Stop assigning subids by default

Resolves: CVE-2024-56433 and #2334169

Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>

.fmf/version

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1

.gitignore

@@ -40,17 +40,3 @@ shadow-4.1.4.2.tar.bz2
 /shadow-4.17.0.tar.xz.asc
 /shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz
 /shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.18.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.18.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.19.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.19.0.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.19.2.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.19.2.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.19.3.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.19.3.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc2.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc2.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc3.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.20.0-rc3.tar.xz.asc
-/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz
-/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz.asc

plans/tier0-functional.fmf

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-summary: Tier 0 functional tests for shadow-utils
-description: |
-    Run comprehensive system tests for shadow-utils. These tests validate user and group
-    account management functionality by testing actual system operations including user
-    creation, password management, group operations, and verification of system files
-    (i.e. /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow).
-
-provision:
-    how: virtual
-    image: fedora
-
-prepare:
-    - name: Install general dependencies
-      how: install
-      package:
-        - expect
-        - gcc
-        - git
-        - libssh-devel
-        - python3-devel
-        - python3-pip
-
-    - name: Setup SSH keys for localhost testing
-      how: shell
-      script:
-        - ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /root/.ssh/id_rsa -N "" -q
-        - cat /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
-        - chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
-        - ssh-keyscan -H localhost >> /root/.ssh/known_hosts
-
-    - name: Clone shadow repository
-      how: shell
-      script:
-        - git clone https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow.git /tmp/shadow-test
-
-    - name: Copy test topology for Fedora CI
-      how: shell
-      script:
-        - cp tests/mhc-fedora-ci.yaml /tmp/shadow-test/tests/system
-
-    - name: Install test dependencies
-      how: shell
-      script:
-        - pip3 install -r /tmp/shadow-test/tests/system/requirements.txt
-
-execute:
-    how: tmt
-    duration: 30m
-    script: |
-        cd /tmp/shadow-test/tests/system
-        pytest --mh-config=mhc-fedora-ci.yaml --mh-lazy-ssh -v

