Port several downstream patches from rhel

Fixes for:
- RHEL-86228, RHEL-45997
- Some coverity issues
- CVE-2022-0529 and CVE-2022-0530 (thanks Stewart Smith for head up
  about these)

.fmf/version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1

plans/all.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+summary: Basic smoke test
+discover:
+    how: fmf
+    url: https://src.fedoraproject.org/tests/unzip.git
+execute:
+    how: tmt

unzip-6.0-COVSCAN-fix-unterminated-string.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+From 06d1b08aef94984256cad3c5a54cedb10295681f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 09:31:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Possible unterminated string fix
+
+---
+ unix/unix.c   |  4 +++-
+ unix/unxcfg.h |  2 +-
+ unzip.c       | 12 ++++++++----
+ zipinfo.c     | 12 ++++++++----
+ 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/unix/unix.c b/unix/unix.c
+index 59b622d..cd57f80 100644
+--- a/unix/unix.c
++++ b/unix/unix.c
+@@ -1945,7 +1945,9 @@ void init_conversion_charsets()
+     	for(i = 0; i < sizeof(dos_charset_map)/sizeof(CHARSET_MAP); i++)
+     		if(!strcasecmp(local_charset, dos_charset_map[i].local_charset)) {
+     			strncpy(OEM_CP, dos_charset_map[i].archive_charset,
+-    					sizeof(OEM_CP));
++    					MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++
++			OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     			break;
+     		}
+     }
+diff --git a/unix/unxcfg.h b/unix/unxcfg.h
+index 8729de2..9ee8cfe 100644
+--- a/unix/unxcfg.h
++++ b/unix/unxcfg.h
+@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ typedef struct stat z_stat;
+ /*    and notfirstcall are used by do_wild().                          */
+ 
+ 
+-#define MAX_CP_NAME 25 
++#define MAX_CP_NAME 25 + 1 
+    
+ #ifdef SETLOCALE
+ #  undef SETLOCALE
+diff --git a/unzip.c b/unzip.c
+index 2d94a38..a485f2b 100644
+--- a/unzip.c
++++ b/unzip.c
+@@ -1561,7 +1561,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+         		                  "error:  a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument"));
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+-    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP));
++    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					} else { /* -I charset */
+     						++argv;
+     						if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) {
+@@ -1570,7 +1571,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+     						s = *argv;
+-    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP));
++    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					}
+     					while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */
+     				}
+@@ -1665,7 +1667,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+         		                  "error:  a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument"));
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+-    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP));
++    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					} else { /* -O charset */
+     						++argv;
+     						if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) {
+@@ -1674,7 +1677,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+     						s = *argv;
+-    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP));
++    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					}
+     					while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */
+     				}
+diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c
+index accca2a..cb7e08d 100644
+--- a/zipinfo.c
++++ b/zipinfo.c
+@@ -519,7 +519,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+         		                  "error:  a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument"));
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+-    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP));
++    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					} else { /* -I charset */
+     						++argv;
+     						if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) {
+@@ -528,7 +529,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+     						s = *argv;
+-    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP));
++    						strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					}
+     					while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */
+     				}
+@@ -568,7 +570,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+         		                  "error:  a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument"));
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+-    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP));
++    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					} else { /* -O charset */
+     						++argv;
+     						if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) {
+@@ -577,7 +580,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+     	                        return(PK_PARAM); 
+     						}
+     						s = *argv;
+-    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP));
++    						strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1);
++                OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0';
+     					}
+     					while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */
+     				}
+-- 
+2.14.5
+

unzip-6.0-CVE-2022-0529-and-0530.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+From: Steven M. Schweda <sms@antinode.info>
+Subject: Fix for CVE-2022-0529 and CVE-2022-0530
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1010355
+X-Debian-version: 6.0-27
+
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -171,8 +171,10 @@
+ static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
+   "warning:  filename too long--truncating.\n";
+ #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT
++   static ZCONST char Far UFilenameCorrupt[] =
++     "error: Unicode filename corrupt.\n";
+    static ZCONST char Far UFilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
+-     "warning:  Converted unicode filename too long--truncating.\n";
++     "warning:  Converted Unicode filename too long--truncating.\n";
+ #endif
+ static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] =
+   "warning:  extra field too long (%d).  Ignoring...\n";
+@@ -2361,16 +2363,30 @@
+                   /* convert UTF-8 to local character set */
+                   fn = utf8_to_local_string(G.unipath_filename,
+                                             G.unicode_escape_all);
+-                  /* make sure filename is short enough */
+-                  if (strlen(fn) >= FILNAMSIZ) {
+-                    fn[FILNAMSIZ - 1] = '\0';
++
++                  /* 2022-07-22 SMS, et al.  CVE-2022-0530
++                   * Detect conversion failure, emit message.
++                   * Continue with unconverted name.
++                   */
++                  if (fn == NULL)
++                  {
+                     Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-                      LoadFarString(UFilenameTooLongTrunc)));
+-                    error = PK_WARN;
++                     LoadFarString(UFilenameCorrupt)));
++                    error = PK_ERR;
++                  }
++                  else
++                  {
++                    /* make sure filename is short enough */
++                    if (strlen(fn) >= FILNAMSIZ) {
++                      fn[FILNAMSIZ - 1] = '\0';
++                      Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++                        LoadFarString(UFilenameTooLongTrunc)));
++                      error = PK_WARN;
++                    }
++                    /* replace filename with converted UTF-8 */
++                    strcpy(G.filename, fn);
++                    free(fn);
+                   }
+-                  /* replace filename with converted UTF-8 */
+-                  strcpy(G.filename, fn);
+-                  free(fn);
+                 }
+ # endif /* UNICODE_WCHAR */
+                 if (G.unipath_filename != G.filename_full)
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@
+      "\nwarning:  Unicode Path version > 1\n";
+    static ZCONST char Far UnicodeMismatchError[] =
+      "\nwarning:  Unicode Path checksum invalid\n";
++   static ZCONST char Far UFilenameTooLongTrunc[] =
++     "warning:  filename too long (P1) -- truncating.\n";
+ #endif
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1915,7 +1917,7 @@
+     Sets both local header and central header fields.  Not terribly clever,
+     but it means that this procedure is only called in one place.
+ 
+-    2014-12-05 SMS.
++    2014-12-05 SMS.  (oCERT.org report.)  CVE-2014-8141.
+     Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling
+     makeint64() or makelong().  Replaced various sizeof() values with
+     simple ("4" or "8") constants.  (The Zip64 structures do not depend
+@@ -1947,7 +1949,7 @@
+ 
+         if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64)
+         {
+-          int offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
++          unsigned offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
+ 
+           if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL))
+           {
+@@ -2046,7 +2049,7 @@
+         }
+         if (eb_id == EF_UNIPATH) {
+ 
+-          int offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
++          unsigned offset = EB_HEADSIZE;
+           ush ULen = eb_len - 5;
+           ulg chksum = CRCVAL_INITIAL;
+ 
+@@ -2504,16 +2507,17 @@
+   int state_dependent;
+   int wsize = 0;
+   int max_bytes = MB_CUR_MAX;
+-  char buf[9];
++  char buf[ MB_CUR_MAX+ 1];             /* ("+1" not really needed?) */
+   char *buffer = NULL;
+   char *local_string = NULL;
++  size_t buffer_size;                   /* CVE-2022-0529 */
+ 
+   for (wsize = 0; wide_string[wsize]; wsize++) ;
+ 
+   if (max_bytes < MAX_ESCAPE_BYTES)
+     max_bytes = MAX_ESCAPE_BYTES;
+-
+-  if ((buffer = (char *)malloc(wsize * max_bytes + 1)) == NULL) {
++  buffer_size = wsize * max_bytes + 1;          /* Reused below. */
++  if ((buffer = (char *)malloc( buffer_size)) == NULL) {
+     return NULL;
+   }
+ 
+@@ -2551,8 +2555,28 @@
+     } else {
+       /* no MB for this wide */
+         /* use escape for wide character */
+-        char *escape_string = wide_to_escape_string(wide_string[i]);
+-        strcat(buffer, escape_string);
++        size_t buffer_len;
++        size_t escape_string_len;
++        char *escape_string;
++        int err_msg = 0;
++
++        escape_string = wide_to_escape_string(wide_string[i]);
++        buffer_len = strlen( buffer);
++        escape_string_len = strlen( escape_string);
++
++        /* Append escape string, as space allows. */
++        /* 2022-07-18 SMS, et al.  CVE-2022-0529 */
++        if (escape_string_len > buffer_size- buffer_len- 1)
++        {
++            escape_string_len = buffer_size- buffer_len- 1;
++            if (err_msg == 0)
++            {
++                err_msg = 1;
++                Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++                 LoadFarString( UFilenameTooLongTrunc)));
++            }
++        }
++        strncat( buffer, escape_string, escape_string_len);
+         free(escape_string);
+     }
+   }
+@@ -2604,9 +2628,18 @@
+   ZCONST char *utf8_string;
+   int escape_all;
+ {
+-  zwchar *wide = utf8_to_wide_string(utf8_string);
+-  char *loc = wide_to_local_string(wide, escape_all);
+-  free(wide);
++  zwchar *wide;
++  char *loc = NULL;
++
++  wide = utf8_to_wide_string( utf8_string);
++
++  /* 2022-07-25 SMS, et al.  CVE-2022-0530 */
++  if (wide != NULL)
++  {
++    loc = wide_to_local_string( wide, escape_all);
++    free( wide);
++  }
++
+   return loc;
+ }
+ 

