diff --git a/.fmf/version b/.fmf/version
deleted file mode 100644
index d00491f..0000000
--- a/.fmf/version
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 3023995..de3b420 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -14,43 +14,3 @@ shadow-4.1.4.2.tar.bz2
/shadow-4.8.tar.xz.asc
/shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz
/shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.9.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.9.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.12.3.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.12.3.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.13.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.13.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.14.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.14.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.15.0rc2.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.15.0rc2.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.15.0rc3.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.15.0rc3.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.15.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.15.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.15.1.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.15.1.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.16.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.16.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.17.0-rc1.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.17.0-rc1.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.17.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.17.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.18.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.18.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.19.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.19.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.19.2.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.19.2.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.19.3.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.19.3.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc2.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc2.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc3.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc3.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz.asc
diff --git a/passwd.pamd b/passwd.pamd
deleted file mode 100644
index fd03d03..0000000
--- a/passwd.pamd
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-#%PAM-1.0
-# This tool only uses the password stack.
-password substack system-auth
--password optional pam_gnome_keyring.so use_authtok
-password substack postlogin
diff --git a/plans/tier0-functional.fmf b/plans/tier0-functional.fmf
deleted file mode 100644
index a9939b5..0000000
--- a/plans/tier0-functional.fmf
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-summary: Tier 0 functional tests for shadow-utils
-description: |
- Run comprehensive system tests for shadow-utils. These tests validate user and group
- account management functionality by testing actual system operations including user
- creation, password management, group operations, and verification of system files
- (i.e. /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow).
-
-provision:
- how: virtual
- image: fedora
-
-prepare:
- - name: Install general dependencies
- how: install
- package:
- - expect
- - gcc
- - git
- - libssh-devel
- - python3-devel
- - python3-pip
-
- - name: Setup SSH keys for localhost testing
- how: shell
- script:
- - ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /root/.ssh/id_rsa -N "" -q
- - cat /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
- - chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
- - ssh-keyscan -H localhost >> /root/.ssh/known_hosts
-
- - name: Clone shadow repository
- how: shell
- script:
- - git clone https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow.git /tmp/shadow-test
-
- - name: Copy test topology for Fedora CI
- how: shell
- script:
- - cp tests/mhc-fedora-ci.yaml /tmp/shadow-test/tests/system
-
- - name: Install test dependencies
- how: shell
- script:
- - pip3 install -r /tmp/shadow-test/tests/system/requirements.txt
-
-execute:
- how: tmt
- duration: 30m
- script: |
- cd /tmp/shadow-test/tests/system
- pytest --mh-config=mhc-fedora-ci.yaml --mh-lazy-ssh -v
diff --git a/shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch b/shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a9d640
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/lib/semanage.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/lib/semanage.c
++++ shadow-4.5/lib/semanage.c
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++#if 0
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -150,6 +151,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+@@ -200,6 +202,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_h
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++#if 0
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_h
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
+ if (ret != 0) {
diff --git a/shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch b/shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3a525b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/man/newusers.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/man/newusers.8.xml
++++ shadow-4.5/man/newusers.8.xml
+@@ -218,7 +218,15 @@
+
+ If this field does not specify an existing directory, the
+ specified directory is created, with ownership set to the
+- user being created or updated and its primary group.
++ user being created or updated and its primary group. Note
++ that newusers does not create parent directories of the new
++ user's home directory. The newusers command will fail to
++ create the home directory if the parent directories do not
++ exist, and will send a message to stderr informing the user
++ of the failure. The newusers command will not halt or return
++ a failure to the calling shell if it fails to create the home
++ directory, it will continue to process the batch of new users
++ specified.
+
+
+ If the home directory of an existing user is changed,
diff --git a/shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch b/shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca7e57b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/useradd.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/useradd.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/useradd.c
+@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', data deleted", user_name));
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', exit code: %d", user_name, code));
+ exit (code);
+ }
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch b/shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..075f482
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/userdel.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/userdel.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/userdel.c
+@@ -143,8 +143,9 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ "\n"
+ "Options:\n"),
+ Prog);
+- (void) fputs (_(" -f, --force force removal of files,\n"
+- " even if not owned by user\n"),
++ (void) fputs (_(" -f, --force force some actions that would fail otherwise\n"
++ " e.g. removal of user still logged in\n"
++ " or files, even if not owned by the user\n"),
+ usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -h, --help display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -r, --remove remove home directory and mail spool\n"), usageout);
diff --git a/shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch b/shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a798d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/libmisc/getdate.y
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/libmisc/getdate.y
++++ shadow-4.5/libmisc/getdate.y
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ static int yyHaveDay;
+ static int yyHaveRel;
+ static int yyHaveTime;
+ static int yyHaveZone;
++static int yyHaveYear;
+ static int yyTimezone;
+ static int yyDay;
+ static int yyHour;
+@@ -293,18 +294,21 @@ date : tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ yyDay = $3;
+ yyYear = $5;
+ }
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tUNUMBER tSNUMBER tSNUMBER {
+ /* ISO 8601 format. yyyy-mm-dd. */
+ yyYear = $1;
+ yyMonth = -$2;
+ yyDay = -$3;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tUNUMBER tMONTH tSNUMBER {
+ /* e.g. 17-JUN-1992. */
+ yyDay = $1;
+ yyMonth = $2;
+ yyYear = -$3;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tMONTH tUNUMBER {
+ yyMonth = $1;
+@@ -314,6 +318,7 @@ date : tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ yyMonth = $1;
+ yyDay = $2;
+ yyYear = $4;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ | tUNUMBER tMONTH {
+ yyMonth = $2;
+@@ -323,6 +328,7 @@ date : tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ yyMonth = $2;
+ yyDay = $1;
+ yyYear = $3;
++ yyHaveYear++;
+ }
+ ;
+
+@@ -395,7 +401,8 @@ relunit : tUNUMBER tYEAR_UNIT {
+
+ number : tUNUMBER
+ {
+- if ((yyHaveTime != 0) && (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
++ if ((yyHaveTime != 0 || $1 >= 100) && !yyHaveYear
++ && (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
+ yyYear = $1;
+ else
+ {
+@@ -802,7 +809,7 @@ yylex (void)
+ return LookupWord (buff);
+ }
+ if (c != '(')
+- return *yyInput++;
++ return (unsigned char)*yyInput++;
+ Count = 0;
+ do
+ {
diff --git a/shadow-4.2.1-null-tm.patch b/shadow-4.2.1-null-tm.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1dd1c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.2.1-null-tm.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/faillog.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/faillog.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/faillog.c
+@@ -163,10 +163,14 @@ static void print_one (/*@null@*/const s
+ }
+
+ tm = localtime (&fl.fail_time);
++ if (tm == NULL) {
++ cp = "(unknown)";
++ } else {
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+- strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%D %H:%M:%S %z", tm);
+- cp = ptime;
++ strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%D %H:%M:%S %z", tm);
++ cp = ptime;
+ #endif
++ }
+ printf ("%-9s %5d %5d ",
+ pw->pw_name, fl.fail_cnt, fl.fail_max);
+ /* FIXME: cp is not defined ifndef HAVE_STRFTIME */
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/chage.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/chage.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/chage.c
+@@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ static void date_to_str (char *buf, size
+ struct tm *tp;
+
+ tp = gmtime (&date);
++ if (tp == NULL) {
++ (void) snprintf (buf, maxsize, "(unknown)");
++ return;
++ }
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ (void) strftime (buf, maxsize, "%Y-%m-%d", tp);
+ #else
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/lastlog.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/lastlog.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/lastlog.c
+@@ -158,13 +158,17 @@ static void print_one (/*@null@*/const s
+
+ ll_time = ll.ll_time;
+ tm = localtime (&ll_time);
++ if (tm == NULL) {
++ cp = "(unknown)";
++ } else {
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+- strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
+- cp = ptime;
++ strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
++ cp = ptime;
+ #else
+- cp = asctime (tm);
+- cp[24] = '\0';
++ cp = asctime (tm);
++ cp[24] = '\0';
+ #endif
++ }
+
+ if (ll.ll_time == (time_t) 0) {
+ cp = _("**Never logged in**\0");
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/passwd.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/passwd.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/passwd.c
+@@ -455,6 +455,9 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *date_to
+ struct tm *tm;
+
+ tm = gmtime (&t);
++ if (tm == NULL) {
++ return "(unknown)";
++ }
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ (void) strftime (buf, sizeof buf, "%m/%d/%Y", tm);
+ #else /* !HAVE_STRFTIME */
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/usermod.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
+@@ -210,6 +210,10 @@ static void date_to_str (/*@unique@*//*@
+ } else {
+ time_t t = (time_t) date;
+ tp = gmtime (&t);
++ if (tp == NULL) {
++ strncpy (buf, "unknown", maxsize);
++ return;
++ }
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ strftime (buf, maxsize, "%Y-%m-%d", tp);
+ #else
diff --git a/shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch b/shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2d70b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/usermod.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
+@@ -455,14 +455,17 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ strcat (buf, pw_pass);
+ pw_pass = buf;
+ } else if (Uflg && pw_pass[0] == '!') {
+- char *s;
++ char *s = pw_pass;
+
+- if (pw_pass[1] == '\0') {
++ while ('!' == *s)
++ ++s;
++
++ if (*s == '\0') {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: unlocking the user's password would result in a passwordless account.\n"
+ "You should set a password with usermod -p to unlock this user's password.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- return pw_pass;
++ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+@@ -471,12 +474,15 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "unlock user '%s' password", user_newname));
+- s = pw_pass;
+- while ('\0' != *s) {
+- *s = *(s + 1);
+- s++;
+- }
++ memmove (pw_pass, s, strlen (s) + 1);
+ } else if (pflg) {
++ if (strchr (user_pass, ':') != NULL) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: The password field cannot contain a colon character.\n"),
++ Prog);
++ return NULL;
++
++ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+ "updating-password",
+@@ -525,6 +531,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ if ( (!is_shadow_pwd)
+ || (strcmp (pwent->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) != 0)) {
+ pwent->pw_passwd = new_pw_passwd (pwent->pw_passwd);
++ if (pwent->pw_passwd == NULL)
++ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ if (uflg) {
+@@ -639,6 +647,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
+ * + aging has been requested
+ */
+ spent->sp_pwdp = new_pw_passwd (spent->sp_pwdp);
++ if (spent->sp_pwdp == NULL)
++ fail_exit(E_PW_UPDATE);
+
+ if (pflg) {
+ spent->sp_lstchg = (long) gettime () / SCALE;
diff --git a/shadow-4.6-getenforce.patch b/shadow-4.6-getenforce.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a55bf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.6-getenforce.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c.getenforce shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c
+--- shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c.getenforce 2018-05-28 15:10:15.870315221 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c 2018-05-28 15:10:15.894315731 +0200
+@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int set_selinux_file_context (const char
+ }
+ return 0;
+ error:
+- if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
++ if (security_getenforce () > 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int reset_selinux_file_context (void)
+ selinux_checked = true;
+ }
+ if (selinux_enabled) {
+- if (setfscreatecon (NULL) != 0) {
++ if (setfscreatecon (NULL) != 0 && security_getenforce () > 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
diff --git a/shadow-4.6-move-home.patch b/shadow-4.6-move-home.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cff9561
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.6-move-home.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.move-home shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.move-home 2018-05-28 14:59:05.594076665 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c 2018-05-28 15:00:28.479837392 +0200
+@@ -1845,6 +1845,11 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ Prog, prefix_user_home, prefix_user_newhome);
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
++ } else {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: The previous home directory (%s) does "
++ "not exist or is inaccessible. Move cannot be completed.\n"),
++ Prog, prefix_user_home);
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.6-redhat.patch b/shadow-4.6-redhat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a8be2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.6-redhat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.redhat shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.redhat 2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c 2018-05-28 13:37:16.695651258 +0200
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ const char *Prog;
+ static gid_t def_group = 100;
+ static const char *def_gname = "other";
+ static const char *def_home = "/home";
+-static const char *def_shell = "";
++static const char *def_shell = "/sbin/nologin";
+ static const char *def_template = SKEL_DIR;
+ static const char *def_create_mail_spool = "no";
+
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static const char *def_expire = "";
+ #define VALID(s) (strcspn (s, ":\n") == strlen (s))
+
+ static const char *user_name = "";
+-static const char *user_pass = "!";
++static const char *user_pass = "!!";
+ static uid_t user_id;
+ static gid_t user_gid;
+ static const char *user_comment = "";
+@@ -1114,9 +1114,9 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ };
+ while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:UZ:",
++ "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:P:s:u:UZ:",
+ #else /* !WITH_SELINUX */
+- "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:U",
++ "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:P:s:u:U",
+ #endif /* !WITH_SELINUX */
+ long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ switch (c) {
+@@ -1267,6 +1267,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ case 'M':
+ Mflg = true;
+ break;
++ case 'n':
+ case 'N':
+ Nflg = true;
+ break;
diff --git a/shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch b/shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cea6ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.min-limit shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
+--- shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.min-limit 2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000001 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c 2018-11-06 10:51:20.554963292 +0100
+@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, g
+ (unsigned long) *max_id);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
++ /*
++ * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
++ * work right with it.
++ */
++ if (*min_id == 0) {
++ *min_id = (gid_t) 1;
++ }
+ } else {
+ /* Non-system groups */
+
+diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.min-limit shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
+--- shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.min-limit 2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000001 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c 2018-11-06 10:51:39.341399569 +0100
+@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, ui
+ (unsigned long) *max_id);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
++ /*
++ * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
++ * work right with it.
++ */
++ if (*min_id == 0) {
++ *min_id = (uid_t) 1;
++ }
+ } else {
+ /* Non-system users */
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.8-crypt_h.patch b/shadow-4.8-crypt_h.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2704e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8-crypt_h.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/configure.ac.crypt_h shadow-4.8/configure.ac
+--- shadow-4.8/configure.ac.crypt_h 2020-01-13 10:26:17.400481712 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/configure.ac 2020-01-13 10:29:11.563529093 +0100
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ AC_HEADER_STDC
+ AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
+ AC_HEADER_STDBOOL
+
+-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
++AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
+ utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
+ utime.h ulimit.h sys/capability.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
+ locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h attr/libattr.h \
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h.crypt_h shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h.crypt_h 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h 2020-01-13 10:26:17.400481712 +0100
+@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
+ #ifndef _DEFINES_H_
+ #define _DEFINES_H_
+
++#include "config.h"
++
+ #if HAVE_STDBOOL_H
+ # include
+ #else
+@@ -94,6 +96,10 @@ char *strchr (), *strrchr (), *strtok ()
+ # include
+ #endif
+
++#if HAVE_CRYPT_H
++# include /* crypt(3) may be defined in here */
++#endif
++
+ #if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+ # include
+ # include
diff --git a/shadow-4.8-goodname.patch b/shadow-4.8-goodname.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3c18d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8-goodname.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c
+--- shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname 2020-01-13 09:44:41.968507996 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c 2020-01-13 09:46:27.863727732 +0100
+@@ -55,26 +55,44 @@ static bool is_valid_name (const char *n
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
+- */
++ * User/group names must match gnu e-regex:
++ * [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,30}[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?
++ *
++ * as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
++ * sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
++ *
++ * Also do not allow fully numeric names or just "." or "..".
++ */
++ int numeric;
+
+- if (('\0' == *name) ||
+- !((('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name))) {
++ if ('\0' == *name ||
++ ('.' == *name && (('.' == name[1] && '\0' == name[2]) ||
++ '\0' == name[1])) ||
++ !((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
++ (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
++ (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
++ *name == '_' ||
++ *name == '.')) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
++ numeric = isdigit(*name);
++
+ while ('\0' != *++name) {
+- if (!(( ('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name) ) ||
+- ( ('0' <= *name) && ('9' >= *name) ) ||
+- ('_' == *name) ||
+- ('-' == *name) ||
+- ( ('$' == *name) && ('\0' == *(name + 1)) )
++ if (!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
++ (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
++ (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
++ *name == '_' ||
++ *name == '.' ||
++ *name == '-' ||
++ (*name == '$' && name[1] == '\0')
+ )) {
+ return false;
+ }
++ numeric &= isdigit(*name);
+ }
+
+- return true;
++ return !numeric;
+ }
+
+ bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name)
+diff -up shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml 2020-01-13 09:44:41.968507996 +0100
+@@ -273,10 +273,12 @@
+
+ CAVEATS
+
+- Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+- followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+- They can end with a dollar sign.
+- In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
++ Groupnames may contain only lower and upper case letters, digits,
++ underscores, or dashes. They can end with a dollar sign.
++
++ Dashes are not allowed at the beginning of the groupname.
++ Fully numeric groupnames and groupnames . or .. are
++ also disallowed.
+
+
+ Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
+diff -up shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname 2019-10-05 03:23:58.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml 2020-01-13 09:44:41.968507996 +0100
+@@ -661,10 +661,14 @@
+
+
+
+- Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+- followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+- They can end with a dollar sign.
+- In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
++ Usernames may contain only lower and upper case letters, digits,
++ underscores, or dashes. They can end with a dollar sign.
++
++ Dashes are not allowed at the beginning of the username.
++ Fully numeric usernames and usernames . or .. are
++ also disallowed. It is not recommended to use usernames beginning
++ with . character as their home directories will be hidden in
++ the ls output.
