diff --git a/00464-enable-pac-and-bti-protections-for-aarch64.patch b/00464-enable-pac-and-bti-protections-for-aarch64.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81729d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/00464-enable-pac-and-bti-protections-for-aarch64.patch @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Charalampos Stratakis +Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 03:02:15 +0200 +Subject: 00464: Enable PAC and BTI protections for aarch64 + +Apply protection against ROP/JOP attacks for aarch64 on asm_trampoline.S + +The BTI flag must be applied in the assembler sources for this class +of attacks to be mitigated on newer aarch64 processors. + +Upstream PR: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/130864/files + +The upstream patch is incomplete but only for the case where +frame pointers are not used on 3.13+. + +Since on Fedora we always compile with frame pointers the BTI/PAC +hardware protections can be enabled without losing Perf unwinding. +--- + Python/asm_trampoline.S | 4 +++ + Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h + +diff --git a/Python/asm_trampoline.S b/Python/asm_trampoline.S +index 341d0bbe51..ae882660b5 100644 +--- a/Python/asm_trampoline.S ++++ b/Python/asm_trampoline.S +@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ ++#include "asm_trampoline_aarch64.h" ++ + .text + .globl _Py_trampoline_func_start + # The following assembly is equivalent to: +@@ -20,10 +22,12 @@ _Py_trampoline_func_start: + #if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__AARCH64EL__) && !defined(__ILP32__) + // ARM64 little endian, 64bit ABI + // generate with aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc 12.1 ++ SIGN_LR + stp x29, x30, [sp, -16]! + mov x29, sp + blr x3 + ldp x29, x30, [sp], 16 ++ VERIFY_LR + ret + #endif + .globl _Py_trampoline_func_end +diff --git a/Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h b/Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..4b0ec4a7dc +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Python/asm_trampoline_aarch64.h +@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ ++#ifndef ASM_TRAMPOLINE_AARCH_64_H_ ++#define ASM_TRAMPOLINE_AARCH_64_H_ ++ ++/* ++ * References: ++ * - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101028/0012/5--Feature-test-macros ++ * - https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/blob/main/aaelf64/aaelf64.rst ++ */ ++ ++#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT) && __ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT == 1 ++ #define BTI_J hint 36 /* bti j: for jumps, IE br instructions */ ++ #define BTI_C hint 34 /* bti c: for calls, IE bl instructions */ ++ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI 1 /* bit 0 GNU Notes is for BTI support */ ++#else ++ #define BTI_J ++ #define BTI_C ++ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI 0 ++#endif ++ ++#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT) ++ #if __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT & 1 ++ #define SIGN_LR hint 25 /* paciasp: sign with the A key */ ++ #define VERIFY_LR hint 29 /* autiasp: verify with the A key */ ++ #elif __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT & 2 ++ #define SIGN_LR hint 27 /* pacibsp: sign with the b key */ ++ #define VERIFY_LR hint 31 /* autibsp: verify with the b key */ ++ #endif ++ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH 2 /* bit 1 GNU Notes is for PAC support */ ++#else ++ #define SIGN_LR BTI_C ++ #define VERIFY_LR ++ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH 0 ++#endif ++ ++/* Add the BTI and PAC support to GNU Notes section */ ++#if GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI != 0 || GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH != 0 ++ .pushsection .note.gnu.property, "a"; /* Start a new allocatable section */ ++ .balign 8; /* align it on a byte boundry */ ++ .long 4; /* size of "GNU\0" */ ++ .long 0x10; /* size of descriptor */ ++ .long 0x5; /* NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 */ ++ .asciz "GNU"; ++ .long 0xc0000000; /* GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND */ ++ .long 4; /* Four bytes of data */ ++ .long (GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_BTI|GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_POINTER_AUTH); /* BTI or PAC is enabled */ ++ .long 0; /* padding for 8 byte alignment */ ++ .popsection; /* end the section */ ++#endif ++ ++#endif diff --git a/00478-cve-2026-4519.patch b/00478-cve-2026-4519.