unzip-6.0-RHEL-86228.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+From: Roy Tam
+Subject: Handle Microsoft ZIP64 files by ignoring invalid "Total number of disks" field
+Origin: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/42/
+Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/42/
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1064000
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/unzip/+bug/2051952
+X-Debian-version: 6.0-29
+
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@
+     fprintf(stdout,"\nnumber of disks (ECR) %u, (ECLOC64) %lu\n",
+             G.ecrec.number_this_disk, ecloc64_total_disks); fflush(stdout);
+ #endif
+-    if ((G.ecrec.number_this_disk != 0xFFFF) &&
++    if ((G.ecrec.number_this_disk != 0xFFFF) && ecloc64_total_disks &&
+         (G.ecrec.number_this_disk != ecloc64_total_disks - 1)) {
+       /* Note: For some unknown reason, the developers at PKWARE decided to
+          store the "zip64 total disks" value as a counter starting from 1,

unzip-6.0-alt-iconv-utf8.patch

@@ -174,11 +174,11 @@ Index: unzip-6.0/unzip.c
 +#else /* UNIX */
 +static ZCONST char Far ZipInfoUsageLine3[] = "miscellaneous options:\n\
 +  -h  print header line       -t  print totals for listed files or for all\n\
-+  -z  print zipfile comment  %c-T%c print file times in sortable decimal format\
-+\n %c-C%c be case-insensitive   %s\
++  -z  print zipfile comment   -T  print file times in sortable decimal format\
++\n  -C  be case-insensitive   %s\
 +  -x  exclude filenames that follow from listing\n\
-+  -O CHARSET  specify a character encoding for DOS, Windows and OS/2 archives\n\
-+  -I CHARSET  specify a character encoding for UNIX and other archives\n";
++  -O  CHARSET  specify a character encoding for DOS, Windows and OS/2 archives\n\
++  -I  CHARSET  specify a character encoding for UNIX and other archives\n";
 +#endif /* !UNIX */
  #ifdef MORE
     static ZCONST char Far ZipInfoUsageLine4[] =
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ Index: unzip-6.0/unzip.c
 +  -U  use escapes for all non-ASCII Unicode  -UU ignore any Unicode fields\n\
 +  -C  match filenames case-insensitively     -L  make (some) names \
 +lowercase\n %-42s  -V  retain VMS version numbers\n%s\
-+  -O CHARSET  specify a character encoding for DOS, Windows and OS/2 archives\n\
-+  -I CHARSET  specify a character encoding for UNIX and other archives\n\n";
++  -O  CHARSET  specify a character encoding for DOS, Windows and OS/2 archives\n\
++  -I  CHARSET  specify a character encoding for UNIX and other archives\n\n";
  #else /* !VMS */
  static ZCONST char Far UnzipUsageLine4[] = "\
  modifiers:\n\

unzip-6.0-cve-2018-1000035-heap-based-overflow.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+--- a/fileio.c	2014-12-05 05:06:05 -0600
++++ b/fileio.c	2017-11-14 01:06:28 -0600
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+-  Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP.  All rights reserved.
++  Copyright (c) 1990-2017 Info-ZIP.  All rights reserved.
+ 
+   See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later
+   (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use.
+@@ -1582,6 +1582,8 @@
+     int r = IZ_PW_ENTERED;
+     char *m;
+     char *prompt;
++    char *ep;
++    char *zp;
+ 
+ #ifndef REENTRANT
+     /* tell picky compilers to shut up about "unused variable" warnings */
+@@ -1590,9 +1592,12 @@
+ 
+     if (*rcnt == 0) {           /* First call for current entry */
+         *rcnt = 2;
+-        if ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL) {
+-            sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt),
+-                    FnFilter1(zfn), FnFilter2(efn));
++        zp = FnFilter1( zfn);
++        ep = FnFilter2( efn);
++        prompt = (char *)malloc(        /* Slightly too long (2* "%s"). */
++         sizeof( PasswPrompt)+ strlen( zp)+ strlen( ep));
++        if (prompt != (char *)NULL) {
++            sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt), zp, ep);
+             m = prompt;
+         } else
+             m = (char *)LoadFarString(PasswPrompt2);

unzip-6.0-cve-2018-18384.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+--- unzip60/list.c	
++++ unzip60/list.c	
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G)    /* return PK-type
+ {
+     int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
+ #ifndef WINDLL
+-    char sgn, cfactorstr[13];
++    char sgn, cfactorstr[1+10+1+1];	/* <sgn><int>%NUL */
+     int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
+ #endif
+     int date_format;
+@@ -389,9 +389,9 @@ int list_files(__G)    /* return PK-type
+             }
+ #else /* !WINDLL */
+             if (cfactor == 100)
+-                sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
++                snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
+             else
+-                sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
++                snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
+             if (longhdr)
+                 Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(LongHdrStats),
+                   FmZofft(G.crec.ucsize, "8", "u"), methbuf,
+@@ -471,9 +471,9 @@ int list_files(__G)    /* return PK-type
+ 
+ #else /* !WINDLL */
+         if (cfactor == 100)
+-            sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
++            snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactor100));
+         else
+-            sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
++            snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor);
+         if (longhdr) {
+             Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(LongFileTrailer),
+               FmZofft(tot_ucsize, "8", "u"), FmZofft(tot_csize, "8", "u"),