+
+
+ Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
diff --git a/shadow-4.8-ignore-login-prompt.patch b/shadow-4.8-ignore-login-prompt.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c93aae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8-ignore-login-prompt.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c.login-prompt shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c.login-prompt 2020-01-13 10:38:44.852796681 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c 2020-01-13 10:39:54.472612511 +0100
+@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
+ {"LASTLOG_UID_MAX", NULL},
+ {"LOGIN_RETRIES", NULL},
+ {"LOGIN_TIMEOUT", NULL},
++ {"LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT", NULL},
+ {"LOG_OK_LOGINS", NULL},
+ {"LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB", NULL},
+ {"MAIL_DIR", NULL},
diff --git a/shadow-4.8-long-entry.patch b/shadow-4.8-long-entry.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64d9636
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8-long-entry.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h.long-entry 2020-01-13 10:29:45.288957339 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h 2020-01-13 10:30:47.482902954 +0100
+@@ -388,6 +388,9 @@ extern char *strerror ();
+ # endif
+ #endif
+
++/* Maximum length of passwd entry */
++#define PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH 32768
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
+ # define shadow_getenv(name) secure_getenv(name)
+ # else
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c.long-entry 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c 2020-01-13 10:29:45.288957339 +0100
+@@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ static int passwd_put (const void *ent,
+ || (pw->pw_gid == (gid_t)-1)
+ || (valid_field (pw->pw_gecos, ":\n") == -1)
+ || (valid_field (pw->pw_dir, ":\n") == -1)
+- || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)) {
++ || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)
++ || (strlen (pw->pw_name) + strlen (pw->pw_passwd) +
++ strlen (pw->pw_gecos) + strlen (pw->pw_dir) +
++ strlen (pw->pw_shell) + 100 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry 2019-10-05 03:23:58.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c 2020-01-13 10:29:45.288957339 +0100
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
+ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *buf)
+ {
+ static struct passwd pwent;
+- static char pwdbuf[1024];
++ static char pwdbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
+ register int i;
+ register char *cp;
+ char *fields[NFIELDS];
+@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *bu
+ * the password structure remain valid.
+ */
+
+- if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf)
++ if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf) {
++ fprintf (stderr, "Too long passwd entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
+ return 0; /* fail if too long */
++ }
+ strcpy (pwdbuf, buf);
+
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c 2020-01-13 10:29:45.289957322 +0100
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
+ */
+ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *string)
+ {
+- static char spwbuf[1024];
++ static char spwbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
+ static struct spwd spwd;
+ char *fields[FIELDS];
+ char *cp;
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *stri
+ */
+
+ if (strlen (string) >= sizeof spwbuf) {
++ fprintf (stderr, "Too long shadow entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
+ return 0; /* fail if too long */
+ }
+ strcpy (spwbuf, string);
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c 2020-01-13 10:29:45.289957322 +0100
+@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ static int shadow_put (const void *ent,
+
+ if ( (NULL == sp)
+ || (valid_field (sp->sp_namp, ":\n") == -1)
+- || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)) {
++ || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)
++ || (strlen (sp->sp_namp) + strlen (sp->sp_pwdp) +
++ 1000 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.8-selinux-perms.patch b/shadow-4.8-selinux-perms.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfb32ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8-selinux-perms.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms 2019-12-01 18:02:43.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c 2020-01-13 10:21:44.558107260 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+ #include
+ #include
+ #include
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include
++#include
++#endif
++#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
++#include
++#endif
+ #ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+@@ -80,6 +87,9 @@ static bool sgr_locked = false;
+ #endif
+ static bool gr_locked = false;
+
++/* The name of the caller */
++static char *myname = NULL;
++
+ /* local function prototypes */
+ static void fail_exit (int code);
+ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status);
+@@ -334,6 +344,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ #endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++static int
++log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++ int audit_fd;
++ va_list ap;
++
++ va_start(ap, fmt);
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++
++ if (audit_fd >= 0) {
++ char *buf;
++
++ if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
++ goto ret;
++ audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL, 0);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ free(buf);
++ goto ret;
++ }
++
++#endif
++ vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
++ret:
++ va_end(ap);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++selinux_check_root (void)
++{
++ int status = -1;
++ security_context_t user_context;
++ union selinux_callback old_callback;
++
++ if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
++ return;
++
++ old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
++ /* setup callbacks */
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
++ if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
++ status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
++
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ freecon(user_context);
++ if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
++ exit(1);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * open_files - lock and open the group databases
+ */
+@@ -427,6 +494,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ const struct group *gr;
+ struct group newgr;
++ struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+ int errors = 0;
+ int line = 0;
+
+@@ -436,12 +504,37 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ (void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ (void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ selinux_check_root ();
++#endif
++
+ process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
+
+ process_flags (argc, argv);
+
+ OPENLOG ("chgpasswd");
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_help_open ();
++#endif
++
++ /*
++ * Determine the name of the user that invoked this command. This
++ * is really hit or miss because there are so many ways that command
++ * can be executed and so many ways to trip up the routines that
++ * report the user name.
++ */
++ pw = get_my_pwent ();
++ if (NULL == pw) {
++ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
++ Prog);
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
++ "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
++ (unsigned long) getuid ()));
++ exit (E_NOPERM);
++ }
++ myname = xstrdup (pw->pw_name);
++
+ check_perms ();
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+diff -up shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms 2019-12-01 18:02:43.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c 2020-01-13 10:21:44.558107260 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+ #include
+ #include
+ #include
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include
++#include
++#endif
++#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
++#include
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+@@ -332,6 +339,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++static int
++log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++ int audit_fd;
++ va_list ap;
++
++ va_start(ap, fmt);
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++
++ if (audit_fd >= 0) {
++ char *buf;
++
++ if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
++ goto ret;
++ audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL, 0);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ free(buf);
++ goto ret;
++ }
++
++#endif
++ vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
++ret:
++ va_end(ap);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++selinux_check_root (void)
++{
++ int status = -1;
++ security_context_t user_context;
++ union selinux_callback old_callback;
++
++ if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
++ return;
++
++ old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
++ /* setup callbacks */
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
++ if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
++ status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
++
++ selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++ freecon(user_context);
++ if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
++ exit(1);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * open_files - lock and open the password databases
+ */
+@@ -428,6 +492,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ (void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ (void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ selinux_check_root ();
++#endif
++
+ process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
+
+ process_flags (argc, argv);
+@@ -440,6 +508,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ OPENLOG ("chpasswd");
+
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_help_open ();
++#endif
++
+ check_perms ();
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
diff --git a/shadow-4.8-selinux.patch b/shadow-4.8-selinux.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b2177b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8-selinux.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/commonio.c.selinux shadow-4.8/lib/commonio.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/commonio.c.selinux 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/commonio.c 2020-01-13 10:08:53.769101131 +0100
+@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s-", db->filename);
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
+ errors++;
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
+ errors++;
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -up shadow-4.8/libmisc/copydir.c.selinux shadow-4.8/libmisc/copydir.c
+--- shadow-4.8/libmisc/copydir.c.selinux 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/libmisc/copydir.c 2020-01-13 10:08:53.769101131 +0100
+@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, co
+ */
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ free (oldlink);
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src
+ int err = 0;
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, c
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/prototypes.h.selinux shadow-4.8/lib/prototypes.h
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/prototypes.h.selinux 2020-01-13 10:08:53.769101131 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/prototypes.h 2020-01-13 10:11:20.914627399 +0100
+@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ extern /*@observer@*/const char *crypt_m
+
+ /* selinux.c */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name);
++extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name);
+ extern int reset_selinux_file_context (void);
+ extern int check_selinux_permit (const char *perm_name);
+ #endif
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/selinux.c.selinux shadow-4.8/lib/selinux.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/selinux.c.selinux 2019-11-12 01:18:25.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/selinux.c 2020-01-13 10:08:53.769101131 +0100
+@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static bool selinux_enabled;
+ * Callers may have to Reset SELinux to create files with default
+ * contexts with reset_selinux_file_context
+ */
+-int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name)
++int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name)
+ {
+ /*@null@*/security_context_t scontext = NULL;
+
+@@ -63,19 +63,23 @@ int set_selinux_file_context (const char
+ if (selinux_enabled) {
+ /* Get the default security context for this file */
+ if (matchpathcon (dst_name, 0, &scontext) < 0) {
+- if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
+- return 1;
+- }
++ /* We could not get the default, copy the original */
++ if (orig_name == NULL)
++ goto error;
++ if (getfilecon (orig_name, &scontext) < 0)
++ goto error;
+ }
+ /* Set the security context for the next created file */
+- if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0) {
+- if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
+- return 1;
+- }
+- }
++ if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0)
++ goto error;
+ freecon (scontext);
+ }
+ return 0;
++ error:
++ if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
++ return 1;
++ }
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/semanage.c.selinux shadow-4.8/lib/semanage.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/semanage.c.selinux 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/semanage.c 2020-01-13 10:08:53.766101181 +0100
+@@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name,
+
+ ret = 0;
+
++ /* drop obsolete matchpathcon cache */
++ matchpathcon_fini();
++
+ done:
+ semanage_seuser_key_free (key);
+ semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
+@@ -369,6 +372,10 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
++
++ /* drop obsolete matchpathcon cache */
++ matchpathcon_fini();
++
+ done:
+ semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
+ return ret;
+diff -up shadow-4.8/src/useradd.c.selinux shadow-4.8/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.8/src/useradd.c.selinux 2020-01-13 10:08:53.762101248 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/src/useradd.c 2020-01-13 10:08:53.767101164 +0100
+@@ -2078,7 +2078,7 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ ++bhome;
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (set_selinux_file_context (prefix_user_home) != 0) {
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (prefix_user_home, NULL) != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot set SELinux context for home directory %s\n"),
+ Prog, user_home);
+@@ -2232,6 +2232,7 @@ static void create_mail (void)
+ */
+ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ {
++ int rv = E_SUCCESS;
+ #ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+@@ -2454,27 +2455,12 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ usr_update ();
+
+- if (mflg) {
+- create_home ();
+- if (home_added) {
+- copy_tree (def_template, prefix_user_home, false, false,
+- (uid_t)-1, user_id, (gid_t)-1, user_gid);
+- } else {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: warning: the home directory %s already exists.\n"
+- "%s: Not copying any file from skel directory into it.\n"),
+- Prog, user_home, Prog);
+- }
+-
+- }
+-
+- /* Do not create mail directory for system accounts */
+- if (!rflg) {
+- create_mail ();
+- }
+-
+ close_files ();
+
++ nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
++ nscd_flush_cache ("group");
++ sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
++
+ /*
+ * tallylog_reset needs to be able to lookup
+ * a valid existing user name,
+@@ -2485,8 +2471,9 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- if (Zflg) {
+- if (set_seuser (user_name, user_selinux) != 0) {
++ if (Zflg && *user_selinux) {
++ if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
++ if (set_seuser (user_name, user_selinux) != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
+@@ -2495,15 +2482,31 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ "adding SELinux user mapping",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, 0);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+- fail_exit (E_SE_UPDATE);
++ rv = E_SE_UPDATE;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+- nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
+- nscd_flush_cache ("group");
+- sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
++ if (mflg) {
++ create_home ();
++ if (home_added) {
++ copy_tree (def_template, prefix_user_home, false, true,
++ (uid_t)-1, user_id, (gid_t)-1, user_gid);
++ } else {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: warning: the home directory %s already exists.\n"
++ "%s: Not copying any file from skel directory into it.\n"),
++ Prog, user_home, Prog);
++ }
++
++ }
++
++ /* Do not create mail directory for system accounts */
++ if (!rflg) {
++ create_mail ();
++ }
+
+- return E_SUCCESS;
++ return rv;
+ }
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.8-useradd-selinux-mail.patch b/shadow-4.8-useradd-selinux-mail.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1777f2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8-useradd-selinux-mail.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 4dc62ebcf37d7568be1d4ca54367215eba8b8a28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: ikerexxe
+Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2020 15:04:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] useradd: doesn't generate /var/spool/mail/$USER with the
+ proper SELinux user identity
+
+Explanation: use set_selinux_file_context() and reset_selinux_file_context() for create_mail() just as is done for create_home()
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1690527
+---
+ src/useradd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
+index a679392d..645d4a40 100644
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static bool home_added = false;
+ #define E_NAME_IN_USE 9 /* username already in use */
+ #define E_GRP_UPDATE 10 /* can't update group file */
+ #define E_HOMEDIR 12 /* can't create home directory */
++#define E_MAILBOXFILE 13 /* can't create mailbox file */
+ #define E_SE_UPDATE 14 /* can't update SELinux user mapping */
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+ #define E_SUB_UID_UPDATE 16 /* can't update the subordinate uid file */
+@@ -2210,6 +2211,16 @@ static void create_mail (void)
+ sprintf (file, "%s/%s/%s", prefix, spool, user_name);
+ else
+ sprintf (file, "%s/%s", spool, user_name);
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ if (set_selinux_file_context (file, NULL) != 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot set SELinux context for mailbox file %s\n"),
++ Prog, file);
++ fail_exit (E_MAILBOXFILE);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ fd = open (file, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, 0);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ perror (_("Creating mailbox file"));
+@@ -2234,6 +2245,15 @@ static void create_mail (void)
+
+ fsync (fd);
+ close (fd);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ /* Reset SELinux to create files with default contexts */
++ if (reset_selinux_file_context () != 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot reset SELinux file creation context\n"),
++ Prog);
++ fail_exit (E_MAILBOXFILE);
++ }
++#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+--
+2.24.1
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.8.1-audit-update.patch b/shadow-4.8.1-audit-update.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b9586a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8.1-audit-update.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2365 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/audit_help.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/audit_help.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/audit_help.c.audit-update 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/audit_help.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.371943299 +0100
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void audit_help_open (void)
+ * This function will log a message to the audit system using a predefined
+ * message format. Parameter usage is as follows:
+ *
+- * type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK for changing any account
++ * type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_MGMT for changing any account
+ * attributes.
+ * pgname - program's name
+ * op - operation. "adding user", "changing finger info", "deleting group"
+@@ -88,6 +88,39 @@ void audit_logger (int type, unused cons
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * This function will log a message to the audit system using a predefined
++ * message format. Parameter usage is as follows:
++ *
++ * type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_MGMT for changing any account
++ * attributes.
++ * pgname - program's name
++ * op - operation. "adding user", "changing finger info", "deleting group"
++ * name - user's account or group name. If not available use NULL.
++ * id - uid or gid that the operation is being performed on. This is used
++ * only when user is NULL.