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8598b76 --- /dev/null +++ b/00478-cve-2026-4519.patch @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Pinky +Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 01:02:37 +0530 +Subject: 00478: CVE-2026-4519 + +Reject leading dashes in webbrowser URLs (GH-146360) + +(cherry picked from commit 82a24a4442312bdcfc4c799885e8b3e00990f02b) + +Co-authored-by: Seth Michael Larson +--- + Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py | 5 +++++ + Lib/webbrowser.py | 12 ++++++++++++ + .../2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst | 1 + + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py +index 2d695bc883..60f094fd6a 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py +@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ def test_open(self): + options=[], + arguments=[URL]) + ++ def test_reject_dash_prefixes(self): ++ browser = self.browser_class(name=CMD_NAME) ++ with self.assertRaises(ValueError): ++ browser.open(f"--key=val {URL}") ++ + + class BackgroundBrowserCommandTest(CommandTestMixin, unittest.TestCase): + +diff --git a/Lib/webbrowser.py b/Lib/webbrowser.py +index 13b9e85f9e..0bdb644d7d 100755 +--- a/Lib/webbrowser.py ++++ b/Lib/webbrowser.py +@@ -158,6 +158,12 @@ def open_new(self, url): + def open_new_tab(self, url): + return self.open(url, 2) + ++ @staticmethod ++ def _check_url(url): ++ """Ensures that the URL is safe to pass to subprocesses as a parameter""" ++ if url and url.lstrip().startswith("-"): ++ raise ValueError(f"Invalid URL: {url}") ++ + + class GenericBrowser(BaseBrowser): + """Class for all browsers started with a command +@@ -175,6 +181,7 @@ def __init__(self, name): + + def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url) ++ self._check_url(url) + cmdline = [self.name] + [arg.replace("%s", url) + for arg in self.args] + try: +@@ -195,6 +202,7 @@ def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + cmdline = [self.name] + [arg.replace("%s", url) + for arg in self.args] + sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url) ++ self._check_url(url) + try: + if sys.platform[:3] == 'win': + p = subprocess.Popen(cmdline) +@@ -260,6 +268,7 @@ def _invoke(self, args, remote, autoraise, url=None): + + def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url) ++ self._check_url(url) + if new == 0: + action = self.remote_action + elif new == 1: +@@ -350,6 +359,7 @@ class Konqueror(BaseBrowser): + + def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url) ++ self._check_url(url) + # XXX Currently I know no way to prevent KFM from opening a new win. + if new == 2: + action = "newTab" +@@ -554,6 +564,7 @@ def register_standard_browsers(): + class WindowsDefault(BaseBrowser): + def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url) ++ self._check_url(url) + try: + os.startfile(url) + except OSError: +@@ -638,6 +649,7 @@ def _name(self, val): + + def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url) ++ self._check_url(url) + if self.name == 'default': + script = 'open location "%s"' % url.replace('"', '%22') # opens in default browser + else: +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..0f27eae99a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-01-16-12-04-49.gh-issue-143930.zYC5x3.rst +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++Reject leading dashes in URLs passed to :func:`webbrowser.open` diff --git a/00479-cve-2026-1502.patch b/00479-cve-2026-1502.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16dc99b --- /dev/null +++ b/00479-cve-2026-1502.patch @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Seth Larson +Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 10:21:42 -0500 +Subject: 00479: CVE-2026-1502 + +Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers + +Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii +--- + Lib/http/client.py | 11 ++++- + Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 45 +++++++++++++++++++ + ...