shadow-4.13-newidmap-support-passing-pid-as-fd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+From 6974df39a708abf8bafbdfa2b7827e0f70f874cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 22:49:42 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd
+
+Closes #635
+
+newuidmap and newgidmap currently take an integner pid as
+the first argument, determining the process id on which to
+act.  Accept also "fd:N", where N must be an open file
+descriptor to the /proc/pid directory for the process to
+act upon.  This way, if you
+
+exec 10</proc/99
+newuidmap fd:10 100000 0 65536
+
+and pid 99 dies and a new process happens to take pid 99 before
+newuidmap happens to do its work, then since newuidmap will use
+openat() using fd 10, it won't change the mapping for the new
+process.
+
+Example:
+
+// terminal 1:
+serge@jerom ~/src/nsexec$ ./nsexec -W -s 0 -S 0 -U
+about to unshare with 10000000
+Press any key to exec (I am 129176)
+
+// terminal 2:
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ exec 10</proc/129176
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chown root src/newuidmap src/newgidmap
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chmod u+s src/newuidmap
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chmod u+s src/newgidmap
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ ./src/newuidmap fd:10 0 100000 10
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ ./src/newgidmap fd:10 0 100000 10
+
+// Terminal 1:
+uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
+
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+---
+ lib/get_pid.c       | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/prototypes.h    |  2 ++
+ man/newgidmap.1.xml | 11 ++++++++++
+ man/newuidmap.1.xml | 11 ++++++++++
+ src/newgidmap.c     | 41 ++++++++++++++----------------------
+ src/newuidmap.c     | 40 +++++++++++++----------------------
+ 6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
+index 10184bf0..ab91d158 100644
+--- a/lib/get_pid.c
++++ b/lib/get_pid.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
+ 
+ #include "prototypes.h"
+ #include "defines.h"
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ 
+ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
+ {
+@@ -29,3 +32,51 @@ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * If use passed in fd:4 as an argument, then return the
++ * value '4', the fd to use.
++ */
++int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
++{
++	long long int val;
++	char *endptr;
++
++	errno = 0;
++	val = strtoll (pidfdstr, &endptr, 10);
++	if (   ('\0' == *pidfdstr)
++	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
++	    || (ERANGE == errno)
++	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (pid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	return (int)val;
++}
++
++int open_pidfd(const char *pidstr)
++{
++	int proc_dir_fd;
++	int written;
++	char proc_dir_name[32];
++	pid_t target;
++
++	if (get_pid(pidstr, &target) == 0)
++		return -ENOENT;
++
++	/* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
++	written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
++		target);
++	if ((written <= 0) || ((size_t)written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "snprintf of proc path failed for %u: %s\n",
++			target, strerror(errno));
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
++	if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("Could not open proc directory for target %u: %s\n"),
++			target, strerror(errno));
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++	return proc_dir_fd;
++}
+diff --git a/lib/prototypes.h b/lib/prototypes.h
+index 400d5b97..21df6f61 100644
+--- a/lib/prototypes.h
++++ b/lib/prototypes.h
+@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ extern int getlong (const char *numstr, /*@out@*/long int *result);
+ 
+ /* get_pid.c */
+ extern int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid);
++extern int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr);
++extern int open_pidfd(const char *pidstr);
+ 
+ /* getrange */
+ extern int getrange (const char *range,
+diff --git a/man/newgidmap.1.xml b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
+index e4ebc69e..9b7683eb 100644
+--- a/man/newgidmap.1.xml
++++ b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
+@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@
+     <para>
+       Note that newgidmap may be used only once for a given process.
+     </para>
++    <para>
++      Instead of an integer process id, the first argument may be
++      specified as <replaceable>fd:N</replaceable>, where the integer N
++      is the file descriptor number for the calling process's opened
++      file for <filename>/proc/[pid[</filename>.  In this case,
++      <command>newgidmap</command> will use
++      <refentrytitle>openat</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum>
++      to open the <filename>gid_map</filename> file under that
++      directory, avoiding a TOCTTOU in case the process exits and
++      the pid is immediately reused.
++    </para>
+ 
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+diff --git a/man/newuidmap.1.xml b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
+index f5cb5b48..ca917a77 100644
+--- a/man/newuidmap.1.xml
++++ b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
+@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@
+     <para>
+       Note that newuidmap may be used only once for a given process.
+     </para>
++    <para>
++      Instead of an integer process id, the first argument may be
++      specified as <replaceable>fd:N</replaceable>, where the integer N
++      is the file descriptor number for the calling process's opened
++      file for <filename>/proc/[pid[</filename>.  In this case,
++      <command>newuidmap</command> will use
++      <refentrytitle>openat</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum>
++      to open the <filename>uid_map</filename> file under that
++      directory, avoiding a TOCTTOU in case the process exits and
++      the pid is immediately reused.
++    </para>
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+   <refsect1 id='options'>
+diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
+index 01d0fe90..d6d29725 100644
+--- a/src/newgidmap.c
++++ b/src/newgidmap.c
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+ 
+ static void usage(void)
+ {
+-	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s <pid> <gid> <lowergid> <count> [ <gid> <lowergid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
++	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [<pid|fd:<pidfd>] <gid> <lowergid> <count> [ <gid> <lowergid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -143,15 +143,12 @@ out:
+  */
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+-	char proc_dir_name[32];
+ 	char *target_str;
+-	pid_t target;
+ 	int proc_dir_fd;
+ 	int ranges;
+ 	struct map_range *mappings;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+-	int written;
+ 	bool allow_setgroups = false;
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+@@ -168,25 +165,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	/* Find the process that needs its user namespace
+ 	 * gid mapping set.
+ 	 */
+-	target_str = argv[1];
+-	if (!get_pid(target_str, &target))
+-		usage();
+ 