++ * grp - group name associated with event
++ */
++void audit_logger_with_group (int type, unused const char *pgname,
++ const char *op, const char *name, unsigned int id,
++ const char *grp, shadow_audit_result result)
++{
++ int len;
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1], buf[1024];
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ return;
++ }
++ len = strnlen(grp, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(grp, len)) {
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s grp=%s", op,
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group, grp, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s grp=\"%s\"", op, grp);
++ }
++ audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd, type, NULL, buf, name, id,
++ NULL, NULL, NULL, (int) result);
++}
++
+ void audit_logger_message (const char *message, shadow_audit_result result)
+ {
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_group.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_group.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_group.c.audit-update 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_group.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.371943299 +0100
+@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void cleanup_report_mod_group (void *cle
+ gr_dbname (),
+ info->action));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info->audit_msg,
+ info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ void cleanup_report_mod_gshadow (void *c
+ sgr_dbname (),
+ info->action));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info->audit_msg,
+ info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ void cleanup_report_add_group_group (voi
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/group",
++ "adding-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ void cleanup_report_add_group_gshadow (v
+
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "adding-shadow-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ void cleanup_report_del_group_group (voi
+ "failed to remove group %s from %s",
+ name, gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/group",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
++ "removing-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ void cleanup_report_del_group_gshadow (v
+ "failed to remove group %s from %s",
+ name, sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "removing-shadow-group",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_group (unused void *
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking group file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-group",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_gshadow (unused void
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking gshadow file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-gshadow",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_user.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_user.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_user.c.audit-update 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/libmisc/cleanup_user.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.371943299 +0100
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ void cleanup_report_mod_passwd (void *cl
+ pw_dbname (),
+ info->action));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
+ info->audit_msg,
+ info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ void cleanup_report_add_user_passwd (voi
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, pw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to /etc/passwd",
++ "adding-user",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ void cleanup_report_add_user_shadow (voi
+
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, spw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to /etc/shadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "adding-shadow-user",
+ name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_passwd (unused void
+ Prog, pw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking passwd file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-passwd",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_shadow (unused void
+ Prog, spw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger_message ("unlocking shadow file",
++ audit_logger_message ("unlocking-shadow",
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h
+--- shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h.audit-update 2020-03-17 16:53:44.364943206 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h 2020-03-17 16:53:44.371943299 +0100
+@@ -219,12 +219,21 @@ extern int audit_fd;
+ extern void audit_help_open (void);
+ /* Use AUDIT_NO_ID when a name is provided to audit_logger instead of an ID */
+ #define AUDIT_NO_ID ((unsigned int) -1)
++#ifndef AUDIT_GRP_MGMT
++#define AUDIT_GRP_MGMT 1132 /* Group account was modified */
++#endif
++#ifndef AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK
++#define AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK 1133 /* Group account password was changed */
++#endif
+ typedef enum {
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE = 0,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS = 1} shadow_audit_result;
+ extern void audit_logger (int type, const char *pgname, const char *op,
+ const char *name, unsigned int id,
+ shadow_audit_result result);
++void audit_logger_with_group (int type, unused const char *pgname,
++ const char *op, const char *name, unsigned int id,
++ const char *grp, shadow_audit_result result);
+ void audit_logger_message (const char *message, shadow_audit_result result);
+ #endif
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/chage.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/chage.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/chage.c.audit-update 2019-11-12 01:18:25.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/chage.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.371943299 +0100
+@@ -123,9 +123,10 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void fail_exit (int
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (E_SUCCESS != code) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change age",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 0);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-age",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+@@ -883,11 +884,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Permission denied.\n"), Prog);
+ fail_exit (E_NOPERM);
+ }
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "display aging info",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+-#endif
++ /* Displaying fields is not of interest to audit */
+ list_fields ();
+ fail_exit (E_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -906,41 +903,43 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change all aging information",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-all-aging-information",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ #endif
+ } else {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (Mflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change max age",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-max-age",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ if (mflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change min age",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-min-age",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (dflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change last change date",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-last-change-date",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (Wflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change passwd warning",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-passwd-warning",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (Iflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change inactive days",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-inactive-days",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ if (Eflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "change passwd expiration",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "change-passwd-expiration",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_uid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/gpasswd.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/gpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/gpasswd.c.audit-update 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/gpasswd.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.371943299 +0100
+@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ (void) fputs (_(" -d, --delete USER remove USER from GROUP\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -h, --help display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -Q, --root CHROOT_DIR directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
+- (void) fputs (_(" -r, --remove-password remove the GROUP's password\n"), usageout);
++ (void) fputs (_(" -r, --delete-password remove the GROUP's password\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -R, --restrict restrict access to GROUP to its members\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -M, --members USER,... set the list of members of GROUP\n"), usageout);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -397,21 +397,14 @@ static void open_files (void)
+
+ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const char *suffix)
+ {
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- char buf[1024];
+-#endif
+ if (aflg) {
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
+ "%s failed to add user %s to group %s%s",
+ myname, user, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to add user %s to group %s%s",
+- myname, user, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (dflg) {
+@@ -419,13 +412,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to remove user %s from group %s%s",
+ myname, user, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to remove user %s from group %s%s",
+- myname, user, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (rflg) {
+@@ -433,13 +422,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to remove password of group %s%s",
+ myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to remove password of group %s%s",
+- myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "delete-group-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Rflg) {
+@@ -447,13 +432,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to restrict access to group %s%s",
+ myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to restrict access to group %s%s",
+- myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "restrict-group",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Aflg || Mflg) {
+@@ -463,13 +444,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to set the administrators of group %s to %s%s",
+ myname, group, admins, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to set the administrators of group %s to %s%s",
+- myname, group, admins, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "set-admins-of-group",
++ admins, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -479,13 +456,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to set the members of group %s to %s%s",
+ myname, group, members, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to set the members of group %s to %s%s",
+- myname, group, members, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-users-to-group",
++ members, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -494,13 +467,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure (const c
+ "%s failed to change password of group %s%s",
+ myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "%s failed to change password of group %s%s",
+- myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "change-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -531,21 +500,14 @@ static void log_gpasswd_failure_gshadow
+
+ static void log_gpasswd_success (const char *suffix)
+ {
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- char buf[1024];
+-#endif
+ if (aflg) {
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "user %s added by %s to group %s%s",
+ user, myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "user %s added by %s to group %s%s",
+- user, myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (dflg) {
+@@ -553,13 +515,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "user %s removed by %s from group %s%s",
+ user, myname, group, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "user %s removed by %s from group %s%s",
+- user, myname, group, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-group",
++ user, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (rflg) {
+@@ -567,13 +525,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "password of group %s removed by %s%s",
+ group, myname, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "password of group %s removed by %s%s",
+- group, myname, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "delete-group-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Rflg) {
+@@ -581,13 +535,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "access to group %s restricted by %s%s",
+ group, myname, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "access to group %s restricted by %s%s",
+- group, myname, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "restrict-group",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ } else if (Aflg || Mflg) {
+@@ -597,13 +547,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "administrators of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+ group, myname, admins, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "administrators of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+- group, myname, admins, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "set-admins-of-group",
++ admins, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -613,13 +559,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "members of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+ group, myname, members, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "members of group %s set by %s to %s%s",
+- group, myname, members, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-users-to-group",
++ members, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+@@ -628,13 +570,9 @@ static void log_gpasswd_success (const c
+ "password of group %s changed by %s%s",
+ group, myname, suffix));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (buf, 1023,
+- "password of group %s changed by %s%s",
+- group, myname, suffix);
+- buf[1023] = '\0';
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- buf,
+- group, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ "change-password",
++ myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, group,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/groupadd.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/groupadd.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/groupadd.c.audit-update 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/groupadd.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.372943312 +0100
+@@ -131,6 +131,15 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int sta
+ exit (status);
+ }
+
++static void fail_exit(int status)
++{
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger(AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog, "add-group", group_name,
++ AUDIT_NO_ID, SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++ exit (status);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * new_grent - initialize the values in a group file entry
+ *
+@@ -214,7 +223,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname (), grp.gr_name);
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ /*
+@@ -224,7 +233,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname (), sgrp.sg_name);
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+ }
+@@ -248,7 +257,7 @@ static void check_new_name (void)
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: '%s' is not a valid group name\n"),
+ Prog, group_name);
+
+- exit (E_BAD_ARG);
++ fail_exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -264,11 +273,11 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/group",
++ "add-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -286,11 +295,11 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group to /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-shadow-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -304,12 +313,6 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+
+ /* Report success at the system level */
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "",
+- group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+-#endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "new group: name=%s, GID=%u",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id));
+ del_cleanup (cleanup_report_add_group);
+@@ -327,7 +330,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_group, NULL);
+
+@@ -337,7 +340,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_gshadow, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -353,7 +356,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", gr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -363,7 +366,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+@@ -496,7 +499,7 @@ static void check_flags (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: group '%s' already exists\n"),
+ Prog, group_name);
+- exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
++ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+
+ if (gflg && (prefix_getgrgid (group_id) != NULL)) {
+@@ -515,7 +518,7 @@ static void check_flags (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: GID '%lu' already exists\n"),
+ Prog, (unsigned long int) group_id);
+- exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
++ fail_exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+@@ -543,7 +546,7 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ retval = pam_start ("groupadd", pampw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+@@ -563,7 +566,7 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ if (NULL != pamh) {
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ }
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+@@ -596,7 +599,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot setup cleanup service.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -618,7 +621,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+
+ if (!gflg) {
+ if (find_new_gid (rflg, &group_id, NULL) < 0) {
+- exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
++ fail_exit (E_GID_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/groupdel.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/groupdel.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/groupdel.c.audit-update 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/groupdel.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.372943312 +0100
+@@ -106,6 +106,15 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int sta
+ exit (status);
+ }
+
++static void fail_exit(int status)
++{
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger(AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog, "delete-group", group_name,
++ AUDIT_NO_ID, SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++ exit (status);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * grp_update - update group file entries
+ *
+@@ -132,7 +141,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
+ Prog, group_name, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -144,7 +153,7 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
+ Prog, group_name, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+@@ -163,12 +172,12 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/group",
++ "delete-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -188,12 +197,12 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "removing group from /etc/gshadow",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-shadow-group",
+ group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -207,13 +216,6 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+
+- /* Report success at the system level */
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "",
+- group_name, (unsigned int) group_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+-#endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "group '%s' removed\n", group_name));
+ del_cleanup (cleanup_report_del_group);
+ }
+@@ -230,7 +232,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_group, NULL);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_unlock_gshadow, NULL);
+ }
+@@ -257,7 +259,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", gr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ if (is_shadow_grp) {
+@@ -266,7 +268,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "cannot open %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+- exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+@@ -307,7 +309,7 @@ static void group_busy (gid_t gid)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove the primary group of user '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, pwd->pw_name);
+- exit (E_GROUP_BUSY);
++ fail_exit (E_GROUP_BUSY);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -392,7 +394,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot setup cleanup service.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ process_flags (argc, argv);
+@@ -406,7 +408,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
+ Prog);
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+
+ retval = pam_start ("groupdel", pampw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+@@ -427,7 +429,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ if (NULL != pamh) {
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ }
+- exit (1);
++ fail_exit (1);
+ }
+ (void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+@@ -447,7 +449,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: group '%s' does not exist\n"),
+ Prog, group_name);
+- exit (E_NOTFOUND);
++ fail_exit (E_NOTFOUND);
+ }
+
+ group_id = grp->gr_gid;
+@@ -471,7 +473,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: %s is the NIS master\n"),
+ Prog, nis_master);
+ }
+- exit (E_NOTFOUND);
++ fail_exit (E_NOTFOUND);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/groupmod.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/groupmod.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/groupmod.c.audit-update 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/groupmod.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.372943312 +0100
+@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info_group.audit_msg,
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+@@ -473,7 +473,14 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ /* If both happened, log password change as its more important */
++ if (pflg)
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
++ info_gshadow.audit_msg,
++ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
++ else
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info_gshadow.audit_msg,
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+@@ -496,7 +503,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
+ info_passwd.audit_msg,
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+@@ -511,8 +518,8 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, Prog,
+- "modifying group",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "modify-group",
+ group_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -524,6 +531,8 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ */
+ static void prepare_failure_reports (void)
+ {
++ char *nv_pair, nv[64];
++
+ info_group.name = group_name;
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ info_gshadow.name = group_name;
+@@ -536,76 +545,109 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (voi
+ #endif
+ info_passwd.audit_msg = xmalloc (512);
+
+- (void) snprintf (info_group.audit_msg, 511,
+- "changing %s; ", gr_dbname ());
++ info_group.action = xmalloc (512);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+- (void) snprintf (info_gshadow.audit_msg, 511,
+- "changing %s; ", sgr_dbname ());
++ info_gshadow.action = xmalloc (512);
+ #endif
+- (void) snprintf (info_passwd.audit_msg, 511,
+- "changing %s; ", pw_dbname ());
++ info_passwd.action = xmalloc (512);
+
+- info_group.action = info_group.audit_msg
+- + strlen (info_group.audit_msg);
++ (void) snprintf (info_group.audit_msg, 511,
++ "changing-group");
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+- info_gshadow.action = info_gshadow.audit_msg
+- + strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg);
++ (void) snprintf (info_gshadow.audit_msg, 511,
++ "changing-shadow-group");
+ #endif
+- info_passwd.action = info_passwd.audit_msg
+- + strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg);
++ (void) snprintf (info_passwd.audit_msg, 511,
++ "changing-group-passwd");
+
++ nv_pair = audit_encode_nv_string(" grp", group_name,
++ strlen(group_name));
++ if(nv_pair) {
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ strncat(info_gshadow.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++#endif
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ free(nv_pair);
++ }
++ snprintf(nv, sizeof(nv), " gid=%lu", (unsigned long)group_id);
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv, 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv, 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
++
+ (void) snprintf (info_group.action,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511,
+ "group %s/%lu",
+ group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ (void) snprintf (info_gshadow.action,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511,
+ "group %s", group_name);
+ #endif
+ (void) snprintf (info_passwd.action,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511,
+ "group %s/%lu",
+ group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
+
+ if (nflg) {
++ nv_pair = audit_encode_nv_string(" new_group", group_newname,
++ strlen(group_newname));
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
+ strncat (info_group.action, ", new name: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+ strncat (info_group.action, group_newname,
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ strncat(info_gshadow.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_gshadow.audit_msg));
+ strncat (info_gshadow.action, ", new name: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.action));
+ strncat (info_gshadow.action, group_newname,
+- 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.action));
+ #endif
+
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv_pair,
++ 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
+ strncat (info_passwd.action, ", new name: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action));
+ strncat (info_passwd.action, group_newname,
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action));
++ free(nv_pair);
+ }
+ if (pflg) {
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, "op=change-password",
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action));
++
++ /* Note: audit doesn't want this value recorded */
+ strncat (info_group.action, ", new password",
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ strncat (info_gshadow.action, ", new password",
+- 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_gshadow.action));
+ #endif
+ }
+ if (gflg) {
++ snprintf(nv, sizeof(nv), " new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long)group_newid);
++ strncat(info_group.audit_msg, nv,
++ 511 - strlen(info_group.audit_msg));
++ strncat(info_passwd.audit_msg, nv,
++ 511 - strlen(info_passwd.audit_msg));
++
+ strncat (info_group.action, ", new gid: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action));
+ (void) snprintf (info_group.action+strlen (info_group.action),
+- 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
++ 511 - strlen (info_group.action),
+ "%lu", (unsigned long int) group_newid);
+
+ strncat (info_passwd.action, ", new gid: ",
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg));
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action));
+ (void) snprintf (info_passwd.action+strlen (info_passwd.action),
+- 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg),
++ 511 - strlen (info_passwd.action),
+ "%lu", (unsigned long int) group_newid);
+ }
+ info_group.audit_msg[511] = '\0';
+@@ -613,6 +655,11 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (voi
+ info_gshadow.audit_msg[511] = '\0';
+ #endif
+ info_passwd.audit_msg[511] = '\0';
++ info_group.action[511] = '\0';
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ info_gshadow.action[511] = '\0';
++#endif
++ info_passwd.action[511] = '\0';
+
+ // FIXME: add a system cleanup
+ add_cleanup (cleanup_report_mod_group, &info_group);
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/newgrp.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/newgrp.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/newgrp.c.audit-update 2020-01-12 15:19:28.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/newgrp.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.372943312 +0100
+@@ -206,11 +206,12 @@ static void check_perms (const struct gr
+ strcmp (cpasswd, grp->gr_passwd) != 0) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "authentication new-gid=%lu",
++ "authentication new_gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) grp->gr_gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_AUTH, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "Invalid password for group '%s' from '%s'",
+@@ -221,11 +222,12 @@ static void check_perms (const struct gr
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "authentication new-gid=%lu",
++ "authentication new_gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) grp->gr_gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_AUTH, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 1);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+
+@@ -236,19 +238,6 @@ failure:
+ * harm. -- JWP
+ */
+ closelog ();
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- if (groupname) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", groupname);
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+- audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+- } else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+- "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+- }
+-#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+@@ -320,15 +309,27 @@ static void syslog_sg (const char *name,
+ is_newgrp ? "newgrp" : "sg", strerror (errno));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (group) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", group);
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1];
++ int len = strnlen(group, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(group, len)) {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=%s",
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group,
++ group, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=\"%s\"",
++ group);
++ }
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -458,7 +459,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) getuid ()));
+@@ -574,15 +575,26 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ perror ("getgroups");
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (group) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", group);
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1];
++ int len = strnlen(group, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(group, len)) {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=%s",
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group,
++ group, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=\"%s\"", group);
++ }
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (),
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+@@ -739,10 +751,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ perror ("setgid");
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
++ "changing new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+@@ -751,10 +763,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ perror ("setuid");
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
++ "changing new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+@@ -768,10 +780,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ execl (SHELL, "sh", "-c", command, (char *) 0);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
++ "changing new_gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ perror (SHELL);
+ exit ((errno == ENOENT) ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
+@@ -835,11 +847,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf), "changing new-gid=%lu",
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf), "changing new_gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 1);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ /*
+ * Exec the login shell and go away. We are trying to get back to
+@@ -863,15 +875,24 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ closelog ();
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (NULL != group) {
+- snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+- "changing new-group=%s", group);
++ char enc_group[(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH*2)+1];
++ int len = strnlen(group, sizeof(enc_group)/2);
++ if (audit_value_needs_encoding(group, len)) {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=%s",
++ audit_encode_value(enc_group,
++ group, len));
++ } else {
++ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
++ "changing new_group=\"%s\"", group);
++ }
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+- (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
++ (unsigned int) getuid (), SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ #endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/useradd.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/useradd.c.audit-update 2020-03-17 16:53:44.365943219 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/useradd.c 2020-03-17 17:03:11.614503929 +0100
+@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ static void create_mail (void);
+ */
+ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ {
++ int type;
++
+ if (home_added) {
+ if (rmdir (prefix_user_home) != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -246,12 +248,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, spw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking shadow file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -259,12 +255,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking passwd file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -272,12 +262,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking group file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -286,12 +270,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking gshadow file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -301,12 +279,6 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking subordinate user file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -314,20 +286,19 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking subordinate group file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
++ if (code == E_PW_UPDATE || code >= E_GRP_UPDATE)
++ type = AUDIT_USER_MGMT;
++ else
++ type = AUDIT_ADD_USER;
++
++ audit_logger (type, Prog,
++ "add-user",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -692,7 +663,7 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USYS_CONFIG, Prog,
+- "changing useradd defaults",
++ "changing-useradd-defaults",
+ NULL, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -974,12 +945,6 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: Out of memory. Cannot update %s.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", gr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE); /* XXX */
+ }
+
+@@ -993,18 +958,12 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname (), ngrp->gr_name);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", gr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, ngrp->gr_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -1049,12 +1008,6 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: Out of memory. Cannot update %s.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", sgr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE); /* XXX */
+ }
+
+@@ -1068,18 +1021,13 @@ static void grp_update (void)
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname (), nsgrp->sg_name);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'", sgr_dbname (), user_name));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
++
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-to-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, nsgrp->sg_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -1452,7 +1400,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
++ "add-user",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1567,7 +1515,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking shadow file",
++ "unlocking-shadow-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1580,7 +1528,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking passwd file",
++ "unlocking-passwd-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1592,7 +1540,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking group file",
++ "unlocking-group-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1606,7 +1554,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking gshadow file",
++ "unlocking-gshadow-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1622,7 +1570,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking subordinate user file",
++ "unlocking-subordinate-user-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1636,7 +1584,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking subordinate group file",
++ "unlocking-subordinate-group-file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1828,7 +1776,7 @@ static void grp_add (void)
+ Prog, gr_dbname (), grp.gr_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group",
++ "add-group",
+ grp.gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1844,7 +1792,7 @@ static void grp_add (void)
+ Prog, sgr_dbname (), sgrp.sg_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group",
++ "add-group",
+ grp.gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+@@ -1854,7 +1802,7 @@ static void grp_add (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "new group: name=%s, GID=%u", user_name, user_gid));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, Prog,
+- "adding group",
++ "add-group",
+ grp.gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -2025,12 +1973,6 @@ static void usr_update (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, spw_dbname (), spent.sp_namp);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding shadow password",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+@@ -2051,9 +1993,14 @@ static void usr_update (void)
+ #endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ /*
++ * Even though we have the ID of the user, we won't send it now
++ * because its not written to disk yet. After close_files it is
++ * and we can use the real ID thereafter.
