CVE-2022-37454: Fix buffer overflows in _sha3 module

Resolves: rhbz#1834423

00319-test_tarfile_ppc64.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 01:44:30 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] 00319: test_tarfile_ppc64
+
+Fix sparse file tests of test_tarfile on ppc64le with the tmpfs
+filesystem.
+
+Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue35772
+
+Co-authored-by: Victor Stinner <vstinner@redhat.com>
+---
+ Lib/test/pythoninfo.py                                   | 2 ++
+ Lib/test/test_tarfile.py                                 | 9 +++++++--
+ .../next/Tests/2019-01-18-12-19-19.bpo-35772.sGBbsn.rst  | 6 ++++++
+ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2019-01-18-12-19-19.bpo-35772.sGBbsn.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/pythoninfo.py b/Lib/test/pythoninfo.py
+index c5586b45a5..96b6db1cb7 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/pythoninfo.py
++++ b/Lib/test/pythoninfo.py
+@@ -515,6 +515,8 @@ def collect_resource(info_add):
+         value = resource.getrlimit(key)
+         info_add('resource.%s' % name, value)
+ 
++    call_func(info_add, 'resource.pagesize', resource, 'getpagesize')
++
+ 
+ def collect_test_socket(info_add):
+     try:
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+index 573be812ea..8e0b275972 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+@@ -980,16 +980,21 @@ class GNUReadTest(LongnameTest, ReadTest, unittest.TestCase):
+     def _fs_supports_holes():
+         # Return True if the platform knows the st_blocks stat attribute and
+         # uses st_blocks units of 512 bytes, and if the filesystem is able to
+-        # store holes in files.
++        # store holes of 4 KiB in files.
++        #
++        # The function returns False if page size is larger than 4 KiB.
++        # For example, ppc64 uses pages of 64 KiB.
+         if sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
+             # Linux evidentially has 512 byte st_blocks units.
+             name = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, "sparse-test")
+             with open(name, "wb") as fobj:
++                # Seek to "punch a hole" of 4 KiB
+                 fobj.seek(4096)
++                fobj.write(b'x' * 4096)
+                 fobj.truncate()
+             s = os.stat(name)
+             support.unlink(name)
+-            return s.st_blocks == 0
++            return (s.st_blocks * 512 < s.st_size)
+         else:
+             return False
+ 
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2019-01-18-12-19-19.bpo-35772.sGBbsn.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2019-01-18-12-19-19.bpo-35772.sGBbsn.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..cfd282f1d0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Tests/2019-01-18-12-19-19.bpo-35772.sGBbsn.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++Fix sparse file tests of test_tarfile on ppc64 with the tmpfs filesystem. Fix
++the function testing if the filesystem supports sparse files: create a file
++which contains data and "holes", instead of creating a file which contains no
++data. tmpfs effective block size is a page size (tmpfs lives in the page cache).
++RHEL uses 64 KiB pages on aarch64, ppc64, ppc64le, only s390x and x86_64 use 4
++KiB pages, whereas the test punch holes of 4 KiB.

