- 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index 9a2ce6d88..5f9530908 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
-+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -1077,6 +1082,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
-+static const char *
-+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return SN_sha1;
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return SN_sha256;
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return SN_sha384;
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return SN_sha512;
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-+{
-+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	u_char *key = NULL;
-+	int r, key_len;
-+
-+	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
-+       char keytype = (char)id;
-+
-+	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (md == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (param_bld == NULL) {
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
-+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
-+		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
-+				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
-+				hash, hashlen) &&
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
-+				&keytype, 1);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
-+	if (params == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
-+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
-+#endif
-+	*keyp = key;
-+	key = NULL;
-+	r = 0;
-+
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	free (key);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else
- static int
- derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-@@ -1140,6 +1246,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- 	return r;
- }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
- 
- #define NKEYS	6
- int
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0034-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From e2c0fb233119584b04d61d243cd58433072559c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 34/53] openssh-8.7p1-ibmca
-
----
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-index f61124585..417c20484 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
--#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
-+#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0037-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch

@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-From ef05b1fceddc64cfc7eb40daac60a137634d0a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 37/53] openssh-9.0p1-audit-log
-
----
- audit-bsm.c   |  2 +-
- audit-linux.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- audit.c       | 18 +++++++++---
- audit.h       |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
-index a6292cb8f..0f2ef8235 100644
---- a/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- }
- 
- int
--audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
-index 4d3e9d41e..d2bc0b526 100644
---- a/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/audit-linux.c
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char *audit_username(void);
- 
- static void
--linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
-     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
- {
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-                 hostname = NULL;
- 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
- 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
--	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	close(audit_fd);
- 
-@@ -139,10 +139,12 @@ fatal_report:
- }
- 
- int
--audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
- {
- 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+	const char *rip;
-+	u_int i;
- 
- 	audit_fd = audit_open();
- 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-@@ -152,14 +154,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
- 		else
- 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
-+	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
- 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
--		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
- 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
- 		goto out;
--	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
- 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
--		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+		rip, NULL, rv);
-+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	if (cert) {
-+		char *pbuf;
-+
-+		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
-+		if (pbuf == NULL)
-+			goto out;
-+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
-+			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
-+		free(pbuf);
-+		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
-+		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+			goto out;
-+
-+		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
-+			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
-+			if (pbuf == NULL)
-+				goto out;
-+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
-+			free(pbuf);
-+			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
-+			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
- out:
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	audit_close(audit_fd);
-@@ -181,26 +213,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
- int
- audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
- {
-+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
- 	if (!user_login_count++)
- 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+		    audit_hostname,
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+	    audit_hostname,
- 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
-+	free(audit_hostname);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
- void
- audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
- {
-+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
- 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+	    audit_hostname,
- 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
- 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
- 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+		    audit_hostname,
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+	free(audit_hostname);
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -213,31 +253,41 @@ void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
- 	if (!user_login_count++)
--		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
--	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
- 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
--		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
-+		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
- 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
-+	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
-+
- 	switch(event) {
- 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
- 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
- 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
- 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
--		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname,
- 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-@@ -257,9 +307,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 		if (user_login_count) {
- 			while (user_login_count--)
- 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+				    audit_hostname,
- 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
- 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+			    audit_hostname,
- 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- 		}
-@@ -268,12 +320,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
- 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
-+			audit_hostname,
- 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		debug_f("unhandled event %d", event);
- 		break;
- 	}
-+	free(audit_hostname);
- }
- 
- void
-diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
-index d0433c3a0..28d51a146 100644
---- a/audit.c
-+++ b/audit.c
-@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- void
- audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
- {
--	char *fp;
-+	char *key_fp = NULL;
-+	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
-+	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
- 
--	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
-+	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
-+		cert = key->cert;
-+		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
-+										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
-+	}
-+	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
- 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	free(fp);
-+	if (key_fp)
-+		free(key_fp);
-+	if (issuer_fp)
-+		free(issuer_fp);
- }
- 
- void
-diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
-index 45d66ccff..05ac132cf 100644
---- a/audit.h
-+++ b/audit.h
-@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
- int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
--int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
-+int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
- void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
- void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
- void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0039-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 7167a191776dacf7e31cf8a8a2ed89887e49f4ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 39/53] openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage
-
----
- ssh.1 | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 6a9fbdc5b..755cdef2b 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It BatchMode
- .It BindAddress
- .It BindInterface
--.It CASignatureAlgorithms
- .It CanonicalDomains
- .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
- .It CanonicalizeHostname
- .It CanonicalizeMaxDots
- .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
-+.It CASignatureAlgorithms
- .It CertificateFile
- .It ChannelTimeout
- .It CheckHostIP
-@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It ControlPath
- .It ControlPersist
- .It DynamicForward
-+.It EnableSSHKeysign
- .It EnableEscapeCommandline
- .It EnableSSHKeysign
- .It EscapeChar
-@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It RemoteCommand
- .It RemoteForward
- .It RequestTTY
-+.It RevokedHostKeys
-+.It SecurityKeyProvider
- .It RequiredRSASize
- .It RevokedHostKeys
- .It SecurityKeyProvider
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0041-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch

@@ -1,616 +0,0 @@
-From 1c0d3b6e9868ef31b97be1679389e3db2616eccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 41/53] openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex
-
----
- dh.c      |  98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- kex.c     | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- kex.h     |   6 +++
- kexdh.c   |  52 ++++++++++++++++++--
- kexecdh.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 5 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
-index 8c9a29fa7..ea0a0b093 100644
---- a/dh.c
-+++ b/dh.c
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
- int
- dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
- {
--	int pbits;
--	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
-+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	int pbits, r = 0;
- 
--	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
- 
- 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
- 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
-@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 	if (need < 256)
- 		need = 256;
-+
-+	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	/*
- 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
- 	 * so double requested need here.
- 	 */
--	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
--		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--
--	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
--	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--	return 0;
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
-+		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed key generation");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* reuse context for key generation */
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not create or init context");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate keys");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
-+	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
-+	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* transferred */
-+	pub_key = NULL;
-+	priv_key = NULL;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
-+	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
-+	return r;
- }
- 
- DH *
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index da2a537ce..56c80395c 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -1613,3 +1613,142 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+/* 
-+ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
-+ * The private key can be omitted.
-+ */
-+EVP_PKEY *
-+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
-+  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
-+  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-+  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
-+  	const char *group_name;
-+  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (k == NULL)
-+    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
-+     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
-+                group_name,
-+                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+	}
-+  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
-+    		const EC_GROUP *group;
-+    		size_t len;
-+
-+		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
-+		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
-+		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
-+		    pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len,
-+		    bn_ctx);
-+		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len) != 1) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-+  	free(pub_ser);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
-+    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int r = 0;
-+
-+	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (priv != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return r;
-+}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index cb06e85a3..6daafb159 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
- # include <openssl/bn.h>
- # include <openssl/dh.h>
- # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-+# include <openssl/evp.h>
-+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #  include <openssl/ec.h>
- # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-@@ -316,6 +319,9 @@ int	kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
-     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-+int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
-+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
- 
- #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
- void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
-diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
-index 6d5a7813d..b05277aa1 100644
---- a/kexdh.c
-+++ b/kexdh.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
-@@ -84,9 +88,12 @@ int
- kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
- {
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- 	size_t klen = 0;
--	int kout, r;
-+	int r = 0;
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
-@@ -101,24 +108,59 @@ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
- 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
-+
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
-+	/* import key */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* import peer key 
-+	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
-+	 */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not get key size");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
--	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
-+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not derive key");
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
--	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
- 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
-  out:
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
-index 500ec5725..1a1bae35e 100644
---- a/kexecdh.c
-+++ b/kexecdh.c
-@@ -36,17 +36,57 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- 
- static int
- kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
-     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
- 
-+static EC_KEY *
-+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
-+{
-+	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	const char *group_name;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+out:
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	return client_key;
-+}
-+
- int
- kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- {
-@@ -56,11 +96,7 @@ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
--	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto out;
--	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -102,11 +138,7 @@ kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
- 	*server_blobp = NULL;
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
--	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto out;
--	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -141,11 +173,21 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
--	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
--	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
--	size_t klen = 0;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
-+	size_t klen = 0, publen;
-+	const char *group_name;
- 	int r;
- 
-+	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
-+	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-@@ -154,45 +196,82 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
- 	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-+
-+	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
-+	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	sshbuf_reset(buf);
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
--	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
- #endif
--	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
--	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
--	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
--	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
-+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	*shared_secretp = buf;
- 	buf = NULL;
-  out:
--	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
-+	freezero(pub, publen);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
- }
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0042-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch

@@ -1,332 +0,0 @@
-From 1cd47036353899fe066f5241d3d70778f103c0e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 42/53] openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof
-
----
- compat.c                               |  6 ++++++
- compat.h                               |  2 +-
- monitor.c                              | 27 +++++++++++++++++------
- regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c       |  3 ++-
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c   |  3 ++-
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c   |  3 ++-
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++----------
- serverloop.c                           |  6 +++++-
- ssh-rsa.c                              |  3 ++-
- sshconnect2.c                          |  8 +++++++
- sshd-session.c                         | 21 ++++++++++++++++++
- 11 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
-index b59f0bfc0..4e611dc39 100644
---- a/compat.c
-+++ b/compat.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ void
- compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
- {
- 	int i;
-+	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
- 	static struct {
- 		char	*pat;
- 		int	bugs;
-@@ -125,16 +126,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
- 	};
- 
- 	/* process table, return first match */
-+	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
- 	ssh->compat = 0;
- 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
- 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
- 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
- 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
- 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
- 			return;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
- }
- 
- /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
-diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
-index 1a19060fc..2e6db5bf9 100644
---- a/compat.h
-+++ b/compat.h
-@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
- #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
--/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
-+#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
- #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
- /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
- #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index b2f501790..6c83739ee 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -754,11 +754,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	struct sshkey *pubkey, *key;
- 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
--	char *alg = NULL;
--	size_t datlen, siglen;
--	int r, is_proof = 0, keyid;
--	u_int compat;
-+	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
-+	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
-+	int r, is_proof = 0;
-+	u_int keyid, compat;
- 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
-+	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
- 
- 	debug3_f("entering");
- 
-@@ -816,18 +817,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
--		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
-+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
-+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
-+		} else {
-+			effective_alg = alg;
-+		}
-+		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
- 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
- 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
- 	    auth_sock > 0) {
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
-+				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
-+			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
-+		} else {
-+			effective_alg = alg;
-+		}
- 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
--		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
-+		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
- 	} else
- 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
- 
--	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
-+	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
- 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
- 
- 	sshbuf_reset(m);
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
-index 16c2f2dff..f4700deeb 100644
---- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
-@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, char *cipher, char *mac,
- 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = mac;
- 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = mac;
- 	}
--	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
-+	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
-+		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
- 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
-index e412b75d8..5b06bc905 100644
---- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
- 	sshkey_free(k2);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
-@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
- 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
- 	sshkey_free(k2);
--	TEST_DONE();
-+	TEST_DONE(); */
- 
- 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
-index d0f47d7cf..ba4d506d5 100644
---- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
-@@ -273,13 +273,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
- 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
--	TEST_DONE();
-+	TEST_DONE();*/
- 
- 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
- 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
-index d0c46a90b..7b5e51b83 100644
---- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
-@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
- 	u_char *sigblob;
- 	size_t siglen;
- 
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
-+
- 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
- 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
-@@ -100,8 +103,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
--	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
--	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
-+	if (expected == 0)
-+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
- 
- 	free(sigblob);
- 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
-@@ -118,16 +122,20 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
- {
- 	size_t len;
- 	u_char *sig;
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT crypto policies */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
- 
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
--	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
--	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
--	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
--	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
--	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
--	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
--	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
--	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
-+	if (expected == 0) {
-+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
-+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
-+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
-+		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
-+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
-+	}
- 	free(sig);
- }
- 
-@@ -552,7 +560,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
- 	    NULL), 0);
- 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
--	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
-+	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
- 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
- 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
-diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
-index 5d3b194d1..55411a6b4 100644
---- a/serverloop.c
-+++ b/serverloop.c
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "serverloop.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "compat.h"
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
-@@ -721,7 +722,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
- 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
- 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
- 		}
--
-+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
-+			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
-+		}
- 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
- 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9428df8d1..7843f3e26 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -533,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
--		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
-+		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
-+			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
- 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index f43c81ad9..2d98fc3da 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -1434,6 +1434,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 			retried = 1;
- 			goto retry_pin;
- 		}
-+		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
-+			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
-+
-+			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
-+			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
-+				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
-+		}
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index e49e4fb51..a558bbc33 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1288,6 +1288,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	check_ip_options(ssh);
- 
-+	{
-+		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
-+		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
-+		if (rsakey == NULL)
-+			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
-+
-+		if (rsakey != NULL) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
-+		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
-+		    }
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
- 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
- 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0043-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 1799ea7ad21a579b864a536709d732f4a8e533dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 43/53] openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign
-
----
- ssh_config.5 | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 8ac5e1633..a06fbfa11 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ or
- This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
- See
- .Xr ssh-keysign 8
--for more information.
-+for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly.
- .It Cm EscapeChar
- Sets the escape character (default:
- .Ql ~ ) .
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0044-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch

@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-From 21202362f4ddaeb630d873fb426039004ac82338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 44/53] openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem
-
----
- kex-names.c         |  23 +++-
- kexmlkem768x25519.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 313 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
-index 1360a4095..9c96e5cb0 100644
---- a/kex-names.c
-+++ b/kex-names.c
-@@ -109,6 +109,19 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
- 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1, 0},
- };
- 
-+static int is_mlkem768_available()
-+{
-+	static int is_fetched = -1;
-+
-+	if (is_fetched == -1) {
-+		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
-+		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
-+		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
-+	}
-+
-+	return is_fetched;
-+}
-+
- static char *
- kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
- {
-@@ -116,8 +129,12 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
- 	const struct kexalg *k;
- 	char sep_str[2] = {sep, '\0'};
- 
--	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++)
-+	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
-+			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
-+			continue;
- 		xextendf(&ret, sep_str, "%s", k->name);
-+	}
- 
- 	return ret;
- }
-@@ -139,6 +156,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- 	const struct kexalg *k;
- 
-+	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
-+		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
-+	return NULL;
-+
- 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- 			return k;
-diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
-index 2585d1db3..ab6167221 100644
---- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
-+++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
-@@ -44,10 +44,127 @@
- #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
- 
- #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+
-+static int
-+mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
-+{
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+    int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
-+    if (ctx == NULL) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
-+        || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
-+	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
-+	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
-+	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+    ret = 0;
-+
-+ err:
-+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
-+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
-+{
-+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
-+	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
-+
-+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
-+		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
-+    if (pkey == NULL) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
-+    if (ctx == NULL
-+	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
-+        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
-+	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
-+	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+    r = 0;
-+
-+ err:
-+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
-+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+
-+    return r;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
-+{
-+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
-+	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
-+
-+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
-+		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
-+    if (pkey == NULL) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
-+    if (ctx == NULL
-+	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
-+        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
-+	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
-+	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	goto err;
-+    }
-+    r = 0;
-+
-+ err:
-+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+
-+    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
-+	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+
-+    return r;
-+}
- 
- int
- kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
- 	size_t need;
-@@ -82,6 +199,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
-+#else
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	u_char *cp = NULL;
-+	size_t need;
-+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
-+	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
-+#endif
-+	cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
-+	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+#endif
-+	/* success */
-+	r = 0;
-+	kex->client_pub = buf;
-+	buf = NULL;
-+ out:
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	return r;
-+#endif
- }
- 
- int
-@@ -89,6 +236,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
-    const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
-    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	const u_char *client_pub;
-@@ -181,12 +329,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
- 	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
-+#else
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	const u_char *client_pub;
-+	u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t need;
-+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
-+
-+	*server_blobp = NULL;
-+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
-+
-+	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
-+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
-+	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
-+	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
-+	    client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
-+	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
-+	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
-+	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
-+	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	/* append ECDH shared key */
-+	client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
-+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+	dump_digest("server cipher text:",
-+	    enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
-+	dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
-+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
-+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	/* success */
-+	r = 0;
-+	*server_blobp = server_blob;
-+	*shared_secretp = buf;
-+	server_blob = NULL;
-+	buf = NULL;
-+ out:
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
-+	explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	return r;
-+#endif
- }
- 
- int
- kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
-     const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
- 	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
-@@ -254,6 +487,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
- 	explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
-+#else
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
-+	size_t need;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
-+
-+	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
-+	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
-+	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
-+	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
-+#endif
-+	if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
-+	    buf, 1)) < 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
-+	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
-+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
-+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
-+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
-+#endif
-+	/* success */
-+	r = 0;
-+	*shared_secretp = buf;
-+	buf = NULL;
-+ out:
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	return r;
-+#endif
- }
- #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
- int
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0045-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From edbbdc306c1710dae777ef315a0d2c5f43134d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 14:53:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 45/53] openssh-9.9p2-error_processing
-
----
- ssh-agent.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index df241379c..dc246066d 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -1346,6 +1346,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
- 	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
- 	    k == NULL ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
-+		if (!r) /* k == NULL */
-+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		error_fr(r, "parse");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0046-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 0772377e00b13f5afaa1b146ce32d0218e9f0d24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 15:11:59 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 46/53] Provide better error for non-supported private keys
-
-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
----
- sshkey.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 394d9b105..eba55ef92 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -3539,6 +3539,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
- 			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		}
- 	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
-+#ifdef ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER
-+	case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
-+#endif
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 	}
- 	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0047-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From d458a65ccac2283563c0fc0962519bb5a9bbd315 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:52:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 47/53] Ignore bad hostkeys in known_hosts file
-
-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
----
- hostfile.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- hostfile.h |  1 +
- ssh.c      |  2 ++
- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
-index 4cec57da5..652d15762 100644
---- a/hostfile.c
-+++ b/hostfile.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
- #include "hmac.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- 
-+static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
-+
-+void
-+hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
-+{
-+	required_rsa_size = size;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
- 
- static int
-@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
- 	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
- 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
- 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
-+	int r = 0;
- 
- 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
- 		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
-@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+		debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
-+		    l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
- 	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
- 	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
-diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
-index a24a4e329..0e9b1a19a 100644
---- a/hostfile.h
-+++ b/hostfile.h
-@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
-     const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
- 
- void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
-+void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
- 
- #endif
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 7d6ba516e..320ac6834 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "myproposal.h"
- #include "utf8.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-@@ -1409,6 +1410,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
- 		}
- 	}
-+	hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
- 	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
- 		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
- 
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0048-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch

@@ -1,450 +0,0 @@
-From 1cf5e40e14d707de2318747758b012fc7245cb7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 48/53] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
-
-RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
-associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
-name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
-to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
-may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
-issuance process.
-
-Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
-GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
-that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
-on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
-
-Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
-
-Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
----
- configure.ac    |   1 +
- gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
- servconf.h      |   2 +
- ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
- sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
- 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 805be4b5e..9d3b19925 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -5050,6 +5050,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
- 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
- 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
-+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
- 
- 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
- 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "match.h"
- 
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
-@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
-+ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
-+ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
-+ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
-+ */
-+
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
-+{
-+	int ret;
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	/* Check indicators */
-+	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
-+					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
-+		/* negative or positive match */
-+		if (ret != 0) {
-+			*matched = i;
-+			return ret;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	/* No rule matched */
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
-  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
-  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
-@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- {
- 	krb5_principal princ;
--	int retval;
-+	int retval, matched;
- 	const char *errmsg;
- 	int k5login_exists;
- 
-@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 	if (k5login_exists &&
- 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
- 		retval = 1;
--		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
--		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
- 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
- 		name, k5login_exists)) {
- 		retval = 1;
--		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
--		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
--		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
- 	} else
- 		retval = 0;
- 
-+	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
-+		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
-+		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
-+		retval = 0;
-+		if (client->indicators) {
-+			matched = -1;
-+			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
-+			if (retval != 0) {
-+				retval = (retval == 1);
-+				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
-+					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
-+					client->indicators[matched],
-+					(char *)client->displayname.value,
-+				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
-+				goto cont;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if (retval == 0) {
-+			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
-+				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
-+			(char *)client->displayname.value);
-+		}
-+	}
-+cont:
-+	if (retval == 1) {
-+		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
-+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
-+	}
- 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- 	return retval;
- }
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index d2bc03486..be80e17ca 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
-     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
--    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-+    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
- 
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
- 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
- 
-+
-+/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
-+ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
-+ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
-+ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
-+
-+#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
-+
-+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
-+static OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+	gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
-+	gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
-+	size_t count, i;
-+
-+	ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
-+				      &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
-+	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+		return (ctx->major);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
-+		/* No indicators in the ticket */
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+
-+	count = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
-+		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
-+		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
-+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
-+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
-+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
-+			continue;
-+		count++;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (count == 0) {
-+		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
-+		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+
-+	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
-+	count = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
-+		authenticated = 0;
-+		complete = 0;
-+		more = -1;
-+		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
-+		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
-+		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
-+			    attrs->elements[i].value,
-+			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
-+			continue;
-+		/* retrieve all indicators */
-+		while (more != 0) {
-+			value.value = NULL;
-+			display_value.value = NULL;
-+			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
-+					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
-+					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
-+			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+				goto out;
-+			}
-+
-+			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
-+				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
-+				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
-+				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
-+				count++;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+out:
-+	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
-+	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
-+	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
-+	return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+
- /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
-  * be called once for a context */
- 
-@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 	}
- 
- 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
-+	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
-+	    ctx->client, client))) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+		return (ctx->major);
-+	}
- 
- 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
- ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
- {
- 	OM_uint32 lmin;
-+	size_t i;
- 
- 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
- 
-@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
- 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
-+
-+			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
-+				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
-+				}
-+				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
-+			}
-+
- 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
- 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
- 			return 0;
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index f78615c28..e53e8ea30 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
-+	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
- 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
-@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
--	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
-+	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -687,6 +688,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -696,6 +698,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1722,6 +1725,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sGssIndicators:
-+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
-+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
-+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
-+		if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
-+			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
-+		break;
-+
- 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3344,6 +3356,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
- #endif
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index c08cf6a7a..c7cec5ece 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	char   **allow_groups;
- 	u_int num_deny_groups;
- 	char   **deny_groups;
-+	char   *gss_indicators;
- 
- 	u_int num_subsystems;
- 	char   **subsystem_name;
-@@ -308,6 +309,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
- 		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
- 		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
- 		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
-+		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 329dc9da0..1506719a9 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
- #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
-+#include <gssapi_ext.h>
-+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
-+#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef KRB5
- # ifndef HEIMDAL
- #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-@@ -112,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
- 	int used;
- 	int updated;
-+	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
- 
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index c172d5aab..676d6d4d2 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
-+Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
-+mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
-+authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
-+.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
-+When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
-+will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
-+indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
-+.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
-+is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
-+policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
-+access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
-+rejected.
-+.Pp
-+By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
-+indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
-+to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
-+preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
-+authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
-+(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
-+indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
-+inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
-+.Pp
-+Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
-+particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
-+FreeIPA environments:
-+.Pp
-+.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
-+.It Cm hardened
-+SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
-+.It Cm pkinit
-+smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
-+.It Cm radius
-+pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
-+.It Cm otp
-+TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
-+.It Cm idp
-+OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
-+and device authorization grant flow
-+.It Cm passkey
-+FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
-+.El
-+.Pp
-+The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- The default is handled system-wide by
- .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
--- 
-2.52.0
-

0050-Provide-a-way-to-disable-GSSAPIDelegateCredentials-s.patch

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-From 71190d3d862113d97708a42b4a7daa7aa3c4e0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 14:55:38 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 50/53] Provide a way to disable GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- server-side
-
----
- gss-serv.c    |  5 +++++
- servconf.c    | 13 ++++++++++++-
- servconf.h    |  1 +
- sshd_config.0 |  3 +++
- sshd_config.5 |  3 +++
- 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index be80e17ca..165484db0 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -509,6 +509,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
-+	if (options.gss_deleg_creds == 0) {
-+		debug_f("delegate credential is disabled, doing nothing");
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
- 		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index e53e8ea30..fb1d150cd 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
- 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
- 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
-@@ -396,6 +397,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 		options->gss_keyex = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
-+		options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
- 		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-@@ -591,7 +594,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
- 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
--	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssDelegateCreds,
-+	sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- 	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -693,6 +698,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1705,6 +1711,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssDelegateCreds:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3352,6 +3362,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index c7cec5ece..9b1a73b8d 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* If true, accept delegated GSS credentials */
- 	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
- 	int 	gss_store_rekey;
- 	char   *gss_kex_algorithms;	/* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
-diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
-index 8c5217c0b..cda9c9182 100644
---- a/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/sshd_config.0
-@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
-              cache on logout.  The default is yes.
- 
-+     GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
-+             Accept delegated credentials on the server side.  The default is yes.
-+
-      GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-              Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
-              acceptor a client authenticates against.  If set to yes then the
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 676d6d4d2..4ae4bebee 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -733,6 +733,9 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
-+Accept delegated credentials on the server side.  The default is
-+.CM yes .
- .It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
- Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
- access control. Further details are described in
--- 
-2.52.0
-

1000-openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-From aecc5861e1cf7094a32f893ae4bfd8409b77e5cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 14:25:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 53/53] openssh-6.7p1-coverity
-
----
- auth-krb5.c                   | 2 ++
- gss-genr.c                    | 3 ++-
- krl.c                         | 3 +++
- loginrec.c                    | 2 ++
- misc.c                        | 3 +++
- monitor.c                     | 4 ++--
- openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 2 +-
- openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c  | 8 ++++----
- readconf.c                    | 1 +
- servconf.c                    | 5 +++--
- serverloop.c                  | 2 +-
- 11 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index b9c261a24..a37be93c3 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
- 		umask(old_umask);
- 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
- 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 
-@@ -434,6 +435,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- 			close(tmpfd);
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
-index f2d6f59e5..91602e045 100644
---- a/gss-genr.c
-+++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -178,8 +178,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
- 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
--
-+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
- 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
- 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
-diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
-index bea5b1b98..4dd8a24a9 100644
---- a/krl.c
-+++ b/krl.c
-@@ -1205,6 +1205,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1215,6 +1216,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1226,6 +1228,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
-index 7d1c9dd43..a017e173b 100644
---- a/loginrec.c
-+++ b/loginrec.c
-@@ -677,9 +677,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
- 	 */
- 
- 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
- # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
- # endif
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index 2fd14159d..d4c4e4164 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -1573,6 +1573,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
- 	}
- 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(nullfd);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- }
- 
- char *
-@@ -2773,6 +2775,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
- 	}
- 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(devnull);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 2f154a3d7..f959e0124 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	/* Wait for the child's exit status */
-@@ -1819,7 +1819,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- 
- 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
--
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
- 	return (0);
- 
-  error:
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-index 346c7fe56..f42792fde 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
-index 26bdc3e08..8e2939b95 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
-@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
- static void
- pselect_notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2_f("reading");
- 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- 	}
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index b6ad47b49..75e1c953c 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -2170,6 +2170,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
- 			} else if (r != 0) {
- 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
- 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
-+				free(arg2);
- 				goto out;
- 			}
- 			free(arg2);
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 956205f6d..1093dcbac 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -2307,8 +2307,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
-index 55411a6b4..acc721cd1 100644
---- a/serverloop.c
-+++ b/serverloop.c
-@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		debug_f("invalid tun");
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,7 @@
-From d124ab0f6eea910dc5f03cdd808f6fa792bf2b7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 08/53] openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info
-
----
- contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 8 ++++++--
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-index cb7152dc8..bbe93d838 100644
---- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
  
  	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
  	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
@@ -26,6 +16,3 @@ index cb7152dc8..bbe93d838 100644
  	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
  
  	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,7 @@
-From c62cd7ce2539c1eac6d0133c07441c617cbc7bc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 07/53] openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress
-
----
- contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
---- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
@@ -19,7 +9,7 @@ index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
+@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -37,7 +27,7 @@ index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
  static int
  passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  {
-@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ 	const char *failed;
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
  	int buttons, default_response;
@@ -46,7 +36,7 @@ index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
  	GdkColor fg, bg;
  	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
-@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
  		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
  	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
@@ -55,12 +45,12 @@ index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
 +		    FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
- 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
- 		if (fg_set)
- 			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
- 		if (bg_set)
- 			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
- 		gtk_box_pack_start(
+		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		if (fg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+		if (bg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(
 -		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
 -		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
 +		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
@@ -68,7 +58,7 @@ index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
  		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
  		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
  		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
-@@ -225,6 +242,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
  			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
  			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
  		}
@@ -91,6 +81,3 @@ index a62f98152..cb7152dc8 100644
  	}
  
  	/* Grab focus */
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
+--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
+@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
++ 
++	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
++
+	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
+ 

openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch

@@ -1,18 +1,7 @@
-From f653eed40e15c4c521ce683a604b46ed81cade6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 04/53] openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man
-
----
- ssh.1  | 2 ++
- sshd.8 | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 697f4e42a..db92ac9af 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
  .Nm
  exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
  if an error occurred.
@@ -21,11 +10,10 @@ index 697f4e42a..db92ac9af 100644
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 7fbca776a..0226a8303 100644
---- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -1018,6 +1018,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
+--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
+@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
  started last).
  The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
  .El
@@ -34,6 +22,3 @@ index 7fbca776a..0226a8303 100644
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
++			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
++				addargs(&alist, "-t");
++			else
++				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);

openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -1,25 +1,7 @@
-From 674851677d1e38cf6992948f8f452e46107a2014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 17/53] openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot
-
----
- log.c              | 11 +++++++++--
- log.h              |  1 +
- monitor.c          | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- monitor.h          |  2 +-
- session.c          | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
- sftp-server-main.c |  2 +-
- sftp-server.c      |  6 +++---
- sftp.h             |  2 +-
- sshd-session.c     |  7 ++++++-
- 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
-index 5969c4a16..49b0c8a68 100644
---- a/log.c
-+++ b/log.c
-@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ void
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
+@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
  log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
      int on_stderr)
  {
@@ -31,7 +13,7 @@ index 5969c4a16..49b0c8a68 100644
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
-@@ -208,8 +213,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
  		exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -44,10 +26,9 @@ index 5969c4a16..49b0c8a68 100644
  
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
-diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
-index 8e8dfc23f..70048a8af 100644
---- a/log.h
-+++ b/log.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
  typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
@@ -56,11 +37,43 @@ index 8e8dfc23f..70048a8af 100644
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index d463d6a9c..453469665 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -2007,9 +2007,22 @@ monitor_init(void)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
+@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
++
+ 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+ 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
++
+ 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	/* Log it */
+ 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+-	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
+ 	free(msg);
+@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+ 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+ 
++	mon->m_state = "";
++
+ 	return mon;
  }
  
  void
@@ -85,11 +98,14 @@ index d463d6a9c..453469665 100644
  }
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index dbc7e0037..d4d631ddc 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct monitor {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
+ 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
+ 	pid_t			 m_pid;
++	char		*m_state;
  };
  
  struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
@@ -98,11 +114,10 @@ index dbc7e0037..d4d631ddc 100644
  
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
@@ -110,7 +125,7 @@ index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
  
  /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
  static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -632,6 +633,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  	int ret;
  	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
  	char session_type[1024];
@@ -118,7 +133,7 @@ index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
  
  	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
  		original_command = command;
-@@ -691,6 +693,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  			tty += 5;
  	}
  
@@ -129,7 +144,7 @@ index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
  	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    session_type,
  	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1469,14 +1475,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
@@ -144,7 +159,7 @@ index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1609,8 +1607,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
  			exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -153,10 +168,10 @@ index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
  	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
  
  	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1638,9 +1634,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
- #endif
+@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
 -		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
 +		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
  	}
@@ -172,31 +187,29 @@ index b8a2dae92..d034f5c65 100644
  	fflush(NULL);
  
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
-index 2c70f89bc..bbb79f278 100644
---- a/sftp-server-main.c
-+++ b/sftp-server-main.c
-@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
--	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
-index 777821acd..185ad1459 100644
---- a/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/sftp-server.c
-@@ -1897,7 +1897,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
  int
 -sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
  {
- 	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
- 	ssize_t len, olen;
-@@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+	ssize_t len, olen;
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  	extern char *__progname;
  
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
@@ -205,7 +218,7 @@ index 777821acd..185ad1459 100644
  
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
-@@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -214,23 +227,21 @@ index 777821acd..185ad1459 100644
  
  	/*
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
-index 2bde8bb7f..ddf1a3968 100644
---- a/sftp.h
-+++ b/sftp.h
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
  
- struct passwd;
- 
--int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 028d5850e..4a5eaa1ff 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
- #endif
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ 	}
  
  	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
@@ -238,7 +249,7 @@ index 028d5850e..4a5eaa1ff 100644
  
  	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
  	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -434,6 +434,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  
  	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
@@ -250,6 +261,3 @@ index 028d5850e..4a5eaa1ff 100644
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
  	demote_sensitive_data();
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- a/scp.c	
++++ a/scp.c	
+@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
++			errno = ENOTDIR;
++			goto bad;
++		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 

openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
++#include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ void
+ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+-	security_context_t *ctx;
++	char *ctx;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
++{
++	int len;
++	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
++	const char *contexts_path;
++	FILE *contexts_file;
++	struct stat sb;
++
++	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
++	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
++		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
++		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
++	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
++		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		    " and not writable by anyone else");
++		fclose(contexts_file);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
++		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
++		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
++			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
++				break;
++			line[len] = '\0';
++		}
++
++		if (line[0] == '\0')
++			continue;
++
++		cp = line;
++		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++
++		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
++				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
++				fclose(contexts_file);
++				return;
++			}
++			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
++		}
++	}
++	fclose(contexts_file);
++
++	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
++		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		    " SELinux context file");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
++	free(preauth_context);
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(date 1703108053912)
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
+ 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
+ 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
+
+-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
+ 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+ 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+ 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the child */

openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -1,21 +1,7 @@
-From ef91c84a26a282adaf95e165ebcdd44a410c4328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 19/53] openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users
-
----
- gss-serv-krb5.c |  3 +--
- servconf.c      | 13 ++++++++++++-
- servconf.h      |  1 +
- sshd_config     |  1 +
- sshd_config.5   |  6 ++++++
- 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 187faf929..03188d9b3 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
+@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  	FILE *fp;
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	char *line = NULL;
@@ -23,7 +9,7 @@ index 187faf929..03188d9b3 100644
  	struct stat st;
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
  	int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -32,19 +18,18 @@ index 187faf929..03188d9b3 100644
                  return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
                                          k5login_exists);
  	}
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
+@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
  	options->use_kuserok = -1;
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -396,6 +397,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  #endif
  	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
  		options->use_kuserok = 1;
@@ -53,16 +38,16 @@ index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -579,7 +582,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
  	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
- 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
  	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -675,6 +678,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -70,7 +55,8 @@ index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
  #else
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -78,7 +64,7 @@ index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
  #endif
  	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -2440,6 +2445,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
  		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -86,10 +72,10 @@ index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sMatch:
- 		if (cmdline)
- 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -3007,6 +3016,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
@@ -97,7 +83,7 @@ index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -3316,6 +3326,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
@@ -105,35 +91,21 @@ index 8f4b2b43e..5e40f1b00 100644
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 11de36a23..c08cf6a7a 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
- 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
  	int	use_kuserok;
 +	int		enable_k5users;
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index ea5a878e6..33713c886 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index c360fcfff..a0fc6064f 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -739,6 +739,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
+@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -146,6 +118,14 @@ index c360fcfff..a0fc6064f 100644
  .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
  doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will

openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,7 @@
-From 7ffeef7e8218c544b6f4a09c5d43e9b748de5a5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 03/53] openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts
-
----
- sshd-session.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index cb4b0523d..1c72e664a 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -754,12 +754,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
  	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@@ -48,8 +38,5 @@ index cb4b0523d..1c72e664a 100644
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
  	}
+ 	return;
  #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
- }
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,5 @@
-From 577b0fea53270292bd0b4979eb5369619b2f5adb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 12/53] openssh-6.6p1-force_krb
-
----
- gss-serv-krb5.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- session.c       |  23 +++++++
- ssh-gss.h       |   4 ++
- sshd.8          |   7 +++
- 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
+index 413b845..54dd383 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
@@ -24,7 +12,7 @@ index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@
+@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
  