unzip-6.0-fix-warning-messages-on-big-files.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>
+Subject: Fix lame code in fileio.c
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/929502
+X-Debian-version: 6.0-23
+
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -2477,6 +2477,7 @@
+      */
+     return (((zusz_t)sig[7]) << 56)
+         + (((zusz_t)sig[6]) << 48)
++        + (((zusz_t)sig[5]) << 40)
+         + (((zusz_t)sig[4]) << 32)
+         + (zusz_t)((((ulg)sig[3]) << 24)
+                  + (((ulg)sig[2]) << 16)

unzip-6.0-sast.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- a/envargs.c	2005-03-04 03:23:38.000000000 +0100
++++ b/envargs.c	2024-11-26 13:17:22.289650230 +0100
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
+ 
+             /* remove escape characters */
+             while ((argstart = MBSCHR(argstart, '\\')) != (char *)NULL) {
+-                strcpy(argstart, argstart + 1);
++                memmove(argstart, argstart + 1, strlen(argstart + 1) + 1);
+                 if (*argstart)
+                     ++argstart;
+             }

unzip-6.0-wcstombs-fortify.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- unzip60/extract.c	2023-01-25 07:05:58.742254870 -0500
++++ unzip60.new/extract.c	2023-01-25 07:04:48.073435349 -0500
+@@ -2889,7 +2889,7 @@ char *fnfilter(raw, space, size)   /* co
+             strcpy( (char *)space, raw);
+             return (char *)space;
+         }
+-        woslen = wcstombs( newraw, wostring, (woslen * MB_CUR_MAX) + 1);
++        woslen = wcstombs( newraw, wostring, woslen + 1);
+ 
+         if (size > 0) {
+             slim = space + size - 4;

unzip-gnu89-build.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+unzip uses C89-only features, so it needs to be built in C89 mode.
+
+diff --git a/unix/Makefile b/unix/Makefile
+index ab32270cf4b9b2cf..5eabbe13095e1f58 100644
+--- a/unix/Makefile
++++ b/unix/Makefile
+@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ generic:	flags	   # now try autoconfigure first
+ #	make $(MAKEF) unzips CF="${CF} `cat flags`"
+ 
+ generic_gcc:
+-	$(MAKE) $(MAKEF) generic CC=gcc IZ_BZIP2="$(IZ_BZIP2)"
++	$(MAKE) $(MAKEF) generic CC="gcc -std=gnu89" IZ_BZIP2="$(IZ_BZIP2)"
+ 
+ # extensions to perform SVR4 package-creation after compilation
+ generic_pkg:	generic svr4package

unzip-zipbomb-manpage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 6fe72291a5563cdbcd2bdd87e36528537b7cdcfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 14:17:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] update the man page
+
+---
+ man/unzip.1 | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/man/unzip.1 b/man/unzip.1
+index 21816d1..4d66073 100644
+--- a/man/unzip.1
++++ b/man/unzip.1
+@@ -850,6 +850,8 @@ the specified zipfiles were not found.
+ invalid options were specified on the command line.
+ .IP 11
+ no matching files were found.
++.IP 12
++invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip-bomb). The zip-bomb checks can be disabled by using the UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION=TRUE environment variable.
+ .IP 50
+ the disk is (or was) full during extraction.
+ .IP 51
+-- 
+2.23.0
+

unzip-zipbomb-part1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:20:32 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input state.
+
+---
+ fileio.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c
+index c042987..bc00d74 100644
+--- a/fileio.c
++++ b/fileio.c
+@@ -530,8 +530,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G)
+          * This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in
+          * defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize
+          * before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0)
+-         * (single exception: see read_byte()'s  "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
++         * (single exception: see readbyte()'s  "G.csize <= 0" handling) !!
+          */
++        if (G.csize < 0L)
++            G.csize = 0L;
+         G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize;
+         G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize;
+         G.incnt_leftover = 0;