+-	/* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
+-	written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
+-		target);
+-	if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: snprintf of proc path failed: %s\n",
+-			Prog, strerror(errno));
+-	}
+-
+-	proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
+-	if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not open proc directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
+-		return EXIT_FAILURE;
++	target_str = argv[1];
++	if (strlen(target_str) > 3 && strncmp(target_str, "fd:", 3) == 0) {
++		/* the user passed in a /proc/pid fd for the process */
++		target_str = &target_str[3];
++		proc_dir_fd = get_pidfd_from_fd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
++	} else {
++		proc_dir_fd = open_pidfd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
+ 	}
+-
+ 	/* Who am i? */
+ 	pw = get_my_pwent ();
+ 	if (NULL == pw) {
+@@ -200,8 +191,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for process\n"),
++			Prog);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -213,8 +204,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	    (!getdef_bool("GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS") && (getgid() != pw->pw_gid)) ||
+ 	    (pw->pw_uid != st.st_uid) ||
+ 	    (getgid() != st.st_gid)) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target %u is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
+-			Prog, target,
++		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
++			Prog,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getuid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_uid, (unsigned long int)st.st_uid,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getgid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_gid, (unsigned long int)st.st_gid);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+diff --git a/src/newuidmap.c b/src/newuidmap.c
+index e8798409..e99655c9 100644
+--- a/src/newuidmap.c
++++ b/src/newuidmap.c
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+ 
+ static void usage(void)
+ {
+-	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s <pid> <uid> <loweruid> <count> [ <uid> <loweruid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
++	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [<pid>|fd:<pidfd>] <uid> <loweruid> <count> [ <uid> <loweruid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -73,15 +73,12 @@ static void usage(void)
+  */
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+-	char proc_dir_name[32];
+ 	char *target_str;
+-	pid_t target;
+ 	int proc_dir_fd;
+ 	int ranges;
+ 	struct map_range *mappings;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+-	int written;
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+ 	log_set_progname(Prog);
+@@ -94,26 +91,20 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (argc < 2)
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	target_str = argv[1];
+ 	/* Find the process that needs its user namespace
+ 	 * uid mapping set.
+ 	 */
+-	target_str = argv[1];
+-	if (!get_pid(target_str, &target))
+-		usage();
+-
+-	/* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
+-	written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
+-		target);
+-	if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: snprintf of proc path failed: %s\n",
+-			Prog, strerror(errno));
+-	}
+-
+-	proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
+-	if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not open proc directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
+-		return EXIT_FAILURE;
++	if (strlen(target_str) > 3 && strncmp(target_str, "fd:", 3) == 0) {
++		/* the user passed in a /proc/pid fd for the process */
++		target_str = &target_str[3];
++		proc_dir_fd = get_pidfd_from_fd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
++	} else {
++		proc_dir_fd = open_pidfd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Who am i? */
+@@ -129,8 +120,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target process\n"), Prog);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -142,8 +132,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	    (!getdef_bool("GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS") && (getgid() != pw->pw_gid)) ||
+ 	    (pw->pw_uid != st.st_uid) ||
+ 	    (getgid() != st.st_gid)) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process %u is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
+-			Prog, target,
++		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
++			Prog,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getuid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_uid, (unsigned long int)st.st_uid,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getgid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_gid, (unsigned long int)st.st_gid);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
+From 7ff33fae6f9cd79c0e012671c37a172e9a681d0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 13:52:32 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] get_pidfd_from_fd: return -1 on error, not 0
+
+Fixes: 6974df39a: newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+---
+ lib/get_pid.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
+index ab91d158..5b6d9da4 100644
+--- a/lib/get_pid.c
++++ b/lib/get_pid.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
+ /*
+  * If use passed in fd:4 as an argument, then return the
+  * value '4', the fd to use.
++ * On error, return -1.
+  */
+ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ {
+@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ 	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
+ 	    || (ERANGE == errno)
+ 	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (pid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
+-		return 0;
++		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return (int)val;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
+From 05e2adf509ba0e3779dae66a276b86927a8e1e0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Vin=C3=ADcius=20dos=20Santos=20Oliveira?=
+ <vini.ipsmaker@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 18:06:02 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Validate fds created by the user
+
+write_mapping() will do the following:
+
+openat(proc_dir_fd, map_file, O_WRONLY);
+
+An attacker could create a directory containing a symlink named
+"uid_map" pointing to any file owned by root, and thus allow him to
+overwrite any root-owned file.
+---
+ lib/get_pid.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
+index 5b6d9da4..8e5e6014 100644
+--- a/lib/get_pid.c
++++ b/lib/get_pid.c
+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ {
+ 	long long int val;
+ 	char *endptr;
++	struct stat st;
++	dev_t proc_st_dev, proc_st_rdev;
+ 
+ 	errno = 0;
+ 	val = strtoll (pidfdstr, &endptr, 10);
+@@ -51,6 +53,21 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (stat("/proc/self/uid_map", &st) < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	proc_st_dev = st.st_dev;
++	proc_st_rdev = st.st_rdev;
++
++	if (fstat(val, &st) < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	if (st.st_dev != proc_st_dev || st.st_rdev != proc_st_rdev) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	return (int)val;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