-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst | 2 + + 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py +index 70451d67d4..7db4807b30 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/client.py ++++ b/Lib/http/client.py +@@ -972,13 +972,22 @@ def _wrap_ipv6(self, ip): + return ip + + def _tunnel(self): ++ if _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(self._tunnel_host): ++ raise ValueError('Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters %r' ++ % (self._tunnel_host,)) + connect = b"CONNECT %s:%d %s\r\n" % ( + self._wrap_ipv6(self._tunnel_host.encode("idna")), + self._tunnel_port, + self._http_vsn_str.encode("ascii")) + headers = [connect] + for header, value in self._tunnel_headers.items(): +- headers.append(f"{header}: {value}\r\n".encode("latin-1")) ++ header_bytes = header.encode("latin-1") ++ value_bytes = value.encode("latin-1") ++ if not _is_legal_header_name(header_bytes): ++ raise ValueError('Invalid header name %r' % (header_bytes,)) ++ if _is_illegal_header_value(value_bytes): ++ raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (value_bytes,)) ++ headers.append(b"%s: %s\r\n" % (header_bytes, value_bytes)) + headers.append(b"\r\n") + # Making a single send() call instead of one per line encourages + # the host OS to use a more optimal packet size instead of +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +index e46dac0077..e027d930d9 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +@@ -369,6 +369,51 @@ def test_invalid_headers(self): + with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'): + conn.putheader(name, value) + ++ def test_invalid_tunnel_headers(self): ++ cases = ( ++ ('Invalid\r\nName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('Invalid\rName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('Invalid\nName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('\r\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('\rInvalidName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('\nInvalidName', 'ValidValue'), ++ (' InvalidName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('\tInvalidName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('Invalid:Name', 'ValidValue'), ++ (':InvalidName', 'ValidValue'), ++ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\r\nValue'), ++ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\rValue'), ++ ('ValidName', 'Invalid\nValue'), ++ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r\n'), ++ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\r'), ++ ('ValidName', 'InvalidValue\n'), ++ ) ++ for name, value in cases: ++ with self.subTest((name, value)): ++ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com') ++ conn.set_tunnel('tunnel', headers={ ++ name: value ++ }) ++ conn.sock = FakeSocket('') ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'): ++ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect() ++ ++ def test_invalid_tunnel_host(self): ++ cases = ( ++ 'invalid\r.host', ++ '\ninvalid.host', ++ 'invalid.host\r\n', ++ 'invalid.host\x00', ++ 'invalid host', ++ ) ++ for tunnel_host in cases: ++ with self.subTest(tunnel_host): ++ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com') ++ conn.set_tunnel(tunnel_host) ++ conn.sock = FakeSocket('') ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Tunnel host can\'t contain control characters'): ++ conn._tunnel() # Called in .connect() ++ + def test_headers_debuglevel(self): + body = ( + b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n' +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..4993633b8e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-20-09-29-42.gh-issue-146211.PQVbs7.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++Reject CR/LF characters in tunnel request headers for the ++HTTPConnection.set_tunnel() method. diff --git a/00480-cve-2026-4786.patch b/00480-cve-2026-4786.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73e4e13 --- /dev/null +++ b/00480-cve-2026-4786.