unzip-zipbomb-part2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+From 47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 22:01:18 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
+
+This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that
+overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the
+end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries
+to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid
+zip file is rejected.
+
+See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's
+analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs.
+
+The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files
+so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any
+bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are
+considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed
+or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to
+be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is
+contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as
+invalid.
+
+This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in
+undefer_input() that misplaced the input state."
+---
+ extract.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ globals.c |   1 +
+ globals.h |   3 +
+ process.c |  11 ++++
+ unzip.h   |   1 +
+ 5 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 1acd769..0973a33 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -319,6 +319,125 @@ static ZCONST char Far UnsupportedExtraField[] =
+   "\nerror:  unsupported extra-field compression type (%u)--skipping\n";
+ static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] =
+   "error [%s]:  bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n";
++static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] =
++  "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n";
++static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] =
++  "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n";
++
++
++
++
++
++/* A growable list of spans. */
++typedef zoff_t bound_t;
++typedef struct {
++    bound_t beg;        /* start of the span */
++    bound_t end;        /* one past the end of the span */
++} span_t;
++typedef struct {
++    span_t *span;       /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of spans */
++    size_t num;         /* number of spans in the list */
++    size_t max;         /* allocated number of spans (num <= max) */
++} cover_t;
++
++/*
++ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val.
++ * If there is no such span, then cover->num is returned.
++ */
++static size_t cover_find(cover, val)
++    cover_t *cover;
++    bound_t val;
++{
++    size_t lo = 0, hi = cover->num;
++    while (lo < hi) {
++        size_t mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
++        if (val < cover->span[mid].beg)
++            hi = mid;
++        else
++            lo = mid + 1;
++    }
++    return hi;
++}
++
++/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */
++static int cover_within(cover, val)
++    cover_t *cover;
++    bound_t val;
++{
++    size_t pos = cover_find(cover, val);
++    return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any
++ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg
++ * must be less than end.
++ *
++ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for
++ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any
++ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the
++ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to
++ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory
++ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned.
++ */
++static int cover_add(cover, beg, end)
++    cover_t *cover;
++    bound_t beg;
++    bound_t end;
++{
++    size_t pos;
++    int prec, foll;
++
++    if (beg >= end)
++    /* The new span is invalid. */
++        return -1;
++
++    /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it does not
++       overlap with any existing spans. */
++    pos = cover_find(cover, beg);
++    if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) ||
++        (pos < cover->num && end > cover->span[pos].beg))
++        return 1;
++
++    /* Check for adjacencies. */
++    prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end;
++    foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg;
++    if (prec && foll) {
++        /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans. Merge the
++           following span into the preceding span, and delete the following
++           span. */
++        cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end;
++        cover->num--;
++        memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1,
++                (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
++    }
++    else if (prec)
++        /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span. Extend the end
++           of the preceding span. */
++        cover->span[pos - 1].end = end;
++    else if (foll)
++        /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span. Extend the
++           beginning of the following span. */
++        cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
++    else {
++        /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the following
++           spans. Assure that there is room and insert the span.  */
++        if (cover->num == cover->max) {
++            size_t max = cover->max == 0 ? 16 : cover->max << 1;
++            span_t *span = realloc(cover->span, max * sizeof(span_t));
++            if (span == NULL)
++                return -2;
++            cover->span = span;
++            cover->max = max;
++        }
++        memmove(cover->span + pos + 1, cover->span + pos,
++                (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
++        cover->num++;
++        cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
++        cover->span[pos].end = end;
++    }
++    return 0;
++}
+ 
+ 
+ 
+@@ -374,6 +493,29 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+     }
+ #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
+ 
++    /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
++       span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
++    if (G.cover == NULL) {
++        G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
++        if (G.cover == NULL) {
++            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++              LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++            return PK_MEM;
++        }
++        ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL;
++        ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
++    }
++    ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
++    if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
++         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
++        cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
++                  G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
++                  G.ziplen) != 0) {
++        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++          LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++        return PK_MEM;
++    }
++
+ /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     The basic idea of this function is as follows.  Since the central di-
+     rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie at the
+@@ -591,7 +733,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+             if (error > error_in_archive)
+                 error_in_archive = error;
+             /* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break) */
+-            if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) {
++            if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC ||
++                error == PK_BOMB) {
+                 /* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ... */
+                 reached_end = FALSE;
+                 /* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */
+@@ -1060,6 +1203,11 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+ 
+         /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset);  */
+         request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes;
++        if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
++            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++              LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++            return PK_BOMB;
++        }
+         inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ;
+         bufstart = request - inbuf_offset;
+ 
+@@ -1591,6 +1739,18 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+             return IZ_CTRLC;        /* cancel operation by user request */
+         }
+ #endif
++        error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
++                          G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
++        if (error < 0) {
++            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++              LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++            return PK_MEM;
++        }
++        if (error != 0) {
++            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++              LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++            return PK_BOMB;
++        }
+ #ifdef MACOS  /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */
+         UserStop();
+ #endif
+@@ -1992,6 +2152,34 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+     }
+ 
+     undefer_input(__G);
++
++    if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
++        /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature
++         * ambiguity)
++         */
++#       define SIG 0x08074b50
++#       define LOW 0xffffffff
++        uch buf[12];
++        unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12);
++        ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf);
++        ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4);
++        ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */
++        if (crc == SIG &&                       /* if not SIG, no signature */
++            (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG ||             /* if not SIG, have signature */
++             (clen == SIG &&                    /* if not SIG, no signature */
++              ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG ||   /* if not SIG, have signature */
++               (ulen == SIG &&                  /* if not SIG, no signature */
++                (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
++                                                /* if not SIG, have signature */
++                )))))
++                   /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
++                   shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
++        if (G.zip64)
++            shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
++        if (shy)
++            error = PK_ERR;
++    }
++
+     return error;
+ 
+ } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */
+diff --git a/globals.c b/globals.c
+index fa8cca5..1e0f608 100644
+--- a/globals.c
++++ b/globals.c
+@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ Uz_Globs *globalsCtor()
+ # if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS))
+     uO.D_flag=1;    /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */
+ # endif
++    G.cover = NULL;     /* not allocated yet */
+ #endif
+ 
+     uO.lflag=(-1);
+diff --git a/globals.h b/globals.h
+index 11b7215..2bdcdeb 100644
+--- a/globals.h
++++ b/globals.h
+@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@ typedef struct Globals {
+     ecdir_rec       ecrec;         /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */
+     z_stat   statbuf;              /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */
+ 
++    int zip64;                     /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */
++
+     int      mem_mode;
+     uch      *outbufptr;           /* extract.c static */
+     ulg      outsize;              /* extract.c static */
+     int      reported_backslash;   /* extract.c static */
+     int      disk_full;
+     int      newfile;
++    void     **cover;              /* used in extract.c for bomb detection */
+ 
+     int      didCRlast;            /* fileio static */
+     ulg      numlines;             /* fileio static: number of lines printed */
+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
+index 1e9a1e1..d2e4dc3 100644
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ void free_G_buffers(__G)     /* releases all memory allocated in global vars */
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */
++    if (G.cover != NULL) {
++        free(*(G.cover));
++        free(G.cover);
++        G.cover = NULL;
++    }
++
+ } /* end function free_G_buffers() */
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1890,6 +1897,8 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
+ #define Z64FLGS 0xffff
+ #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
+ 
++    G.zip64 = FALSE;
++
+     if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
+         return PK_COOL;
+ 
+@@ -1927,6 +1936,8 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
+ #if 0
+           break;                /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */
+ #endif /* 0 */
++
++          G.zip64 = TRUE;
+         }
+
+         /* Skip this extra field block. */
+diff --git a/unzip.h b/unzip.h
+index 5b2a326..ed24a5b 100644
+--- a/unzip.h
++++ b/unzip.h
+@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ typedef struct _Uzp_cdir_Rec {
+ #define PK_NOZIP           9   /* zipfile not found */
+ #define PK_PARAM          10   /* bad or illegal parameters specified */
+ #define PK_FIND           11   /* no files found */
++#define PK_BOMB           12   /* likely zip bomb */
+ #define PK_DISK           50   /* disk full */
+ #define PK_EOF            51   /* unexpected EOF */
+ 

unzip-zipbomb-part3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From 6d351831be705cc26d897db44f878a978f4138fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 20:43:17 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Do not raise a zip bomb alert for a misplaced central
+ directory.
+
+There is a zip-like file in the Firefox distribution, omni.ja,
+which is a zip container with the central directory placed at the
+start of the file instead of after the local entries as required
+by the zip standard. This commit marks the actual location of the
+central directory, as well as the end of central directory records,
+as disallowed locations. This now permits such containers to not
+raise a zip bomb alert, where in fact there are no overlaps.
+---
+ extract.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ process.c |  6 ++++++
+ unzpriv.h | 10 ++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 0973a33..1b73cb0 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -493,8 +493,11 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+     }
+ #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
+ 
+-    /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
+-       span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
++    /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with
++       spans that cover any extra bytes at the start, the central directory,
++       the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end of central
++       directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central directory
++       record, if present. */
+     if (G.cover == NULL) {
+         G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
+         if (G.cover == NULL) {
+@@ -506,15 +509,25 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+         ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
+     }
+     ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
+-    if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
+-         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
+-        cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
++    if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
+                   G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
+-                  G.ziplen) != 0) {
++                  G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory +
++                  G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) {
+         Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+           LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+         return PK_MEM;
+     }
++    if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
++         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
++        (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 &&
++         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start,
++                   G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) ||
++        cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start,
++                  G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) {
++        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++          LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++        return PK_BOMB;
++    }
+ 
+ /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     The basic idea of this function is as follows.  Since the central di-
+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
+index d2e4dc3..d75d405 100644
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -1408,6 +1408,10 @@ static int find_ecrec64(__G__ searchlen)         /* return PK-class error */
+ 
+     /* Now, we are (almost) sure that we have a Zip64 archive. */
+     G.ecrec.have_ecr64 = 1;
++    G.ecrec.ec_start -= ECLOC64_SIZE+4;
++    G.ecrec.ec64_start = ecrec64_start_offset;
++    G.ecrec.ec64_end = ecrec64_start_offset +
++                       12 + makeint64(&byterec[ECREC64_LENGTH]);
+ 
+     /* Update the "end-of-central-dir offset" for later checks. */
+     G.real_ecrec_offset = ecrec64_start_offset;
+@@ -1542,6 +1546,8 @@ static int find_ecrec(__G__ searchlen)          /* return PK-class error */
+       makelong(&byterec[OFFSET_START_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY]);
+     G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length =
+       makeword(&byterec[ZIPFILE_COMMENT_LENGTH]);
++    G.ecrec.ec_start = G.real_ecrec_offset;
++    G.ecrec.ec_end = G.ecrec.ec_start + 22 + G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length;
+ 
+     /* Now, we have to read the archive comment, BEFORE the file pointer
+        is moved away backwards to seek for a Zip64 ECLOC64 structure.
+diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h
+index dc9eff5..297b3c7 100644
+--- a/unzpriv.h
++++ b/unzpriv.h
+@@ -2185,6 +2185,16 @@ typedef struct VMStimbuf {
+        int have_ecr64;                  /* valid Zip64 ecdir-record exists */
+        int is_zip64_archive;            /* Zip64 ecdir-record is mandatory */
+        ush zipfile_comment_length;
++       zusz_t ec_start, ec_end;         /* offsets of start and end of the
++                                           end of central directory record,
++                                           including if present the Zip64
++                                           end of central directory locator,
++                                           which immediately precedes the
++                                           end of central directory record */
++       zusz_t ec64_start, ec64_end;     /* if have_ecr64 is true, then these
++                                           are the offsets of the start and
++                                           end of the Zip64 end of central
++                                           directory record */
+    } ecdir_rec;
+ 
+ 

