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5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Karolina Surma
278eb3fa41 Update to Python 3.11.16 2026-08-14 11:29:55 +02:00
Miro Hrončok
dadebe1c22 Skip UDP Lite tests if it's not supported
- Fixes FTBFS on Linux kernel 7.1 and newer
2026-07-30 17:24:31 +02:00
Fedora Release Engineering
79c55d4ad7 Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild 2026-07-16 22:47:27 +00:00
Lumír Balhar
55cc855c79 Run a new test to monitor changes in required symbols
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 12:24:01 +02:00
Miro Hrončok
fc0070dafa Fix ssl.SSLError: [ASN1: NOT_ENOUGH_DATA] not enough data with OpenSSL 3.5.7+ 2026-07-02 10:54:53 +02:00
13 changed files with 57 additions and 668 deletions

View file

@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ Co-authored-by: stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com>
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Build/2025-03-31-19-22-41.gh-issue-131865.PIJy7X.rst
diff --git a/Makefile.pre.in b/Makefile.pre.in
index 81d4d50f82..0bd3447638 100644
index ad29e1a0ca..79b07194bb 100644
--- a/Makefile.pre.in
+++ b/Makefile.pre.in
@@ -1453,7 +1453,7 @@ Python/frozen.o: $(FROZEN_FILES_OUT)
@@ -1458,7 +1458,7 @@ Python/frozen.o: $(FROZEN_FILES_OUT)
# an include guard, so we can't use a pipeline to transform its output.
Include/pydtrace_probes.h: $(srcdir)/Include/pydtrace.d
$(MKDIR_P) Include
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ index 81d4d50f82..0bd3447638 100644
: sed in-place edit with POSIX-only tools
sed 's/PYTHON_/PyDTrace_/' $@ > $@.tmp
mv $@.tmp $@
@@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ Python/import.o: $(srcdir)/Include/pydtrace.h
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ Python/import.o: $(srcdir)/Include/pydtrace.h
Modules/gcmodule.o: $(srcdir)/Include/pydtrace.h
Python/pydtrace.o: $(srcdir)/Include/pydtrace.d $(DTRACE_DEPS)

View file

@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ Co-authored-by: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-02-18-09-50-31.gh-issue-115627.HGchj0.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
index 0b169c37d5..921c41bd0d 100644
index aa8ce81db6..61cde99753 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ssl.py
@@ -2633,16 +2633,18 @@ def run(self):
@@ -2635,16 +2635,18 @@ def run(self):
self.write(msg.lower())
except OSError as e:
# handles SSLError and socket errors
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ index 0b169c37d5..921c41bd0d 100644
try:
self.write(b"ERROR\n")
except OSError:
@@ -3337,8 +3339,8 @@ def test_wrong_cert_tls13(self):
@@ -3339,8 +3341,8 @@ def test_wrong_cert_tls13(self):
suppress_ragged_eofs=False) as s:
s.connect((HOST, server.port))
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ index 0b169c37d5..921c41bd0d 100644
):
# TLS 1.3 perform client cert exchange after handshake
s.write(b'data')
@@ -4610,8 +4612,8 @@ def msg_cb(conn, direction, version, content_type, msg_type, data):
@@ -4612,8 +4614,8 @@ def msg_cb(conn, direction, version, content_type, msg_type, data):
# test sometimes fails with EOF error. Test passes as long as
# server aborts connection with an error.
with self.assertRaisesRegex(
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ index 0000000000..75d926ab59
+Fix the :mod:`ssl` module error handling of connection terminate by peer.
+It now throws an OSError with the appropriate error code instead of an EOFError.
diff --git a/Modules/_ssl.c b/Modules/_ssl.c
index 6275d94d64..ee7b131920 100644
index 9c2e8c391d..174e5dfce5 100644
--- a/Modules/_ssl.c
+++ b/Modules/_ssl.c
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ PySSL_ChainExceptions(PySSLSocket *sslsock) {