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stan Ulbrych +Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 20:02:52 +0100 +Subject: 00480: CVE-2026-4786 + +Fix webbrowser `%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check +--- + Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py | 9 +++++++++ + Lib/webbrowser.py | 5 +++-- + .../2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py +index 60f094fd6a..e900c0212b 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_webbrowser.py +@@ -99,6 +99,15 @@ def test_open_new_tab(self): + options=[], + arguments=[URL]) + ++ def test_reject_action_dash_prefixes(self): ++ browser = self.browser_class(name=CMD_NAME) ++ with self.assertRaises(ValueError): ++ browser.open('%action--incognito') ++ # new=1: action is "--new-window", so "%action" itself expands to ++ # a dash-prefixed flag even with no dash in the original URL. ++ with self.assertRaises(ValueError): ++ browser.open('%action', new=1) ++ + + class EdgeCommandTest(CommandTestMixin, unittest.TestCase): + +diff --git a/Lib/webbrowser.py b/Lib/webbrowser.py +index 0bdb644d7d..79d410bcae 100755 +--- a/Lib/webbrowser.py ++++ b/Lib/webbrowser.py +@@ -268,7 +268,6 @@ def _invoke(self, args, remote, autoraise, url=None): + + def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + sys.audit("webbrowser.open", url) +- self._check_url(url) + if new == 0: + action = self.remote_action + elif new == 1: +@@ -282,7 +281,9 @@ def open(self, url, new=0, autoraise=True): + raise Error("Bad 'new' parameter to open(); " + + "expected 0, 1, or 2, got %s" % new) + +- args = [arg.replace("%s", url).replace("%action", action) ++ self._check_url(url.replace("%action", action)) ++ ++ args = [arg.replace("%action", action).replace("%s", url) + for arg in self.remote_args] + args = [arg for arg in args if arg] + success = self._invoke(args, True, autoraise, url) +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..45cdeebe1b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-31-09-15-51.gh-issue-148169.EZJzz2.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++A bypass in :mod:`webbrowser` allowed URLs prefixed with ``%action`` to pass ++the dash-prefix safety check. diff --git a/00482-cve-2026-6100.patch b/00482-cve-2026-6100.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5656e3d --- /dev/null +++ b/00482-cve-2026-6100.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stan Ulbrych +Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 02:14:54 +0100 +Subject: 00482: CVE-2026-6100 + +Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor +--- + .../Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst | 5 +++++ + Modules/_bz2module.c | 1 + + Modules/_lzmamodule.c | 1 + + Modules/zlibmodule.c | 1 + + 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst + +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..9502189ab1 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-04-10-16-28-21.gh-issue-148395.kfzm0G.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++Fix a dangling input pointer in :class:`lzma.LZMADecompressor`, ++:class:`bz2.BZ2Decompressor`, and internal :class:`!zlib._ZlibDecompressor` ++when memory allocation fails with :exc:`MemoryError`, which could let a ++subsequent :meth:`!decompress` call read or write through a stale pointer to ++the already-released caller buffer. +diff --git a/Modules/_bz2module.c b/Modules/_bz2module.c +index 97bd44b4ac..a732e89d55 100644 +--- a/Modules/_bz2module.c ++++ b/Modules/_bz2module.c +@@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ decompress(BZ2Decompressor *d, char *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length) + return result; + + error: ++ bzs->next_in = NULL; + Py_XDECREF(result); + return NULL; + } +diff --git a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c +index 7bbd6569aa..103a6ef86c 100644 +--- a/Modules/_lzmamodule.c ++++ b/Modules/_lzmamodule.c +@@ -1114,6 +1114,7 @@ decompress(Decompressor *d, uint8_t *data, size_t len, Py_ssize_t max_length) + return result; + + error: ++ lzs->next_in = NULL; + Py_XDECREF(result); + return NULL; + } +diff --git a/Modules/zlibmodule.c b/Modules/zlibmodule.c +index f94c57e4c8..9759593b6a 100644 +--- a/Modules/zlibmodule.c ++++ b/Modules/zlibmodule.c +@@ -1645,6 +1645,7 @@ decompress(ZlibDecompressor *self, uint8_t *data, + return result; + + error: ++ self->zst.next_in = NULL; + Py_XDECREF(result); + return NULL; + } diff --git a/00483-cve-2026-2297.patch b/00483-cve-2026-2297.