unzip-zipbomb-part4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 5e2efcd633a4a1fb95a129a75508e7d769e767be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2020 20:36:28 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in UZbunzip2() that incorrectly updated G.incnt.
+
+The update assumed a full buffer, which is not always full. This
+could result in a false overlapped element detection when a small
+bzip2-compressed file was unzipped. This commit remedies that.
+---
+ extract.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index d9866f9..0cb7bfc 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -3010,7 +3010,7 @@ __GDEF
+ #endif
+ 
+     G.inptr = (uch *)bstrm.next_in;
+-    G.incnt = (G.inbuf + INBUFSIZ) - G.inptr;  /* reset for other routines */
++    G.incnt -= G.inptr - G.inbuf;       /* reset for other routines */
+ 
+ uzbunzip_cleanup_exit:
+     err = BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(&bstrm);

unzip-zipbomb-part5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 5c572555cf5d80309a07c30cf7a54b2501493720 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2020 21:39:09 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in UZinflate() that incorrectly updated G.incnt.
+
+The update assumed a full buffer, which is not always full. This
+could result in a false overlapped element detection when a small
+deflate-compressed file was unzipped using an old zlib. This
+commit remedies that.
+---
+ inflate.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/inflate.c b/inflate.c
+index 2f5a015..70e3cc0 100644
+--- a/inflate.c
++++ b/inflate.c
+@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ int UZinflate(__G__ is_defl64)
+       G.dstrm.total_out));
+ 
+     G.inptr = (uch *)G.dstrm.next_in;
+-    G.incnt = (G.inbuf + INBUFSIZ) - G.inptr;  /* reset for other routines */
++    G.incnt -= G.inptr - G.inbuf;       /* reset for other routines */
+ 
+ uzinflate_cleanup_exit:
+     err = inflateReset(&G.dstrm);

unzip-zipbomb-part6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From 122050bac16fae82a460ff739fb1ca0f106e9d85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2021 13:09:34 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Determine Zip64 status entry-by-entry instead of for entire
+ file.
+
+Fixes a bug for zip files with mixed Zip64 and not Zip64 entries,
+which resulted in an incorrect data descriptor length. The bug is
+seen when a Zip64 entry precedes a non-Zip64 entry, in which case
+the data descriptor would have been assumed to be larger than it
+is, resulting in an incorrect bomb warning due to a perceived
+overlap with the next entry. This commit determines and saves the
+Zip64 status for each entry based on the central directory, and
+then computes the length of each data descriptor accordingly.
+---
+ extract.c | 5 +++--
+ globals.h | 2 --
+ process.c | 4 +---
+ unzpriv.h | 1 +
+ 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 504afd6..878817d 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -658,6 +658,7 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+                     break;
+                 }
+             }
++            G.pInfo->zip64 = FALSE;
+             if ((error = do_string(__G__ G.crec.extra_field_length,
+                 EXTRA_FIELD)) != 0)
+             {
+@@ -2187,12 +2188,12 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+              (clen == SIG &&                    /* if not SIG, no signature */
+               ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG ||   /* if not SIG, have signature */
+                (ulen == SIG &&                  /* if not SIG, no signature */
+-                (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
++                (G.pInfo->zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
+                                                 /* if not SIG, have signature */
+                 )))))
+                    /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
+                    shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
+-        if (G.zip64)
++        if (G.pInfo->zip64)
+             shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
+         if (shy)
+             error = PK_ERR;
+diff --git a/globals.h b/globals.h
+index f9c6daf..a883c90 100644
+--- a/globals.h
++++ b/globals.h
+@@ -261,8 +261,6 @@ typedef struct Globals {
+     ecdir_rec       ecrec;         /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */
+     z_stat   statbuf;              /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */
+ 
+-    int zip64;                     /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */
+-
+     int      mem_mode;
+     uch      *outbufptr;           /* extract.c static */
+     ulg      outsize;              /* extract.c static */
+diff --git a/process.c b/process.c
+index d75d405..d643c6f 100644
+--- a/process.c
++++ b/process.c
+@@ -1903,8 +1903,6 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
+ #define Z64FLGS 0xffff
+ #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
+ 
+-    G.zip64 = FALSE;
+-
+     if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
+         return PK_COOL;
+ 
+@@ -1943,7 +1941,7 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len)
+           break;                /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */
+ #endif /* 0 */
+ 
+-          G.zip64 = TRUE;
++          G.pInfo->zip64 = TRUE;
+         }
+ 
+         /* Skip this extra field block. */
+diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h
+index 09f288e..75b3359 100644
+--- a/unzpriv.h
++++ b/unzpriv.h
+@@ -2034,6 +2034,7 @@ typedef struct min_info {
+ #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT
+     unsigned GPFIsUTF8: 1;   /* crec gen_purpose_flag UTF-8 bit 11 is set */
+ #endif
++    unsigned zip64: 1;       /* true if entry has Zip64 extra block */
+ #ifndef SFX
+     char Far *cfilname;      /* central header version of filename */
+ #endif

