Rebuilt for Python 3.15.0b4 ABI change

x86 HVM I/O port list traversal [XSA-491, CVE-2026-42487]
domctl lock open to abuse [XSA-492, CVE-2026-42489, CVE-2026-42490]
Arm: Completion of memory accesses not guaranteed by completion of a TLBI
	 [XSA-493, CVE-2025-10263]
x86: mismatched mapcache metadata [XSA-494, CVE-2026-42488]

.gitignore

@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
 pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2
 zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
 polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz
-/xen-4.11.2.tar.gz
+/mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz
+/xen-4.21.1.tar.xz

CVE-2014-0150.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.4.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c.orig	2014-07-02 15:54:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.4.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c	2014-11-18 20:50:13.593122915 +0000
-@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@
-         return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
- 
-     if (mac_data.entries) {
--        if (n->mac_table.in_use + mac_data.entries <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
-+        if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES - mac_data.entries) {
-             memcpy(n->mac_table.macs + (n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN),
-                    elem->out_sg[2].iov_base + sizeof(mac_data),
-                    mac_data.entries * ETH_ALEN);

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5278.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c.orig	2015-09-26 17:27:49.494334726 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c	2015-09-26 17:31:53.107474932 +0100
-@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
-         if (index <= s->stop)
-             avail = s->stop - index;
-         else
--            avail = 0;
-+            break;
-         len = size;
-         if (len > avail)
-             len = avail;

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5279.patch

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c	2015-09-26 17:27:49.494334726 +0100
-@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@
-     }
- 
-     index = s->curpag << 8;
-+    if (index >= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+        index = s->start;
-+    }
-     /* 4 bytes for header */
-     total_len = size + 4;
-     /* address for next packet (4 bytes for CRC) */
-@@ -387,15 +390,21 @@
-         offset = addr | (page << 4);
-         switch(offset) {
-         case EN0_STARTPG:
--            s->start = val << 8;
-+            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->start = val << 8;
-+            }
-             s->tainted = 1;
-             break;
-         case EN0_STOPPG:
--            s->stop = val << 8;
-+            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->stop = val << 8;
-+            }
-             s->tainted = 1;
-             break;
-         case EN0_BOUNDARY:
--            s->boundary = val;
-+            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->boundary = val;
-+            }
-             break;
-         case EN0_IMR:
-             s->imr = val;
-@@ -436,7 +445,9 @@
-             s->phys[offset - EN1_PHYS] = val;
-             break;
-         case EN1_CURPAG:
--            s->curpag = val;
-+            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->curpag = val;
-+            }
-             s->tainted = 1;
-             break;
-         case EN1_MULT ... EN1_MULT + 7:

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-6815.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c	2015-09-26 17:16:36.406544380 +0100
-@@ -461,7 +461,8 @@
-                 memmove(tp->data, tp->header, hdr);
-                 tp->size = hdr;
-             }
--        } while (split_size -= bytes);
-+            split_size -= bytes;
-+        } while (bytes && split_size);
-     } else if (!tp->tse && tp->cptse) {
-         // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set
-         DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentaion Error\n");

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7295.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.c	2015-10-10 16:57:01.806370020 +0100
-@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@
-     return vring_avail_idx(vq) == vq->last_avail_idx;
- }
- 
--void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
--                    unsigned int len, unsigned int idx)
-+static void virtqueue_unmap_sg(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+			       unsigned int len)
- {
-     unsigned int offset;
-     int i;
-@@ -302,7 +302,19 @@
-         
-         offset += size;
-     }
-+}
- 
-+void virtqueue_discard(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+                       unsigned int len)
-+{
-+    vq->last_avail_idx--;
-+    virtqueue_unmap_sg(vq, elem, len);
-+}
-+
-+void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+                    unsigned int len, unsigned int idx)
-+{
-+    virtqueue_unmap_sg(vq, elem, len);
-     idx = (idx + vring_used_idx(vq)) % vq->vring.num;
- 
-     /* Get a pointer to the next entry in the used ring. */
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.h.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.h	2015-10-10 16:57:53.146216039 +0100
-@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@
- void virtqueue_push(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-                     unsigned int len);
- void virtqueue_flush(VirtQueue *vq, unsigned int count);
-+void virtqueue_discard(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+                       unsigned int len);
- void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-                     unsigned int len, unsigned int idx);
- 
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c.orig	2015-10-10 16:10:05.071786348 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c	2015-10-10 19:05:34.510029916 +0100
-@@ -424,11 +424,15 @@
-         len = iov_fill(sg, elem.in_num,
-                        buf + offset, size - offset);
-         total += len;
-+        offset += len;
-+        if (!n->mergeable_rx_bufs && offset < size) {
-+            virtqueue_discard(n->rx_vq, &elem, total);
-+            return;
-+        }
- 
-         /* signal other side */
-         virtqueue_fill(n->rx_vq, &elem, total, i++);
- 
--        offset += len;
-     }
- 
-     if (mhdr)

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7512.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 8b98a2f07175d46c3f7217639bd5e03f2ec56343 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 15:00:06 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] pcnet: fix rx buffer overflow(CVE-2015-7512)
-
-Backends could provide a packet whose length is greater than buffer
-size. Check for this and truncate the packet to avoid rx buffer
-overflow in this case.
-
-Cc: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c |    6 ++++++
- 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
-index 309c40b..1f4a3db 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
-@@ -1064,6 +1064,12 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
-             int pktcount = 0;
- 
-             if (!s->looptest) {
-+                if (size > 4092) {
-+#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
-+                    fprintf(stderr, "pcnet: truncates rx packet.\n");
-+#endif
-+                    size = 4092;
-+                }
-                 memcpy(src, buf, size);
-                 /* no need to compute the CRC */
-                 src[size] = 0;
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8345.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 00837731d254908a841d69298a4f9f077babaf24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 08:42:33 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] eepro100: Prevent two endless loops
-
-http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2015-11/msg04592.html
-shows an example how an endless loop in function action_command can
-be achieved.
-
-During my code review, I noticed a 2nd case which can result in an
-endless loop.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
- 1 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
-index 60333b7..685a478 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
-@@ -774,6 +774,11 @@ static void tx_command(EEPRO100State *s)
-                 uint32_t tx_buffer_address = ldl_phys(tbd_address);
-                 uint16_t tx_buffer_size = lduw_phys(tbd_address + 4);
-                 //~ uint16_t tx_buffer_el = lduw_phys(tbd_address + 6);
-+                if (tx_buffer_size == 0) {
-+                    /* Prevent an endless loop. */
-+                    logout("loop in %s:%u\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
-+                    break;
-+                }
-                 tbd_address += 8;
-                 logout
-                     ("TBD (simplified mode): buffer address 0x%08x, size 0x%04x\n",
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8504.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 4c65fed8bdf96780735dbdb92a8bd0d6b6526cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2015 18:54:17 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] ui: vnc: avoid floating point exception
-
-While sending 'SetPixelFormat' messages to a VNC server,
-the client could set the 'red-max', 'green-max' and 'blue-max'
-values to be zero. This leads to a floating point exception in
-write_png_palette while doing frame buffer updates.
-
-Reported-by: Lian Yihan <lianyihan@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c |    6 +++---
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
-index 7538405..cbe4d33 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
-@@ -2198,15 +2198,15 @@ static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
-     }
- 
-     vs->clientds = vs->serverds;
--    vs->clientds.pf.rmax = red_max;
-+    vs->clientds.pf.rmax = red_max ? red_max : 0xFF;
-     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.rbits, red_max);
-     vs->clientds.pf.rshift = red_shift;
-     vs->clientds.pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
--    vs->clientds.pf.gmax = green_max;
-+    vs->clientds.pf.gmax = green_max ? green_max : 0xFF;
-     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.gbits, green_max);
-     vs->clientds.pf.gshift = green_shift;
-     vs->clientds.pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
--    vs->clientds.pf.bmax = blue_max;
-+    vs->clientds.pf.bmax = blue_max ? blue_max : 0xFF;
-     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.bbits, blue_max);
-     vs->clientds.pf.bshift = blue_shift;
-     vs->clientds.pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1714.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.6.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/fw_cfg.c.orig	2016-01-04 15:35:42.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.6.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/fw_cfg.c	2016-03-06 16:42:33.464296362 +0000
-@@ -54,11 +54,15 @@
- static void fw_cfg_write(FWCfgState *s, uint8_t value)
- {
-     int arch = !!(s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ARCH_LOCAL);
--    FWCfgEntry *e = &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
-+    FWCfgEntry *e = (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID) ? NULL :
-+                     &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
- 
-     FW_CFG_DPRINTF("write %d\n", value);
- 
--    if (s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_WRITE_CHANNEL && s->cur_offset < e->len) {
-+    if (s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_WRITE_CHANNEL
-+        && e != NULL
-+        && e->callback
-+        && s->cur_offset < e->len) {
-         e->data[s->cur_offset++] = value;
-         if (s->cur_offset == e->len) {
-             e->callback(e->callback_opaque, e->data);
-@@ -88,7 +92,8 @@
- static uint8_t fw_cfg_read(FWCfgState *s)
- {
-     int arch = !!(s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ARCH_LOCAL);
--    FWCfgEntry *e = &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
-+    FWCfgEntry *e = (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID) ? NULL :
-+                    &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
-     uint8_t ret;
- 
-     if (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID || !e->data || s->cur_offset >= e->len)

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1981.patch

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	Laszlo Ersek
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH] e1000: eliminate infinite loops on
-out-of-bounds transfer start
-*Date*: 	Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:17:20 +0100
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-The start_xmit() and e1000_receive_iov() functions implement DMA transfers
-iterating over a set of descriptors that the guest's e1000 driver
-prepares:
-
-- the TDLEN and RDLEN registers store the total size of the descriptor
-  area,
-
-- while the TDH and RDH registers store the offset (in whole tx / rx
-  descriptors) into the area where the transfer is supposed to start.
-
-Each time a descriptor is processed, the TDH and RDH register is bumped
-(as appropriate for the transfer direction).
-
-QEMU already contains logic to deal with bogus transfers submitted by the
-guest:
-
-- Normally, the transmit case wants to increase TDH from its initial value
-  to TDT. (TDT is allowed to be numerically smaller than the initial TDH
-  value; wrapping at or above TDLEN bytes to zero is normal.) The failsafe
-  that QEMU currently has here is a check against reaching the original
-  TDH value again -- a complete wraparound, which should never happen.
-
-- In the receive case RDH is increased from its initial value until
-  "total_size" bytes have been received; preferably in a single step, or
-  in "s->rxbuf_size" byte steps, if the latter is smaller. However, null
-  RX descriptors are skipped without receiving data, while RDH is
-  incremented just the same. QEMU tries to prevent an infinite loop
-  (processing only null RX descriptors) by detecting whether RDH assumes
-  its original value during the loop. (Again, wrapping from RDLEN to 0 is
-  normal.)
-
-What both directions miss is that the guest could program TDLEN and RDLEN
-so low, and the initial TDH and RDH so high, that these registers will
-immediately be truncated to zero, and then never reassume their initial
-values in the loop -- a full wraparound will never occur.
-
-The condition that expresses this is:
-
-  xdh_start >= s->mac_reg[XDLEN] / sizeof(desc)
-
-i.e., TDH or RDH start out after the last whole rx or tx descriptor that
-fits into the TDLEN or RDLEN sized area.
-
-This condition could be checked before we enter the loops, but
-pci_dma_read() / pci_dma_write() knows how to fill in buffers safely for
-bogus DMA addresses, so we just extend the existing failsafes with the
-above condition.
-
-Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <address@hidden>
-Cc: Petr Matousek <address@hidden>
-Cc: Stefano Stabellini <address@hidden>
-Cc: Prasad Pandit <address@hidden>
-Cc: Michael Roth <address@hidden>
-Cc: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
-RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1296044
-Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <address@hidden>
-Reviewed-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
----
-
-Notes:
-    Regarding the public posting: we made an honest effort to vet this
-    vulnerability, and the impact seems low -- no host side reads/writes,
-    "just" a DoS (infinite loop). We decided the patch could be posted
-    publicly, for the usual review process. Jason and Prasad checked the
-    patch in the internal discussion already, but comments, improvements
-    etc. are clearly welcome. The CVE request is underway. Thanks.
-
- hw/net/e1000.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
-index bec06e9..34d0823 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c
-@@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ start_xmit(E1000State *s)
-          * bogus values to TDT/TDLEN.
-          * there's nothing too intelligent we could do about this.
-          */
--        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start) {
-+        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start ||
-+            tdh_start >= s->mac_reg[TDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
-             DBGOUT(TXERR, "TDH wraparound @%x, TDT %x, TDLEN %x\n",
-                    tdh_start, s->mac_reg[TDT], s->mac_reg[TDLEN]);
-             break;
-@@ -1165,7 +1166,8 @@ e1000_receive_iov(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt)
-             s->mac_reg[RDH] = 0;
-         s->check_rxov = 1;
-         /* see comment in start_xmit; same here */
--        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start) {
-+        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start ||
-+            rdh_start >= s->mac_reg[RDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
-             DBGOUT(RXERR, "RDH wraparound @%x, RDT %x, RDLEN %x\n",
-                    rdh_start, s->mac_reg[RDT], s->mac_reg[RDLEN]);
-             set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO);
--- 
-1.8.3.1

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2538.patch

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When processing remote NDIS control message packets,
-the USB Net device emulator uses a fixed length(4096) data buffer.
-The incoming informationBufferOffset & Length combination could
-overflow and cross that range. Check control message buffer
-offsets and length to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/dev-network.c | 9 ++++++---
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per review
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg03475.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-network.c b/hw/usb/dev-network.c
-index 8a4ff49..180adce 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/usb-net.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/usb-net.c
-@@ -915,8 +915,9 @@ static int rndis_query_response(USBNetState *s,
- 
-     bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
-     buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
--    if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
-+    if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
-         return USB_RET_STALL;
-+    }
- 
-     infobuflen = ndis_query(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
-                             bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen, infobuf,
-@@ -961,8 +962,9 @@ static int rndis_set_response(USBNetState *s,
- 
-     bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
-     buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
--    if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
-+    if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
-         return USB_RET_STALL;
-+    }
- 
-     ret = ndis_set(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
-                     bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen);
-@@ -1212,8 +1214,9 @@ static void usb_net_handle_dataout(USBNetState *s, USBPacket *p)
-     if (le32_to_cpu(msg->MessageType) == RNDIS_PACKET_MSG) {
-         uint32_t offs = 8 + le32_to_cpu(msg->DataOffset);
-         uint32_t size = le32_to_cpu(msg->DataLength);
--        if (offs + size <= len)
-+        if (offs < len && size < len && offs + size <= len) {
-             qemu_send_packet(s->vc, s->out_buf + offs, size);
-+        }
-     }
-     s->out_ptr -= len;
-     memmove(s->out_buf, &s->out_buf[len], s->out_ptr);
--- 
-2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2841.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Ne2000 NIC uses ring buffer of NE2000_MEM_SIZE(49152)
-bytes to process network packets. Registers PSTART & PSTOP
-define ring buffer size & location. Setting these registers
-to invalid values could lead to infinite loop or OOB r/w
-access issues. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Yang Hongke <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-Update per review:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg05522.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c
-index b032212..ced4666 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,10 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
- {
-     int avail, index, boundary;
- 
-+    if (s->stop <= s->start) {
-+        return 1;
-+    }
-+
-     index = s->curpag << 8;
-     boundary = s->boundary << 8;
-     if (index < boundary)
--- 
-2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2857.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-While computing IP checksum, 'net_checksum_calculate' reads
-payload length from the packet. It could exceed the given 'data'
-buffer size. Add a check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Liu Ling <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- net/checksum.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per review:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg06121.html
-
-diff --git a/net/checksum.c b/net/checksum.c
-index 14c0855..0942437 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/net-checksum.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/net-checksum.c
-@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
-     int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
-     uint16_t csum;
- 
-+    /* Ensure data has complete L2 & L3 headers. */
-+    if (length < 14 + 20) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
- 	return; /* not IPv4 */
-     hlen  = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
-@@ -76,8 +81,9 @@ void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
- 	return;
-     }
- 
--    if (plen < csum_offset+2)
--	return;
-+    if (plen < csum_offset + 2 || 14 + hlen + plen > length) {
-+        return;
-+    }
- 
-     data[14+hlen+csum_offset]   = 0;
-     data[14+hlen+csum_offset+1] = 0;
--- 
-2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4001.patch

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From 3a15cc0e1ee7168db0782133d2607a6bfa422d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2016 11:33:48 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] net: stellaris_enet: check packet length against receive buffer
-
-When receiving packets over Stellaris ethernet controller, it
-uses receive buffer of size 2048 bytes. In case the controller
-accepts large(MTU) packets, it could lead to memory corruption.
-Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Oleksandr Bazhaniuk <oleksandr.bazhaniuk@intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-id: 1460095428-22698-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
-Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c |   12 +++++++++++-
- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
-index 84cf60b..6880894 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
-@@ -236,8 +236,18 @@ static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, si
-     n = s->next_packet + s->np;
-     if (n >= 31)
-         n -= 31;
--    s->np++;
- 
-+    if (size >= sizeof(s->rx[n].data) - 6) {
-+        /* If the packet won't fit into the
-+         * emulated 2K RAM, this is reported
-+         * as a FIFO overrun error.
-+         */
-+        s->ris |= SE_INT_FOV;
-+        stellaris_enet_update(s);
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    s->np++;
-     s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
-     p = s->rx[n].data;
-     *(p++) = (size + 6);
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4002.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When receiving packets over MIPSnet network device, it uses
- receive buffer of size 1514 bytes. In case the controller
-accepts large(MTU) packets, it could lead to memory corruption.
-Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported by: Oleksandr Bazhaniuk <address@hidden>
-
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
-index f261011..e134b31 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
-@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static ssize_t mipsnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t si
-     if (!mipsnet_can_receive(opaque))
-         return;
- 
-+    if (size >= sizeof(s->rx_buffer)) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-     s->busy = 1;
- 
-     /* Just accept everything. */
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4439.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	P J P
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/2] scsi: check command buffer length
-before write(CVE-2016-4439)
-*Date*: 	Thu, 19 May 2016 16:09:30 +0530
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte
-FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer. While
-writing to this command buffer 's->cmdbuf[TI_BUFSZ=16]', a check
-was missing to validate input length. Add check to avoid OOB write
-access.
-
-Fixes CVE-2016-4439
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/esp.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index 8961be2..01497e6 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -448,7 +448,11 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
-         break;
-     case ESP_FIFO:
-         if (s->do_cmd) {
--            s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
-+            if (s->cmdlen < TI_BUFSZ) {
-+                s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
-+            } else {
-+                ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-+            }
-         } else if (s->ti_size == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
-             ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-         } else {
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4441.patch

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	P J P
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH 2/2] scsi: check dma length before
-reading scsi command(CVE-2016-4441)
-*Date*: 	Thu, 19 May 2016 16:09:31 +0530
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte
-FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer.
-Routine get_cmd() uses DMA to read scsi commands into this buffer.
-Add check to validate DMA length against buffer size to avoid any
-overrun.
-
-Fixes CVE-2016-4441
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/esp.c | 11 +++++++----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index 01497e6..591c817 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ void esp_request_cancelled(SCSIRequest *req)
-     }
- }
- 
--static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf)
-+static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t buflen)
- {
-     uint32_t dmalen;
-     int target;
-@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf)
-     target = s->wregs[ESP_WBUSID] & BUSID_DID;
-     if (s->dma) {
-         dmalen = s->rregs[ESP_TCLO] | (s->rregs[ESP_TCMID] << 8);
-+        if (dmalen > buflen) {
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-         s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, buf, dmalen);
-     } else {
-         dmalen = s->ti_size;
-@@ -166,7 +169,7 @@ static void handle_satn(ESPState *s)
-     uint8_t buf[32];
-     int len;
- 
--    len = get_cmd(s, buf);
-+    len = get_cmd(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
-     if (len)
-         do_cmd(s, buf);
- }
-@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ static void handle_satn_stop(ESPState *s)
- 
- static void handle_satn_stop(ESPState *s)
- {
--    s->cmdlen = get_cmd(s, s->cmdbuf);
-+    s->cmdlen = get_cmd(s, s->cmdbuf, sizeof(s->cmdbuf));
-     if (s->cmdlen) {
-         DPRINTF("Set ATN & Stop: cmdlen %d\n", s->cmdlen);
-         s->do_cmd = 1;
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5238.patch

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	Paolo Bonzini
-*Subject*: 	Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] scsi: check buffer length before
-reading scsi command
-*Date*: 	Wed, 1 Jun 2016 15:10:16 +0200
-*User-agent*: 	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
-Thunderbird/45.1.0
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-On 31/05/2016 19:53, P J P wrote:
->/ From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>/
->/ /
->/ The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte/
->/ FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer./
->/ Routine get_cmd() in non-DMA mode, uses 'ti_size' to read scsi/
->/ command into a buffer. Add check to validate command length against/
->/ buffer size to avoid any overrun./
->/ /
->/ Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>/
->/ Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>/
->/ ---/
->/  hw/scsi/esp.c | 3 +++/
->/  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)/
->/ /
->/ diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
->/ index 60c1b28..953027a 100644/
->/ --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
->/ +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
->/ @@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t /
->/ buflen)/
->/          s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, buf, dmalen);/
->/      } else {/
->/          dmalen = s->ti_size;/
->/ +        if (dmalen > TI_BUFSZ) {/
->/ +            return 0;/
->/ +        }/
->/          memcpy(buf, s->ti_buf, dmalen);/
->/          buf[0] = buf[2] >> 5;/
->/      }/
->/ /
-
-In theory this shouldn't happen, but I agree that it is better to be
-defensive.  I'm queuing this patch.
-
-At least the following patch is needed to ensure that ti_size always
-matches ti_rptr/ti_wptr (Hervé, what do you think about it? should I
-resubmit it formally?).  Also, things are more complicated than
-necessary due to ti_size being used for both DMA and FIFO transfers.
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index c2f6f8f..6407844 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void write_response(ESPState *s)
-     } else {
-         s->ti_size = 2;
-         s->ti_rptr = 0;
--        s->ti_wptr = 0;
-+        s->ti_wptr = 2;
-         s->rregs[ESP_RFLAGS] = 2;
-     }
-     esp_raise_irq(s);
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5338.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	P J P
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3] scsi: esp: check TI buffer index
-before read/write
-*Date*: 	Mon, 6 Jun 2016 22:04:43 +0530
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with internal 16-byte
-FIFO buffers. One is used to handle commands and other is for
-information transfer. Three control variables 'ti_rptr',
-'ti_wptr' and 'ti_size' are used to control r/w access to the
-information transfer buffer ti_buf[TI_BUFSZ=16]. In that,
-
-'ti_rptr' is used as read index, where read occurs.
-'ti_wptr' is a write index, where write would occur.
-'ti_size' indicates total bytes to be read from the buffer.
-
-While reading/writing to this buffer, index could exceed its
-size. Add check to avoid OOB r/w access.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/esp.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-06/msg01326.html
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index c2f6f8f..4b94bbc 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -403,18 +403,17 @@ uint64_t esp_reg_read(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr)
-     DPRINTF("read reg[%d]: 0x%2.2x\n", saddr, s->rregs[saddr]);
-     switch (saddr) {
-     case ESP_FIFO:
--        if (s->ti_size > 0) {
-+        if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
-+            /* Data out.  */
-+            ESP_ERROR("PIO data read not implemented\n");
-+            s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
-+            esp_raise_irq(s);
-+        } else if (s->ti_rptr < s->ti_wptr) {
-             s->ti_size--;
--            if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
--                /* Data out.  */
--                ESP_ERROR("PIO data read not implemented\n");
--                s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
--            } else {
--                s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
--            }
-+            s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
-             esp_raise_irq(s);
-         }
--        if (s->ti_size == 0) {
-+        if (s->ti_rptr == s->ti_wptr) {
-             s->ti_rptr = 0;
-             s->ti_wptr = 0;
-         }
-@@ -459,7 +457,7 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
-             } else {
-                 ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-             }
--        } else if (s->ti_size == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
-+        } else if (s->ti_wptr == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
-             ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-         } else {
-             s->ti_size++;
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-6351.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 926cde5f3e4d2504ed161ed0cb771ac7cad6fd11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 00:22:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] scsi: esp: make cmdbuf big enough for maximum CDB size
-
-While doing DMA read into ESP command buffer 's->cmdbuf', it could
-write past the 's->cmdbuf' area, if it was transferring more than 16
-bytes.  Increase the command buffer size to 32, which is maximum when
-'s->do_cmd' is set, and add a check on 'len' to avoid OOB access.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
----
- hw/esp.c         |    6 ++++--
- hw/esp.c |    3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/esp.c b/hw/esp.c
-index 64680b3..baa0a2c 100644
---- a/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/hw/esp.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
- #include "hw.h"
- #include "scsi-disk.h"
- #include "scsi.h"
-+#include <assert.h>
- 
- /* debug ESP card */
- //#define DEBUG_ESP
-@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ static void esp_do_dma(ESPState *s)
-     len = s->dma_left;
-     if (s->do_cmd) {
-         DPRINTF("command len %d + %d\n", s->cmdlen, len);
-+        assert (s->cmdlen <= sizeof(s->cmdbuf) &&
-+                len <= sizeof(s->cmdbuf) - s->cmdlen);
-         s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, &s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen], len);
-         s->ti_size = 0;
-         s->cmdlen = 0;
-@@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ static void handle_ti(ESPState *s)
-     s->dma_counter = dmalen;
- 
-     if (s->do_cmd)
--        minlen = (dmalen < 32) ? dmalen : 32;
-+        minlen = (dmalen < ESP_CMDBUF_SZ) ? dmalen : ESP_CMDBUF_SZ;
-     else if (s->ti_size < 0)
-         minlen = (dmalen < -s->ti_size) ? dmalen : -s->ti_size;
-     else
-@@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
-         break;
-     case ESP_FIFO:
-         if (s->do_cmd) {
--            if (s->cmdlen < TI_BUFSZ) {
-+            if (s->cmdlen < ESP_CMDBUF_SZ) {
-                 s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
-             } else {
-                 ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-diff --git a/hw/esp.c b/hw/esp.c
-index 6c79527..d2c4886 100644
---- a/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/hw/esp.c
-@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ void esp_init(hwaddr espaddr, int it_shift,
- 
- #define ESP_REGS 16
- #define TI_BUFSZ 16
-+#define ESP_CMDBUF_SZ 32
- 
- typedef struct ESPState ESPState;
- 
-@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ struct ESPState {
-     uint32_t dma;
-     SCSIDevice *scsi_dev[ESP_MAX_DEVS];
-     SCSIDevice *current_dev;
--    uint8_t cmdbuf[TI_BUFSZ];
-+    uint8_t cmdbuf[ESP_CMDBUF_SZ];
-     uint32_t cmdlen;
-     uint32_t do_cmd;
- 
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8669.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 3592fe0c919cf27a81d8e9f9b4f269553418bb01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 11:28:08 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] char: serial: check divider value against baud base
-
-16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
-(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
-be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
-greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
-divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-Id: <1476251888-20238-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
----
- hw/char/serial.c |    3 ++-
- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/serial.c b/hw/serial.c
-index 3442f47..eec72b7 100644
---- a/hw/serial.c
-+++ b/hw/serial.c
-@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
-     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
-     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
- 
--    if (s->divider == 0)
-+    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     frame_size = 1;
-     if (s->lcr & 0x08) {
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8910.patch

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-RTL8139 ethernet controller in C+ mode supports multiple
-descriptor rings, each with maximum of 64 descriptors. While
-processing transmit descriptor ring in 'rtl8139_cplus_transmit',
-it does not limit the descriptor count and runs forever. Add
-check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Henderson <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/rtl8139.c b/hw/rtl8139.c
-index 3345bc6..f05e59c 100644
---- a/hw/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static void rtl8139_cplus_transmit(RTL8139State *s)
- {
-     int txcount = 0;
- 
--    while (rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-+    while (txcount < 64 && rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-     {
-         ++txcount;
-     }
--- 
-2.7.4