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b504c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/00483-cve-2026-2297.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Steve Dower +Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 19:55:52 +0000 +Subject: 00483: CVE-2026-2297 + +Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling +--- + Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py | 2 +- + .../Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py +index 9b8a8dfc5a..6e4a087a10 100644 +--- a/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py ++++ b/Lib/importlib/_bootstrap_external.py +@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ def get_filename(self, fullname): + + def get_data(self, path): + """Return the data from path as raw bytes.""" +- if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)): ++ if isinstance(self, (SourceLoader, SourcelessFileLoader, ExtensionFileLoader)): + with _io.open_code(str(path)) as file: + return file.read() + else: +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..dcdb44d4fa +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-04-18-59-17.gh-issue-145506.6hwvEh.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++Fixes :cve:`2026-2297` by ensuring that ``SourcelessFileLoader`` uses ++:func:`io.open_code` when opening ``.pyc`` files. diff --git a/00484-cve-2026-3644.patch b/00484-cve-2026-3644.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1c12bd --- /dev/null +++ b/00484-cve-2026-3644.patch @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stan Ulbrych <89152624+StanFromIreland@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 13:43:43 +0000 +Subject: 00484: CVE-2026-3644 + +Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies + +Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner +--- + Lib/http/cookies.py | 24 ++++++++++-- + Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ + ...-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst | 4 ++ + 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/cookies.py b/Lib/http/cookies.py +index d0a69cbe19..63d119ad46 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/cookies.py ++++ b/Lib/http/cookies.py +@@ -335,9 +335,16 @@ def update(self, values): + key = key.lower() + if key not in self._reserved: + raise CookieError("Invalid attribute %r" % (key,)) ++ if _has_control_character(key, val): ++ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in " ++ f"cookies {key!r} {val!r}") + data[key] = val + dict.update(self, data) + ++ def __ior__(self, values): ++ self.update(values) ++ return self ++ + def isReservedKey(self, K): + return K.lower() in self._reserved + +@@ -363,9 +370,15 @@ def __getstate__(self): + } + + def __setstate__(self, state): +- self._key = state['key'] +- self._value = state['value'] +- self._coded_value = state['coded_value'] ++ key = state['key'] ++ value = state['value'] ++ coded_value = state['coded_value'] ++ if _has_control_character(key, value, coded_value): ++ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies " ++ f"{key!r} {value!r} {coded_value!r}") ++ self._key = key ++ self._value = value ++ self._coded_value = coded_value + + def output(self, attrs=None, header="Set-Cookie:"): + return "%s %s" % (header, self.OutputString(attrs)) +@@ -377,13 +390,16 @@ def __repr__(self): + + def js_output(self, attrs=None): + # Print javascript ++ output_string = self.OutputString(attrs) ++ if _has_control_character(output_string): ++ raise CookieError("Control characters are not allowed in cookies") + return """ + +- """ % (self.OutputString(attrs).replace('"', r'\"')) ++ """ % (output_string.replace('"', r'\"')) + + def OutputString(self, attrs=None): + # Build up our result +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py +index f196bcc48e..2478a6c630 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_http_cookies.py +@@ -573,6 +573,14 @@ def test_control_characters(self): + with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): + morsel["path"] = c0 + ++ # .