00378-support-expat-2-4-5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 15:48:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 00378: Support expat 2.4.5
+
+Curly brackets were never allowed in namespace URIs
+according to RFC 3986, and so-called namespace-validating
+XML parsers have the right to reject them a invalid URIs.
+
+libexpat >=2.4.5 has become strcter in that regard due to
+related security issues; with ET.XML instantiating a
+namespace-aware parser under the hood, this test has no
+future in CPython.
+
+References:
+- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3968
+- https://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/
+
+Also, test_minidom.py: Support Expat >=2.4.5
+
+Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue46811
+
+Co-authored-by: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+---
+ Lib/test/test_minidom.py                        | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py                      |  6 ------
+ .../2022-02-20-21-03-31.bpo-46811.8BxgdQ.rst    |  1 +
+ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-02-20-21-03-31.bpo-46811.8BxgdQ.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_minidom.py b/Lib/test/test_minidom.py
+index d55e25edba..03fee2704e 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_minidom.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_minidom.py
+@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ import pickle
+ from test import support
+ import unittest
+ 
++import pyexpat
+ import xml.dom.minidom
+ 
+ from xml.dom.minidom import parse, Node, Document, parseString
+ from xml.dom.minidom import getDOMImplementation
++from xml.parsers.expat import ExpatError
+ 
+ 
+ tstfile = support.findfile("test.xml", subdir="xmltestdata")
+@@ -1156,7 +1158,13 @@ class MinidomTest(unittest.TestCase):
+ 
+         # Verify that character decoding errors raise exceptions instead
+         # of crashing
+-        self.assertRaises(UnicodeDecodeError, parseString,
++        if pyexpat.version_info >= (2, 4, 5):
++            self.assertRaises(ExpatError, parseString,
++                    b'<fran\xe7ais></fran\xe7ais>')
++            self.assertRaises(ExpatError, parseString,
++                    b'<franais>Comment \xe7a va ? Tr\xe8s bien ?</franais>')
++        else:
++            self.assertRaises(UnicodeDecodeError, parseString,
+                 b'<fran\xe7ais>Comment \xe7a va ? Tr\xe8s bien ?</fran\xe7ais>')
+ 
+         doc.unlink()
+@@ -1602,7 +1610,12 @@ class MinidomTest(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.confirm(doc2.namespaceURI == xml.dom.EMPTY_NAMESPACE)
+ 
+     def testExceptionOnSpacesInXMLNSValue(self):
+-        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Unsupported syntax'):
++        if pyexpat.version_info >= (2, 4, 5):
++            context = self.assertRaisesRegex(ExpatError, 'syntax error')
++        else:
++            context = self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Unsupported syntax')
++
++        with context:
+             parseString('<element xmlns:abc="http:abc.com/de f g/hi/j k"><abc:foo /></element>')
+ 
+     def testDocRemoveChild(self):
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py b/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
+index b01709e901..acaa519f42 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_xml_etree.py
+@@ -1668,12 +1668,6 @@ class BugsTest(unittest.TestCase):
+                 b"<?xml version='1.0' encoding='ascii'?>\n"
+                 b'<body>t&#227;g</body>')
+ 
+-    def test_issue3151(self):
+-        e = ET.XML('<prefix:localname xmlns:prefix="${stuff}"/>')
+-        self.assertEqual(e.tag, '{${stuff}}localname')
+-        t = ET.ElementTree(e)
+-        self.assertEqual(ET.tostring(e), b'<ns0:localname xmlns:ns0="${stuff}" />')
+-
+     def test_issue6565(self):
+         elem = ET.XML("<body><tag/></body>")
+         self.assertEqual(summarize_list(elem), ['tag'])
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-02-20-21-03-31.bpo-46811.8BxgdQ.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-02-20-21-03-31.bpo-46811.8BxgdQ.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..6969bd1898
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-02-20-21-03-31.bpo-46811.8BxgdQ.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++Make test suite support Expat >=2.4.5