View file

@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: tomcruiseqi <tom33qi@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 02:23:28 +0800
Subject: 00478: CVE-2026-4519
Reject leading dashes in webbrowser URLs (GH-143931) (GH-146364)
(cherry picked from commit 82a24a4442312bdcfc4c799885e8b3e00990f02b)
Co-authored-by: Seth Michael Larson <seth@python.org>
---
Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py | 5 +++++
Lib/webbrowser.py | 14 ++++++++++++++
.../2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst | 1 +
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
index 9d608d63a0..0ac985f56c 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ def test_open(self):
options=[],
arguments=[URL])
+ def test_reject_dash_prefixes(self):
+ browser = self.browser_class(name=CMD_NAME)
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open(f"--key=val {URL}")
+
class BackgroundBrowserCommandTest(CommandTestMixin, unittest.TestCase):
diff --git a/Lib/webbrowser.py b/Lib/webbrowser.py
index 5d72524c08..0fd0aeb3c1 100755
--- a/Lib/webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/webbrowser.py
@@ -155,6 +155,12 @@ def open_new(self, url):
def open_new_tab(self, url):
return self.open(url, 2)
+ @staticmethod
+ def _check_url(url):
+ """Ensures that the URL is safe to pass to subprocesses as a parameter"""
+ if url and url.lstrip().startswith("-"):
+ raise ValueError(f"Invalid URL: {url}")
+
class GenericBrowser(BaseBrowser):
"""Class for all browsers started with a command
@@ -172,6 +178,7 @@ def __init__(self, name):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
cmdline = [self.name] + [arg.replace("%s", url)
for arg in self.args]
try:
@@ -192,6 +199,7 @@ def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
cmdline = [self.name] + [arg.replace("%s", url)
for arg in self.args]
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
try:
if sys.platform[:3] == 'win':
p = subprocess.Popen(cmdline)
@@ -257,6 +265,7 @@ def _invoke(self, args, remote, autoraise, url=None):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
if new == 0:
action = self.remote_action
elif new == 1:
@@ -358,6 +367,7 @@ class Konqueror(BaseBrowser):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
# XXX Currently I know no way to prevent KFM from opening a new win.
if new == 2:
action = "newTab"
@@ -442,6 +452,7 @@ def _remote(self, action):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
if new:
ok = self._remote("LOADNEW " + url)
else:
@@ -605,6 +616,7 @@ def register_standard_browsers():
class WindowsDefault(BaseBrowser):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
try:
os.startfile(url)
except OSError:
@@ -637,6 +649,7 @@ def __init__(self, name):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
assert "'" not in url
# hack for local urls
if not ':' in url:
@@ -689,6 +702,7 @@ def _name(self, val):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
+ self._check_url(url)
if self.name == 'default':
script = 'open location "%s"' % url.replace('"', '%22') # opens in default browser
else:
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f27eae99a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Reject leading dashes in URLs passed to :func:`webbrowser.open`

View file

@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Seth Larson <seth@python.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 10:21:42 -0500
Subject: 00479: CVE-2026-1502
Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers
Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
---
Lib/http/client.py | 11 ++++-
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 45 +++++++++++++++++++
...-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst | 2 +
3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
index c977612732..8cf783ab30 100644
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
@@ -941,12 +941,21 @@ def _wrap_ipv6(self, ip):
return ip
def _tunnel(self):
+ if _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(self._tunnel_host):
+ raise ValueError('Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters %r'
+ % (self._tunnel_host,))
connect = b"CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n" % (
self._wrap_ipv6(self._tunnel_host.encode("ascii")),
self._tunnel_port)
headers = [connect]
for header, value in self._tunnel_headers.items():
- headers.append(f"{header}: {value}\r\n".encode("latin-1"))
+ header_bytes = header.encode("latin-1")
+ value_bytes = value.encode("latin-1")
+ if not _is_legal_header_name(header_bytes):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header name %r' % (header_bytes,))
+ if _is_illegal_header_value(value_bytes):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (value_bytes,))
+ headers.append(b"%s: %s\r\n" % (header_bytes, value_bytes))
headers.append(b"\r\n")
# Making a single send() call instead of one per line encourages
# the host OS to use a more optimal packet size instead of
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
index 55363413b3..a4ab909ca9 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -371,6 +371,51 @@ def test_invalid_headers(self):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
conn.putheader(name, value)
+ def test_invalid_tunnel_headers(self):
+ cases = (
+ ('Invalid\r\nName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid\rName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid\nName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\r\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\rInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ (' InvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('\tInvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('Invalid:Name', 'ValidValue'),
+ (':InvalidName', 'ValidValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\r\nValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\rValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\nValue'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r\n'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r'),
+ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\n'),
+ )
+ for name, value in cases:
+ with self.subTest((name, value)):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.set_tunnel('tunnel', headers={
+ name: value
+ })
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
+ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect()
+
+ def test_invalid_tunnel_host(self):
+ cases = (
+ 'invalid\r.host',
+ '\ninvalid.host',
+ 'invalid.host\r\n',
+ 'invalid.host\x00',
+ 'invalid host',
+ )
+ for tunnel_host in cases:
+ with self.subTest(tunnel_host):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.set_tunnel(tunnel_host)
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters'):
+ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect()
+
def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
body = (
b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n'
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4993633b8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Reject CR/LF characters in tunnel request headers for the
+HTTPConnection.set_tunnel() method.