++ */
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++ "add-user",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ /*
+@@ -2140,12 +2087,6 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot create directory %s\n"),
+ Prog, path);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding home directory",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+ if (chown (path, 0, 0) < 0) {
+@@ -2168,8 +2109,8 @@ static void create_home (void)
+ chmod (prefix_user_home, mode);
+ home_added = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-home-dir",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+@@ -2354,12 +2295,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ */
+ if (prefix_getpwnam (user_name) != NULL) { /* local, no need for xgetpwnam */
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: user '%s' already exists\n"), Prog, user_name);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+
+@@ -2375,12 +2310,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: group %s exists - if you want to add this user to that group, use -g.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2410,12 +2339,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: UID %lu is not unique\n"),
+ Prog, (unsigned long) user_id);
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding user",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+ fail_exit (E_UID_IN_USE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2489,9 +2412,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "adding SELinux user mapping",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, 0);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_ASSIGN, Prog,
++ "add-selinux-user-mapping",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ rv = E_SE_UPDATE;
+ }
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/userdel.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/userdel.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/userdel.c.audit-update 2020-03-17 16:53:44.368943259 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/userdel.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.373943325 +0100
+@@ -222,9 +222,9 @@ static void update_groups (void)
+ * Update the DBM group file with the new entry as well.
+ */
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user from group",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "deleting-user-from-group",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, ngrp->gr_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "delete '%s' from group '%s'\n",
+@@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ static void update_groups (void)
+ exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user from shadow group",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "deleting-user-from-shadow-group",
++ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, nsgrp->sg_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "delete '%s' from shadow group '%s'\n",
+@@ -363,9 +363,9 @@ static void remove_usergroup (void)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "deleting group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
++ "delete-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, user_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -381,9 +381,9 @@ static void remove_usergroup (void)
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
+- "deleting shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, user_name,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user",
++ "delete-user",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -565,24 +565,12 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, pw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ pw_locked = true;
+ if (pw_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (is_shadow_pwd) {
+@@ -590,12 +578,6 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, spw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking shadow password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ spw_locked = true;
+@@ -603,12 +585,6 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, spw_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening shadow password file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -616,23 +592,11 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, gr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ gr_locked = true;
+ if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -641,24 +605,12 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking shadow group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sgr_locked= true;
+ if (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening shadow group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -669,24 +621,12 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking subordinate user file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = true;
+ if (sub_uid_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening subordinate user file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -695,24 +635,12 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "locking subordinate group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = true;
+ if (sub_gid_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "opening subordinate group file",
+- user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -757,7 +685,7 @@ static void update_user (void)
+ #endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user entries",
++ "delete-user",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -865,7 +793,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "Cannot remove %s: %s", mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -882,7 +810,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "Cannot remove %s: %s", mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -892,8 +820,8 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else
+ {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -911,7 +839,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -928,7 +856,7 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "Cannot remove %s: %s", mailfile, strerror (errno)));
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -938,8 +866,8 @@ static int remove_mailbox (void)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else
+ {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting mail file",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-mail-file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -1152,7 +1080,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user not found",
++ "deleting-user-not-found",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -1208,7 +1136,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ if (!fflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting user logged in",
++ "deleting-user-logged-in",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -1302,8 +1230,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else
+ {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "deleting-home-directory",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+@@ -1312,7 +1240,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (0 != errors) {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+- "deleting home directory",
++ "deleting-home-directory",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+@@ -1325,8 +1253,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to SELinux user mapping removal failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "removing SELinux user mapping",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_REMOVE, Prog,
++ "delete-selinux-user-mapping",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/usermod.c.audit-update shadow-4.8.1/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.8.1/src/usermod.c.audit-update 2020-03-17 16:53:44.370943285 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/src/usermod.c 2020-03-17 16:53:44.373943325 +0100
+@@ -457,8 +457,8 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "updating passwd",
+- user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 0);
++ "updating-password",
++ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "lock user '%s' password", user_newname));
+ strcpy (buf, "!");
+@@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "updating password",
+- user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 0);
++ "updating-password",
++ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "unlock user '%s' password", user_newname));
+ s = pw_pass;
+@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ } else if (pflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing password",
++ "updating-password",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "change user '%s' password", user_newname));
+@@ -518,8 +518,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ fail_exit (E_NAME_IN_USE);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing name",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-name",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -539,8 +539,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+
+ if (uflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing uid",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-uid",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -550,8 +550,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ }
+ if (gflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing primary group",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-primary-group",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ }
+ if (cflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing comment",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-comment",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ pwent->pw_gecos = user_newcomment;
+@@ -570,8 +570,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+
+ if (dflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-home-dir",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -581,8 +581,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ }
+ if (sflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing user shell",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-shell",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -612,8 +612,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
+
+ if (fflg) {
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing inactive days",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-inactive-days",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -629,8 +629,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
+ date_to_str (old_exp, sizeof(old_exp),
+ user_expire * DAY);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing expiration date",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "changing-expiration-date",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+@@ -713,9 +713,9 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void fail_exit (int
+ #endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "modifying account",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 0);
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "modify-account",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif
+ exit (code);
+ }
+@@ -769,9 +769,12 @@ static void update_group (void)
+ user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing group member",
+- user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (
++ AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "update-member-in-group",
++ user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ ngrp->gr_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "change '%s' to '%s' in group '%s'",
+@@ -785,9 +788,11 @@ static void update_group (void)
+ ngrp->gr_mem = del_list (ngrp->gr_mem, user_name);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "removing group member",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ ngrp->gr_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "delete '%s' from group '%s'",
+@@ -800,9 +805,11 @@ static void update_group (void)
+ ngrp->gr_mem = add_list (ngrp->gr_mem, user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "adding user to group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ ngrp->gr_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "add '%s' to group '%s'",
+ user_newname, ngrp->gr_name));
+@@ -877,9 +884,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ nsgrp->sg_adm = add_list (nsgrp->sg_adm, user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing admin name in shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_MGMT, Prog,
++ "update-admin-name-in-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, nsgrp->sg_name,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "change admin '%s' to '%s' in shadow group '%s'",
+@@ -899,9 +907,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing member in shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "update-member-in-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ nsgrp->sg_name, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "change '%s' to '%s' in shadow group '%s'",
+@@ -915,9 +924,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ nsgrp->sg_mem = del_list (nsgrp->sg_mem, user_name);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "removing user from shadow group",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "delete-user-from-shadow-group",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ nsgrp->sg_name, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "delete '%s' from shadow group '%s'",
+@@ -930,9 +940,10 @@ static void update_gshadow (void)
+ nsgrp->sg_mem = add_list (nsgrp->sg_mem, user_newname);
+ changed = true;
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "adding user to shadow group",
+- user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID, 1);
++ audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "add-user-to-shadow-group",
++ user_newname, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ nsgrp->sg_name, 1);
+ #endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "add '%s' to shadow group '%s'",
+ user_newname, nsgrp->sg_name));
+@@ -1799,8 +1810,8 @@ static void move_home (void)
+
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (uflg || gflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing home directory owner",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-home-dir-owner",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -1818,8 +1829,8 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "moving home directory",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "moving-home-dir",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid,
+ 1);
+ #endif
+@@ -1847,9 +1858,9 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ Prog, prefix_user_home);
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK,
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT,
+ Prog,
+- "moving home directory",
++ "moving-home-dir",
+ user_newname,
+ (unsigned int) user_newid,
+ 1);
+@@ -2071,8 +2082,8 @@ static void move_mailbox (void)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing mail file owner",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-mail-file-owner",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -2098,8 +2109,8 @@ static void move_mailbox (void)
+ }
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ else {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing mail file name",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-mail-file-name",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -2294,8 +2305,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "modifying User mapping ",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_ASSIGN, Prog,
++ "changing-selinux-user-mapping ",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -2307,8 +2318,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ _("%s: warning: the user name %s to SELinux user mapping removal failed.\n"),
+ Prog, user_name);
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "removing SELinux user mapping",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ROLE_REMOVE, Prog,
++ "delete-selinux-user-mapping",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+ #endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+@@ -2349,8 +2360,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ */
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (uflg || gflg) {
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+- "changing home directory owner",
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
++ "updating-home-dir-owner",
+ user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ }
+ #endif
diff --git a/shadow-4.8.1-check-local-groups.patch b/shadow-4.8.1-check-local-groups.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26608b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8.1-check-local-groups.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+From 8762f465d487a52bf68f9c0b7c3c1eb3caea7bc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: ikerexxe
+Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 09:08:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] useradd: check only local groups with -G option
+
+Check only local groups when adding new supplementary groups to a user
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1727236
+---
+ src/useradd.c | 234 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 157 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
+index 645d4a40..90210233 100644
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ static void get_defaults (void);
+ static void show_defaults (void);
+ static int set_defaults (void);
+ static int get_groups (char *);
++static struct group * get_local_group (char * grp_name);
+ static void usage (int status);
+ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *);
+
+@@ -220,7 +221,10 @@ static void grp_update (void);
+
+ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv);
+ static void close_files (void);
++static void close_group_files (void);
++static void unlock_group_files (void);
+ static void open_files (void);
++static void open_group_files (void);
+ static void open_shadow (void);
+ static void faillog_reset (uid_t);
+ static void lastlog_reset (uid_t);
+@@ -731,6 +735,11 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Open the group files
++ */
++ open_group_files ();
++
+ /*
+ * So long as there is some data to be converted, strip off
+ * each name and look it up. A mix of numerical and string
+@@ -749,7 +758,7 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
+ * Names starting with digits are treated as numerical
+ * GID values, otherwise the string is looked up as is.
+ */
+- grp = prefix_getgr_nam_gid (list);
++ grp = get_local_group (list);
+
+ /*
+ * There must be a match, either by GID value or by
+@@ -799,6 +808,9 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
+ user_groups[ngroups++] = xstrdup (grp->gr_name);
+ } while (NULL != list);
+
++ close_group_files ();
++ unlock_group_files ();
++
+ user_groups[ngroups] = (char *) 0;
+
+ /*
+@@ -811,6 +823,44 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * get_local_group - checks if a given group name exists locally
++ *
++ * get_local_group() checks if a given group name exists locally.
++ * If the name exists the group information is returned, otherwise NULL is
++ * returned.
++ */
++static struct group * get_local_group(char * grp_name)
++{
++ const struct group *grp;
++ struct group *result_grp = NULL;
++ long long int gid;
++ char *endptr;
++
++ gid = strtoll (grp_name, &endptr, 10);
++ if ( ('\0' != *grp_name)
++ && ('\0' == *endptr)
++ && (ERANGE != errno)
++ && (gid == (gid_t)gid)) {
++ grp = gr_locate_gid ((gid_t) gid);
++ }
++ else {
++ grp = gr_locate(grp_name);
++ }
++
++ if (grp != NULL) {
++ result_grp = __gr_dup (grp);
++ if (NULL == result_grp) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: Out of memory. Cannot find group '%s'.\n"),
++ Prog, grp_name);
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ }
++ }
++
++ return result_grp;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * usage - display usage message and exit
+ */
+@@ -1530,23 +1580,9 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", spw_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ }
+- if (do_grp_update) {
+- if (gr_close () == 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", gr_dbname ()));
+- fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+- }
+-#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+- if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_close () == 0)) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
+- Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+- fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+- }
+-#endif
+- }
++
++ close_group_files ();
++
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+ if (is_sub_uid && (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+@@ -1587,34 +1623,9 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ pw_locked = false;
+- if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking-group-file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+- /* continue */
+- }
+- gr_locked = false;
+-#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+- if (is_shadow_grp) {
+- if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
+-#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+- audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+- "unlocking-gshadow-file",
+- user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+- SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+-#endif
+- /* continue */
+- }
+- sgr_locked = false;
+- }
+-#endif
++
++ unlock_group_files ();
++
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+@@ -1647,6 +1658,71 @@ static void close_files (void)
+ #endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ }
+
++/*
++ * close_group_files - close all of the files that were opened
++ *
++ * close_group_files() closes all of the files that were opened related
++ * with groups. This causes any modified entries to be written out.
++ */
++static void close_group_files (void)
++{
++ if (do_grp_update) {
++ if (gr_close () == 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", gr_dbname ()));
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ }
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_close () == 0)) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
++ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sgr_dbname ()));
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ }
++#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
++ }
++}
++
++/*
++ * unlock_group_files - unlock all of the files that were locked
++ *
++ * unlock_group_files() unlocks all of the files that were locked related
++ * with groups. This causes any modified entries to be written out.
++ */
++static void unlock_group_files (void)
++{
++ if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
++ "unlocking-group-file",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
++ /* continue */
++ }
++ gr_locked = false;
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ if (is_shadow_grp) {
++ if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sgr_dbname ());
++ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
++ "unlocking-gshadow-file",
++ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
++ /* continue */
++ }
++ sgr_locked = false;
++ }
++#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
++}
++
+ /*
+ * open_files - lock and open the password files
+ *
+@@ -1668,37 +1744,8 @@ static void open_files (void)
+
+ /* shadow file will be opened by open_shadow(); */
+
+- /*
+- * Lock and open the group file.
+- */
+- if (gr_lock () == 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+- Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+- }
+- gr_locked = true;
+- if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
+- fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+- }
+-#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+- if (is_shadow_grp) {
+- if (sgr_lock () == 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+- Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+- }
+- sgr_locked = true;
+- if (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
+- fprintf (stderr,
+- _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+- Prog, sgr_dbname ());
+- fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+- }
+- }
+-#endif
++ open_group_files ();
++
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
+@@ -1733,6 +1780,39 @@ static void open_files (void)
+ #endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ }
+
++static void open_group_files (void)
++{
++ if (gr_lock () == 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++ Prog, gr_dbname ());
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ }
++ gr_locked = true;
++ if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ }
++
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++ if (is_shadow_grp) {
++ if (sgr_lock () == 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ }
++ sgr_locked = true;
++ if (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
++ fprintf (stderr,
++ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
++ Prog, sgr_dbname ());
++ fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
++ }
++ }
++#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
++}
++
+ static void open_shadow (void)
+ {
+ if (!is_shadow_pwd) {
+--
+2.25.4
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.8.1-commonio-force-lock-file-sync.patch b/shadow-4.8.1-commonio-force-lock-file-sync.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ca7b53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8.1-commonio-force-lock-file-sync.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From fb0f702cbf958a5ee9097c1611212c9880b347ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: ikerexxe
+Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 17:08:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] commonio: force lock file sync
+
+lib/commonio.c: after writing to the lock file, force a file sync to
+the storage system.
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1862056
+---
+ lib/commonio.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/commonio.c b/lib/commonio.c
+index 16fa7e75..c5b3d104 100644
+--- a/lib/commonio.c
++++ b/lib/commonio.c
+@@ -157,7 +157,17 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
+ if (write (fd, buf, (size_t) len) != len) {
+ if (log) {
+ (void) fprintf (stderr,
+- "%s: %s: %s\n",
++ "%s: %s file write error: %s\n",
++ Prog, file, strerror (errno));
++ }
++ (void) close (fd);
++ unlink (file);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ if (fdatasync (fd) == -1) {
++ if (log) {
++ (void) fprintf (stderr,
++ "%s: %s file sync error: %s\n",
+ Prog, file, strerror (errno));
+ }
+ (void) close (fd);
+--
+2.26.2
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.8.1-man-include-lastlog-file-caveat.patch b/shadow-4.8.1-man-include-lastlog-file-caveat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7be60c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8.1-man-include-lastlog-file-caveat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From df6ec1d1693c8c80c323b40d6fc82bb549363db3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Iker Pedrosa
+Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 05:26:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] man: include lastlog file caveat (#313)
+
+man/lastlog.8.xml: add another point to the caveats section regarding
+the handling of the lastlog file by external tools.
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=951564
+---
+ man/lastlog.8.xml | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/man/lastlog.8.xml b/man/lastlog.8.xml
+index fc096c8f..7e68282f 100644
+--- a/man/lastlog.8.xml
++++ b/man/lastlog.8.xml
+@@ -233,5 +233,12 @@
+ is no entries for users with UID between 170 and 800 lastlog will appear
+ to hang as it processes entries with UIDs 171-799).
+
++
++ Having high UIDs can create problems when handling the
++ /var/log/lastlog with external tools. Although the
++ actual file is sparse and does not use too much space, certain
++ applications are not designed to identify sparse files by default and may
++ require a specific option to handle them.
++
+
+
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/shadow-4.8.1-manfix.patch b/shadow-4.8.1-manfix.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29f06a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8.1-manfix.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/chage.1.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/chage.1.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/chage.1.xml.manfix 2019-10-05 01:28:34.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/chage.1.xml 2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
+@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@
+ Set the number of days since January 1st, 1970 when the password
+ was last changed. The date may also be expressed in the format
+ YYYY-MM-DD (or the format more commonly used in your area).
++ If the LAST_DAY is set to
++ 0 the user is forced to change his password
++ on the next log on.
+
+
+
+@@ -119,6 +122,13 @@
+ system again.
+
+
++ For example the following can be used to set an account to expire
++ in 180 days:
++
++
++ chage -E $(date -d +180days +%Y-%m-%d)
++
++
+ Passing the number -1 as the
+ EXPIRE_DATE will remove an account
+ expiration date.
+@@ -239,6 +249,18 @@
+ The chage program requires a shadow password file to
+ be available.