unzip-zipbomb-part7.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From af0d07f95809653b669d88aa0f424c6d5aa48ba0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <fork@madler.net>
+Date: Sat, 2 Jul 2022 14:35:04 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Be more liberal in the acceptance of data descriptors.
+
+Previously the zip64 flag determined the size of the lengths in the
+data descriptor. This is compliant with the zip format. However, a
+bug in the Java zip library results in an incorrect setting of that
+flag. This commit permits either 32-bit or 64-bit lengths, auto-
+detecting which it is, which works around the Java bug.
+---
+ extract.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 878817d..b1c74df 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -2173,30 +2173,130 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+     undefer_input(__G);
+ 
+     if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
+-        /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature
+-         * ambiguity)
+-         */
+-#       define SIG 0x08074b50
+-#       define LOW 0xffffffff
+-        uch buf[12];
+-        unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12);
+-        ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf);
+-        ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4);
+-        ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */
+-        if (crc == SIG &&                       /* if not SIG, no signature */
+-            (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG ||             /* if not SIG, have signature */
+-             (clen == SIG &&                    /* if not SIG, no signature */
+-              ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG ||   /* if not SIG, have signature */
+-               (ulen == SIG &&                  /* if not SIG, no signature */
+-                (G.pInfo->zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
+-                                                /* if not SIG, have signature */
+-                )))))
+-                   /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
+-                   shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
+-        if (G.pInfo->zip64)
+-            shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
+-        if (shy)
++        // Skip over the data descriptor. We need to correctly position the
++        // read pointer after the data descriptor for the proper detection of
++        // overlapped zip file components.
++        //
++        // We need to resolve an ambiguity over four possible data descriptor
++        // formats. We check for all four, and pick the longest match. The data
++        // descriptor can have a signature or not, and it can use four or
++        // eight-byte lengths. The zip format requires resolving the ambiguity
++        // of a signature or not, but it uses the zip64 flag to determine
++        // whether the lengths are four or eight bytes. However there is a bug
++        // in the Java zip library that applies the wrong value of that flag.
++        // This works around that bug by always trying both length formats.
++        //
++        // So why the longest match? And does this resolve the ambiguity? No,
++        // it doesn't definitively resolve the ambiguity. However choosing the
++        // longest match at least resolves it for a normal zip file, where the
++        // bytes following the data descriptor must be another zip signature
++        // that is not a data descriptor signature. There are a few specific
++        // cases for which more than one of the formats will match the given
++        // CRC and lengths. The most plausible is between four and eight-byte
++        // lengths, either with or without a signature. That only occurs for an
++        // entry with an uncompressed size of zero. We consider the data
++        // descriptor to be a vector of four-byte values. Then the possible
++        // data descriptors are [(s) 0 c 0] and [(s) 0 c 0 0 0], where (s) is
++        // the optional signature, and c is the compressed length. c would be
++        // two for the Deflate compressed data format. These look the same, so
++        // if the file contains [(s) 0 c 0 0 0], then we cannot discriminate
++        // them. However if the data descriptor was intended to be [(s) 0 c 0],
++        // then it has been followed by eight zero bytes in the zip file for
++        // some reason. For a normal zip file this cannot be the case. The data
++        // descriptor would always be immediately followed by another zip file
++        // signature, which is four bytes that are not zeros. The other cases
++        // where more than one format matches are vanishingly unlikely, but the
++        // longest match strategy resolves those as well in a normal zip file.
++        // Those pairs are [s s s] vs. [s s s s], [s s s] vs. [s s s 0 s 0],
++        // and [s s s s s] vs. [s s s s s s]. For all, s is the signature for a
++        // data descriptor. For the first two we have an entry whose CRC,
++        // compressed length, and uncompressed length are all equal (!), and
++        // are all equal to the signature (!!). If this occurs, clearly someone
++        // is messing with us. However the strategy works nonetheless. We see
++        // that if the shorter descriptor, [s s s] were what was intended, then
++        // it has been followed by either four zero bytes or a data descriptor
++        // signature. Neither can occur for a normal zip file, where it must be
++        // followed by a signature that is not a data descriptor signature. So
++        // the longest match is the correct choice. The final case is outright
++        // insane, since the compressed and uncompressed lengths are the data
++        // descriptor signature repeated twice to make a 64-bit length, which
++        // is about 6e17. The largest drive available as I write this is 100TB,
++        // which is one six thousandth of that length. If I apply Moore's law
++        // to drive capacity, we might get to 6e17 about 25 years from now. If
++        // this code is still in use then (I've seen other code I've written in
++        // use for over 30 years), then we're still in luck. A data descriptor
++        // cannot be followed by a data descriptor signature in a normal zip
++        // file. The longest match strategy continues to work.
++        //
++        // So what is a not normal zip file, where these assumptions might fall
++        // apart? zip files have been used in a non-standard way as a poor
++        // substitute for a file system, with entries deleted and perhaps
++        // others replacing them partially, with fragmented zip files being the
++        // result. Then all bets are off as to what might or might not follow a
++        // data descriptor. Though if this sort of data descriptor ambiguity
++        // falls in one of those gaps, then there should be no adverse
++        // consequences for picking the unintended one.
++        int len = 0;
++#       define SIG 0x08074b50           // optional data descriptor signature
++#ifdef LARGE_FILE_SUPPORT
++        uch buf[24];
++        int got = readbuf((char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
++        if (got >= 24 && makelong(buf) == SIG &&
++                         makelong(buf + 4) == G.lrec.crc32 &&
++                         makeint64(buf + 8) == G.lrec.csize &&
++                         makeint64(buf + 16) == G.lrec.ucsize)
++            // Have a data descriptor with a signature and 64-bit lengths.
++            len = 24;
++        else if (got >= 20 && makelong(buf) == G.lrec.crc32 &&
++                              makeint64(buf + 4) == G.lrec.csize &&
++                              makeint64(buf + 12) == G.lrec.ucsize)
++            // Have a data descriptor with no signature and 64-bit lengths.
++            len = 20;
++        else if ((G.lrec.csize >> 32) == 0 && (G.lrec.ucsize >> 32) == 0)
++            // Both lengths are short enough to fit in 32 bits.
++#else
++        uch buf[16];
++        int got = readbuf((char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
++#endif
++        {
++            if (got >= 16 && makelong(buf) == SIG &&
++                             makelong(buf + 4) == G.lrec.crc32 &&
++                             makelong(buf + 8) == G.lrec.csize &&
++                             makelong(buf + 12) == G.lrec.ucsize)
++                // Have a data descriptor with a signature and 32-bit lengths.
++                len = 16;
++            else if (got >= 12 && makelong(buf) == G.lrec.crc32 &&
++                                  makelong(buf + 4) == G.lrec.csize &&
++                                  makelong(buf + 8) == G.lrec.ucsize)
++                // Have a data descriptor with no signature and 32-bit lengths.
++                len = 12;
++        }
++        if (len == 0)
++            // There is no data descriptor that matches the entry CRC and
++            // length values.
+             error = PK_ERR;
++
++        // Back up got-len bytes, to position the read pointer after the data
++        // descriptor. Or to where the data descriptor was supposed to be, in
++        // the event none was found.
++        int back = got - len;
++        if (G.incnt + back > INBUFSIZ) {
++            // Need to load the preceding buffer. We've been here before.
++            G.cur_zipfile_bufstart -= INBUFSIZ;
++#ifdef USE_STRM_INPUT
++            zfseeko(G.zipfd, G.cur_zipfile_bufstart, SEEK_SET);
++#else /* !USE_STRM_INPUT */
++            zlseek(G.zipfd, G.cur_zipfile_bufstart, SEEK_SET);
++#endif /* ?USE_STRM_INPUT */
++            read(G.zipfd, (char *)G.inbuf, INBUFSIZ);
++            G.incnt -= INBUFSIZ - back;
++            G.inptr += INBUFSIZ - back;
++        }
++        else {
++            // Back up within current buffer.
++            G.incnt += back;
++            G.inptr -= back;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     return error;