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-9776.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 77d54985b85a0cb760330ec2bd92505e0a2a97a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 00:38:39 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: check receive buffer size register value
-
-ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses a receive buffer size
-register(EMRBR) to hold maximum size of all receive buffers.
-It is set by a user before any operation. If it was set to be
-zero, ColdFire emulator would go into an infinite loop while
-receiving data in mcf_fec_receive. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/mcf_fec.c |    2 +-
- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/mcf_fec.c b/hw/mcf_fec.c
-index dc61bac..4025eb3 100644
---- a/hw/mcf_fec.c
-+++ b/hw/mcf_fec.c
-@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
-         s->tx_descriptor = s->etdsr;
-         break;
-     case 0x188:
--        s->emrbr = value & 0x7f0;
-+        s->emrbr = value > 0 ? value & 0x7F0 : 0x7F0;
-         break;
-     default:
-         cpu_abort(cpu_single_env, "mcf_fec_write Bad address 0x%x\n",
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-6505.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 02:23:33 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
-
-The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
-limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Message-id: 5899a02e.45ca240a.6c373.93c1@mx.google.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/usb-ohci.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb-ohci.c b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-index 2cba3e3..21c93e0 100644
---- a/hw/usb-ohci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
- 
- #define OHCI_MAX_PORTS 15
- 
-+#define ED_LINK_LIMIT 4
-+
- static int64_t usb_frame_time;
- static int64_t usb_bit_time;
- 
-@@ -1184,7 +1186,7 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
-     uint32_t next_ed;
-     uint32_t cur;
-     int active;
--
-+    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
-     active = 0;
- 
-     if (head == 0)
-@@ -1199,6 +1201,10 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
- 
-         next_ed = ed.next & OHCI_DPTR_MASK;
- 
-+        if (++link_cnt > ED_LINK_LIMIT) {
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-+
-         if ((ed.head & OHCI_ED_H) || (ed.flags & OHCI_ED_K)) {
-             uint32_t addr;
-             /* Cancel pending packets for ED that have been paused.  */
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-7718.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 215902d7b6fb50c6fc216fc74f770858278ed904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:39:19 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] fix :cirrus_vga fix OOB read case qemu Segmentation fault
-
-check the validity of parameters in cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_xxx
-and cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_xxx to avoid the OOB read which causes qemu Segmentation fault.
-
-After the fix, we will touch the assert in
-cirrus_invalidate_region:
-assert(off_cur_end >= off_cur);
-
-Signed-off-by: fangying <fangying1@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
-Message-id: 20170314063919.16200-1-hangaohuai@huawei.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h b/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
-index 0925a00..b7447f8 100644
---- a/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
-+++ b/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
-@@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
-     src = src_ - src_base;
-     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
-     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
-+
-+    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
-         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
- 	    p = *(dst_base + m(dst));
-@@ -143,6 +148,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
-     src = src_ - src_base;
-     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
-     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
-+
-+    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
-         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
- 	    p1 = *(dst_base + m(dst));
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-8309.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 3268a845f41253fb55852a8429c32b50f36f349a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 09:56:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] audio: release capture buffers
-
-AUD_add_capture() allocates two buffers which are never released.
-Add the missing calls to AUD_del_capture().
-
-Impact: Allows vnc clients to exhaust host memory by repeatedly
-starting and stopping audio capture.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2017-8309
-Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
-Reported-by: "Jiangxin (hunter, SCC)" <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-id: 20170428075612.9997-1-kraxel@redhat.com
----
- audio/audio.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/audio/audio.c b/audio/audio.c
-index c8898d8..beafed2 100644
---- a/audio/audio.c
-+++ b/audio/audio.c
-@@ -2028,6 +2028,8 @@ void AUD_del_capture (CaptureVoiceOut *cap, void *cb_opaque)
-                     sw = sw1;
-                 }
-                 LIST_REMOVE (cap, entries);
-+                qemu_free (cap->hw.mix_buf);
-+                qemu_free (cap->buf);
-                 qemu_free (cap);
-             }
-             return;
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-9330.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 03:15:03 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: fix error return code in servicing iso td
-
-It should return 1 if an error occurs when reading iso td.
-This will avoid an infinite loop issue in ohci_service_ed_list.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Message-id: 5899ac3e.1033240a.944d5.9a2d@mx.google.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/usb-ohci.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb-ohci.c b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-index c82a92f..2cba3e3 100644
---- a/hw/usb-ohci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static int ohci_service_iso_td(OHCIState *ohci, struct ohci_ed *ed,
- 
-     if (!ohci_read_iso_td(addr, &iso_td)) {
-         printf("usb-ohci: ISO_TD read error at %x\n", addr);
--        return 0;
-+        return 1;
-     }
- 
-     starting_frame = OHCI_BM(iso_td.flags, TD_SF);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.bug1399055.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 4299b90e9ba9ce5ca9024572804ba751aa1a7e70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 13:15:17 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: check vga bits per pixel(bpp) value
-
-In Cirrus CLGD 54xx VGA Emulator, if cirrus graphics mode is VGA,
-'cirrus_get_bpp' returns zero(0), which could lead to a divide
-by zero error in while copying pixel data. The same could occur
-via blit pitch values. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-id: 1476776717-24807-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/cirrus_vga.c |   14 ++++++++++----
- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
-index 3d712d5..bdb092e 100644
---- a/hw/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
- static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
-                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
- {
-+    if (!pitch) {
-+        return true;
-+    }
-     if (pitch < 0) {
-         int64_t min = addr
-             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
-@@ -715,7 +718,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
-                                             s->cirrus_addr_mask));
- }
- 
--static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
-+static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
- {
-     int sx = 0, sy = 0;
-     int dx = 0, dy = 0;
-@@ -729,6 +732,9 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
-         int width, height;
- 
-         depth = s->get_bpp((VGAState *)s) / 8;
-+        if (!depth) {
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-         s->get_resolution((VGAState *)s, &width, &height);
- 
-         /* extra x, y */
-@@ -783,6 +789,8 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
-     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
- 				s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
- 				s->cirrus_blt_height);
-+
-+    return 1;
- }
- 
- static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
-@@ -790,11 +798,9 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
-     if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
-         return 0;
- 
--    cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
-+    return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
-             s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
-             s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
--
--    return 1;
- }
- 
- /***************************************
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

sources

@@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ SHA512 (newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz) = 40eb96bbc6736a16b6399e0cdb73e853d0d90b685c967e77
 SHA512 (zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e
 SHA512 (polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz) = 88da614e4d3f4409c4fd3bb3e44c7587ba051e3fed4e33d526069a67e8180212e1ea22da984656f50e290049f60ddca65383e5983c0f8884f648d71f698303ad
 SHA512 (pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2) = 2b3d98d027e46d8c08037366dde6f0781ca03c610ef2b380984639e4ef39899ed8d8b8e4cd9c9dc54df101279b95879bd66bfd4d04ad07fef41e847ea7ae32b5
-SHA512 (xen-4.11.2.tar.gz) = 48d3d926d35eb56c79c06d0abc6e6be2564fadb43367cc7f46881c669a75016707672179c2cca1c4cfb14af2cefd46e2e7f99470cddf7df2886d8435a2de814e
+SHA512 (mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz) = 7543774d15da84476d93d04154990923c82209cb3fa125574c0383652c5a310957200f54b63b34502161f9c3afce4907e0060d9036f3eaf3a7cb6b1b3119b546
+SHA512 (xen-4.21.1.tar.xz) = 8dfe65255e202b3dacf9d0d7265636bc1f97627c11b08babc13a5b8e74c7c65e7e2c6a1513e28b3c713fe512edb6702a73b2bf667e2a8f2ce825b196a2cd5aab

xen-net-disable-iptables-on-bridge.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.1.0-orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge	2008-08-22 10:49:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.1.0-new/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge	2008-08-29 11:29:38.000000000 +0100
-@@ -96,8 +96,6 @@ case "$command" in
-         ;;
- esac
- 
--handle_iptable
--
- call_hooks vif post
- 
- log debug "Successful vif-bridge $command for $dev, bridge $bridge."
---- xen-3.3.0-orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-network-common.sh	2008-08-22 10:49:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-3.3.0-new/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-network-common.sh	2008-08-29 11:29:38.000000000 +0100
-@@ -99,6 +99,13 @@ create_bridge () {
- 	brctl addbr ${bridge}
- 	brctl stp ${bridge} off
- 	brctl setfd ${bridge} 0
-+	# Setting these to zero stops guest<->LAN traffic
-+	# traversing the bridge from hitting the *tables
-+	# rulesets. guest<->host traffic still gets processed
-+	# by the host's iptables rules so this isn't a hole
-+	sysctl -q -w "net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-arptables=0"
-+	sysctl -q -w "net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables=0"
-+	sysctl -q -w "net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables=0"
-     fi
- }
- 

xen.canonicalize.patch

@@ -1,56 +1,54 @@
---- xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c.orig	2017-04-12 16:18:57.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c	2017-04-13 21:17:12.255231094 +0100
-@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
- 		/* check if valid event */
- 	} else {
- 		relative = !strstarts(vec[0], "/");
--		vec[0] = canonicalize(conn, in, vec[0]);
-+		vec[0] = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, in, vec[0]);
- 		if (!vec[0])
- 			return ENOMEM;
- 		if (!is_valid_nodename(vec[0]))
-@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@
+--- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/watch.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/watch.c	2023-10-02 16:12:14.971264769 +0100
+@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
+ 			    const char **path, bool *relative)
+ {
+ 	*relative = !strstarts(*path, "/") && !strstarts(*path, "@");
+-	*path = canonicalize(conn, ctx, *path, true);
++	*path = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, *path, true);
+ 
+ 	return *path ? 0 : errno;
+ }
+@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@
  	if (get_strings(in, vec, ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) != ARRAY_SIZE(vec))
  		return EINVAL;
  
--	node = canonicalize(conn, in, vec[0]);
-+	node = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, in, vec[0]);
+-	node = canonicalize(conn, ctx, vec[0], true);
++	node = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, vec[0], true);
  	if (!node)
- 		return ENOMEM;
+ 		return errno;
  	list_for_each_entry(watch, &conn->watches, list) {
---- xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c.orig	2017-04-12 16:18:57.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c	2017-04-13 21:19:35.668429881 +0100
-@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@
+--- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.c	2023-10-02 16:12:14.993264626 +0100
+@@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@
  	return strings;
  }
  
--char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node)
-+char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node)
+-const char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
++const char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
+ 			 const char *node, bool allow_special)
  {
- 	const char *prefix;
+ 	const char *name;
+@@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@
+ {
+ 	struct node *node;
  
-@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@
+-	*canonical_name = canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
++	*canonical_name = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
+ 	if (!*canonical_name)
+ 		return NULL;
  
- 	if (!canonical_name)
- 		canonical_name = &tmp_name;
--	*canonical_name = canonicalize(conn, ctx, name);
-+	*canonical_name = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, name);
- 	return get_node(conn, ctx, *canonical_name, perm);
- }
+@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@
+ 	const char *tmp_name;
+ 	const struct node *node;
  
---- xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h.orig	2017-04-12 16:18:57.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h	2017-04-13 21:20:29.146368478 +0100
-@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
- void send_ack(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type);
+-	tmp_name = canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
++	tmp_name = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
+ 	if (!tmp_name)
+ 		return NULL;
  
- /* Canonicalize this path if possible. */
--char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node);
-+char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node);
- 
- /* Write a node to the tdb data base. */
- int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node);
---- xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c.orig	2016-12-05 12:03:27.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c	2017-02-26 21:52:24.554678631 +0000
+--- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c	2023-10-02 16:12:15.001264574 +0100
 @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  	}
  }
@@ -87,8 +85,8 @@
  			fprintf(stderr, "%s", line);
  		} while (strcmp(line, "Okay.\n") != 0);
  
---- xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c.orig	2016-12-05 12:03:27.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c	2017-02-26 21:52:50.320622804 +0000
+--- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c	2023-10-02 16:12:15.008264528 +0100
 @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  #include <termios.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
@@ -107,3 +105,14 @@
  	seed = strtoul(line, 0, 0);
  
  	printf("Seed Okay.\n"); fflush(stdout);
+--- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.h.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.h	2023-10-02 16:12:15.015264482 +0100
+@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
+ void send_ack(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalize this path if possible. */
+-const char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
++const char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
+ 			 const char *node, bool allow_special);
+ 
+ /* Get access permissions. */

xen.drop.brctl.patch

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/colo-proxy-setup.orig	2018-06-28 08:39:45.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/colo-proxy-setup	2018-07-03 20:09:26.637017216 +0100
-@@ -76,10 +76,10 @@
- 
- function setup_secondary()
- {
--    do_without_error brctl delif $bridge $vifname
--    do_without_error brctl addbr $forwardbr
--    do_without_error brctl addif $forwardbr $vifname
--    do_without_error brctl addif $forwardbr $forwarddev
-+    do_without_error ip link set $vifname nomaster
-+    do_without_error ip link add name $forwardbr type bridge
-+    do_without_error ip link set $vifname master $forwardbr
-+    do_without_error ip link set $forwarddev master $forwardbr
-     do_without_error ip link set dev $forwardbr up
-     do_without_error modprobe xt_SECCOLO
- 
-@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@
- 
- function teardown_secondary()
- {
--    do_without_error brctl delif $forwardbr $forwarddev
--    do_without_error brctl delif $forwardbr $vifname
--    do_without_error brctl delbr $forwardbr
--    do_without_error brctl addif $bridge $vifname
-+    do_without_error ip link set $forwarddev nomaster
-+    do_without_error ip link set $vifname nomaster
-+    do_without_error ip link delete $forwardbr type bridge
-+    do_without_error ip link set $vifname master $bridge
- 
-     do_without_error iptables -t mangle -D PREROUTING -m physdev --physdev-in \
-         $vifname -j SECCOLO --index $index
---- xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif2.orig	2018-06-28 08:39:45.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif2	2018-07-03 20:11:07.558757301 +0100
-@@ -7,13 +7,12 @@
- bridge=$(xenstore_read_default "$XENBUS_PATH/bridge" "$bridge")
- if [ -z "$bridge" ]
-     then
--    nr_bridges=$(($(brctl show | cut -f 1 | grep -v "^$" | wc -l) - 1))
-+    nr_bridges=$(bridge link | wc -l)
-     if [ "$nr_bridges" != 1 ]
- 	then
- 	fatal "no bridge specified, and don't know which one to use ($nr_bridges found)"
-     fi
--    bridge=$(brctl show | cut -d "
--" -f 2 | cut -f 1)
-+    bridge=$(bridge link | cut -d" " -f10)
- fi
- 
- command="$1"
---- xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge.orig	2018-07-03 19:59:18.499474117 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge	2018-07-03 20:12:31.088852864 +0100
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
- 
- if [ -z "$bridge" ]
- then
--  bridge=$(brctl show | awk 'NR==2{print$1}')
-+  bridge=$(bridge link | cut -d" " -f10)
- 
-   if [ -z "$bridge" ]
-   then
-@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
-         ;;
- 
-     offline)
--        do_without_error brctl delif "$bridge" "$dev"
-+        do_without_error ip link set "$dev" nomaster
-         do_without_error ifconfig "$dev" down
-         ;;
- 
---- xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-network-common.sh.orig	2018-07-03 19:59:18.500474154 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-network-common.sh	2018-07-03 20:16:16.466205182 +0100
-@@ -111,9 +111,7 @@
- 
-     # Don't create the bridge if it already exists.
-     if [ ! -e "/sys/class/net/${bridge}/bridge" ]; then
--	brctl addbr ${bridge}
--	brctl stp ${bridge} off
--	brctl setfd ${bridge} 0
-+	ip link add name ${bridge} type bridge stp_state 0 forward_delay 0
- 	# Setting these to zero stops guest<->LAN traffic
- 	# traversing the bridge from hitting the *tables
- 	# rulesets. guest<->host traffic still gets processed
-@@ -134,7 +132,7 @@
- 	ip link set dev ${dev} up || true
- 	return
-     fi
--    brctl addif ${bridge} ${dev}
-+    ip link set ${dev} master ${bridge}
-     ip link set dev ${dev} up
- }
- 
---- xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux.orig	2017-09-15 19:37:27.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux	2018-07-03 20:17:52.934780235 +0100
-@@ -34,4 +34,4 @@
- fi
- 
- ifconfig $1 0.0.0.0 up
--brctl addif $bridge $1 || true
-+ip link set $1 master $bridge || true

xen.efi.build.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- xen-4.20.0-rc4/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk.orig	2025-02-07 11:56:01.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.20.0-rc4/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk	2025-02-09 22:56:05.579507311 +0000
+@@ -95,7 +95,9 @@
+                                          -c $(srctree)/$(efi-check).c -o $(efi-check).o,y)
+ 
+ # Check if the linker supports PE.
+-EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
++#EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
++# use a reduced set of options from LDFLAGS
++EFI_LDFLAGS = --as-needed --build-id=sha1 -mi386pep --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
+ LD_PE_check_cmd = $(call ld-option,$(EFI_LDFLAGS) --image-base=0x100000000 -o $(efi-check).efi $(efi-check).o)
+ XEN_BUILD_PE := $(LD_PE_check_cmd)
+ 

xen.fedora.crypt.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c.orig	2015-07-12 21:55:32.875504811 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c	2015-07-12 22:03:03.860005391 +0100
-@@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@
-     GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020200 /* 2.2.0 */
- static int vnc_set_gnutls_priority(gnutls_session_t s, int x509)
- {
--    const char *priority = x509 ? "NORMAL" : "NORMAL:+ANON-DH";
-+    const char *priority = x509 ? "@SYSTEM" : "@SYSTEM:+ANON-DH";
-     int rc;
- 
-     rc = gnutls_priority_set_direct(s, priority, NULL);

xen.fedora.efi.build.patch

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.8.0/xen/Makefile.orig	2016-12-05 12:03:27.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.8.0/xen/Makefile	2017-02-28 00:02:54.080529810 +0000
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
- MAKEFLAGS += -rR
- 
- EFI_MOUNTPOINT ?= $(BOOT_DIR)/efi
-+EFI_VENDOR=fedora
- 
- ARCH=$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)
- SRCARCH=$(shell echo $(ARCH) | sed -e 's/x86.*/x86/' -e s'/arm\(32\|64\)/arm/g')

xen.fedora.systemd.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
-diff -uN xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/Makefile xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/Makefile
---- xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/Makefile	2015-01-12 16:53:24.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/Makefile	2015-01-25 22:23:26.000000000 +0000
-@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
+--- xen-4.17.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/Makefile.orig	2022-12-08 18:03:08.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.17.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/Makefile	2022-12-09 19:47:53.227189371 +0000
+@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
  XEN_SYSTEMD_SERVICE += xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service
  XEN_SYSTEMD_SERVICE += xendomains.service
  XEN_SYSTEMD_SERVICE += xen-watchdog.service
@@ -10,16 +9,7 @@ diff -uN xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/Makefile xen-4.5.0/tools/hot
 +XEN_SYSTEMD_SERVICE += oxenstored.service
  XEN_SYSTEMD_SERVICE += xendriverdomain.service
  
- ALL_XEN_SYSTEMD =	$(XEN_SYSTEMD_MODULES)  \
-diff -uN xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/var-lib-xenstored.mount.in xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/var-lib-xenstored.mount.in
---- xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/var-lib-xenstored.mount.in	2015-01-12 16:53:24.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/var-lib-xenstored.mount.in	2015-01-25 22:28:59.000000000 +0000
-@@ -9,4 +9,4 @@
- What=xenstore
- Where=@XEN_LIB_STORED@
- Type=tmpfs
--Options=mode=755
-+Options=mode=755,context="system_u:object_r:xenstored_var_lib_t:s0"
+ ALL_XEN_SYSTEMD :=	$(XEN_SYSTEMD_MODULES)  \
 diff -uN xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/xenconsoled.service.in xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service.in
 --- xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/xenconsoled.service.in	2015-01-12 16:53:24.000000000 +0000
 +++ xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service.in	2015-01-25 22:30:26.000000000 +0000
@@ -59,27 +49,26 @@ diff -uN xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.s
  Before=xendomains.service libvirtd.service libvirt-guests.service
  RefuseManualStop=true
  ConditionPathExists=/proc/xen/capabilities
---- xen-4.6.0/tools/configure.ac.orig	2015-02-15 16:47:22.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.6.0/tools/configure.ac	2015-03-01 16:18:30.493647587 +0000
-@@ -382,9 +382,9 @@
+--- xen-4.17.0/tools/configure.ac.orig	2022-12-08 18:03:08.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.17.0/tools/configure.ac	2022-12-09 19:50:24.773193862 +0000
+@@ -481,8 +481,8 @@
  
  AS_IF([test "x$systemd" = "xy"], [
      AC_CONFIG_FILES([
 +    hotplug/Linux/systemd/oxenstored.service
      hotplug/Linux/systemd/proc-xen.mount
-     hotplug/Linux/systemd/var-lib-xenstored.mount
 -    hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-init-dom0.service
      hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service
      hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-watchdog.service
      hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service
---- xen-4.6.0/tools/configure.orig	2015-02-15 16:47:22.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.6.0/tools/configure	2015-03-01 16:20:10.648285840 +0000
-@@ -8995,7 +8995,7 @@
+--- xen-4.17.0/tools/configure.orig	2022-12-08 18:03:08.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.17.0/tools/configure	2022-12-09 19:51:43.278708226 +0000
+@@ -10081,7 +10081,7 @@
+ if test "x$systemd" = "xy"
+ then :
  
- if test "x$systemd" = "xy"; then :
- 
--    ac_config_files="$ac_config_files hotplug/Linux/systemd/proc-xen.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/var-lib-xenstored.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-init-dom0.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-watchdog.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendomains.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendriverdomain.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenstored.service"
-+    ac_config_files="$ac_config_files hotplug/Linux/systemd/oxenstored.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/proc-xen.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/var-lib-xenstored.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-watchdog.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendomains.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendriverdomain.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenstored.service"
+-    ac_config_files="$ac_config_files hotplug/Linux/systemd/proc-xen.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-init-dom0.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-watchdog.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendomains.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendriverdomain.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenstored.service"
++    ac_config_files="$ac_config_files hotplug/Linux/systemd/oxenstored.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/proc-xen.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-watchdog.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendomains.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendriverdomain.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenstored.service"
  
  
  fi

xen.gcc11.fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+--- xen-4.14.0/xen/include/crypto/vmac.h.orig	2020-07-23 16:07:51.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.14.0/xen/include/crypto/vmac.h	2020-10-24 15:45:49.246467465 +0100
+@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@
+ 
+ #define vmac_update vhash_update
+ 
+-void vhash_update(unsigned char m[],
++void vhash_update(uint8_t *m,
+           unsigned int mbytes,
+           vmac_ctx_t *ctx);
+ 
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
+index 320e06f..618ae92 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
+@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static void __init tboot_copy_memory(unsigned char *va, uint32_t size,
+ 
+ void __init tboot_probe(void)
+ {
+-    tboot_shared_t *tboot_shared;
++    tboot_shared_t * volatile tboot_shared;
+     static const uuid_t __initconst tboot_shared_uuid = TBOOT_SHARED_UUID;
+ 
+     /* Look for valid page-aligned address for shared page. */

xen.gcc12.fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+--- xen-4.16.0/Config.mk.orig	2021-11-30 11:42:42.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.16.0/Config.mk	2022-01-24 20:25:16.687125822 +0000
+@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@
+ 
+ $(call cc-option-add,CFLAGS,CC,-Wno-unused-but-set-variable)
+ $(call cc-option-add,CFLAGS,CC,-Wno-unused-local-typedefs)
++$(call cc-option-add,CFLAGS,CC,-Wno-error=array-bounds)
+ 
+ LDFLAGS += $(foreach i, $(EXTRA_LIB), -L$(i)) 
+ CFLAGS += $(foreach i, $(EXTRA_INCLUDES), -I$(i))

xen.gcc7.fix.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.8.0/extras/mini-os/Makefile.orig	2016-09-28 12:09:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.8.0/extras/mini-os/Makefile	2017-02-15 21:15:19.340197960 +0000
-@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@
- APP_LDLIBS += -lz
- APP_LDLIBS += -lm
- LDLIBS += -lc
-+ifeq ($(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH),x86_32)
-+LDLIBS += -L$(shell dirname `gcc -m32 -print-libgcc-file-name`) -lgcc
-+endif
- endif
- 
- ifneq ($(APP_OBJS)-$(lwip),-y)

xen.gcc8.temp.fix.patch

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.10.0/tools/Makefile.orig	2017-12-13 11:37:59.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.10.0/tools/Makefile	2018-02-27 12:04:44.376192357 +0000
-@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
- SUBDIRS-y += libs
- SUBDIRS-y += libxc
- SUBDIRS-y += flask
--SUBDIRS-y += fuzz
-+#SUBDIRS-y += fuzz
- SUBDIRS-y += xenstore
- SUBDIRS-y += misc
- SUBDIRS-y += examples
---- xen-4.10.0/tools/debugger/kdd/kdd.c.orig	2018-02-22 12:31:57.007039159 +0000
-+++ xen-4.10.0/tools/debugger/kdd/kdd.c	2018-02-22 18:27:37.213653422 +0000
-@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@
-         }
-     } else {
-         /* 32-bit control-register space starts at 0x[2]cc, for 84 bytes */
--        uint32_t offset = addr;
-+/*        uint32_t offset = addr;
-         if (offset > 0x200)
-             offset -= 0x200;
-         offset -= 0xcc;
-@@ -696,7 +696,9 @@
-             len = 0;
-         } else {
-             memcpy(buf, ((uint8_t *)&ctrl.c32) + offset, len);
--        }
-+        } */
-+	/* disable above code due to compile issue for now */
-+	len = 0;
-     }
- 
-     s->txp.cmd.mem.addr = addr;
---- xen-4.10.0/tools/libxl/libxl_arm_acpi.c.orig	2017-12-13 11:37:59.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.10.0/tools/libxl/libxl_arm_acpi.c	2018-02-28 12:37:08.887221211 +0000
-@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
-     struct acpi_table_rsdp *rsdp = (void *)dom->acpi_modules[0].data + offset;
- 
-     memcpy(rsdp->signature, "RSD PTR ", sizeof(rsdp->signature));
--    memcpy(rsdp->oem_id, ACPI_OEM_ID, sizeof(rsdp->oem_id));
-+    memcpy(rsdp->oem_id, ACPI_OEM_ID, sizeof(ACPI_OEM_ID));
-     rsdp->length = acpitables[RSDP].size;
-     rsdp->revision = 0x02;
-     rsdp->xsdt_physical_address = acpitables[XSDT].addr;
-@@ -205,11 +205,11 @@
-     memcpy(h->signature, sig, 4);
-     h->length = len;
-     h->revision = rev;
--    memcpy(h->oem_id, ACPI_OEM_ID, sizeof(h->oem_id));
--    memcpy(h->oem_table_id, ACPI_OEM_TABLE_ID, sizeof(h->oem_table_id));
-+    memcpy(h->oem_id, ACPI_OEM_ID, sizeof(ACPI_OEM_ID));
-+    memcpy(h->oem_table_id, ACPI_OEM_TABLE_ID, sizeof(ACPI_OEM_TABLE_ID));
-     h->oem_revision = 0;
-     memcpy(h->asl_compiler_id, ACPI_ASL_COMPILER_ID,
--           sizeof(h->asl_compiler_id));
-+           sizeof(ACPI_ASL_COMPILER_ID));
-     h->asl_compiler_revision = 0;
-     h->checksum = 0;
- }
---- xen-4.10.0/tools/xenpmd/xenpmd.c.orig	2018-02-28 16:18:50.377726049 +0000
-+++ xen-4.10.0/tools/xenpmd/xenpmd.c	2018-02-28 16:20:31.502426829 +0000
-@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
-                             strlen(info->model_number) +
-                             strlen(info->serial_number) +
-                             strlen(info->battery_type) +
--                            strlen(info->oem_info) + 4));
-+                            strlen(info->oem_info) + 4) & 0xff);
-     write_ulong_lsb_first(val+2, info->present);
-     write_ulong_lsb_first(val+10, info->design_capacity);
-     write_ulong_lsb_first(val+18, info->last_full_capacity);

xen.gcc9.fixes.patch

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 +++ xen-4.11.1/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c	2019-02-10 19:24:09.378805103 +0000
 @@ -171,6 +171,9 @@
  	printk("%sMTRR variable ranges %sabled:\n", level,
- 	       mtrr_state.enabled & 2 ? "en" : "dis");
+ 	       mtrr_state.enabled ? "en" : "dis");
  	width = (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT + 3) / 4;
 +	if (  width > 64 ) {
 +		width=64;
@@ -21,14 +21,3 @@
  
  	for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; ++i) {
  		if (mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask & MTRR_PHYSMASK_VALID)
---- xen-4.11.1/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/rombios_compat.h.orig	2018-11-29 14:04:11.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.11.1/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/rombios_compat.h	2019-02-14 21:16:28.660456669 +0000
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
-     Bit16u filler4;
-     } r8;
-   } u;
--} __attribute__((packed)) pushad_regs_t;
-+} pushad_regs_t;
- 
- 
- 

xen.git-90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From 90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 21:55:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/amd: Mitigate AMD-SN-7053 / FP-DSS
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This is XSA-488 / CVE-2025-54505
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 99912d346009fda1e7fb1510c9501fbab17e92a0)
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c               | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+index 8c55d233f3..1bb0766ebf 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+@@ -1048,6 +1048,42 @@ void amd_init_de_cfg(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+     wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val | new);
+ }
+ 
++static void amd_init_fp_cfg(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
++{
++    uint64_t val, new = 0;
++
++    /* If virtualised, we won't have mutable access even if we can read it. */
++    if ( cpu_has_hypervisor )
++        return;
++
++    /*
++     * On Zen1, mitigate SB-7053 / FP-DSS Floating Point Divider State
++     * Sampling by setting bit 9 as instructed.
++     */
++    if ( c->family == 0x17 && is_zen1_uarch() )
++        new |= 1 << 9;
++
++    /*
++     * Avoid reading FP_CFG if we don't intend to change anything.  The
++     * register doesn't exist on all families.
++     */
++    if ( !new )
++        return;
++
++    val = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG);
++
++    if ( (val & new) == new )
++        return;
++
++    /*
++     * FP_CFG is a Core-scoped MSR, and this write is racy.  However, both
++     * threads calculate the new value from state which expected to be
++     * consistent across CPUs and unrelated to the old value, so the result
++     * should be consistent.
++     */
++    wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG, val | new);
++}
++
+ void __init amd_init_lfence_dispatch(void)
+ {
+     struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+@@ -1120,6 +1156,7 @@ static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ 	uint64_t value;
+ 
+ 	amd_init_de_cfg(c);
++	amd_init_fp_cfg(c);
+ 
+ 	if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
+ 		amd_init_lfence_dispatch(); /* Needs amd_init_de_cfg() */
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+index df52587c85..6c5b2569e1 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@
+ #define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG		0xc0011020U
+ #define MSR_AMD64_IC_CFG		0xc0011021U
+ #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG		0xc0011022U
++#define MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG		0xc0011028U
+ #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029U
+ #define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE	(_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
+ #define MSR_AMD64_EX_CFG		0xc001102cU
+-- 
+2.39.5
+

xen.glibcfix.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.7.0/tools/blktap2/control/tap-ctl-allocate.c.orig	2016-06-20 11:38:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.7.0/tools/blktap2/control/tap-ctl-allocate.c	2016-09-02 10:07:55.964084808 +0100
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/ioctl.h>
-+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
- #include <linux/major.h>
- 
- #include "tap-ctl.h"
---- xen-4.7.0/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h.orig	2016-06-20 11:38:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.7.0/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h	2016-09-02 17:35:24.853783711 +0100
-@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
- #include <sys/socket.h>
- #include <sys/file.h>
- #include <sys/ioctl.h>
-+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
- 
- #include <xenevtchn.h>
- #include <xenstore.h>

xen.hypervisor.config

@@ -1,80 +1,208 @@
 #
 # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Xen/x86 4.10.0 Configuration
+# Xen/x86 4.20 Configuration
 #
+CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
+CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=150001
+CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION=0
+CONFIG_LD_IS_GNU=y
+CONFIG_CC_HAS_VISIBILITY_ATTRIBUTE=y
+CONFIG_CC_SPLIT_SECTIONS=y
+CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B=y
+CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT=16
 CONFIG_X86_64=y
 CONFIG_X86=y
 CONFIG_ARCH_DEFCONFIG="arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig"
+CONFIG_CC_HAS_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
+CONFIG_HAS_AS_CET_SS=y
+CONFIG_HAS_CC_CET_IBT=y
 
 #
 # Architecture Features
 #
+CONFIG_AMD=y
+CONFIG_INTEL=y
+CONFIG_64BIT=y
 CONFIG_NR_CPUS=256
+CONFIG_NR_NUMA_NODES=64
 CONFIG_PV=y
+CONFIG_PV32=y
 CONFIG_PV_LINEAR_PT=y
 CONFIG_HVM=y
+CONFIG_AMD_SVM=y
+CONFIG_INTEL_VMX=y
+CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK=y
+CONFIG_XEN_IBT=y
 CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING=y
 # CONFIG_BIGMEM is not set
-# CONFIG_HVM_FEP is not set
-CONFIG_TBOOT=y
+CONFIG_HVM_FEP=y
+CONFIG_X86_PSR=y
+CONFIG_XEN_ALIGN_DEFAULT=y
+# CONFIG_XEN_ALIGN_2M is not set
+# CONFIG_X2APIC_PHYSICAL is not set
+CONFIG_X2APIC_MIXED=y
+# CONFIG_XEN_GUEST is not set
+# CONFIG_HYPERV_GUEST is not set
+# CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX is not set
+CONFIG_ALTP2M=y
+# end of Architecture Features
 
 #
 # Common Features
 #
 CONFIG_COMPAT=y
 CONFIG_CORE_PARKING=y
+CONFIG_GRANT_TABLE=y
+CONFIG_ALTERNATIVE_CALL=y
+CONFIG_ARCH_MAP_DOMAIN_PAGE=y
+CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_FRAME=y
 CONFIG_HAS_ALTERNATIVE=y
+CONFIG_HAS_COMPAT=y
+CONFIG_HAS_DIT=y
 CONFIG_HAS_EX_TABLE=y
-CONFIG_HAS_MEM_ACCESS=y
-CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING=y
-CONFIG_HAS_MEM_SHARING=y
-CONFIG_HAS_PDX=y
-CONFIG_HAS_KEXEC=y
-CONFIG_HAS_GDBSX=y
+CONFIG_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLY=y
 CONFIG_HAS_IOPORTS=y
+CONFIG_HAS_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ=y
+CONFIG_HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY=y
+CONFIG_HAS_UBSAN=y
+CONFIG_HAS_VMAP=y
+CONFIG_MEM_ACCESS_ALWAYS_ON=y
+CONFIG_MEM_ACCESS=y
+CONFIG_NEEDS_LIBELF=y
+CONFIG_NUMA=y
+
+#
+# Speculative hardening
+#
+CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
+CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK=y
+CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_ARRAY=y
+CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_BRANCH=y
+CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS=y
+CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK=y
+# end of Speculative hardening
+
+# CONFIG_DIT_DEFAULT is not set
+CONFIG_HYPFS=y
+CONFIG_HYPFS_CONFIG=y
+CONFIG_IOREQ_SERVER=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC=y
-CONFIG_TMEM=y
-CONFIG_XENOPROF=y
 # CONFIG_XSM is not set
 CONFIG_SCHED_CREDIT=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_CREDIT2=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_RTDS=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_ARINC653=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_NULL=y
-CONFIG_SCHED_DEFAULT="credit"
-CONFIG_CRYPTO=y
+CONFIG_SCHED_DEFAULT="credit2"
+# CONFIG_BOOT_TIME_CPUPOOLS is not set
 CONFIG_LIVEPATCH=y
 CONFIG_FAST_SYMBOL_LOOKUP=y
+CONFIG_ENFORCE_UNIQUE_SYMBOLS=y
 CONFIG_CMDLINE=""
+CONFIG_DOM0_MEM=""
+CONFIG_DTB_FILE=""
+CONFIG_TRACEBUFFER=y
+# end of Common Features
 
 #
 # Device Drivers
 #
 CONFIG_ACPI=y
 CONFIG_ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP=y
-CONFIG_NUMA=y
+CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA=y
 CONFIG_HAS_NS16550=y
 CONFIG_HAS_EHCI=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_TX_BUFSIZE=32768
+# CONFIG_XHCI is not set
 CONFIG_HAS_CPUFREQ=y
 CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH=y
+CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU=y
+CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU=y
+# CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_NONE is not set
+CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_BASIC=y
+# CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_SCRATCH_PAGE is not set
 CONFIG_HAS_PCI=y
+CONFIG_HAS_PCI_MSI=y
 CONFIG_VIDEO=y
 CONFIG_VGA=y
-CONFIG_DEFCONFIG_LIST="$ARCH_DEFCONFIG"
-CONFIG_XEN_GUEST=n
+CONFIG_HAS_VPCI=y
+# end of Device Drivers
+
+# CONFIG_EXPERT is not set
+# CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED is not set
+CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128=y
+CONFIG_ARCH_VCPU_IOREQ_COMPLETION=y
 
 #
 # Debugging Options
 #
 # CONFIG_DEBUG is not set
+CONFIG_GDBSX=y
+CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y
+CONFIG_SELF_TESTS=y
+# CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_PROFILE is not set
+CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKS=y
+# CONFIG_PERF_COUNTERS is not set
+CONFIG_VERBOSE_DEBUG=y
+CONFIG_SCRUB_DEBUG=y
+# CONFIG_UBSAN is not set
+# CONFIG_DEBUG_TRACE is not set
+CONFIG_XMEM_POOL_POISON=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y
+# end of Debugging Options
 