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
@@ -32,7 +20,7 @@ index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
  extern ServerOptions options;
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -55,6 +58,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
  # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
  #endif
  
@@ -46,7 +34,7 @@ index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	int retval;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -54,7 +42,7 @@ index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
  
  	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
  		return 0;
-@@ -98,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		return 0;
  	}
@@ -78,7 +66,7 @@ index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  
-@@ -109,6 +132,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	return retval;
  }
  
@@ -217,10 +205,10 @@ index 8d2b677f7..14502c5a6 100644
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
 diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index b8f0c1a58..3eae5bdf3 100644
+index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
 --- a/session.c
 +++ b/session.c
-@@ -642,6 +642,29 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
  		command = auth_opts->force_command;
  		forced = "(key-option)";
  	}
@@ -251,7 +239,7 @@ index b8f0c1a58..3eae5bdf3 100644
  	if (forced != NULL) {
  		s->forced = 1;
 diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 8ec451926..db34d77f4 100644
+index 0374c88..509109a 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
 @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
@@ -266,10 +254,10 @@ index 8ec451926..db34d77f4 100644
  
  /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 0226a8303..e2d8ff003 100644
+index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
  The client tries to authenticate itself using
  host-based authentication,
  public key authentication,
@@ -277,7 +265,7 @@ index 0226a8303..e2d8ff003 100644
  challenge-response authentication,
  or password authentication.
  .Pp
-@@ -874,6 +875,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
  but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
  rlogin/rsh.
  .Pp
@@ -290,6 +278,3 @@ index 0226a8303..e2d8ff003 100644
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
  and authentication information.
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,129 +1,7 @@
-From 5f16fff915643a515adbbd2e0cd12717938e3570 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 02/53] openssh-6.6p1-keycat
-
----
- HOWTO.ssh-keycat                 |  12 ++
- Makefile.in                      |   8 +-
- configure.ac                     |   6 +
- misc.c                           |   7 +
- openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c |  42 +++++-
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   1 +
- platform.c                       |   2 +-
- ssh-keycat.c                     | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 8 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 HOWTO.ssh-keycat
- create mode 100644 ssh-keycat.c
-
-diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..630ec628c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
-@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
-+The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-+of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
-+polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled.
-+
-+To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
-+        AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
-+        AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
-+
-+Do not forget to enable public key authentication:
-+        PubkeyAuthentication yes
-+
-+
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index ba17a79f0..a3a495c1b 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
- ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
-+SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
- SSHD_AUTH=$(libexecdir)/sshd-auth
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
- K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
-+KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
- LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
- LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
- LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@
-@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
- 
- LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
- 	ssh_api.o \
-@@ -252,6 +254,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
- ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
- 
-+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
- 
-@@ -439,6 +444,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index db5211013..fd632a5a8 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -3648,6 +3648,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 			PAM_MSG="yes"
- 
- 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
- 
-@@ -3658,6 +3659,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 					;;
- 				*)
- 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- 					;;
- 				esac
- 			fi
-@@ -4883,6 +4885,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
- 
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5894,6 +5897,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
- 
- echo ""
- 
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index 5bed34735..7e27a38d1 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -2921,6 +2921,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
  			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
  			_exit(1);
  		}
@@ -137,13 +15,88 @@ index 5bed34735..7e27a38d1 100644
  		if (env != NULL)
  			execve(av[0], av, env);
  		else
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index b9fbe38b7..4d56745f7 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+--- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
++++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
++of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
++polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled.
++
++To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
++        AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
++        AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
++
++Do not forget to enable public key authentication:
++        PubkeyAuthentication yes
++
++
+diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
+--- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
++++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
++SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
++KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
+ AR=@AR@
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ 
++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ 
+@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
+@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
  
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@@ -162,7 +115,7 @@ index b9fbe38b7..4d56745f7 100644
  /* Send audit message */
  static int
  sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-@@ -317,7 +331,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -171,14 +124,14 @@ index b9fbe38b7..4d56745f7 100644
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -328,16 +342,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
- 	if (inetd_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
@@ -191,7 +144,7 @@ index b9fbe38b7..4d56745f7 100644
  
  	if (role != NULL)
  		free(role);
-@@ -345,6 +359,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  	return rv;
  }
  
@@ -216,7 +169,7 @@ index b9fbe38b7..4d56745f7 100644
  /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
  void
  sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -353,7 +385,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
  	int r = 0;
  	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
  
@@ -225,23 +178,19 @@ index b9fbe38b7..4d56745f7 100644
  		return;
  
  	if (options.use_pam) {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index 055c825e4..c004071d1 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t *ctx;
  
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
  
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
-index bcf1b0491..c92a0cba6 100644
---- a/platform.c
-+++ b/platform.c
-@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
  {
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
@@ -250,11 +199,9 @@ index bcf1b0491..c92a0cba6 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..5678be079
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh-keycat.c
+diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
++++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -497,6 +444,41 @@ index 000000000..5678be079
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+ 
+@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 

openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -1,22 +1,7 @@
-From d0c2e8ddde548c79144547152b523346ae9f0358 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 15/53] openssh-6.6p1-kuserok
-
----
- auth-krb5.c     |  20 ++++++++-
- gss-serv-krb5.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- servconf.c      |  13 +++++-
- servconf.h      |   1 +
- sshd_config     |   1 +
- sshd_config.5   |   5 +++
- 6 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 4910aa38a..b9c261a24 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -55,6 +55,21 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
@@ -38,7 +23,7 @@ index 4910aa38a..b9c261a24 100644
  static int
  krb5_init(void *context)
  {
-@@ -158,8 +173,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
@@ -50,11 +35,10 @@ index 4910aa38a..b9c261a24 100644
  		problem = -1;
  		goto out;
  	}
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 820f794cf..187faf929 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
      int);
  
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
@@ -62,7 +46,7 @@ index 820f794cf..187faf929 100644
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
  
-@@ -91,6 +92,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
   * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
   */
  
@@ -166,7 +150,7 @@ index 820f794cf..187faf929 100644
  static int
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  {
-@@ -115,7 +213,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
  	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
  	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
  	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
@@ -176,7 +160,7 @@ index 820f794cf..187faf929 100644
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
  		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
  	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
@@ -188,19 +172,18 @@ index 820f794cf..187faf929 100644
  	}
  	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
  		int saved_errno = errno;
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 7bf1507df..8f4b2b43e 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -393,6 +394,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
  		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
  #endif
@@ -209,16 +192,16 @@ index 7bf1507df..8f4b2b43e 100644
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -561,7 +564,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
- 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-@@ -653,12 +656,14 @@ static struct {
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
  	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -233,18 +216,18 @@ index 7bf1507df..8f4b2b43e 100644
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -2431,6 +2436,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
+@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+		}
+		break;
+
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sMatch:
- 		if (cmdline)
- 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -2997,6 +3006,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
@@ -252,19 +235,18 @@ index 7bf1507df..8f4b2b43e 100644
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -3305,6 +3315,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
 +	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index a4a38d6d7..11de36a23 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ typedef struct {
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
+@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
  						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
@@ -272,23 +254,10 @@ index a4a38d6d7..11de36a23 100644
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 8db9f0fb1..ea5a878e6 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index cae0fd0b4..c360fcfff 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1040,6 +1040,10 @@ The default value
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
+@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  .Cm no
  can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
  user account.
@@ -297,9 +266,9 @@ index cae0fd0b4..c360fcfff 100644
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- offer to clients.
-@@ -1354,6 +1358,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm IPQoS ,
  .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
  .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
@@ -307,6 +276,14 @@ index cae0fd0b4..c360fcfff 100644
  .Cm LogLevel ,
  .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
  .Cm MaxSessions ,
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no

openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 	debug3_f("done");
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
++		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 
+ 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+ 
+-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (in_chroot == 0)
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr,
+ 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		setexeccon(NULL);
+-#endif
+ #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ 		    (char *)NULL);
+@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (privsep_chroot) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	if (1) {
++#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
++	if (0) {
++		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
+ #else
+ 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+ #endif

openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
+@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
+@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 
+ 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+ 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+ 
+@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+ 
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
+@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
+@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
+@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
+@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			free(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (newstr)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+-	else
++	else {
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++		free(gss);
++	     }
++	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
++			freezero(blob, blen);
++			blob = NULL;
++			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;

openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,6 @@
-From 57ae33c2f43425725345c910d90ef6fed75d3b85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 21/53] openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission
-
----
- sftp-server.8 |  7 +++++++
- sftp-server.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
-index 5311bf929..5e6e3aa44 100644
---- a/sftp-server.8
-+++ b/sftp-server.8
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
  .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
@@ -33,11 +22,10 @@ index 5311bf929..5e6e3aa44 100644
  .El
  .Pp
  On some systems,
-diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
-index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
---- a/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/sftp-server.c
-@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
+@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
  /* Version of client */
  static u_int version;
  
@@ -48,7 +36,7 @@ index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
  /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
  static int init_done;
  
-@@ -741,6 +745,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	Attrib a;
  	char *name;
  	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@@ -56,7 +44,7 @@ index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -750,6 +755,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
  	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
  	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@@ -67,7 +55,7 @@ index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
  	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
  	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
  	if (readonly &&
-@@ -771,6 +780,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  			}
  		}
  	}
@@ -76,7 +64,7 @@ index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
  	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
  		send_status(id, status);
  	free(name);
-@@ -1890,7 +1901,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  	fprintf(stderr,
  	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
  	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
@@ -85,7 +73,7 @@ index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
  	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
  	    __progname, __progname);
  	exit(1);
-@@ -1914,7 +1925,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
+@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
  	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -94,7 +82,7 @@ index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'Q':
  			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1976,6 +1987,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
+@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
  			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
  			break;
@@ -110,6 +98,3 @@ index 185ad1459..e04fc63b3 100644
  		case 'h':
  		default:
  			sftp_server_usage();
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
+--- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
++++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
+@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);

openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -1,19 +1,7 @@
-From ffa3fdb2ad2c7afc91993d9301e35d2e9a83ea47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 36/53] openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition
-
----
- monitor_wrap.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- monitor_wrap.h |  2 ++
- session.c      | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index fb44ae733..17a6c9786 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1426,4 +1426,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
+@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
@@ -64,11 +52,10 @@ index fb44ae733..17a6c9786 100644
 +	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
 +}
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 1bcbfd305..2b814dbd1 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
+@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
  void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
@@ -77,11 +64,10 @@ index 1bcbfd305..2b814dbd1 100644
  #endif
  
  struct Session;
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
  login_cap_t *lc;
  #endif
  
@@ -92,7 +78,7 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
  static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -358,6 +362,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -101,7 +87,7 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
  #define USE_PIPES 1
  /*
   * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
-@@ -481,6 +487,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
  		close(err[0]);
  #endif
  
@@ -110,7 +96,7 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
  		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
  		do_child(ssh, s, command);
  		/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -595,6 +603,9 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
  		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
  		close(ttyfd);
  
@@ -120,22 +106,22 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
  		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
  #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
  		do_login(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -729,6 +740,8 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
  	}
  	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
+ 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -744,6 +757,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
  	 */
  	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
  
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (ret == 0) {
++	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@@ -150,7 +136,7 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
  	return ret;
  }
  
-@@ -1490,6 +1517,33 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
  }
  
@@ -161,11 +147,12 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++	if (use_privsep)
++		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	/* FIXME beldmit destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); */
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@@ -184,12 +171,12 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
  /*
   * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
   * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1507,13 +1561,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
  
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
--	/* remove keys from memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
+-	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@@ -198,6 +185,3 @@ index 107edcf91..80282dfd8 100644
  	/* Force a password change */
  	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
  		do_setusercontext(pw);
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -1,20 +1,8 @@
-From 0b19c3dabb1e23837238e90238f1ab5fa3c99df8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 14/53] openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory
-
----
- auth-krb5.c     | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- auth.h          |  2 ++
- gss-serv-krb5.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
- sshd.8          |  4 ++++
- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
 diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 035032221..4910aa38a 100644
+index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
 --- a/auth-krb5.c
 +++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -465,5 +465,21 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
  		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
  	}
  }
@@ -37,10 +25,10 @@ index 035032221..4910aa38a 100644
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 10e88e11f..391630350 100644
+index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
  
  #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
  krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
@@ -50,10 +38,10 @@ index 10e88e11f..391630350 100644
  
  #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index df55512d3..820f794cf 100644
+index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -144,8 +144,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
  {
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
@@ -83,10 +71,10 @@ index df55512d3..820f794cf 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index e2d8ff003..fa33f5232 100644
+index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
  These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
  Further details are described in
  .Xr ksu 1 .
@@ -97,6 +85,3 @@ index e2d8ff003..fa33f5232 100644
  .Pp
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,21 @@
-From 25b593f41fa85bcaf1bbdc9c368325c4af033208 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 22/53] openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom
+Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
+
+All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
+sshd process to handle a new client connection is
+spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
+without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
+files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
+closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
+
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
 
 ---
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-index 49a4f35ff..f61124585 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -140,7 +140,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
  	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
  	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
  		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
@@ -45,6 +49,4 @@ index 49a4f35ff..f61124585 100644
  	}
  	(void) closedir(dirp);
  	return;
--- 
-2.52.0
 

openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch

@@ -1,32 +1,22 @@
-From d6dc5be6e969ecffe30b9972706b3c92d930d81f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 06/53] openssh-7.2p2-x11
-
----
- channels.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
 diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 80014ff34..5ce6bd400 100644
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -5169,11 +5169,13 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+--- a/channels.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/channels.c	(date 1703026069921)
+@@ -5075,11 +5075,13 @@
  }
- 
+
  static int
 -connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
 +connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
  {
  	int sock;
  	struct sockaddr_un addr;
- 
-+	if (len <= 0)
-+		return -1;
+
++    if (len <= 0)
++        return -1;
  	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
  	if (sock == -1) {
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-@@ -5181,11 +5183,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+@@ -5087,11 +5089,12 @@
  	}
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
@@ -41,8 +31,8 @@ index 80014ff34..5ce6bd400 100644
 -	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
  	return -1;
  }
- 
-@@ -5193,8 +5196,18 @@ static int
+
+@@ -5099,8 +5102,18 @@
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
@@ -63,6 +53,3 @@ index 80014ff34..5ce6bd400 100644
  }
  
  #ifdef __APPLE__
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -1,22 +1,18 @@
-From 763c65f6f349a7bab344a58991246891700e4fa0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 15:35:14 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 51/53] openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays
-
----
- channels.c    |  9 ++++++---
- channels.h    |  2 +-
- servconf.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
- servconf.h    |  2 ++
- session.c     |  5 +++--
- sshd_config.5 |  7 +++++++
- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 26ed9945f..c26380e25 100644
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -5067,7 +5067,7 @@ rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ 
+ /* -- X11 forwarding */
+-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+-#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
++/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
++#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
+ 
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
+@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
   */
  int
  x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
@@ -25,33 +21,66 @@ index 26ed9945f..c26380e25 100644
      u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
  {
  	Channel *nc = NULL;
-@@ -5080,8 +5080,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
- 	    x11_display_offset > UINT16_MAX - X11_BASE_PORT - MAX_DISPLAYS)
+@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 	if (chanids == NULL)
  		return -1;
  
 +	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
 +	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
 +
  	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
--	    display_number < x11_display_offset + MAX_DISPLAYS;
+-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
 +	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
  	    display_number++) {
- 		port = X11_BASE_PORT + display_number;
+-		port = 6000 + display_number;
++		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
++		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
++			break;
  		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-@@ -5146,7 +5149,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+ 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
  		if (num_socks > 0)
  			break;
  	}
--	if (display_number >= x11_display_offset + MAX_DISPLAYS) {
-+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_BASE_PORT ) {
+-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
  		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
  		return -1;
  	}
-diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
-index 7456541f8..754bd98ee 100644
---- a/channels.h
-+++ b/channels.h
-@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
++	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+ 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* Connect it to the display. */
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 			close(sock);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	}
+ 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ 	if (!ai) {
+-		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
++		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	set_nodelay(sock);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
  
  void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
  int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
@@ -59,12 +88,11 @@ index 7456541f8..754bd98ee 100644
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
  void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
  	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
- int      x11_channel_used_recently(struct ssh *ssh);
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
+@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->print_lastlog = -1;
  	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
  	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
@@ -72,7 +100,7 @@ index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
  	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
  	options->permit_tty = -1;
  	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
-@@ -357,6 +358,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
  	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
  		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
@@ -81,16 +109,16 @@ index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
  	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
  		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
  	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -582,7 +585,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
- 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 -	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 +	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
  	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
  	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
  	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -725,6 +728,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -98,7 +126,7 @@ index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
  	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1775,6 +1779,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
  			*intptr = value;
  		break;
  