00382-cve-2015-20107.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 11:43:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 00382: CVE-2015-20107
+
+Make mailcap refuse to match unsafe filenames/types/params (GH-91993)
+
+Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/68966
+
+Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
+---
+ Doc/library/mailcap.rst                       | 12 +++++++++
+ Lib/mailcap.py                                | 26 +++++++++++++++++--
+ Lib/test/test_mailcap.py                      |  8 ++++--
+ ...2-04-27-18-25-30.gh-issue-68966.gjS8zs.rst |  4 +++
+ 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-04-27-18-25-30.gh-issue-68966.gjS8zs.rst
+
+diff --git a/Doc/library/mailcap.rst b/Doc/library/mailcap.rst
+index 896afd1d73..849d0bc05f 100644
+--- a/Doc/library/mailcap.rst
++++ b/Doc/library/mailcap.rst
+@@ -54,6 +54,18 @@ standard.  However, mailcap files are supported on most Unix systems.
+    use) to determine whether or not the mailcap line applies.  :func:`findmatch`
+    will automatically check such conditions and skip the entry if the check fails.
+ 
++   .. versionchanged:: 3.11
++
++      To prevent security issues with shell metacharacters (symbols that have
++      special effects in a shell command line), ``findmatch`` will refuse
++      to inject ASCII characters other than alphanumerics and ``@+=:,./-_``
++      into the returned command line.
++
++      If a disallowed character appears in *filename*, ``findmatch`` will always
++      return ``(None, None)`` as if no entry was found.
++      If such a character appears elsewhere (a value in *plist* or in *MIMEtype*),
++      ``findmatch`` will ignore all mailcap entries which use that value.
++      A :mod:`warning <warnings>` will be raised in either case.
+ 
+ .. function:: getcaps()
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/mailcap.py b/Lib/mailcap.py
+index bd0fc0981c..dcd4b449e8 100644
+--- a/Lib/mailcap.py
++++ b/Lib/mailcap.py
+@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
+ 
+ import os
+ import warnings
++import re
+ 
+ __all__ = ["getcaps","findmatch"]
+ 
+@@ -13,6 +14,11 @@ def lineno_sort_key(entry):
+     else:
+         return 1, 0
+ 
++_find_unsafe = re.compile(r'[^\xa1-\U0010FFFF\w@+=:,./-]').search
++
++class UnsafeMailcapInput(Warning):
++    """Warning raised when refusing unsafe input"""
++
+ 
+ # Part 1: top-level interface.
+ 
+@@ -165,15 +171,22 @@ def findmatch(caps, MIMEtype, key='view', filename="/dev/null", plist=[]):
+     entry to use.
+ 
+     """
++    if _find_unsafe(filename):
++        msg = "Refusing to use mailcap with filename %r. Use a safe temporary filename." % (filename,)
++        warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
++        return None, None
+     entries = lookup(caps, MIMEtype, key)
+     # XXX This code should somehow check for the needsterminal flag.
+     for e in entries:
+         if 'test' in e:
+             test = subst(e['test'], filename, plist)
++            if test is None:
++                continue
+             if test and os.system(test) != 0:
+                 continue
+         command = subst(e[key], MIMEtype, filename, plist)
+-        return command, e
++        if command is not None:
++            return command, e
+     return None, None
+ 
+ def lookup(caps, MIMEtype, key=None):
+@@ -206,6 +219,10 @@ def subst(field, MIMEtype, filename, plist=[]):
+             elif c == 's':
+                 res = res + filename
+             elif c == 't':
++                if _find_unsafe(MIMEtype):
++                    msg = "Refusing to substitute MIME type %r into a shell command." % (MIMEtype,)
++                    warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
++                    return None
+                 res = res + MIMEtype
+             elif c == '{':
+                 start = i
+@@ -213,7 +230,12 @@ def subst(field, MIMEtype, filename, plist=[]):
+                     i = i+1
+                 name = field[start:i]
+                 i = i+1
+-                res = res + findparam(name, plist)
++                param = findparam(name, plist)
++                if _find_unsafe(param):
++                    msg = "Refusing to substitute parameter %r (%s) into a shell command" % (param, name)
++                    warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
++                    return None
++                res = res + param
+             # XXX To do:
+             # %n == number of parts if type is multipart/*
+             # %F == list of alternating type and filename for parts
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_mailcap.py b/Lib/test/test_mailcap.py
+index c08423c670..920283d9a2 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_mailcap.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_mailcap.py
+@@ -121,7 +121,8 @@ class HelperFunctionTest(unittest.TestCase):
+             (["", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], ""),
+             (["echo foo", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo foo"),
+             (["echo %s", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo foo.txt"),
+-            (["echo %t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo audio/*"),
++            (["echo %t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], None),
++            (["echo %t", "audio/wav", "foo.txt"], "echo audio/wav"),
+             (["echo \\%t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo %t"),
+             (["echo foo", "audio/*", "foo.txt", plist], "echo foo"),
+             (["echo %{total}", "audio/*", "foo.txt", plist], "echo 3")
+@@ -205,7 +206,10 @@ class FindmatchTest(unittest.TestCase):
+              ('"An audio fragment"', audio_basic_entry)),
+             ([c, "audio/*"],
+              {"filename": fname},
+-             ("/usr/local/bin/showaudio audio/*", audio_entry)),
++             (None, None)),
++            ([c, "audio/wav"],
++             {"filename": fname},
++             ("/usr/local/bin/showaudio audio/wav", audio_entry)),
+             ([c, "message/external-body"],
+              {"plist": plist},
+              ("showexternal /dev/null default john python.org     /tmp foo bar", message_entry))
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-04-27-18-25-30.gh-issue-68966.gjS8zs.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-04-27-18-25-30.gh-issue-68966.gjS8zs.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..da81a1f699
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-04-27-18-25-30.gh-issue-68966.gjS8zs.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
++The deprecated mailcap module now refuses to inject unsafe text (filenames,
++MIME types, parameters) into shell commands. Instead of using such text, it
++will warn and act as if a match was not found (or for test commands, as if
++the test failed).