+# ARM64 settings
+CONFIG_MMU=y
+CONFIG_ARM_64=y
+CONFIG_ARM=y
+CONFIG_ARM_EFI=y
+CONFIG_GICV2=y
+CONFIG_GICV3=y
+CONFIG_VGICV2=y
+# CONFIG_NEW_VGIC is not set
+CONFIG_SBSA_VUART_CONSOLE=y
+CONFIG_HWDOM_VUART=y
+CONFIG_ARM_SSBD=y
+CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
+CONFIG_STATIC_EVTCHN=y
+CONFIG_PARTIAL_EMULATION=y
+
+#
 # ARM errata workaround via the alternative framework
 #
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_824069=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_819472=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_832075=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_834220=y
+CONFIG_ARM_ERRATUM_858921=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1508412=y
 
-CONFIG_SBSA_VUART_CONSOLE=y
-# CONFIG_NEW_VGIC is not set
+# end of ARM errata workaround via the alternative framework
+CONFIG_ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
+CONFIG_ALL_PLAT=y
+# CONFIG_QEMU is not set
+# CONFIG_RCAR3 is not set
+# CONFIG_MPSOC is not set
+# CONFIG_NO_PLAT is not set
+CONFIG_ALL64_PLAT=y
+CONFIG_MPSOC_PLATFORM=y
+
+#
+# Common Features
+#
+CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE=y
+CONFIG_HAS_CADENCE_UART=y
+CONFIG_HAS_LINFLEX=y
+CONFIG_HAS_IMX_LPUART=y
+CONFIG_HAS_MVEBU=y
+CONFIG_HAS_MESON=y
+CONFIG_HAS_PL011=y
+CONFIG_HAS_OMAP=y
+CONFIG_HAS_SCIF=y
+CONFIG_ARM_SMMU=y
+# CONFIG_IPMMU_VMSA is not set

xen.json.nocpuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+--- xen-4.21.0/tools/libs/light/libxl_nocpuid.c.orig	2025-11-18 18:02:13.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.21.0/tools/libs/light/libxl_nocpuid.c	2025-11-20 09:03:56.517804514 +0000
+@@ -40,11 +40,24 @@
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_LIBJSONC
++#ifndef _hidden
++#define _hidden
++#endif
++_hidden int libxl_cpuid_policy_list_gen_jso(json_object **jso_r,
++                                libxl_cpuid_policy_list *pcpuid)
++{
++    return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(HAVE_LIBYAJL)
+ yajl_gen_status libxl_cpuid_policy_list_gen_json(yajl_gen hand,
+                                 libxl_cpuid_policy_list *pcpuid)
+ {
+     return 0;
+ }
++#endif
+ 
+ int libxl__cpuid_policy_list_parse_json(libxl__gc *gc,
+                                         const libxl__json_object *o,

xen.python.env.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.11.0/tools/xenmon/Makefile.orig	2018-07-09 14:47:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0/tools/xenmon/Makefile	2018-09-10 21:13:15.200655105 +0100
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- 	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
- 	$(INSTALL_PROG) xenbaked $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/xenbaked
- 	$(INSTALL_PROG) xentrace_setmask  $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/xentrace_setmask
--	$(INSTALL_PROG) xenmon.py  $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/xenmon.py
-+	$(INSTALL_PYTHON_PROG) xenmon.py  $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/xenmon.py
- 
- .PHONY: uninstall
- uninstall:
---- xen-4.11.0/tools/misc/xen-ringwatch.orig	2018-07-09 14:47:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0/tools/misc/xen-ringwatch	2018-09-10 21:18:53.191063128 +0100
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--#!/usr/bin/python
-+#!/usr/bin/python2
- #
- # Copyright (C) 2011 Citrix Systems, Inc.
- #
---- xen-4.11.0/tools/python/Makefile.orig	2018-07-09 14:47:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0/tools/python/Makefile	2018-09-10 21:21:07.097979007 +0100
-@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
- 		setup.py install --record $(INSTALL_LOG) $(PYTHON_PREFIX_ARG) \
- 		--root="$(DESTDIR)" --force
- 
--	$(INSTALL_PROG) scripts/convert-legacy-stream $(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC_BIN)
--	$(INSTALL_PROG) scripts/verify-stream-v2 $(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC_BIN)
-+	$(INSTALL_PYTHON_PROG) scripts/convert-legacy-stream $(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC_BIN)
-+	$(INSTALL_PYTHON_PROG) scripts/verify-stream-v2 $(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC_BIN)
- 
- .PHONY: uninstall
- uninstall:
---- xen-4.11.0/tools/python/install-wrap.orig	2018-07-09 14:47:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0/tools/python/install-wrap	2018-09-11 20:09:57.803655357 +0100
-@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
- destf="$dest"
- for srcf in ${srcs}; do
- 	if test -d "$dest"; then
--		destf="$dest/${srcf%%*/}"
-+		destf="$dest/${srcf##*/}"
- 	fi
- 	org="$(sed -n '2q; /^#! *\/usr\/bin\/env python *$/p' $srcf)"
- 	if test "x$org" = x; then
---- xen-4.11.0/tools/misc/xencov_split.orig	2018-07-09 14:47:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0/tools/misc/xencov_split	2018-09-18 21:56:07.397893895 +0100
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--#!/usr/bin/python
-+#!/usr/bin/python2
- 
- import sys, os, os.path as path, struct, errno
- from optparse import OptionParser

xen.python3.12.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--- xen-4.17.1/tools/python/Makefile.orig	2023-04-27 13:53:19.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.17.1/tools/python/Makefile	2023-06-22 22:21:25.287486906 +0100
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+ .PHONY: all
+ all: build
+ 
+-PY_CFLAGS = $(CFLAGS) $(PY_NOOPT_CFLAGS)
++PY_CFLAGS = $(CFLAGS) $(PY_NOOPT_CFLAGS) -Wno-error=declaration-after-statement
+ PY_LDFLAGS = $(SHLIB_LDFLAGS) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS)
+ INSTALL_LOG = build/installed_files.txt
+ 
+--- xen-4.17.1/tools/pygrub/Makefile.orig	2023-04-27 13:53:19.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.17.1/tools/pygrub/Makefile	2023-06-22 22:52:52.803047401 +0100
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ XEN_ROOT = $(CURDIR)/../..
+ include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/Rules.mk
+ 
+-PY_CFLAGS = $(CFLAGS) $(PY_NOOPT_CFLAGS)
++PY_CFLAGS = $(CFLAGS) $(PY_NOOPT_CFLAGS) -Wno-error=declaration-after-statement
+ PY_LDFLAGS = $(SHLIB_LDFLAGS) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS)
+ INSTALL_LOG = build/installed_files.txt
+ 

xen.stubdom.build.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.11.0/stubdom/Makefile.orig	2018-07-09 14:47:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0/stubdom/Makefile	2018-07-11 22:33:00.764078143 +0100
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
- 	patch -d $@ -p0 < newlib.patch
- 	patch -d $@ -p0 < newlib-chk.patch
- 	patch -d $@ -p1 < newlib-stdint-size_max-fix-from-1.17.0.patch
--	find $@ -type f | xargs perl -i.bak \
-+	find $@ -type f | xargs egrep -l "tzname|daylight|timezone" | xargs perl -i.bak \
- 		-pe 's/\b_(tzname|daylight|timezone)\b/$$1/g'
- 	touch $@
- 

xen.use.fedora.ipxe.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.2.0/tools/firmware/hvmloader/Makefile.orig	2012-05-27 21:57:04.481812859 +0100
-+++ xen-4.2.0/tools/firmware/hvmloader/Makefile	2012-06-02 18:52:44.935034128 +0100
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
- else
- CIRRUSVGA_ROM := ../vgabios/VGABIOS-lgpl-latest.cirrus.bin
- endif
--ETHERBOOT_ROMS := $(addprefix ../etherboot/ipxe/src/bin/, $(addsuffix .rom, $(ETHERBOOT_NICS)))
-+ETHERBOOT_ROMS := $(addprefix /usr/share/ipxe/, $(addsuffix .rom, $(ETHERBOOT_NICS)))
- endif
- 
- ROMS := 
---- xen-4.2.0/Config.mk.orig	2012-05-27 21:57:04.479812884 +0100
-+++ xen-4.2.0/Config.mk	2012-06-02 18:55:14.087169469 +0100
-@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
- 
- SEABIOS_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= rel-1.11.1
- 
--ETHERBOOT_NICS ?= rtl8139 8086100e
-+ETHERBOOT_NICS ?= 10ec8139 8086100e
- 
- 
- QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION ?= xen-4.11.2
---- xen-4.2.0/tools/firmware/Makefile.orig	2012-05-27 21:57:04.480812871 +0100
-+++ xen-4.2.0/tools/firmware/Makefile	2012-06-02 19:03:52.254691484 +0100
-@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
- SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_SEABIOS) += seabios-dir
- SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_ROMBIOS) += rombios
- SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_ROMBIOS) += vgabios
--SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_ROMBIOS) += etherboot
-+#SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_ROMBIOS) += etherboot
- SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_PV_SHIM) += xen-dir
- SUBDIRS-y += hvmloader
- 

xen.vwprintw.fix.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.11.0/tools/xenstat/xentop/xentop.c.orig	2018-07-09 14:47:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0/tools/xenstat/xentop/xentop.c	2018-08-14 22:41:08.035898962 +0100
-@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@
- 	if (!batch) {
- 		if((current_row() < lines()-1)) {
- 			va_start(args, fmt);
--			vwprintw(stdscr, (curses_str_t)fmt, args);
-+			vw_printw(stdscr, (curses_str_t)fmt, args);
- 			va_end(args);
- 		}
- 	} else {

xsa296.patch

@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: xen/hypercall: Don't use BUG() for parameter checking in hypercall_create_continuation()
-
-Since c/s 1d429034 "hypercall: update vcpu_op to take an unsigned vcpuid",
-which incorrectly swapped 'i' for 'u' in the parameter type list, guests have
-been able to hit the BUG() in next_args()'s default case.
-
-Correct these back to 'i'.
-
-In addition, make adjustments to prevent this class of issue from occurring in
-the future - crashing Xen is not an appropriate form of parameter checking.
-
-Capitalise NEXT_ARG() to catch all uses, to highlight that it is a macro doing
-non-function-like things behind the scenes, and undef it when appropriate.
-Implement a bad_fmt: block which prints an error, asserts unreachable, and
-crashes the guest.
-
-On the ARM side, drop all parameter checking of p.  It is asymmetric with the
-x86 side, and akin to expecting memcpy() or sprintf() to check their src/fmt
-parameter before use.  A caller passing "" or something other than a string
-literal will be obvious during code review.
-
-This is XSA-296.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-index 941bbff4fe..a3da8e9c08 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-@@ -383,14 +383,15 @@ void sync_vcpu_execstate(struct vcpu *v)
-     /* Nothing to do -- no lazy switching */
- }
- 
--#define next_arg(fmt, args) ({                                              \
-+#define NEXT_ARG(fmt, args)                                                 \
-+({                                                                          \
-     unsigned long __arg;                                                    \
-     switch ( *(fmt)++ )                                                     \
-     {                                                                       \
-     case 'i': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned int);  break;    \
-     case 'l': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned long); break;    \
-     case 'h': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, void *);        break;    \
--    default:  __arg = 0; BUG();                                             \
-+    default:  goto bad_fmt;                                                 \
-     }                                                                       \
-     __arg;                                                                  \
- })
-@@ -405,9 +406,6 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     unsigned int i;
-     va_list args;
- 
--    /* All hypercalls take at least one argument */
--    BUG_ON( !p || *p == '\0' );
--
-     current->hcall_preempted = true;
- 
-     va_start(args, format);
-@@ -415,7 +413,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     if ( mcs->flags & MCSF_in_multicall )
-     {
-         for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
--            mcs->call.args[i] = next_arg(p, args);
-+            mcs->call.args[i] = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
- 
-         /* Return value gets written back to mcs->call.result */
-         rc = mcs->call.result;
-@@ -431,7 +429,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
- 
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
- 
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-@@ -454,7 +452,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
- 
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
- 
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-@@ -475,8 +473,16 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     va_end(args);
- 
-     return rc;
-+
-+ bad_fmt:
-+    gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Bad hypercall continuation format '%c'\n", *p);
-+    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+    domain_crash(current->domain);
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
-+#undef NEXT_ARG
-+
- void startup_cpu_idle_loop(void)
- {
-     struct vcpu *v = current;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c b/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c
-index d483dbaa6b..4643e5eb43 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hypercall.c
-@@ -80,14 +80,15 @@ const hypercall_args_t hypercall_args_table[NR_hypercalls] =
- #undef COMP
- #undef ARGS
- 
--#define next_arg(fmt, args) ({                                              \
-+#define NEXT_ARG(fmt, args)                                                 \
-+({                                                                          \
-     unsigned long __arg;                                                    \
-     switch ( *(fmt)++ )                                                     \
-     {                                                                       \
-     case 'i': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned int);  break;    \
-     case 'l': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, unsigned long); break;    \
-     case 'h': __arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(args, void *);        break;    \
--    default:  __arg = 0; BUG();                                             \
-+    default:  goto bad_fmt;                                                 \
-     }                                                                       \
-     __arg;                                                                  \
- })
-@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     if ( mcs->flags & MCSF_in_multicall )
-     {
-         for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
--            mcs->call.args[i] = next_arg(p, args);
-+            mcs->call.args[i] = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
-     }
-     else
-     {
-@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-         {
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-                 case 0: regs->rdi = arg; break;
-@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-         {
-             for ( i = 0; *p != '\0'; i++ )
-             {
--                arg = next_arg(p, args);
-+                arg = NEXT_ARG(p, args);
-                 switch ( i )
-                 {
-                 case 0: regs->rbx = arg; break;
-@@ -154,8 +155,16 @@ unsigned long hypercall_create_continuation(
-     va_end(args);
- 
-     return op;
-+
-+ bad_fmt:
-+    gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Bad hypercall continuation format '%c'\n", *p);
-+    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+    domain_crash(curr->domain);
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
-+#undef NEXT_ARG
-+
- int hypercall_xlat_continuation(unsigned int *id, unsigned int nr,
-                                 unsigned int mask, ...)
- {
-diff --git a/xen/common/compat/domain.c b/xen/common/compat/domain.c
-index 39877b3ab2..2531fa7421 100644
---- a/xen/common/compat/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/compat/domain.c
-@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int compat_vcpu_op(int cmd, unsigned int vcpuid, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) ar
-         }
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
--            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iuh",
-+            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
-                                                cmd, vcpuid, arg);
- 
-         break;
-diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
-index 2308588052..65bcd85e34 100644
---- a/xen/common/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
-@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, unsigned int vcpuid, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
- 
-         rc = arch_initialise_vcpu(v, arg);
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
--            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iuh",
-+            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op, "iih",
-                                                cmd, vcpuid, arg);
- 
-         break;

xsa298-4.11.patch

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/PV: check GDT/LDT limits during emulation
-
-Accesses beyond the LDT limit originating from emulation would trigger
-the ASSERT() in pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(). On production builds such
-accesses would cause an attempt to promote the touched page (offset from
-the present LDT base address) to a segment descriptor one. If this
-happens to succeed, guest user mode would be able to elevate its
-privileges to that of the guest kernel. This is particularly easy when
-there's no LDT at all, in which case the LDT base stored internally to
-Xen is simply zero.
-
-Also adjust the ASSERT() that was triggering: It was off by one to
-begin with, and for production builds we also better use
-ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() instead with suitable recovery code afterwards.
-
-This is XSA-298.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c
-@@ -51,7 +51,13 @@ static int read_gate_descriptor(unsigned
-     const struct desc_struct *pdesc = gdt_ldt_desc_ptr(gate_sel);
- 
-     if ( (gate_sel < 4) ||
--         ((gate_sel >= FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE) && !(gate_sel & 4)) ||
-+         /*
-+          * We're interested in call gates only, which occupy a single
-+          * seg_desc_t for 32-bit and a consecutive pair of them for 64-bit.
-+          */
-+         ((gate_sel >> 3) + !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) >=
-+          (gate_sel & 4 ? v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents
-+                        : v->arch.pv_vcpu.gdt_ents)) ||
-          __get_user(desc, pdesc) )
-         return 0;
- 
-@@ -70,7 +76,7 @@ static int read_gate_descriptor(unsigned
-     if ( !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) )
-     {
-         if ( (*ar & 0x1f00) != 0x0c00 ||
--             (gate_sel >= FIRST_RESERVED_GDT_BYTE - 8 && !(gate_sel & 4)) ||
-+             /* Limit check done above already. */
-              __get_user(desc, pdesc + 1) ||
-              (desc.b & 0x1f00) )
-             return 0;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.c
-@@ -31,7 +31,14 @@ int pv_emul_read_descriptor(unsigned int
- {
-     struct desc_struct desc;
- 
--    if ( sel < 4)
-+    if ( sel < 4 ||
-+         /*
-+          * Don't apply the GDT limit here, as the selector may be a Xen
-+          * provided one. __get_user() will fail (without taking further
-+          * action) for ones falling in the gap between guest populated
-+          * and Xen ones.
-+          */
-+         ((sel & 4) && (sel >> 3) >= v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents) )
-         desc.b = desc.a = 0;
-     else if ( __get_user(desc, gdt_ldt_desc_ptr(sel)) )
-         return 0;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
-@@ -92,12 +92,16 @@ bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int
-     BUG_ON(unlikely(in_irq()));
- 
-     /*
--     * Hardware limit checking should guarantee this property.  NB. This is
-+     * Prior limit checking should guarantee this property.  NB. This is
-      * safe as updates to the LDT can only be made by MMUEXT_SET_LDT to the
-      * current vcpu, and vcpu_reset() will block until this vcpu has been
-      * descheduled before continuing.
-      */
--    ASSERT((offset >> 3) <= curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents);
-+    if ( unlikely((offset >> 3) >= curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return false;
-+    }
- 
-     if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-         linear = (uint32_t)linear;

xsa299-4.11-0001-x86-mm-L1TF-checks-don-t-leave-a-partial-entry.patch

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From 852df269d247e177d5f2e9b8f3a4301a6fdd76bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 01/11] x86/mm: L1TF checks don't leave a partial entry
-
-On detection of a potential L1TF issue, most validation code returns
--ERESTART to allow the switch to shadow mode to happen and cause the
-original operation to be restarted.
-
-However, in the validation code, the return value -ERESTART has been
-repurposed to indicate 1) the function has partially completed
-something which needs to be undone, and 2) calling put_page_type()
-should cleanly undo it.  This causes problems in several places.
-
-For L1 tables, on receiving an -ERESTART return from alloc_l1_table(),
-alloc_page_type() will set PGT_partial on the page.  If for some
-reason the original operation never restarts, then on domain
-destruction, relinquish_memory() will call free_page_type() on the
-page.
-
-Unfortunately, alloc_ and free_l1_table() aren't set up to deal with
-PGT_partial.  When returning a failure, alloc_l1_table() always
-de-validates whatever it's validated so far, and free_l1_table()
-always devalidates the whole page.  This means that if
-relinquish_memory() calls free_page_type() on an L1 that didn't
-complete due to an L1TF, it will call put_page_from_l1e() on "page
-entries" that have never been validated.
-
-For L2+ tables, setting rc to ERESTART causes the rest of the
-alloc_lN_table() function to *think* that the entry in question will
-have PGT_partial set.  This will cause it to set partial_pte = 1.  If
-relinqush_memory() then calls free_page_type() on one of those pages,
-then free_lN_table() will call put_page_from_lNe() on the entry when
-it shouldn't.
-
-Rather than indicating -ERESTART, indicate -EINTR.  This is the code
-to indicate that nothing has changed from when you started the call
-(which is effectively how alloc_l1_table() handles errors).
-
-mod_lN_entry() shouldn't have any of these types of problems, so leave
-potential changes there for a clean-up patch later.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index e6a4cb28f8..8ced185b49 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ get_page_from_l2e(
-     int rc;
- 
-     if ( !(l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
--        return pv_l1tf_check_l2e(d, l2e) ? -ERESTART : 1;
-+        return pv_l1tf_check_l2e(d, l2e) ? -EINTR : 1;
- 
-     if ( unlikely((l2e_get_flags(l2e) & L2_DISALLOW_MASK)) )
-     {
-@@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
-     int rc;
- 
-     if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
--        return pv_l1tf_check_l3e(d, l3e) ? -ERESTART : 1;
-+        return pv_l1tf_check_l3e(d, l3e) ? -EINTR : 1;
- 
-     if ( unlikely((l3e_get_flags(l3e) & l3_disallow_mask(d))) )
-     {
-@@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
-     int rc;
- 
-     if ( !(l4e_get_flags(l4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
--        return pv_l1tf_check_l4e(d, l4e) ? -ERESTART : 1;
-+        return pv_l1tf_check_l4e(d, l4e) ? -EINTR : 1;
- 
-     if ( unlikely((l4e_get_flags(l4e) & L4_DISALLOW_MASK)) )
-     {
-@@ -1404,7 +1404,7 @@ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_info *page)
-     {
-         if ( !(l1e_get_flags(pl1e[i]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         {
--            ret = pv_l1tf_check_l1e(d, pl1e[i]) ? -ERESTART : 0;
-+            ret = pv_l1tf_check_l1e(d, pl1e[i]) ? -EINTR : 0;
-             if ( ret )
-                 goto out;
-         }
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0002-x86-mm-Don-t-re-set-PGT_pinned-on-a-partially-de-val.patch

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-From 6bdddd7980eac0cc883945d823986f24682ca47a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 02/11] x86/mm: Don't re-set PGT_pinned on a partially
- de-validated page
-
-When unpinning pagetables, if an operation is interrupted,
-relinquish_memory() re-sets PGT_pinned so that the un-pin will
-pickedup again when the hypercall restarts.
-
-This is appropriate when put_page_and_type_preemptible() returns
--EINTR, which indicates that the page is back in its initial state
-(i.e., completely validated).  However, for -ERESTART, this leads to a
-state where a page has both PGT_pinned and PGT_partial set.
-
-This happens to work at the moment, although it's not really a
-"canonical" state; but in subsequent patches, where we need to make a
-distinction in handling between PGT_validated and PGT_partial pages,
-this causes issues.
-
-Move to a "canonical" state by:
-- Only re-setting PGT_pinned on -EINTR
-- Re-dropping the refcount held by PGT_pinned on -ERESTART
-
-In the latter case, the PGT_partial bit will be cleared further down
-with the rest of the other PGT_partial pages.
-
-While here, clean up some trainling whitespace.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 29f892c04c..8fbecbb169 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void play_dead(void)
-      * this case, heap corruption or #PF can occur (when heap debugging is
-      * enabled). For example, even printk() can involve tasklet scheduling,
-      * which touches per-cpu vars.
--     * 
-+     *
-      * Consider very carefully when adding code to *dead_idle. Most hypervisor
-      * subsystems are unsafe to call.
-      */
-@@ -1838,9 +1838,34 @@ static int relinquish_memory(
-             break;
-         case -ERESTART:
-         case -EINTR:
-+            /*
-+             * -EINTR means PGT_validated has been re-set; re-set
-+             * PGT_pinned again so that it gets picked up next time
-+             * around.
-+             *
-+             * -ERESTART, OTOH, means PGT_partial is set instead.  Put
-+             * it back on the list, but don't set PGT_pinned; the
-+             * section below will finish off de-validation.  But we do
-+             * need to drop the general ref associated with
-+             * PGT_pinned, since put_page_and_type_preemptible()
-+             * didn't do it.
-+             *
-+             * NB we can do an ASSERT for PGT_validated, since we
-+             * "own" the type ref; but theoretically, the PGT_partial
-+             * could be cleared by someone else.
-+             */
-+            if ( ret == -EINTR )
-+            {
-+                ASSERT(page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_validated);
-+                set_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info);
-+            }
-+            else
-+                put_page(page);
-+
-             ret = -ERESTART;
-+
-+            /* Put the page back on the list and drop the ref we grabbed above */
-             page_list_add(page, list);
--            set_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info);
-             put_page(page);
-             goto out;
-         default:
-@@ -2062,7 +2087,7 @@ void vcpu_kick(struct vcpu *v)
-      * pending flag. These values may fluctuate (after all, we hold no
-      * locks) but the key insight is that each change will cause
-      * evtchn_upcall_pending to be polled.
--     * 
-+     *
-      * NB2. We save the running flag across the unblock to avoid a needless
-      * IPI for domains that we IPI'd to unblock.
-      */
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0003-x86-mm-Separate-out-partial_pte-tristate-into-indivi.patch

@@ -1,609 +0,0 @@
-From 7c0a37005f52d10903ce22851b52ae9b6f4f0ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 03/11] x86/mm: Separate out partial_pte tristate into
- individual flags
-
-At the moment, partial_pte is a tri-state that contains two distinct bits
-of information:
-
-1. If zero, the pte at index [nr_validated_ptes] is un-validated.  If
-   non-zero, the pte was last seen with PGT_partial set.
-
-2. If positive, the pte at index [nr_validated_ptes] does not hold a
-   general reference count.  If negative, it does.
-
-To make future patches more clear, separate out this functionality
-into two distinct, named bits: PTF_partial_set (for #1) and
-PTF_partial_general_ref (for #2).
-
-Additionally, a number of functions which need this information also
-take other flags to control behavior (such as `preemptible` and
-`defer`).  These are hard to read in the caller (since you only see
-'true' or 'false'), and ugly when many are added together.  In
-preparation for adding yet another flag in a future patch, collapse
-all of these into a single `flag` variable.
-
-NB that this does mean checking for what was previously the '-1'
-condition a bit more ugly in the put_page_from_lNe functions (since
-you have to check for both partial_set and general ref); but this
-clause will go away in a future patch.
-
-Also note that the original comment had an off-by-one error:
-partial_flags (like partial_pte before it) concerns
-plNe[nr_validated_ptes], not plNe[nr_validated_ptes+1].
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c        | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h |  41 ++++++----
- 2 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 8ced185b49..1c4f54e328 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -610,20 +610,34 @@ static int alloc_segdesc_page(struct page_info *page)
- static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-                           bool preemptible);
- 
-+/*
-+ * The following flags are used to specify behavior of various get and
-+ * put commands.  The first two are also stored in page->partial_flags
-+ * to indicate the state of the page pointed to by
-+ * page->pte[page->nr_validated_entries].  See the comment in mm.h for
-+ * more information.
-+ */
-+#define PTF_partial_set         (1 << 0)
-+#define PTF_partial_general_ref (1 << 1)
-+#define PTF_preemptible         (1 << 2)
-+#define PTF_defer               (1 << 3)
-+
- static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     mfn_t mfn, unsigned long type, struct domain *d,
--    int partial, int preemptible)
-+    unsigned int flags)
- {
-     struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-     int rc;
-+    bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible,
-+         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref;
- 
--    if ( likely(partial >= 0) &&
-+    if ( likely(!partial_ref) &&
-          unlikely(!get_page_from_mfn(mfn, d)) )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
-     rc = _get_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
- 
--    if ( unlikely(rc) && partial >= 0 &&
-+    if ( unlikely(rc) && !partial_ref &&
-          (!preemptible || page != current->arch.old_guest_table) )
-         put_page(page);
- 
-@@ -1104,7 +1118,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
- define_get_linear_pagetable(l2);
- static int
- get_page_from_l2e(
--    l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
-+    l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, unsigned int flags)
- {
-     unsigned long mfn = l2e_get_pfn(l2e);
-     int rc;
-@@ -1119,8 +1133,9 @@ get_page_from_l2e(
-         return -EINVAL;
-     }
- 
--    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(_mfn(mfn), PGT_l1_page_table, d,
--                                    partial, false);
-+    ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_preemptible));
-+
-+    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(_mfn(mfn), PGT_l1_page_table, d, flags);
-     if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) && get_l2_linear_pagetable(l2e, pfn, d) )
-         rc = 0;
- 
-@@ -1137,7 +1152,7 @@ get_page_from_l2e(
- define_get_linear_pagetable(l3);
- static int
- get_page_from_l3e(
--    l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
-+    l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc;
- 
-@@ -1152,7 +1167,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
-     }
- 
-     rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
--        l3e_get_mfn(l3e), PGT_l2_page_table, d, partial, 1);
-+        l3e_get_mfn(l3e), PGT_l2_page_table, d, flags | PTF_preemptible);
-     if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) &&
-          !is_pv_32bit_domain(d) &&
-          get_l3_linear_pagetable(l3e, pfn, d) )
-@@ -1170,7 +1185,7 @@ get_page_from_l3e(
- define_get_linear_pagetable(l4);
- static int
- get_page_from_l4e(
--    l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, int partial)
-+    l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn, struct domain *d, unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc;
- 
-@@ -1185,7 +1200,7 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
-     }
- 
-     rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
--        l4e_get_mfn(l4e), PGT_l3_page_table, d, partial, 1);
-+        l4e_get_mfn(l4e), PGT_l3_page_table, d, flags | PTF_preemptible);
-     if ( unlikely(rc == -EINVAL) && get_l4_linear_pagetable(l4e, pfn, d) )
-         rc = 0;
- 
-@@ -1275,7 +1290,7 @@ void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner)
-  * Note also that this automatically deals correctly with linear p.t.'s.
-  */
- static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
--                             int partial, bool defer)
-+                             unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc = 0;
- 
-@@ -1295,12 +1310,13 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         struct page_info *pg = l2e_get_page(l2e);
-         struct page_info *ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
--        if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-+        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-+              PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!defer);
-+            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
-             rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, ptpg);
-         }
--        else if ( defer )
-+        else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = ptpg;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1317,7 +1333,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
- }
- 
- static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
--                             int partial, bool defer)
-+                             unsigned int flags)
- {
-     struct page_info *pg;
-     int rc;
-@@ -1340,13 +1356,14 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-     pg = l3e_get_page(l3e);
- 
--    if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-+    if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-+         PTF_partial_set )
-     {
--        ASSERT(!defer);
-+        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
-         return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     }
- 
--    if ( defer )
-+    if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-     {
-         current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-         current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1361,7 +1378,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- }
- 
- static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
--                             int partial, bool defer)
-+                             unsigned int flags)
- {
-     int rc = 1;
- 
-@@ -1370,13 +1387,14 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-     {
-         struct page_info *pg = l4e_get_page(l4e);
- 
--        if ( unlikely(partial > 0) )
-+        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-+              PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!defer);
-+            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
-             return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         }
- 
--        if ( defer )
-+        if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1483,12 +1501,13 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-     unsigned long  pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l2_pgentry_t  *pl2e;
-     unsigned int   i;
--    int            rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
-+    int            rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
- 
-     pl2e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
--          i++, partial = 0 )
-+          i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-         {
-@@ -1498,18 +1517,19 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-         }
- 
-         if ( !is_guest_l2_slot(d, type, i) ||
--             (rc = get_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, d, partial)) > 0 )
-+             (rc = get_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, d, partial_flags)) > 0 )
-             continue;
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
-+            /* Set 'set', retain 'general ref' */
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-             rc = -ERESTART;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 && rc != -EINTR )
-@@ -1518,7 +1538,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_pte = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = 0;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-             }
-@@ -1542,7 +1562,8 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     unsigned long  pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l3_pgentry_t  *pl3e;
-     unsigned int   i;
--    int            rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
-+    int            rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
- 
-     pl3e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-@@ -1557,7 +1578,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         memset(pl3e + 4, 0, (L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 4) * sizeof(*pl3e));
- 
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
--          i++, partial = 0 )
-+          i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-         {
-@@ -1574,20 +1595,22 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-             else
-                 rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-                     l3e_get_mfn(pl3e[i]),
--                    PGT_l2_page_table | PGT_pae_xen_l2, d, partial, 1);
-+                    PGT_l2_page_table | PGT_pae_xen_l2, d,
-+                    partial_flags | PTF_preemptible);
-         }
--        else if ( (rc = get_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, d, partial)) > 0 )
-+        else if ( (rc = get_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, d, partial_flags)) > 0 )
-             continue;
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
-+            /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-             rc = -ERESTART;
-         }
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-@@ -1604,7 +1627,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         if ( i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-         }
-@@ -1736,19 +1759,21 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     unsigned long  pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l4_pgentry_t  *pl4e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
-     unsigned int   i;
--    int            rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
-+    int            rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
- 
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
--          i++, partial = 0 )
-+          i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         if ( !is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) ||
--             (rc = get_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, d, partial)) > 0 )
-+             (rc = get_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, d, partial_flags)) > 0 )
-             continue;
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_pte = partial ?: 1;
-+            /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 )
-         {
-@@ -1758,7 +1783,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_pte = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = 0;
-                 if ( rc == -EINTR )
-                     rc = -ERESTART;
-                 else
-@@ -1811,19 +1836,20 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
-     unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l2_pgentry_t *pl2e;
--    int rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
--    unsigned int i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !partial;
-+    int rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int partial_flags = page->partial_flags,
-+        i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !(partial_flags & PTF_partial_set);
- 
-     pl2e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-     for ( ; ; )
-     {
-         if ( is_guest_l2_slot(d, page->u.inuse.type_info, i) )
--            rc = put_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, partial, false);
-+            rc = put_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, partial_flags);
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-             break;
- 
--        partial = 0;
-+        partial_flags = 0;
- 
-         if ( !i-- )
-             break;
-@@ -1845,12 +1871,14 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     else if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_pte = partial ?: -1;
-+        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
-+            partial_flags :
-+            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i + 1;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-         rc = -ERESTART;
-     }
- 
-@@ -1862,18 +1890,19 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
-     unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l3_pgentry_t *pl3e;
--    int rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
--    unsigned int  i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !partial;
-+    int rc = 0;
-+    unsigned int partial_flags = page->partial_flags,
-+        i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !(partial_flags & PTF_partial_set);
- 
-     pl3e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-     for ( ; ; )
-     {
--        rc = put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, partial, 0);
-+        rc = put_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, partial_flags);
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-             break;
- 
--        partial = 0;
-+        partial_flags = 0;
-         if ( rc == 0 )
-             pl3e[i] = unadjust_guest_l3e(pl3e[i], d);
- 
-@@ -1892,12 +1921,14 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_pte = partial ?: -1;
-+        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
-+            partial_flags :
-+            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i + 1;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-         rc = -ERESTART;
-     }
-     return rc > 0 ? 0 : rc;
-@@ -1908,26 +1939,29 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page);
-     unsigned long pfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page));
-     l4_pgentry_t *pl4e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
--    int rc = 0, partial = page->partial_pte;
--    unsigned int  i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !partial;
-+    int rc = 0;
-+    unsigned partial_flags = page->partial_flags,
-+        i = page->nr_validated_ptes - !(partial_flags & PTF_partial_set);
- 
-     do {
-         if ( is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) )
--            rc = put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, partial, 0);
-+            rc = put_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, partial_flags);
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-             break;
--        partial = 0;
-+        partial_flags = 0;
-     } while ( i-- );
- 
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_pte = partial ?: -1;
-+        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
-+            partial_flags :
-+            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i + 1;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-         rc = -ERESTART;
-     }
- 
-@@ -2203,7 +2237,7 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e,
-         return -EBUSY;
-     }
- 
--    put_page_from_l2e(ol2e, pfn, 0, true);
-+    put_page_from_l2e(ol2e, pfn, PTF_defer);
- 
-     return rc;
- }
-@@ -2271,7 +2305,7 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e,
-         if ( !create_pae_xen_mappings(d, pl3e) )
-             BUG();
- 
--    put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, 0, 1);
-+    put_page_from_l3e(ol3e, pfn, PTF_defer);
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-@@ -2334,7 +2368,7 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e,
-         return -EFAULT;
-     }
- 
--    put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, 0, 1);
-+    put_page_from_l4e(ol4e, pfn, PTF_defer);
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-@@ -2598,7 +2632,7 @@ int free_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-     if ( !(type & PGT_partial) )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = 1U << PAGETABLE_ORDER;
--        page->partial_pte = 0;
-+        page->partial_flags = 0;
-     }
- 
-     switch ( type & PGT_type_mask )
-@@ -2889,7 +2923,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-         if ( !(x & PGT_partial) )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = 0;
--            page->partial_pte = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = 0;
-         }
-         page->linear_pt_count = 0;
-         rc = alloc_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
-@@ -3064,7 +3098,7 @@ int new_guest_cr3(mfn_t mfn)
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, 0, 1);
-+    rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(mfn, PGT_root_page_table, d, PTF_preemptible);
-     switch ( rc )
-     {
-     case 0:
-@@ -3452,7 +3486,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-             if ( op.arg1.mfn != 0 )
-             {
-                 rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
--                    _mfn(op.arg1.mfn), PGT_root_page_table, currd, 0, 1);
-+                    _mfn(op.arg1.mfn), PGT_root_page_table, currd, PTF_preemptible);
- 
-                 if ( unlikely(rc) )
-                 {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index 1ea173c555..46cba52941 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -228,19 +228,34 @@ struct page_info
-          * setting the flag must not drop that reference, whereas the instance
-          * clearing it will have to.
-          *
--         * If @partial_pte is positive then PTE at @nr_validated_ptes+1 has
--         * been partially validated. This implies that the general reference
--         * to the page (acquired from get_page_from_lNe()) would be dropped
--         * (again due to the apparent failure) and hence must be re-acquired
--         * when resuming the validation, but must not be dropped when picking
--         * up the page for invalidation.
-+         * If partial_flags & PTF_partial_set is set, then the page at
-+         * at @nr_validated_ptes had PGT_partial set as a result of an
-+         * operation on the current page.  (That page may or may not
-+         * still have PGT_partial set.)
-          *
--         * If @partial_pte is negative then PTE at @nr_validated_ptes+1 has
--         * been partially invalidated. This is basically the opposite case of
--         * above, i.e. the general reference to the page was not dropped in
--         * put_page_from_lNe() (due to the apparent failure), and hence it
--         * must be dropped when the put operation is resumed (and completes),
--         * but it must not be acquired if picking up the page for validation.
-+         * If PTF_partial_general_ref is set, then the PTE at
-+         * @nr_validated_ptef holds a general reference count for the
-+         * page.
-+         *
-+         * This happens:
-+         * - During de-validation, if de-validation of the page was
-+         *   interrupted
-+         * - During validation, if an invalid entry is encountered and
-+         *   validation is preemptible
-+         * - During validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref was set on
-+         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because we're picking
-+         *   up from a partial de-validation).
-+         *
-+         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is clear,
-+         * then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it is set, no
-+         * reference should be acquired.
-+         *
-+         * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
-+         * clear, no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a
-+         * reference should be dropped.
-+         *
-+         * NB that PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref are
-+         * defined in mm.c, the only place where they are used.
-          *
-          * The 3rd field, @linear_pt_count, indicates
-          * - by a positive value, how many same-level page table entries a page
-@@ -251,7 +266,7 @@ struct page_info
-         struct {
-             u16 nr_validated_ptes:PAGETABLE_ORDER + 1;
-             u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 2;
--            s16 partial_pte:2;
-+            u16 partial_flags:2;
-             s16 linear_pt_count;
-         };
- 
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0004-x86-mm-Use-flags-for-_put_page_type-rather-than-a-bo.patch