View file

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 22:41:51 +0100
Subject: 00480: CVE-2026-4786
Fix webbrowser `%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check
---
Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py | 8 ++++++++
Lib/webbrowser.py | 5 +++--
.../2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst | 2 ++
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
index 0ac985f56c..d629f889db 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py
@@ -99,6 +99,14 @@ def test_open_new_tab(self):
options=[],
arguments=[URL])
+ def test_reject_action_dash_prefixes(self):
+ browser = self.browser_class(name=CMD_NAME)
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open('%action--incognito')
+ # new=1: action is "--new-window", so "%action" itself expands to
+ # a dash-prefixed flag even with no dash in the original URL.
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ browser.open('%action', new=1)
class MozillaCommandTest(CommandTestMixin, unittest.TestCase):
diff --git a/Lib/webbrowser.py b/Lib/webbrowser.py
index 0fd0aeb3c1..026bdfbd7b 100755
--- a/Lib/webbrowser.py
+++ b/Lib/webbrowser.py
@@ -265,7 +265,6 @@ def _invoke(self, args, remote, autoraise, url=None):
def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url)
- self._check_url(url)
if new == 0:
action = self.remote_action
elif new == 1:
@@ -279,7 +278,9 @@ def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True):
raise Error("Bad 'new' parameter to open(); " +
"expected 0, 1, or 2, got %s" % new)
- args = [arg.replace("%s", url).replace("%action", action)
+ self._check_url(url.replace("%action", action))
+
+ args = [arg.replace("%action", action).replace("%s", url)
for arg in self.remote_args]
args = [arg for arg in args if arg]
success = self._invoke(args, True, autoraise, url)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45cdeebe1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+A bypass in :mod:`webbrowser` allowed URLs prefixed with ``%action`` to pass
+the dash-prefix safety check.

View file

@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 22:42:36 +0100
Subject: 00482: CVE-2026-6100
Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor
---
.../Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst | 5 +++++
Modules/_bz2module.c | 1 +
Modules/_lzmamodule.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..349d1cf3ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Fix a dangling input pointer in :class:`lzma.LZMADecompressor`,
+and :class:`bz2.BZ2Decompressor`
+when memory allocation fails with :exc:`MemoryError`, which could let a
+subsequent :meth:`!decompress` call read or write through a stale pointer to
+the already-released caller buffer.
diff --git a/Modules/_bz2module.c b/Modules/_bz2module.c
index 798e9efc62..b08ac5e44e 100644
--- a/Modules/_bz2module.c
+++ b/Modules/_bz2module.c
@@ -595,6 +595,7 @@ decompress(BZ2Decompressor *d, char *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length)
return result;
error:
+ bzs->next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
index 97453a2808..51106a6a07 100644
--- a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
+++ b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c
@@ -1105,6 +1105,7 @@ decompress(Decompressor *d, uint8_t *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length)
return result;
error:
+ lzs->next_in = NULL;
Py_XDECREF(result);
return NULL;
}

View file

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 19:55:52 +0000
Subject: 00483: CVE-2026-2297
Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling
---
Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py | 2 +-
.../Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst | 2 ++
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
diff --git a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
index e53f6acf38..588da3c7ad 100644
--- a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
+++ b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ def get_filename(self, fullname):
def get_data(self, path):
"""Return the data from path as raw bytes."""
- if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)):
+ if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, SourcelessFileLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)):
with _io.open_code(str(path)) as file:
return file.read()
else:
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..edeb9e640c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Fixes CVE-2026-2297 by ensuring that ``SourcelessFileLoader`` uses
+:func:`io.open_code` when opening ``.pyc`` files.

