diff --git a/00386-cve-2021-28861.patch b/00386-cve-2021-28861.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..080026b --- /dev/null +++ b/00386-cve-2021-28861.patch @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 15:05:00 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] 00386: CVE-2021-28861 + +Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when +an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header +with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix +proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan). + +Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google]. +(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e) + +Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879 +Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642 + +Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith +--- + Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++ + Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 ++++++++++++++++++- + ...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++ + 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py +index 60a4dadf03..ce05be13d3 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/server.py ++++ b/Lib/http/server.py +@@ -323,6 +323,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler): + return False + self.command, self.path, self.request_version = command, path, version + ++ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect ++ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts ++ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI ++ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path. ++ if self.path.startswith('//'): ++ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single / ++ + # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive. + try: + self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile, +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +index 66e937e04b..5a0a7c3f74 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + pass + + def setUp(self): +- BaseTestCase.setUp(self) ++ super().setUp() + self.cwd = os.getcwd() + basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() + os.chdir(basetempdir) +@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + except: + pass + finally: +- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self) ++ super().tearDown() + + def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None): + def close_conn(): +@@ -399,6 +399,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK, + data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE) + ++ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self): ++ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location. ++ ++ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host. ++ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389 ++ ++ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot ++ resolve into a redirect to another server. ++ """ ++ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory')) ++ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory' ++ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash ++ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does ++ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic. ++ response = self.request(url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!') ++ ++ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack_url = f'/{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location) ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, ++ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and ' ++ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.') ++ ++ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack3_url = f'//{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack3_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location) ++ ++ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http ++ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed ++ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head ++ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen. ++ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}' ++ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/' ++ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if ++ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that ++ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header. ++ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location) ++ + def test_get(self): + #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer + response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test') +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..029d437190 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server ++when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial ++fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan. diff --git a/python3.6.rpmlintrc b/python3.6.rpmlintrc index 2b57ecd..2b5059d 100644 --- a/python3.6.rpmlintrc +++ b/python3.6.rpmlintrc @@ -77,3 +77,9 @@ addFilter(r'\bpython3(\.\d+)?\.(src|spec): (E|W): specfile-error\s+$') # SPELLING ERRORS addFilter(r'spelling-error .* en_US (bytecode|pyc|filename|tkinter|namespaces|pytest) ') + +# These bundled provides are declared twice, as they're bundled twice +# separately in pip and setuptools. +addFilter(r'useless-provides bundled\(python3dist\(packaging\)\)') +addFilter(r'useless-provides bundled\(python3dist\(setuptools\)\)') +addFilter(r'useless-provides bundled\(python3dist\(six\)\)') diff --git a/python3.6.spec b/python3.6.spec index 086c95a..44c48c2 100644 --- a/python3.6.spec +++ b/python3.6.spec @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/ #global prerel ... %global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel} Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}} -Release: 10%{?dist} +Release: 11%{?dist} License: Python @@ -497,6 +497,20 @@ Patch378: 00378-support-expat-2-4-5.patch # Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390 Patch382: 00382-cve-2015-20107.patch +# 00386 # 0e4bced7d3cd0f94ebfbcc209e10dbf81607b073 +# CVE-2021-28861 +# +# Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when +# an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header +# with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix +# proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan). +# +# Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google]. +# +# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879 +# Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642 +Patch386: 00386-cve-2021-28861.patch + # (New patches go here ^^^) # # When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc., @@ -1687,6 +1701,10 @@ CheckPython optimized # ====================================================== %changelog +* Wed Sep 14 2022 Lumír Balhar - 3.6.15-11 +- Fix for CVE-2021-28861 +Resolves: rhbz#2120785 + * Wed Jul 20 2022 Charalampos Stratakis - 3.6.15-10 - Fix test_tarfile on ppc64le Resolves: rhbz#2109120