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-From 20b8a6702c6839bafd252789396b443d4b5c5474 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 04/11] x86/mm: Use flags for _put_page_type rather than a
- boolean
-
-This is in mainly in preparation for _put_page_type taking the
-partial_flags value in the future.  It also makes it easier to read in
-the caller (since you see a flag name rather than `true` or `false`).
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 1c4f54e328..e2fba15d86 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ get_page_from_l4e(
-     return rc;
- }
- 
--static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible,
-+static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned int flags,
-                           struct page_info *ptpg);
- 
- void put_page_from_l1e(l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *l1e_owner)
-@@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
-             ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, ptpg);
-+            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-         }
-         else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         }
-         else
-         {
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, ptpg);
-+            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-             if ( likely(!rc) )
-                 put_page(pg);
-         }
-@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-          PTF_partial_set )
-     {
-         ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--        return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     }
- 
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1370,7 +1370,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+    rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     if ( likely(!rc) )
-         put_page(pg);
- 
-@@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
-             ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            return _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+            return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         }
- 
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-             return 0;
-         }
- 
--        rc = _put_page_type(pg, true, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         if ( likely(!rc) )
-             put_page(pg);
-     }
-@@ -2701,10 +2701,11 @@ static int _put_final_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- }
- 
- 
--static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, bool preemptible,
-+static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned int flags,
-                           struct page_info *ptpg)
- {
-     unsigned long nx, x, y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
-+    bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible;
- 
-     ASSERT(current_locked_page_ne_check(page));
- 
-@@ -2911,7 +2912,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- 
-             if ( unlikely(iommu_ret) )
-             {
--                _put_page_type(page, false, NULL);
-+                _put_page_type(page, 0, NULL);
-                 rc = iommu_ret;
-                 goto out;
-             }
-@@ -2938,7 +2939,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- 
- void put_page_type(struct page_info *page)
- {
--    int rc = _put_page_type(page, false, NULL);
-+    int rc = _put_page_type(page, 0, NULL);
-     ASSERT(rc == 0);
-     (void)rc;
- }
-@@ -2955,7 +2956,7 @@ int get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
- 
- int put_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page)
- {
--    return _put_page_type(page, true, NULL);
-+    return _put_page_type(page, PTF_preemptible, NULL);
- }
- 
- int get_page_type_preemptible(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-@@ -2972,7 +2973,7 @@ int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
-         return 0;
- 
--    switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, true,
-+    switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, PTF_preemptible,
-                                  v->arch.old_guest_ptpg) )
-     {
-     case -EINTR:
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0005-x86-mm-Rework-get_page_and_type_from_mfn-conditional.patch

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-From 7b3f9f9a797459902bebba962e31be5cbfe7b515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/11] x86/mm: Rework get_page_and_type_from_mfn conditional
-
-Make it easier to read by declaring the conditions in which we will
-retain the ref, rather than the conditions under which we release it.
-
-The only way (page == current->arch.old_guest_table) can be true is if
-preemptible is true; so remove this from the query itself, and add an
-ASSERT() to that effect on the opposite path.
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-NB that alloc_lN_table() mishandle the "linear pt failure" situation
-described in the comment; this will be addressed in a future patch.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index e2fba15d86..eaf7b14245 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -637,8 +637,43 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
- 
-     rc = _get_page_type(page, type, preemptible);
- 
--    if ( unlikely(rc) && !partial_ref &&
--         (!preemptible || page != current->arch.old_guest_table) )
-+    /*
-+     * Retain the refcount if:
-+     * - page is fully validated (rc == 0)
-+     * - page is not validated (rc < 0) but:
-+     *   - We came in with a reference (partial_ref)
-+     *   - page is partially validated but there's been an error
-+     *     (page == current->arch.old_guest_table)
-+     *
-+     * The partial_ref-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
-+     * are two scenarios where partial_ref might be true coming in:
-+     * - mfn has been partially demoted as type `type`; i.e. has
-+     *   PGT_partial set
-+     * - mfn has been partially demoted as L(type+1) (i.e., a linear
-+     *   page; e.g. we're being called from get_page_from_l2e with
-+     *   type == PGT_l1_table, but the mfn is PGT_l2_table)
-+     *
-+     * If there's an error, in the first case, _get_page_type will
-+     * either return -ERESTART, in which case we want to retain the
-+     * ref (as the caller will consider it retained), or -EINVAL, in
-+     * which case old_guest_table will be set; in both cases, we need
-+     * to retain the ref.
-+     *
-+     * In the second case, if there's an error, _get_page_type() can
-+     * *only* return -EINVAL, and *never* set old_guest_table.  In
-+     * that case we also want to retain the reference, to allow the
-+     * page to continue to be torn down (i.e., PGT_partial cleared)
-+     * safely.
-+     *
-+     * Also note that we shouldn't be able to leave with the reference
-+     * count retained unless we succeeded, or the operation was
-+     * preemptible.
-+     */
-+    if ( likely(!rc) || partial_ref )
-+        /* nothing */;
-+    else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table )
-+        ASSERT(preemptible);
-+    else
-         put_page(page);
- 
-     return rc;
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0006-x86-mm-Have-alloc_l-23-_table-clear-partial_flags-wh.patch

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-From d28893777be56ef51562ed32502377974f738fd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 06/11] x86/mm: Have alloc_l[23]_table clear partial_flags when
- preempting
-
-In order to allow recursive pagetable promotions and demotions to be
-interrupted, Xen must keep track of the state of the sub-pages
-promoted or demoted.  This is stored in two elements in the page
-struct: nr_entries_validated and partial_flags.
-
-The rule is that entries [0, nr_entries_validated) should always be
-validated and hold a general reference count.  If partial_flags is
-zero, then [nr_entries_validated] is not validated and no reference
-count is held.  If PTF_partial_set is set, then [nr_entries_validated]
-is partially validated.
-
-At the moment, a distinction is made between promotion and demotion
-with regard to whether the entry itself "holds" a general reference
-count: when entry promotion is interrupted (i.e., returns -ERESTART),
-the entry is not considered to hold a reference; when entry demotion
-is interrupted, the entry is still considered to hold a general
-reference.
-
-PTF_partial_general_ref is used to distinguish between these cases.
-If clear, it's a partial promotion => no general reference count held
-by the entry; if set, it's partial demotion, so a general reference
-count held.  Because promotions and demotions can be interleaved, this
-value is passed to get_page_and_type_from_mfn and put_page_from_l*e,
-to be able to properly handle reference counts.
-
-Unfortunately, when alloc_l[23]_table check hypercall_preempt_check()
-and return -ERESTART, they set nr_entries_validated, but don't clear
-partial_flags.
-
-If we were picking up from a previously-interrupted promotion, that
-means that PTF_partial_set would be set even though
-[nr_entries_validated] was not partially validated.  This means that
-if the page in this state were de-validated, put_page_type() would
-erroneously be called on that entry.
-
-Perhaps worse, if we were racing with a de-validation, then we might
-leave both PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref; and when
-de-validation picked up again, both the type and the general ref would
-be erroneously dropped from [nr_entries_validated].
-
-In a sense, the real issue here is code duplication.  Rather than
-duplicate the interruption code, set rc to -EINTR and fall through to
-the code which already handles that case correctly.
-
-Given the logic at this point, it should be impossible for
-partial_flags to be non-zero; add an ASSERT() to catch any changes.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 18 ++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index eaf7b14245..053465cb7c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1545,13 +1545,8 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-           i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
--        {
--            page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            rc = -ERESTART;
--            break;
--        }
--
--        if ( !is_guest_l2_slot(d, type, i) ||
-+            rc = -EINTR;
-+        else if ( !is_guest_l2_slot(d, type, i) ||
-              (rc = get_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, d, partial_flags)) > 0 )
-             continue;
- 
-@@ -1616,13 +1611,8 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-           i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         if ( i > page->nr_validated_ptes && hypercall_preempt_check() )
--        {
--            page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            rc = -ERESTART;
--            break;
--        }
--
--        if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) && (i == 3) )
-+            rc = -EINTR;
-+        else if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) && (i == 3) )
-         {
-             if ( !(l3e_get_flags(pl3e[i]) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ||
-                  (l3e_get_flags(pl3e[i]) & l3_disallow_mask(d)) )
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0007-x86-mm-Always-retain-a-general-ref-on-partial.patch

@@ -1,374 +0,0 @@
-From f608a53c25806a7a4318cbe225bc5f5bbf154d69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 07/11] x86/mm: Always retain a general ref on partial
-
-In order to allow recursive pagetable promotions and demotions to be
-interrupted, Xen must keep track of the state of the sub-pages
-promoted or demoted.  This is stored in two elements in the page struct:
-nr_entries_validated and partial_flags.
-
-The rule is that entries [0, nr_entries_validated) should always be
-validated and hold a general reference count.  If partial_flags is
-zero, then [nr_entries_validated] is not validated and no reference
-count is held.  If PTF_partial_set is set, then [nr_entries_validated]
-is partially validated.
-
-At the moment, a distinction is made between promotion and demotion
-with regard to whether the entry itself "holds" a general reference
-count: when entry promotion is interrupted (i.e., returns -ERESTART),
-the entry is not considered to hold a reference; when entry demotion
-is interrupted, the entry is still considered to hold a general
-reference.
-
-PTF_partial_general_ref is used to distinguish between these cases.
-If clear, it's a partial promotion => no general reference count held
-by the entry; if set, it's partial demotion, so a general reference
-count held.  Because promotions and demotions can be interleaved, this
-value is passed to get_page_and_type_from_mfn and put_page_from_l*e,
-to be able to properly handle reference counts.
-
-Unfortunately, because a refcount is not held, it is possible to
-engineer a situation where PFT_partial_set is set but the page in
-question has been assigned to another domain.  A sketch is provided in
-the appendix.
-
-Fix this by having the parent page table entry hold a general
-reference count whenever PFT_partial_set is set.  (For clarity of
-change, keep two separate flags.  These will be collapsed in a
-subsequent changeset.)
-
-This has two basic implications.  On the put_page_from_lNe() side,
-this mean that the (partial_set && !partial_ref) case can never happen,
-and no longer needs to be special-cased.
-
-Secondly, because both flags are set together, there's no need to carry over
-existing bits from partial_pte.
-
-(NB there is still another issue with calling _put_page_type() on a
-page which had PGT_partial set; that will be handled in a subsequent
-patch.)
-
-On the get_page_and_type_from_mfn() side, we need to distinguish
-between callers which hold a reference on partial (i.e.,
-alloc_lN_table()), and those which do not (new_cr3, PIN_LN_TABLE, and
-so on): pass a flag if the type should be retained on interruption.
-
-NB that since l1 promotion can't be preempted, that get_page_from_l2e
-can't return -ERESTART.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
------
-* Appendix: Engineering PTF_partial_set while a page belongs to a
-  foreign domain
-
-Suppose A is a page which can be promoted to an l3, and B is a page
-which can be promoted to an l2, and A[x] points to B.  B has
-PGC_allocated set but no other general references.
-
-V1:  PIN_L3 A.
-  A is validated, B is validated.
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated | PGT_pinned
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated (A[x] holds a general ref)
-
-V1: UNPIN A.
-  A begins de-validation.
-  Arrange to be interrupted when i < x
-  V1->old_guest_table = A
-  V1->old_guest_table_ref_held = false
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  A.nr_validated_entries = i < x
-  B.type_count = 0
-  B.count = 1 | PGC_allocated
-
-V2: MOD_L4_ENTRY to point some l4e to A.
-  Picks up re-validation of A.
-  Arrange to be interrupted halfway through B's validation
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated (PGT_partial holds a general ref)
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  A.nr_validated_entries = x
-  A.partial_pte = PTF_partial_set
-
-V3: MOD_L3_ENTRY to point some other l3e (not in A) to B.
-  Validates B.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated ("other l3e" holds a general ref)
-
-V3: MOD_L3_ENTRY to clear l3e pointing to B.
-  Devalidates B.
-  B.type_count = 0
-  B.count = 1 | PGC_allocated
-
-V3: decrease_reservation(B)
-  Clears PGC_allocated
-  B.count = 0 => B is freed
-
-B gets assigned to a different domain
-
-V1: Restarts UNPIN of A
-  put_old_guest_table(A)
-    ...
-      free_l3_table(A)
-
-Now since A.partial_flags has PTF_partial_set, free_l3_table() will
-call put_page_from_l3e() on A[x], which points to B, while B is owned
-by another domain.
-
-If A[x] held a general refcount for B on partial validation, as it does
-for partial de-validation, then B would still have a reference count of
-1 after PGC_allocated was freed; so B wouldn't be freed until after
-put_page_from_l3e() had happend on A[x].
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c        | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 15 ++++---
- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 053465cb7c..68a9e74002 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -617,10 +617,11 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-  * page->pte[page->nr_validated_entries].  See the comment in mm.h for
-  * more information.
-  */
--#define PTF_partial_set         (1 << 0)
--#define PTF_partial_general_ref (1 << 1)
--#define PTF_preemptible         (1 << 2)
--#define PTF_defer               (1 << 3)
-+#define PTF_partial_set           (1 << 0)
-+#define PTF_partial_general_ref   (1 << 1)
-+#define PTF_preemptible           (1 << 2)
-+#define PTF_defer                 (1 << 3)
-+#define PTF_retain_ref_on_restart (1 << 4)
- 
- static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     mfn_t mfn, unsigned long type, struct domain *d,
-@@ -629,7 +630,11 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-     int rc;
-     bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible,
--         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref,
-+         partial_set = flags & PTF_partial_set,
-+         retain_ref  = flags & PTF_retain_ref_on_restart;
-+
-+    ASSERT(partial_ref == partial_set);
- 
-     if ( likely(!partial_ref) &&
-          unlikely(!get_page_from_mfn(mfn, d)) )
-@@ -642,13 +647,15 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      * - page is fully validated (rc == 0)
-      * - page is not validated (rc < 0) but:
-      *   - We came in with a reference (partial_ref)
-+     *   - page is partially validated (rc == -ERESTART), and the
-+     *     caller has asked the ref to be retained in that case
-      *   - page is partially validated but there's been an error
-      *     (page == current->arch.old_guest_table)
-      *
-      * The partial_ref-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
-      * are two scenarios where partial_ref might be true coming in:
--     * - mfn has been partially demoted as type `type`; i.e. has
--     *   PGT_partial set
-+     * - mfn has been partially promoted / demoted as type `type`;
-+     *   i.e. has PGT_partial set
-      * - mfn has been partially demoted as L(type+1) (i.e., a linear
-      *   page; e.g. we're being called from get_page_from_l2e with
-      *   type == PGT_l1_table, but the mfn is PGT_l2_table)
-@@ -671,7 +678,8 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      */
-     if ( likely(!rc) || partial_ref )
-         /* nothing */;
--    else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table )
-+    else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table ||
-+              (retain_ref && rc == -ERESTART) )
-         ASSERT(preemptible);
-     else
-         put_page(page);
-@@ -1348,8 +1356,8 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-+            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
-+            BUG();
-         }
-         else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-@@ -1394,8 +1402,8 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-     if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-          PTF_partial_set )
-     {
--        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--        return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
-+        BUG();
-     }
- 
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1425,8 +1433,8 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-         if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
-               PTF_partial_set )
-         {
--            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_defer));
--            return _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
-+            BUG();
-         }
- 
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-@@ -1550,13 +1558,22 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-              (rc = get_page_from_l2e(pl2e[i], pfn, d, partial_flags)) > 0 )
-             continue;
- 
--        if ( rc == -ERESTART )
--        {
--            page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            /* Set 'set', retain 'general ref' */
--            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
--        }
--        else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-+        /*
-+         * It shouldn't be possible for get_page_from_l2e to return
-+         * -ERESTART, since we never call this with PTF_preemptible.
-+         * (alloc_l1_table may return -EINTR on an L1TF-vulnerable
-+         * entry.)
-+         *
-+         * NB that while on a "clean" promotion, we can never get
-+         * PGT_partial.  It is possible to arrange for an l2e to
-+         * contain a partially-devalidated l2; but in that case, both
-+         * of the following functions will fail anyway (the first
-+         * because the page in question is not an l1; the second
-+         * because the page is not fully validated).
-+         */
-+        ASSERT(rc != -ERESTART);
-+
-+        if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             page->partial_flags = 0;
-@@ -1565,6 +1582,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-         else if ( rc < 0 && rc != -EINTR )
-         {
-             gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Failure in alloc_l2_table: slot %#x\n", i);
-+            ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table == NULL);
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-@@ -1621,16 +1639,17 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-                 rc = get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-                     l3e_get_mfn(pl3e[i]),
-                     PGT_l2_page_table | PGT_pae_xen_l2, d,
--                    partial_flags | PTF_preemptible);
-+                    partial_flags | PTF_preemptible | PTF_retain_ref_on_restart);
-         }
--        else if ( (rc = get_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, d, partial_flags)) > 0 )
-+        else if ( (rc = get_page_from_l3e(pl3e[i], pfn, d,
-+                               partial_flags | PTF_retain_ref_on_restart)) > 0 )
-             continue;
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-@@ -1791,14 +1810,15 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-           i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-         if ( !is_guest_l4_slot(d, i) ||
--             (rc = get_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, d, partial_flags)) > 0 )
-+             (rc = get_page_from_l4e(pl4e[i], pfn, d,
-+                               partial_flags | PTF_retain_ref_on_restart)) > 0 )
-             continue;
- 
-         if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = partial_flags | PTF_partial_set;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 )
-         {
-@@ -1896,9 +1916,7 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     else if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
--            partial_flags :
--            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -1946,9 +1964,7 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
--            partial_flags :
--            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -1979,9 +1995,7 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = (partial_flags & PTF_partial_set) ?
--            partial_flags :
--            (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref);
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index 46cba52941..dc9cb869dd 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -238,22 +238,25 @@ struct page_info
-          * page.
-          *
-          * This happens:
--         * - During de-validation, if de-validation of the page was
-+         * - During validation or de-validation, if the operation was
-          *   interrupted
-          * - During validation, if an invalid entry is encountered and
-          *   validation is preemptible
-          * - During validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref was set on
--         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because we're picking
--         *   up from a partial de-validation).
-+         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because it picked up a
-+         *   previous operation)
-          *
--         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is clear,
--         * then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it is set, no
--         * reference should be acquired.
-+         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
-+         * clear, then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it
-+         * is set, no reference should be acquired.
-          *
-          * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
-          * clear, no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a
-          * reference should be dropped.
-          *
-+         * NB at the moment, PTF_partial_set should be set if and only if
-+         * PTF_partial_general_ref is set.
-+         *
-          * NB that PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref are
-          * defined in mm.c, the only place where they are used.
-          *
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0008-x86-mm-Collapse-PTF_partial_set-and-PTF_partial_gene.patch

@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
-From 6811df7fb7a1d4bb5a75fec9cf41519b5c86c605 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 08/11] x86/mm: Collapse PTF_partial_set and
- PTF_partial_general_ref into one
-
-...now that they are equivalent.  No functional change intended.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c        | 50 +++++++++++-----------------------------
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h | 29 +++++++++++------------
- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 68a9e74002..4970b19aff 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -612,13 +612,12 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
- 
- /*
-  * The following flags are used to specify behavior of various get and
-- * put commands.  The first two are also stored in page->partial_flags
-- * to indicate the state of the page pointed to by
-+ * put commands.  The first is also stored in page->partial_flags to
-+ * indicate the state of the page pointed to by
-  * page->pte[page->nr_validated_entries].  See the comment in mm.h for
-  * more information.
-  */
- #define PTF_partial_set           (1 << 0)
--#define PTF_partial_general_ref   (1 << 1)
- #define PTF_preemptible           (1 << 2)
- #define PTF_defer                 (1 << 3)
- #define PTF_retain_ref_on_restart (1 << 4)
-@@ -630,13 +629,10 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-     struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-     int rc;
-     bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible,
--         partial_ref = flags & PTF_partial_general_ref,
-          partial_set = flags & PTF_partial_set,
-          retain_ref  = flags & PTF_retain_ref_on_restart;
- 
--    ASSERT(partial_ref == partial_set);
--
--    if ( likely(!partial_ref) &&
-+    if ( likely(!partial_set) &&
-          unlikely(!get_page_from_mfn(mfn, d)) )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
-@@ -646,14 +642,14 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      * Retain the refcount if:
-      * - page is fully validated (rc == 0)
-      * - page is not validated (rc < 0) but:
--     *   - We came in with a reference (partial_ref)
-+     *   - We came in with a reference (partial_set)
-      *   - page is partially validated (rc == -ERESTART), and the
-      *     caller has asked the ref to be retained in that case
-      *   - page is partially validated but there's been an error
-      *     (page == current->arch.old_guest_table)
-      *
--     * The partial_ref-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
--     * are two scenarios where partial_ref might be true coming in:
-+     * The partial_set-on-error clause is worth an explanation.  There
-+     * are two scenarios where partial_set might be true coming in:
-      * - mfn has been partially promoted / demoted as type `type`;
-      *   i.e. has PGT_partial set
-      * - mfn has been partially demoted as L(type+1) (i.e., a linear
-@@ -676,7 +672,7 @@ static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
-      * count retained unless we succeeded, or the operation was
-      * preemptible.
-      */
--    if ( likely(!rc) || partial_ref )
-+    if ( likely(!rc) || partial_set )
-         /* nothing */;
-     else if ( page == current->arch.old_guest_table ||
-               (retain_ref && rc == -ERESTART) )
-@@ -1353,13 +1349,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         struct page_info *pg = l2e_get_page(l2e);
-         struct page_info *ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
--        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
--              PTF_partial_set )
--        {
--            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
--            BUG();
--        }
--        else if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-+        if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = ptpg;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-@@ -1399,13 +1389,6 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-     pg = l3e_get_page(l3e);
- 
--    if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
--         PTF_partial_set )
--    {
--        /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
--        BUG();
--    }
--
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-     {
-         current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-@@ -1430,13 +1413,6 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
-     {
-         struct page_info *pg = l4e_get_page(l4e);
- 
--        if ( (flags & (PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref)) ==
--              PTF_partial_set )
--        {
--            /* partial_set should always imply partial_ref */
--            BUG();
--        }
--
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-@@ -1649,7 +1625,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc == -EINTR && i )
-         {
-@@ -1818,7 +1794,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             /* Set 'set', leave 'general ref' set if this entry was set */
--            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-         }
-         else if ( rc < 0 )
-         {
-@@ -1916,7 +1892,7 @@ static int free_l2_table(struct page_info *page)
-     else if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -1964,7 +1940,7 @@ static int free_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-@@ -1995,7 +1971,7 @@ static int free_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-     if ( rc == -ERESTART )
-     {
-         page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set | PTF_partial_general_ref;
-+        page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-     }
-     else if ( rc == -EINTR && i < L4_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1 )
-     {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index dc9cb869dd..c6ba9e4d73 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ struct page_info
-          * operation on the current page.  (That page may or may not
-          * still have PGT_partial set.)
-          *
--         * If PTF_partial_general_ref is set, then the PTE at
-+         * Additionally, if PTF_partial_set is set, then the PTE at
-          * @nr_validated_ptef holds a general reference count for the
-          * page.
-          *
-@@ -242,23 +242,20 @@ struct page_info
-          *   interrupted
-          * - During validation, if an invalid entry is encountered and
-          *   validation is preemptible
--         * - During validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref was set on
--         *   this entry to begin with (perhaps because it picked up a
-+         * - During validation, if PTF_partial_set was set on this
-+         *   entry to begin with (perhaps because it picked up a
-          *   previous operation)
-          *
--         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
--         * clear, then a general reference must be re-acquired; if it
--         * is set, no reference should be acquired.
-+         * When resuming validation, if PTF_partial_set is clear, then
-+         * a general reference must be re-acquired; if it is set, no
-+         * reference should be acquired.
-          *
--         * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_general_ref is
--         * clear, no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a
--         * reference should be dropped.
-+         * When resuming de-validation, if PTF_partial_set is clear,
-+         * no reference should be dropped; if it is set, a reference
-+         * should be dropped.
-          *
--         * NB at the moment, PTF_partial_set should be set if and only if
--         * PTF_partial_general_ref is set.
--         *
--         * NB that PTF_partial_set and PTF_partial_general_ref are
--         * defined in mm.c, the only place where they are used.
-+         * NB that PTF_partial_set is defined in mm.c, the only place
-+         * where it is used.
-          *
-          * The 3rd field, @linear_pt_count, indicates
-          * - by a positive value, how many same-level page table entries a page
-@@ -268,8 +265,8 @@ struct page_info
-          */
-         struct {
-             u16 nr_validated_ptes:PAGETABLE_ORDER + 1;
--            u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 2;
--            u16 partial_flags:2;
-+            u16 :16 - PAGETABLE_ORDER - 1 - 1;
-+            u16 partial_flags:1;
-             s16 linear_pt_count;
-         };
- 
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0009-x86-mm-Properly-handle-linear-pagetable-promotion-fa.patch

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From a6098b8920b02149220641cb13358e9012b5fc4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 09/11] x86/mm: Properly handle linear pagetable promotion
- failures
-
-In order to allow recursive pagetable promotions and demotions to be
-interrupted, Xen must keep track of the state of the sub-pages
-promoted or demoted.  This is stored in two elements in the page
-struct: nr_entries_validated and partial_flags.
-
-The rule is that entries [0, nr_entries_validated) should always be
-validated and hold a general reference count.  If partial_flags is
-zero, then [nr_entries_validated] is not validated and no reference
-count is held.  If PTF_partial_set is set, then [nr_entries_validated]
-is partially validated, and a general reference count is held.
-
-Unfortunately, in cases where an entry began with PTF_partial_set set,
-and get_page_from_lNe() returns -EINVAL, the PTF_partial_set bit is
-erroneously dropped.  (This scenario can be engineered mainly by the
-use of interleaving of promoting and demoting a page which has "linear
-pagetable" entries; see the appendix for a sketch.)  This means that
-we will "leak" a general reference count on the page in question,
-preventing the page from being freed.
-
-Fix this by setting page->partial_flags to the partial_flags local
-variable.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
------
-Appendix
-
-Suppose A and B can both be promoted to L2 pages, and A[x] points to B.
-
-V1: PIN_L2 B.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-
-V1: MOD_L3_ENTRY pointing something to A.
-  In the process of validating A[x], grab an extra type / ref on B:
-  B.type_count = 2 | PGT_validated
-  B.count = 3 | PGC_allocated
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_validated
-  A.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-
-V1: UNPIN B.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_validate
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-
-V1: MOD_L3_ENTRY removing the reference to A.
-  De-validate A, down to A[x], which points to B.
-  Drop the final type on B.  Arrange to be interrupted.
-  B.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  B.count = 2 | PGC_allocated
-  A.type_count = 1 | PGT_partial
-  A.nr_validated_entries = x
-  A.partial_pte = -1
-
-V2: MOD_L3_ENTRY adds a reference to A.
-
-At this point, get_page_from_l2e(A[x]) tries
-get_page_and_type_from_mfn(), which fails because it's the wrong type;
-and get_l2_linear_pagetable() also fails, because B isn't validated as
-an l2 anymore.
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 4970b19aff..cfb7538403 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_flags = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-             }
-@@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         if ( i )
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--            page->partial_flags = 0;
-+            page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-         }
-@@ -1804,7 +1804,7 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-             if ( i )
-             {
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
--                page->partial_flags = 0;
-+                page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 if ( rc == -EINTR )
-                     rc = -ERESTART;
-                 else
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0010-x86-mm-Fix-nested-de-validation-on-error.patch