View file

@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <89152624+StanFromIreland@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 13:43:43 +0000
Subject: 00484: CVE-2026-3644
Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies
Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner <victor.stinner@gmail.com>
---
Lib/http/cookies.py | 24 ++++++++++--
Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
...-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst | 4 ++
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/cookies.py b/Lib/http/cookies.py
index 5cfa7a8072..6b36ffa9f8 100644
--- a/Lib/http/cookies.py
+++ b/Lib/http/cookies.py
@@ -335,9 +335,16 @@ def update(self, values):
key = key.lower()
if key not in self._reserved:
raise CookieError("Invalid attribute %r" % (key,))
+ if _has_control_character(key, val):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in "
+ f"cookies {key!r} {val!r}")
data[key] = val
dict.update(self, data)
+ def __ior__(self, values):
+ self.update(values)
+ return self
+
def isReservedKey(self, K):
return K.lower() in self._reserved
@@ -363,9 +370,15 @@ def __getstate__(self):
}
def __setstate__(self, state):
- self._key = state['key']
- self._value = state['value']
- self._coded_value = state['coded_value']
+ key = state['key']
+ value = state['value']
+ coded_value = state['coded_value']
+ if _has_control_character(key, value, coded_value):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies "
+ f"{key!r} {value!r} {coded_value!r}")
+ self._key = key
+ self._value = value
+ self._coded_value = coded_value
def output(self, attrs=None, header="Set-Cookie:"):
return "%s %s" % (header, self.OutputString(attrs))
@@ -377,13 +390,16 @@ def __repr__(self):
def js_output(self, attrs=None):
# Print javascript
+ output_string = self.OutputString(attrs)
+ if _has_control_character(output_string):
+ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies")
return """
<script type="text/javascript">
<!-- begin hiding
document.cookie = \"%s\";
// end hiding -->
</script>
- """ % (self.OutputString(attrs).replace('"', r'\"'))
+ """ % (output_string.replace('"', r'\"'))
def OutputString(self, attrs=None):
# Build up our result
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
index 2438c57ef4..f9a846f8fa 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py
@@ -527,6 +527,14 @@ def test_control_characters(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel["path"] = c0
+ # .__setstate__()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': c0, 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': 'coded'})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': c0, 'coded_value': 'coded'})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': c0})
+
# .setdefault()
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel.setdefault("path", c0)
@@ -541,6 +549,18 @@ def test_control_characters(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
morsel.set("path", "val", c0)
+ # .update()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.update({"path": c0})
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel.update({c0: "val"})
+
+ # .__ior__()
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel |= {"path": c0}
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ morsel |= {c0: "val"}
+
def test_control_characters_output(self):
# Tests that even if the internals of Morsel are modified
# that a call to .output() has control character safeguards.
@@ -561,6 +581,24 @@ def test_control_characters_output(self):
with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
cookie.output()
+ # Tests that .js_output() also has control character safeguards.
+ for c0 in support.control_characters_c0():
+ morsel = cookies.Morsel()
+ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value")
+ morsel._key = c0 # Override private variable.
+ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie()
+ cookie["cookie"] = morsel
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ cookie.js_output()
+
+ morsel = cookies.Morsel()
+ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value")
+ morsel._coded_value = c0 # Override private variable.
+ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie()
+ cookie["cookie"] = morsel
+ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError):
+ cookie.js_output()
+
def load_tests(loader, tests, pattern):
tests.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(cookies))
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc2e503779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Reject control characters in :class:`http.cookies.Morsel`
+:meth:`~http.cookies.Morsel.update` and
+:meth:`~http.cookies.BaseCookie.js_output`.
+This addresses `CVE-2026-3644 <https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-3644>`_.