@@ -109,7 +137,7 @@ index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
  	case sX11UseLocalhost:
  		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3037,6 +3045,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
@@ -117,7 +145,7 @@ index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
-@@ -3332,6 +3341,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
  	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
@@ -125,11 +153,10 @@ index fb1d150cd..956205f6d 100644
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
  	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 9b1a73b8d..6bfdf6305 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
  
  #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
  #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
@@ -137,7 +164,7 @@ index 9b1a73b8d..6bfdf6305 100644
  
  /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
  #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
-@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
  	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
  					 * searching at */
@@ -145,14 +172,13 @@ index 9b1a73b8d..6bfdf6305 100644
  	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
  	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
  	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 80282dfd8..e53d044a0 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -2681,8 +2681,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
  		return 0;
  	}
- 	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
 -	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
 -	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
 +	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
@@ -161,11 +187,10 @@ index 80282dfd8..e53d044a0 100644
  		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
  		return 0;
  	}
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 4ae4bebee..3dbce55fc 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1403,6 +1403,7 @@ Available keywords are
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
  .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
  .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
@@ -173,7 +198,7 @@ index 4ae4bebee..3dbce55fc 100644
  .Cm X11Forwarding
  and
  .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
-@@ -2112,6 +2113,12 @@ Specifies the first display number available for
+@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
  X11 forwarding.
  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
  The default is 10.
@@ -186,6 +211,3 @@ index 4ae4bebee..3dbce55fc 100644
  .It Cm X11Forwarding
  Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
  The argument must be
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
+
+    systemd stuff
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([CHANNELLIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether user wants systemd support
++SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
++	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
++	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
++		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
++			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
++				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
++				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
++				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
++				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
++				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
++			else
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++			fi
++		fi
++	fi ]
++)
++
++
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
++echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e0d4923
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/contrib/sshd.service
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++[Unit]
++Description=OpenSSH server daemon
++Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
++After=network.target
++
++[Service]
++Type=notify
++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
++KillMode=process
++Restart=on-failure
++RestartPreventExitStatus=255
++
++[Install]
++WantedBy=multi-user.target
++
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
++		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);

openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
+crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
+Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+-- 1.9.1
+1.9.1
+diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
++++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
+@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_gettid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+

openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -1,58 +1,40 @@
-From 4cacb1bda51a2d91cf4cc1c8058b989dfc0c58c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 23/53] openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux
-
----
- auth2-pubkey.c                   |  8 ++++--
- misc.c                           |  5 ++--
- misc.h                           |  2 +-
- openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++---------------
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  5 ++--
- platform.c                       |  6 ++++-
- sshconnect.c                     |  2 +-
- sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
- sshd-session.c                   |  6 +++--
- 9 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index c326a69ba..b7300ca9e 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
+diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
  
  /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
  
  static char *
-@@ -483,7 +485,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
+ format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
+@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-@@ -759,7 +762,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
- 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index 7e27a38d1..2fd14159d 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -2788,7 +2788,8 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
  pid_t
  subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
      int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
@@ -62,7 +44,7 @@ index 7e27a38d1..2fd14159d 100644
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
-@@ -2922,7 +2923,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
  			_exit(1);
  		}
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -71,11 +53,10 @@ index 7e27a38d1..2fd14159d 100644
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
-index f3c5a18c6..8cdfd7cec 100644
---- a/misc.h
-+++ b/misc.h
-@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
  pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
@@ -84,22 +65,36 @@ index f3c5a18c6..8cdfd7cec 100644
  
  typedef struct arglist arglist;
  struct arglist {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -48,10 +48,6 @@
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
+ 
+ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #endif
  
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
+-extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  int
  sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -221,7 +217,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
+@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
  }
  
  static void
@@ -109,7 +104,7 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  {
  	*role = NULL;
  	*level = NULL;
-@@ -239,8 +236,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
  
  /* Return the default security context for the given username */
  static int
@@ -120,7 +115,7 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  {
  	char *sename, *lvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -248,7 +245,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  	int r = 0;
  	context_t con = NULL;
  
@@ -129,16 +124,16 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  
  #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
  	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-@@ -270,7 +267,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  	if (r == 0) {
  		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
  			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
  
  			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-@@ -331,7 +328,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -148,7 +143,7 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -340,11 +338,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -157,12 +152,12 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  
  	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
--	if (inetd_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
-@@ -360,9 +358,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
  }
  
  static int
@@ -175,7 +170,7 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  }
  
  static int
-@@ -372,25 +371,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
  }
  
  int
@@ -209,7 +204,7 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
  				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
-@@ -406,7 +408,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -218,51 +213,66 @@ index 4d56745f7..ab083a637 100644
  	if (r >= 0) {
  		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
  		if (r < 0) {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index c004071d1..26c5f773b 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
--void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
--int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
-index c92a0cba6..66d0c2a6b 100644
---- a/platform.c
-+++ b/platform.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
+@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
  
+ extern int use_privsep;
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  
- /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
- int
-@@ -140,7 +142,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+ void
+ platform_pre_listen(void)
+@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  }
  
-diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
-index 912a520c5..babe4a982 100644
---- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
+ static int test_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+ static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
+ static int saved_argc;
+ 
+ /* re-exec */
+-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
++int rexeced_flag = 0;
+ static int rexec_flag = 1;
+ static int rexec_argc = 0;
+ static char **rexec_argv;
+@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
++++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
  
  	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
@@ -271,43 +281,3 @@ index 912a520c5..babe4a982 100644
  		goto out;
  
  	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
-diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
-index 5a4ee733c..f3c38a7d1 100644
---- a/sshd-auth.c
-+++ b/sshd-auth.c
-@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
- int debug_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
--static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Saved arguments to main(). */
- static char **saved_argv;
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 4a5eaa1ff..d6bece941 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
- int debug_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
--static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
- static int log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1337,7 +1337,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,33 +1,6 @@
-From d7dd45f9e19a71269828bc5f8567613a02f6feef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 14:01:38 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 38/53] openssh-7.7p1-fips
-
----
- dh.c                     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- dh.h                     |  1 +
- kex-names.c              |  6 +++-
- kex.c                    |  3 +-
- kexgen.c                 | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- kexgexc.c                |  5 +++
- myproposal.h             | 33 ++++++++++++++++++
- readconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  3 ++
- servconf.c               | 18 +++++++---
- ssh-ed25519.c            |  9 +++++
- ssh-gss.h                |  5 +++
- ssh-keygen.c             | 20 +++++++++--
- ssh-rsa.c                |  3 ++
- ssh.c                    |  5 +++
- sshconnect2.c            |  9 ++++-
- sshd.c                   | 13 +++++++
- sshkey.c                 | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 18 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
-index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
---- a/dh.c
-+++ b/dh.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-05-06 12:12:10.107634472 +0200
 @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
  
  #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -36,7 +9,7 @@ index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
  
  #include "dh.h"
  #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
  	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
  	struct dhgroup dhg;
  
@@ -49,7 +22,7 @@ index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
  	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
  		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
  		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
  	return 8192;
  }
  
@@ -88,10 +61,9 @@ index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
 +}
 +
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
-index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644
---- a/dh.h
-+++ b/dh.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-05-06 12:11:28.393298005 +0200
 @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
  
  int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
@@ -100,19 +72,18 @@ index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644
  
  u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
  void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
-index 31e395aa2..1360a4095 100644
---- a/kex-names.c
-+++ b/kex-names.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
  
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #endif
- 
-@@ -208,7 +209,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
  	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
  	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
  		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
@@ -124,149 +95,9 @@ index 31e395aa2..1360a4095 100644
  			free(s);
  			return 0;
  		}
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index 44f350ce8..da2a537ce 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
- # include <openssl/kdf.h>
- # include <openssl/param_build.h>
-@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
- 
- 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
- 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
--		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
- 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
- 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
- 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
-diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
-index 58edc79ad..9a970adf1 100644
---- a/kexgen.c
-+++ b/kexgen.c
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
-@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		break;
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
--		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		break;
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
--		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
--		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
--		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		break;
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
--		    &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+		        &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
--		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
--		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
-+		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
--		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
--		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		} else {
-+		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
-+		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
-index 097d83f30..ccbb9b580 100644
---- a/kexgexc.c
-+++ b/kexgexc.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
@@ -274,8 +105,8 @@ index 097d83f30..ccbb9b580 100644
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include <sys/types.h>
  
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
  		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		goto out;
  	}
@@ -286,11 +117,10 @@ index 097d83f30..ccbb9b580 100644
  	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
  
  	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
-index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
---- a/myproposal.h
-+++ b/myproposal.h
-@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
  	"rsa-sha2-512," \
  	"rsa-sha2-256"
  
@@ -308,8 +138,8 @@ index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
 +
  #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
  	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
-@@ -79,6 +91,27 @@
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
  
  #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
  
@@ -337,10 +167,9 @@ index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
  /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
  #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
  	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index 3f67f4de4..b6ad47b49 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.428926336 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
 @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
  #include <string.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -349,7 +178,7 @@ index 3f67f4de4..b6ad47b49 100644
  #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
  # include <glob.h>
  #else
-@@ -3078,11 +3079,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
  	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@@ -371,11 +200,10 @@ index 3f67f4de4..b6ad47b49 100644
  #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
  		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e0f2d4289..c52f64897 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.463926606 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
  #ifdef __NR_open
  	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
  #endif
@@ -385,22 +213,18 @@ index e0f2d4289..c52f64897 100644
  #ifdef __NR_openat
  	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
  #endif
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index ac84b74d9..f78615c28 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,10 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.455926545 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  #include <limits.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
  #include <errno.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
  #include <util.h>
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
- # include <glob.h>
- #else
-@@ -244,11 +247,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
  	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@@ -422,150 +246,10 @@ index ac84b74d9..f78615c28 100644
  #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
  		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
-index c8caa2221..4bcd9ef81 100644
---- a/ssh-ed25519.c
-+++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
- 
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
-@@ -163,6 +164,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key,
- 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
- 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
- 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
- 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -244,6 +249,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index a894e23c9..329dc9da0 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
- 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
- 	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
- 
-+#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
-+	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
-+
- #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
- 
- typedef struct {
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 3c582a83a..afa279097 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
- #endif
- 
-@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
-+#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
- 
- /*
-  * Default number of bits in the RSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
-@@ -195,6 +197,10 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_RSA:
- 		if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-@@ -248,7 +254,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
- 	char *name = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
--		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
-+		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
- 	else {
- 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-@@ -1057,9 +1063,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && type == KEY_ED25519) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
-@@ -3757,7 +3771,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
--		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
-+		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
- 
- 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
- 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index fe1518984..9428df8d1 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 8d27f6379..7d6ba516e 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
  #endif
@@ -573,7 +257,7 @@ index 8d27f6379..7d6ba516e 100644
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
-@@ -1664,6 +1665,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		exit(0);
  	}
  
@@ -584,10 +268,9 @@ index 8d27f6379..7d6ba516e 100644
  	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
  	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
  	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index b253f991b..fffa66c8d 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
 @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
  #include <vis.h>
  #endif
@@ -597,48 +280,95 @@ index b253f991b..fffa66c8d 100644
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
-+			 match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+-		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+-
+-		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+-		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+-			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+-			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+-			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+-				free(gss_host);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 +
- 		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
- 		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
- 		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- 		}
++			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
++			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
++				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
++				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
++				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
++					free(gss_host);
++					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
++				}
++			} else {
+ 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ 			}
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
  
- 		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 -		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+		    options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
-+		free(gss_kex_filtered);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++			if (gss) {
++				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 +
- 		if (gss) {
- 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
- 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index ed7faf96d..de2baa5e4 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
- #include <poll.h>
++				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++				    "%s,null", orig);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #endif
  #include <pwd.h>
  #include <signal.h>
 +#include <syslog.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <time.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
-@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
  #include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #endif
  
-@@ -1613,6 +1615,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
  			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
  			    options.host_key_files[i]);
@@ -652,7 +382,7 @@ index ed7faf96d..de2baa5e4 100644
  		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
  		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
  			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
-@@ -1836,6 +1845,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
  	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
  
@@ -663,27 +393,45 @@ index ed7faf96d..de2baa5e4 100644
  	/*
  	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
  	 * unmounted if desired.
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 148fee2b7..394d9b105 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ 		orig = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (options.gss_keyex)
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+-	else
+-		gss = NULL;
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
 @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
  #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #endif
  
  #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
  #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
  #include "sshkey.h"
  #include "match.h"
 +#include "log.h"
  #include "ssh-sk.h"
- #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
  
-@@ -386,6 +388,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
  		impl = keyimpls[i];
  		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
  			continue;
@@ -702,7 +450,7 @@ index 148fee2b7..394d9b105 100644
  		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
  		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
-@@ -1418,6 +1432,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+@@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
  		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
  	}
  
@@ -723,29 +471,208 @@ index 148fee2b7..394d9b105 100644
  	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
  	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
  	*ret = *k;
-@@ -2251,6 +2279,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
  		*lenp = 0;
  	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
-+	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+	/* Fallthrough */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		/* Fallthrough */
  	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
  		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
  	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
-@@ -2290,6 +2323,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
  		*detailsp = NULL;
  	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
+		goto out;
+
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:53:41.428343304 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c	2022-07-11 16:56:09.284663661 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *ke
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
- 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
- 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;

openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -1,25 +1,26 @@
-From 1a5b32dbf550467a4ae19351667bcfdf9c52e44d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 13/53] openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique
-
----
- auth-krb5.c     | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- auth.h          |   3 +-
- gss-serv-krb5.c |  42 +++-----
- gss-serv.c      |  10 +-
- servconf.c      |  12 ++-
- servconf.h      |   2 +
- session.c       |   5 +-
- ssh-gss.h       |   4 +-
- sshd-session.c  |   2 +-
- sshd_config.5   |   8 ++
- 10 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  #endif
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
  	char *client, *platform_client;
  	const char *errmsg;
  
-@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  		goto out;
  	}
  
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
-@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  		goto out;
  #endif
  
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
  		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
  
-@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  void
  krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
@@ -125,29 +126,12 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
  	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
  		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
  		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -238,36 +281,189 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	}
  }
  
 -#ifndef HEIMDAL
--krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
--	mode_t old_umask;
- 
--	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
--	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
--		return ENOMEM;
--
--	old_umask = umask(0177);
--	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
--	oerrno = errno;
--	umask(old_umask);
--	if (tmpfd == -1) {
--		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
--		return oerrno;
++
 +#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
 +int
 +ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
@@ -165,8 +149,7 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
 +	old = *dsc;
 +
 +	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1) {
-+		*dsc = old;
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
 +		free(src);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
@@ -213,9 +196,8 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
- 	}
- 
--	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++	}
++
 +	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
 +		goto cleanup;
 +
@@ -250,13 +232,29 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
-+krb5_error_code
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
-+	mode_t old_umask;
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
 +	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
-+
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
+-	}
 +	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
@@ -271,7 +269,8 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
 +		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
 +		if (ret < 0)
 +			return ENOMEM;
-+
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
 +		old_umask = umask(0177);
 +		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
  		oerrno = errno;
@@ -338,32 +337,42 @@ index 9d2f1f0ea..035032221 100644
  }
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 83d07ae8b..10e88e11f 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
+@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
  
-@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
  
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
  #endif
  
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
  
@@ -372,7 +381,7 @@ index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  {
  	krb5_ccache ccache;
-@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
  	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -390,7 +399,7 @@ index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
  # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
  # endif
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -409,7 +418,7 @@ index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
  	}
  #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
  
-@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
  		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -418,7 +427,7 @@ index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
  	}
  
  	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
-@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -427,7 +436,7 @@ index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
  	}
  
  	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  	    client->creds, ccache))) {
  		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -465,7 +474,7 @@ index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
  		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
  #endif
  
-@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  
  	client->store.data = krb_context;
  
@@ -474,44 +483,10 @@ index 14502c5a6..df55512d3 100644
  }
  
  int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 6bac42931..d2bc03486 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -414,13 +414,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -500,9 +502,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 3b93ca829..7bf1507df 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -519,7 +494,7 @@ index 3b93ca829..7bf1507df 100644
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -376,6 +377,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
  	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@@ -528,16 +503,16 @@ index 3b93ca829..7bf1507df 100644
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -558,7 +561,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+@@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ typedef enum {
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
- 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-@@ -649,11 +652,13 @@ static struct {
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -551,7 +526,7 @@ index 3b93ca829..7bf1507df 100644
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1662,6 +1667,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -562,7 +537,7 @@ index 3b93ca829..7bf1507df 100644
  	case sGssAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -3295,6 +3304,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # ifdef USE_AFS
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
@@ -570,11 +545,10 @@ index 3b93ca829..7bf1507df 100644
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index c3f501400..a4a38d6d7 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ typedef struct {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@@ -583,11 +557,10 @@ index c3f501400..a4a38d6d7 100644
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 3eae5bdf3..b8a2dae92 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -987,7 +987,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
  	 * the child's environment as they see fit
  	 */
@@ -597,7 +570,7 @@ index 3eae5bdf3..b8a2dae92 100644
  #endif
  