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-From eabd77b59f4006128501d6e15f9e620dfb349420 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 10/11] x86/mm: Fix nested de-validation on error
-
-If an invalid entry is discovered when validating a page-table tree,
-the entire tree which has so far been validated must be de-validated.
-Since this may take a long time, alloc_l[2-4]_table() set current
-vcpu's old_guest_table immediately; put_old_guest_table() will make
-sure that put_page_type() will be called to finish off the
-de-validation before any other MMU operations can happen on the vcpu.
-
-The invariant for partial pages should be:
-
-* Entries [0, nr_validated_ptes) should be completely validated;
-  put_page_type() will de-validate these.
-
-* If [nr_validated_ptes] is partially validated, partial_flags should
-  set PTF_partiaL_set.  put_page_type() will be called on this page to
-  finish off devalidation, and the appropriate refcount adjustments
-  will be done.
-
-alloc_l[2-3]_table() indicates partial validation to its callers by
-setting current->old_guest_table.
-
-Unfortunately, this is mishandled.
-
-Take the case where validating lNe[x] returns an error.
-
-First, alloc_l3_table() doesn't check old_guest_table at all; as a
-result, partial_flags is not set when it should be.  nr_validated_ptes
-is set to x; and since PFT_partial_set clear, de-validation resumes at
-nr_validated_ptes-1.  This means that the l2 page at pl3e[x] will not
-have put_page_type() called on it when de-validating the rest of the
-l3: it will be stuck in the PGT_partial state until the domain is
-destroyed, or until it is re-used as an l2.  (Any other page type will
-fail.)
-
-Worse, alloc_l4_table(), rather than setting PTF_partial_set as it
-should, sets nr_validated_ptes to x+1.  When de-validating, since
-partial is 0, this will correctly resume calling put_page_type at [x];
-but, if the put_page_type() is never called, but instead
-get_page_type() is called, validation will pick up at [x+1],
-neglecting to validate [x].  If the rest of the validation succeeds,
-the l4 will be validated even though [x] is invalid.
-
-Fix this in both cases by setting PTF_partial_set if old_guest_table
-is set.
-
-While here, add some safety catches:
-- old_guest_table must point to the page contained in
-  [nr_validated_ptes].
-- alloc_l1_page shouldn't set old_guest_table
-
-If we experience one of these situations in production builds, it's
-safer to avoid calling put_page_type for the pages in question.  If
-they have PGT_partial set, they will be cleaned up on domain
-destruction; if not, we have no idea whether a type count is safe to
-drop.  Retaining an extra type ref that should have been dropped may
-trigger a BUG() on the free_domain_page() path, but dropping a type
-count that shouldn't be dropped may cause a privilege escalation.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index cfb7538403..aa03cb8b40 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1561,6 +1561,20 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-             ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table == NULL);
-             if ( i )
-             {
-+                /*
-+                 * alloc_l1_table() doesn't set old_guest_table; it does
-+                 * its own tear-down immediately on failure.  If it
-+                 * did we'd need to check it and set partial_flags as we
-+                 * do in alloc_l[34]_table().
-+                 *
-+                 * Note on the use of ASSERT: if it's non-null and
-+                 * hasn't been cleaned up yet, it should have
-+                 * PGT_partial set; and so the type will be cleaned up
-+                 * on domain destruction.  Unfortunately, we would
-+                 * leak the general ref held by old_guest_table; but
-+                 * leaking a page is less bad than a host crash.
-+                 */
-+                ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table == NULL);
-                 page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-                 page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-@@ -1588,6 +1602,7 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-     unsigned int   i;
-     int            rc = 0;
-     unsigned int   partial_flags = page->partial_flags;
-+    l3_pgentry_t   l3e = l3e_empty();
- 
-     pl3e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-@@ -1634,7 +1649,11 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-             rc = -ERESTART;
-         }
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-+        {
-+            /* XSA-299 Backport: Copy l3e for checking */
-+            l3e = pl3e[i];
-             break;
-+        }
- 
-         pl3e[i] = adjust_guest_l3e(pl3e[i], d);
-     }
-@@ -1648,6 +1667,24 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-         {
-             page->nr_validated_ptes = i;
-             page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-+            if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
-+            {
-+                /*
-+                 * We've experienced a validation failure.  If
-+                 * old_guest_table is set, "transfer" the general
-+                 * reference count to pl3e[nr_validated_ptes] by
-+                 * setting PTF_partial_set.
-+                 *
-+                 * As a precaution, check that old_guest_table is the
-+                 * page pointed to by pl3e[nr_validated_ptes].  If
-+                 * not, it's safer to leak a type ref on production
-+                 * builds.
-+                 */
-+                if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l3e_get_page(l3e) )
-+                    page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                else
-+                    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+            }
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-         }
-@@ -1810,7 +1847,23 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-                 else
-                 {
-                     if ( current->arch.old_guest_table )
--                        page->nr_validated_ptes++;
-+                    {
-+                        /*
-+                         * We've experienced a validation failure.  If
-+                         * old_guest_table is set, "transfer" the general
-+                         * reference count to pl3e[nr_validated_ptes] by
-+                         * setting PTF_partial_set.
-+                         *
-+                         * As a precaution, check that old_guest_table is the
-+                         * page pointed to by pl4e[nr_validated_ptes].  If
-+                         * not, it's safer to leak a type ref on production
-+                         * builds.
-+                         */
-+                        if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l4e_get_page(pl4e[i]) )
-+                            page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                        else
-+                            ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+                    }
-                     current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-                 }
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa299-4.11-0011-x86-mm-Don-t-drop-a-type-ref-unless-you-held-a-ref-t.patch

@@ -1,413 +0,0 @@
-From f0086e3ac65c8bcabb84c1c29ab00b0c8a187555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 17:57:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 11/11] x86/mm: Don't drop a type ref unless you held a ref to
- begin with
-
-Validation and de-validation of pagetable trees may take arbitrarily
-large amounts of time, and so must be preemptible.  This is indicated
-by setting the PGT_partial bit in the type_info, and setting
-nr_validated_entries and partial_flags appropriately.  Specifically,
-if the entry at [nr_validated_entries] is partially validated,
-partial_flags should have the PGT_partial_set bit set, and the entry
-should hold a general reference count.  During de-validation,
-put_page_type() is called on partially validated entries.
-
-Unfortunately, there are a number of issues with the current algorithm.
-
-First, doing a "normal" put_page_type() is not safe when no type ref
-is held: there is nothing to stop another vcpu from coming along and
-picking up validation again: at which point the put_page_type may drop
-the only page ref on an in-use page.  Some examples are listed in the
-appendix.
-
-The core issue is that put_page_type() is being called both to clean
-up PGT_partial, and to drop a type count; and has no way of knowing
-which is which; and so if in between, PGT_partial is cleared,
-put_page_type() will drop the type ref erroneously.
-
-What is needed is to distinguish between two states:
-- Dropping a type ref which is held
-- Cleaning up a page which has been partially de/validated
-
-Fix this by telling put_page_type() which of the two activities you
-intend.
-
-When cleaning up a partial de/validation, take no action unless you
-find a page partially validated.
-
-If put_page_type() is called without PTF_partial_set, and finds the
-page in a PGT_partial state anyway, then there's certainly been a
-misaccounting somewhere, and carrying on would almost certainly cause
-a security issue, so crash the host instead.
-
-In put_page_from_lNe, pass partial_flags on to _put_page_type().
-
-old_guest_table may be set either with a fully validated page (when
-using the "deferred put" pattern), or with a partially validated page
-(when a normal "de-validation" is interrupted, or when a validation
-fails part-way through due to invalid entries).  Add a flag,
-old_guest_table_partial, to indicate which of these it is, and use
-that to pass the appropriate flag to _put_page_type().
-
-While here, delete stray trailing whitespace.
-
-This is part of XSA-299.
-
-Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
------
-Appendix:
-
-Suppose page A, when interpreted as an l3 pagetable, contains all
-valid entries; and suppose A[x] points to page B, which when
-interpreted as an l2 pagetable, contains all valid entries.
-
-P1: PIN_L3_TABLE
-  A -> PGT_l3_table | 1 | valid
-  B -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | valid
-
-P1: UNPIN_TABLE
-  > Arrange to interrupt after B has been de-validated
-  B:
-    type_info -> PGT_l2_table | 0
-  A:
-    type_info -> PGT_l3_table | 1 | partial
-    nr_validated_enties -> (less than x)
-
-P2: mod_l4_entry to point to A
-  > Arrange for this to be interrupted while B is being validated
-  B:
-    type_info -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | partial
-    (nr_validated_entires &c set as appropriate)
-  A:
-    type_info -> PGT_l3_table | 1 | partial
-    nr_validated_entries -> x
-    partial_pte = 1
-
-P3: mod_l3_entry some other unrelated l3 to point to B:
-  B:
-    type_info -> PGT_l2_table | 1
-
-P1: Restart UNPIN_TABLE
-
-At this point, since A.nr_validate_entries == x and A.partial_pte !=
-0, free_l3_table() will call put_page_from_l3e() on pl3e[x], dropping
-its type count to 0 while it's still being pointed to by some other l3
-
-A similar issue arises with old_guest_table.  Consider the following
-scenario:
-
-Suppose A is a page which, when interpreted as an l2, has valid entries
-until entry x, which is invalid.
-
-V1:  PIN_L2_TABLE(A)
-  <Validate until we try to validate [x], get -EINVAL>
-  A -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | PGT_partial
-  V1 -> old_guest_table = A
-  <delayed>
-
-V2: PIN_L2_TABLE(A)
-  <Pick up where V1 left off, try to re-validate [x], get -EINVAL>
-  A -> PGT_l2_table | 1 | PGT_partial
-  V2 -> old_guest_table = A
-  <restart>
-  put_old_guest_table()
-    _put_page_type(A)
-      A -> PGT_l2_table | 0
-
-V1: <restart>
-  put_old_guest_table()
-    _put_page_type(A) # UNDERFLOW
-
-Indeed, it is possible to engineer for old_guest_table for every vcpu
-a guest has to point to the same page.
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c        |  6 +++
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c            | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h |  4 +-
- 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 8fbecbb169..c880568dd4 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -1074,9 +1074,15 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
-                     rc = -ERESTART;
-                     /* Fallthrough */
-                 case -ERESTART:
-+                    /*
-+                     * NB that we're putting the kernel-mode table
-+                     * here, which we've already successfully
-+                     * validated above; hence partial = false;
-+                     */
-                     v->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     v->arch.old_guest_table =
-                         pagetable_get_page(v->arch.guest_table);
-+                    v->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-                     v->arch.guest_table = pagetable_null();
-                     break;
-                 default:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index aa03cb8b40..c701c7ef14 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -1353,10 +1353,11 @@ static int put_page_from_l2e(l2_pgentry_t l2e, unsigned long pfn,
-         {
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = ptpg;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-+            current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-         }
-         else
-         {
--            rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-+            rc = _put_page_type(pg, flags | PTF_preemptible, ptpg);
-             if ( likely(!rc) )
-                 put_page(pg);
-         }
-@@ -1379,6 +1380,7 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
-         unsigned long mfn = l3e_get_pfn(l3e);
-         int writeable = l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_RW;
- 
-+        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_partial_set));
-         ASSERT(!(mfn & ((1UL << (L3_PAGETABLE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1)));
-         do {
-             put_data_page(mfn_to_page(_mfn(mfn)), writeable);
-@@ -1391,12 +1393,14 @@ static int put_page_from_l3e(l3_pgentry_t l3e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-     if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-     {
-+        ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_partial_set));
-         current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-         current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-+        current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+    rc = _put_page_type(pg, flags | PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-     if ( likely(!rc) )
-         put_page(pg);
- 
-@@ -1415,12 +1419,15 @@ static int put_page_from_l4e(l4_pgentry_t l4e, unsigned long pfn,
- 
-         if ( flags & PTF_defer )
-         {
-+            ASSERT(!(flags & PTF_partial_set));
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn));
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = pg;
-+            current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-             return 0;
-         }
- 
--        rc = _put_page_type(pg, PTF_preemptible, mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-+        rc = _put_page_type(pg, flags | PTF_preemptible,
-+                            mfn_to_page(_mfn(pfn)));
-         if ( likely(!rc) )
-             put_page(pg);
-     }
-@@ -1525,6 +1532,14 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
- 
-     pl2e = map_domain_page(_mfn(pfn));
- 
-+    /*
-+     * NB that alloc_l2_table will never set partial_pte on an l2; but
-+     * free_l2_table might if a linear_pagetable entry is interrupted
-+     * partway through de-validation.  In that circumstance,
-+     * get_page_from_l2e() will always return -EINVAL; and we must
-+     * retain the type ref by doing the normal partial_flags tracking.
-+     */
-+
-     for ( i = page->nr_validated_ptes; i < L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES;
-           i++, partial_flags = 0 )
-     {
-@@ -1579,6 +1594,7 @@ static int alloc_l2_table(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type)
-                 page->partial_flags = partial_flags;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
-             }
-         }
-         if ( rc < 0 )
-@@ -1681,12 +1697,16 @@ static int alloc_l3_table(struct page_info *page)
-                  * builds.
-                  */
-                 if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l3e_get_page(l3e) )
-+                {
-+                    ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table_partial);
-                     page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                }
-                 else
-                     ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-             }
-             current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-             current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+            current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
-         }
-         while ( i-- > 0 )
-             pl3e[i] = unadjust_guest_l3e(pl3e[i], d);
-@@ -1860,12 +1880,16 @@ static int alloc_l4_table(struct page_info *page)
-                          * builds.
-                          */
-                         if ( current->arch.old_guest_table == l4e_get_page(pl4e[i]) )
-+                        {
-+                            ASSERT(current->arch.old_guest_table_partial);
-                             page->partial_flags = PTF_partial_set;
-+                        }
-                         else
-                             ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-                     }
-                     current->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     current->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                    current->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
-                 }
-             }
-         }
-@@ -2782,6 +2806,28 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned int flags,
-         x  = y;
-         nx = x - 1;
- 
-+        /*
-+         * Is this expected to do a full reference drop, or only
-+         * cleanup partial validation / devalidation?
-+         *
-+         * If the former, the caller must hold a "full" type ref;
-+         * which means the page must be validated.  If the page is
-+         * *not* fully validated, continuing would almost certainly
-+         * open up a security hole.  An exception to this is during
-+         * domain destruction, where PGT_validated can be dropped
-+         * without dropping a type ref.
-+         *
-+         * If the latter, do nothing unless type PGT_partial is set.
-+         * If it is set, the type count must be 1.
-+         */
-+        if ( !(flags & PTF_partial_set) )
-+            BUG_ON((x & PGT_partial) ||
-+                   !((x & PGT_validated) || page_get_owner(page)->is_dying));
-+        else if ( !(x & PGT_partial) )
-+            return 0;
-+        else
-+            BUG_ON((x & PGT_count_mask) != 1);
-+
-         ASSERT((x & PGT_count_mask) != 0);
- 
-         switch ( nx & (PGT_locked | PGT_count_mask) )
-@@ -3041,17 +3087,34 @@ int put_old_guest_table(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( !v->arch.old_guest_table )
-         return 0;
- 
--    switch ( rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table, PTF_preemptible,
--                                 v->arch.old_guest_ptpg) )
-+    rc = _put_page_type(v->arch.old_guest_table,
-+                        PTF_preemptible |
-+                        ( v->arch.old_guest_table_partial ?
-+                          PTF_partial_set : 0 ),
-+                        v->arch.old_guest_ptpg);
-+
-+    if ( rc == -ERESTART || rc == -EINTR )
-     {
--    case -EINTR:
--    case -ERESTART:
-+        v->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-         return -ERESTART;
--    case 0:
--        put_page(v->arch.old_guest_table);
-     }
- 
-+    /*
-+     * It shouldn't be possible for _put_page_type() to return
-+     * anything else at the moment; but if it does happen in
-+     * production, leaking the type ref is probably the best thing to
-+     * do.  Either way, drop the general ref held by old_guest_table.
-+     */
-+    ASSERT(rc == 0);
-+
-+    put_page(v->arch.old_guest_table);
-     v->arch.old_guest_table = NULL;
-+    v->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-+    /*
-+     * Safest default if someone sets old_guest_table without
-+     * explicitly setting old_guest_table_partial.
-+     */
-+    v->arch.old_guest_table_partial = true;
- 
-     return rc;
- }
-@@ -3201,11 +3264,11 @@ int new_guest_cr3(mfn_t mfn)
-             switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page) )
-             {
-             case -EINTR:
--                rc = -ERESTART;
--                /* fallthrough */
-             case -ERESTART:
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-+                rc = -ERESTART;
-                 break;
-             default:
-                 BUG_ON(rc);
-@@ -3479,6 +3542,7 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-                     {
-                         curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                         curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                        curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = false;
-                     }
-                 }
-             }
-@@ -3513,6 +3577,11 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-             case -ERESTART:
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                 curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                /*
-+                 * EINTR means we still hold the type ref; ERESTART
-+                 * means PGT_partial holds the type ref
-+                 */
-+                curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-                 rc = 0;
-                 break;
-             default:
-@@ -3581,11 +3650,15 @@ long do_mmuext_op(
-                 switch ( rc = put_page_and_type_preemptible(page) )
-                 {
-                 case -EINTR:
--                    rc = -ERESTART;
--                    /* fallthrough */
-                 case -ERESTART:
-                     curr->arch.old_guest_ptpg = NULL;
-                     curr->arch.old_guest_table = page;
-+                    /*
-+                     * EINTR means we still hold the type ref;
-+                     * ERESTART means PGT_partial holds the ref
-+                     */
-+                    curr->arch.old_guest_table_partial = (rc == -ERESTART);
-+                    rc = -ERESTART;
-                     break;
-                 default:
-                     BUG_ON(rc);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-index 1ac5a96c08..360c38bd83 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ struct arch_domain
- 
-     struct paging_domain paging;
-     struct p2m_domain *p2m;
--    /* To enforce lock ordering in the pod code wrt the 
-+    /* To enforce lock ordering in the pod code wrt the
-      * page_alloc lock */
-     int page_alloc_unlock_level;
- 
-@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ struct arch_vcpu
-     struct page_info *old_guest_table;  /* partially destructed pagetable */
-     struct page_info *old_guest_ptpg;   /* containing page table of the */
-                                         /* former, if any */
-+    bool old_guest_table_partial;       /* Are we dropping a type ref, or just
-+                                         * finishing up a partial de-validation? */
-     /* guest_table holds a ref to the page, and also a type-count unless
-      * shadow refcounts are in use */
-     pagetable_t shadow_table[4];        /* (MFN) shadow(s) of guest */
--- 
-2.23.0
-

xsa301-4.11-1.patch

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-From 21dfe8f707febd62869d4ebbaa155736870bebec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 12:06:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] xen/arm: p2m: Avoid aliasing guest physical frame
-
-The P2M helpers implementation is quite lax and will end up to ignore
-the unused top bits of a guest physical frame.
-
-This effectively means that p2m_set_entry() will create a mapping for a
-different frame (it is always equal to gfn & (mask unused bits)). Yet
-p2m->max_mapped_gfn will be updated using the original frame.
-
-At the moment, p2m_get_entry() and p2m_resolve_translation_fault()
-assume that p2m_get_root_pointer() will always return a non-NULL pointer
-when the GFN is smaller than p2m->max_mapped_gfn.
-
-Unfortunately, because of the aliasing described above, it would be
-possible to set p2m->max_mapped_gfn high enough so it covers frame that
-would lead p2m_get_root_pointer() to return NULL.
-
-As we don't sanity check the guest physical frame provided by a guest, a
-malicious guest could craft a series of hypercalls that will hit the
-BUG_ON() and therefore DoS Xen.
-
-To prevent aliasing, the function p2m_get_root_pointer() is now reworked
-to return NULL If any of the unused top bits are not zero. The caller
-can then decide what's the appropriate action to do. Since the two paths
-(i.e. P2M_ROOT_PAGES == 1 and P2M_ROOT_PAGES != 1) are now very
-similarly, take the opportunity to consolidate them making the code a
-bit simpler.
-
-With this change, p2m_get_entry() will not try to insert a mapping as
-the root pointer is invalid.
-
-Note that root_table is now switch to unsigned long as unsigned int is
-not enough to hold part of a GFN.
-
-This is part of XSA-301.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 17 +++++------------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index d43c3aa896..3967ee7306 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -177,21 +177,14 @@ void p2m_tlb_flush_sync(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
- static lpae_t *p2m_get_root_pointer(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                     gfn_t gfn)
- {
--    unsigned int root_table;
--
--    if ( P2M_ROOT_PAGES == 1 )
--        return __map_domain_page(p2m->root);
-+    unsigned long root_table;
- 
-     /*
--     * Concatenated root-level tables. The table number will be the
--     * offset at the previous level. It is not possible to
--     * concatenate a level-0 root.
-+     * While the root table index is the offset from the previous level,
-+     * we can't use (P2M_ROOT_LEVEL - 1) because the root level might be
-+     * 0. Yet we still want to check if all the unused bits are zeroed.
-      */
--    ASSERT(P2M_ROOT_LEVEL > 0);
--
--    root_table = gfn_x(gfn) >> (level_orders[P2M_ROOT_LEVEL - 1]);
--    root_table &= LPAE_ENTRY_MASK;
--
-+    root_table = gfn_x(gfn) >> (level_orders[P2M_ROOT_LEVEL] + LPAE_SHIFT);
-     if ( root_table >= P2M_ROOT_PAGES )
-         return NULL;
- 
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa301-4.11-2.patch

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-From 4426d993b7ee0966fb39531dc5a269ce8493ca97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 12:35:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] xen/arm: p2m: Avoid off-by-one check on
- p2m->max_mapped_gfn
-
-The code base is using inconsistently the field p2m->max_mapped_gfn.
-Some of the useres expect that p2m->max_guest_gfn contain the highest
-mapped GFN while others expect highest + 1.
-
-p2m->max_guest_gfn is set as highest + 1, because of that the sanity
-check on the GFN in p2m_resolved_translation_fault() and
-p2m_get_entry() can be bypassed when GFN == p2m->max_guest_gfn.
-
-p2m_get_root_pointer(p2m->max_guest_gfn) may return NULL if it is
-outside of address range supported and therefore the BUG_ON() could be
-hit.
-
-The current value hold in p2m->max_mapped_gfn is inconsistent with the
-expectation of the common code (see domain_get_maximum_gpfn()) and also
-the documentation of the field.
-
-Rather than changing the check in p2m_translation_fault() and
-p2m_get_entry(), p2m->max_mapped_gfn is now containing the highest
-mapped GFN and the callers assuming "highest + 1" are now adjusted.
-
-Take the opportunity to use 1UL rather than 1 as page_order could
-theoritically big enough to overflow a 32-bit integer.
-
-Lastly, the documentation of the field max_guest_gfn to reflect how it
-is computed.
-
-This is part of XSA-301.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c        | 6 +++---
- xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h | 5 +----
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index 3967ee7306..c7e049901d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static int __p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-         p2m_write_pte(entry, pte, p2m->clean_pte);
- 
-         p2m->max_mapped_gfn = gfn_max(p2m->max_mapped_gfn,
--                                      gfn_add(sgfn, 1 << page_order));
-+                                      gfn_add(sgfn, (1UL << page_order) - 1));
-         p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn = gfn_min(p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn, sgfn);
-     }
- 
-@@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@ int relinquish_p2m_mapping(struct domain *d)
-     p2m_write_lock(p2m);
- 
-     start = p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn;
--    end = p2m->max_mapped_gfn;
-+    end = gfn_add(p2m->max_mapped_gfn, 1);
- 
-     for ( ; gfn_x(start) < gfn_x(end);
-           start = gfn_next_boundary(start, order) )
-@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ int p2m_cache_flush(struct domain *d, gfn_t start, unsigned long nr)
-     p2m_read_lock(p2m);
- 
-     start = gfn_max(start, p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn);
--    end = gfn_min(end, p2m->max_mapped_gfn);
-+    end = gfn_min(end, gfn_add(p2m->max_mapped_gfn, 1));
- 
-     for ( ; gfn_x(start) < gfn_x(end); start = next_gfn )
-     {
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-index 8823707c17..7f1f7e9109 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-@@ -38,10 +38,7 @@ struct p2m_domain {
-     /* Current Translation Table Base Register for the p2m */
-     uint64_t vttbr;
- 
--    /*
--     * Highest guest frame that's ever been mapped in the p2m
--     * Only takes into account ram and foreign mapping
--     */
-+    /* Highest guest frame that's ever been mapped in the p2m */
-     gfn_t max_mapped_gfn;
- 
-     /*
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa301-4.11-3.patch

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 61c73af08b4ede1fc8cfd2cf72661e6c7cfdbeaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 10:55:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] xen/arm: p2m: Don't check the return of
- p2m_get_root_pointer() with BUG_ON()
-
-It turns out that the BUG_ON() was actually reachable with well-crafted
-hypercalls. The BUG_ON() is here to prevent catch logical error, so
-crashing Xen is a bit over the top.
-
-While all the holes should now be fixed, it would be better to downgrade
-the BUG_ON() to something less fatal to prevent any more DoS.
-
-The BUG_ON() in p2m_get_entry() is now replaced by ASSERT_UNREACHABLE()
-to catch mistake in debug build and return INVALID_MFN for production
-build. The interface also requires to set page_order to give an idea of
-the size of "hole". So 'level' is now set so we report a hole of size of
-the an entry of the root page-table. This stays inline with what happen
-when the GFN is higher than p2m->max_mapped_gfn.
-
-This is part of XSA-301.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index c7e049901d..af3515df42 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -318,7 +318,12 @@ mfn_t p2m_get_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn,
-      * the table should always be non-NULL because the gfn is below
-      * p2m->max_mapped_gfn and the root table pages are always present.
-      */
--    BUG_ON(table == NULL);
-+    if ( !table )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        level = P2M_ROOT_LEVEL;
-+        goto out;
-+    }
- 
-     for ( level = P2M_ROOT_LEVEL; level < 3; level++ )
-     {
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa302-4.11-0001-IOMMU-add-missing-HVM-check.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From bbca29f88d9ad9c7e91125a3b5d5f13a23e5801f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 13:36:59 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] IOMMU: add missing HVM check
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Fix an unguarded d->arch.hvm access in assign_device().
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
-(cherry picked from commit 41fd1009cd7416b73d745a77c24b4e8d1a296fe6)
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-index f51cae7f4e..037aba7c94 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -1416,7 +1416,8 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
-     /* Prevent device assign if mem paging or mem sharing have been 
-      * enabled for this domain */
-     if ( unlikely(!need_iommu(d) &&
--            (d->arch.hvm_domain.mem_sharing_enabled ||
-+            ((is_hvm_domain(d) &&
-+              d->arch.hvm_domain.mem_sharing_enabled) ||
-              vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) ||
-              p2m_get_hostp2m(d)->global_logdirty)) )
-         return -EXDEV;
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa302-4.11-0002-passthrough-quarantine-PCI-devices.patch