00386-cve-2021-28861.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 15:05:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] 00386: CVE-2021-28861
+
+Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
+an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
+with a misleading target.  Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
+proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
+
+Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
+(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e)
+
+Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
+Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
+
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
+---
+ Lib/http/server.py                            |  7 +++
+ Lib/test/test_httpservers.py                  | 53 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ ...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst |  3 ++
+ 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py
+index 60a4dadf03..ce05be13d3 100644
+--- a/Lib/http/server.py
++++ b/Lib/http/server.py
+@@ -323,6 +323,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
+             return False
+         self.command, self.path, self.request_version = command, path, version
+ 
++        # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
++        # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
++        # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
++        # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
++        if self.path.startswith('//'):
++            self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/')  # Reduce to a single /
++
+         # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
+         try:
+             self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+index 66e937e04b..5a0a7c3f74 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
+         pass
+ 
+     def setUp(self):
+-        BaseTestCase.setUp(self)
++        super().setUp()
+         self.cwd = os.getcwd()
+         basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
+         os.chdir(basetempdir)
+@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
+             except:
+                 pass
+         finally:
+-            BaseTestCase.tearDown(self)
++            super().tearDown()
+ 
+     def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None):
+         def close_conn():
+@@ -399,6 +399,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
+         self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
+                                      data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
+ 
++    def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
++        """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
++
++        //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
++        https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
++
++        This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
++        resolve into a redirect to another server.
++        """
++        os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
++        url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
++        expected_location = f'{url}/'  # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash
++        # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
++        # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
++        response = self.request(url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        location = response.getheader('Location')
++        self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
++
++        # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
++        attack_url = f'/{url}'
++        response = self.request(attack_url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        location = response.getheader('Location')
++        self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
++        self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
++                msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
++                'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
++
++        # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
++        attack3_url = f'//{url}'
++        response = self.request(attack3_url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
++
++        # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
++        # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
++        # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
++        # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
++        attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
++        expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
++        response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        location = response.getheader('Location')
++        # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
++        # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
++        # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
++        self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
++
+     def test_get(self):
+         #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
+         response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..029d437190
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
++when an URI path starts with ``//``.  Vulnerability discovered, and initial
++fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.