View file

@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 11:27:39 +0100
Subject: 00485: CVE-2026-4224
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models
Co-authored-by: Bénédikt Tran <10796600+picnixz@users.noreply.github.com>
---
Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
...6-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst | 4 ++++
Modules/pyexpat.c | 9 ++++++++-
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
index 9aa2fcedad..8afce3ffe1 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py
@@ -675,6 +675,24 @@ def test_change_size_2(self):
parser.Parse(xml2, True)
self.assertEqual(self.n, 4)
+class ElementDeclHandlerTest(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_deeply_nested_content_model(self):
+ # This should raise a RecursionError and not crash.
+ # See https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/145986.
+ N = 500_000
+ data = (
+ b'<!DOCTYPE root [\n<!ELEMENT root '
+ + b'(a, ' * N + b'a' + b')' * N
+ + b'>\n]>\n<root/>\n'
+ )
+
+ parser = expat.ParserCreate()
+ parser.ElementDeclHandler = lambda _1, _2: None
+ with support.infinite_recursion():
+ with self.assertRaises(RecursionError):
+ parser.Parse(data)
+
+
class MalformedInputTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test1(self):
xml = b"\0\r\n"
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cb9dbadb72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+:mod:`xml.parsers.expat`: Fixed a crash caused by unbounded C recursion when
+converting deeply nested XML content models with
+:meth:`~xml.parsers.expat.xmlparser.ElementDeclHandler`.
+This addresses `CVE-2026-4224 <https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-4224>`_.
diff --git a/Modules/pyexpat.c b/Modules/pyexpat.c
index 7b76ddfabd..13c4e8e0ad 100644
--- a/Modules/pyexpat.c
+++ b/Modules/pyexpat.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#endif
#include "Python.h"
+#include "pycore_ceval.h" // _Py_EnterRecursiveCall()
#include "pycore_runtime.h" // _Py_ID()
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -578,6 +579,10 @@ static PyObject *
conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
PyObject *(*conv_string)(const XML_Char *))
{
+ if (_Py_EnterRecursiveCall(" in conv_content_model")) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
PyObject *result = NULL;
PyObject *children = PyTuple_New(model->numchildren);
int i;
@@ -589,7 +594,7 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
conv_string);
if (child == NULL) {
Py_XDECREF(children);
- return NULL;
+ goto done;
}
PyTuple_SET_ITEM(children, i, child);
}
@@ -597,6 +602,8 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model,
model->type, model->quant,
conv_string,model->name, children);
}
+done:
+ _Py_LeaveRecursiveCall();
return result;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Karolina Surma <ksurma@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 09:38:26 +0200
Subject: 00494: Increase the timeout of test_large_content_length_truncated
It has started to fail randomly when run on s390x architecture.
---
Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
index b0b09daab0..59434936b7 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ def test_large_content_length(self):
self.assertEqual(res.read(), b'%d %d' % (size, size) + self.linesep)
def test_large_content_length_truncated(self):
- with support.swap_attr(self.request_handler, 'timeout', 0.001):
+ with support.swap_attr(self.request_handler, 'timeout', support.LOOPBACK_TIMEOUT):
for w in range(18, 65):
size = 1 << w
headers = {'Content-Length' : str(size)}

View file

@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ discover:
- name: marshalparser
path: /marshalparser
test: "VERSION=${pybasever} SAMPLE=10 ./test_marshalparser_compatibility.sh"
- name: required_symbols
path: /required-symbols
test: "VERSION=${pybasever} ./check.sh"
prepare:
- name: Install dependencies
@ -51,8 +54,9 @@ prepare:
- virtualenv # for virtualenv tests
- glibc-all-langpacks # for locale tests
- marshalparser # for testing compatibility (magic numbers) with marshalparser
- binutils # for nm (symbol inspection)
- rpm # for debugging
- dnf # for upgrade
- dnf # for upgrade and downgrade
- name: Update packages
how: shell
script: dnf upgrade -y