  	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1063,7 +1064,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -606,33 +579,10 @@ index 3eae5bdf3..b8a2dae92 100644
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index db34d77f4..a894e23c9 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 6e28020e9..028d5850e 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
  		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@@ -641,11 +591,10 @@ index 6e28020e9..028d5850e 100644
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index b90068bf3..cae0fd0b4 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1032,6 +1032,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
+@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -658,8 +607,26 @@ index b90068bf3..cae0fd0b4 100644
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- offer to clients.
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);

openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,25 +1,6 @@
-From c76607384ff077ba1c45759e749562cccaeaa335 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 09/53] openssh-8.7p1-redhat
-
----
- ssh_config            |  7 +++++++
- ssh_config_redhat     | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- sshd_config           |  8 ++++++++
- sshd_config.0         |  6 +++---
- sshd_config.5         |  2 +-
- sshd_config_redhat    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- sshd_config_redhat_cp |  7 +++++++
- 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 ssh_config_redhat
- create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat
- create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat_cp
-
-diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index 238a0c5e3..d9324c957 100644
---- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
+--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
 @@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
  #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
  #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
@@ -31,12 +12,10 @@ index 238a0c5e3..d9324c957 100644
 +# included below. For more information, see manual page for
 +#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff --git a/ssh_config_redhat b/ssh_config_redhat
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..8b1b59021
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh_config_redhat
-@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
+--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
 +Match final all
@@ -50,35 +29,12 @@ index 000000000..8b1b59021
 +# mode correctly we set this to yes.
 +	ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
-+# rhbz#2352653 - export COLORTERM
-+	SendEnv COLORTERM
-+
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 0f4a3a724..608203e4b 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
- 
-+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
-+
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
-index c63d729a9..8c5217c0b 100644
---- a/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/sshd_config.0
-@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
       SyslogFacility
               Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
@@ -91,11 +47,10 @@ index c63d729a9..8c5217c0b 100644
  
       TCPKeepAlive
               Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 6ae606f1e..aa9f0af76 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1941,7 +1941,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
  .It Cm SyslogFacility
  Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
  .Xr sshd 8 .
@@ -104,15 +59,31 @@ index 6ae606f1e..aa9f0af76 100644
  LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
  The default is AUTH.
  .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat b/sshd_config_redhat
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..993a28d52
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/sshd_config_redhat
-@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
+--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 +
-+KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
 +
 +GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
@@ -121,18 +92,13 @@ index 000000000..993a28d52
 +
 +X11Forwarding yes
 +
-+# rhbz#2352653 - accept COLORTERM
-+	AcceptEnv COLORTERM
-+
 +# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
-diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat_cp b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..1d592d13f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
 +# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
@@ -141,6 +107,3 @@ index 000000000..1d592d13f
 +# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
 +Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
+@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+ 	    cfg, &includes, NULL, rexeced_flag);
+ 
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
++	if (! options.use_pam)
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
++# problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes

openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -1,83 +1,57 @@
-From b6875ceaca4be9e0de0d6d260d8fcff1772f5fb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 01/53] openssh-7.8p1-role-mls
-
----
- auth-pam.c                       |   2 +-
- auth-pam.h                       |   2 +-
- auth.h                           |   3 +
- auth2-gss.c                      |  11 +-
- auth2-hostbased.c                |   9 +
- auth2-pubkey.c                   |  11 +-
- auth2.c                          |  14 ++
- misc.c                           |   8 +
- monitor.c                        |  37 ++-
- monitor.h                        |   4 +
- monitor_wrap.c                   |  21 ++
- monitor_wrap.h                   |   3 +
- openbsd-compat/Makefile.in       |   3 +-
- openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  37 +--
- openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   3 +-
- platform.c                       |   2 +-
- sshd-session.c                   |   3 +
- 18 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-
-diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
-index 5591f094e..70bcae83a 100644
---- a/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
-  * during the ssh authentication process.
-  */
- int
--do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- 	int ret = 1;
- 	char *compound;
-diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
-index 8d801c689..9dd7ae078 100644
---- a/auth-pam.h
-+++ b/auth-pam.h
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
- void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(void);
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
--int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 98bb23d4c..83d07ae8b 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	char		*service;
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
- 	char		*style;
+diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
+--- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
+@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char		*role;
++	char *role = NULL;
 +#endif
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
- 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
- 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index 75eb4e3a3..f7898ab3e 100644
---- a/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -314,8 +314,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
++		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
++        }
+ 		userauth_banner(ssh);
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
+diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
+@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
  	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
 +	char *micuser;
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	u_char *p;
-@@ -300,7 +301,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	const char *displayname;
+@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
@@ -92,7 +66,7 @@ index 75eb4e3a3..f7898ab3e 100644
  	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-@@ -313,6 +320,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
  	sshbuf_free(b);
@@ -100,12 +74,11 @@ index 75eb4e3a3..f7898ab3e 100644
 +		free(micuser);
  	free(mic.value);
  
- 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
-index 9d8b860eb..976484fc5 100644
---- a/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -129,7 +129,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
@@ -122,11 +95,10 @@ index 9d8b860eb..976484fc5 100644
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index 15ad3000c..c326a69ba 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -204,9 +204,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
+@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
  			goto done;
  		}
  		/* reconstruct packet */
@@ -145,51 +117,47 @@ index 15ad3000c..c326a69ba 100644
  		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index b9bb46f59..1345d3257 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
- 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
+--- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role = NULL;
++	char		*role;
 +#endif
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
-@@ -284,6 +287,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
-@@ -313,7 +321,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
- 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
- 		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index ce77ec943..5bed34735 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ char *
+ 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+ 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ 	char *compound;
+diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
+@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
  colon(char *cp)
  {
  	int flag = 0;
@@ -197,7 +165,7 @@ index ce77ec943..5bed34735 100644
  
  	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
  		return NULL;
-@@ -837,6 +838,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
  			return (cp);
  		if (*cp == '/')
  			return NULL;
@@ -211,11 +179,10 @@ index ce77ec943..5bed34735 100644
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -225,7 +192,7 @@ index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -184,6 +187,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -235,7 +202,7 @@ index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -919,6 +925,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -245,7 +212,7 @@ index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -993,6 +1002,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -272,16 +239,16 @@ index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1364,7 +1393,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  	struct sshbuf *b;
- 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
  	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
  	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1395,6 +1424,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -290,7 +257,7 @@ index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1445,7 +1476,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -299,7 +266,7 @@ index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1466,6 +1497,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -308,13 +275,12 @@ index a9e854bec..85dc1b1b7 100644
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index 3f8a9bea3..9dcd9c293 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
+--- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
  	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_STATE = 51, MONITOR_ANS_STATE = 52,
  
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
@@ -323,11 +289,10 @@ index 3f8a9bea3..9dcd9c293 100644
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 33494b73f..347eb6870 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -453,6 +453,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
+@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  
@@ -355,11 +320,10 @@ index 33494b73f..347eb6870 100644
  /* Do the password authentication */
  int
  mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index c87295388..9b42ddbcb 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
+@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
      const char *, u_int compat);
  void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
@@ -369,11 +333,10 @@ index c87295388..9b42ddbcb 100644
  struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
  char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
  int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-index 53c87db6d..39531ae77 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
  	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
@@ -383,12 +346,79 @@ index 53c87db6d..39531ae77 100644
  
  .c.o:
  	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..b9fbe38b7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -442,6 +472,7 @@ index 000000000..b9fbe38b7
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@@ -647,7 +678,7 @@ index 000000000..b9fbe38b7
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag) {
++		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -721,7 +752,7 @@ index 000000000..b9fbe38b7
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag) {
++	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@@ -809,82 +840,10 @@ index 000000000..b9fbe38b7
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index c1d54f38d..7426f6f79 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -109,37 +109,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- 	return sc;
- }
- 
--/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
--void
--ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
--{
--	char *user_ctx = NULL;
--
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
--		return;
--
--	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
--
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
--	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
--		switch (security_getenforce()) {
--		case -1:
--			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
--		case 0:
--			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
--			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
--			break;
--		default:
--			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
--			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
--		}
--	}
--	if (user_ctx != NULL)
--		freecon(user_ctx);
--
--	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
--}
--
- /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
- void
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-@@ -152,7 +121,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- 
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 
- 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index 959430de1..055c825e4 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
--void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
-index fd1a7a7c2..bcf1b0491 100644
---- a/platform.c
-+++ b/platform.c
-@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -893,11 +852,10 @@ index fd1a7a7c2..bcf1b0491 100644
  #endif
  }
  
-diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
-index 8979f743b..cb4b0523d 100644
---- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd-session.c
-@@ -1306,6 +1306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
+@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
@@ -906,7 +864,4 @@ index 8979f743b..cb4b0523d 100644
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred();
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);

openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,8 @@
-From e1d86d265d9543c77fa90a33acc70246e68bf3bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 25/53] openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6
-
----
- scp.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
 diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index e1992622f..621131ffc 100644
+index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
 --- a/scp.c
 +++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1169,7 +1169,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
@@ -22,6 +13,4 @@ index e1992622f..621131ffc 100644
  			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
  			    thost, targ);
  			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
--- 
-2.52.0
 

openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -1,18 +1,7 @@
-From 6d9e08f061451f6cd464af5ec598fa99d15acadb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 26/53] openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies
-
----
- ssh_config.5  | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
- sshd_config.5 | 179 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
- 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -438,17 +438,13 @@ A single argument of
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.284590156 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.623052194 +0200
+@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@
  causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
  This is the default behaviour.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -35,7 +24,7 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -587,20 +583,25 @@ If the option is set to
+@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
  (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -65,21 +54,21 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -616,13 +617,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -479,13 +480,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -1022,6 +1016,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+@@ -885,6 +879,11 @@
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -91,7 +80,7 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -1034,10 +1033,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -897,10 +896,8 @@
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -103,7 +92,7 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1056,36 +1053,25 @@ will not be converted automatically,
+@@ -919,36 +916,25 @@
  but may be manually hashed using
  .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -148,7 +137,7 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  .Pp
  The
  .Fl Q
-@@ -1138,6 +1124,17 @@ to prefer their algorithms.
+@@ -1001,6 +987,17 @@
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
@@ -166,7 +155,7 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  .It Cm HostKeyAlias
  Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
  real host name when looking up or saving the host key
-@@ -1360,6 +1357,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1232,30 +1229,25 @@
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -175,11 +164,8 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
- their preference order.
- The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
-@@ -1368,29 +1370,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- .Pp
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@@ -195,11 +181,9 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  .Sq ^
  character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
--.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--mlkem768x25519-sha256,
--sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@@ -207,12 +191,11 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
- .Pp
 +built-in openssh default set.
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
- .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
-@@ -1506,37 +1496,33 @@ function, and all code in the
+@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -259,7 +242,7 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1725,39 +1711,31 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
+@@ -1567,39 +1555,31 @@
  The default is
  .Cm no .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -311,7 +294,7 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
  Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
  The argument to this keyword must be
-@@ -2504,7 +2482,9 @@ for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+@@ -2265,7 +2245,9 @@
  This file must be world-readable.
  .El
  .Sh SEE ALSO
@@ -322,11 +305,10 @@ index 8a4b469cf..8ac5e1633 100644
  .Sh AUTHORS
  .An -nosplit
  OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@ If the argument is
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.277590077 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.592051845 +0200
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -349,7 +331,7 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -533,20 +529,25 @@ The default is
+@@ -525,20 +521,25 @@
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -379,21 +361,21 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -573,13 +574,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -565,13 +566,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -774,53 +768,43 @@ For this to work
+@@ -766,53 +760,43 @@
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -466,7 +448,7 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -887,25 +871,14 @@ is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+@@ -879,25 +863,14 @@
  .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  environment variable.
  .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
@@ -497,7 +479,7 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -1051,6 +1024,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
+@@ -1044,20 +1017,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -506,12 +488,9 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- offer to clients.
- The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
-@@ -1059,16 +1037,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- .Pp
- If the specified list begins with a
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
@@ -527,25 +506,27 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
-@@ -1105,14 +1083,6 @@ sntrup761x25519-sha512
+ .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+@@ -1089,16 +1067,6 @@
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--mlkem768x25519-sha256,
--sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1199,21 +1169,26 @@ function, and all code in the
+@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -576,7 +557,7 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1256,15 +1231,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+@@ -1241,15 +1214,6 @@
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -592,7 +573,7 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1751,36 +1717,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1633,36 +1597,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -638,7 +619,7 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -2281,7 +2236,9 @@ This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+@@ -2131,7 +2084,9 @@
  .El
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
@@ -649,6 +630,3 @@ index a0fc6064f..c172d5aab 100644
  .Sh AUTHORS
  .An -nosplit
  OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol	2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
+@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ 		lnum++;
+ 		cp = line;
+-		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
++		cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+ 		/* Trim leading space and comments */
+ 		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ 		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
+
+    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++static const EVP_MD *
++digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return EVP_sha1();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return EVP_sha256();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return EVP_sha384();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return EVP_sha512();
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *key = NULL;
++	int r, key_len;
++
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
++	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
++	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
++	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
++	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
++#endif
++	*keyp = key;
++	key = NULL;
++	r = 0;
++
++out:
++	free (key);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (r < 0) {
++		return r;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+

openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,7 @@
-From a3b6182e1d6b69a37a6c841baa43b818251036b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 30/53] openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors
-
----
- auth-pam.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
-index 70bcae83a..70b2b8580 100644
---- a/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -551,7 +551,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors	2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c	2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
+@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  		goto auth_fail;
  
  	if (!do_pam_account()) {
@@ -24,9 +14,9 @@ index 70bcae83a..70b2b8580 100644
  		goto auth_fail;
  	}
  	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -608,8 +612,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
  	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
 -	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
@@ -37,20 +27,18 @@ index 70bcae83a..70b2b8580 100644
  	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
  		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
  	else
-@@ -913,9 +919,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			plen++;
  			free(msg);
  			break;
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
 +			sshpam_account_status = 0;
 +			/* FALLTHROUGH */
  		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
 -			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -				sshpam_account_status = 0;
-+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
-+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
  				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
  			/* FALLTHROUGH */
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,8 @@
-From ed5e5df9ec7ac96ac2a68c5711db00ed29d4d1cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 28/53] openssh-8.2p1-visibility
-
----
- regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
 diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-index 4c96e8827..4af5209db 100644
+index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
 --- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
 +++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
  #endif
  }
  
@@ -20,7 +11,7 @@ index 4c96e8827..4af5209db 100644
  sk_api_version(void)
  {
  	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
-@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -29,7 +20,7 @@ index 4c96e8827..4af5209db 100644
  sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
      const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
      struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
-@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -38,7 +29,7 @@ index 4c96e8827..4af5209db 100644
  sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
      const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
      uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -47,6 +38,3 @@ index 4c96e8827..4af5209db 100644
  sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
      struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
  {
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
-From c8dce0615eac6d2a724cdb3f288d7aaa1362f65b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 29/53] openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6
-
----
- channels.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
 diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 5ce6bd400..26ed9945f 100644
 --- a/channels.c
 +++ b/channels.c
-@@ -5123,6 +5123,16 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ 			if (x11_use_localhost)
+ 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
  				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
  				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
@@ -28,6 +23,8 @@ index 5ce6bd400..26ed9945f 100644
  				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
  					close(socks[n]);
  				num_socks = 0;
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ 				break;

openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c.orig	2022-04-12 15:47:03.815044607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c	2022-04-12 15:48:12.464963511 +0200
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>

openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch

@@ -1,18 +1,7 @@
-From 14f25e21b4e2c5e625f266fcc9af42c2f89845de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 33/53] openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits
-
----
- readconf.c | 1 +
- servconf.c | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
 diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index eab734aaf..3f67f4de4 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ static struct {
+--- a/readconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/readconf.c	(date 1703169891147)
+@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@
  	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
  	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
  	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
@@ -21,17 +10,13 @@ index eab734aaf..3f67f4de4 100644
  	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
  	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
 diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index b63a7f0b0..ac84b74d9 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ static struct {
+--- a/servconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/servconf.c	(date 1703169891148)
+@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@
  	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
  	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
--- 
-2.52.0
-
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }

openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,6 @@
-From 53e44bd1f669ecd6a7429e94b55beec8e3c0c529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 40/53] openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs
-
----
- regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- sshconnect2.c            | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
-index 28dcfe170..b9e716dcd 100644
---- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
-+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+--- openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx	2023-05-29 18:15:56.311236887 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2023-05-29 18:16:07.598503551 +0200
 @@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
  
  ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
@@ -35,7 +24,7 @@ index 28dcfe170..b9e716dcd 100644
  	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
  	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
  		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
-@@ -32,12 +45,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either
+@@ -32,12 +48,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private
  
  unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  
@@ -55,10 +44,10 @@ index 28dcfe170..b9e716dcd 100644
  	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
  	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
  	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
-@@ -50,15 +67,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+@@ -50,15 +70,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
  done
  
- SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com' | maybe_filter_sk`
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
 +SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
  
  # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
@@ -74,7 +63,7 @@ index 28dcfe170..b9e716dcd 100644
  	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
  	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
  	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
-@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+@@ -70,7 +93,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >>
  ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
    cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
  
@@ -83,20 +72,19 @@ index 28dcfe170..b9e716dcd 100644
  	verbose "cert type $k"
  	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
  	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index fffa66c8d..f43c81ad9 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx	2023-04-26 17:37:35.100827792 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-04-26 17:50:31.860748877 +0200
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
      const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
  {
  	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
--	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
-+	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
+-	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
++	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-@@ -257,10 +257,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+@@ -260,9 +260,21 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  	if (use_known_hosts_order)
  		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
  