@@ -1,498 +0,0 @@
-From ec99857f59f7f06236f11ca8b0b2303e5e745cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2019 17:52:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] passthrough: quarantine PCI devices
-
-When a PCI device is assigned to an untrusted domain, it is possible for
-that domain to program the device to DMA to an arbitrary address. The
-IOMMU is used to protect the host from malicious DMA by making sure that
-the device addresses can only target memory assigned to the guest. However,
-when the guest domain is torn down the device is assigned back to dom0,
-thus allowing any in-flight DMA to potentially target critical host data.
-
-This patch introduces a 'quarantine' for PCI devices using dom_io. When
-the toolstack makes a device assignable (by binding it to pciback), it
-will now also assign it to DOMID_IO and the device will only be assigned
-back to dom0 when the device is made unassignable again. Whilst device is
-assignable it will only ever transfer between dom_io and guest domains.
-dom_io is actually only used as a sentinel domain for quarantining purposes;
-it is not configured with any IOMMU mappings. Assignment to dom_io simply
-means that the device's initiator (requestor) identifier is not present in
-the IOMMU's device table and thus any DMA transactions issued will be
-terminated with a fault condition.
-
-In addition, a fix to assignment handling is made for VT-d.  Failure
-during the assignment step should not lead to a device still being
-associated with its prior owner. Hand the device to DomIO temporarily,
-until the assignment step has completed successfully.  Remove the PI
-hooks from the source domain then earlier as well.
-
-Failure of the recovery reassign_device_ownership() may not go silent:
-There e.g. may still be left over RMRR mappings in the domain assignment
-to which has failed, and hence we can't allow that domain to continue
-executing.
-
-NOTE: This patch also includes one printk() cleanup; the
-      "XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device: " tag is dropped in iommu_do_pci_domctl(),
-      since similar printk()-s elsewhere also don't log such a tag.
-
-This is XSA-302.
-
-Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c                     | 25 +++++++++++-
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c                           |  2 +
- xen/common/domctl.c                         | 14 ++++++-
- xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c | 10 ++++-
- xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c             |  9 +++++
- xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c               | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c         | 40 ++++++++++++++++---
- xen/include/xen/pci.h                       |  3 ++
- 8 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
-index 4755a0c93c..81890a91ac 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
-@@ -754,6 +754,7 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_add(libxl__gc *gc,
-                                             libxl_device_pci *pcidev,
-                                             int rebind)
- {
-+    libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
-     unsigned dom, bus, dev, func;
-     char *spath, *driver_path = NULL;
-     int rc;
-@@ -779,7 +780,7 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_add(libxl__gc *gc,
-     }
-     if ( rc ) {
-         LOG(WARN, PCI_BDF" already assigned to pciback", dom, bus, dev, func);
--        return 0;
-+        goto quarantine;
-     }
- 
-     /* Check to see if there's already a driver that we need to unbind from */
-@@ -810,6 +811,19 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_add(libxl__gc *gc,
-         return ERROR_FAIL;
-     }
- 
-+quarantine:
-+    /*
-+     * DOMID_IO is just a sentinel domain, without any actual mappings,
-+     * so always pass XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED to avoid assignment being
-+     * unnecessarily denied.
-+     */
-+    rc = xc_assign_device(ctx->xch, DOMID_IO, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev),
-+                          XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED);
-+    if ( rc < 0 ) {
-+        LOG(ERROR, "failed to quarantine "PCI_BDF, dom, bus, dev, func);
-+        return ERROR_FAIL;
-+    }
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -817,9 +831,18 @@ static int libxl__device_pci_assignable_remove(libxl__gc *gc,
-                                                libxl_device_pci *pcidev,
-                                                int rebind)
- {
-+    libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
-     int rc;
-     char *driver_path;
- 
-+    /* De-quarantine */
-+    rc = xc_deassign_device(ctx->xch, DOMID_IO, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev));
-+    if ( rc < 0 ) {
-+        LOG(ERROR, "failed to de-quarantine "PCI_BDF, pcidev->domain, pcidev->bus,
-+            pcidev->dev, pcidev->func);
-+        return ERROR_FAIL;
-+    }
-+
-     /* Unbind from pciback */
-     if ( (rc=pciback_dev_is_assigned(gc, pcidev)) < 0 ) {
-         return ERROR_FAIL;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index e6a4cb28f8..c1ab57f9a5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -295,9 +295,11 @@ void __init arch_init_memory(void)
-      * Initialise our DOMID_IO domain.
-      * This domain owns I/O pages that are within the range of the page_info
-      * array. Mappings occur at the priv of the caller.
-+     * Quarantined PCI devices will be associated with this domain.
-      */
-     dom_io = domain_create(DOMID_IO, NULL);
-     BUG_ON(IS_ERR(dom_io));
-+    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dom_io->arch.pdev_list);
- 
-     /*
-      * Initialise our COW domain.
-diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
-index 9b7bc083ee..741d774cd1 100644
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -392,6 +392,16 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
- 
-     switch ( op->cmd )
-     {
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
-+        if ( op->domain == DOMID_IO )
-+        {
-+            d = dom_io;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+        else if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
-+            return -ESRCH;
-+        /* fall through */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
-         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
-         {
-@@ -413,7 +423,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
- 
-     if ( !domctl_lock_acquire() )
-     {
--        if ( d )
-+        if ( d && d != dom_io )
-             rcu_unlock_domain(d);
-         return hypercall_create_continuation(
-             __HYPERVISOR_domctl, "h", u_domctl);
-@@ -1148,7 +1158,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
-     domctl_lock_release();
- 
-  domctl_out_unlock_domonly:
--    if ( d )
-+    if ( d && d != dom_io )
-         rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- 
-     if ( copyback && __copy_to_guest(u_domctl, op, 1) )
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
-index 12d2695b89..ec8baae717 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
-@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(
-     u8 bus = pdev->bus;
-     const struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(domain);
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return;
-+
-     BUG_ON( !hd->arch.root_table || !hd->arch.paging_mode ||
-             !iommu->dev_table.buffer );
- 
-@@ -305,6 +309,10 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(struct domain *domain,
-     int req_id;
-     u8 bus = pdev->bus;
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return;
-+
-     BUG_ON ( iommu->dev_table.buffer == NULL );
-     req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
-     dte = iommu->dev_table.buffer + (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE);
-@@ -391,7 +399,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u8 devfn,
-             ivrs_mappings[req_id].read_permission);
-     }
- 
--    return reassign_device(hardware_domain, d, devfn, pdev);
-+    return reassign_device(pdev->domain, d, devfn, pdev);
- }
- 
- static void deallocate_next_page_table(struct page_info *pg, int level)
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-index 04b0be37d3..8027d96f1c 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-@@ -219,6 +219,9 @@ void iommu_teardown(struct domain *d)
- {
-     const struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
- 
-+    if ( d == dom_io )
-+        return;
-+
-     d->need_iommu = 0;
-     hd->platform_ops->teardown(d);
-     tasklet_schedule(&iommu_pt_cleanup_tasklet);
-@@ -229,6 +232,9 @@ int iommu_construct(struct domain *d)
-     if ( need_iommu(d) > 0 )
-         return 0;
- 
-+    if ( d == dom_io )
-+        return 0;
-+
-     if ( !iommu_use_hap_pt(d) )
-     {
-         int rc;
-@@ -404,6 +410,9 @@ int __init iommu_setup(void)
-     printk("I/O virtualisation %sabled\n", iommu_enabled ? "en" : "dis");
-     if ( iommu_enabled )
-     {
-+        if ( iommu_domain_init(dom_io) )
-+            panic("Could not set up quarantine\n");
-+
-         printk(" - Dom0 mode: %s\n",
-                iommu_passthrough ? "Passthrough" :
-                iommu_dom0_strict ? "Strict" : "Relaxed");
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-index 037aba7c94..fb010a547b 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -1389,19 +1389,29 @@ static int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
-     return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev->devfn, pci_to_dev(pdev));
- }
- 
--/*
-- * If the device isn't owned by the hardware domain, it means it already
-- * has been assigned to other domain, or it doesn't exist.
-- */
- static int device_assigned(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
- {
-     struct pci_dev *pdev;
-+    int rc = 0;
- 
-     pcidevs_lock();
--    pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(hardware_domain, seg, bus, devfn);
-+
-+    pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
-+
-+    if ( !pdev )
-+        rc = -ENODEV;
-+    /*
-+     * If the device exists and it is not owned by either the hardware
-+     * domain or dom_io then it must be assigned to a guest, or be
-+     * hidden (owned by dom_xen).
-+     */
-+    else if ( pdev->domain != hardware_domain &&
-+              pdev->domain != dom_io )
-+        rc = -EBUSY;
-+
-     pcidevs_unlock();
- 
--    return pdev ? 0 : -EBUSY;
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
-@@ -1415,7 +1425,8 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
- 
-     /* Prevent device assign if mem paging or mem sharing have been 
-      * enabled for this domain */
--    if ( unlikely(!need_iommu(d) &&
-+    if ( d != dom_io &&
-+         unlikely(!need_iommu(d) &&
-             ((is_hvm_domain(d) &&
-               d->arch.hvm_domain.mem_sharing_enabled) ||
-              vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) ||
-@@ -1432,12 +1443,20 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
-         return rc;
-     }
- 
--    pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(hardware_domain, seg, bus, devfn);
-+    pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
-+
-+    rc = -ENODEV;
-     if ( !pdev )
--    {
--        rc = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn) ? -EBUSY : -ENODEV;
-         goto done;
--    }
-+
-+    rc = 0;
-+    if ( d == pdev->domain )
-+        goto done;
-+
-+    rc = -EBUSY;
-+    if ( pdev->domain != hardware_domain &&
-+         pdev->domain != dom_io )
-+        goto done;
- 
-     if ( pdev->msix )
-         msixtbl_init(d);
-@@ -1460,6 +1479,10 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
-     }
- 
-  done:
-+    /* The device is assigned to dom_io so mark it as quarantined */
-+    if ( !rc && d == dom_io )
-+        pdev->quarantine = true;
-+
-     if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && need_iommu(d) )
-         iommu_teardown(d);
-     pcidevs_unlock();
-@@ -1472,6 +1495,7 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
- {
-     const struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
-     struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
-+    struct domain *target;
-     int ret = 0;
- 
-     if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops )
-@@ -1482,12 +1506,16 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-     if ( !pdev )
-         return -ENODEV;
- 
-+    /* De-assignment from dom_io should de-quarantine the device */
-+    target = (pdev->quarantine && pdev->domain != dom_io) ?
-+        dom_io : hardware_domain;
-+
-     while ( pdev->phantom_stride )
-     {
-         devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
-         if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
-             break;
--        ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, hardware_domain, devfn,
-+        ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, target, devfn,
-                                                 pci_to_dev(pdev));
-         if ( !ret )
-             continue;
-@@ -1498,7 +1526,7 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-     }
- 
-     devfn = pdev->devfn;
--    ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, hardware_domain, devfn,
-+    ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, target, devfn,
-                                             pci_to_dev(pdev));
-     if ( ret )
-     {
-@@ -1508,6 +1536,9 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn)
-         return ret;
-     }
- 
-+    if ( pdev->domain == hardware_domain  )
-+        pdev->quarantine = false;
-+
-     pdev->fault.count = 0;
- 
-     if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && need_iommu(d) )
-@@ -1686,7 +1717,7 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
-             ret = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_domctl,
-                                                 "h", u_domctl);
-         else if ( ret )
--            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device: "
-+            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
-                    "assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u to dom%d failed (%d)\n",
-                    seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
-                    d->domain_id, ret);
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-index 4c719d4ee7..19f7d13013 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-@@ -1338,6 +1338,10 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
-     int agaw, rc, ret;
-     bool_t flush_dev_iotlb;
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return 0;
-+
-     ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
-     spin_lock(&iommu->lock);
-     maddr = bus_to_context_maddr(iommu, bus);
-@@ -1573,6 +1577,10 @@ int domain_context_unmap_one(
-     int iommu_domid, rc, ret;
-     bool_t flush_dev_iotlb;
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        return 0;
-+
-     ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
-     spin_lock(&iommu->lock);
- 
-@@ -1705,6 +1713,10 @@ static int domain_context_unmap(struct domain *domain, u8 devfn,
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-+    /* dom_io is used as a sentinel for quarantined devices */
-+    if ( domain == dom_io )
-+        goto out;
-+
-     /*
-      * if no other devices under the same iommu owned by this domain,
-      * clear iommu in iommu_bitmap and clear domain_id in domid_bitmp
-@@ -2389,6 +2401,15 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
-     if ( ret )
-         return ret;
- 
-+    if ( devfn == pdev->devfn )
-+    {
-+        list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &dom_io->arch.pdev_list);
-+        pdev->domain = dom_io;
-+    }
-+
-+    if ( !has_arch_pdevs(source) )
-+        vmx_pi_hooks_deassign(source);
-+
-     if ( !has_arch_pdevs(target) )
-         vmx_pi_hooks_assign(target);
- 
-@@ -2407,15 +2428,13 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
-         pdev->domain = target;
-     }
- 
--    if ( !has_arch_pdevs(source) )
--        vmx_pi_hooks_deassign(source);
--
-     return ret;
- }
- 
- static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
-     struct domain *d, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev, u32 flag)
- {
-+    struct domain *s = pdev->domain;
-     struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
-     int ret = 0, i;
-     u16 bdf, seg;
-@@ -2458,8 +2477,8 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
-         }
-     }
- 
--    ret = reassign_device_ownership(hardware_domain, d, devfn, pdev);
--    if ( ret )
-+    ret = reassign_device_ownership(s, d, devfn, pdev);
-+    if ( ret || d == dom_io )
-         return ret;
- 
-     /* Setup rmrr identity mapping */
-@@ -2472,11 +2491,20 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
-             ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, flag);
-             if ( ret )
-             {
--                reassign_device_ownership(d, hardware_domain, devfn, pdev);
-+                int rc;
-+
-+                rc = reassign_device_ownership(d, s, devfn, pdev);
-                 printk(XENLOG_G_ERR VTDPREFIX
-                        " cannot map reserved region (%"PRIx64",%"PRIx64"] for Dom%d (%d)\n",
-                        rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address,
-                        d->domain_id, ret);
-+                if ( rc )
-+                {
-+                    printk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX
-+                           " failed to reclaim %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from %pd (%d)\n",
-+                           seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), d, rc);
-+                    domain_crash(d);
-+                }
-                 break;
-             }
-         }
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/pci.h b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-index 4cfa774615..066364bdef 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ struct pci_dev {
- 
-     nodeid_t node; /* NUMA node */
- 
-+    /* Device to be quarantined, don't automatically re-assign to dom0 */
-+    bool quarantine;
-+
-     enum pdev_type {
-         DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN,
-         DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT,
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa303-0001-xen-arm32-entry-Split-__DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP-in-two.patch

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-From c8cb33fa64c9ccbfa2a494a9dad2e0a763c09176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 13:07:53 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/4] xen/arm32: entry: Split __DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP in two
-
-The preprocessing macro __DEFINE_ENTRY_TRAP is used to generate trap
-entry function. While the macro is fairly small today, follow-up patches
-will increase the size signicantly.
-
-In general, assembly macros are more readable as they allow you to name
-parameters and avoid '\'. So the actual implementation of the trap is
-now switched to an assembly macro.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-index 0b4cd19abd..4a762e04f1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -126,24 +126,28 @@ abort_guest_exit_end:
- skip_check:
-         mov pc, lr
- 
--/*
-- * Macro to define trap entry. The iflags corresponds to the list of
-- * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-- */
-+        /*
-+         * Macro to define trap entry. The iflags corresponds to the list of
-+         * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-+         */
-+        .macro vector trap, iflags
-+        SAVE_ALL
-+        cpsie   \iflags
-+        adr     lr, return_from_trap
-+        mov     r0, sp
-+        /*
-+         * Save the stack pointer in r11. It will be restored after the
-+         * trap has been handled (see return_from_trap).
-+         */
-+        mov     r11, sp
-+        bic     sp, #7      /* Align the stack pointer (noop on guest trap) */
-+        b       do_trap_\trap
-+        .endm
-+
- #define __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, iflags)                               \
-         ALIGN;                                                          \
- trap_##trap:                                                            \
--        SAVE_ALL;                                                       \
--        cpsie iflags;                                                   \
--        adr lr, return_from_trap;                                       \
--        mov r0, sp;                                                     \
--        /*                                                              \
--         * Save the stack pointer in r11. It will be restored after the \
--         * trap has been handled (see return_from_trap).                \
--         */                                                             \
--        mov r11, sp;                                                    \
--        bic sp, #7; /* Align the stack pointer (noop on guest trap) */  \
--        b do_trap_##trap
-+        vector trap, iflags
- 
- /* Trap handler which unmask IRQ/Abort, keep FIQ masked */
- #define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, ai)
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa303-0002-xen-arm32-entry-Fold-the-macro-SAVE_ALL-in-the-macro.patch

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-From be7379207c83fa74f8a6c22a8ea213f02714776f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 13:15:48 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/4] xen/arm32: entry: Fold the macro SAVE_ALL in the macro
- vector
-
-Follow-up rework will require the macro vector to distinguish between
-a trap from a guest vs while in the hypervisor.
-
-The macro SAVE_ALL already has code to distinguish between the two and
-it is only called by the vector macro. So fold the former into the
-latter. This will help to avoid duplicating the check.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-index 4a762e04f1..150cbc0b4b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -13,27 +13,6 @@
- #define RESTORE_BANKED(mode) \
-         RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(SP_##mode) ; RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(LR_##mode) ; RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(SPSR_##mode)
- 
--#define SAVE_ALL                                                        \
--        sub sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp); /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */      \
--        push {r0-r12}; /* Save R0-R12 */                                \
--                                                                        \
--        mrs r11, ELR_hyp;               /* ELR_hyp is return address. */\
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_pc];                                       \
--                                                                        \
--        str lr, [sp, #UREGS_lr];                                        \
--                                                                        \
--        add r11, sp, #UREGS_kernel_sizeof+4;                            \
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp];                                       \
--                                                                        \
--        mrc CP32(r11, HSR);             /* Save exception syndrome */   \
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_hsr];                                      \
--                                                                        \
--        mrs r11, SPSR_hyp;                                              \
--        str r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr];                                     \
--        and r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK;                                        \
--        cmp r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP;                                         \
--        blne save_guest_regs
--
- save_guest_regs:
- #ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
-         /*
-@@ -52,7 +31,7 @@ save_guest_regs:
-         ldr r11, =0xffffffff  /* Clobber SP which is only valid for hypervisor frames. */
-         str r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp]
-         SAVE_ONE_BANKED(SP_usr)
--        /* LR_usr is the same physical register as lr and is saved in SAVE_ALL */
-+        /* LR_usr is the same physical register as lr and is saved by the caller */
-         SAVE_BANKED(svc)
-         SAVE_BANKED(abt)
-         SAVE_BANKED(und)
-@@ -131,7 +110,28 @@ skip_check:
-          * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-          */
-         .macro vector trap, iflags
--        SAVE_ALL
-+        /* Save registers in the stack */
-+        sub     sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp) /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */
-+        push    {r0-r12}                       /* Save R0-R12 */
-+        mrs     r11, ELR_hyp                   /* ELR_hyp is return address */
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_pc]
-+
-+        str     lr, [sp, #UREGS_lr]
-+
-+        add     r11, sp, #(UREGS_kernel_sizeof + 4)
-+
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp]
-+
-+        mrc     CP32(r11, HSR)                 /* Save exception syndrome */
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_hsr]
-+
-+        mrs     r11, SPSR_hyp
-+        str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr]
-+        and     r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK
-+        cmp     r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP
-+        blne    save_guest_regs
-+
-+        /* We are ready to handle the trap, setup the registers and jump. */
-         cpsie   \iflags
-         adr     lr, return_from_trap
-         mov     r0, sp
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa303-0003-xen-arm32-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch

@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-From 098fe877967870ffda2dfd9629a5fd272f6aacdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2019 17:49:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/4] xen/arm32: Don't blindly unmask interrupts on trap
- without a change of level
-
-Exception vectors will unmask interrupts regardless the state of them in
-the interrupted context.
-
-One of the consequences is IRQ will be unmasked when receiving an
-undefined instruction exception (used by WARN*) from the hypervisor.
-This could result to unexpected behavior such as deadlock (if a lock was
-shared with interrupts).
-
-In a nutshell, interrupts should only be unmasked when it is safe to do.
-Xen only unmask IRQ and Abort interrupts, so the logic can stay simple.
-
-As vectors exceptions may be shared between guest and hypervisor, we now
-need to have a different policy for the interrupts.
-
-On exception from hypervisor, each vector will select the list of
-interrupts to inherit from the interrupted context. Any interrupts not
-listed will be kept masked.
-
-On exception from the guest, the Abort and IRQ will be unmasked
-depending on the exact vector.
-
-The interrupts will be kept unmasked when the vector cannot used by
-either guest or hypervisor.
-
-Note that each vector is not anymore preceded by ALIGN. This is fine
-because the alignment is already bigger than what we need.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-index 150cbc0b4b..ec90cca093 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
-@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@
- #include <asm/alternative.h>
- #include <public/xen.h>
- 
-+/*
-+ * Short-hands to defined the interrupts (A, I, F)
-+ *
-+ * _ means the interrupt state will not change
-+ * X means the state of interrupt X will change
-+ *
-+ * To be used with msr cpsr_* only
-+ */
-+#define IFLAGS_AIF      PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_IRQ_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK
-+#define IFLAGS_A_F      PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK
-+
- #define SAVE_ONE_BANKED(reg)    mrs r11, reg; str r11, [sp, #UREGS_##reg]
- #define RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(reg) ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_##reg]; msr reg, r11
- 
-@@ -106,10 +117,18 @@ skip_check:
-         mov pc, lr
- 
-         /*
--         * Macro to define trap entry. The iflags corresponds to the list of
--         * interrupts (Asynchronous Abort, IRQ, FIQ) to unmask.
-+         * Macro to define a trap entry.
-+         *
-+         *  @guest_iflags: Optional list of interrupts to unmask when
-+         *      entering from guest context. As this is used with cpsie,
-+         *      the letter (a, i, f) should be used.
-+         *
-+         *  @hyp_iflags: Optional list of interrupts to inherit when
-+         *      entering from hypervisor context. Any interrupts not
-+         *      listed will be kept unchanged. As this is used with cpsr_*,
-+         *      IFLAGS_* short-hands should be used.
-          */
--        .macro vector trap, iflags
-+        .macro vector trap, guest_iflags=n, hyp_iflags=0
-         /* Save registers in the stack */
-         sub     sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp) /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */
-         push    {r0-r12}                       /* Save R0-R12 */
-@@ -127,12 +146,39 @@ skip_check:
- 
-         mrs     r11, SPSR_hyp
-         str     r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr]
--        and     r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK
--        cmp     r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP
--        blne    save_guest_regs
- 
-+        /*
-+         * We need to distinguish whether we came from guest or
-+         * hypervisor context.
-+         */
-+        and     r0, r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK
-+        cmp     r0, #PSR_MODE_HYP
-+
-+        bne     1f
-+        /*
-+         * Trap from the hypervisor
-+         *
-+         * Inherit the state of the interrupts from the hypervisor
-+         * context. For that we need to use SPSR (stored in r11) and
-+         * modify CPSR accordingly.
-+         *
-+         * CPSR = (CPSR & ~hyp_iflags) | (SPSR & hyp_iflags)
-+         */
-+        mrs     r10, cpsr
-+        bic     r10, r10, #\hyp_iflags
-+        and     r11, r11, #\hyp_iflags
-+        orr     r10, r10, r11
-+        msr     cpsr_cx, r10
-+        b       2f
-+
-+1:
-+        /* Trap from the guest */
-+        bl      save_guest_regs
-+        .if     \guest_iflags != n
-+        cpsie   \guest_iflags
-+        .endif
-+2:
-         /* We are ready to handle the trap, setup the registers and jump. */
--        cpsie   \iflags
-         adr     lr, return_from_trap
-         mov     r0, sp
-         /*
-@@ -144,20 +190,6 @@ skip_check:
-         b       do_trap_\trap
-         .endm
- 
--#define __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, iflags)                               \
--        ALIGN;                                                          \
--trap_##trap:                                                            \
--        vector trap, iflags
--
--/* Trap handler which unmask IRQ/Abort, keep FIQ masked */
--#define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, ai)
--
--/* Trap handler which unmask Abort, keep IRQ/FIQ masked */
--#define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOIRQ(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, a)
--
--/* Trap handler which unmask IRQ, keep Abort/FIQ masked */
--#define DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOABORT(trap) __DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(trap, i)
--
-         .align 5
- GLOBAL(hyp_traps_vector)
-         b trap_reset                    /* 0x00 - Reset */
-@@ -228,14 +260,62 @@ decode_vectors:
- 
- #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
- 
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(reset)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(undefined_instruction)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(hypervisor_call)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(prefetch_abort)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(guest_sync)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOIRQ(irq)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOIRQ(fiq)
--DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY_NOABORT(data_abort)
-+/* Vector not used by the Hypervisor. */
-+trap_reset:
-+        vector reset
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector only used by the Hypervisor.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception can be executed with all the interrupts (e.g.
-+ * IRQ) unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked
-+ * some of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupted
-+ * context.
-+ */
-+trap_undefined_instruction:
-+        vector undefined_instruction, hyp_iflags=IFLAGS_AIF
-+
-+/* We should never reach this trap */
-+trap_hypervisor_call:
-+        vector hypervisor_call
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector only used by the hypervisor.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception can be executed with all the interrupts (e.g.
-+ * IRQ) unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked
-+ * some of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupted
-+ * context.
-+ */
-+trap_prefetch_abort:
-+       vector prefetch_abort, hyp_iflags=IFLAGS_AIF
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector only used by the hypervisor.
-+ *
-+ * Data Abort should be rare and most likely fatal. It is best to not
-+ * unmask any interrupts to limit the amount of code that can run before
-+ * the Data Abort is treated.
-+ */
-+trap_data_abort:
-+        vector data_abort
-+
-+/* Vector only used by the guest. We can unmask Abort/IRQ. */
-+trap_guest_sync:
-+        vector guest_sync, guest_iflags=ai
-+
-+
-+/* Vector used by the hypervisor and the guest. */
-+trap_irq:
-+        vector irq, guest_iflags=a, hyp_iflags=IFLAGS_A_F
-+
-+/*
-+ * Vector used by the hypervisor and the guest.
-+ *
-+ * FIQ are not meant to happen, so we don't unmask any interrupts.
-+ */
-+trap_fiq:
-+        vector fiq
- 
- return_from_trap:
-         /*
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa303-0004-xen-arm64-Don-t-blindly-unmask-interrupts-on-trap-wi.patch

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-From c6d290ce157a044dec417fdda8db71e41a37d744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 18:10:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 4/4] xen/arm64: Don't blindly unmask interrupts on trap
- without a change of level
-
-Some of the traps without a change of the level (i.e. hypervisor ->
-hypervisor) will unmask interrupts regardless the state of them in the
-interrupted context.
-
-One of the consequences is IRQ will be unmasked when receiving a
-synchronous exception (used by WARN*()). This could result to unexpected
-behavior such as deadlock (if a lock was shared with interrupts).
-
-In a nutshell, interrupts should only be unmasked when it is safe to
-do. Xen only unmask IRQ and Abort interrupts, so the logic can stay
-simple:
-    - hyp_error: All the interrupts are now kept masked. SError should
-      be pretty rare and if ever happen then we most likely want to
-      avoid any other interrupts to be generated. The potential main
-      "caller" is during virtual SError synchronization on the exit
-      path from the guest (see check_pending_vserror).
-
-    - hyp_sync: The interrupts state is inherited from the interrupted
-      context.
-
-    - hyp_irq: All the interrupts but IRQ state are inherited from the
-      interrupted context. IRQ is kept masked.
-
-This is part of XSA-303.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <Julien.Grall@arm.com>
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
----
- xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-index 2d9a2713a1..3e41ba65b6 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/entry.S
-@@ -188,24 +188,63 @@ hyp_error_invalid:
-         entry   hyp=1
-         invalid BAD_ERROR
- 
-+/*
-+ * SError received while running in the hypervisor mode.
-+ *
-+ * Technically, we could unmask the IRQ if it were unmasked in the
-+ * interrupted context. However, this require to check the PSTATE. For
-+ * simplicity, as SError should be rare and potentially fatal,
-+ * all interrupts are kept masked.
-+ */
- hyp_error:
-         entry   hyp=1
--        msr     daifclr, #2
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_hyp_serror
-         exit    hyp=1
- 
--/* Traps taken in Current EL with SP_ELx */
-+/*
-+ * Synchronous exception received while running in the hypervisor mode.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception could be executed with all the interrupts (e.g.
-+ * IRQ) unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked
-+ * some of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupted
-+ * context.
-+ */
- hyp_sync:
-         entry   hyp=1
--        msr     daifclr, #6
-+
-+        /* Inherit interrupts */
-+        mrs     x0, SPSR_el2
-+        and     x0, x0, #(PSR_DBG_MASK | PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_IRQ_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK)
-+        msr     daif, x0
-+
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_hyp_sync
-         exit    hyp=1
- 
-+/*
-+ * IRQ received while running in the hypervisor mode.
-+ *
-+ * While the exception could be executed with all the interrupts but IRQ
-+ * unmasked, the interrupted context may have purposefully masked some
-+ * of them. So we want to inherit the state from the interrupt context
-+ * and keep IRQ masked.
-+ *
-+ * XXX: We may want to consider an ordering between interrupts (e.g. if
-+ * SError are masked, then IRQ should be masked too). However, this
-+ * would require some rework in some paths (e.g. panic, livepatch) to
-+ * ensure the ordering is enforced everywhere.
-+ */
- hyp_irq:
-         entry   hyp=1
--        msr     daifclr, #4
-+
-+        /* Inherit D, A, F interrupts and keep I masked */
-+        mrs     x0, SPSR_el2
-+        mov     x1, #(PSR_DBG_MASK | PSR_ABT_MASK | PSR_FIQ_MASK)
-+        and     x0, x0, x1
-+        orr     x0, x0, #PSR_IRQ_MASK
-+        msr     daif, x0
-+
-         mov     x0, sp
-         bl      do_trap_irq
-         exit    hyp=1
--- 
-2.11.0
-

xsa483.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
+Subject: tools/oxenstored: Reset quota when resetting permissions
+
+The quota object contains both limits and the current node usage counts.
+
+When a domain is torn down, the node data itself is cleaned up but the node
+usage counts are not.  A later domain reusing the same domid can create fewer
+nodes before being deemed to be over quota.
+
+Reset the count when the node permissions are cleaned up.
+
+This is XSA-483 / CVE-2026-23556.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
+index 9b8dd2812df0..aa9204ead3ec 100644
+--- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
++++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
+@@ -465,7 +465,8 @@ let reset_permissions store domid =
+         if perms <> node.perms then
+           Logging.debug "store|node" "Changed permissions for node %s" (Node.get_name node);
+         Some { node with Node.perms }
+-    ) store.root
++    ) store.root;
++  store.quota <- Quota.del store.quota domid
+ 
+ type ops = {
+   store: t;

xsa484.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From 3d0d19ad17f29c64dde4a7baf392da4fd58f3654 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 15:06:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tools/xenstored: make conn_delete_all_transactions()
+ idempotent
+
+conn_delete_all_transactions() should be callable in any context,
+resetting ALL transaction related data.
+
+This includes number of active transactions and the transaction
+pointer in struct connection.
+
+So reset conn->trans to NULL in conn_delete_all_transactions() and
+do the cleanup for each transaction in destroy_transaction().
+
+This avoids triggering the assert() in conn_delete_all_transactions()
+in case e.g. ignore_connection() was called while an operation inside
+a transaction was performed, or XS_RESET_WATCHES was called in a
+transaction.
+
+This is XSA-484 / CVE-2026-23557.
+
+Reported-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
+Fixes: 1f9d04fb021c ("xenstored: allow guest to shutdown all its watches/transactions")
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+---
+ tools/xenstored/transaction.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/xenstored/transaction.c b/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
+index 167cd597fd..0825c48859 100644
+--- a/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
++++ b/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
+@@ -432,17 +432,23 @@ static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
+ static int destroy_transaction(void *_transaction)
+ {
+ 	struct transaction *trans = _transaction;
++	struct connection *conn = trans->conn;
+ 	struct accessed_node *i;
+ 
+ 	wrl_ntransactions--;
+ 	trace_destroy(trans, "transaction");
+ 	while ((i = list_top(&trans->accessed, struct accessed_node, list))) {
+ 		if (i->ta_node)
+-			db_delete(trans->conn, i->trans_name, NULL);
++			db_delete(conn, i->trans_name, NULL);
+ 		list_del(&i->list);
+ 		talloc_free(i);
+ 	}
+ 
++	list_del(&trans->list);
++	domain_transaction_dec(conn);
++	if (list_empty(&conn->transaction_list))
++		conn->ta_start_time = 0;
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -523,10 +529,6 @@ int do_transaction_end(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
+ 		return ENOENT;
+ 
+ 	conn->transaction = NULL;
+-	list_del(&trans->list);
+-	domain_transaction_dec(conn);
+-	if (list_empty(&conn->transaction_list))
+-		conn->ta_start_time = 0;
+ 
+ 	chk_quota = trans->node_created && domain_is_unprivileged(conn);
+ 
+@@ -572,14 +574,10 @@ void conn_delete_all_transactions(struct connection *conn)
+ 	struct transaction *trans;
+ 
+ 	while ((trans = list_top(&conn->transaction_list,
+-				 struct transaction, list))) {
+-		list_del(&trans->list);
++				 struct transaction, list)))
+ 		talloc_free(trans);
+-	}
+-
+-	assert(conn->transaction == NULL);
+ 
+-	conn->ta_start_time = 0;
++	conn->transaction = NULL;
+ }
+ 
+ int check_transactions(struct hashtable *hash)
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

xsa486.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: gnttab: split gnttab_map_frame()
+
+If a domain tries to map status frames in parallel to switching grant
+table version from 2 to 1, the mapping operation may put in place P2M
+entries referencing MFNs which gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is in the
+process of freeing.
+
+Ideally we would refcount pages when entered into P2M tables, but that's a
+significant change. Extend the grant-table-locked region instead in
+xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() (being the sole caller of gnttab_map_frame()),
+such that a race with gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is no longer
+possible.
+
+This is XSA-486 / CVE-2026-23558.
+
+Fixes: 5ce8fafa947c ("Dynamic grant-table sizing")
+Fixes: a98dc13703e0 ("Introduce a grant_entry_v2 structure")
+Reported-by: Rafal Wojtczuk <rafal.wojtczuk@7bulls.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
+@@ -174,12 +174,10 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+     switch ( space )
+     {
+     case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
+-        rc = gnttab_map_frame(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
++        rc = gnttab_map_frame_begin(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        /* Need to take care of the reference obtained in gnttab_map_frame(). */
+-        page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+         t = p2m_ram_rw;
+ 
+         break;
+@@ -281,10 +279,23 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+      * to drop the reference we took earlier. In all other cases we need to
+      * drop any reference we took earlier (perhaps indirectly).
+      */
+-    if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign ? rc : page != NULL )
++    switch ( space )
+     {
++    default:
++        if ( page )
++            put_page(page);
++        break;
++
++    case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
++        gnttab_map_frame_end(d, mfn);
++        break;
++
++    case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign:
++        if ( !rc )
++            break;
+         ASSERT(page != NULL);
+         put_page(page);
++        break;
+     }
+ 
+     return rc;
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+@@ -2009,11 +2009,9 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+         break;
+ 
+     case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
+-        rc = gnttab_map_frame(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
++        rc = gnttab_map_frame_begin(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+-        /* Need to take care of the reference obtained in gnttab_map_frame(). */
+-        page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+         break;
+ 
+     case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn:
+@@ -2095,19 +2093,28 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+     put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gfn));
+ 
+  put_both:
+-    /*
+-     * In the XENMAPSPACE_gmfn case, we took a ref of the gfn at the top.
+-     * We also may need to transfer ownership of the page reference to our
+-     * caller.
+-     */
+-    if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn )
++    switch ( space )
+     {
++    case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn:
++        /*
++         * We took a ref of the gfn at the top.  We also may need to transfer
++         * ownership of the page reference to our caller.
++         */
+         put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+         if ( !rc && extra.ppage )
+         {
+             *extra.ppage = page;
+             page = NULL;
+         }
++        break;
++
++    case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
++        /*
++         * We (gnttab_map_frame_begin()) acquired a lock and took a ref of the
++         * page underlying the MFN at the top.
++         */
++        gnttab_map_frame_end(d, mfn);
++        break;
+     }
+ 
+     if ( page )
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -4250,7 +4250,8 @@ int gnttab_acquire_resource(
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
++int gnttab_map_frame_begin(
++    struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
+ {
+     int rc = 0;
+     struct grant_table *gt = d->grant_table;
+@@ -4288,11 +4289,19 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
+             put_page(pg);
+     }
+ 
+-    grant_write_unlock(gt);
++    if ( rc )
++        grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
+ 
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
++void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn)
++{
++    put_page(mfn_to_page(mfn));
++
++    grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
++}
++
+ static void gnttab_usage_print(struct domain *rd)
+ {
+     int first = 1;
+--- a/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
+@@ -60,8 +60,13 @@ int gnttab_release_mappings(struct domai
+ int mem_sharing_gref_to_gfn(struct grant_table *gt, grant_ref_t ref,
+                             gfn_t *gfn, uint16_t *status);
+ 
+-int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn,
+-                     mfn_t *mfn);
++/*
++ * These need to be used as a pair, as the first (in the success case) returns
++ * with a lock and page reference held which the second needs to drop.
++ */
++int gnttab_map_frame_begin(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn,
++                           mfn_t *mfn);
++void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn);
+ 
+ unsigned int gnttab_resource_max_frames(const struct domain *d, unsigned int id);
+ 
+@@ -100,12 +105,14 @@ static inline int mem_sharing_gref_to_gf
+     return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx,
+-                                   gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
++static inline int gnttab_map_frame_begin(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx,
++                                         gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
+ {
+     return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ 
++static inline void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn) {}
++
+ static inline unsigned int gnttab_resource_max_frames(
+     const struct domain *d, unsigned int id)
+ {