unzip-zipbomb-switch.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+From 5b44c818b96193b3e240f38f61985fa2bc780eb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 15:42:17 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Add an option to disable the zipbomb detection
+
+This can be done by settting a newly introduced environment variable
+UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION to {TRUE,True,true}. If the variable is unset, or
+set to any other value the zipbomb detection is left enabled.
+
+Example:
+	UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION=True unzip ./zbsm.zip -d ./test
+---
+ extract.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ unzip.c   | 15 ++++++++--
+ unzip.h   |  1 +
+ 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 878817d..3e58071 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -322,7 +322,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] =
+ static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] =
+   "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n";
+ static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] =
+-  "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n";
++  "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n \
++To unzip the file anyway, rerun the command with UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION=TRUE environmnent variable\n";
+ 
+ 
+ 
+@@ -502,35 +503,37 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+        the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end of central
+        directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central directory
+        record, if present. */
+-    if (G.cover == NULL) {
++    if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) {
++      if (G.cover == NULL) {
+         G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
+         if (G.cover == NULL) {
+-            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-              LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+-            return PK_MEM;
++            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++              LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++            return PK_MEM;
+         }
+         ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL;
+         ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
+-    }
+-    ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
+-    if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
+-                  G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
+-                  G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory +
+-                  G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) {
++    }
++    ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
++    if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
++                  G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
++                  G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory +
++                  G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) {
+         Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-          LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++          LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+         return PK_MEM;
+-    }
+-    if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
+-         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
+-        (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 &&
+-         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start,
+-                   G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) ||
+-        cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start,
+-                  G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) {
++    }
++    if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
++         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
++        (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 &&
++         cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start,
++                   G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) ||
++        cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start,
++                  G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) {
+         Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-          LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++          LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+         return PK_BOMB;
++      }
+     }
+ 
+ /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+@@ -1222,10 +1225,12 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+ 
+         /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset);  */
+         request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes;
+-        if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
++        if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) {
++          if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
+             Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-              LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++              LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+             return PK_BOMB;
++          }
+         }
+         inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ;
+         bufstart = request - inbuf_offset;
+@@ -1758,17 +1763,19 @@ reprompt:
+             return IZ_CTRLC;        /* cancel operation by user request */
+         }
+ #endif
+-        error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
+-                          G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
+-        if (error < 0) {
++        if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) {
++          error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
++                            G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
++          if (error < 0) {
+             Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-              LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
++                                LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
+             return PK_MEM;
+-        }
+-        if (error != 0) {
++          }
++          if (error != 0) {
+             Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-              LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
++                                LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
+             return PK_BOMB;
++          }
+         }
+ #ifdef MACOS  /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */
+         UserStop();
+@@ -2171,8 +2178,8 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+     }
+ 
+     undefer_input(__G);
+-
+-    if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
++    if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) {
++      if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
+         // Skip over the data descriptor. We need to correctly position the
+         // read pointer after the data descriptor for the proper detection of
+         // overlapped zip file components.
+@@ -2189,8 +2196,8 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+             G.incnt += back;
+             G.inptr -= back;
+         }
++      }
+     }
+-
+     return error;
+ 
+ } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */
+diff --git a/unzip.c b/unzip.c
+index 8dbfc95..abb3644 100644
+--- a/unzip.c
++++ b/unzip.c
+@@ -1329,10 +1329,9 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv)
+     int *pargc;
+     char ***pargv;
+ {
+-    char **argv, *s;
++    char **argv, *s, *zipbomb_envar;
+     int argc, c, error=FALSE, negative=0, showhelp=0;
+ 
+-
+     argc = *pargc;
+     argv = *pargv;
+ 
+@@ -1923,6 +1922,18 @@ opts_done:  /* yes, very ugly...but only used by UnZipSFX with -x xlist */
+     else
+         G.extract_flag = TRUE;
+ 
++    /* Disable the zipbomb detection, this is the only option set only via the shell variables but it should at least not clash with something in the future. */
++    zipbomb_envar = getenv("UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION");
++    uO.zipbomb = TRUE;
++    if (zipbomb_envar != NULL) {
++      /* strcasecmp might be a better approach here but it is POSIX-only */
++      if ((strcmp ("TRUE", zipbomb_envar) == 0)
++       || (strcmp ("True", zipbomb_envar) == 0)
++       || (strcmp ("true",zipbomb_envar) == 0)) {
++        uO.zipbomb = FALSE;
++      }
++    }
++
+     *pargc = argc;
+     *pargv = argv;
+     return PK_OK;
+diff --git a/unzip.h b/unzip.h
+index ed24a5b..e7665e8 100644
+--- a/unzip.h
++++ b/unzip.h
+@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ typedef struct _UzpOpts {
+ #ifdef UNIX
+     int cflxflag;       /* -^: allow control chars in extracted filenames */
+ #endif
++  int zipbomb;
+ #endif /* !FUNZIP */
+ } UzpOpts;
+ 
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

unzip.spec

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-
 # Settings for EL <= 7
 %if 0%{?rhel} && 0%{?rhel} <= 7
 %{!?__global_ldflags: %global __global_ldflags -Wl,-z,relro}
@@ -7,9 +6,8 @@
 Summary: A utility for unpacking zip files
 Name: unzip
 Version: 6.0
-Release: 36%{?dist}
-License: BSD
-Group: Applications/Archiving
+Release: 71%{?dist}
+License: Info-ZIP
 Source: http://downloads.sourceforge.net/infozip/unzip60.tar.gz
 
 # Not sent to upstream.
@@ -57,8 +55,38 @@ Patch21: 0001-Fix-CVE-2016-9844-rhbz-1404283.patch
 # restore unix timestamp accurately
 Patch22: unzip-6.0-timestamp.patch
 
-URL: http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html
-BuildRequires:  bzip2-devel
+# fix possible heap based stack overflow in passwd protected files
+Patch23: unzip-6.0-cve-2018-1000035-heap-based-overflow.patch
+
+Patch24: unzip-6.0-cve-2018-18384.patch
+
+# covscan issues
+Patch25: unzip-6.0-COVSCAN-fix-unterminated-string.patch
+
+Patch26: unzip-zipbomb-part1.patch
+Patch27: unzip-zipbomb-part2.patch
+Patch28: unzip-zipbomb-part3.patch
+Patch29: unzip-zipbomb-manpage.patch
+Patch30: unzip-zipbomb-part4.patch
+Patch31: unzip-zipbomb-part5.patch
+Patch32: unzip-zipbomb-part6.patch
+Patch33: unzip-zipbomb-part7.patch
+Patch34: unzip-zipbomb-switch.patch
+
+Patch35: unzip-gnu89-build.patch
+Patch36: unzip-6.0-wcstombs-fortify.patch
+
+Patch37: unzip-6.0-fix-warning-messages-on-big-files.patch
+Patch38: unzip-6.0-sast.patch
+Patch39: unzip-6.0-RHEL-86228.patch
+#From Debian
+Patch40: unzip-6.0-CVE-2022-0529-and-0530.patch
+
+
+
+URL: http://infozip.sourceforge.net
+BuildRequires: make
+BuildRequires:  bzip2-devel, gcc
 
 %description
 The unzip utility is used to list, test, or extract files from a zip
@@ -73,48 +101,190 @@ a zip archive.
 
