Rebuilt for Python 3.15.0b4 ABI change

x86 HVM I/O port list traversal [XSA-491, CVE-2026-42487]
domctl lock open to abuse [XSA-492, CVE-2026-42489, CVE-2026-42490]
Arm: Completion of memory accesses not guaranteed by completion of a TLBI
	 [XSA-493, CVE-2025-10263]
x86: mismatched mapcache metadata [XSA-494, CVE-2026-42488]

.gitignore

@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
 pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2
 zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
 polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz
-/xen-4.19.2.tar.gz
+/mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz
+/xen-4.21.1.tar.xz

CVE-2014-0150.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.4.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c.orig	2014-07-02 15:54:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.4.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c	2014-11-18 20:50:13.593122915 +0000
-@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@
-         return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
- 
-     if (mac_data.entries) {
--        if (n->mac_table.in_use + mac_data.entries <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
-+        if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES - mac_data.entries) {
-             memcpy(n->mac_table.macs + (n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN),
-                    elem->out_sg[2].iov_base + sizeof(mac_data),
-                    mac_data.entries * ETH_ALEN);

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5278.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c.orig	2015-09-26 17:27:49.494334726 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c	2015-09-26 17:31:53.107474932 +0100
-@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
-         if (index <= s->stop)
-             avail = s->stop - index;
-         else
--            avail = 0;
-+            break;
-         len = size;
-         if (len > avail)
-             len = avail;

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5279.patch

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c	2015-09-26 17:27:49.494334726 +0100
-@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@
-     }
- 
-     index = s->curpag << 8;
-+    if (index >= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+        index = s->start;
-+    }
-     /* 4 bytes for header */
-     total_len = size + 4;
-     /* address for next packet (4 bytes for CRC) */
-@@ -387,15 +390,21 @@
-         offset = addr | (page << 4);
-         switch(offset) {
-         case EN0_STARTPG:
--            s->start = val << 8;
-+            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->start = val << 8;
-+            }
-             s->tainted = 1;
-             break;
-         case EN0_STOPPG:
--            s->stop = val << 8;
-+            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->stop = val << 8;
-+            }
-             s->tainted = 1;
-             break;
-         case EN0_BOUNDARY:
--            s->boundary = val;
-+            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->boundary = val;
-+            }
-             break;
-         case EN0_IMR:
-             s->imr = val;
-@@ -436,7 +445,9 @@
-             s->phys[offset - EN1_PHYS] = val;
-             break;
-         case EN1_CURPAG:
--            s->curpag = val;
-+            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
-+                s->curpag = val;
-+            }
-             s->tainted = 1;
-             break;
-         case EN1_MULT ... EN1_MULT + 7:

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-6815.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c	2015-09-26 17:16:36.406544380 +0100
-@@ -461,7 +461,8 @@
-                 memmove(tp->data, tp->header, hdr);
-                 tp->size = hdr;
-             }
--        } while (split_size -= bytes);
-+            split_size -= bytes;
-+        } while (bytes && split_size);
-     } else if (!tp->tse && tp->cptse) {
-         // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set
-         DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentaion Error\n");

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7295.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.c	2015-10-10 16:57:01.806370020 +0100
-@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@
-     return vring_avail_idx(vq) == vq->last_avail_idx;
- }
- 
--void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
--                    unsigned int len, unsigned int idx)
-+static void virtqueue_unmap_sg(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+			       unsigned int len)
- {
-     unsigned int offset;
-     int i;
-@@ -302,7 +302,19 @@
-         
-         offset += size;
-     }
-+}
- 
-+void virtqueue_discard(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+                       unsigned int len)
-+{
-+    vq->last_avail_idx--;
-+    virtqueue_unmap_sg(vq, elem, len);
-+}
-+
-+void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+                    unsigned int len, unsigned int idx)
-+{
-+    virtqueue_unmap_sg(vq, elem, len);
-     idx = (idx + vring_used_idx(vq)) % vq->vring.num;
- 
-     /* Get a pointer to the next entry in the used ring. */
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.h.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.h	2015-10-10 16:57:53.146216039 +0100
-@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@
- void virtqueue_push(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-                     unsigned int len);
- void virtqueue_flush(VirtQueue *vq, unsigned int count);
-+void virtqueue_discard(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-+                       unsigned int len);
- void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
-                     unsigned int len, unsigned int idx);
- 
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c.orig	2015-10-10 16:10:05.071786348 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c	2015-10-10 19:05:34.510029916 +0100
-@@ -424,11 +424,15 @@
-         len = iov_fill(sg, elem.in_num,
-                        buf + offset, size - offset);
-         total += len;
-+        offset += len;
-+        if (!n->mergeable_rx_bufs && offset < size) {
-+            virtqueue_discard(n->rx_vq, &elem, total);
-+            return;
-+        }
- 
-         /* signal other side */
-         virtqueue_fill(n->rx_vq, &elem, total, i++);
- 
--        offset += len;
-     }
- 
-     if (mhdr)