@@ -112,15 +100,14 @@ index fffa66c8d..f43c81ad9 100644
 +			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +	}
 +
- 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
- 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
- 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
+ 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
 -	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +	    filtered_algs);
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-@@ -304,6 +316,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  #endif
  
  	free(hkalgs);
@@ -128,6 +115,3 @@ index fffa66c8d..f43c81ad9 100644
  
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.338710923 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.357711165 +0100
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -145,16 +146,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
++	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.279676981 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2023-01-20 15:01:07.007821379 +0100
+@@ -660,11 +660,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	struct sshkey *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
++	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
+ 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+ 	int r, is_proof = 0;
+ 	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
++	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -719,18 +720,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
++		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
++	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh	2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
+@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+ 
+-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
++#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
++PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+ EXTRA_TYPES=""
+ rsa=""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
+@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
+ 
+ tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
+ 
+-REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
++#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
++REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
+ 
+ # File based tests
+ file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
+@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
+ 	fi
+ }
+ 
+-SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+-SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
++#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
++SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
++SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
+ 
+ for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ 	# generate user key
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
+@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype,
+ 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ 	if (kex != NULL)
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
++	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
++		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ do_kex(char *kex)
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
+-	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
++	/* do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); */
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
+@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:10:37.533168013 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c	2023-01-26 12:15:35.637631860 +0100
+@@ -333,13 +333,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
++	*/
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -101,8 +104,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
++	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0)
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -119,16 +123,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
++		expected = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0) {
++		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
++		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
++		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -514,7 +524,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
++	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:19:23.659513651 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c	2023-01-26 12:20:28.021044803 +0100
+@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ tests(void)
+ 	check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("check DSA signature");
+ 	check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
++	*/
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
++			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
++		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-01-25 15:59:34.225364883 +0100
+@@ -1461,6 +1464,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_cha
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
++		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
++			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
++
++			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
++			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
++		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.355711140 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
+@@ -1640,6 +1651,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt;
+ 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+ 	sigset_t sigmask;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+@@ -1938,6 +1950,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    key = NULL;
+ 		    continue;
+ 		}
++		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA_CERT)) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("sshd: SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	forbid_ssh_rsa = 1;
++		    }
++		}
++		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			logit_f("sshd: ssh-dss is disabled, skipping key file %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++			key = NULL;
++			continue;
++		    }
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -2275,6 +2306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
+@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
++		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
++			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}

openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch

@@ -1,21 +1,8 @@
-From e6478b233cd2298c9e6e6128867421892ff8f0e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 32/53] openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp
-
----
- scp.c         |  2 +-
- sftp-client.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- sftp-client.h |  4 ++--
- sftp.c        |  6 +++---
- 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
-
 diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 3c213f83d..78c79a755 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
- 
+--- a/scp.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/scp.c	(date 1703111453316)
+@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@
+
  	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
  		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
 -		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
@@ -24,11 +11,10 @@ index 3c213f83d..78c79a755 100644
  			errs = 1;
  		}
 diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
-index 840170ab6..9bf9cc047 100644
---- a/sftp-client.c
-+++ b/sftp-client.c
-@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
- 
+--- a/sftp-client.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/sftp-client.c	(date 1703169614263)
+@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@
+
  /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
  static char *
 -sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
@@ -36,7 +22,7 @@ index 840170ab6..9bf9cc047 100644
  {
  	struct sshbuf *msg;
  	u_int expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -1047,11 +1047,43 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@
  		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
  			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
@@ -85,9 +71,9 @@ index 840170ab6..9bf9cc047 100644
  	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
  		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
  		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
-@@ -1076,9 +1108,9 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@
  }
- 
+
  char *
 -sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
 +sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
@@ -95,9 +81,9 @@ index 840170ab6..9bf9cc047 100644
 -	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
 +	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
  }
- 
+
  int
-@@ -1092,9 +1124,9 @@ sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@
  {
  	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
  		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
@@ -107,18 +93,18 @@ index 840170ab6..9bf9cc047 100644
 -	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
 +	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
  }
- 
+
  int
-@@ -2014,7 +2046,7 @@ sftp_download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@
  	char *src_canon;
  	int ret;
- 
+
 -	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
 +	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
  		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
  		return -1;
  	}
-@@ -2366,12 +2398,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+@@ -2365,12 +2397,12 @@
  int
  sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
      int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
@@ -127,48 +113,47 @@ index 840170ab6..9bf9cc047 100644
  {
  	char *dst_canon;
  	int ret;
- 
+
 -	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
 +	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
  		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
  		return -1;
  	}
-@@ -2826,7 +2858,7 @@ sftp_crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+@@ -2825,7 +2857,7 @@
  	char *from_path_canon;
  	int ret;
- 
+
 -	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
 +	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
  		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
  		    from_path);
  		return -1;
 diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
-index 873ad3849..fe58651c1 100644
---- a/sftp-client.h
-+++ b/sftp-client.h
-@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+--- a/sftp-client.h	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/sftp-client.h	(date 1703111691284)
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
  int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
- 
+
  /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
 -char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
 +char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
+
  /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
  char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int sftp_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
   * times if 'pflag' is set
   */
  int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
 -    int, int, int, int, int, int);
 +    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
- 
+
  /*
   * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+
 diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
-index 3b505eea2..2a99698a8 100644
---- a/sftp.c
-+++ b/sftp.c
-@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+--- a/sftp.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/sftp.c	(date 1703168795365)
+@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@
  		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
  			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
  			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
@@ -177,7 +162,7 @@ index 3b505eea2..2a99698a8 100644
  				err = -1;
  		} else {
  			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
-@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@
  		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
  			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
  		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
@@ -186,15 +171,12 @@ index 3b505eea2..2a99698a8 100644
  			err = 1;
  			break;
  		}
-@@ -2241,7 +2241,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@
  	}
  #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
- 
+
 -	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
 +	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
  		fatal("Need cwd");
  	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
- 
--- 
-2.52.0
 

openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch

@@ -1,31 +1,18 @@
-From ca8b4de1019b859e2c68288a554d1905a6cf029f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 31/53] openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch
-
----
- pathnames.h | 1 +
- scp.1       | 7 +++++++
- scp.c       | 8 ++++++++
- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
-index 0dcc49552..78bba2314 100644
---- a/pathnames.h
-+++ b/pathnames.h
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h	2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
  #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
  #define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
 +#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH		SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
  
  #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
  #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index 7bce0fe6f..2bb838c7d 100644
---- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -334,6 +334,13 @@ during download or upload.
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
+@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
  By default a 32KB buffer is used.
  .El
  .El
@@ -39,11 +26,10 @@ index 7bce0fe6f..2bb838c7d 100644
  .Sh EXIT STATUS
  .Ex -std scp
  .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 621131ffc..3c213f83d 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -633,6 +633,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
+@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  	if (iamremote)
  		mode = MODE_SCP;
  
@@ -58,6 +44,3 @@ index 621131ffc..3c213f83d 100644
  	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
  		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
  
--- 
-2.52.0
-

openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff --color -ru a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+--- a/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:47:51.307295880 +0200
++++ b/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:50:28.793363263 +0200
+@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@
+ .It AddressFamily
+ .It BatchMode
+ .It BindAddress
++.It BindInterface
+ .It CanonicalDomains
+ .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ .It CanonicalizeHostname
+@@ -510,6 +511,7 @@
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
+ .It DynamicForward
++.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
+ .It EscapeChar
+ .It ExitOnForwardFailure
+@@ -538,6 +540,8 @@
+ .It IdentitiesOnly
+ .It IdentityAgent
+ .It IdentityFile
++.It IgnoreUnknown
++.It Include
+ .It IPQoS
+ .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ .It KbdInteractiveDevices
+@@ -546,6 +550,7 @@
+ .It LocalCommand
+ .It LocalForward
+ .It LogLevel
++.It LogVerbose
+ .It MACs
+ .It Match
+ .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -566,6 +571,8 @@
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RevokedHostKeys
++.It SecurityKeyProvider
+ .It RequiredRSASize
+ .It SendEnv
+ .It ServerAliveInterval
+@@ -575,6 +582,7 @@
+ .It StreamLocalBindMask
+ .It StreamLocalBindUnlink
+ .It StrictHostKeyChecking
++.It SyslogFacility
+ .It TCPKeepAlive
+ .It Tunnel
+ .It TunnelDevice

openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2022-10-24 14:51:43.685766639 +0200
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit.c	2022-10-24 15:20:38.854548226 +0200
+@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ void
+ audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
+ {
+-	char *fp;
++	char *key_fp = NULL;
++	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
++	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
++		cert = key->cert;
++		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
++										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++	}
++	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
+ 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	free(fp);
++	if (key_fp)
++		free(key_fp);
++	if (issuer_fp)
++		free(issuer_fp);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit.h	2022-10-24 14:58:20.887565518 +0200
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininf
+ int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+-int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
+ void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c	2022-10-24 15:21:58.165303951 +0200
+@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++	const char *rip;
++	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host
+ 		else
+ 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
++	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+-		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+ 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		goto out;
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
+-		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		rip, NULL, rv);
++	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		goto out;
++
++	if (cert) {
++		char *pbuf;
++
++		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
++		if (pbuf == NULL)
++			goto out;
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
++			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
++		free(pbuf);
++		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++			goto out;
++
++		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
++			if (pbuf == NULL)
++				goto out;
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
++			free(pbuf);
++			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
+ out:
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);

openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/dh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.730868316 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
++
++	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
++		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed key generation");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* reuse context for key generation */
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not create or init context");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not generate keys");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
++	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* transferred */
++	pub_key = NULL;
++	priv_key = NULL;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
++	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.731868327 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -1623,3 +1623,47 @@
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++/* 
++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
++ * The private key can be omitted.
++ */
++int
++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
++    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++
++	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (priv != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return r;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.674867692 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:25:28.494533889 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
++	int kout, r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
++	/* import key */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* import peer key 
++	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
++	 */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not get key size");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
++	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.h openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:24:28.725868260 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -283,6 +286,8 @@
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
++int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
++    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);

openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
+--- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
+@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++static EC_KEY *
++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
++{
++	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	const char *group_name;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
++	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
++		goto out;
++	}
++out:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	return client_key;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
++	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
++	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
++	size_t klen = 0, publen;
++	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
++	if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
++
++	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
++	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
++	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
++	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }

openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+--- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
+@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
+ 
+ /*
+  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+- * within a patch series.
++ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
++ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
++ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
++ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
+  */
+ 
+ int
+@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
+ 	if (headerver == libver)
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+-	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+-	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+-		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
++	/*
++	 * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
++	 */
++	if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
++		mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
+ 		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+-	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
++	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
++	 * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ 	 */
+ 	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+ 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;

openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 618bb198..8ea831f4 100644
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve	2023-07-21 15:38:13.237276580 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2023-07-21 15:41:30.269943569 +0200
+@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
+ /* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
+ static char *allowed_providers;
+ 
++/*
++ * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to
++ * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-bind@openssh.com).
++ */
++static int remote_add_provider;
++
+ /* locking */
+ #define LOCK_SIZE	32
+ #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
+@@ -1228,6 +1234,12 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+ 		if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
+ 			debug_f("internal provider");
+ 		} else {
++			if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
++				verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": "
++				    "remote addition of providers is disabled",
++				    sk_provider);
++				goto out;
++			}
+ 			if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+ 				verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
+ 				    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
+@@ -1368,7 +1380,7 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ static char *
+-sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
++sanitize_pkcs11_provider(SocketEntry *e, const char *provider)
+ {
+ 	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
+ 	char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */
+@@ -1399,6 +1411,11 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
+ 		module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */
+ 
+ 	if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */
++		if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
++			verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of "
++			    "providers is disabled", provider);
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+ 			verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+ 			    module_path, strerror(errno));
+@@ -1455,7 +1472,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 		goto send;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
++	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
+ 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
+ 		goto send;
+ 
+@@ -1516,7 +1533,7 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
+ 	}
+ 	free(pin);
+ 
+-	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
++	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
+ 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
+ 		goto send;
+ 
+@@ -2108,7 +2125,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'O':
+ 			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
+-				restrict_websafe  = 0;
++				restrict_websafe = 0;
++			else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0)
++				remote_add_provider = 1;
+ 			else
+ 				fatal("Unknown -O option");
+ 			break;
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
+-		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+-		goto fail;
+-	}
++	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
++		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+ 
+ 	p->module->handle = handle;
+ 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
+--- a/ssh-agent.1	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh-agent.1	2023-07-19 21:39:17.981406432 +0200
+@@ -107,9 +107,27 @@
+ .It Fl O Ar option
+ Specify an option when starting
+ .Nm .
+-Currently only one option is supported:
++Currently two options are supported:
++.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
++and
+ .Cm no-restrict-websafe .
+-This instructs
++.Pp
++The
++.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
++option allows clients of a forwarded
++.Nm
++to load PKCS#11 or FIDO provider libraries.
++By default only local clients may perform this operation.
++Note that signalling that a
++.Nm
++client remote is performed by
++.Xr ssh 1 ,
++and use of other tools to forward access to the agent socket may circumvent
++this restriction.
++.Pp
++The
++.Cm no-restrict-websafe ,
++instructs
+ .Nm
+ to permit signatures using FIDO keys that might be web authentication
+ requests.

openssh.rpmlintrc

@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@
 addFilter(r'openssh-askpass.x86_64: W: non-conffile-in-etc /etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.c?sh')
 
 # The ssh-keysign is not supposed to have standard permissions
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 4555')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 2555')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: setgid-binary /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys 2555')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: W: non-standard-gid /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys')
 
 # The -cavs subpackage is internal without documentation
 # The -askpass is not intended to be used directly so it is missing documentation

openssh.spec

@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@
 # Do we want libedit support
 %global libedit 1
 
+# Whether to build pam_ssh_agent_auth
+%if 0%{?!nopam:1}
+%global pam_ssh_agent 1
+%else
+%global pam_ssh_agent 0
+%endif
+
 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
 # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
 %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1}
@@ -38,17 +45,24 @@
 # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
 
-%global openssh_ver 10.2p1
+# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
+%global openssh_ver 9.6p1
+%global openssh_rel 1
+%global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
+%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 9
 
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+#URL1: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source2: sshd.pam
 Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
+Source4: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.gz
+Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
 Source6: ssh-keycat.pam
 Source7: sshd.sysconfig
 Source9: sshd@.service
@@ -62,123 +76,161 @@ Source17: ssh-agent.socket
 Source19: openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
 Source20: ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
 Source21: ssh-host-keys-migration.service
-Source22: parallel_test.sh
-Source23: parallel_test.Makefile
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
+Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
+# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
+Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
+Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
+Patch202: openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+
+# --- pam_ssh-agent ---
+# make it build reusing the openssh sources
+Patch300: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
+# check return value of seteuid()
+# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/23/
+Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
+# explicitly make pam callbacks visible
+Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
+# update to current version of agent structure
+Patch305: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
+# remove prefixes to be able to build against current openssh library
+Patch306: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
+# Fix NULL dereference from getpwuid() return value
+# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/22/
+Patch307: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2070113
+Patch308: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch
+Patch309: pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch
 
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX)
-Patch0001: 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
-Patch0002: 0002-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+Patch400: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634
+Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+#?
+Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644
-Patch0003: 0003-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
 #(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925
-Patch0004: 0004-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
-Patch0005: 0005-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
-Patch0006: 0006-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
-Patch0007: 0007-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+#?
+Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789
+Patch609: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+
+#?
+Patch700: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+#?
+Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
 #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332
-Patch0008: 0008-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX)
-Patch0009: 0009-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
+Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
 # warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
-Patch0010: 0010-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+
 # GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
-Patch0011: 0011-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+# from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
+# and
+# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
+# upstream MR:
+# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
+Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
 #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
-Patch0012: 0012-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-# Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494)
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775
-Patch0013: 0013-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
-# Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
-Patch0014: 0014-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
-Patch0015: 0015-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
-# Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650)
-Patch0016: 0016-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
-# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681)
-Patch0017: 0017-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
-# scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223)
-Patch0018: 0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
 # add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
 # CVE-2014-9278
-Patch0019: 0019-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+# Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494)
+# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775
+Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+# Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
+Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
+Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+# Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650)
+Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+# privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580)
+Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681)
+Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+# scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223)
+Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
 # apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521)
-Patch0020: 0020-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+Patch922: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
 # Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055)
-Patch0021: 0021-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
 # make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom
-Patch0022: 0022-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
+Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+# Help systemd to track the running service
+Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
 # Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
-Patch0023: 0023-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
 # Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
-Patch0024: 0024-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration)
+# https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11
+# git show > ~/devel/fedora/openssh/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
 # Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
-Patch0025: 0025-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
 # clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
-Patch0026: 0026-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
+# TODO fix the comment above ^
+Patch963: openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
 # Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
-Patch0027: 0027-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 # sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
-Patch0028: 0028-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
-Patch0029: 0029-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+# ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
+Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
 # sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
-Patch0030: 0030-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+
 # Implement kill switch for SCP protocol
-Patch0031: 0031-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+Patch977: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+
 # Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854
 # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299
 # downstream only
-Patch0032: 0032-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
-# Downstream alias for MinRSABits
-Patch0033: 0033-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+Patch981: openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+# https://github.com/djmdjm/openssh-wip/pull/13
+Patch982: openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
 # downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix
 # From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14
-Patch0034: 0034-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
-# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
-Patch0035: 0035-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
-# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
-Patch0036: 0036-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
-Patch0037: 0037-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
-Patch0038: 0038-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+Patch984: openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+
 # Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage
 # upstream bug:
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455
-Patch0039: 0039-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+Patch1002: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+
 # Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation
 # upstream MR:
 # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
-Patch0040: 0040-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
-Patch0041: 0041-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
-Patch0042: 0042-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
-Patch0043: 0043-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
-Patch0044: 0044-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
-# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/02/22/1
-Patch0045: 0045-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
-# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/564
-Patch0046: 0046-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
-# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/567
-Patch0047: 0047-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
-# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500
-Patch0048: 0048-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
-Patch0049: 0049-NIST-curves-hybrid-KEX-implementation.patch
-# landed upstream, to be removed after 10.3
-Patch0050: 0050-Provide-a-way-to-disable-GSSAPIDelegateCredentials-s.patch
-# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
-Patch0051: 0051-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, seriously reworked on rebasing to 10.2)
-# https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11
-Patch0052: 0052-openssh-10.2p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
-Patch1000: 1000-openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+Patch1006: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+
+Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
+Patch1013: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
+Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
 