00392-cve-2022-37454-fix-buffer-overflows-in-_sha3-module.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Theo Buehler <botovq@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2022 20:37:54 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] 00392: CVE-2022-37454: Fix buffer overflows in _sha3 module
+
+This is a port of the applicable part of XKCP's fix [1] for
+CVE-2022-37454 and avoids the segmentation fault and the infinite
+loop in the test cases published in [2].
+
+[1]: https://github.com/XKCP/XKCP/commit/fdc6fef075f4e81d6b1bc38364248975e08e340a
+[2]: https://mouha.be/sha-3-buffer-overflow/
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0e4e058602d93b88256ff90bbef501ba20be9dd3)
+
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google LLC] <greg@krypto.org>
+---
+ Lib/test/test_hashlib.py                          |  9 +++++++++
+ .../2022-10-21-13-31-47.gh-issue-98517.SXXGfV.rst |  1 +
+ Modules/_sha3/kcp/KeccakSponge.inc                | 15 ++++++++-------
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-10-21-13-31-47.gh-issue-98517.SXXGfV.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_hashlib.py b/Lib/test/test_hashlib.py
+index 9711856853..08f0af3748 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_hashlib.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_hashlib.py
+@@ -418,6 +418,15 @@ class HashLibTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
+     def test_case_md5_uintmax(self, size):
+         self.check('md5', b'A'*size, '28138d306ff1b8281f1a9067e1a1a2b3')
+ 
++    @unittest.skipIf(sys.maxsize < _4G - 1, 'test cannot run on 32-bit systems')
++    @bigmemtest(size=_4G - 1, memuse=1, dry_run=False)
++    def test_sha3_update_overflow(self, size):
++        """Regression test for gh-98517 CVE-2022-37454."""
++        h = hashlib.sha3_224()
++        h.update(b'\x01')
++        h.update(b'\x01'*0xffff_ffff)
++        self.assertEqual(h.hexdigest(), '80762e8ce6700f114fec0f621fd97c4b9c00147fa052215294cceeed')
++
+     # use the three examples from Federal Information Processing Standards
+     # Publication 180-1, Secure Hash Standard,  1995 April 17
+     # http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs/fip180-1.htm
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-10-21-13-31-47.gh-issue-98517.SXXGfV.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-10-21-13-31-47.gh-issue-98517.SXXGfV.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..2d23a6ad93
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-10-21-13-31-47.gh-issue-98517.SXXGfV.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++Port XKCP's fix for the buffer overflows in SHA-3 (CVE-2022-37454).
+diff --git a/Modules/_sha3/kcp/KeccakSponge.inc b/Modules/_sha3/kcp/KeccakSponge.inc
+index e10739deaf..cf92e4db4d 100644
+--- a/Modules/_sha3/kcp/KeccakSponge.inc
++++ b/Modules/_sha3/kcp/KeccakSponge.inc
+@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ int SpongeAbsorb(SpongeInstance *instance, const unsigned char *data, size_t dat
+     i = 0;
+     curData = data;
+     while(i < dataByteLen) {
+-        if ((instance->byteIOIndex == 0) && (dataByteLen >= (i + rateInBytes))) {
++        if ((instance->byteIOIndex == 0) && (dataByteLen-i >= rateInBytes)) {
+ #ifdef SnP_FastLoop_Absorb
+             /* processing full blocks first */
+ 
+@@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ int SpongeAbsorb(SpongeInstance *instance, const unsigned char *data, size_t dat
+         }
+         else {
+             /* normal lane: using the message queue */
+-
+-            partialBlock = (unsigned int)(dataByteLen - i);
+-            if (partialBlock+instance->byteIOIndex > rateInBytes)
++            if (dataByteLen-i > rateInBytes-instance->byteIOIndex)
+                 partialBlock = rateInBytes-instance->byteIOIndex;
++            else
++                partialBlock = (unsigned int)(dataByteLen - i);
+             #ifdef KeccakReference
+             displayBytes(1, "Block to be absorbed (part)", curData, partialBlock);
+             #endif
+@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int SpongeSqueeze(SpongeInstance *instance, unsigned char *data, size_t dataByte
+     i = 0;
+     curData = data;
+     while(i < dataByteLen) {
+-        if ((instance->byteIOIndex == rateInBytes) && (dataByteLen >= (i + rateInBytes))) {
++        if ((instance->byteIOIndex == rateInBytes) && (dataByteLen-i >= rateInBytes)) {
+             for(j=dataByteLen-i; j>=rateInBytes; j-=rateInBytes) {
+                 SnP_Permute(instance->state);
+                 SnP_ExtractBytes(instance->state, curData, 0, rateInBytes);
+@@ -299,9 +299,10 @@ int SpongeSqueeze(SpongeInstance *instance, unsigned char *data, size_t dataByte
+                 SnP_Permute(instance->state);
+                 instance->byteIOIndex = 0;
+             }
+-            partialBlock = (unsigned int)(dataByteLen - i);
+-            if (partialBlock+instance->byteIOIndex > rateInBytes)
++            if (dataByteLen-i > rateInBytes-instance->byteIOIndex)
+                 partialBlock = rateInBytes-instance->byteIOIndex;
++            else
++                partialBlock = (unsigned int)(dataByteLen - i);
+             i += partialBlock;
+ 
+             SnP_ExtractBytes(instance->state, curData, instance->byteIOIndex, partialBlock);