+
++
++ The chage program will report only the information from the shadow
++ password file. This implies that configuration from other sources
++ (e.g. LDAP or empty password hash field from the passwd file) that
++ affect the user's login will not be shown in the chage output.
++
++
++ The chage program will also not report any
++ inconsistency between the shadow and passwd files (e.g. missing x in
++ the passwd file). The pwck can be used to check
++ for this kind of inconsistencies.
++
+ The chage command is restricted to the root
+ user, except for the option, which may be used by
+ an unprivileged user to determine when their password or account is due
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/groupadd.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/groupadd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/groupadd.8.xml.manfix 2020-03-17 15:34:48.745414917 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/groupadd.8.xml 2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
+@@ -320,13 +320,13 @@
+
+ 4
+
+- GID not unique (when not used)
++ GID is already used (when called without )
+
+
+
+ 9
+
+- group name not unique
++ group name is already used
+
+
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix 2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml 2020-03-17 15:41:13.383588722 +0100
+@@ -179,20 +179,10 @@
+
+ SETUP
+
+- The groupmems executable should be in mode
+- 2710 as user root and in group
+- groups. The system administrator can add users to
+- group groups to allow or disallow them using the
+- groupmems utility to manage their own group
+- membership list.
++ In this operating system the groupmems executable
++ is not setuid and regular users cannot use it to manipulate
++ the membership of their own group.
+
+-
+-
+- $ groupadd -r groups
+- $ chmod 2710 groupmems
+- $ chown root.groups groupmems
+- $ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+-
+
+
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix 2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5 2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
+@@ -147,10 +147,6 @@ 以下の参照表は、
+ shadow パスワード機能のどのプログラムが
+ どのパラメータを使用するかを示したものである。
+ .na
+-.IP chfn 12
+-CHFN_AUTH CHFN_RESTRICT
+-.IP chsh 12
+-CHFN_AUTH
+ .IP groupadd 12
+ GID_MAX GID_MIN
+ .IP newusers 12
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix 2020-01-17 16:47:56.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml 2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
+@@ -164,6 +164,17 @@
+ long numeric parameters is machine-dependent.
+
+
++
++ Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
++ behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
++ tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
++ passwd command) should be configured elsewhere. The only values that
++ affect PAM modules are ENCRYPT_METHOD and SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
++ for pam_unix module, FAIL_DELAY for pam_faildelay module,
++ and UMASK for pam_umask module. Refer to
++ pam(8) for more information.
++
++
+ The following configuration items are provided:
+
+
+@@ -256,16 +267,6 @@
+
+
+
+- chfn
+-
+-
+- CHFN_AUTH
+- CHFN_RESTRICT
+- LOGIN_STRING
+-
+-
+-
+-
+ chgpasswd
+
+
+@@ -286,14 +287,6 @@
+
+
+
+-
+- chsh
+-
+-
+- CHSH_AUTH LOGIN_STRING
+-
+-
+-
+
+
+
+@@ -359,34 +352,6 @@
+ LASTLOG_UID_MAX
+
+
+-
+- login
+-
+-
+- CONSOLE
+- CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+- ENV_HZ ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+- ENV_TZ ENVIRON_FILE
+- ERASECHAR FAIL_DELAY
+- FAILLOG_ENAB
+- FAKE_SHELL
+- FTMP_FILE
+- HUSHLOGIN_FILE
+- ISSUE_FILE
+- KILLCHAR
+- LASTLOG_ENAB LASTLOG_UID_MAX
+- LOGIN_RETRIES
+- LOGIN_STRING
+- LOGIN_TIMEOUT LOG_OK_LOGINS LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+- MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE
+- MOTD_FILE NOLOGINS_FILE PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+- QUOTAS_ENAB
+- TTYGROUP TTYPERM TTYTYPE_FILE
+- ULIMIT UMASK
+- USERGROUPS_ENAB
+-
+-
+-
+
+
+ newgrp / sg
+@@ -415,17 +380,6 @@
+
+
+
+-
+- passwd
+-
+-
+- ENCRYPT_METHOD MD5_CRYPT_ENAB OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
+- PASS_ALWAYS_WARN PASS_CHANGE_TRIES PASS_MAX_LEN PASS_MIN_LEN
+- SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
+- SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS
+-
+-
+-
+
+ pwck
+
+@@ -452,32 +406,6 @@
+
+
+
+-
+- su
+-
+-
+- CONSOLE
+- CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+- ENV_HZ ENVIRON_FILE
+- ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+- ENV_TZ LOGIN_STRING MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+- MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE QUOTAS_ENAB
+- SULOG_FILE SU_NAME
+- SU_WHEEL_ONLY
+- SYSLOG_SU_ENAB
+- USERGROUPS_ENAB
+-
+-
+-
+-
+- sulogin
+-
+-
+- ENV_HZ
+- ENV_TZ
+-
+-
+-
+
+ useradd
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/shadow.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/shadow.5.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/shadow.5.xml.manfix 2019-12-01 17:52:32.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/shadow.5.xml 2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
+
+
+ The date of the last password change, expressed as the number
+- of days since Jan 1, 1970.
++ of days since Jan 1, 1970 00:00 UTC.
+
+
+ The value 0 has a special meaning, which is that the user
+@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@
+
+
+ After expiration of the password and this expiration period is
+- elapsed, no login is possible using the current user's
+- password. The user should contact her administrator.
++ elapsed, no login is possible for the user.
++ The user should contact her administrator.
+
+
+ An empty field means that there are no enforcement of an
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
+
+
+ The date of expiration of the account, expressed as the number
+- of days since Jan 1, 1970.
++ of days since Jan 1, 1970 00:00 UTC.
+
+
+ Note that an account expiration differs from a password
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/useradd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix 2020-03-17 15:34:48.745414917 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/useradd.8.xml 2020-03-17 15:34:48.751414997 +0100
+@@ -359,6 +359,11 @@
+ is not enabled, no home
+ directories are created.
+
++
++ The directory where the user's home directory is created must
++ exist and have proper SELinux context and permissions. Otherwise
++ the user's home directory cannot be created or accessed.
++
+
+
+
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/usermod.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/usermod.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/usermod.8.xml.manfix 2019-12-20 06:58:23.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/usermod.8.xml 2020-03-17 15:34:48.751414997 +0100
+@@ -143,7 +143,8 @@
+ If the
+ option is given, the contents of the current home directory will
+ be moved to the new home directory, which is created if it does
+- not already exist.
++ not already exist. If the current home directory does not exist
++ the new home directory will not be created.
+
+
+
+@@ -205,6 +206,12 @@
+ The group ownership of files outside of the user's home directory
+ must be fixed manually.
+
++
++ The change of the group ownership of files inside of the user's
++ home directory is also not done if the home dir owner uid is
++ different from the current or new user id. This is safety measure
++ for special home directories such as /.
++
+
+
+
+@@ -267,7 +274,8 @@
+
+
+ Move the content of the user's home directory to the new
+- location.
++ location. If the current home directory does not exist
++ the new home directory will not be created.
+
+
+ This option is only valid in combination with the
+@@ -381,6 +389,12 @@
+ must be fixed manually.
+
+
++ The change of the user ownership of files inside of the user's
++ home directory is also not done if the home dir owner uid is
++ different from the current or new user id. This is safety measure
++ for special home directories such as /.
++
++
+ No checks will be performed with regard to the
+ , ,
+ , or
diff --git a/shadow-4.8.1-useradd-man-clarification.patch b/shadow-4.8.1-useradd-man-clarification.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fdb652
--- /dev/null
+++ b/shadow-4.8.1-useradd-man-clarification.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 6543c600d841e4f7779269412d470e50eae25b13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: ikerexxe
+Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2020 14:50:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] useradd: clarify the useradd -d parameter behavior in man
+ page
+
+Explanation: clarify the useradd -d parameter as it does create directory HOME_DIR if it doesn't exit.
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1677005
+
+Changelog: [serge] minor tweak to the text
+---
+ man/useradd.8.xml | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/useradd.8.xml b/man/useradd.8.xml
+index 03612ce8..023c0d69 100644
+--- a/man/useradd.8.xml
++++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -181,8 +181,10 @@
+ login directory. The default is to append the
+ LOGIN name to
+ BASE_DIR and use that as the login
+- directory name. The directory HOME_DIR
+- does not have to exist but will not be created if it is missing.
++ directory name. If the directory
++ HOME_DIR does not exist, then it
++ will be created unless the option is
++ specified.
+
+
+
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/shadow-utils.login.defs b/shadow-utils.login.defs
index e84c7ab..7f1c0e4 100644
--- a/shadow-utils.login.defs
+++ b/shadow-utils.login.defs
@@ -130,9 +130,10 @@ HOME_MODE 0700
#
PASS_MAX_DAYS 99999
PASS_MIN_DAYS 0
-PASS_MIN_LEN 8
PASS_WARN_AGE 7
+# Currently PASS_MIN_LEN is not supported
+
# Currently SU_WHEEL_ONLY is not supported
# Currently CRACKLIB_DICTPATH is not supported
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ UID_MAX 60000
SYS_UID_MIN 201
SYS_UID_MAX 999
# Extra per user uids
-SUB_UID_MIN 524288
+SUB_UID_MIN 100000
SUB_UID_MAX 600100000
SUB_UID_COUNT 65536
@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ GID_MAX 60000
SYS_GID_MIN 201
SYS_GID_MAX 999
# Extra per user group ids
-SUB_GID_MIN 524288
+SUB_GID_MIN 100000
SUB_GID_MAX 600100000
SUB_GID_COUNT 65536
@@ -173,22 +174,11 @@ SUB_GID_COUNT 65536
#
#LOGIN_TIMEOUT 60
-#
-# Maximum number of attempts to change password if rejected (too easy)
-#
-PASS_CHANGE_TRIES 5
+# Currently PASS_CHANGE_TRIES is not supported
-#
-# Warn about weak passwords (but still allow them) if you are root.
-#
-PASS_ALWAYS_WARN yes
+# Currently PASS_ALWAYS_WARN is not supported
-#
-# Number of significant characters in the password for crypt().
-# Default is 8, don't change unless your crypt() is better.
-# Ignored if MD5_CRYPT_ENAB set to "yes".
-#
-#PASS_MAX_LEN 8
+# Currently PASS_MAX_LEN is not supported
# Currently CHFN_AUTH is not supported
@@ -208,11 +198,10 @@ PASS_ALWAYS_WARN yes
# If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-# If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-# If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to BLOWFISH, BLOWFISH-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
#
-ENCRYPT_METHOD YESCRYPT
+ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
#
# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
@@ -229,33 +218,7 @@ ENCRYPT_METHOD YESCRYPT
# Currently SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS is not supported
-#
-# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to BCRYPT.
-#
-# Define the number of BCRYPT rounds.
-# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
-# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
-# this value is increased.
-#
-# If not specified, 13 rounds will be attempted.
-# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
-# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
-#
-#BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 13
-#BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 31
-
-#
-# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
-#
-# Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
-# With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
-# However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
-# if this value is increased.
-#
-# If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
-# The value must be within the 1-11 range.
-#
-#YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5
+# Currently BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS and BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS are not supported
# Currently CONSOLE_GROUPS is not supported
@@ -303,13 +266,3 @@ CREATE_HOME yes
# missing.
#
#FORCE_SHADOW yes
-
-#
-# Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
-# Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
-# authentication code.
-#
-# Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
-# that are available in your system.
-#
-HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512
diff --git a/shadow-utils.spec b/shadow-utils.spec
index 7bc7e8b..a317e27 100644
--- a/shadow-utils.spec
+++ b/shadow-utils.spec
@@ -1,74 +1,80 @@
Summary: Utilities for managing accounts and shadow password files
Name: shadow-utils
-Version: 4.20.0
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Version: 4.8.1
+Release: 7%{?dist}
Epoch: 2
-License: BSD-3-Clause AND GPL-2.0-or-later
-URL: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
-Source0: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/4.20.0/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz
-Source1: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/4.20.0/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz.asc
+URL: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
+Source0: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/%{version}/shadow-%{version}.tar.xz
+Source1: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/%{version}/shadow-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
Source2: shadow-utils.useradd
Source3: shadow-utils.login.defs
Source4: shadow-bsd.txt
Source5: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.txt
Source6: shadow-utils.HOME_MODE.xml
-Source7: passwd.pamd
+# Misc small changes - most probably non-upstreamable
+Patch0: shadow-4.6-redhat.patch
+# Be more lenient with acceptable user/group names - non upstreamable
+Patch1: shadow-4.8-goodname.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/7384865775b0203b9cf5337a047744f0a4555868
+Patch2: shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
+# Misc SElinux related changes - upstreamability unknown
+Patch6: shadow-4.8-selinux.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/a8361e741040cd926c9c93aac89820052531b1a3
+Patch11: shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
+# SElinux related - upstreamability unknown
+Patch14: shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
+# Misc manual page changes
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/c0818ab01d1896784245eedec9495e1e6e0260af
+# Changes in man/groupmems.8.xml, man/ja/man5/login.defs.5 and man/login.defs.5.xml not upstreamed
+Patch15: shadow-4.8.1-manfix.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/f4cbf38ad7801bab6fae50e9b5a2effc3c48a1ea
+Patch17: shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
+# Date parsing improvement - could be upstreamed
+Patch19: shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch
+# Additional error message - could be upstreamed
+Patch21: shadow-4.6-move-home.patch
+# Audit message changes - upstreamability unknown
+Patch22: shadow-4.8.1-audit-update.patch
+# Changes related to password unlocking - could be upstreamed
+Patch23: shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch
+# Additional SElinux related changes - upstreamability unknown
+Patch28: shadow-4.8-selinux-perms.patch
+# Handle NULL return from *time funcs - could be upstreamed
+Patch29: shadow-4.2.1-null-tm.patch
+# SElinux related - upstreamability unknown
+Patch31: shadow-4.6-getenforce.patch
+# Handle include of crypt.h - could be upstreamed
+Patch32: shadow-4.8-crypt_h.patch
+# Handle /etc/passwd corruption - could be upstreamed
+Patch33: shadow-4.8-long-entry.patch
+# Limit uid/gid allocation to non-zero - could be upstreamed
+Patch38: shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch
+# Ignore LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT in login.defs - upstreamability unknown
+Patch40: shadow-4.8-ignore-login-prompt.patch
+# Generate /var/spool/mail/$USER with the proper SELinux user identity - already upstreamed
+Patch42: shadow-4.8-useradd-selinux-mail.patch
+# Clarify useradd man regarding "-d" parameter - already upstreamed
+Patch43: shadow-4.8.1-useradd-man-clarification.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/8762f465d487a52bf68f9c0b7c3c1eb3caea7bc9
+Patch44: shadow-4.8.1-check-local-groups.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/599cc003daf833bffdc9cbe0d33dc8b3e7ec74c8
+Patch45: shadow-4.8.1-commonio-force-lock-file-sync.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/df6ec1d1693c8c80c323b40d6fc82bb549363db3
+Patch46: shadow-4.8.1-man-include-lastlog-file-caveat.patch
-### Globals ###
-%global includesubiddir %{_includedir}/shadow
-# Fail linking if there are undefined symbols.
-%global _ld_strict_symbol_defs 1
-
-### Patches ###
-
-### Dependencies ###
-Requires: audit-libs >= 1.6.5
-Requires: libselinux >= 1.25.2-1
-Requires: pam-libs
-Requires: setup
-
-### Build Dependencies ###
-BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 1.6.5
-BuildRequires: autoconf
-BuildRequires: automake
-BuildRequires: bison
-BuildRequires: docbook-dtds
-BuildRequires: docbook-style-xsl
-BuildRequires: flex
+License: BSD and GPLv2+
BuildRequires: gcc
-BuildRequires: gettext-devel
-BuildRequires: git
-BuildRequires: itstool
-BuildRequires: libacl-devel
-BuildRequires: libattr-devel
-BuildRequires: libcmocka-devel
-BuildRequires: libeconf-devel
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.25.2-1
+BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 1.6.5
BuildRequires: libsemanage-devel
-BuildRequires: libtool
-BuildRequires: libxcrypt-devel
-BuildRequires: libxslt
-BuildRequires: make
-BuildRequires: pam
-BuildRequires: pam-devel
-
-### Provides ###
+BuildRequires: libacl-devel, libattr-devel
+BuildRequires: bison, flex, docbook-style-xsl, docbook-dtds
+BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, libtool, gettext-devel
+BuildRequires: /usr/bin/xsltproc, /usr/bin/itstool
+Requires: libselinux >= 1.25.2-1
+Requires: audit-libs >= 1.6.5
+Requires: setup
Provides: shadow = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
-Provides: passwd = 0.80-18
-Obsoletes: passwd <= 0.80-19
-
-%if "%{_sbindir}" == "%{_bindir}"
-# Compat symlinks for Requires in other packages.
-# We rely on filesystem to create the symlinks for us.
-Requires: filesystem(unmerged-sbin-symlinks)
-Provides: /usr/sbin/adduser
-Provides: /usr/sbin/useradd
-Provides: /usr/sbin/userdel
-Provides: /usr/sbin/usermod
-Provides: /usr/sbin/groupadd
-Provides: /usr/sbin/groupdel
-Provides: /usr/sbin/groupmod
-%endif
%description
The shadow-utils package includes the necessary programs for
@@ -77,28 +83,37 @@ programs for managing user and group accounts. The pwconv command
converts passwords to the shadow password format. The pwunconv command
unconverts shadow passwords and generates a passwd file (a standard
UNIX password file). The pwck command checks the integrity of password
-and shadow files. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used
-for managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod
-commands are used for managing group accounts.