__setstate__() ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ morsel.__setstate__({'key': c0, 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': 'coded'}) ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': c0, 'coded_value': 'coded'}) ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ morsel.__setstate__({'key': 'key', 'value': 'val', 'coded_value': c0}) ++ + # .setdefault() + with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): + morsel.setdefault("path", c0) +@@ -587,6 +595,18 @@ def test_control_characters(self): + with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): + morsel.set("path", "val", c0) + ++ # .update() ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ morsel.update({"path": c0}) ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ morsel.update({c0: "val"}) ++ ++ # .__ior__() ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ morsel |= {"path": c0} ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ morsel |= {c0: "val"} ++ + def test_control_characters_output(self): + # Tests that even if the internals of Morsel are modified + # that a call to .output() has control character safeguards. +@@ -607,6 +627,24 @@ def test_control_characters_output(self): + with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): + cookie.output() + ++ # Tests that .js_output() also has control character safeguards. ++ for c0 in support.control_characters_c0(): ++ morsel = cookies.Morsel() ++ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value") ++ morsel._key = c0 # Override private variable. ++ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie() ++ cookie["cookie"] = morsel ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ cookie.js_output() ++ ++ morsel = cookies.Morsel() ++ morsel.set("key", "value", "coded-value") ++ morsel._coded_value = c0 # Override private variable. ++ cookie = cookies.SimpleCookie() ++ cookie["cookie"] = morsel ++ with self.assertRaises(cookies.CookieError): ++ cookie.js_output() ++ + + def load_tests(loader, tests, pattern): + tests.addTest(doctest.DocTestSuite(cookies)) +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..e53a932d12 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-06-17-03-38.gh-issue-145599.kchwZV.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++Reject control characters in :class:`http.cookies.Morsel` ++:meth:`~http.cookies.Morsel.update` and ++:meth:`~http.cookies.BaseCookie.js_output`. ++This addresses :cve:`2026-3644`. diff --git a/00485-cve-2026-4224.patch b/00485-cve-2026-4224.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..14f8734 --- /dev/null +++ b/00485-cve-2026-4224.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stan Ulbrych <89152624+StanFromIreland@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 21:46:06 +0000 +Subject: 00485: CVE-2026-4224 +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models + +Co-authored-by: Bénédikt Tran <10796600+picnixz@users.noreply.github.com> +--- + Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + ...6-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst | 4 ++++ + Modules/pyexpat.c | 9 ++++++++- + 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py +index 38f951573f..37d9086f40 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_pyexpat.py +@@ -675,6 +675,24 @@ def test_change_size_2(self): + parser.Parse(xml2, True) + self.assertEqual(self.n, 4) + ++class ElementDeclHandlerTest(unittest.TestCase): ++ def test_deeply_nested_content_model(self): ++ # This should raise a RecursionError and not crash. ++ # See https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/145986. ++ N = 500_000 ++ data = ( ++ b'\n]>\n\n' ++ ) ++ ++ parser = expat.ParserCreate() ++ parser.ElementDeclHandler = lambda _1, _2: None ++ with support.infinite_recursion(): ++ with self.assertRaises(RecursionError): ++ parser.Parse(data) ++ ++ + class MalformedInputTest(unittest.TestCase): + def test1(self): + xml = b"\0\r\n" +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..79536d1fef +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2026-03-14-17-31-39.gh-issue-145986.ifSSr8.