shadow-4.15.0-manfix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix	2023-05-26 04:56:11.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml	2024-02-09 10:42:20.337036378 +0100
+@@ -156,20 +156,10 @@
+   <refsect1 id='setup'>
+     <title>SETUP</title>
+     <para>
+-      The <command>groupmems</command> executable should be in mode
+-      <literal>2710</literal> as user <emphasis>root</emphasis> and in group
+-      <emphasis>groups</emphasis>. The system administrator can add users to
+-      group <emphasis>groups</emphasis> to allow or disallow them using the
+-      <command>groupmems</command> utility to manage their own group
+-      membership list.
++      In this operating system the <command>groupmems</command> executable
++      is not setuid and regular users cannot use it to manipulate
++      the membership of their own group.
+     </para>
+-
+-    <programlisting>
+-	$ groupadd -r groups
+-	$ chmod 2710 groupmems
+-	$ chown root:groups groupmems
+-	$ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+-    </programlisting>
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+   <refsect1 id='configuration'>
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5
+--- shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix	2023-03-13 21:58:56.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5	2024-02-09 10:42:20.337036378 +0100
+@@ -123,10 +123,6 @@ 以下の参照表は、
+ shadow パスワード機能のどのプログラムが
+ どのパラメータを使用するかを示したものである。
+ .na
+-.IP chfn 12
+-CHFN_AUTH CHFN_RESTRICT
+-.IP chsh 12
+-CHFN_AUTH
+ .IP groupadd 12
+ GID_MAX GID_MIN
+ .IP newusers 12
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml
+--- shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix	2024-01-22 22:36:43.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml	2024-02-09 10:45:49.014407259 +0100
+@@ -144,6 +144,17 @@
+       long numeric parameters is machine-dependent.
+     </para>
+ 
++    <para>
++      Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
++      behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
++      tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
++      passwd command) should be configured elsewhere. The only values that
++      affect PAM modules are <emphasis>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> and <emphasis>SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS</emphasis>
++      for pam_unix module, <emphasis>FAIL_DELAY</emphasis> for pam_faildelay module,
++      and <emphasis>UMASK</emphasis> for pam_umask module. Refer to
++      pam(8) for more information.
++    </para>
++
+     <para>The following configuration items are provided:</para>
+ 
+     <variablelist remap='IP'>
+@@ -240,16 +251,6 @@
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+-	<term>chfn</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CHFN_AUTH</phrase>
+-	    CHFN_RESTRICT
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>chgpasswd</term>
+ 	<listitem>
+ 	  <para>
+@@ -276,14 +277,6 @@
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+-	<term>chsh</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    CHSH_AUTH LOGIN_STRING
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <!-- expiry: no variables (CONSOLE_GROUPS linked, but not used) -->
+       <!-- faillog: no variables -->
+       <varlistentry>
+@@ -352,34 +345,6 @@
+ 	  <para>LASTLOG_UID_MAX</para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+-	<term>login</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+-	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+-	    ENV_TZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+-	    ERASECHAR FAIL_DELAY
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FAILLOG_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    FAKE_SHELL
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FTMP_FILE</phrase>
+-	    HUSHLOGIN_FILE
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ISSUE_FILE</phrase>
+-	    KILLCHAR
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LASTLOG_ENAB LASTLOG_UID_MAX</phrase>
+-	    LOGIN_RETRIES
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+-	    LOGIN_TIMEOUT LOG_OK_LOGINS LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE
+-	    MOTD_FILE NOLOGINS_FILE PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+-	    QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    TTYGROUP TTYPERM TTYTYPE_FILE
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ULIMIT UMASK</phrase>
+-	    USERGROUPS_ENAB
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <!-- logoutd: no variables -->
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>newgrp / sg</term>
+@@ -451,32 +416,6 @@
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+-	<term>su</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+-	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+-	    ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ LOGIN_STRING MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+-	    MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    SULOG_FILE SU_NAME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">SU_WHEEL_ONLY</phrase>
+-	    SYSLOG_SU_ENAB
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">USERGROUPS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+-	<term>sulogin</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    ENV_HZ
+-	    ENV_TZ
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>useradd</term>
+ 	<listitem>