python3.6.rpmlintrc

@@ -77,3 +77,9 @@ addFilter(r'\bpython3(\.\d+)?\.(src|spec): (E|W): specfile-error\s+$')
 
 # SPELLING ERRORS
 addFilter(r'spelling-error .* en_US (bytecode|pyc|filename|tkinter|namespaces|pytest) ')
+
+# These bundled provides are declared twice, as they're bundled twice
+# separately in pip and setuptools.
+addFilter(r'useless-provides bundled\(python3dist\(packaging\)\)')
+addFilter(r'useless-provides bundled\(python3dist\(setuptools\)\)')
+addFilter(r'useless-provides bundled\(python3dist\(six\)\)')

python3.6.spec

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
 #global prerel ...
 %global upstream_version %{general_version}%{?prerel}
 Version: %{general_version}%{?prerel:~%{prerel}}
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Release: 14%{?dist}
 License: Python
 
 
@@ -406,6 +406,15 @@ Patch292: 00292-restore-PyExc_RecursionErrorInst-symbol.patch
 # See also: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1489816
 Patch294: 00294-define-TLS-cipher-suite-on-build-time.patch
 
+# 00319 # 137b120c34cd92a9694edc0196f0d78311071dba
+# test_tarfile_ppc64
+#
+# Fix sparse file tests of test_tarfile on ppc64le with the tmpfs
+# filesystem.
+#
+# Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue35772
+Patch319: 00319-test_tarfile_ppc64.patch
+
 # 00343 # c758d1d3051b80314a533a8a42244beb4670141e
 # Fix test_faulthandler on GCC 10
 #
@@ -450,6 +459,109 @@ Patch353: 00353-architecture-names-upstream-downstream.patch
 # - 8766cb74e186d3820db0a855ccd780d6d84461f7
 Patch358: 00358-align-allocations-and-pygc_head-to-16-bytes-on-64-bit-platforms.patch
 