 License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
-Requires: openssl-libs >= 3.5.0
 
 %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
 BuildRequires: libX11-devel
@@ -193,14 +245,13 @@ BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl-interpreter, perl-generators, zlib-devel
 BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5
 BuildRequires: util-linux, groff
 BuildRequires: pam-devel
-BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 3.5.0
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
 BuildRequires: perl-podlators
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
 BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 BuildRequires: gcc make
 BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
 BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
-BuildRequires: libxcrypt-devel
 Recommends: p11-kit
 Obsoletes: openssh-ldap < 8.3p1-4
 Obsoletes: openssh-cavs < 8.4p1-5
@@ -229,10 +280,6 @@ Summary: An open source SSH client applications
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
 
-%package keysign
-Summary: A helper program used for host-based authentication
-Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
-
 %package server
 Summary: An open source SSH server daemon
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
@@ -253,6 +300,12 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Summary: OpenSSH SK driver for test purposes
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 
+%package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
+Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
+Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
+Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
+License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant AND OpenSSL
+
 %description
 SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
 commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
@@ -272,11 +325,6 @@ OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
 the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
 
-%description keysign
-OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
-into and executing commands on a remote machine. ssh-keysign is a
-helper program used for host-based authentication disabled by default.
-
 %description server
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
@@ -295,14 +343,106 @@ an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
 %description sk-dummy
 This package contains a test SK driver used for OpenSSH test purposes
 
+%description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
+This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate
+users using ssh keys stored in a ssh-agent. Through the use of the
+forwarding of ssh-agent connection it also allows to authenticate with
+remote ssh-agent instance.
+
+The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks.
+
 %prep
 gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
-%autosetup -T -b 0 -p1
+%setup -q -a 4
+
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
+%patch -P 300 -p2 -b .psaa-build
+%patch -P 301 -p2 -b .psaa-seteuid
+%patch -P 302 -p2 -b .psaa-visibility
+%patch -P 306 -p2 -b .psaa-compat
+%patch -P 305 -p2 -b .psaa-agent
+%patch -P 307 -p2 -b .psaa-deref
+%patch -P 308 -p2 -b .rsasha2
+%patch -P 309 -p1 -b .psaa-configure-c99
+# Remove duplicate headers and library files
+rm -f $(cat %{SOURCE5})
+popd
+%endif
+
+%patch -P 400 -p1 -b .role-mls
+%patch -P 404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux
+
+%patch -P 502 -p1 -b .keycat
+
+%patch -P 601 -p1 -b .ip-opts
+%patch -P 606 -p1 -b .ipv6man
+%patch -P 607 -p1 -b .sigpipe
+%patch -P 609 -p1 -b .x11
+%patch -P 702 -p1 -b .progress
+%patch -P 703 -p1 -b .grab-info
+%patch -P 707 -p1 -b .redhat
+%patch -P 711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
+# 
+%patch -P 800 -p1 -b .gsskex
+%patch -P 801 -p1 -b .force_krb
+%patch -P 804 -p1 -b .ccache_name
+%patch -P 805 -p1 -b .k5login
+# 
+%patch -P 901 -p1 -b .kuserok
+%patch -P 906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
+%patch -P 916 -p1 -b .contexts
+%patch -P 918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot
+%patch -P 919 -p1 -b .scp
+%patch -P 802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users
+%patch -P 922 -p1 -b .sshdt
+%patch -P 926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
+%patch -P 939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
+%patch -P 944 -p1 -b .x11max
+%patch -P 948 -p1 -b .systemd
+%patch -P 949 -p1 -b .refactor
+%patch -P 950 -p1 -b .sandbox
+%patch -P 951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
+%patch -P 953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
+%patch -P 962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
+%patch -P 963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
+%patch -P 964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
+%patch -P 965 -p1 -b .visibility
+%patch -P 966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
+%patch -P 974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
+%patch -P 975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
+
+%patch -P 977 -p1 -b .kill-scp
+
+%patch -P 981 -p1 -b .scp-sftpdirs
+%patch -P 982 -p1 -b .minrsabits
+%patch -P 984 -p1 -b .ibmca
+
+%patch -P 200 -p1 -b .audit
+%patch -P 201 -p1 -b .audit-race
+%patch -P 202 -p1 -b .audit-log
+%patch -P 700 -p1 -b .fips
+
+%patch -P 1002 -p1 -b .ssh-manpage
+
+%patch -P 1006 -p1 -b .negotiate-supported-algs
+
+%patch -P 1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-dh
+%patch -P 1013 -p1 -b .evp-fips-ecdh
+%patch -P 1014 -p1 -b .nosha1hostproof
+
+%patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity
 
 autoreconf
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
+autoreconf
+popd
 
 %build
 %set_build_flags
+# the -fvisibility=hidden is needed for clean build of the pam_ssh_agent_auth
+# it is needed for lib(open)ssh build too since it is linked to the pam module too
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden"; export CFLAGS
 %if %{pie}
 %ifarch s390 s390x sparc sparcv9 sparc64
 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
@@ -336,14 +476,16 @@ fi
 	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
 	--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
 	--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
-	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
-	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin \
+	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
 	--with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \
 	--disable-strip \
 	--without-zlib-version-check \
+	--with-ssl-engine \
 	--with-ipaddr-display \
 	--with-pie=no \
 	--without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \
+	--with-systemd \
 	--with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \
 	--with-security-key-builtin=yes \
 	--with-pam \
@@ -391,9 +533,22 @@ fi
 popd
 %endif
 
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
+LDFLAGS="$SAVE_LDFLAGS"
+%configure --with-selinux \
+	--libexecdir=/%{_libdir}/security \
+	--with-mantype=man \
+	--without-openssl-header-check `# The check is broken`
+%make_build
+popd
+%endif
+
 %check
-OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null %{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23}  # ./parallel_tests.sh parallel_tests.Makefile
-#make tests
+#to run tests use "--with check"
+%if %{?_with_check:1}%{!?_with_check:0}
+make tests
+%endif
 
 %install
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
@@ -451,6 +606,12 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
 
 perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
 
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
+%make_install
+popd
+%endif
+
 install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest/
 install -m 755 regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest
 
@@ -501,6 +662,8 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
 
 %files clients
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
@@ -528,15 +691,9 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket
 
-%files keysign
-%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
-
 %files server
 %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-session
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-auth
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
@@ -568,183 +725,22 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %files askpass
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
-%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
 %endif
 
 %files sk-dummy
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/sshtest/sk-dummy.so
 
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
+%files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
+%license pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/security/pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/pam_ssh_agent_auth.8*
+%endif
+
 %changelog
-* Wed Dec 17 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.2p1-1
-- Rebase to OpenSSH 10.2p1
-
-* Wed Dec 10 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-10
-- Update gssapi-keyex patch to not abort KEX without hostkey
-
-* Mon Dec 01 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-9
-- rebuilt
-
-* Mon Nov 03 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-8
-- Implement mlkem768nistp256-sha256 and mlkem1024nistp384-sha384 KEX methods
-
-* Mon Sep 15 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-7
-- rebuilt
-
-* Thu Aug 28 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-6
-- Enable GSS KEX in FIPS mode
-
-* Thu Jul 24 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 10.0p1-5
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Fri Jun 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-4
-- Update sshd@.service to follow upstream, mostly support ephemeral sshd keys
-  Submitted by Allison Karlitskaya (https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/101)
-  Needs a SELinux counterpart.
-  Related: rhbz#2374928
-
-* Mon Jun 09 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-3
-- Apply patches forgot in previous respin
-
-* Mon May 19 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-2
-- Provide better diagnostics for non-supported private keys
-  (https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/564)
-- Ignore too short hostkeys in known_hosts file
-  (https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/567)
-- Switch to systemd-socket activation for ssh-agent
-  Resolves: rhbz#2181353
-
-* Fri May 16 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 10.0p1-1
-- Rebase to OpenSSH 10.0p1
-
-* Thu Apr 17 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-15
-- Require OpenSSL 3.5 to support PQ crypto
-- Suppress systemd warning on restart sshd
-
-* Tue Mar 18 2025 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek  <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 9.9p1-14
-- Remove /usr/local/sbin from the default path too
-
-* Tue Mar 18 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-13
-- Remove /usr/sbin from the default path
-  Resolves: rhbz#2352387
-- Export and accept COLORTERM
-  Resolves: rhbz#2352653
-
-* Thu Mar 06 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-12
-- Update ssh-keysign permission for RPM linter
-
-* Wed Mar 05 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-11
-- Use OpenSSL ML-KEM implementation instead of the native one
-
-* Tue Feb 25 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-10
-- Some minor fixes from Rocky Linux
-  https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/02/22/1
-
-* Tue Feb 18 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-9
-- Fix regression of Match directive processing
-- Fix missing error codes set and invalid error code checks in OpenSSH. It
-  prevents memory exhaustion attack and a MITM attack when VerifyHostKeyDNS
-  is on (CVE-2025-26465, CVE-2025-26466).
-
-* Sat Feb 01 2025 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 9.9p1-8.1
-- Add explicit BR: libxcrypt-devel
-
-* Wed Jan 29 2025 FeRD (Frank Dana) <ferdnyc@gmail.com> - 9.9p1-8
-- Replace deprecated (since 8.7) ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-  with KbdInteractiveAuthentication, in redhat sshd config
-
-* Mon Jan 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-7
-- Fix regression of Match directive processing
-  Resolves: rhbz#2341769
-
-* Mon Jan 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-6
-- Remove pam-ssh-agent subcomponent
-  Resolves: rhbz#2338440
-
-* Fri Jan 17 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.9p1-5.1
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Mon Oct 28 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-5
-- Fix MLKEM for BE platforms
-
-* Wed Oct 16 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-4
-- Resolve memory management issues after rebase
-- Define OPTIONS env in systemd modules (https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/92)
-
-* Fri Oct 11 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-3
-- Separate ssh-keysign to a dedicated package
-- Use FIPS KEX defaults in FIPS mode
-
-* Thu Oct 10 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-2
-- Update version of pam_ssh_agent_auth
-
-* Tue Oct 08 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-1
-- Update to OpenSSH 9.9p1
-
-* Tue Sep 03 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-4
-- Synchronize patches from Red Hat
-
-* Mon Aug 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-3
-- Sshd now proposes to enter password again when a non-existing user is specified
-
-* Fri Jul 26 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-2
-- Change default key type in FIPS mode
-
-* Mon Jul 22 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-1
-- Update to OpenSSH 9.8p1
-
-* Thu Jul 18 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-1.14
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jul 02 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.13
-- rebuilt
-
-* Mon Jul 01 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com> - 9.6p1-12
-- Patch 9.6p1 for CVE-2024-6387
-
-* Mon Jul 01 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com> - 9.6p1-11
-- Shorten paths used for parallel tests to fix BZ#2295117
-
-* Thu May 09 2024 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-10
-- Correctly audit hostname and IP address
-- Make default key sizes configurable in sshd-keygen
-
-* Wed Apr 24 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.9
-- Use OpenSSL SSH KDF implementation - s390x fixup
-
-* Wed Apr 24 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.8
-- Use OpenSSL SSH KDF implementation
-
-* Wed Apr 17 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.7
-- Only set PAM_RHOST if the remote host is not "UNKNOWN"
-  https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/71
-  Patch by Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>
-- Some spec cleanup
-  https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/74
-  by Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
-
-* Thu Apr 04 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.6
-- rebuilt
-
-* Thu Apr 04 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.5
-- rebuilt
-
-* Tue Apr 02 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer@gmail.com> - 9.6p1-1.4
-- Build OpenSSH without libsystemd dependency, using reference implementation
-
-* Wed Mar 13 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.6p1-1.3
-- Build OpenSSH without engine support
-- Make tests run at build phase (using parallel run mechanism by Alexander Sosedkin)
-
-* Thu Jan 25 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-1.2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Sun Jan 21 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-1.1
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
-
 * Tue Dec 26 2023 Daniel Milnes <daniel@daniel-milnes.uk> - 9.6p1-1
 - Update to OpenSSH 9.6
-  Original patches from https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/63
-  Tuned by Dmitry Belyavskiy for GSS and PKCS#11 URI processing
 
 * Fri Dec 22 2023 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 9.3p1-13.1
 - Fix type errors in downstream gssapi-keyex patch

pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+configure.ac: Improve C99 compatibility
+
+Future compilers will not support implicit declarations and implicit
+ints by default.  This means that configure probes which rely on them
+will fail unconditionally, without actually testing anything.
+
+The changes mostly mirror what has been implemented in the openssh
+repository, but had to be adapted somewhat because of drift between
+the two versions of configure.ac.
+
+Sam James has submitted similar fixes upstream:
+
+  <https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pull/41>
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 6496679..d927b62 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -500,10 +500,10 @@ int main(void) { exit(0); }
+ 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUNDLE, 1, [Define if your system uses bundles instead of ELF shared objects])
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have working getaddrinfo)
+ 	AC_TRY_RUN([#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+-main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+-		exit(0);
++int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
++		return 0;
+ 	else
+-		exit(1);
++		return 1;
+ }], [AC_MSG_RESULT(working)],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(buggy)
+ 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO, 1, [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])],
+@@ -917,8 +917,8 @@ AC_SUBST(LDFLAGS_SHARED)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(compiler and flags for sanity)
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([
+-#include <stdio.h>
+-int main(){exit(0);}
++#include <stdlib.h>
++int main(void){exit(0);}
+ 	])],
+ 	[	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ 	[
+@@ -951,9 +951,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+     strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+     s = dirname(buf);
+     if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+-	exit(1);
++	return 1;
+     } else {
+-	exit(0);
++	return 0;
+     }
+ }
+ 				]])],
+@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <dirent.h>
+-int main(void){struct dirent d;exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));}
++int main(void){struct dirent d;return sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char);}
+ 	]])],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ 	[
+@@ -1327,8 +1327,10 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresuid, [
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresuid seems to work)
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ int main(){errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0);}
+ 		]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+@@ -1344,8 +1346,10 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresgid, [
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresgid seems to work)
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ int main(){errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0);}
+ 		]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+@@ -1384,7 +1388,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
+-int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");exit(b[4]!='\0');}
++int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");return b[4]!='\0';}
+ 		]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ 		[
+@@ -1418,7 +1422,7 @@ int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
+ int main(void)
+ {
+ 	char x[1];
+-	exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1);
++	return x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1;
+ } ]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ 		[
+@@ -1467,7 +1471,8 @@ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+-main() { char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
++#include <unistd.h>
++int main(void) { char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
+ if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
+ 	exit(1);
+ unlink(template); exit(0);
+@@ -1492,10 +1497,14 @@ if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if openpty correctly handles controlling tty)
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/fcntl.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
++#include <pty.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ int
+ main()
+@@ -1543,6 +1552,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+@@ -1748,6 +1758,7 @@ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC(RAND_add, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL, 1,
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+@@ -1794,12 +1805,12 @@ int main(void) {
+ 
+ 	fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ 	if(fd == NULL)
+-		exit(1);
++		return 1;
+ 
+ 	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
+-		exit(1);
++		return 1;
+ 
+-	exit(0);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 	]])],
+ 	[
+@@ -1829,7 +1840,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+-int main(void) { exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); }
++int main(void) { return SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1; }
+ 	]])],
+ 	[
+ 		AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+@@ -2598,7 +2609,7 @@ dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+-main()
++int main(void)
+ {
+ 	char buf[50];
+ 	char expected_out[50];
+@@ -2611,11 +2622,11 @@ main()
+ 	strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
+ 	snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
+ 	if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
+-		exit(1);
+-	exit(0);
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ #else
+-main() { exit(0); }
++int main(void) { return 0; }
+ #endif
+ 		]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) ],
+ 		AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
+@@ -2746,11 +2757,11 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
+ int main() {
+ #ifdef msg_accrights
+ #error "msg_accrights is a macro"
+-exit(1);
++return 1;
+ #endif
+ struct msghdr m;
+ m.msg_accrights = 0;
+-exit(0);
++return 0;
+ }
+ 		])],
+ 		[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+@@ -2773,11 +2784,11 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
+ int main() {
+ #ifdef msg_control
+ #error "msg_control is a macro"
+-exit(1);
++return 1;
+ #endif
+ struct msghdr m;
+ m.msg_control = 0;
+-exit(0);
++return 0;
+ }
+ 		])],
+ 		[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+@@ -2791,7 +2802,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+ fi
+ 
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
+-	AC_TRY_LINK([],
++	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
+ 		[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]
+@@ -2871,7 +2882,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
+ fi
+ 
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
+-	AC_TRY_LINK([],
++	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
+ 		[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]
+@@ -2884,7 +2895,7 @@ fi
+ 
+ 
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
+-	AC_TRY_LINK([],
++	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
+ 		[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]

pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+authfd.c
+authfd.h
+atomicio.c
+atomicio.h
+bufaux.c
+bufbn.c
+buffer.h
+buffer.c
+cleanup.c
+cipher.h
+compat.h
+entropy.c
+entropy.h
+fatal.c
+includes.h
+kex.h
+key.c
+key.h
+log.c
+log.h
+match.h
+misc.c
+misc.h
+pathnames.h
+platform.h
+rsa.h
+ssh-dss.c
+ssh-rsa.c
+ssh.h
+ssh2.h
+uidswap.c
+uidswap.h
+uuencode.c
+uuencode.h
+xmalloc.c
+xmalloc.h