shadow-4.17.4-account-tools-setuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c.account-tools-setuid shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c.account-tools-setuid	2024-03-08 22:27:04.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c	2024-03-11 11:21:57.561150382 +0100
+@@ -443,9 +443,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	const char *salt;
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	bool use_pam = true;
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	bool errors = false;
+ 	intmax_t line = 0;
+@@ -469,19 +471,23 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
+ 	prefix = process_prefix_flag ("-P", argc, argv);
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (md5flg || eflg || cflg || prefix[0]) {
+ 		use_pam = false;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	OPENLOG (Prog);
+ 
+ 	check_perms ();
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (!use_pam)
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	{
+ 		is_shadow_pwd = spw_file_present ();
+ 
+@@ -543,6 +549,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 		newpwd = cp;
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (use_pam) {
+ 			if (do_pam_passwd_non_interactive (Prog, name, newpwd) != 0) {
+@@ -553,6 +560,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			}
+ 		} else
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{
+ 		const struct spwd *sp;
+ 		struct spwd newsp;
+@@ -672,9 +680,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	 * password database.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (errors) {
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (!use_pam)
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+ 			         _("%s: error detected, changes ignored\n"),
+@@ -683,9 +693,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		fail_exit (1);
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (!use_pam)
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	{
+ 	/* Save the changes */
+ 		close_files ();
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c.account-tools-setuid shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c
+--- shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c.account-tools-setuid	2024-03-08 22:27:04.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c	2024-03-11 11:16:18.365408572 +0100
+@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ 
+ #include "alloc/x/xmalloc.h"
+@@ -430,6 +432,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ static void check_perms (void)
+ {
+ 	if (!list) {
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ 		int retval;
+@@ -463,7 +466,8 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ 			fail_exit (1);
+ 		}
+ 		(void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+-#endif
++#endif /* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c.account-tools-setuid shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c
+--- shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c.account-tools-setuid	2024-03-08 22:27:04.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c	2024-03-11 11:20:07.198909046 +0100
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ static const char Prog[] = "newusers";
+ 
+ static bool rflg = false;	/* create a system account */
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ static /*@null@*//*@observer@*/char *crypt_method = NULL;
+ #define cflg (NULL != crypt_method)
+@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ static long bcrypt_rounds = 13;
+ static long yescrypt_cost = 5;
+ #endif				/* USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ static bool is_shadow;
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -97,9 +99,11 @@ NORETURN static void fail_exit (int);
+ static int add_group (const char *, const char *, gid_t *, gid_t);
+ static int get_user_id (const char *, uid_t *);
+ static int add_user (const char *, uid_t, gid_t);
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ static int update_passwd (struct passwd *, const char *);
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *, const char *);
+ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv);
+ static void check_flags (void);
+@@ -121,6 +125,7 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ 	                  "Options:\n"),
+ 	                Prog);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -b, --badname                 allow bad names\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 	(void) fprintf (usageout,
+ 	                _("  -c, --crypt-method METHOD     the crypt method (one of %s)\n"),
+@@ -136,9 +141,11 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ #endif
+ 	               );
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -h, --help                    display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --system                  create system accounts\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -s, --sha-rounds              number of rounds for the SHA, BCRYPT\n"
+@@ -146,6 +153,7 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ 	              usageout);
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	(void) fputs ("\n", usageout);
+ 
+ 	exit (status);
+@@ -405,6 +413,7 @@ static int add_user (const char *name, u
+ 	return (pw_update (&pwent) == 0) ? -1 : 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ /*
+  * update_passwd - update the password in the passwd entry
+@@ -457,6 +466,7 @@ static int update_passwd (struct passwd
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ /*
+  * add_passwd - add or update the encrypted password
+@@ -465,10 +475,13 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ {
+ 	const struct spwd *sp;
+ 	struct spwd spent;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 	char *cp;
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 	void *crypt_arg = NULL;
+ 	if (NULL != crypt_method) {
+@@ -505,13 +518,14 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ 		return update_passwd (pwd, password);
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do the first and easiest shadow file case. The user already
+ 	 * exists in the shadow password file.
+ 	 */
+ 	sp = spw_locate (pwd->pw_name);
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
++#if !defined(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	if (NULL != sp) {
+ 		spent = *sp;
+ 		if (   (NULL != crypt_method)
+@@ -547,7 +561,7 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ 	if (!streq(pwd->pw_passwd, "x")) {
+ 		return update_passwd (pwd, password);
+ 	}
+-#else				/* USE_PAM */
++#else				/* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID && !USE_PAM */
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If there is already a shadow entry, do not touch it.
+ 	 * If there is already a passwd entry with a password, do not
+@@ -558,14 +572,14 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ 	    || !streq(pwd->pw_passwd, "x")) {
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-#endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif				/* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID && !USE_PAM */
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Now the really hard case - I need to create an entirely new
+ 	 * shadow password file entry.
+ 	 */
+ 	spent.sp_namp = pwd->pw_name;
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
++#if !defined(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	if ((crypt_method != NULL) && streq(crypt_method, "NONE")) {
+ 		spent.sp_pwdp = (char *)password;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -610,35 +624,41 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ 	int c;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+         int bad_s;
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif 				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	static struct option long_options[] = {
+ 		{"badname",      no_argument,       NULL, 'b'},
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		{"crypt-method", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{"help",         no_argument,       NULL, 'h'},
+ 		{"system",       no_argument,       NULL, 'r'},
+ 		{"root",         required_argument, NULL, 'R'},
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 		{"sha-rounds",   required_argument, NULL, 's'},
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'}
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
++#if !defined(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 	                         "c:bhrs:",
+ #else				/* !USE_SHA_CRYPT && !USE_BCRYPT && !USE_YESCRYPT */
+ 	                         "c:bhr",
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+-#else				/* USE_PAM */
++#else				/* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID && !USE_PAM */
+ 	                         "bhr",
+ #endif
+ 	                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+@@ -646,11 +666,13 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 		case 'b':
+ 			allow_bad_names = true;
+ 			break;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		case 'c':
+ 			crypt_method = optarg;
+ 			break;
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		case 'h':
+ 			usage (EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ 			break;
+@@ -659,6 +681,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'R': /* no-op, handled in process_root_flag () */
+ 			break;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 		case 's':
+@@ -698,6 +721,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 			break;
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		default:
+ 			usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 			break;
+@@ -730,6 +754,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+  */
+ static void check_flags (void)
+ {
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 	if (sflg && !cflg) {
+@@ -762,6 +787,7 @@ static void check_flags (void)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1052,12 +1078,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	intmax_t line = 0;
+ 	uid_t uid;
+ 	gid_t gid;
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	intmax_t *lines = NULL;
+ 	char **usernames = NULL;
+ 	char **passwords = NULL;
+ 	size_t nusers = 0;
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	log_set_progname(Prog);
+ 	log_set_logfd(stderr);
+@@ -1195,6 +1223,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 		newpw = *pw;
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		/* keep the list of user/password for later update by PAM */
+ 		nusers++;
+@@ -1211,6 +1240,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		usernames[nusers-1] = xstrdup(fields[0]);
+ 		passwords[nusers-1] = xstrdup(fields[1]);
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		if (add_passwd (&newpw, fields[1]) != 0) {
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+ 			         _("%s: line %jd: can't update password\n"),
+@@ -1327,6 +1357,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
+ 	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	/* Now update the passwords using PAM */
+ 	for (size_t i = 0; i < nusers; i++) {
+@@ -1339,6 +1370,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	exit (EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }

shadow-utils-configure-gshadow.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+The missing #include <gshadow.h> causes the configure check to fail
+spuriously, resulting in HAVE_SHADOWGRP not being defined.
+
+Submitted upstream: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/595>
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 924254a0c8171802..6c7d9839979e037d 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
+ 		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
+ 		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
+ 				#include <shadow.h>
++				#ifdef HAVE_GSHADOW_H
++				#include <gshadow.h>
++				#endif
++				int
+ 				main()
+ 				{
+ 					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");

shadow-utils.login.defs

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ SYS_UID_MAX               999
 # Extra per user uids
 SUB_UID_MIN		   524288
 SUB_UID_MAX		600100000
-SUB_UID_COUNT		    65536
+SUB_UID_COUNT		        0
 
 #
 # Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ SYS_GID_MAX               999
 # Extra per user group ids
 SUB_GID_MIN		   524288
 SUB_GID_MAX		600100000
-SUB_GID_COUNT		    65536
+SUB_GID_COUNT		        0
 
 #
 # Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad

shadow-utils.spec

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 Summary: Utilities for managing accounts and shadow password files
 Name: shadow-utils
-Version: 4.20.0
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Version: 4.17.4
+Release: 2%{?dist}
 Epoch: 2
 License: BSD-3-Clause AND GPL-2.0-or-later
 URL: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
-Source0: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/4.20.0/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz
-Source1: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/4.20.0/shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz.asc
+Source0: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/4.17.4/shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz
+Source1: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/4.17.4/shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz.asc
 Source2: shadow-utils.useradd
 Source3: shadow-utils.login.defs
 Source4: shadow-bsd.txt
@@ -18,8 +18,16 @@ Source7: passwd.pamd
 %global includesubiddir %{_includedir}/shadow
 # Fail linking if there are undefined symbols.
 %global _ld_strict_symbol_defs 1
+# workaround: _pam_confdir definition disappeared
+%if ! %{defined _pam_confdir}
+%define _pam_confdir /etc/pam.d
+%endif
 
 ### Patches ###
+# Misc manual page changes - non-upstreamable
+Patch0: shadow-4.15.0-manfix.patch
+# Probably non-upstreamable
+Patch1: shadow-4.17.4-account-tools-setuid.patch
 
 ### Dependencies ###
 Requires: audit-libs >= 1.6.5
@@ -41,7 +49,6 @@ BuildRequires: git
 BuildRequires: itstool
 BuildRequires: libacl-devel
 BuildRequires: libattr-devel
-BuildRequires: libcmocka-devel
 BuildRequires: libeconf-devel
 BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.25.2-1
 BuildRequires: libsemanage-devel
@@ -49,7 +56,6 @@ BuildRequires: libtool
 BuildRequires: libxcrypt-devel
 BuildRequires: libxslt
 BuildRequires: make
-BuildRequires: pam
 BuildRequires: pam-devel
 
 ### Provides ###
@@ -77,9 +83,10 @@ programs for managing user and group accounts. The pwconv command
 converts passwords to the shadow password format. The pwunconv command
 unconverts shadow passwords and generates a passwd file (a standard
 UNIX password file). The pwck command checks the integrity of password
-and shadow files. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used
-for managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod
-commands are used for managing group accounts.
+and shadow files. The lastlog command prints out the last login times
+for all users. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used for
+managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod commands
+are used for managing group accounts.
 
 
 ### Subpackages ###
@@ -98,7 +105,7 @@ Requires: shadow-utils-subid = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 Development files for shadow-utils-subid.
 