 %prep
 %setup -q -n unzip60
-%patch1 -p1 -b .bzip2-configure
-%patch2 -p1 -b .exec-shield
-%patch3 -p1 -b .close
-%patch4 -p1 -b .attribs-overflow
-%patch5 -p1 -b .configure
-%patch6 -p1 -b .manpage-fix
-%patch7 -p1 -b .recmatch
-%patch8 -p1 -b .symlink
-%patch9 -p1 -b .caseinsensitive
-%patch10 -p1 -b .format-secure
-%patch11 -p1 -b .valgrind
-%patch12 -p1 -b .x-option
-%patch13 -p1 -b .overflow
-%patch14 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8139
-%patch15 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8140
-%patch16 -p1 -b .cve-2014-8141
-%patch17 -p1 -b .overflow-long-fsize
-%patch18 -p1 -b .heap-overflow-infloop
-%patch19 -p1 -b .utf
-%patch20 -p1 -b .utf-print
-%patch21 -p1 -b .cve-2016-9844
-%patch22 -p1 -b .timestamp
+%patch -P1 -p1
+%patch -P2 -p1
+%patch -P3 -p1
+%patch -P4 -p1
+%patch -P5 -p1
+%patch -P6 -p1
+%patch -P7 -p1
+%patch -P8 -p1
+%patch -P9 -p1
+%patch -P10 -p1
+%patch -P11 -p1
+%patch -P12 -p1
+%patch -P13 -p1
+%patch -P14 -p1
+%patch -P15 -p1
+%patch -P16 -p1
+%patch -P17 -p1
+%patch -P18 -p1
+%patch -P19 -p1
+%patch -P20 -p1
+%patch -P21 -p1
+%patch -P22 -p1
+%patch -P23 -p1
+%patch -P24 -p1
+%patch -P25 -p1
+
+%patch -P26 -p1
+%patch -P27 -p1
+%patch -P28 -p1
+%patch -P29 -p1
+%patch -P30 -p1
+%patch -P31 -p1
+%patch -P32 -p1
+%patch -P33 -p1
+%patch -P34 -p1
+%patch -P35 -p1
+%patch -P36 -p1
+%patch -P37 -p1
+%patch -P38 -p1
+%patch -P39 -p1
+%patch -P40 -p1
 
 %build
 # IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID is needed for right functionality of unzip -X
-# NOMEMCPY solve problem with memory overlapping - decomression is slowly,
+# NOMEMCPY solve problem with memory overlapping - decompression is slowly,
 # but successfull.
-make -f unix/Makefile CF_NOOPT="-I. -DUNIX $RPM_OPT_FLAGS -DNOMEMCPY -DIZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID -DNO_LCHMOD" \
-                      LFLAGS2="%{?__global_ldflags}" generic_gcc %{?_smp_mflags}
+%make_build -f unix/Makefile CF_NOOPT="-I. -DUNIX $RPM_OPT_FLAGS -DNOMEMCPY -DIZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID -DNO_LCHMOD" \
+                      LFLAGS2="%{?__global_ldflags}" generic_gcc
 
 %install
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-make -f unix/Makefile prefix=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix} MANDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1 INSTALL="cp -p" install
+make -f unix/Makefile prefix=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix} MANDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1 INSTALL="cp -p" install
 
 %files
-%defattr(-,root,root)
 %license LICENSE COPYING.OLD
 %doc README BUGS
 %{_bindir}/*
 %{_mandir}/*/*
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Jul 22 2026 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-71
+- Port some RHEL downstream patches to fedora
+- Fixes for RHEL-86228, RHEL-45997 + some issues found by coverity and other scans
+- Fixes for CVE-2022-0529 and 2022-0530 (Thanks Stewart Smith for the Heads up about these)
+
+* Fri Jul 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-70
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jan 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-69
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_44_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Aug 20 2025 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-68
+- Another zipmbomb patch
+Resolves: rhbz#2360938
+
+* Fri Jul 25 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-67
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sun Jan 19 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-66
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Nov 25 2024 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-65
+- Zipinfo: remove the extra %c that cause invalid reads
+- Zipinfo: fix the whitespace formating of the help message
+Related: RHEL-59972
+
+* Sat Jul 20 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-64
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jan 27 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-63
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jul 22 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-62
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_39_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Apr 13 2023 Lukáš Zaoral <lzaoral@redhat.com> - 6.0-61
+- migrate to SPDX license format
+
+* Wed Jan 25 2023 Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@redhat.com> - 6.0-60
+- Fix length passed to wcstombs call (#2164068)
+
+* Sat Jan 21 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-59
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Nov 09 2022 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-59
+- Rebuild with the -std=gnu89 flag
+Resolves: rhbz#1750694
+
+* Sat Jul 23 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-58
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jan 22 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-57
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Dec 16 2021 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-56
+- Update the manpage regarding the 6.0-55
+
+* Mon Dec 13 2021 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-55
+- Allow to opt-out of the zipbomb detection
+
+* Tue Nov 09 2021 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-54
+- Update the URL
+
+* Fri Jul 23 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-53
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Apr 29 2021 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-52
+- Sync the zipbomb false postives fixes with rhel
+- zipbomb-part4 patch introduced in 6.0-51 has been renamed to part6 and part4 and part5 have been ported from rhel
+Resolves: 1953565
+
+* Thu Mar 25 2021 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-51
+- Fix false positive in the zipbomb detection
+Related: 1920632
+
+* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-50
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-49
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jul 14 2020 Tom Stellard <tstellar@redhat.com> - 6.0-48
+- Use make macros
+- https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/UseMakeBuildInstallMacro
+
+* Fri Jan 31 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-47
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Nov 18 2019 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-46
+- Mention the zipbomb exit code in the manpage
+  Related: CVE-2019-13232
+
+* Wed Oct 23 2019 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-45
+- Fix possible zipbomb in unzip
+  Resolves: CVE-2019-13232
+
+* Sat Jul 27 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-44
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sun Feb 03 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-43
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Nov 08 2018 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-42
+- fix several possibly unterminated strings
+  When copying to OEM_CP and ISO_CP strings, the string could end unterminated
+  (stncpy does not append '\0').
+
+* Thu Nov 08 2018 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-41
+- Fix CVE-2018-18384
+  Resolves: CVE-2018-18384
+
+* Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-40
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Mar 01 2018 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-39
+- Add gcc to buildrequires
+
+* Tue Feb 13 2018 Jakub Martisko <jamartis@redhat.com> - 6.0-38
+- Fix CVE-2018-1000035 - heap based buffer overflow when opening
+  password protected files.
+  Resolves: 1537043 
+
+* Fri Feb 09 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-37
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild
+
 * Thu Aug 03 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 6.0-36
 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Binutils_Mass_Rebuild