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ ++:mod:`xml.parsers.expat`: Fixed a crash caused by unbounded C recursion when ++converting deeply nested XML content models with ++:meth:`~xml.parsers.expat.xmlparser.ElementDeclHandler`. ++This addresses :cve:`2026-4224`. +diff --git a/Modules/pyexpat.c b/Modules/pyexpat.c +index 79492ca5c4..8673540f35 100644 +--- a/Modules/pyexpat.c ++++ b/Modules/pyexpat.c +@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ + #endif + + #include "Python.h" ++#include "pycore_ceval.h" // _Py_EnterRecursiveCall() + #include "pycore_runtime.h" // _Py_ID() + #include + +@@ -578,6 +579,10 @@ static PyObject * + conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model, + PyObject *(*conv_string)(const XML_Char *)) + { ++ if (_Py_EnterRecursiveCall(" in conv_content_model")) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + PyObject *result = NULL; + PyObject *children = PyTuple_New(model->numchildren); + int i; +@@ -589,7 +594,7 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model, + conv_string); + if (child == NULL) { + Py_XDECREF(children); +- return NULL; ++ goto done; + } + PyTuple_SET_ITEM(children, i, child); + } +@@ -597,6 +602,8 @@ conv_content_model(XML_Content * const model, + model->type, model->quant, + conv_string,model->name, children); + } ++done: ++ _Py_LeaveRecursiveCall(); + return result; + } + diff --git a/00494-increase-the-timeout-of-test_large_content_length_truncated.patch b/00494-increase-the-timeout-of-test_large_content_length_truncated.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9d0ef51..0000000 --- a/00494-increase-the-timeout-of-test_large_content_length_truncated.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Karolina Surma -Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 09:38:26 +0200 -Subject: 00494: Increase the timeout of test_large_content_length_truncated - -It has started to fail randomly when run on s390x architecture. ---- - Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py -index 96fc9ca574..6a3f5731a4 100644 ---- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py -+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py -@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ def test_large_content_length(self): - self.assertEqual(res.read(), b'%d %d' % (size, size) + self.linesep) - - def test_large_content_length_truncated(self): -- with support.swap_attr(self.request_handler, 'timeout', 0.001): -+ with support.swap_attr(self.request_handler, 'timeout', support.LOOPBACK_TIMEOUT): - for w in range(18, 65): - size = 1 << w - headers = {'Content-Length' : str(size)} diff --git a/plan.fmf b/plan.fmf index bb48d32..663476e 100644 --- a/plan.fmf +++ b/plan.fmf @@ -34,9 +34,6 @@ discover: - name: marshalparser path: /marshalparser test: "VERSION=${pybasever} SAMPLE=10 ./test_marshalparser_compatibility.sh" - - name: required_symbols - path: /required-symbols - test: "VERSION=${pybasever} ./check.sh" prepare: - name: Install dependencies @@ -54,9 +51,8 @@ prepare: - virtualenv # for virtualenv tests - glibc-all-langpacks # for locale tests - marshalparser # for testing compatibility (magic numbers) with marshalparser - - binutils # for nm (symbol inspection) - rpm # for debugging - - dnf # for upgrade and downgrade + - dnf # for upgrade - perf # for test_perf_profiler - name: Update packages how: shell diff --git a/python3.12.spec b/python3.12.spec index 0c61ac1..0e96a8f 100644 --- a/python3.12.spec +++ b/python3.12.spec @@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/ # WARNING When rebasing to a new Python version, # remember to update the python3-docs package as well -%global general_version %{pybasever}.14 +%global general_version %{pybasever}.13 #global prerel ... %global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel} Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}} -Release: 1%{?dist} +Release: 3%{?dist} License: Python-2.0.1 @@ -400,6 +400,23 @@ Patch461: 00461-downstream-only-install-wheel-in-test-venvs-when-setuptools-71.p # stressed on OpenSSL 3.5. Patch462: 00462-fix-pyssl_seterror-handling-ssl_error_syscall.patch +# 00464 # 1c713e02a26bf8865bb6421749d19d0766cac178 +# Enable