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,992 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
+  */
+ 
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
+                 case EOF:
+                 case '\0':
+                     if (len > 0) { 
+-                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+-                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
++                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
++                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
+                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
+                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
+                         len = 0;
+@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
+ {
+     size_t i;
+     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
++        free(argv[i]);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
++    free(argv);
+     return;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+-    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
++    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
+     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
+     int tried;
+     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+ 
++#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
++
+ /* 
+  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
+  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
+@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+     if (count == 0)
+         return NULL;
+    
+-    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
++    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
+         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
+@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
++agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+     size_t i;
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
++    int r;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
++    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-void
+-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
++static void
++pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+     u_char *cookie = NULL;
+@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
+     size_t count = 0;
+     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
+-    Buffer action_agentbuf;
++    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
+     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
+     char * retc;
+     int32_t reti;
++    int r;
+ 
+-    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++    rnd = arc4random();
+     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
+     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
+         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
+     }
+ 
+-    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
++    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+-            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++            rnd = arc4random();
+         }
+         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     }
+     else {
+         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+     }
+     
+     /*
+@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
+     time(&ts);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
++    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
+-    if(retc)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    if (retc) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    }
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     if (free_logbuf) { 
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
++        free(action_logbuf);
++        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
++    }
++    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
++    if (reti >= 0) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+-    if(reti >= 0)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
++    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     free(cookie);
+     return;
+@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ 
+ 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+ 	auth->fd = sock;
+-	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
++	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 	auth->howmany = 0;
+ 
+ 	return auth;
+@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    Key *key;
++    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+     char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
++        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+         {
+             if(key != NULL) {
+-                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
++                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+                 id->key = key;
+                 id->filename = comment;
+                 id->ac = ac;
+-                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
++                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
+-                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
++                free(id->filename);
++                key_free(id->key);
++                free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+             }
+         }
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
++        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
++        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
+     EVP_cleanup();
+     return retval;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
+@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+  * a patch 8-)
+  */
+ #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
+-    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
++    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
+ #endif
+ 
+     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
+@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
++    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
++    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
+ 
+     if(ruser_ptr) {
+         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
+         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
+             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
++            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
+         } else
+ #endif
+         {
+             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
++                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ 
+     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
+     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          */
+         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+      */
+ 
+     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ 
+         /*
+          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
+@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
+         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
+         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
++            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
+             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
+                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+         }
+@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
+          */
+         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+         } else {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+         }
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
++        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
+     }
+ 
+ cleanexit:
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ 
+-#include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
+ 
+ extern char *authorized_keys_file;
+@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+         } else {
+             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
+             if(!slash_ptr)
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal
++                fatal
+                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+ 
+             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
++                fatal("Username too long");
+ 
+             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+         }
+         authorized_keys_file =
+-            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
++            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
+                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
+                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
++        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
+                                                               percent_expand
+                                                               later, we'd step
+                                                               on this, so free
+@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
+ #endif
+     authorized_keys_file =
+-        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
++        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
+                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
+                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
++pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     return
+         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
++int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
+ void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+-
+-#include "identity.h"
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ /* return 1 if user allows given key */
+ /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
+ static int
+-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
++pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+-    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char *line = NULL;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     u_long linenum = 0;
+-    Key *found;
++    struct sshkey *found;
+     char *fp;
++    size_t linesize = 0;
+ 
+     found_key = 0;
+-    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
++    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
+ 
+-    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
++    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
+         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
+ 
++        linenum++;
+         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+             int quoted = 0;
+ 
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
++            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+             /* key_options = cp; */
+             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+             }
+             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+-            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
++            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
++                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
+                 continue;
+             }
+         }
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
++        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
+             found_key = 1;
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
++            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+                                   linenum);
+-            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+-                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
+-            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
++            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
++            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
++                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
++            free(fp);
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
++    free(line);
++    sshkey_free(found);
+     if(!found_key)
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
++        verbose("key not found");
+     return found_key;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ int
+-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
++pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     struct stat st;
+-    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char buf[256];
+ 
+     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
++    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
+ 
+     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
+     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
++        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ 
+     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+         fclose(f);
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
++        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
+                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
+-                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
++                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int ok, found_key = 0;
+@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+     else {
+         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
+         if(pw == NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
++            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
+                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror
++        error
+             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
+        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
++        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
+     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
++    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
+                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
+ 
+     /* 
+      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+      * run cleanup_exit() code.
+      */
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+ 
+     switch ((pid = fork())) {
+     case -1:                                              /* error */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         close(p[1]);
+         return 0;
+@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
+         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
++            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
+            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+ #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
++            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
++            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
+            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         _exit(127);
+     default:                                              /* parent */
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     close(p[1]);
+     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         /* Don't leave zombie child */
+         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+         if(errno != EINTR) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
++            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             goto out;
+         }
+     }
+     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+         goto out;
+     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     found_key = ok;
+   out:
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+     return found_key;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ 
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 	int comparehome = 0;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
++    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
+ 
+ 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+-		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
++		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ 
+-		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
++		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 
+ 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+-			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
++			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ 			    buf);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
++
+ /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
+ extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
+  */
+ 
+ int
+-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
++userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
+ {
+-    Buffer          b = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
+     char           *pkalg = NULL;
+     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+-    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
+-    int             authenticated = 0;
++    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
++    int             r, authenticated = 0;
+ 
+-    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
++    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
+ 
+     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
+     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+     /* construct packet to sign and test */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
++    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
++    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
+         authenticated = 1;
+ 
+   user_auth_clean_exit:
+     /* if(&b != NULL) */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
++    sshbuf_free(b);
++  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
+     if(sig != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
++        free(sig);
+     if(pkblob != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
++        free(pkblob);
+     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+     return authenticated;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
+ #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ 
+-#include <identity.h>
+-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
++#include "identity.h"
++int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
+ 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
+ 	*p = '\0';
+ 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
++	xfree(encoded);
+ 	return len;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
++	buf = malloc(2*len);
+ 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
+@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 	}
+ 	if (i % 70 != 69)
+ 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
++	free(buf);
+ }
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "defines.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include <includes.h>
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
+     int authenticated = 0;
+     const char method[] = "publickey ";
+ 
+-    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
++    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
+     char* saveptr;
+ 
+     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
+     while (auth_line != NULL) {
+         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
+             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
+-            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
++            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+             if (key == NULL) {
+                 continue;
+             }
+-            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
++            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
+             if (r == 1) {
+                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
+                     authenticated = 1;
+-                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++                    sshkey_free(key);
+                     break;
+                 }
+             } else {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
++                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
+             }
+-            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++            sshkey_free(key);
+         }
+         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
+     }

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
++++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
+ int
+ pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
++    struct passwd *pw;
+     return
+-        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+-                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
+-        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
+-                                             authorized_keys_file)
++        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
++        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
+         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
+                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
+                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
+@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	errno = 0; 
+-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
+ 		close(sock);
+-        if(errno == EACCES)
+-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
++		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++		close(sock);
++		sock = -1;
++		if(errno == EACCES)
++			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++	}
+ 
+-	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+-
++	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
++		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 	return sock;
+ }
+ 

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2 openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2	2022-07-15 15:08:12.865585410 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2022-07-15 15:16:25.164282372 +0200
+@@ -87,8 +87,13 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA
++	&& ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), "rsa-sha2-256", 0) == 0) {
++	/* Do nothing */
++    } else {
++        if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
++            goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    }
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+     if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
+ extern char    *__progname;
+ #endif
+ 
+-PAM_EXTERN int
++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
+ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+ {
+     char          **argv_ptr;
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-PAM_EXTERN int
++PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
+ pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+ {
+     UNUSED(pamh);

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
+ typedef struct identity Identity;
+ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++       int     fd;
++       struct sshbuf *identities;
++       int     howmany;
++}      AuthenticationConnection;
++
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ {
+     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+-    char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
++    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
++    int r;
++    unsigned int i;
+ 
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+-        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+-        {
+-            if(key != NULL) {
++        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
++            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
++               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
++                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
++        } else {
++            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
++            {
++              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
+                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+-                id->key = key;
+-                id->filename = comment;
++                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
++                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
+                 id->ac = ac;
+                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                free(id->filename);
+-                key_free(id->key);
+                 free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+-            }
+-        }
++              }
++            }
+-        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+-        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
++            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
++        }
++        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
++        free(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
+@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
+@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "ssh.h"
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <sys/un.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ 
+ #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+ 
++/* 
++ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
++ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
++ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. 
++ *
++ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that 
++ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a 
++ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
++ */
++
+ static char *
+ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
+ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    char *cookie = NULL;
++    u_char *cookie = NULL;
+     uint8_t i = 0;
+     uint32_t rnd = 0;
+     uint8_t cookie_len;
+@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
+         }
+-        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
++        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ }
+ 
+ int
++ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
++{
++	const char *authsocket;
++	int sock;
++	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
++	struct stat sock_st;
++
++	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
++	if (!authsocket)
++		return -1;
++
++	/* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
++	if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
++		if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
++			fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
++			return -1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* 
++	 * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody 
++	 * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
++	 */
++	if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
++		error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
++	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
++
++	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++	if (sock < 0)
++		return -1;
++
++	/* close on exec */
++	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
++		close(sock);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	errno = 0; 
++	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++		close(sock);
++        if(errno == EACCES)
++		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++
++	return sock;
++}
++
++AuthenticationConnection *
++ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
++{
++	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
++	int sock;
++
++	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
++
++	/*
++	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
++	 * exited due to a timeout.
++	 */
++	if (sock < 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
++	auth->fd = sock;
++	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
++	auth->howmany = 0;
++
++	return auth;
++}
++
++int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
+@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+-    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
++    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+         {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
+ CC=@CC@
+ LD=@LD@
+ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ LIBS=@LIBS@
+ AR=@AR@
+ AWK=@AWK@
+@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+ PERL=@PERL@
+ SED=@SED@
+ ENT=@ENT@
+-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+-LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
++LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
++LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
+ 
+ ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
+ 
+-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
+ 
+ 
+ MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
+@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+ 
+-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
++LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+ $(LIBCOMPAT): always
+ 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
+ always:
+ 
+-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+-	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
++	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8

parallel_test.Makefile

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# just a Makefile parallel_test.sh uses to run stuff in parallel with make
-%:
-	$(MAKE) -j1 -C .t/$* $*
-
-t-exec-%:
-	$(MAKE) -j1 -C ".t/t-exec-$*" \
-		TEST_SSH_PORT=10$*0 \
-		SKIP_LTESTS="$(shell cat .ltests/not-in/$*)" \
-		BUILDDIR="$(shell pwd)/.t/t-exec-$*" \
-		TEST_SHELL=sh \
-		MAKE=make \
-		TEST_SSH_TRACE=yes \
-		TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL=yes \
-		t-exec \

parallel_test.sh

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/bash
-set -uexo pipefail
-
-# The custom %check script to run the OpenSSH upstream testsuite in parallel.
-#
-# The upstream testsuite is serial,
-# so the idea here is to split the testsuite into several $PARTS:
-# * file-tests
-# * interop-tests
-# * unit
-# * ltests-00
-# * ltests-01
-# * ...
-# * ltests-23
-# and run them in parallel, using make, each in its own build subtree.
-
-PARALLEL_MAKEFILE=$1
-
-SPLIT=24
-PARTS='file-tests interop-tests unit '
-for ((i = 1; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
-    PARTS+="t-exec-$ii "
-done
-
-# work around a selinux restriction:
-chcon -t unconfined_exec_t ssh-sk-helper || :
-
-# work around something else that only crops up in brew
-export TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
-
-# create a .test directory to store all our files in:
-mkdir -p .t .ltests/{in,not-in}
-
-# patch testsuite: use different ports to avoid port collisions
-grep -REi 'port=[2-9][0-9]*' regress
-sed -i 's|PORT=4242|PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
-    regress/test-exec.sh*
-sed -i 's|^P=3301  # test port|P=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
-    regress/multiplex.sh*
-sed -i 's|^fwdport=3301|fwdport=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
-    regress/cfgmatch.sh* regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh*
-sed -i 's|^LFWD_PORT=.*|LFWD_PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 1)|' \
-    regress/forward-control.sh*
-sed -i 's|^RFWD_PORT=.*|RFWD_PORT=$(expr $TEST_SSH_PORT + 2)|' \
-    regress/forward-control.sh*
-( ! grep -REi 'port=[2-9][0-9]*' regress)  # try to find more of those
-
-# patch testsuite: speed up
-sed -i 's|sleep 1$|sleep .25|' regress/forward-control.sh
-
-# extract LTESTS list to .tests/ltests/all:
-grep -Ex 'tests:[[:space:]]*file-tests t-exec interop-tests extra-tests unit' Makefile
-echo -ne '\necho-ltests:\n\techo ${LTESTS}' >> regress/Makefile
-make -s -C regress echo-ltests | tr ' ' '\n' > .ltests/all
-
-# separate ltests into $SPLIT roughly equal .tests/ltests/in/$ii parts:
-grep -qFx connect .ltests/all
-( ! grep -qFx nonex .ltests/all )
-split -d -a2 --number=l/$SPLIT .ltests/all .ltests/in/
-wc -l .ltests/in/*
-grep -qFx connect .ltests/in/*
-
-# generate the inverses of them --- .ltests/not-in/$ii:
-( ! grep -qFx nonex .ltests/in/* )
-for ((i = 0; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
-    while read -r tname; do
-        if ! grep -qFx "$tname" ".ltests/in/$ii"; then
-            echo -n "$tname " >> ".ltests/not-in/$ii"
-        fi
-    done < .ltests/all
-done
-grep . .ltests/not-in/*
-( ! grep -q ^connect .ltests/not-in/0 )
-for ((i = 1; i < SPLIT; i++)); do ii=$(printf %02d $i);
-    grep -q ^connect .ltests/not-in/$ii
-done
-
-# prepare several test directories:
-for PART in $PARTS; do
-    mkdir .t/${PART}
-    cp -ra * .t/${PART}/
-    sed -i "s|abs_top_srcdir=.*|abs_top_srcdir=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
-        .t/${PART}/Makefile
-    sed -i "s|abs_top_builddir=.*|abs_top_builddir=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
-        .t/${PART}/Makefile
-    sed -i "s|^BUILDDIR=.*|BUILDDIR=$(pwd)/.t/${PART}|" \
-        .t/${PART}/Makefile
-done
-
-# finally, run tests $PARTS in parallel in their own subtrees:
-time make -f "$PARALLEL_MAKEFILE" -j$(nproc) $PARTS

plans/main.fmf

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-summary: Run all tests
-execute:
-  how: tmt
-discover:
-  how: fmf
-

sources

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz) = 66f3dd646179e71aaf41c33b6f14a207dc873d71d24f11c130a89dee317ee45398b818e5b94887b5913240964a38630d7bca3e481e0f1eff2e41d9e1cfdbdfc5
-SHA512 (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz.asc) = f1f71700b1b0b2117aed505488b98b7ebb51ce26e53184b08df0b07aa2c5a1e54dc4d3cbcbe871b5ad849a2a0e22b02af318ff22a68c980ab53b04be03c9bf3c
+SHA512 (openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz) = 0ebf81e39914c3a90d7777a001ec7376a94b37e6024baf3e972c58f0982b7ddef942315f5e01d56c00ff95603b4a20ee561ab918ecc55511df007ac138160509
+SHA512 (openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc) = aec5a5bd6ce480a8e5b5879dc55f8186aec90fe61f085aa92ad7d07f324574aa781be09c83b7443a32848d091fd44fb12c1842d49cee77afc351e550ffcc096d
+SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21

ssh-agent.service

@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1) man:ssh-add(1) man:ssh(1)
 Requires=ssh-agent.socket
 
 [Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -D
+Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/rm -f $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -D -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
 PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID
 SuccessExitStatus=2
 Type=simple

sshd-keygen

@@ -9,14 +9,8 @@ case $KEYTYPE in
 		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
 			exit 0
 		fi ;;
-	"rsa")
-		if [[ ! -z $SSH_RSA_BITS  ]]; then
-			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_RSA_BITS"
-		fi ;; # always ok
-	"ecdsa") 
-		if [[ ! -z $SSH_ECDSA_BITS  ]]; then
-			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_ECDSA_BITS"
-		fi ;;
+	"rsa") ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa") ;;
 	*) # wrong argument
 		exit 12 ;;
 esac
@@ -31,7 +25,7 @@ fi
 rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
 
 # create new keys
-if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE $SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
 	exit 1
 fi
 

sshd-keygen@.service

@@ -4,9 +4,6 @@ ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key
 
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
-# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
-# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
-Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i
 

sshd.service

@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=notify
-# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
-# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
-Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID

sshd.sysconfig

@@ -5,7 +5,3 @@
 # example using  systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
 # of DSA key or  systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
 # creation.
-
-#SSH_RSA_BITS=3072
-#SSH_ECDSA_BITS=256
-OPTIONS=""

sshd@.service

@@ -8,10 +8,6 @@ After=sshd-keygen.target
 Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
-# Set option as empty variable to avoid warnings upon expanding the command line
-# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
-Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys"
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS
 StandardInput=socket
-ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all

tests/main.fmf

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-test: ./runtest.sh
-framework: beakerlib
-require:
-  - iproute           # needs ip command
-  - procps-ng         # needs ps and pgrep commands
-  - initscripts       # needs service command
-  - openssh-clients   # needs ssh command
-  - findutils         # needs find command
-  - net-tools         # needs netstat command
-  - libselinux-utils  # needs selinuxenabled command
-  - nmap-ncat         # needs nc command

tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export TESTVERSION=1.0
 
 BUILT_FILES=
 
-FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile pam_save_ssh_var.c
+FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile PURPOSE pam_save_ssh_var.c
 
 .PHONY: all install download clean
 

tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/PURPOSE

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+PURPOSE of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
+Description: This is basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+
+Created as a response to rhbz#1251777 and previous one rhbz#1225106.
+The code of pam module is outdated and compiled with current openssh
+version which went through quite enough refactoring.