xsa490-4.21.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Subject: x86/amd: Mitigate AMD-SN-7052
+
+This is XSA-490 / CVE-2025-54518.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+index 1bb0766ebf13..b5bf2b732e8f 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+@@ -1116,11 +1116,25 @@ static void amd_check_bp_cfg(void)
+ {
+ 	uint64_t val, new = 0;
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * AMD Erratum #1485.  Set bit 5, as instructed.
+-	 */
+-	if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && is_zen4_uarch())
+-		new |= (1 << 5);
++	if (!cpu_has_hypervisor) {
++		/*
++		 * AMD Erratum #1485.  If SMT is enabled and STIBP disabled,
++		 * the CPU may fetch incorrect instruction bytes.
++		 *
++		 * Set bit 5, as instructed.
++		 */
++		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && is_zen4_uarch())
++			new |= (1 << 5);
++
++		/*
++		 * AMD SB-7052.  CPU OP Cache corruption, causing instructions
++		 * to be executed at a higher privilege.
++		 *
++		 * Set bit 33, as instructed.
++		 */
++		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x17 && is_zen2_uarch())
++			new |= (1UL << 33);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On hardware supporting SRSO_MSR_FIX, activate BP_SPEC_REDUCE by

xsa491-4.21.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/HVM: add locking to I/O port translation list traversal
+
+XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping is usable by DM stubdoms, and hence we can't
+assume the list to be left unaltered while the guest (really: the
+hypervisor on behalf of the guest) is accessing it.
+
+This is XSA-491 / CVE-2026-42487.
+
+Fixes: 192c4dabc344 ("domctl and p2m changes for PCI passthru")
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                    "ioport_map:add: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
+                    d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
+ 
++            write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+             list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
+                 if (g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
+                 {
+@@ -684,11 +685,14 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                 g2m_ioport->np = np;
+                 list_add_tail(&g2m_ioport->list, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list);
+             }
++            write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+             if ( !ret )
+                 ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+             if ( ret && !found && g2m_ioport )
+             {
++                write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+                 list_del(&g2m_ioport->list);
++                write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+                 xfree(g2m_ioport);
+             }
+         }
+@@ -697,6 +701,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
+                    "ioport_map:remove: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
+                    d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
++
++            write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+             list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
+                 if ( g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
+                 {
+@@ -704,6 +710,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                     xfree(g2m_ioport);
+                     break;
+                 }
++            write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
+             ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+             if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(currd) )
+                 printk(XENLOG_ERR
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+@@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ void hvmemul_cancel(struct vcpu *v)
+     hvio->mmio_insn_bytes = 0;
+     hvio->mmio_access = (struct npfec){};
+     hvio->mmio_retry = false;
+-    hvio->g2m_ioport = NULL;
+ 
+     hvmemul_cache_disable(v);
+ }
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+@@ -610,6 +610,7 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain
+     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.irq_lock);
+     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.uc_lock);
+     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.write_map.lock);
++    rwlock_init(&d->arch.hvm.g2m_ioport_lock);
+     rwlock_init(&d->arch.hvm.mmcfg_lock);
+     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.hvm.write_map.list);
+     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.hvm.g2m_ioport_list);
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
+@@ -143,36 +143,56 @@ bool handle_pio(uint16_t port, unsigned
+     return true;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool cf_check g2m_portio_accept(
+-    const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, const ioreq_t *p)
++/* NB: Returns with the lock held in the success case. */
++static const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_portio_find_and_lock(struct hvm_domain *hvm,
++                                                         uint64_t addr,
++                                                         uint32_t size)
+ {
+-    struct vcpu *curr = current;
+-    const struct hvm_domain *hvm = &curr->domain->arch.hvm;
+-    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &curr->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
+-    struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
+-    unsigned int start, end;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
++
++    read_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+ 
+     list_for_each_entry( g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list )
+     {
+-        start = g2m_ioport->gport;
+-        end = start + g2m_ioport->np;
+-        if ( (p->addr >= start) && (p->addr + p->size <= end) )
+-        {
+-            hvio->g2m_ioport = g2m_ioport;
+-            return 1;
+-        }
++        unsigned int start = g2m_ioport->gport;
++
++        if ( addr >= start && addr + size <= start + g2m_ioport->np )
++            return g2m_ioport;
+     }
+ 
+-    return 0;
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
++    return NULL;
++}
++
++static bool cf_check g2m_portio_accept(
++    const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, const ioreq_t *p)
++{
++    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
++        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, p->addr, p->size);
++
++    if ( !g2m_ioport )
++        return false;
++
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
++    return true;
+ }
+ 
+ static int cf_check g2m_portio_read(
+     const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t addr, uint32_t size,
+     uint64_t *data)
+ {
+-    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &current->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
+-    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport = hvio->g2m_ioport;
+-    unsigned int mport = (addr - g2m_ioport->gport) + g2m_ioport->mport;
++    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
++        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, addr, size);
++    unsigned int mport;
++
++    if ( !g2m_ioport )
++        return X86EMUL_RETRY;
++
++    mport = addr - g2m_ioport->gport + g2m_ioport->mport;
+ 
+     switch ( size )
+     {
+@@ -189,6 +209,8 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_read(
+         BUG();
+     }
+ 
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
+     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -196,9 +218,15 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_write(
+     const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t addr, uint32_t size,
+     uint64_t data)
+ {
+-    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &current->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
+-    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport = hvio->g2m_ioport;
+-    unsigned int mport = (addr - g2m_ioport->gport) + g2m_ioport->mport;
++    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
++        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, addr, size);
++    unsigned int mport;
++
++    if ( !g2m_ioport )
++        return X86EMUL_RETRY;
++
++    mport = addr - g2m_ioport->gport + g2m_ioport->mport;
+ 
+     switch ( size )
+     {
+@@ -215,6 +243,8 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_write(
+         BUG();
+     }
+ 
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
+     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/domain.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/domain.h
+@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct hvm_domain {
+ 
+     /* List of guest to machine IO ports mapping. */
+     struct list_head g2m_ioport_list;
++    rwlock_t g2m_ioport_lock;
+ 
+     /* List of MMCFG regions trapped by Xen. */
+     struct list_head mmcfg_regions;
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vcpu.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vcpu.h
+@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ struct hvm_vcpu_io {
+     unsigned long msix_unmask_address;
+     unsigned long msix_snoop_address;
+     unsigned long msix_snoop_gpa;
+-
+-    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
+ };
+ 
+ struct nestedvcpu {

xsa492-4.21-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: sched: use sequence counter to enlighten vcpu_runstate_get()
+
+Subsequently XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo will want to invoke the function
+without holding a lock, thus allowing parallel execution of potentially
+many instances. As was learned from 228ab9992ffb ("domctl: improve
+locking during domain destruction"), reverted by d0887cc6b16e, such
+parallelism can result in severe lock contention on any (previously)
+inner lock. To avoid taking that risk replace the use of the scheduler
+lock in vcpu_runstate_get() by a newly introduced sequence counter.
+Convert the "no lock if current" property to "use a local counter
+instance", thus guaranteeing the loop to exit after the first iteration.
+
+Skeleton and commentary of the seqcount implementation based on /
+derived from Linux 6.11-rc.
+
+To have runstate_seq placed next to runstate in struct vcpu, without
+introducing a new obvious padding hole, yet while keeping the latter
+adjacent to runstate_guest{,_area} as well, move runstate down a little.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
++++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
+@@ -281,13 +281,18 @@ static inline void vcpu_runstate_change(
+     }
+ 
+     delta = new_entry_time - v->runstate.state_entry_time;
+-    if ( delta > 0 )
++
++    /* Serialization: ->schedule_lock (see ASSERT() above). */
++    with_seq_write(&v->runstate_seq)
+     {
+-        v->runstate.time[v->runstate.state] += delta;
+-        v->runstate.state_entry_time = new_entry_time;
+-    }
++        if ( delta > 0 )
++        {
++            v->runstate.time[v->runstate.state] += delta;
++            v->runstate.state_entry_time = new_entry_time;
++        }
+ 
+-    v->runstate.state = new_state;
++        v->runstate.state = new_state;
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ void sched_guest_idle(void (*idle) (void), unsigned int cpu)
+@@ -307,30 +312,18 @@ void sched_guest_idle(void (*idle) (void
+ void vcpu_runstate_get(const struct vcpu *v,
+                        struct vcpu_runstate_info *runstate)
+ {
+-    spinlock_t *lock;
+-    s_time_t delta;
+-    struct sched_unit *unit;
++    struct seqcount seq = SEQCNT_ZERO();
++    const struct seqcount *s = likely(v == current) ? &seq : &v->runstate_seq;
+ 
+-    rcu_read_lock(&sched_res_rculock);
+-
+-    /*
+-     * Be careful in case of an idle vcpu: the assignment to a unit might
+-     * change even with the scheduling lock held, so be sure to use the
+-     * correct unit for locking in order to avoid triggering an ASSERT() in
+-     * the unlock function.
+-     */
+-    unit = is_idle_vcpu(v) ? get_sched_res(v->processor)->sched_unit_idle
+-                           : v->sched_unit;
+-    lock = likely(v == current) ? NULL : unit_schedule_lock_irq(unit);
+-    memcpy(runstate, &v->runstate, sizeof(*runstate));
+-    delta = NOW() - runstate->state_entry_time;
+-    if ( delta > 0 )
+-        runstate->time[runstate->state] += delta;
+-
+-    if ( unlikely(lock != NULL) )
+-        unit_schedule_unlock_irq(lock, unit);
++    until_seq_read(s)
++    {
++        s_time_t delta;
+ 
+-    rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
++        *runstate = v->runstate;
++        delta = NOW() - runstate->state_entry_time;
++        if ( delta > 0 )
++            runstate->time[runstate->state] += delta;
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ uint64_t get_cpu_idle_time(unsigned int cpu)
+--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
+ #include <xen/radix-tree.h>
+ #include <xen/multicall.h>
+ #include <xen/nospec.h>
++#include <xen/seqcount.h>
+ #include <xen/tasklet.h>
+ #include <xen/mm.h>
+ #include <xen/smp.h>
+@@ -198,7 +199,6 @@ struct vcpu
+ 
+     struct sched_unit *sched_unit;
+ 
+-    struct vcpu_runstate_info runstate;
+ #ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ # define runstate_guest(v) ((v)->runstate_guest)
+     XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_runstate_info_t) runstate_guest; /* guest address */
+@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ struct vcpu
+     } runstate_guest; /* guest address */
+ #endif
+     struct guest_area runstate_guest_area;
++    struct vcpu_runstate_info runstate;
++    struct seqcount  runstate_seq;
+     unsigned int     new_state;
+ 
+     /* Has the FPU been initialised? */
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/xen/include/xen/seqcount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
++#ifndef XEN_SEQCOUNT_H
++#define XEN_SEQCOUNT_H
++
++#include <xen/lib.h>
++#include <xen/nospec.h>
++
++#include <asm/atomic.h>
++#include <asm/system.h>
++
++/*
++ * Sequence counters (seqcount_t)
++ *
++ * This is the raw counting mechanism, without any writer protection.
++ *
++ * Write side critical sections must be serialized (and non-preemptible).
++ *
++ * If readers can be invoked from interrupt contexts, interrupts must also
++ * be respectively disabled before entering the write section.
++ *
++ * This mechanism can't be used if the protected data contains pointers,
++ * as the writer can invalidate a pointer that a reader is following.
++ */
++struct seqcount {
++    unsigned int sequence;
++};
++
++/*
++ * SEQCNT_ZERO() - initializer for seqcount_t
++ * @name: Name of the struct seqcount instance
++ */
++#define SEQCNT_ZERO() { .sequence = 0 }
++
++static inline unsigned int seqprop_sequence(const struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    return ACCESS_ONCE(s->sequence);
++}
++
++/*
++ * read_seqcount_begin() - begin a seqcount read critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
++ *
++ * Return: count to be passed to read_seqcount_retry()
++ */
++static inline unsigned int _read_seqcount_begin(const struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    unsigned int seq;
++
++    while ((seq = seqprop_sequence(s)) & 1)
++        cpu_relax();
++
++    smp_rmb();
++
++    return seq;
++}
++
++static always_inline unsigned int read_seqcount_begin(const struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    unsigned int seq = _read_seqcount_begin(s);
++
++    block_lock_speculation();
++
++    return seq;
++}
++
++/*
++ * read_seqcount_retry() - end a seqcount read critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
++ * @start: count, from read_seqcount_begin()
++ *
++ * read_seqcount_retry closes the read critical section of given struct
++ * seqcount.  If the critical section was invalid, it must be ignored
++ * (and typically retried).
++ *
++ * Return: true if a read section retry is required, else false
++ */
++static inline bool _read_seqcount_retry(const struct seqcount *s,
++                                        unsigned int start)
++{
++    smp_rmb();
++    return unlikely(seqprop_sequence(s) != start);
++}
++
++static always_inline bool read_seqcount_retry(const struct seqcount *s,
++                                              unsigned int start)
++{
++    return lock_evaluate_nospec(_read_seqcount_retry(s, start));
++}
++
++/* Loops until a consistent count has been observed across the loop body. */
++#define until_seq_read(seq)                                    \
++    for ( unsigned int retry_ = 1, count_;                     \
++          retry_ && (count_ = read_seqcount_begin(seq), true); \
++          retry_ = read_seqcount_retry(seq, count_) )
++
++/*
++ * write_seqcount_begin() - start a struct seqcount write side critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
++ *
++ * Context: sequence counter write side sections must be serialized.
++ * If readers can be invoked from interrupt context, interrupts must be
++ * respectively disabled.
++ */
++static inline void write_seqcount_begin(struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    add_sized(&s->sequence, 1);
++    smp_wmb();
++}
++
++/*
++ * write_seqcount_end() - end a struct seqcount write side critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to seqcount
++ */
++static inline void write_seqcount_end(struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    smp_wmb();
++    add_sized(&s->sequence, 1);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Not really a loop, but we need write_seqcount_{begin,end}() in the correct
++ * position.
++ */
++#define with_seq_write(seq)                           \
++    for ( bool once_ = true;                          \
++          once_ && (write_seqcount_begin(seq), true); \
++          (write_seqcount_end(seq), once_ = false) )
++
++#endif /* XEN_SEQCOUNT_H */
++
++/*
++ * Local variables:
++ * mode: C
++ * c-file-style: "BSD"
++ * c-basic-offset: 4
++ * tab-width: 4
++ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
++ * End:
++ */

xsa492-4.21-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo without acquiring domctl lock
+
+getdomaininfo() is not called under consistently the same lock. Thus,
+with caller side locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the
+domctl lock not held. (Callers not pausing the domain they want to
+retrieve information for already need to be aware that not all of the
+data returned can be relied on as being consistent; most data will also
+be stale by the time the caller gets to look at it.)
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+While moving, convert an assignment to an assertion: The domain in
+question was determined from the field which previously was "updated".
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: 5513bd0b4675 ("add xenstore domain flag to hypervisor")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -318,6 +318,26 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Handle sub-ops not requiring the domctl lock. */
++    switch ( op->cmd )
++    {
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++        ret = xsm_getdomaininfo(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
++        if ( !ret )
++        {
++            getdomaininfo(d, &op->u.getdomaininfo);
++
++            ASSERT(op->domain == op->u.getdomaininfo.domain);
++            copyback = true;
++        }
++
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++    default:
++        /* Everything else handled further down. */
++        break;
++    }
++
+     ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op->cmd,
+                      /* SSIDRef only applicable for cmd == createdomain */
+                      op->u.createdomain.ssidref);
+@@ -516,17 +536,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         copyback = 1;
+         break;
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+-        ret = xsm_getdomaininfo(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        getdomaininfo(d, &op->u.getdomaininfo);
+-
+-        op->domain = op->u.getdomaininfo.domain;
+-        copyback = 1;
+-        break;
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpucontext:
+     {
+         vcpu_guest_context_u c = { .nat = NULL };
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -172,9 +172,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_XS_PRIV, current->domain, d);
++
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
++        return -EILSEQ;
++
+     default:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+     }
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -682,8 +682,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+          */
+         return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
+ 
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
++    /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
++        return -EILSEQ;
++
++    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:

xsa492-4.21-03.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Subject: domctl: protect locking for get_domain_state
+
+When DOMID_INVALID is passed, the dom exec handler lock is being taken
+without any check that the domain is even allowed to take the lock. This
+allows for an unauthorized domain to DoS the get_domain_state domctl op.
+Move to consider the op effectively being called against the hypervisor.
+Thus it is the target of the call being invoked to identify the last
+domain with a state change. The subsequent check of whether the source
+domain is allowed the state of the last domain to change state is still
+relevant.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
++++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ allow xenstore_t xen_t:xen writeconsole;
+ # Xenstore queries domaininfo on all domains
+ allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain getdomaininfo;
+ allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain2 get_domain_state;
++allow xenstore_t domxen_t:domain2 get_domain_state;
+ 
+ # As a shortcut, the following 3 rules are used instead of adding a domain_comms
+ # rule between xenstore_t and every domain type that talks to xenstore
+--- a/xen/common/domain.c
++++ b/xen/common/domain.c
+@@ -216,12 +216,8 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_g
+     if ( info->pad0 )
+         return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-    if ( d )
++    if ( d != dom_xen )
+     {
+-        rc = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+-        if ( rc )
+-            return rc;
+-
+         set_domain_state_info(info, d);
+ 
+         return 0;
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -304,13 +304,19 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         fallthrough;
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
+         {
+             d = NULL;
+             break;
+         }
+         fallthrough;
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++        if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
++        {
++            d = dom_xen;
++            break;
++        }
++        fallthrough;
+     default:
+         d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
+         if ( !d )
+@@ -863,7 +869,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+-        ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
++        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
++        if ( !ret )
++            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
+         if ( !ret )
+             copyback = true;
+         break;
+@@ -876,7 +884,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     domctl_lock_release();
+ 
+  domctl_out_unlock_domonly:
+-    if ( d && d != dom_io )
++    if ( d && !is_system_domain(d) )
+         rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ 
+     if ( copyback && __copy_to_guest(u_domctl, op, 1) )

xsa492-4.21-04.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state without acquiring domctl lock
+
+get_domain_state() uses its own locking. Thus, with caller side locking
+irrelevant, it can as well be called with the domctl lock not held.
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: 3ad3df1bd0aa ("xen: add new domctl get_domain_state")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -339,6 +339,14 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+ 
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
++        if ( !ret )
++            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
++        if ( !ret )
++            copyback = true;
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
+     default:
+         /* Everything else handled further down. */
+         break;
+@@ -868,14 +876,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+         break;
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+-        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+-        if ( !ret )
+-            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
+-        if ( !ret )
+-            copyback = true;
+-        break;
+-
+     default:
+         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -172,10 +172,9 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+-        return xsm_default_action(XSM_XS_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -694,7 +695,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/../domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:

xsa492-4.21-05.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domain: locking for iomem_caps accesses
+
+In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_mapping handling
+out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is needed to
+synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission.
+
+Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
+outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
+limited to non-__init code).
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domain.c
++++ b/xen/common/domain.c
+@@ -518,10 +518,15 @@ static int late_hwdom_init(struct domain
+      * may be modified after this hypercall returns if a more complex
+      * device model is desired.
+      */
++    write_lock(&dom0->caps_lock);
+     rangeset_swap(d->irq_caps, dom0->irq_caps);
+     rangeset_swap(d->iomem_caps, dom0->iomem_caps);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     rangeset_swap(d->arch.ioport_caps, dom0->arch.ioport_caps);
++#endif
++    write_unlock(&dom0->caps_lock);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     setup_io_bitmap(d);
+     setup_io_bitmap(dom0);
+ #endif
+@@ -873,6 +878,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t dom
+     rspin_lock_init_prof(d, domain_lock);
+     rspin_lock_init_prof(d, page_alloc_lock);
+     spin_lock_init(&d->hypercall_deadlock_mutex);
++    rwlock_init(&d->caps_lock);
+     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->page_list);
+     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->extra_page_list);
+     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->xenpage_list);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -267,6 +267,35 @@ static struct vnuma_info *vnuma_init(con
+     return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+ 
++void iocaps_double_lock(struct domain *d, bool write)
++{
++    struct domain *currd = current->domain;
++
++    if ( d->domain_id > currd->domain_id )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++    if ( write )
++        write_lock(&d->caps_lock);
++    else
++        read_lock(&d->caps_lock);
++
++    if ( d->domain_id < currd->domain_id )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++}
++
++void iocaps_double_unlock(struct domain *d, bool write)
++{
++    struct domain *currd = current->domain;
++
++    if ( d != currd )
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++    if ( write )
++        write_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
++    else
++        read_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
++}
++
+ static bool is_stable_domctl(uint32_t cmd)
+ {
+     return cmd == XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state;
+@@ -687,6 +716,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */
+             break;
+ 
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
+                                      mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ||
+              xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) )
+@@ -695,6 +726,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+         else
+             ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -719,19 +752,15 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             break;
+ #endif
+ 
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
++
+         ret = -EPERM;
+         if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
+-             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        if ( add )
++             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ||
++             (ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add)) ||
++             !paging_mode_translate(d) )
++            /* Nothing. */;
++        else if ( add )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
+                    "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
+@@ -755,6 +784,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+                        "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
+                        ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
+         }
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
+@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
+ #include <asm/iocap.h>
+ #include <asm/p2m.h>
+ 
++void iocaps_double_lock(struct domain *d, bool write);
++void iocaps_double_unlock(struct domain *d, bool write);
++
+ static inline int iomem_permit_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long s,
+                                       unsigned long e)
+ {
+--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ struct domain
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* I/O capabilities (access to IRQs and memory-mapped I/O). */
++    rwlock_t         caps_lock;
+     struct rangeset *iomem_caps;
+     struct rangeset *irq_caps;
+ 

xsa492-4.21-06.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/domain: locking for ioport_caps accesses
+
+In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping
+handling out of the domctl-locked region, the new separate (per-domain)
+lock is used to synchronize in particular with
+XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission.
+
+Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
+outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
+limited to non-__init code).
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports;
+         int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access;
+ 
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
+             ret = -EINVAL;
+         else if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) ||
+@@ -242,6 +244,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
+         else
+             ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -648,16 +652,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+         hvm = &d->arch.hvm;
+-        if ( add )
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
++        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ||
++             (ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add)) )
++            ret = ret ?: -EPERM;
++        else if ( add )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
+                    "ioport_map:add: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
+@@ -718,6 +720,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                        "ioport_map: error %ld denying dom%d access to [%x,%x]\n",
+                        ret, d->domain_id, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+         }
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+@@ -2339,9 +2339,12 @@ void __hwdom_init setup_io_bitmap(struct
+         return;
+ 
+     bitmap_fill(d->arch.hvm.io_bitmap, 0x10000);
++
++    read_lock(&d->caps_lock);
+     if ( rangeset_report_ranges(d->arch.ioport_caps, 0, 0x10000,
+                                 io_bitmap_cb, d) )
+         BUG();
++    read_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
+ 
+     /*
+      * We need to trap 4-byte accesses to 0xcf8 (see admin_io_okay(),

xsa492-4.21-07.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domain: locking for irq_caps accesses
+
+In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq
+handling out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is
+needed to synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,gsi}_permission.
+
+Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
+outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
+limited to non-__init code).
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     {
+         int rc;
++        struct domain *currd = current->domain;
+         struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind = &domctl->u.bind_pt_irq;
+         uint32_t irq = bind->u.spi.spi;
+         uint32_t virq = bind->machine_irq;
+@@ -107,21 +108,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+-            return -EPERM;
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
+ 
+-        if ( !vgic_reserve_virq(d, virq) )
+-            return -EBUSY;
+-
+-        rc = route_irq_to_guest(d, virq, irq, "routed IRQ");
+-        if ( rc )
+-            vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            rc = -EPERM;
++        else if ( !vgic_reserve_virq(d, virq) )
++            rc = -EBUSY;
++        else
++        {
++            rc = route_irq_to_guest(d, virq, irq, "routed IRQ");
++            if ( rc )
++                vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
++        }
+ 
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
+         return rc;
+     }
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+     {
+         int rc;
++        struct domain *currd = current->domain;
+         struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind = &domctl->u.bind_pt_irq;
+         uint32_t irq = bind->u.spi.spi;
+         uint32_t virq = bind->machine_irq;
+@@ -138,16 +144,15 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+-            return -EPERM;
+-
+-        rc = release_guest_irq(d, virq);
+-        if ( rc )
+-            return rc;
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
+ 
+-        vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            rc = -EPERM;
++        else if ( !(rc = release_guest_irq(d, virq)) )
++            vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
+ 
+-        return 0;
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
++        return rc;
+     }
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vuart_op:
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -267,16 +267,17 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
+-        ret = -EPERM;
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) ||
+              xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, flags) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        if ( flags )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( flags )
+             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+         else
+             ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+ 
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -579,20 +580,27 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+ 
+         irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+-            break;
++        if ( irq <= 0 )
++            ret = -EPERM;
+ 
+-        ret = -ESRCH;
+-        if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
+         {
+             pcidevs_lock();
+             ret = pt_irq_create_bind(d, bind);
+             pcidevs_unlock();
++
++            if ( ret < 0 )
++                printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_create_bind failed (%ld) for %pd\n",
++                       ret, d);
+         }
+-        if ( ret < 0 )
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_create_bind failed (%ld) for dom%d\n",
+-                   ret, d->domain_id);
++        else
++            ret = -ESRCH;
++
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -605,23 +613,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+-            break;
+-
+         ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+-        if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
+         {
+             pcidevs_lock();
+             ret = pt_irq_destroy_bind(d, bind);
+             pcidevs_unlock();
++
++            if ( ret < 0 )
++                printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_destroy_bind failed (%ld) for %pd\n",
++                       ret, d);
+         }
+-        if ( ret < 0 )
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_destroy_bind failed (%ld) for dom%d\n",
+-                   ret, d->domain_id);
++
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -695,6 +695,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = -EINVAL;
+             break;
+         }
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         irq = pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq);
+         if ( !irq || xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
+             ret = -EPERM;
+@@ -702,6 +705,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+         else
+             ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ #endif

xsa492-4.21-08.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: XSM/Flask: split the .iomem_mapping() hook
+
+It's used twice in entirely different situations. The use in do_domctl()
+wants to become an ordinary XSM_DM_PRIV invocation, while the one in vPCI
+code need to remain XSM_HOOK (it may plausibly become XSM_TARGET). For
+Flask, the same backing function will continue to be used for the time
+being.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int cf_check map_range(
+             return -EPERM;
+         }
+ 
+-        rc = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, map->d, map_mfn, m_end, map->map);
++        rc = xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(XSM_HOOK, map->d, map_mfn, m_end, map->map);
+         if ( rc )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -580,6 +580,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
++static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(
++    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
++{
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
++}
++
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_pci_config_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start,
+     uint16_t end, uint8_t access)
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+                             uint8_t allow);
+     int (*iomem_mapping)(struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e,
+                          uint8_t allow);
++    int (*iomem_mapping_vpci)(struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e,
++                              uint8_t allow);
+     int (*pci_config_permission)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf,
+                                  uint16_t start, uint16_t end, uint8_t access);
+ 
+@@ -523,6 +525,12 @@ static inline int xsm_iomem_mapping(
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.iomem_mapping, d, s, e, allow);
+ }
+ 
++static inline int xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(
++    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
++{
++    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.iomem_mapping_vpci, d, s, e, allow);
++}
++
+ static inline int xsm_pci_config_permission(
+     xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start,
+     uint16_t end, uint8_t access)
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .irq_permission                = xsm_irq_permission,
+     .iomem_permission              = xsm_iomem_permission,
+     .iomem_mapping                 = xsm_iomem_mapping,
++    .iomem_mapping_vpci            = xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci,
+     .pci_config_permission         = xsm_pci_config_permission,
+     .get_vnumainfo                 = xsm_get_vnumainfo,
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -1950,6 +1950,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .irq_permission = flask_irq_permission,
+     .iomem_permission = flask_iomem_permission,
+     .iomem_mapping = flask_iomem_mapping,
++    .iomem_mapping_vpci = flask_iomem_mapping,
+     .pci_config_permission = flask_pci_config_permission,
+ 
+     .resource_plug_core = flask_resource_plug_core,

xsa492-4.21-09.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+Move the re-purposed dedicated XSM check as early as possible.
+
+Minimal "modernization": Switch "add" to bool and use %pd in log messages.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -376,6 +376,66 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             copyback = true;
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    {
++        unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
++        unsigned long mfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
++        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
++        unsigned long mfn_end = mfn + nr_mfns - 1;
++        bool add = op->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
++
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( mfn_end < mfn || /* Wrap? */
++             ((mfn | mfn_end) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
++             (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* Wrap? */
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
++        if ( ret || !paging_mode_translate(d) )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_X86 /* XXX ARM!? */
++        ret = -E2BIG;
++        /* Must break hypercall up as this could take a while. */
++        if ( nr_mfns > 64 )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++#endif
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
++
++        ret = -EPERM;
++        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
++             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
++            /* Nothing. */;
++        else if ( add )
++        {
++            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
++                   "memory_map:add: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
++                   d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
++
++            ret = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
++            if ( ret < 0 )
++                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
++                       "memory_map:fail: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx ret:%ld\n",
++                       d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
++        }
++        else
++        {
++            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
++                   "memory_map:remove: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
++                   d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
++
++            ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
++            if ( ret < 0 && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
++                printk(XENLOG_ERR
++                       "memory_map: error %ld removing %pd access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
++                       ret, d, mfn, mfn_end);
++        }
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++
+     default:
+         /* Everything else handled further down. */
+         break;
+@@ -736,64 +796,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+-    {
+-        unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
+-        unsigned long mfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
+-        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
+-        unsigned long mfn_end = mfn + nr_mfns - 1;
+-        int add = op->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
+-
+-        ret = -EINVAL;
+-        if ( mfn_end < mfn || /* wrap? */
+-             ((mfn | mfn_end) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
+-             (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* wrap? */
+-            break;
+-
+-#ifndef CONFIG_X86 /* XXX ARM!? */
+-        ret = -E2BIG;
+-        /* Must break hypercall up as this could take a while. */
+-        if ( nr_mfns > 64 )
+-            break;
+-#endif
+-
+-        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
+-
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
+-             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ||
+-             (ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add)) ||
+-             !paging_mode_translate(d) )
+-            /* Nothing. */;
+-        else if ( add )
+-        {
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
+-                   "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
+-                   d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
+-
+-            ret = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
+-            if ( ret < 0 )
+-                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+-                       "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx ret:%ld\n",
+-                       d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
+-        }
+-        else
+-        {
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
+-                   "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
+-                   d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
+-
+-            ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
+-            if ( ret < 0 && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
+-                printk(XENLOG_ERR
+-                       "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
+-                       ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
+-        }
+-
+-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -168,13 +168,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     switch ( cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_mapping(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -692,7 +693,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 

xsa492-4.21-10.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+As the handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), almost no code is
+being moved, but a 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops) invocation of
+arch_do_domctl() is being added. Move just the re-purposed dedicated XSM
+check as early as possible.
+
+In flask_domctl() don't put #ifdef around the moved case label.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -663,12 +663,15 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
++        ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
++        if ( ret )
++            break;
++
+         hvm = &d->arch.hvm;
+         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+ 
+-        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ||
+-             (ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add)) )
+-            ret = ret ?: -EPERM;
++        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
+         else if ( add )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -436,6 +436,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+     }
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++        ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
+     default:
+         /* Everything else handled further down. */
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_OTHER);
+     switch ( cmd )
+     {
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iopor
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_ioport_mapping(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+@@ -703,7 +704,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH

xsa492-4.21-11.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+(It also already isn't used when pt_irq_{create,destroy}_bind() are
+invoked for PVH Dom0.) As the handling is in arch-specific code, no code
+is being moved, but the 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops like the ones
+here) invocation of arch_do_domctl() is being re-used.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        rc = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        rc = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( irq != virq )
+             return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-        rc = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        rc = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        ret = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -437,6 +437,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -168,13 +168,11 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     switch ( cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+-        return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -541,14 +539,14 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unmap
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_bind_pt_irq(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unbind_pt_irq(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -683,10 +683,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -697,9 +699,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/../domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:

xsa492-4.21-12.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_io{mem,port}_permission without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+As the I/O port handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is
+being moved, but the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move
+the re-purposed dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -233,12 +233,17 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports;
+         int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access;
+ 
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
++            break;
++
++        ret = xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow);
++        if ( ret )
++            break;
++
+         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+ 
+-        if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
+-            ret = -EINVAL;
+-        else if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) ||
+-                  xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow) )
++        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) )
+             ret = -EPERM;
+         else if ( allow )
+             ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -376,6 +376,34 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             copyback = true;
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
++    {
++        unsigned long mfn = op->u.iomem_permission.first_mfn;
++        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.iomem_permission.nr_mfns;
++        bool allow = op->u.iomem_permission.allow_access;
++
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* Wrap? */
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        ret = xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow);
++        if ( ret )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
++        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
++                                     mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( allow )
++            ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
++        else
++            ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     {
+         unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
+@@ -436,6 +464,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+     }
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+@@ -777,31 +806,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+-    {
+-        unsigned long mfn = op->u.iomem_permission.first_mfn;
+-        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.iomem_permission.nr_mfns;
+-        int allow = op->u.iomem_permission.allow_access;
+-
+-        ret = -EINVAL;
+-        if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */
+-            break;
+-
+-        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+-
+-        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
+-                                     mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ||
+-             xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) )
+-            ret = -EPERM;
+-        else if ( allow )
+-            ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+-        else
+-            ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+-
+-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -170,7 +170,9 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -567,7 +569,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_irq_p
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -763,7 +765,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_priv_
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_ioport_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -686,7 +686,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -695,14 +697,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH

xsa492-4.21-13.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,gsi}_permission without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+As the GSI handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is being
+moved there; the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move the
+re-purposed (XSM_HOOK -> XSM_PRIV, as xsm_domctl() is now bypassed)
+dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -272,10 +272,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
++        ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, flags);
++        if ( ret )
++            break;
++
+         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+ 
+-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) ||
+-             xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, flags) )
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+             ret = -EPERM;
+         else if ( flags )
+             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -464,8 +464,41 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
++    {
++        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
++        bool allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
++
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(current->domain, pirq);
++
++        ret = -EPERM;
++        if ( irq )
++            ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
++        if ( ret )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( allow )
++            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
++        else
++            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+@@ -779,33 +812,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         }
+         break;
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+-    {
+-        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
+-        int allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
+-
+-        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
+-        {
+-            ret = -EINVAL;
+-            break;
+-        }
+-
+-        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+-
+-        irq = pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq);
+-        if ( !irq || xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
+-            ret = -EPERM;
+-        else if ( allow )
+-            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+-        else
+-            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+-
+-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+-        break;
+-    }
+-#endif
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -170,9 +170,11 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -562,7 +564,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unmap
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_irq_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -686,9 +686,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -696,14 +698,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+     /*

xsa492-4.21-14.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop vm_event_control hook
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). Care needs to be taken with the
+GET_VERSION sub-op, which may be invoked with DOMID_INVALID, and which has
+been (and continues to be) bypassing XSM checking.
+
+Since the latter two parameters were unused, monitor_domctl() invoking the
+hook was actually redundant with the earlier xsm_domctl() (as can be seen
+nicely from the hunks changing xsm/flask/hooks.c).
+
+As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at the same early
+point with and without Flask.
+
+While folding XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op and XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op in
+flask_domctl(), also fold in XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -496,6 +496,23 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
++        if ( op->u.vm_event_op.op == XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION )
++        {
++            /* No XSM check (and potentially d == NULL) here. */
++            ret = vm_event_domctl(d, &op->u.vm_event_op);
++            if ( !ret )
++                copyback = true;
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++        }
++        if ( !d )
++        {
++            ret = -ESRCH;
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++        }
++        /* Other sub-ops handled further down. */
++        break;
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+--- a/xen/common/monitor.c
++++ b/xen/common/monitor.c
+@@ -30,16 +30,11 @@
+ 
+ int monitor_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_monitor_op *mop)
+ {
+-    int rc;
+     bool requested_status = false;
+ 
+     if ( unlikely(current->domain == d) ) /* no domain_pause() */
+         return -EPERM;
+ 
+-    rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, mop->op, mop->event);
+-    if ( unlikely(rc) )
+-        return rc;
+-
+     switch ( mop->op )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_ENABLE:
+--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
++++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
+@@ -603,11 +603,10 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, st
+ 
+     /* All other subops need to target a real domain. */
+     if ( unlikely(d == NULL) )
+-        return -ESRCH;
+-
+-    rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, vec->mode, vec->op);
+-    if ( rc )
+-        return rc;
++    {
++        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
++        return -EILSEQ;
++    }
+ 
+     if ( unlikely(d == current->domain) ) /* no domain_pause() */
+     {
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -652,13 +652,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_hvm_a
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_vm_event_control(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_mem_access(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
+ {
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -157,8 +157,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+     int (*hvm_altp2mhvm_op)(struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op);
+     int (*get_vnumainfo)(struct domain *d);
+ 
+-    int (*vm_event_control)(struct domain *d, int mode, int op);
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+     int (*mem_access)(struct domain *d);
+ #endif
+@@ -657,12 +655,6 @@ static inline int xsm_get_vnumainfo(xsm_
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_vnumainfo, d);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int xsm_vm_event_control(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.vm_event_control, d, mode, op);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+ static inline int xsm_mem_access(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
+ {
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -116,8 +116,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .remove_from_physmap           = xsm_remove_from_physmap,
+     .map_gmfn_foreign              = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign,
+ 
+-    .vm_event_control              = xsm_vm_event_control,
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+     .mem_access                    = xsm_mem_access,
+ #endif
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -699,7 +699,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+@@ -793,9 +792,8 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__TRIGGER);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required:
+-        return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op:
+@@ -1368,11 +1366,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_hvm_altp2mhvm_
+     return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__ALTP2MHVM_OP);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_vm_event_control(struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+-{
+-    return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+ static int cf_check flask_mem_access(struct domain *d)
+ {
+@@ -1971,8 +1964,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .do_xsm_op = do_flask_op,
+     .get_vnumainfo = flask_get_vnumainfo,
+ 
+-    .vm_event_control = flask_vm_event_control,
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+     .mem_access = flask_mem_access,
+ #endif

xsa492-4.21-15.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: pass full struct xen_domctl to xsm_domctl()
+
+Subsequently some sub-ops will want to inspect their sub-sub-ops. Plus
+this way we don't need to pass SSIDref separately anymore for
+domain_create.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ long do_paging_domctl_cont(
+     if ( d == NULL )
+         return -ESRCH;
+ 
+-    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op.cmd, 0 /* SSIDref not applicable */);
++    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, &op);
+     if ( !ret )
+     {
+         if ( domctl_lock_acquire() )
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -526,9 +526,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op->cmd,
+-                     /* SSIDRef only applicable for cmd == createdomain */
+-                     op->u.createdomain.ssidref);
++    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op);
+     if ( ret )
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_t
+ }
+ 
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref)
++    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op)
+ {
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_OTHER);
+-    switch ( cmd )
++    switch ( op->cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+     int (*sysctl_scheduler_op)(int op);
+ #endif
+     int (*set_target)(struct domain *d, struct domain *e);
+-    int (*domctl)(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref);
++    int (*domctl)(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op);
+     int (*sysctl)(int cmd);
+     int (*readconsole)(uint32_t clear);
+ 
+@@ -260,9 +260,9 @@ static inline int xsm_set_target(
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int xsm_domctl(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d,
+-                             unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref)
++                             struct xen_domctl *op)
+ {
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl, d, cmd, ssidref);
++    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl, d, op);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int xsm_sysctl(xsm_default_t def, int cmd)
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -667,10 +667,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_set_target(str
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd,
+-                                 uint32_t ssidref)
++static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op)
+ {
+-    switch ( cmd )
++    switch ( op->cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain:
+         /*
+@@ -680,7 +679,8 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+          * Note that d is NULL because we haven't even allocated memory for it
+          * this early in XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain.
+          */
+-        return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
++        return avc_current_has_perm(op->u.createdomain.ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN,
++                                    DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__SET_LLC_COLORS);
+ 
+     default:
+-        return avc_unknown_permission("domctl", cmd);
++        return avc_unknown_permission("domctl", op->cmd);
+     }
+ }
+ 

xsa492-4.21-16.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop scheduler_op hook
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
+struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
+the same early point with and without Flask.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
++++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
+@@ -2074,10 +2074,6 @@ long sched_adjust(struct domain *d, stru
+ {
+     long ret;
+ 
+-    ret = xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(XSM_HOOK, d, op->cmd);
+-    if ( ret )
+-        return ret;
+-
+     if ( op->sched_id != dom_scheduler(d)->sched_id )
+         return -EINVAL;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -141,13 +141,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_getdo
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int cmd)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG int cmd)
+ {
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+                                 struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);
+     int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d, uint32_t ssidref);
+     int (*getdomaininfo)(struct domain *d);
+-    int (*domctl_scheduler_op)(struct domain *d, int op);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+     int (*sysctl_scheduler_op)(int op);
+ #endif
+@@ -240,12 +239,6 @@ static inline int xsm_get_domain_state(x
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_domain_state, d);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int cmd)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl_scheduler_op, d, cmd);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ static inline int xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op(xsm_default_t def, int cmd)
+ {
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .security_domaininfo           = xsm_security_domaininfo,
+     .domain_create                 = xsm_domain_create,
+     .getdomaininfo                 = xsm_getdomaininfo,
+-    .domctl_scheduler_op           = xsm_domctl_scheduler_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+     .sysctl_scheduler_op           = xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op,
+ #endif
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_getdomaininfo(
+     return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__GETDOMAININFO);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_domctl_scheduler_op(struct domain *d, int op)
++static int flask_domctl_scheduler_op(struct domain *d, int op)
+ {
+     switch ( op )
+     {
+@@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+@@ -745,6 +744,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_setdomainhandle:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__SETDOMAINHANDLE);
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
++        return flask_domctl_scheduler_op(d, op->u.scheduler_op.cmd);
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_ext_vcpucontext:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_vcpu_msrs:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_setvcpucontext:
+@@ -1884,7 +1886,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo,
+     .domain_create = flask_domain_create,
+     .getdomaininfo = flask_getdomaininfo,
+-    .domctl_scheduler_op = flask_domctl_scheduler_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+     .sysctl_scheduler_op = flask_sysctl_scheduler_op,
+ #endif

xsa492-4.21-17.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop shadow_control_op hook
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
+struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
+the same early point with and without Flask.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+@@ -677,10 +677,6 @@ int paging_domctl(struct domain *d, stru
+         return -EBUSY;
+     }
+ 
+-    rc = xsm_shadow_control(XSM_HOOK, d, sc->op);
+-    if ( rc )
+-        return rc;
+-
+     /* Code to handle log-dirty. Note that some log dirty operations
+      * piggy-back on shadow operations. For example, when
+      * XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF is called, it first checks whether log dirty
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -682,13 +682,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_do_mc
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_shadow_control(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_mem_sharing_op(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
+ {
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -172,7 +172,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     int (*do_mca)(void);
+-    int (*shadow_control)(struct domain *d, uint32_t op);
+     int (*mem_sharing_op)(struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op);
+     int (*apic)(struct domain *d, int cmd);
+     int (*machine_memory_map)(void);
+@@ -680,12 +679,6 @@ static inline int xsm_do_mca(xsm_default
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.do_mca);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int xsm_shadow_control(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.shadow_control, d, op);
+-}
+-
+ static inline int xsm_mem_sharing_op(
+     xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
+ {
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .platform_op                   = xsm_platform_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     .do_mca                        = xsm_do_mca,
+-    .shadow_control                = xsm_shadow_control,
+     .mem_sharing_op                = xsm_mem_sharing_op,
+     .apic                          = xsm_apic,
+     .machine_memory_map            = xsm_machine_memory_map,
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ #include <asm/pv/shim.h>
++static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, unsigned int op);
+ #else
+ #define pv_shim false
+ #endif
+@@ -699,10 +700,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+-#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+     /*
+      * These have individual XSM hooks
+@@ -787,6 +784,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_address_size:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__GETADDRSIZE);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
++        return flask_shadow_control(d, op->u.shadow_op.op);
++#endif
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING);
+ 
+@@ -1603,7 +1605,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_do_mca(void)
+     return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN__MCA_OP);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
++static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, unsigned int op)
+ {
+     uint32_t perm;
+ 
+@@ -1999,7 +2001,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .platform_op = flask_platform_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     .do_mca = flask_do_mca,
+-    .shadow_control = flask_shadow_control,
+     .mem_sharing_op = flask_mem_sharing_op,
+     .apic = flask_apic,
+     .machine_memory_map = flask_machine_memory_map,

xsa492-4.21-18.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group without acquiring domctl lock
+
+iommu_get_device_group() uses its own locking. Thus, with caller side
+locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the domctl lock not
+held.
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -513,6 +513,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         /* Other sub-ops handled further down. */
+         break;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
++        ret = iommu_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+@@ -918,7 +922,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+         ret = iommu_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+         break;
+ 
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ static int iommu_get_device_group(
+         if ( (pdev->seg != seg) || ((b == bus) && (df == devfn)) )
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if ( xsm_get_device_group(XSM_HOOK, (seg << 16) | (b << 8) | df) )
++        if ( xsm_get_device_group(XSM_PRIV, (seg << 16) | (b << 8) | df) )
+             continue;
+ 
+         sdev_id = iommu_call(ops, get_device_group_id, seg, b, df);
+@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
+         u32 max_sdevs;
+         XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(uint32) sdevs;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_get_device_group(XSM_HOOK, domctl->u.get_device_group.machine_sbdf);
++        ret = xsm_get_device_group(XSM_PRIV, domctl->u.get_device_group.machine_sbdf);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+@@ -401,7 +402,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_v
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_device_group(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+@@ -705,7 +706,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+      * These have individual XSM hooks
+      * (drivers/passthrough/{pci,device_tree.c)
+      */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:

xsa492-4.21-19.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop {,de}assign_{,dt}device hooks
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). As a positive side effect,
+permissions are then checked at the same early point with and without
+Flask. As the DT device path needs fetching earlier (but must not be
+double fetched), cache it in a private field of the public interface
+struct.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -325,6 +325,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
+         if ( op->domain == DOMID_IO )
+         {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++            if ( op->u.assign_device.dev == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT )
++                op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = NULL;
++#endif
+             d = dom_io;
+             break;
+         }
+@@ -332,6 +336,11 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             return -ESRCH;
+         fallthrough;
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++        if ( op->u.assign_device.dev == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT )
++            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = NULL;
++        fallthrough;
++#endif
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
+         {
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
+@@ -340,15 +340,15 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
+         if ( (d && d->is_dying) || domctl->u.assign_device.flags )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
+-                                    domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
+-                                    &dev);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_assign_dtdevice(XSM_HOOK, d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
++        dev = domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev;
++        if ( !dev )
++        {
++            ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
++                                        domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
++                                        &dev);
++            if ( ret )
++                break;
++        }
+ 
+         if ( domctl->cmd == XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device )
+         {
+@@ -396,15 +396,15 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
+         if ( domctl->u.assign_device.flags )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
+-                                    domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
+-                                    &dev);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_deassign_dtdevice(XSM_HOOK, d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
++        dev = domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev;
++        if ( !dev )
++        {
++            ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
++                                        domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
++                                        &dev);
++            if ( ret )
++                break;
++        }
+ 
+         if ( d == dom_io )
+         {
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+@@ -1740,10 +1740,6 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
+ 
+         machine_sbdf = domctl->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_assign_device(XSM_HOOK, d, machine_sbdf);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+         seg = machine_sbdf >> 16;
+         bus = PCI_BUS(machine_sbdf);
+         devfn = PCI_DEVFN(machine_sbdf);
+@@ -1785,10 +1781,6 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
+ 
+         machine_sbdf = domctl->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_deassign_device(XSM_HOOK, d, machine_sbdf);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+         seg = machine_sbdf >> 16;
+         bus = PCI_BUS(machine_sbdf);
+         devfn = PCI_DEVFN(machine_sbdf);
+--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
++++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+@@ -575,7 +575,10 @@ struct xen_domctl_assign_device {
+         } pci;
+         struct {
+             uint32_t size; /* Length of the path */
+-            XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(char) path; /* path to the device tree node */
++            XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(char) path; /* Path to the device tree node */
++#ifdef __XEN__
++            struct dt_device_node *dev; /* Resolved device node of the above */
++#endif
+         } dt;
+     } u;
+ };
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -405,40 +405,8 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_d
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+-
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_assign_device(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_deassign_device(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ #endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI */
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_assign_dtdevice(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_deassign_dtdevice(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+-#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY */
+-
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_resource_plug_core(XSM_DEFAULT_VOID)
+ {
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -124,13 +124,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
+     int (*get_device_group)(uint32_t machine_bdf);
+-    int (*assign_device)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
+-    int (*deassign_device)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-    int (*assign_dtdevice)(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
+-    int (*deassign_dtdevice)(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
+ #endif
+ 
+     int (*resource_plug_core)(void);
+@@ -533,35 +526,8 @@ static inline int xsm_get_device_group(x
+ {
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_device_group, machine_bdf);
+ }
+-
+-static inline int xsm_assign_device(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.assign_device, d, machine_bdf);
+-}
+-
+-static inline int xsm_deassign_device(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.deassign_device, d, machine_bdf);
+-}
+ #endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI) */
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-static inline int xsm_assign_dtdevice(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.assign_dtdevice, d, dtpath);
+-}
+-
+-static inline int xsm_deassign_dtdevice(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.deassign_dtdevice, d, dtpath);
+-}
+-
+-#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY */
+-
+ static inline int xsm_resource_plug_pci(xsm_default_t def, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.resource_plug_pci, machine_bdf);
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -81,13 +81,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
+     .get_device_group              = xsm_get_device_group,
+-    .assign_device                 = xsm_assign_device,
+-    .deassign_device               = xsm_deassign_device,
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-    .assign_dtdevice               = xsm_assign_dtdevice,
+-    .deassign_dtdevice             = xsm_deassign_dtdevice,
+ #endif
+ 
+     .resource_plug_core            = xsm_resource_plug_core,
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,17 @@ static int flask_shadow_control(struct d
+ #define pv_shim false
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
++static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, unsigned int machine_bdf);
++static int flask_deassign_device(struct domain *d, unsigned int machine_bdf);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++static int flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
++static int flask_deassign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
++#endif
++#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH */
++
+ static uint32_t domain_sid(const struct domain *dom)
+ {
+     struct domain_security_struct *dsec = dom->ssid;
+@@ -700,16 +711,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+-    /*
+-     * These have individual XSM hooks
+-     * (drivers/passthrough/{pci,device_tree.c)
+-     */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
+-#endif
+         return 0;
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain:
+@@ -789,6 +790,49 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return flask_shadow_control(d, op->u.shadow_op.op);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
++
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
++        switch ( op->u.assign_device.dev )
++        {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
++        case XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_PCI:
++            return op->cmd != XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device
++                   ? flask_assign_device(
++                         d, op->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf)
++                   : flask_deassign_device(
++                         d, op->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++        case XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT:
++        {
++            struct dt_device_node *dev;
++            int ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(op->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
++                                            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
++                                            &dev);
++
++            if ( ret )
++                return ret;
++
++            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = dev;
++
++            return op->cmd != XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device
++                   ? flask_assign_dtdevice(d, dt_node_full_name(dev))
++                   : flask_deassign_dtdevice(d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
++        }
++#endif
++
++        default:
++            /* Unknown type. */
++            break;
++        }
++        return avc_unknown_permission("assign_device", op->cmd);
++
++#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH */
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING);
+ 
+@@ -1416,7 +1460,7 @@ static int flask_test_assign_device(uint
+     return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__STAT_DEVICE, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
++static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+     uint32_t dsid, rsid;
+     int rc = -EPERM;
+@@ -1446,7 +1490,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_assign_device(
+     return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, dperm, &ad);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_deassign_device(
++static int flask_deassign_device(
+     struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+     uint32_t rsid;
+@@ -1478,7 +1522,7 @@ static int flask_test_assign_dtdevice(co
+                                 NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
++static int flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+ {
+     uint32_t dsid, rsid;
+     int rc = -EPERM;
+@@ -1508,7 +1552,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_assign_dtdevic
+     return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, dperm, &ad);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_deassign_dtdevice(
++static int flask_deassign_dtdevice(
+     struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+ {
+     uint32_t rsid;
+@@ -1989,13 +2033,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
+     .get_device_group = flask_get_device_group,
+-    .assign_device = flask_assign_device,
+-    .deassign_device = flask_deassign_device,
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-    .assign_dtdevice = flask_assign_dtdevice,
+-    .deassign_dtdevice = flask_deassign_dtdevice,
+ #endif
+ 
+     .platform_op = flask_platform_op,

xsa492-4.21-20.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_set_target without acquiring domctl lock
+
+The only locking required here is that between checking d->target and
+setting it. To avoid the need for an explicit lock, use cmpxchgptr() to
+update d->target.
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -505,6 +505,30 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
++    {
++        struct domain *e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
++
++        ret = -ESRCH;
++        if ( !e )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        if ( d == e )
++            ret = -EINVAL;
++        else if ( !is_hvm_domain(e) )
++            ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
++        else
++            ret = xsm_set_target(XSM_PRIV, d, e);
++
++        /* Hold reference on @e until we destroy @d. */
++        if ( !ret && cmpxchgptr(&d->target, NULL, e) )
++            ret = -EINVAL;
++
++        if ( ret )
++            put_domain(e);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+         if ( op->u.vm_event_op.op == XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION )
+         {
+@@ -844,36 +868,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-    {
+-        struct domain *e;
+-
+-        ret = -ESRCH;
+-        e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
+-        if ( e == NULL )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = -EINVAL;
+-        if ( (d == e) || (d->target != NULL) )
+-        {
+-            put_domain(e);
+-            break;
+-        }
+-
+-        ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+-        if ( is_hvm_domain(e) )
+-            ret = xsm_set_target(XSM_HOOK, d, e);
+-        if ( ret )
+-        {
+-            put_domain(e);
+-            break;
+-        }
+-
+-        /* Hold reference on @e until we destroy @d. */
+-        d->target = e;
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe:
+         d->suspend_evtchn = op->u.subscribe.port;
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_sysct
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_target(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *e)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -705,14 +705,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-        return 0;
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__DESTROY);
+ 

xsa493-4.21-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+From 2e21b5301765de353c06081eee953255bf327176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 10:11:24 +0200
+Subject: xen/arm64: flushtlb: Optimize ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
+
+The ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI workaround is used to mitigate several
+errata where broadcast TLBI;DSB sequences don't provide all the
+architecturally required synchronization. The workaround performs more
+work than necessary, and can have significant overhead. This patch
+optimizes the workaround, as explained below.
+
+1. All relevant errata only affect the ordering and/or completion of
+   memory accesses which have been translated by an invalidated TLB
+   entry. The actual invalidation of TLB entries is unaffected.
+
+2. The existing workaround is applied to both broadcast and local TLB
+   invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
+   apply a workaround for broadcast invalidation.
+
+3. The existing workaround replaces every TLBI with a TLBI;DSB;TLBI
+   sequence, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
+   execute a single additional TLBI;DSB sequence after any number of
+   TLBIs are completed by a DSB.
+
+   For example, for a sequence of batched TLBIs:
+
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
+       DSB ISH
+
+   ... the existing workaround will expand this to:
+
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]     // additional
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]     // additional
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]     // additional
+       DSB ISH
+
+   ... whereas it is sufficient to have:
+
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
+       DSB ISH
+       TLBI <opX>[, <argX>]     // additional
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+
+   Using a single additional TLBI and DSB at the end of the sequence can
+   have significantly lower overhead as each DSB which completes a TLBI
+   must synchronize with other PEs in the system, with potential
+   performance effects both locally and system-wide.
+
+4. The existing workaround repeats each specific TLBI operation, whereas
+   for all relevant errata it is sufficient for the additional TLBI to
+   use *any* operation which will be broadcast, regardless of which
+   translation regime or stage of translation the operation applies to.
+
+   For example, for a single TLBI:
+
+       TLBI ALLE2IS
+       DSB ISH
+
+   ... the existing workaround will expand this to:
+
+       TLBI ALLE2IS
+       DSB ISH
+       TLBI ALLE2IS             // additional
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+
+   ... whereas it is sufficient to have:
+
+       TLBI ALLE2IS
+       DSB ISH
+       TLBI VALE1IS, XZR        // additional
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+
+   As the additional TLBI doesn't have to match a specific earlier TLBI,
+   the additional TLBI can be implemented in separate code, with no
+   memory of the earlier TLBIs. The additional TLBI can also use a
+   cheaper TLBI operation.
+
+5. The existing workaround is applied to both Stage-1 and Stage-2 TLB
+   invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
+   apply a workaround for Stage-1 invalidation.
+
+   Architecturally, TLBI operations which invalidate only Stage-2
+   information (e.g. IPAS2E1IS) are not required to invalidate TLB
+   entries which combine information from Stage-1 and Stage-2
+   translation table entries, and consequently may not complete memory
+   accesses translated by those combined entries. In these cases,
+   completion of memory accesses is only guaranteed after subsequent
+   invalidation of Stage-1 information (e.g. VMALLE1IS).
+
+Rework the workaround logic as follows:
+ - add TLB_HELPER_LOCAL() to be used for local TLB ops without a
+   workaround,
+ - modify TLB_HELPER() workaround to use tlbi vale2is, xzr as a second
+   TLBI,
+ - drop TLB_HELPER_VA(). It's used only by __flush_xen_tlb_one_local
+   which is local and does not need workaround and by
+   __flush_xen_tlb_one. In the latter case, since it's used in a loop,
+   we don't need a workaround in the middle. Add __tlb_repeat_sync with
+   a workaround to be used at the end after DSB and before final ISB,
+ - TLBI VALE2IS passing XZR is used as an additional TLBI. While there is
+   an identity mapping there, it's used very rarely. The performance
+   impact is therefore negligible. If things change in the future, we
+   can revisit the decision.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7c502d7591519135765b8041cbd1c70e56e5a0b9)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
+index 61c25a318998..5483be08fbbe 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
+@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one(vaddr_t va)
+     asm volatile(STORE_CP32(0, TLBIMVAHIS) : : "r" (va) : "memory");
+ }
+ 
++/* Only for ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI */
++static inline void __tlb_repeat_sync(void) {}
++
+ #endif /* __ASM_ARM_ARM32_FLUSHTLB_H__ */
+ /*
+  * Local variables:
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
+index 3b99c11b50d1..1606b26bf28a 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
+@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@
+  * ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI:
+  * Modification of the translation table for a virtual address might lead to
+  * read-after-read ordering violation.
+- * The workaround repeats TLBI+DSB ISH operation for all the TLB flush
+- * operations. While this is strictly not necessary, we don't want to
+- * take any risk.
++ * The workaround repeats TLBI+DSB ISH operation for broadcast TLB flush
++ * operations. The workaround is not needed for local operations.
++ *
++ * It is sufficient for the additional TLBI to use *any* operation which will
++ * be broadcast, regardless of which translation regime or stage of translation
++ * the operation applies to. TLBI VALE2IS is used passing XZR. While there is
++ * an identity mapping there, it's only used during suspend/resume, CPU on/off,
++ * so the impact (performance if any) is negligible.
+  *
+  * For Xen page-tables the ISB will discard any instructions fetched
+  * from the old mappings.
+@@ -26,69 +31,90 @@
+  * Note that for local TLB flush, using non-shareable (nsh) is sufficient
+  * (see D5-4929 in ARM DDI 0487H.a). Although, the memory barrier in
+  * for the workaround is left as inner-shareable to match with Linux
+- * v6.1-rc8.
++ * v6.19.
+  */
+-#define TLB_HELPER(name, tlbop, sh)              \
++#define TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(name, tlbop)            \
+ static inline void name(void)                    \
+ {                                                \
+     asm_inline volatile (                        \
+-        "dsb  "  # sh  "st;"                     \
++        "dsb  nshst;"                            \
+         "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";"                    \
+-        ALTERNATIVE(                             \
+-            "nop; nop;",                         \
+-            "dsb  ish;"                          \
+-            "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";",               \
+-            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,        \
+-            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \
+-        "dsb  "  # sh  ";"                       \
++        "dsb  nsh;"                              \
+         "isb;"                                   \
+         : : : "memory");                         \
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * FLush TLB by VA. This will likely be used in a loop, so the caller
+- * is responsible to use the appropriate memory barriers before/after
+- * the sequence.
+- *
+- * See above about the ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI sequence.
+- */
+-#define TLB_HELPER_VA(name, tlbop)               \
+-static inline void name(vaddr_t va)              \
+-{                                                \
+-    asm_inline volatile (                        \
+-        "tlbi "  # tlbop  ", %0;"                \
+-        ALTERNATIVE(                             \
+-            "nop; nop;",                         \
+-            "dsb  ish;"                          \
+-            "tlbi "  # tlbop  ", %0;",           \
+-            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,        \
+-            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \
+-        : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");  \
++#define TLB_HELPER(name, tlbop)                       \
++static inline void name(void)                         \
++{                                                     \
++    asm_inline volatile (                             \
++        "dsb  ishst;"                                 \
++        "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";"                         \
++        ALTERNATIVE(                                  \
++            "nop; nop;",                              \
++            "dsb  ish;"                               \
++            "tlbi vale2is, xzr;",                     \
++            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,             \
++            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI)      \
++        "dsb  ish;"                                   \
++        "isb;"                                        \
++        : : : "memory"); \
+ }
+ 
+ /* Flush local TLBs, current VMID only. */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb_local, vmalls12e1, nsh)
++TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_guest_tlb_local, vmalls12e1)
+ 
+ /* Flush innershareable TLBs, current VMID only */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb, vmalls12e1is, ish)
++TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb, vmalls12e1is)
+ 
+ /* Flush local TLBs, all VMIDs, non-hypervisor mode */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb_local, alle1, nsh)
++TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_all_guests_tlb_local, alle1)
+ 
+ /* Flush innershareable TLBs, all VMIDs, non-hypervisor mode */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb, alle1is, ish)
++TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb, alle1is)
+ 
+ /* Flush all hypervisor mappings from the TLB of the local processor. */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_xen_tlb_local, alle2, nsh)
++TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_xen_tlb_local, alle2)
++
++#undef TLB_HELPER_LOCAL
++#undef TLB_HELPER
++
++/*
++ * FLush TLB by VA. This will likely be used in a loop, so the caller
++ * is responsible to use the appropriate memory barriers before/after
++ * the sequence.
++ */
+ 
+ /* Flush TLB of local processor for address va. */
+-TLB_HELPER_VA(__flush_xen_tlb_one_local, vae2)
++static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one_local(vaddr_t va)
++{
++    asm_inline volatile (
++        "tlbi vae2, %0" : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");
++}
+ 
+ /* Flush TLB of all processors in the inner-shareable domain for address va. */
+-TLB_HELPER_VA(__flush_xen_tlb_one, vae2is)
++static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one(vaddr_t va)
++{
++    asm_inline volatile (
++        "tlbi vae2is, %0" : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");
++}
+ 
+-#undef TLB_HELPER
+-#undef TLB_HELPER_VA
++/*
++ * ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI:
++ * For all relevant erratas it is only necessary to execute a single
++ * additional TLBI;DSB sequence after any number of TLBIs are completed by DSB.
++ */
++static inline void __tlb_repeat_sync(void)
++{
++    asm_inline volatile (
++        ALTERNATIVE(
++            "nop; nop;",
++            "tlbi vale2is, xzr;"
++            "dsb  ish;",
++            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
++            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI)
++        : : : "memory");
++}
+ 
+ #endif /* __ASM_ARM_ARM64_FLUSHTLB_H__ */
+ /*
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
+index e45fb6d97b02..c292c3c00d29 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static inline void flush_xen_tlb_range_va(vaddr_t va,
+         va += PAGE_SIZE;
+     }
+     dsb(ish); /* Ensure the TLB invalidation has completed */
++    __tlb_repeat_sync();
+     isb();
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
+index 19c0ec63a59a..feafc14ebfda 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
+  *
+  *  Reserved to identity map Xen
+  *
++ *  Note: As part of ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI, VA 0 is used for an extra
++ *  TLBI operation given its rare use (only identity mapping) and thus
++ *  negligible performance impact.
++ *
+  * 0x00000a0000000000 - 0x00000a7fffffffff (512GB, L0 slot [20])
+  *  (Relative offsets)
+  *   0  -   2M   Unmapped