 %prep
-%autosetup -p 1 -S git -n shadow-4.20.0
+%autosetup -p 1 -S git -n shadow-4.17.4
 
 iconv -f ISO88591 -t utf-8  doc/HOWTO > doc/HOWTO.utf8
 cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
@@ -106,12 +113,16 @@ cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
 cp -a %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE5} .
 cp -a %{SOURCE6} man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
 
+# Force regeneration of getdate.c
+rm lib/getdate.c
+
 %build
 autoreconf
 %configure \
-        --disable-account-tools-setuid \
-        --enable-logind=no \
-        --enable-man \
+	--disable-account-tools-setuid \
+	--enable-lastlog \
+	--enable-logind=no \
+	--enable-man \
         --enable-shadowgrp \
         --enable-shared \
         --with-audit \
@@ -123,21 +134,16 @@ autoreconf
         --with-yescrypt \
         --without-libbsd \
         --without-libcrack \
-        --without-nscd \
+	--without-nscd \
         --without-sssd
 %make_build
 
-%check
-make check
-
 %install
 %make_install gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
 install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default
 install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
 install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
 install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chpasswd
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/newusers
 install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/passwd
 
 
@@ -155,20 +161,26 @@ mv -v $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/* $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/
 # Remove binaries we don't use.
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chfn
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chsh
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/expiry
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/login
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/su
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/faillog
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/logoutd
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/nologin
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/expiry.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/logoutd.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
@@ -180,8 +192,11 @@ rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
 
 # Remove PAM service files we don't use.
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chfn
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chpasswd
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chsh
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/groupmems
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/login
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/newusers
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/su
 
 find $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir} -depth -type d -empty -delete
@@ -208,12 +223,11 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
 %license gpl-2.0.txt shadow-bsd.txt
 %attr(0644,root,root)   %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
 %attr(0644,root,root)   %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
-%config(noreplace) %{_pam_confdir}/chpasswd
-%config(noreplace) %{_pam_confdir}/newusers
 %config(noreplace) %{_pam_confdir}/passwd
 %{_bindir}/sg
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/chage
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gpasswd
+%{_bindir}/lastlog
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/newgrp
 %attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setgid=ep) %{_bindir}/newgidmap
 %attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setuid=ep) %{_bindir}/newuidmap
@@ -251,6 +265,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
 %{_mandir}/man8/chgpasswd.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/newusers.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/*conv.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/lastlog.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/vipw.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/vigr.8*
 
@@ -264,80 +279,9 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
 %{_libdir}/libsubid.so
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Jul 29 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.20.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.20.0
-
-* Wed Jul 22 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.20.0-rc3-1
-- Rebase to version 4.20.0-rc3
-
-* Fri Jul 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.19.3-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Wed May 27 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.19.3-3
-- Enable use of PAM for chpasswd and newusers
-  Resolves: #2461179 and #2283963
-
-* Thu Apr 23 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.19.3-2
-- btrfs: simplify checks improve useradd behavior for non-btrfs
-
-* Wed Feb 11 2026 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.19.3-1
-- Rebase to version 4.19.3
-  Resolves: #2426288
-
-* Tue Jan 27 2026 Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> - 2:4.19.0-6
-- chkhash.c: fix escaping in SHA-256 / SHA-512 / MD5 regexes
-
-* Mon Jan 26 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.19.0-5
-- chkhash.c: fix support for ! and * in hashes
-- usermod.c: add back optimizations
-
-* Sat Jan 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.19.0-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_44_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Mon Jan 12 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.19.0-3
-- useradd: Support config for creating home dirs as Btrfs subvolumes
-
-* Fri Jan  9 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.19.0-2
-- Enable unit-tests
-
-* Fri Jan  9 2026 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.19.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.19.0
-  Resolves: #2426288 and #2249524
-
-* Tue Nov 25 2025 Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> - 2:4.18.0-7
-- Also revert changes from -4 (last known good was -3)
-
-* Tue Nov 25 2025 Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> - 2:4.18.0-6
-- Revert changes from -5 (they were only meant for testing)
-
-* Tue Nov 25 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.18.0-5
-- Test CI
-
-* Fri Oct 31 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.18.0-4
-- Stop setting SELinux labels in chroot and prefix environments
-  Resolves: #2249524
-
-* Tue Jul 29 2025 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2:4.18.0-3
-- Revert "Stop assigning subids by default"
-  Resolves: #2382662
-
-* Fri Jul 25 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.18.0-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jul 22 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.18.0-1
-- Rebase to version 4.18.0. Resolves: #2374710
-
-* Fri Jul 18 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.17.4-5
+* Tue Jul 22 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.17.4-2
 - Stop assigning subids by default
-  Resolves: CVE-2024-56433 and #2334168
-
-* Tue Jul 15 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.17.4-4
-- FSWC: Migrate to lastlog2
-  Link: <https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Migrate_to_lastlog2>
-  Resolves: #2361588
-
-* Tue Mar 25 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.17.4-2
-- Add pam dependency for _pam_confdir missing macro. Resolves: #2354806
+  Resolves: CVE-2024-56433 and #2334169
 