PAC and BTI protections for aarch64 +# +# Apply protection against ROP/JOP attacks for aarch64 on asm_trampoline.S +# +# The BTI flag must be applied in the assembler sources for this class +# of attacks to be mitigated on newer aarch64 processors. +# +# Upstream PR: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/130864/files +# +# The upstream patch is incomplete but only for the case where +# frame pointers are not used on 3.13+. +# +# Since on Fedora we always compile with frame pointers the BTI/PAC +# hardware protections can be enabled without losing Perf unwinding. +Patch464: 00464-enable-pac-and-bti-protections-for-aarch64.patch + # 00474 # 837ddca0372fa87ff9cee47142200caa21e77def # CVE-2025-15366 # @@ -416,11 +433,47 @@ Patch474: 00474-cve-2025-15366.patch # (cherry-picked from commit b234a2b67539f787e191d2ef19a7cbdce32874e7) Patch475: 00475-cve-2025-15367.patch -# 00494 # 430aab133397ed44cc9ee621fd311e02fee317b5 -# Increase the timeout of test_large_content_length_truncated +# 00478 # eb93352dc8e31f4d52546b84daad875e6ff7f29e +# CVE-2026-4519 # -# It has started to fail randomly when run on s390x architecture. -Patch494: 00494-increase-the-timeout-of-test_large_content_length_truncated.patch +# Reject leading dashes in webbrowser URLs (GH-146360) +Patch478: 00478-cve-2026-4519.patch + +# 00479 # 97404b2cf62e545c2d41be7ccfed4e74da9ee665 +# CVE-2026-1502 +# +# Reject CR/LF in HTTP tunnel request headers +Patch479: 00479-cve-2026-1502.patch + +# 00480 # 6f4eef3ba4d9818a53698e994550ee8db17a1e2e +# CVE-2026-4786 +# +# Fix webbrowser `%%action` substitution bypass of dash-prefix check +Patch480: 00480-cve-2026-4786.patch + +# 00482 # 69f14bc306fc62400d45565faa980b77858b9151 +# CVE-2026-6100 +# +# Fix a possible UAF in {LZMA,BZ2,_Zlib}Decompressor +Patch482: 00482-cve-2026-6100.patch + +# 00483 # 577c595137ce6ff92158ddaf2d7b7ea86437825d +# CVE-2026-2297 +# +# Logging Bypass in Legacy .pyc File Handling +Patch483: 00483-cve-2026-2297.patch + +# 00484 # 8b5133c1ab17a060cd134bea2a4b6e1831c47fed +# CVE-2026-3644 +# +# Incomplete control character validation in http.cookies +Patch484: 00484-cve-2026-3644.patch + +# 00485 # 12a5b206676927bcee131ab4f2bd6783d2f5914a +# CVE-2026-4224 +# +# Stack overflow parsing XML with deeply nested DTD content models +Patch485: 00485-cve-2026-4224.patch # (New patches go here ^^^) # @@ -1758,20 +1811,6 @@ CheckPython optimized # ====================================================== %changelog -* Thu Aug 13 2026 Karolina Surma - 3.12.14-1 -- Update to Python 3.12.14 - -* Tue Jul 28 2026 Lukáš Zachar - 3.12.13-6 -- Security fix for CVE-2026-15308 -Resolves: rhbz#2498688 - -* Tue Jul 28 2026 Miro Hrončok - 3.12.13-5 -- Skip UDP Lite tests if it's not supported -- Fixes FTBFS on Linux kernel 7.1 and newer - -* Thu Jul 16 2026 Fedora Release Engineering - 3.12.13-4 -- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild - * Thu Apr 16 2026 Charalampos Stratakis - 3.12.13-3 - Security fixes for CVE-2026-1502, CVE-2026-4786, CVE-2026-6100, CVE-2026-2297, CVE-2026-3644, CVE-2026-4224 Resolves: rhbz#2444705, rhbz#2448189, rhbz#2448205, rhbz#2457942, rhbz#2458014, rhbz#2458222 diff --git a/sources b/sources index f116187..5b33098 100644 --- a/sources +++ b/sources @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -SHA512 (Python-3.12.14.tar.xz) = 9007399ffdd3a493c91a98cd7a6cb93acfb8de80f3be2f5480cda36f134d49b5043a60bc6b5c62ed18cc6a2e4e3c81cb7556ac5f337e2cd58ff3449a8099ed22 -SHA512 (Python-3.12.14.tar.xz.asc) = 69cc4757f5d79ea46f9b632d5b34f9f16855cb1f767f77c827ad65546ba8f77b68e75a661ebc4e4f453edd7a98a73d916491597f67d4fed9c891aa599a869324 +SHA512 (Python-3.12.13.tar.xz) = e1eb66f0b34581f0155e3ce25ba72cf0b4b1107672ed0ad3e86bcfe616945c9204c41ffc492f32b1066b9154913ff88343038967ad8711dd05e6f2332fdb735b +SHA512 (Python-3.12.13.tar.xz.asc) = 903fd3baa7e29891bb00fb159ec9c43804a71002c4cd38902d25bf4e5167f856b37d211a5b1098ee60e1ea41f8a10a1596dd2382edc6d7367d55dd4154807fc7 diff --git a/tests/.fmf/version b/tests/.fmf/version new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d00491f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/.fmf/version @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1