View file

@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
# WARNING When rebasing to a new Python version,
# remember to update the python3-docs package as well
%global general_version %{pybasever}.15
%global general_version %{pybasever}.16
#global prerel ...
%global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel}
Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}}
Release: 4%{?dist}
Release: 1%{?dist}
License: Python-2.0.1
@ -367,47 +367,11 @@ Patch474: 00474-cve-2025-15366.patch
# (cherry-picked from commit b234a2b67539f787e191d2ef19a7cbdce32874e7)
Patch475: 00475-cve-2025-15367.patch
# 00478 # 40c5c88950b10eaf1c10c5afcc39887b8e23c997
# CVE-2026-4519
# 00494 # 430aab133397ed44cc9ee621fd311e02fee317b5
# Increase the timeout of test_large_content_length_truncated
#
# Reject leading dashes in webbrowser URLs (GH-143931) (GH-146364)
Patch478: 00478-cve-2026-4519.patch
# 00479 # 6fe61dd71dec5b7c9de2b1994172981667d034a1
# CVE-2026-1502
#
# Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers
Patch479: 00479-cve-2026-1502.patch
# 00480 # 9f4b1483ecfbc8c08117133c239fba544fcb42e7
# CVE-2026-4786
#
# Fix webbrowser `%%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check
Patch480: 00480-cve-2026-4786.patch
# 00482 # 2a21454e658935990766df8c3c48af9363e8422a
# CVE-2026-6100
#
# Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor
Patch482: 00482-cve-2026-6100.patch
# 00483 # cdb097a23eac5a09fb063a0e91001f69ff324205
# CVE-2026-2297
#
# Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling
Patch483: 00483-cve-2026-2297.patch
# 00484 # cf0bd2f2cce15cb35558aa08de34e9d18a8089f7
# CVE-2026-3644
#
# Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies
Patch484: 00484-cve-2026-3644.patch
# 00485 # 54d821ba2f5a03ccced037978fcdb0a7c4d6878f
# CVE-2026-4224
#
# Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models
Patch485: 00485-cve-2026-4224.patch
# It has started to fail randomly when run on s390x architecture.
Patch494: 00494-increase-the-timeout-of-test_large_content_length_truncated.patch
# (New patches go here ^^^)
#
@ -1741,6 +1705,19 @@ CheckPython optimized
# ======================================================
%changelog
* Thu Aug 13 2026 Karolina Surma <ksurma@redhat.com> - 3.11.16-1
- Update to Python 3.11.16
* Thu Jul 30 2026 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 3.11.15-7
- Skip UDP Lite tests if it's not supported
- Fixes FTBFS on Linux kernel 7.1 and newer
* Thu Jul 16 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.11.15-6
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild
* Thu Jul 02 2026 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 3.11.15-5
- Fix ssl.SSLError: [ASN1: NOT_ENOUGH_DATA] not enough data with OpenSSL 3.5.7+
* Fri Apr 17 2026 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.11.15-4
- Security fixes for CVE-2026-1502, CVE-2026-4786, CVE-2026-6100, CVE-2026-2297, CVE 2026-3644, CVE-2026-4224
Resolves: rhbz#2457941, rhbz#2458221, rhbz#2458013, rhbz#2444704, rhbz#2448188, rhbz#2448204

View file

@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
SHA512 (Python-3.11.15.tar.xz) = 1667f4839acfd23d05917a12993983b7dc3ab4438a37c72496fd040ac6981f4dea9dc95461ca701a6862beedb56c423fb83398b8b18e39e1efe12f539fced1c1
SHA512 (Python-3.11.15.tar.xz.asc) = 673822ca037acb521bf7d3e7433f83cc2d60c8d102cfbf6695234e2a50ce12a7003040ad4017438510ebbb1ff0ba6727253fae250b07bc0e3d24b5578e80be52
SHA512 (Python-3.11.16.tar.xz) = f4e168d35596c2df080663d8e8b3472f03bace987d46b49b8410f2425ba193215b9880c7d03d4653ec31c83b72209d95866fc1cb6d666799145075b092f64a48
SHA512 (Python-3.11.16.tar.xz.asc) = b31b3205e68951478fe76f4884a124ebb4955a711b6105754d4179acb48b16a5439ec8c35383a84787cd673fa1143f2f047c6d65944909b0f1a8e3c75a0e2efe