 * Thu Mar 20 2025 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.17.4-1
 - Rebase to version 4.17.4. Resolves: #2353491

sources

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SHA512 (shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz) = 0b8afded372e4d37a78f38cb972c0ab877870ef6356cdd1c45be3c708af3d1496c6f87de6bf6a5b1d217d4d52d7e2d15c28b26530949cc6de0231a4028930406
-SHA512 (shadow-4.20.0.tar.xz.asc) = e4b134543768f323df30a1e450c22086d013020928d62bd3207db7f633beea3587b67802da5b575d5a794e8c2bebd7a0abeba6ed69d44bf08adc37df3bf352ac
+SHA512 (shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz) = 06830f654650312a79ccd6d729a51808b324d594abf1c05d56a2d0880936df292ec5c9fd6c7f4ad59a6d0f2bf5be0af42afe6386c24c2c087fd64fff301bade3
+SHA512 (shadow-4.17.4.tar.xz.asc) = 24f14397a975e4b09be087705a96544ff8ad76e0aa8c708ed4a53db3a295ad0a33fd0797fc570dcbb2446d4e103a3e43922a93168f65012eba5d3fe31549ebdd

tests/mhc-fedora-ci.yaml

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-provisioned_topologies:
-- shadow
-domains:
-- id: shadow
-  hosts:
-  - hostname: localhost
-    role: shadow
-    conn:
-      type: ssh
-      host: localhost
-      user: root
-    artifacts:
-    - /var/log/*

tests/sanity/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. This copyrighted material 
+# is made available to anyone wishing to use, modify, copy, or
+# redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General
+# Public License v.2.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
+# WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
+#
+# Author: Jakub Hrozek
+
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+# Example Makefile for RHTS                                          #
+# This example is geared towards a test for a specific package       #
+# It does most of the work for you, but may require further coding   #
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+
+# The toplevel namespace within which the test lives.
+TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE=CoreOS
+
+# The name of the package under test:
+PACKAGE_NAME=shadow-utils
+
+# The path of the test below the package:
+RELATIVE_PATH=sanity
+
+# Version of the Test. Used with make tag.
+export TESTVERSION=1.1
+
+# The combined namespace of the test.
+export TEST=/$(TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE)/$(PACKAGE_NAME)/$(RELATIVE_PATH)
+
+# A phony target is one that is not really the name of a file.
+# It is just a name for some commands to be executed when you
+# make an explicit request. There are two reasons to use a
+# phony target: to avoid a conflict with a file of the same
+# name, and to improve performance.
+.PHONY: all install download clean
+
+# Executables to be built should be added here, they will be generated on the system under test.
+BUILT_FILES= 
+
+# Data files, .c files, scripts anything needed to either compile the test and/or run it.
+FILES=$(METADATA) Makefile PURPOSE sanity_test.py runtest.sh
+
+run: $(FILES) build
+	./runtest.sh
+
+build: $(BUILT_FILES)
+	chmod a+x ./sanity_test.py
+	chmod a+x ./runtest.sh
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *~ *.rpm $(BUILT_FILES)
+
+# Include Common Makefile
+include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
+
+# Generate the testinfo.desc here:
+$(METADATA): Makefile
+	@touch $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Owner:        Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>" > $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Name:         $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Path:         $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestVersion:  $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "License:      GNU GPL" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Description:  Basic sanity test for shadow-utils" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestTime:     5m" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "RunFor:       $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Requires:     $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Requires:     python" >> $(METADATA)
+	rhts-lint $(METADATA)
+

tests/sanity/PURPOSE

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+This is a basic sanity test for the shadow-utils package. It is implemented
+in python on top of the unittesting.py module.
+
+Its purpose is to ensure that the binaries in the shadow-utils package behave
+as expected and its switches/options work correctly.
+
+For the most part, every binary in the shadow-utils package is represented by
+a single class named Test<BinaryName>, i.e. TestUsermod etc. There are some 
+exceptions, like TestUseraddWeirdNameTest though.
+

tests/sanity/runtest.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+. /usr/bin/rhts-environment.sh
+. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
+
+rlJournalStart
+rlFileBackup --clean /etc/default/useradd- /etc/default/useradd
+setenforce 0
+python sanity_test.py -v
+setenforce 1
+rlFileRestore
+
+EXIT=$?
+if [[ $EXIT -eq 0 ]]; then
+    RESULT="PASS"
+else
+    RESULT="FAIL"
+fi
+
+
+rlJournalEnd
+
+echo "Result: $RESULT"
+echo "Exit: $EXIT"
+report_result $TEST $RESULT $EXIT

tests/tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+# This first play always runs on the local staging system
+- hosts: localhost
+  roles:
+  - role: standard-test-beakerlib
+    tags:
+    - classic
+    - atomic
+    tests:
+    - sanity
+    required_packages:
+    - shadow-utils     # sanity test needs shadow-utils
+    - python           # sanity test needs python