+# 00378 # b0c3e36a85f7eec22d64222176ea5139c0bc097d
+# Support expat 2.4.5
+#
+# Curly brackets were never allowed in namespace URIs
+# according to RFC 3986, and so-called namespace-validating
+# XML parsers have the right to reject them a invalid URIs.
+#
+# libexpat >=2.4.5 has become strcter in that regard due to
+# related security issues; with ET.XML instantiating a
+# namespace-aware parser under the hood, this test has no
+# future in CPython.
+#
+# References:
+# - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3968
+# - https://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/
+#
+# Also, test_minidom.py: Support Expat >=2.4.5
+#
+# Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue46811
+Patch378: 00378-support-expat-2-4-5.patch
+
+# 00382 # 9e275dcdf3934b827994ecc3247d583d5bab7985
+# CVE-2015-20107
+#
+# Make mailcap refuse to match unsafe filenames/types/params (GH-91993)
+#
+# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/68966
+#
+# Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
+Patch382: 00382-cve-2015-20107.patch
+
+# 00386 # 0e4bced7d3cd0f94ebfbcc209e10dbf81607b073
+# CVE-2021-28861
+#
+# Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
+# an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
+# with a misleading target.  Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
+# proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
+#
+# Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
+#
+# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
+# Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
+Patch386: 00386-cve-2021-28861.patch
+
+# 00387 # c687b2d407c9ec9ddf30a14f7151aa2064a8b0eb
+# CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int()
+#
+# gh-95778: CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int() (GH-96504)
+#
+# Converting between `int` and `str` in bases other than 2
+# (binary), 4, 8 (octal), 16 (hexadecimal), or 32 such as base 10 (decimal) now
+# raises a `ValueError` if the number of digits in string form is above a
+# limit to avoid potential denial of service attacks due to the algorithmic
+# complexity. This is a mitigation for CVE-2020-10735
+# (https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10735).
+#
+# This new limit can be configured or disabled by environment variable, command
+# line flag, or :mod:`sys` APIs. See the `Integer String Conversion Length
+# Limitation` documentation.  The default limit is 4300
+# digits in string form.
+#
+# Patch by Gregory P. Smith [Google] and Christian Heimes [Red Hat] with feedback
+# from Victor Stinner, Thomas Wouters, Steve Dower, Ned Deily, and Mark Dickinson.
+#
+# Notes on the backport to Python 3.6:
+#
+# * Use "Python 3.6.15-13" version in the documentation, whereas this
+#   version will never be released
+# * Only add _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits global variable:
+#   Python 3.6 doesn't have PyConfig API (PEP 597) nor _PyRuntime.
+# * sys.flags.int_max_str_digits cannot be -1 on Python 3.6: it is
+#   set to the default limit. Adapt test_int_max_str_digits() for that.
+# * Declare _PY_LONG_DEFAULT_MAX_STR_DIGITS and
+#   _PY_LONG_MAX_STR_DIGITS_THRESHOLD macros in longobject.h but only
+#   if the Py_BUILD_CORE macro is defined.
+# * Declare _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits in pydebug.h.
+#
+#
+# gh-95778: Mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in error message (#96874)
+#
+# When ValueError is raised if an integer is larger than the limit,
+# mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in the error message.
+#
+#
+# gh-96848: Fix -X int_max_str_digits option parsing (#96988)
+#
+# Fix command line parsing: reject "-X int_max_str_digits" option with
+# no value (invalid) when the PYTHONINTMAXSTRDIGITS environment
+# variable is set to a valid limit.
+Patch387: 00387-cve-2020-10735-prevent-dos-by-very-large-int.patch
+
+# 00392 # 033f82b975577a72218ce385b5333dcc5c88dfd5
+# CVE-2022-37454: Fix buffer overflows in _sha3 module
+#
+# This is a port of the applicable part of XKCP's fix [1] for
+# CVE-2022-37454 and avoids the segmentation fault and the infinite
+# loop in the test cases published in [2].
+#
+# [1]: https://github.com/XKCP/XKCP/commit/fdc6fef075f4e81d6b1bc38364248975e08e340a
+# [2]: https://mouha.be/sha-3-buffer-overflow/
+Patch392: 00392-cve-2022-37454-fix-buffer-overflows-in-_sha3-module.patch
+
 # (New patches go here ^^^)
 #
 # When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
@@ -1640,6 +1752,29 @@ CheckPython optimized
 # ======================================================
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Nov 10 2022 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 3.6.15-14
+- CVE-2022-37454: Fix buffer overflows in _sha3 module
+  Related: rhbz#2140200
+
+* Wed Oct 05 2022 Victor Stinner <vstinner@python.org> - 3.6.15-6
+- Prevent denial of service (DoS) by very large integers.
+  Resolves: rhbz#1834423
+
+* Wed Sep 14 2022 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 3.6.15-5
+- Fix for CVE-2021-28861
+Resolves: rhbz#2120785
+
+* Wed Jul 20 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.15-4
+- Fix test_tarfile on ppc64le
+
+* Fri Jun 10 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.15-3
+- Security fix for CVE-2015-20107
+Resolves: rhbz#2075390
+
+* Thu Mar 03 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.15-2
+- Fix the test suite support for Expat >= 2.4.5
+Resolves: rhbz#2056970
+
 * Sun Sep 05 2021 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 3.6.15-1
 - Update to 3.6.15