-
-
-### Subpackages ###
-%package subid
-Summary: A library to manage subordinate uid and gid ranges
-
-%description subid
-Utility library that provides a way to manage subid ranges.
-
-
-%package subid-devel
-Summary: Development package for shadow-utils-subid
-Requires: shadow-utils-subid = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
-
-%description subid-devel
-Development files for shadow-utils-subid.
+and shadow files. The lastlog command prints out the last login times
+for all users. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used for
+managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod commands
+are used for managing group accounts.
%prep
-%autosetup -p 1 -S git -n shadow-4.20.0
+%setup -q -n shadow-%{version}
+%patch0 -p1 -b .redhat
+%patch1 -p1 -b .goodname
+%patch2 -p1 -b .info-parent-dir
+%patch6 -p1 -b .selinux
+%patch11 -p1 -b .logmsg
+%patch14 -p1 -b .default-range
+%patch15 -p1 -b .manfix
+%patch17 -p1 -b .userdel
+%patch19 -p1 -b .date-parsing
+%patch21 -p1 -b .move-home
+%patch22 -p1 -b .audit-update
+%patch23 -p1 -b .unlock
+%patch28 -p1 -b .selinux-perms
+%patch29 -p1 -b .null-tm
+%patch31 -p1 -b .getenforce
+%patch32 -p1 -b .crypt_h
+%patch33 -p1 -b .long-entry
+%patch38 -p1 -b .sysugid-min-limit
+%patch40 -p1 -b .login-prompt
+%patch42 -p1 -b .useradd-selinux-mail
+%patch43 -p1 -b .useradd-man-clarification
+%patch44 -p1 -b .check-local-groups
+%patch45 -p1 -b .commonio-force-lock-file-sync
+%patch46 -p1 -b .man-include-lastlog-file-caveat
iconv -f ISO88591 -t utf-8 doc/HOWTO > doc/HOWTO.utf8
cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
@@ -106,83 +121,93 @@ cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
cp -a %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE5} .
cp -a %{SOURCE6} man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
+# Force regeneration of getdate.c
+rm libmisc/getdate.c
+
%build
+%ifarch sparc64
+#sparc64 need big PIE
+export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fPIE"
+export LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now"
+%else
+export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fpie"
+export LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now"
+%endif
+
autoreconf
%configure \
- --disable-account-tools-setuid \
- --enable-logind=no \
- --enable-man \
--enable-shadowgrp \
- --enable-shared \
+ --enable-man \
--with-audit \
- --with-bcrypt \
- --with-group-name-max-length=32 \
- --with-libpam \
- --with-selinux \
--with-sha-crypt \
- --with-yescrypt \
- --without-libbsd \
+ --with-selinux \
--without-libcrack \
- --without-nscd \
- --without-sssd
+ --without-libpam \
+ --disable-shared \
+ --with-group-name-max-length=32
%make_build
-%check
-make check
-
%install
-%make_install gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
-install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default
-install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
-install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
-install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chpasswd
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/newusers
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/passwd
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+%make_install gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
+install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default
+install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
+install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
ln -s useradd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/adduser
-ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
-for subdir in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/{??,??_??,??_??.*}/man* ; do
+ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
+for subdir in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/{??,??_??,??_??.*}/man* ; do
test -d $subdir && test -e $subdir/useradd.8 && echo ".so man8/useradd.8" > $subdir/adduser.8
done
-%if "%{_sbindir}" == "%{_bindir}"
-# The installation script doesn't actually use the configured paths :(
-mv -v $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/* $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/
-%endif
-
# Remove binaries we don't use.
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chfn
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chsh
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/login
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/su
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/faillog
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/nologin
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man3/getspnam.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
-
-# Remove PAM service files we don't use.
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chfn
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chsh
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/login
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/su
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chfn
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chsh
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/expiry
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/groups
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/login
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/passwd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/su
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/faillog
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.access
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/limits
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/logoutd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/nologin
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/limits.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/limits.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/login.access.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/login.access.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/porttime.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/porttime.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
find $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir} -depth -type d -empty -delete
%find_lang shadow
@@ -194,30 +219,19 @@ for dir in $(ls -1d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/{??,??_??}) ; do
echo "%%lang($lang) $dir/man*/*" >> shadow.lang
done
-# Move header files to its own folder
-echo $(ls)
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{includesubiddir}
-install -m 644 libsubid/subid.h $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{includesubiddir}/
-
-# Remove .la and .a files created by libsubid
-rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
-rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
-
%files -f shadow.lang
%doc NEWS doc/HOWTO README
+%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
%license gpl-2.0.txt shadow-bsd.txt
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
-%config(noreplace) %{_pam_confdir}/chpasswd
-%config(noreplace) %{_pam_confdir}/newusers
-%config(noreplace) %{_pam_confdir}/passwd
%{_bindir}/sg
%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/chage
%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gpasswd
+%{_bindir}/lastlog
%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/newgrp
%attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setgid=ep) %{_bindir}/newgidmap
%attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setuid=ep) %{_bindir}/newuidmap
-%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/passwd
%{_sbindir}/adduser
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/user*
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/group*
@@ -235,7 +249,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
%{_mandir}/man1/newgrp.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/newgidmap.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/newuidmap.1*
-%{_mandir}/man1/passwd.*
%{_mandir}/man3/shadow.3*
%{_mandir}/man5/shadow.5*
%{_mandir}/man5/login.defs.5*
@@ -251,336 +264,21 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
%{_mandir}/man8/chgpasswd.8*
%{_mandir}/man8/newusers.8*
%{_mandir}/man8/*conv.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/lastlog.8*
%{_mandir}/man8/vipw.8*
%{_mandir}/man8/vigr.8*
-%files subid
-%{_libdir}/libsubid.so.*
-%{_bindir}/getsubids
-%{_mandir}/man1/getsubids.1*
-
-%files subid-devel
-%{includesubiddir}/subid.h
-%{_libdir}/libsubid.so
-
%changelog
-* Wed Jul 29 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.20.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.20.0
+* Mon Aug 16 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-7
+- allow all types of groups when modifying supplementary groups (#1975327)
-* Wed Jul 22 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.20.0-rc3-1
-- Rebase to version 4.20.0-rc3
-
-* Fri Jul 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.19.3-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Wed May 27 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.19.3-3
-- Enable use of PAM for chpasswd and newusers
- Resolves: #2461179 and #2283963
-
-* Thu Apr 23 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.19.3-2
-- btrfs: simplify checks improve useradd behavior for non-btrfs
-
-* Wed Feb 11 2026 Debarshi Ray - 2:4.19.3-1
-- Rebase to version 4.19.3
- Resolves: #2426288
-
-* Tue Jan 27 2026 Adam Williamson - 2:4.19.0-6
-- chkhash.c: fix escaping in SHA-256 / SHA-512 / MD5 regexes
-
-* Mon Jan 26 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.19.0-5
-- chkhash.c: fix support for ! and * in hashes
-- usermod.c: add back optimizations
-
-* Sat Jan 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.19.0-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_44_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Mon Jan 12 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.19.0-3
-- useradd: Support config for creating home dirs as Btrfs subvolumes
-
-* Fri Jan 9 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.19.0-2
-- Enable unit-tests
-
-* Fri Jan 9 2026 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.19.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.19.0
- Resolves: #2426288 and #2249524
-
-* Tue Nov 25 2025 Adam Williamson - 2:4.18.0-7
-- Also revert changes from -4 (last known good was -3)
-
-* Tue Nov 25 2025 Adam Williamson - 2:4.18.0-6
-- Revert changes from -5 (they were only meant for testing)
-
-* Tue Nov 25 2025 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.18.0-5
-- Test CI
-
-* Fri Oct 31 2025 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.18.0-4
-- Stop setting SELinux labels in chroot and prefix environments
- Resolves: #2249524
-
-* Tue Jul 29 2025 Alexey Tikhonov - 2:4.18.0-3
-- Revert "Stop assigning subids by default"
- Resolves: #2382662
-
-* Fri Jul 25 2025 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.18.0-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jul 22 2025 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.18.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.18.0. Resolves: #2374710
-
-* Fri Jul 18 2025 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.17.4-5
-- Stop assigning subids by default
- Resolves: CVE-2024-56433 and #2334168
-
-* Tue Jul 15 2025 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.17.4-4
-- FSWC: Migrate to lastlog2
- Link:
- Resolves: #2361588
-
-* Tue Mar 25 2025 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.17.4-2
-- Add pam dependency for _pam_confdir missing macro. Resolves: #2354806
-
-* Thu Mar 20 2025 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.17.4-1
-- Rebase to version 4.17.4. Resolves: #2353491
-- Fixes problems with expiration dates
-
-* Sat Feb 01 2025 Björn Esser - 2:4.17.0-5
-- Add explicit BR: libxcrypt-devel
-
-* Sun Jan 19 2025 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.17.0-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Sun Jan 12 2025 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek - 2:4.17.0-3
-- Rebuilt for the bin-sbin merge (2nd attempt)
-
-* Thu Dec 26 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.17.0
-- Rebase to version 4.17.0. Resolves: #2293678
-
-* Sun Dec 22 2024 Björn Esser - 2:4.17.0~rc1-2
-- Remove potentially dangerous {C,LD}FLAGS shenanigans
-- Fail linking if there are undefined symbols at link-time
-
-* Mon Dec 9 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.17.0~rc1-1
-- Rebase to version 4.17.0-rc1
-
-* Tue Nov 12 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.16.0-7
-- SPDX license migration for subpackages
-
-* Wed Oct 16 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.16.0-6
-- Rebuilt for libeconf soname bump
-
-* Mon Oct 7 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.16.0-5
-- useradd: fix write_full() return value. Resolves: #2313559
-
-* Fri Sep 13 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.16.0-3
-- Disable nscd
-
-* Wed Aug 28 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.16.0-2
-- Rebase to version 4.16.0 (#2293678)
-
-* Tue Jul 23 2024 Kevin Fenzi - 2:4.15.1-9
-- Revert chpasswd: use PAM again for now.
-
-* Sat Jul 20 2024 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.15.1-8
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jul 09 2024 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek - 2:4.15.1-7
-- Rebuilt for the bin-sbin merge
-
-* Thu May 30 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.15.1-6
-- chpasswd: use PAM again (#2283963)
-
-* Mon May 20 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.15.1-5
-- Several fixes for issues detected by static analyzer tools
-
-* Thu Apr 11 2024 Zbigniew Jedrzejewski-Szmek - 2:4.15.1-4
-- Fix build with %%_bindir==%%_sbindir
-- Add virtual Provides for old file paths used by other packages
-
-* Thu Mar 21 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.15.1-2
-- getdef: avoid spurious error messages about unknown configuration options.
- Resolves: #2265291
-
-* Tue Mar 12 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.15.1-1
-- Wrong versioning for 4.15.0 RC releases makes the oficial release look lower than them.
- Fix it by bumping the minor release to 4.15.1. Resolves: #2268690
-
-* Mon Mar 11 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.15.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.15.0
-
-* Mon Feb 12 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.14.0-6
-- Build linking `libpam`
-
-* Thu Feb 1 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.14.0-5
-- passwd: Provide binary from this package. Enable libpam and
- disable account-tools-setuid. Provide passwd PAM service file.
- Resolves: #2233275
-- passwd: provide --stdin option
-
-* Mon Jan 29 2024 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.14.0-4
-- Disable SSSD support. Resolves: #2253182
-
-* Sat Jan 27 2024 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.14.0-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Oct 3 2023 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.14.0-2
-- useradd: Set proper SELinux labels for def_usrtemplate
-
-* Wed Aug 16 2023 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.14.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.14.0. Resolves: #2229000
-
-* Sat Jul 22 2023 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.13-8
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_39_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jun 06 2023 Yaakov Selkowitz - 2:4.13-7
-- Remove unused libbsd-devel dependency
-
-* Mon Mar 6 2023 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.13-6
-- Add libbsd-devel and libeconf-devel as build dependencies
-
-* Thu Mar 2 2023 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.13-5
-- newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd. Resolves: #2174752
-
-* Sat Jan 21 2023 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.13-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Wed Nov 23 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.13-3
-- Change SUB_UID_MIN and SUB_GID_MIN to 524288. Resolves: #2144558
-
-* Mon Nov 21 2022 Florian Weimer - 2:4.13-2
-- Fix gshadow configure check (switching to glibc implementation)
-
-* Wed Nov 9 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.13-1
-- Rebase to version 4.13
-- SPDX license migration
-
-* Wed Oct 5 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.12.3-3
-- chage: Fix regression in print_date. Resolves: #2129336
-
-* Fri Sep 9 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.12.3-2
-- useradd: Do not reset non-existent data in {last,fail}log
-
-* Mon Aug 22 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.12.3-1
-- Rebase to version 4.12.3. Resolves: #2117809
-
-* Mon Aug 1 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.11.1-4
-- useradd: modify check ID range for system users. Resolves: #2093692
-
-* Sat Jul 23 2022 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.11.1-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Thu Feb 10 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.11.1-2
-- Fix explicit subid requirement for subid-devel
-
-* Tue Jan 25 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.11.1-1
-- Rebase to version 4.11.1 (#2034038)
-- Fix release sources
-- Add explicit subid requirement for subid-devel
-
-* Sat Jan 22 2022 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.9-10
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Mon Jan 17 2022 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-9
-- nss: get shadow_logfd with log_get_logfd() (#2038811)
-- lib: make shadow_logfd and Prog not extern
-- lib: rename Prog to shadow_progname
-- lib: provide default values for shadow_progname
-- libsubid: use log_set_progname in subid_init
-
-* Fri Nov 19 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-8
-- getsubids: provide system binary and man page (#1980780)
-- pwck: fix segfault when calling fprintf() (#2021339)
-- newgrp: fix segmentation fault (#2019553)
-- groupdel: fix SIGSEGV when passwd does not exist (#1986111)
-
-* Fri Nov 12 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-7
-- useradd: change SELinux labels for home files (#2022658)
-
-* Thu Nov 4 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-6
-- useradd: revert fix memleak of grp (#2018697)
-
-* Wed Oct 27 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-5
-- useradd: generate home and mail directories with selinux user attribute
-
-* Thu Sep 23 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-4
-- login.defs: include HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO key
-- Clean spec file: organize dependencies and move License location
-
-* Tue Aug 17 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-3
-- libmisc: fix default value in SHA_get_salt_rounds()
-
-* Mon Aug 9 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-2
-- useradd: avoid generating an empty subid range (#1990653)
-
-* Wed Aug 4 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.9-1
-- Rebase to version 4.9
-- usermod: allow all group types with -G option (#1975327)
-- Clean spec file
-
-* Fri Jul 23 2021 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.8.1-20
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Wed Jul 14 2021 Björn Esser - 2:4.8.1-19
-- Add patch to fix 'fread returns element count, not element size'
-
-* Wed Jul 14 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-18
-- Fix regression issues detected in rhbz#667593 and rhbz#672510
-
-* Mon Jul 12 2021 Björn Esser - 2:4.8.1-17
-- Enable bcrypt support, as libxcrypt supports it well
-
-* Sun Jul 04 2021 Björn Esser - 2:4.8.1-16
-- Add a patch to obtain random bytes using getentropy()
-- Update shadow-4.8-crypt_h.patch with the upstreamed version
-- Add a patch to make use of crypt_gensalt() from libxcrypt
-
-* Tue Jun 29 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-15
-- useradd: free correct pointer (#1976809)
-
-* Mon Jun 28 2021 Björn Esser - 2:4.8.1-14
-- Add a patch to fix the used prefix for the bcrypt hash method
-- Add a patch to cleanup the code in libmisc/salt.c
-- Add a patch adding some clarifying comments in libmisc/salt.c
-- Add a patch to obtain random bytes from /dev/urandom
-
-* Mon Jun 28 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-13
-- Covscan fixes
-
-* Mon Jun 21 2021 Björn Esser - 2:4.8.1-12
-- Backport support for yescrypt hash method
-- Add a patch to fix the parameter type of YESCRYPT_salt_cost()
-
-* Mon Jun 21 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-11
-- libsubid: don't print error messages on stderr by default
-- libsubid: libsubid_init return false if out of memory
-- useradd: fix SUB_UID_COUNT=0
-- libsubid: don't return owner in list_owner_ranges API call
-- libsubid: libsubid_init don't print messages on error
-- libsubid: fix newusers when nss provides subids
-- man: clarify subid delegation
-- libsubid: make shadow_logfd not extern
-
-* Thu May 6 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-10
-- man: mention NSS in new[ug]idmap manpages
-- libsubid: move development header to shadow folder
-
-* Fri Apr 16 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-9
-- libsubid: creation and nsswitch support
-- Creation of subid and subid-devel subpackages
-
-* Mon Mar 29 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-8
+* Mon Apr 26 2021 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-6
- man: include lastlog file caveat (#951564)
- Upstream links to several patches
-- Spec file cleanup by Robert Scheck
-- Add BuildRequires: make by Tom Stellard
-* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.8.1-7
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Mon Nov 9 2020 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-6
+* Mon Nov 16 2020 Iker Pedrosa - 2:4.8.1-5
- commonio: force lock file sync (#1862056)
-
-* Tue Nov 3 2020 Petr Lautrbach - 2:4.8.1-5
-- Rebuild with libsemanage.so.2
+- spec: add Provides keyword
* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering - 2:4.8.1-4
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index 7669083..0e0c57a 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SHA512 (shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz) = 0b8afded372e4d37a78f38cb972c0ab877870ef6356cdd1c45be3c708af3d1496c6f87de6bf6a5b1d217d4d52d7e2d15c28b26530949cc6de0231a4028930406
-SHA512 (shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz.asc) = e4b134543768f323df30a1e450c22086d013020928d62bd3207db7f633beea3587b67802da5b575d5a794e8c2bebd7a0abeba6ed69d44bf08adc37df3bf352ac
+SHA512 (shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz) = 780a983483d847ed3c91c82064a0fa902b6f4185225978241bc3bc03fcc3aa143975b46aee43151c6ba43efcfdb1819516b76ba7ad3d1d3c34fcc38ea42e917b
+SHA512 (shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz.asc) = ec7686263c81d3feb8ee4314c3323a9a3ada74aafaaf99f4f0d9af9b1341f8c5ff5477ecf98dd94dbb7d921f532d655b0b6a87d94c71893f35dc9bc54c84dd42
diff --git a/tests/mhc-fedora-ci.yaml b/tests/mhc-fedora-ci.yaml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8747e67..0000000
--- a/tests/mhc-fedora-ci.yaml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-provisioned_topologies:
-- shadow
-domains:
-- id: shadow
- hosts:
- - hostname: localhost
- role: shadow
- conn:
- type: ssh
- host: localhost
- user: root
- artifacts:
- - /var/log/*
diff --git a/tests/sanity/Makefile b/tests/sanity/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..386221b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/sanity/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. This copyrighted material
+# is made available to anyone wishing to use, modify, copy, or
+# redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General
+# Public License v.2.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
+# WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
+#
+# Author: Jakub Hrozek
+
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+# Example Makefile for RHTS #
+# This example is geared towards a test for a specific package #
+# It does most of the work for you, but may require further coding #
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+
+# The toplevel namespace within which the test lives.
+TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE=CoreOS
+
+# The name of the package under test:
+PACKAGE_NAME=shadow-utils
+
+# The path of the test below the package:
+RELATIVE_PATH=sanity
+
+# Version of the Test. Used with make tag.
+export TESTVERSION=1.1
+
+# The combined namespace of the test.
+export TEST=/$(TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE)/$(PACKAGE_NAME)/$(RELATIVE_PATH)
+
+# A phony target is one that is not really the name of a file.
+# It is just a name for some commands to be executed when you
+# make an explicit request. There are two reasons to use a
+# phony target: to avoid a conflict with a file of the same
+# name, and to improve performance.
+.PHONY: all install download clean
+
+# Executables to be built should be added here, they will be generated on the system under test.
+BUILT_FILES=
+
+# Data files, .c files, scripts anything needed to either compile the test and/or run it.
+FILES=$(METADATA) Makefile PURPOSE sanity_test.py runtest.sh
+
+run: $(FILES) build
+ ./runtest.sh
+
+build: $(BUILT_FILES)
+ chmod a+x ./sanity_test.py
+ chmod a+x ./runtest.sh
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *~ *.rpm $(BUILT_FILES)
+
+# Include Common Makefile
+include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
+
+# Generate the testinfo.desc here:
+$(METADATA): Makefile
+ @touch $(METADATA)
+ @echo "Owner: Jakub Hrozek " > $(METADATA)
+ @echo "Name: $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "Path: $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "TestVersion: $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "License: GNU GPL" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "Description: Basic sanity test for shadow-utils" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "TestTime: 5m" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "RunFor: $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "Requires: $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+ @echo "Requires: python" >> $(METADATA)
+ rhts-lint $(METADATA)
+
diff --git a/tests/sanity/PURPOSE b/tests/sanity/PURPOSE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27062e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/sanity/PURPOSE
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+This is a basic sanity test for the shadow-utils package. It is implemented
+in python on top of the unittesting.py module.
+
+Its purpose is to ensure that the binaries in the shadow-utils package behave
+as expected and its switches/options work correctly.
+
+For the most part, every binary in the shadow-utils package is represented by
+a single class named Test, i.e. TestUsermod etc. There are some
+exceptions, like TestUseraddWeirdNameTest though.
+
diff --git a/tests/sanity/runtest.sh b/tests/sanity/runtest.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..cb2a2b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/sanity/runtest.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+. /usr/bin/rhts-environment.sh
+. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
+
+rlJournalStart
+rlFileBackup --clean /etc/default/useradd- /etc/default/useradd
+setenforce 0
+python sanity_test.py -v
+setenforce 1
+rlFileRestore
+
+EXIT=$?
+if [[ $EXIT -eq 0 ]]; then
+ RESULT="PASS"
+else
+ RESULT="FAIL"
+fi
+
+
+rlJournalEnd
+
+echo "Result: $RESULT"
+echo "Exit: $EXIT"
+report_result $TEST $RESULT $EXIT
diff --git a/tests/sanity/sanity_test.py b/tests/sanity/sanity_test.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e9c45c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/sanity/sanity_test.py
@@ -0,0 +1,1013 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+"""
+A script that tests functionality of the shadow-utils package.
+
+Author: Jakub Hrozek,
+License: GNU GPL v2
+Date: 2007
+
+TODO:
+ * tests for password aging
+ * if something fails, print out the command issued for easier debugging
+ * test long options variants along with the short ones
+"""
+
+import unittest
+import pwd
+import grp
+import commands
+import os
+import os.path
+import sys
+import copy
+import tempfile
+import rpm
+import shutil
+
+from UserDict import UserDict
+
+class RedHatVersion(object):
+ def __init__(self, type=None, version=None, release=None):
+ self.type = type
+ self.version = version
+ self.release = release
+ self.rhel = False
+
+ def __eq__( self, other):
+ """
+ Don't compare if either of the values is None
+ so we can do comparisons like 'is it fedora?' or 'is it rhel4?'
+ """
+ ok = (self.type == other.type)
+ if ok == False: return False
+
+ if self.version and other.version:
+ ok = (self.version == other.version)
+ if ok == False: return False
+
+ if (self.release == other.release):
+ ok = (self.release == other.release)
+
+ return ok
+
+ def __ne__( self, other):
+ return not self.__eq__(other)
+
+ def __get_fedora_info(self, mi):
+ return [ (h['version'],h['release']) for h in mi ][0]
+
+ def __get_rhel_info(self, mi):
+ # The rules for RHEL versions are braindead..releases even more
+ ver_rpm, rel_rpm = [ (h['version'],h['release']) for h in mi ][0]
+ rhel_versions = { '3AS' : 3, '4AS' : 4, '5Server' : 5, '5Client' : 5, '6' : 6 }
+ if ver_rpm[:3] == '5.9' or ver_rpm[:1] == '6': # rhel6 prerelease and release hack
+ rhel_versions[ver_rpm] = 6
+ if ver_rpm in rhel_versions.keys():
+ return (rhel_versions[ver_rpm], rel_rpm)
+
+ def is_rhel(self):
+ return self.rhel
+
+ def get_info(self):
+ """
+ Returns a tuple containing (type, version, release) of RHEL or Fedora.
+ Type is either RHEL or Fedora.
+ Returns None if it cannot parse the info
+ """
+
+ ts = rpm.TransactionSet()
+ mi = ts.dbMatch()
+ mi.pattern('name', rpm.RPMMIRE_GLOB, 'redhat-release*')
+
+ if mi:
+ self.rhel = True
+ return ('RHEL',) + self.__get_rhel_info(mi)
+ else:
+ mi = ts.dbMatch('name','fedora-release')
+ self.rhel = False
+ if mi.count() != 0:
+ return ('Fedora',) + self.__get_fedora_info(mi)
+
+ return None
+
+
+class UserInfo(UserDict):
+ fields = { "pw_name" : 0, "pw_passwd" : 1, "pw_uid" : 2, "pw_gid" : 3,
+ "pw_gecos" : 4, "pw_dir" : 5, "pw_shell" : 6 }
+
+ def __init__(self):
+ UserDict.__init__(self)
+ for f in UserInfo.fields: self[f] = None
+
+ def __getitem__(self, key):
+ return UserDict.__getitem__(self, key)
+
+ def __setitem__(self, key, value):
+ UserDict.__setitem__(self, key, value)
+
+ def __cmp__(self, other):
+ return UserDict.__cmp__(self, other)
+
+ def __repr__(self):
+ return " ; ".join( [ "%s => %s" % (k, v) for k, v in self.data.items() ] )
+
+ def __parse_info(self, struct):
+ for f in UserInfo.fields:
+ self[f] = struct[UserInfo.fields[f]]
+
+ def get_info_uid(self, uid):
+ self.__parse_info(pwd.getpwuid(uid))
+
+ def get_info_name(self, name):
+ try:
+ self.__parse_info(pwd.getpwnam(name))
+ except KeyError:
+ return None
+
+ def lazy_compare(self, pattern):
+ """ Compare pattern against self. If any field in pattern is set
+ to None, it is automatically considered equal with the corresponding
+ field in self. """
+ for field in UserInfo.fields:
+ if pattern[field] and pattern[field] != self[field]:
+ return False
+
+ return True
+
+class GroupInfo(UserDict):
+ fields = { "gr_name" : 0, "gr_passwd" : 1,
+ "gr_gid" : 2, "gr_mem" : 3}
+
+ def __init__(self):
+ UserDict.__init__(self)
+ for f in GroupInfo.fields: self[f] = None
+
+ def __getitem__(self, key):
+ return UserDict.__getitem__(self, key)
+
+ def __setitem__(self, key, value):
+ UserDict.__setitem__(self, key, value)
+
+ def __cmp__(self, other):
+ return UserDict.__cmp__(self, other)
+
+ def __repr__(self):
+ return " ; ".join( [ "%s => %s" % (k, v) for k, v in self.data.items() ] )
+
+ def __parse_info(self, struct):
+ for f in GroupInfo.fields:
+ self[f] = struct[GroupInfo.fields[f]]
+
+ def get_info_gid(self, gid):
+ self.__parse_info(grp.getgrgid(gid))
+
+ def get_info_name(self, name):
+ self.__parse_info(grp.getgrnam(name))
+
+ def lazy_compare(self, pattern):
+ """ Compare pattern against self. If any field in pattern is set
+ to None, it is automatically considered equal with the corresponding
+ field in self. """
+ for field in GroupInfo.fields:
+ if pattern[field] and pattern[field] != self[field]:
+ return False
+
+ return True
+
+class LoginDefsParser(UserDict):
+ "A quick-n-dirty way how to fetch the defaults from /etc/login.defs into a dictionary"
+
+ def __getitem__(self, key):
+ try:
+ return UserDict.__getitem__(self, key)
+ except KeyError:
+ # if a name-value is not defined in the config file, return defaults
+ if key == "CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL":
+ return "yes"
+ if key == "UMASK":
+ return "077"
+
+ def __init__(self, path="/etc/login.defs",split=None):
+ self.path = path
+ UserDict.__init__(self)
+ try:
+ defs = open(path)
+ except IOError:
+ print "Could not open the config file %s" % (path)
+
+ for line in defs:
+ if line.startswith('#'): continue
+ fields = line.split(split)
+ if len(fields) != 2: continue # yeah, we're dirty
+ self.data[fields[0]] = fields[1]
+
+ def serialize(self):
+ output = open(self.path, "w+")
+ for k,v in self.data.items():
+ output.write("%s=%s" % (k, v))
+
+ output.write("\n")
+ output.close()
+
+class TestUserInfo(unittest.TestCase):
+ def testLazyCompare(self):
+ """ (test sanity): Test comparing two UserInfo records """
+ a = UserInfo()
+ a["pw_name"] = "foo"
+ a["pw_uid"] = 555
+ b = copy.deepcopy(a)
+ c = UserInfo()
+
+ self.assertEqual(a.lazy_compare(b), True)
+ self.assertEqual(a.lazy_compare(c), True)
+
+ c["pw_name"] = "foo"
+ c["pw_uid"] = None
+ self.assertEqual(a.lazy_compare(c), True)
+ self.assertEqual(c.lazy_compare(a), False)
+
+ c["pw_name"] = "bar"
+ self.assertNotEqual(a.lazy_compare(c), True)
+
+ def testGetInfoUid(self):
+ """ (test sanity): Test getting user info based on his UID """
+ a = UserInfo()
+ a.get_info_uid(0)
+ self.assertEqual(a["pw_name"], "root")
+
+ def testGetInfoName(self):
+ """ (test sanity): Test getting user info based on his name """
+ a = UserInfo()
+ a.get_info_name("root")
+ self.assertEqual(a["pw_uid"], 0)
+
+class ShadowUtilsTestBase:
+ """ Handy routines """
+ def getDefaults(self):
+ # get the default values for so we can compare against that
+ (status, defaults_str) = commands.getstatusoutput('useradd -D')
+ if status != 0:
+ raise RuntimeError("Could not get the default values for useradd")
+ return dict([ rec.split("=") for rec in defaults_str.split("\n") ])
+
+ def getDefaultUserInfo(self, username):
+ expected = UserInfo()
+ defaults = self.getDefaults()
+
+ expected["pw_name"] = username
+ expected["pw_dir"] = defaults["HOME"] + "/" + username
+ expected["pw_shell"] = defaults["SHELL"]
+
+ return expected
+
+class TestUseradd(ShadowUtilsTestBase, unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.username = "test-shadow-utils-useradd"
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ commands.getstatusoutput("userdel -r %s" % (self.username))
+
+ def testBasicAdd(self):
+ """ useradd: Tests basic adding of a user """
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(self.username)
+
+ runme = "useradd %s" % (self.username)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput(runme)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a user\nIssued command: %s" % (runme))
+
+ def testExistingUser(self):
+ """ useradd: Test that user with an existing name cannot be added """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ self.assertNotEqual(commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (self.username))[0], 0, "FAIL: User that already exists added")
+
+ def testCustomUID(self):
+ """ useradd: Adding an user with a specific UID """
+ UID = 23456 # FIXME - test for a free UID slot first
+
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(self.username)
+ expected["pw_uid"] = UID
+
+ runme = "useradd %s -u %d" % (self.username, UID)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput(runme)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, "Issued command: %s\n" % (runme) + "Got from useradd: %s\n" % (output))
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a user with a specific UID\nIssued command: %s" % (runme))
+
+ def testNegativeUID(self):
+ """ useradd: Tests that user cannot have a negative UID assigned """
+ self.assertNotEqual(commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s --uid -5" % (self.username))[0], 0, "FAIL: User with UID < 0 added")
+
+ def testCustomExistingUID(self):
+ """ useradd: Adding a user with a specific existing UID """
+ UID = 32112
+
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(self.username)
+ expected["pw_uid"] = UID
+
+ (status_u, output_u) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s -u %d" % (self.username, UID))
+
+ # must fail without -o flag
+ (status_u_no_o, output_u_no_o) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd foo -u %d" % (UID))
+
+ # must pass with -o flag
+ (status_o, output_o) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd foo -u %d -o" % (UID))
+
+ # clean up
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("userdel -r foo")
+
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status_u, 0, "FAIL: cannot add an user with a specified UID\n"+output_u)
+ self.assertEqual(status_o, 0, "FAIL: cannot add an user with an existing UID using the -o flag\n"+output_o)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ self.assertNotEqual(status_u_no_o, 0, "FAIL: user with an existing UID added\n"+output_u_no_o)
+
+ def testCustomGID(self):
+ """ useradd: Adding an user with a specific GID """
+ GID = 100 # users group should be everywhere - should we test before?
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(self.username)
+ expected["pw_gid"] = GID
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s -g %d" % (self.username, GID))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a user with a specific GID")
+
+ def testCustomShell(self):
+ """ useradd: Adding an user with a specific login shell """
+ shell = "/bin/ksh"
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(self.username)
+ expected["pw_shell"] = shell
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s -s %s" % (self.username, shell))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a user with a specific shell")
+
+ def testCustomHome(self):
+ """ useradd: Adding an user with a specific home directory """
+ home = "/tmp/useradd-test"
+ os.mkdir(home)
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(self.username)
+ expected["pw_dir"] = home
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s -d %s" % (self.username, home))
+ shutil.rmtree(home)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a user with a specific home")
+
+ def testSystemAccount(self):
+ """ useradd: Adding a system user (UID < UID_MIN from /etc/login.defs) """
+ defaults = LoginDefsParser()
+
+ # system account with no home dir
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(self.username)
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd -r %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(os.path.exists(created["pw_dir"]), False, "FAIL: System user has a home dir created")
+ self.assertEqual(created["pw_uid"] < defaults['UID_MIN'], True, "FAIL: System user has UID > UID_MIN")
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a system user")
+
+ def testAddToMoreGroups(self):
+ """ useradd: Creating an user that belongs to more than one group """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd -G bin %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ gr_bin = GroupInfo()
+ gr_bin.get_info_name("bin")
+ self.assertEqual(self.username in gr_bin["gr_mem"], True, "FAIL: User not in supplementary group after usermod -G -a")
+
+
+ def testAddWithCommonName(self):
+ """ useradd: Specifying a comment (user for account name) """
+ comment = "zzzzzz"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd -c %s %s" % (comment, self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created["pw_gecos"], comment, "FAIL: failed to create a user with a GECOS comment")
+
+ def testHomePermissions(self):
+ """ useradd: Check if permissions on newly created home dir match the umask """
+ defaults = LoginDefsParser()
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+
+ import stat
+ perm = os.stat(created["pw_dir"])[stat.ST_MODE]
+ mode = int(oct(perm & 0777))
+
+ self.assertEqual(defaults["UMASK"], "077", "FAIL: umask setting is not sane - is %s, should be 077" % (defaults["UMASK"]))
+ self.assertEqual(int(defaults["UMASK"]) + mode , 777, "FAIL: newly-created home dir does not match the umask")
+
+ def testCreateMailSpool(self):
+ """ useradd: Check whether the mail spool gets created when told to"""
+ # set up creating of mail spool
+ defaults = LoginDefsParser("/etc/default/useradd", split="=")
+
+ create_mail = defaults["CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL"]
+ defaults["CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL"] = "yes"
+ defaults.serialize()
+
+ login_defs = LoginDefsParser()
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # clean up
+ defaults["CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL"] = create_mail
+ defaults.serialize()
+ self.assertEqual(os.path.exists(login_defs["MAIL_DIR"] + "/" + self.username), True, "FAIL: useradd did not create mail spool")
+
+ def testDefaultMailSettings(self):
+ """ useradd: Check whether the mail spool is on by default"""
+ defaults = LoginDefsParser("/etc/default/useradd", split="=")
+ self.assertEqual(defaults["CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL"], "yes\n")
+
+ def testNoLastlog(self):
+ """ useradd: Check if the -l option prevents from being added to the lastlog """
+ pass # FIXME - add some code here
+
+
+class TestUseraddWeirdNameTest(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ """ Tests addition/removal of usernames that have proven to be problematic in the past.
+ The reason to separate these from the main useradd test suite is to not run the setUp
+ and tearDown methods """
+
+ def addAndRemove(self, username, success=True):
+ expected = self.getDefaultUserInfo(username)
+ expected["pw_name"] = username
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (username))
+ if success:
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ else:
+ self.failIfEqual(status, 0, output)
+ return True
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(username)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: TestUseraddWeirdName::addAndRemove - could not add a user")
+
+ # the cleanup method won't help this time
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("userdel -r %s" % (username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testNumericName(self):
+ """ useradd: Test if an user with a purely numerical name can be added (123) """
+ return self.addAndRemove("123")
+
+ def testSambaName(self):
+ """ useradd: Test if an user with a name with a dollar at the end can be added (joepublic$ ) """
+ return self.addAndRemove("joepublic$")
+
+ def testDotInName(self):
+ """ useradd: Test if an user with a name with a dot in it can be added (joe.public ) """
+ return self.addAndRemove("joe.public")
+
+ def testAtInName(self):
+ """ useradd: Test if an user with an '@' in name can be added (joe@public.com) - should fail """
+ return self.addAndRemove("joe@public.com", False)
+
+ def testUppercase(self):
+ """ useradd: Test if an user with UPPERCASE or Uppercase name can be added """
+ return self.addAndRemove("JOEPUBLIC")
+ return self.addAndRemove("Joepublic")
+
+class TestUseraddDefaultsChange(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def testDefaultsChange(self):
+ """ useradd: Test overriding default settings (shell, home dir, group) with a -D option """
+ save = self.getDefaults()
+
+ new_defs = dict()
+ new_defs["SHELL"] = "/bin/ksh"
+ new_defs["GROUP"] = "1"
+ new_defs["HOME"] = "/tmp"
+
+ command = "useradd -D -s%s -g%s -b%s" % (new_defs["SHELL"], new_defs["GROUP"], new_defs["HOME"])
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput(command)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ overriden = self.getDefaults()
+ [ self.assertEqual(overriden[k], new_defs[k]) for k in new_defs.keys() ]
+
+ command = "useradd -D -s%s -g%s -b%s" % (save["SHELL"], save["GROUP"], save["HOME"])
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput(command)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+
+class TestUserdel(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.username = "test-shadow-utils-userdel"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testRemoveUserGroup(self):
+ """ userdel: test if userdel removes user's group when he's deleted - regression test for #201379 """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("userdel -r %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # This would fail if we did not have the group removed
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("userdel -r %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+class TestUsermod(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.username = "test-shadow-utils-usermod"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("userdel -r %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testAppendToSupplementaryGroup(self):
+ """ usermod: Test if a user can be added to a supplementary group """
+ add_group = "additional_group"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (add_group))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ (status_mod, output_mod) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -a -G %s %s" % (add_group, self.username))
+ add_group_info = GroupInfo()
+ add_group_info.get_info_name(add_group)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (add_group))
+
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status_mod, 0, output_mod)
+ self.assertEqual(self.username in add_group_info["gr_mem"], True, "User not in supplementary group after usermod -G --append")
+
+
+ def testAppendToSupplementaryGroupLongOption(self):
+ """ usermod: Test if a user can be added to a supplementary group via --append rather that -a (regression test for 222540) """
+ # this is known to not work on older RHELs - test what we are running
+ rhv = RedHatVersion()
+ runs = rhv.get_info()
+ if rhv.is_rhel():
+ if runs[1] < 5:
+ print "This test makes sense for RHEL5+"
+ return
+ else:
+ if runs[1] < 6:
+ print "This test makes sense for Fedora 6+"
+ return
+
+ type, release, version = RedHatVersion().get_info()
+ if RedHatVersion().is_rhel():
+ if release < 5 or (release == 5 and version < 2):
+ print "This test makes sense for RHEL 5.2+"
+ return
+
+ add_group = "additional_group"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (add_group))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ (status_mod, output_mod) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod --append -G %s %s" % (add_group, self.username))
+ add_group_info = GroupInfo()
+ add_group_info.get_info_name(add_group)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (add_group))
+
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status_mod, 0, output_mod)
+ self.assertEqual(self.username in add_group_info["gr_mem"], True, "User not in supplementary group after usermod -G --append")
+
+
+ def testNameChange(self):
+ """ usermod: Test if the comment field (used as the Common Name) can be changed """
+ new_comment = "zzzzzz"
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -c %s %s" % (new_comment, self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+
+ self.assertEqual(created["pw_gecos"], new_comment)
+
+ def testHomeChange(self):
+ """ usermod: Test if user's home directory can be changed """
+ new_home = "/tmp"
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ old_home = created["pw_dir"]
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -d %s %s" % (new_home, self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created["pw_dir"], new_home)
+
+ # revert to old home so we can userdel -r in tearDown
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -d %s %s" % (old_home, self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # FIXME - test if contents of /home directories are transferred with the -m option
+ # FIXME - test if new home is created if does not exist before
+
+ def testGIDChange(self):
+ """ usermod: Test if user's gid can be changed. """
+ new_group = "root"
+ # test non-existing group
+ (status_fail, output_fail) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -g no-such-group %s" % (self.username))
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -g %s %s" % (new_group, self.username))
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+
+ left = GroupInfo()
+ if left.get_info_name(self.username) == None:
+ (status_del, output_del) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status_del, 0, output_del)
+
+ self.failIfEqual(status_fail, 0, output_fail)
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ self.assertEqual(created["pw_gid"], 0) #0 is root group
+
+ def testLoginChange(self):
+ """ usermod: Test if user's login can be changed """
+ new_login = "usermod-login-change"
+ user = UserInfo()
+ user.get_info_name(self.username)
+ uid = user["pw_uid"] # UID won't change even when login does
+
+ # test changing to an existing user name
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -l root %s" % (self.username))
+ self.failIfEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -l %s %s" % (new_login, self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ user.get_info_name(new_login)
+ self.assertEqual(user["pw_uid"], uid)
+
+ # revert so we can userdel -r on tearDown
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -l %s %s" % (self.username, new_login))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testShellChange(self):
+ """ usermod: Test if user's shell can be changed """
+ new_shell = "/bin/sh"
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("usermod -s %s %s" % (new_shell, self.username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = UserInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.username)
+ self.assertEqual(created["pw_shell"], new_shell)
+
+class TestGroupadd(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.groupname = "test-shadow-utils-groups"
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (self.groupname))
+
+ def testAddGroup(self):
+ """ groupadd: Basic adding of a group """
+
+ expected = GroupInfo()
+ expected["gr_name"] = self.groupname
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = GroupInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.groupname)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a group")
+
+ def testAddSystemGroup(self):
+ """ groupadd: Adding a system group with gid < MIN_GID """
+
+ expected = GroupInfo()
+ expected["gr_name"] = self.groupname
+ defaults = LoginDefsParser()
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd -r %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = GroupInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.groupname)
+ self.assertEqual(created["gr_gid"] < defaults["GID_MIN"], True, "FAIL: System group has gid >= GID_MIN")
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not add a system group")
+
+ def testAddExistingGid(self):
+ """ groupadd: Test if we group with an existing GID can be added """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ gname = "%s-2" % (self.groupname)
+
+ created = GroupInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.groupname)
+
+ # no -o option -> this should fail
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd -g%s %s" % (created["gr_gid"], gname))
+ self.failIfEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # override with -o option, should pass now
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd -g%s -o %s" % (created["gr_gid"], gname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # test if the new GID is really the same
+ same_gid = GroupInfo()
+ same_gid.get_info_name(gname)
+ self.assertEqual(same_gid["gr_gid"], created["gr_gid"])
+
+ # clean up
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (gname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+
+ def testOverrideDefaults(self):
+ """ groupadd: Test if the defaults can be overriden with the -K option """
+ # this is known to not work on older RHELs - test what we are running
+ rhv = RedHatVersion()
+ runs = rhv.get_info()
+ if rhv.is_rhel():
+ if runs[1] < 5:
+ print "This test makes sense for RHEL5+"
+ return
+ else:
+ if runs[1] < 6:
+ print "This test makes sense for Fedora 6+"
+ return
+
+
+ GID_MIN = 600
+ GID_MAX = 625
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd -K GID_MIN=%d -K GID_MAX=%d %s" %
+ (GID_MIN, GID_MAX, self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = GroupInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.groupname)
+ self.assertEqual(GID_MIN <= created["gr_gid"] <= GID_MAX, True, "FAIL: created an user with UID of %d" % (created["gr_gid"]))
+
+
+ def testFOption(self):
+ """ groupadd: Tests the -f option of groupadd """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd -f %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.assertEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+class TestGroupaddInvalidName(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def testGroupaddInvalidName(self):
+ """ groupadd: Test adding of a group with an invalid name """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd foo?")
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd aaaaabbbbbcccccdddddeeeeefffffggg") #33 chars
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+class TestGroupaddValidName(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def testGroupaddValidName(self):
+ """ groupadd: Test adding and removing of groups with maximal valid name and name ending with $ """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd aaaaabbbbbcccccdddddeeeeefffffgg") #32 chars
+ self.assertEqual(status, 0, output)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd aaaaabbbbbcccccdddddeeeeefffffg\$") #32 chars
+ self.assertEqual(status, 0, output)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel aaaaabbbbbcccccdddddeeeeefffffgg") #32 chars
+ self.assertEqual(status, 0, output)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel aaaaabbbbbcccccdddddeeeeefffffg\$") #32 chars
+ self.assertEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+
+class TestGroupmod(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.groupname = "test-shadow-utils-groups"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (self.groupname))
+
+ def testChangeGID(self):
+ """ groupmod: Test changing a gid of a group """
+ expected = GroupInfo()
+ expected["gr_name"] = self.groupname
+ expected["gr_gid"] = 54321
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupmod -g%d %s" % (expected["gr_gid"], self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ created = GroupInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.groupname)
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not change GID of an existing group")
+
+ def testChangeGIDToExistingValue(self):
+ """ groupmod: Test changing GID to an existing value """
+ second_name = "%s-2" % (self.groupname)
+
+ created = GroupInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.groupname)
+
+ expected = GroupInfo()
+ expected["gr_name"] = self.groupname
+ expected["gr_gid"] = created["gr_gid"]
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (second_name))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # try to assingn GID of the first group to the second - this should fail without the -o option
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupmod -g%d %s" % (created["gr_gid"], second_name))
+ self.failIfEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # should pass with the -o option
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupmod -g%d -o %s" % (created["gr_gid"], second_name))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ self.assertEqual(created.lazy_compare(expected), True, "FAIL: Could not change GID of an existing group to an existing one")
+
+ # clean up
+ commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (second_name))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testChangeGroupName(self):
+ """ groupmod: Test changing a group's name """
+ second_name = "%s-2" % (self.groupname)
+
+ created = GroupInfo()
+ created.get_info_name(self.groupname)
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupmod -n%s %s" % (second_name, self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ changed = GroupInfo()
+ changed.get_info_gid(created["gr_gid"])
+ self.assertEqual(changed["gr_name"], second_name)
+ self.assertEqual(changed["gr_gid"], created["gr_gid"])
+
+ # change back, so the group could be deleted by tearDown
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupmod -n%s %s" % (self.groupname, second_name))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testChangeGroupNameExisting(self):
+ """ groupmod: Test changing a group's name to an existing one """
+ existing = "bin"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupmod -n%s %s" % (existing, self.groupname))
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output) # man groupmod -> 9: group name already in use
+
+ def testChangeNonExistingGroup(self):
+ """ groupmod: Test properties of a non-existing group """
+ nonexistent = "foobar"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupmod -nspameggs %s" % (nonexistent))
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, status) # man groupmod -> 6: specified group doesn't exist
+
+class TestGroupdel(unittest.TestCase, ShadowUtilsTestBase):
+ def testCorrectGroupdel(self):
+ """ groupdel: Basic usage of groupdel """
+ self.groupname = "test-shadow-utils-groups"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupadd %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (self.groupname))
+ self.assertEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testGroupdelNoSuchGroup(self):
+ """ groupdel: Remove non-existing group """
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel foobar")
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testRemovePrimaryGroup(self):
+ """ groupdel: Remove a primary group of an user """
+ username = "test-groupdel-primary"
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("useradd %s" % (username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("groupdel %s" % (username))
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ # clean up
+ (status, output) = commands.getstatusoutput("userdel -r %s" % (username))
+ self.failUnlessEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+class TestPwckGrpck(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.passwd_path = tempfile.mktemp(suffix="test-pwck-passwd")
+ self.passwd_file = open(self.passwd_path, "w")
+ self.group_path = tempfile.mktemp(suffix="test-pwck-grp")
+ self.group_file = open(self.group_path, "w")
+ self.gshadow_path = tempfile.mktemp(suffix="test-pwck-gshadow")
+ self.gshadow_file = open(self.gshadow_path, "w")
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ self.passwd_file.close()
+ self.group_file.close()
+ self.gshadow_file.close()
+
+ os.remove(self.passwd_path)
+ os.remove(self.group_path)
+ os.remove(self.gshadow_path)
+
+ def runPwckCheck(self, passwd, group):
+ self.passwd_file.truncate()
+ self.group_file.truncate()
+
+ self.passwd_file.write(passwd)
+ self.passwd_file.flush()
+ self.group_file.write(group)
+ self.group_file.flush()
+
+ command = "pwck -r %s %s" % (self.passwd_path, self.group_path)
+ return commands.getstatusoutput(command)
+
+ def runGrpCheck(self, group, gshadow):
+ self.group_file.truncate()
+ self.gshadow_file.truncate()
+
+ self.gshadow_file.write(gshadow)
+ self.gshadow_file.flush()
+
+ self.group_file.write(group)
+ self.group_file.flush()
+
+ command = "grpck -r %s %s" % (self.group_path, self.gshadow_path)
+ return commands.getstatusoutput(command)
+
+
+ def testValidEntries(self):
+ """ pwck: a valid entry """
+ status, output = self.runPwckCheck("foo:x:685:0::/dev/null:/bin/bash", "")
+ rhv = RedHatVersion()
+ runs = rhv.get_info()
+ if rhv.is_rhel():
+ if runs[1] < 6:
+ self.assertEqual(status, 0, output)
+ else:
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testNumberOfFields(self):
+ """ pwck: invalid number of fields in the record """
+ not_enough = "foo:x:685:685::/dev/null"
+ too_many = "foo:x:685:685::/dev/null:/bin/bash:comment"
+ status, output = self.runPwckCheck(not_enough, "")
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ status, output = self.runPwckCheck(too_many, "")
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testUniqueUserName(self):
+ """ pwck: unique user name in the record """
+ duplicate_username = "foo:x:685:685::/dev/null:/bin/bash\nfoo:x:686:686::/dev/null:/bin/bash"
+ status, output = self.runPwckCheck(duplicate_username, "")
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testValidID(self):
+ """ pwck: invalid UID in the records """
+ invalid_ids = [ "foo:x:-1:685::/dev/null:/bin/bash", "foo:x:blah:685::/dev/null:/bin/bash", "foo:x:1234567890:685::/dev/null:/bin/bash" ]
+ for record in invalid_ids:
+ status, output = self.runPwckCheck(record, "")
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, record)
+
+
+ def testValidPrimaryGroup(self):
+ """ pwck: invalid primary group """
+ invalid_groups = [ "foo:x:685:-1::/dev/null:/bin/bash", "foo:x:685:blah::/dev/null:/bin/bash", "foo:x:685:1234567890::/dev/null:/bin/bash" ]
+ for record in invalid_groups:
+ status, output = self.runPwckCheck("", record)
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testValidHomeDir(self):
+ """ pwck: invalid home dir """
+ for record in [ "foo:x:685:685::123:/bin/bash", "foo:x:685:685::/path/to/nowhere:/bin/bash", "foo:x:685:1234567890::!:/bin/bash" ]:
+ status, output = self.runPwckCheck(record, "")
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+ def testBZ164954(self):
+ """ grpck: regression test for BZ164954 """
+ record = "root:x:0:root\nbin:x:1:root,bin,daemon\ndaemon:x:2:root,bin,daemon\nsys:x:3:root,bin,adm\nadm:x:4:root,adm,daemon"
+ status, output = self.runGrpCheck("", record)
+ self.assertNotEqual(status, 0, output)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ broken_on_rhel4 = { "TestUseradd" : [ "testCustomUID", "testCustomGID" ] }
+
+ if os.getuid() != 0:
+ print "This test must be run as root"
+ sys.exit(1)
+
+ unittest.main()
+
diff --git a/tests/tests.yml b/tests/tests.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09f4769
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/tests.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+# This first play always runs on the local staging system
+- hosts: localhost
+ roles:
+ - role: standard-test-beakerlib
+ tags:
+ - classic
+ - atomic
+ tests:
+ - sanity
+ required_packages:
+ - shadow-utils # sanity test needs shadow-utils
+ - python # sanity test needs python