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7512.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 8b98a2f07175d46c3f7217639bd5e03f2ec56343 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 15:00:06 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] pcnet: fix rx buffer overflow(CVE-2015-7512)
-
-Backends could provide a packet whose length is greater than buffer
-size. Check for this and truncate the packet to avoid rx buffer
-overflow in this case.
-
-Cc: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c |    6 ++++++
- 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
-index 309c40b..1f4a3db 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
-@@ -1064,6 +1064,12 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
-             int pktcount = 0;
- 
-             if (!s->looptest) {
-+                if (size > 4092) {
-+#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
-+                    fprintf(stderr, "pcnet: truncates rx packet.\n");
-+#endif
-+                    size = 4092;
-+                }
-                 memcpy(src, buf, size);
-                 /* no need to compute the CRC */
-                 src[size] = 0;
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8345.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 00837731d254908a841d69298a4f9f077babaf24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 08:42:33 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] eepro100: Prevent two endless loops
-
-http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2015-11/msg04592.html
-shows an example how an endless loop in function action_command can
-be achieved.
-
-During my code review, I noticed a 2nd case which can result in an
-endless loop.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
- 1 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
-index 60333b7..685a478 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
-@@ -774,6 +774,11 @@ static void tx_command(EEPRO100State *s)
-                 uint32_t tx_buffer_address = ldl_phys(tbd_address);
-                 uint16_t tx_buffer_size = lduw_phys(tbd_address + 4);
-                 //~ uint16_t tx_buffer_el = lduw_phys(tbd_address + 6);
-+                if (tx_buffer_size == 0) {
-+                    /* Prevent an endless loop. */
-+                    logout("loop in %s:%u\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
-+                    break;
-+                }
-                 tbd_address += 8;
-                 logout
-                     ("TBD (simplified mode): buffer address 0x%08x, size 0x%04x\n",
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8504.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 4c65fed8bdf96780735dbdb92a8bd0d6b6526cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2015 18:54:17 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] ui: vnc: avoid floating point exception
-
-While sending 'SetPixelFormat' messages to a VNC server,
-the client could set the 'red-max', 'green-max' and 'blue-max'
-values to be zero. This leads to a floating point exception in
-write_png_palette while doing frame buffer updates.
-
-Reported-by: Lian Yihan <lianyihan@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c |    6 +++---
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
-index 7538405..cbe4d33 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
-@@ -2198,15 +2198,15 @@ static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
-     }
- 
-     vs->clientds = vs->serverds;
--    vs->clientds.pf.rmax = red_max;
-+    vs->clientds.pf.rmax = red_max ? red_max : 0xFF;
-     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.rbits, red_max);
-     vs->clientds.pf.rshift = red_shift;
-     vs->clientds.pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
--    vs->clientds.pf.gmax = green_max;
-+    vs->clientds.pf.gmax = green_max ? green_max : 0xFF;
-     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.gbits, green_max);
-     vs->clientds.pf.gshift = green_shift;
-     vs->clientds.pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
--    vs->clientds.pf.bmax = blue_max;
-+    vs->clientds.pf.bmax = blue_max ? blue_max : 0xFF;
-     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.bbits, blue_max);
-     vs->clientds.pf.bshift = blue_shift;
-     vs->clientds.pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1714.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.6.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/fw_cfg.c.orig	2016-01-04 15:35:42.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.6.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/fw_cfg.c	2016-03-06 16:42:33.464296362 +0000
-@@ -54,11 +54,15 @@
- static void fw_cfg_write(FWCfgState *s, uint8_t value)
- {
-     int arch = !!(s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ARCH_LOCAL);
--    FWCfgEntry *e = &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
-+    FWCfgEntry *e = (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID) ? NULL :
-+                     &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
- 
-     FW_CFG_DPRINTF("write %d\n", value);
- 
--    if (s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_WRITE_CHANNEL && s->cur_offset < e->len) {
-+    if (s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_WRITE_CHANNEL
-+        && e != NULL
-+        && e->callback
-+        && s->cur_offset < e->len) {
-         e->data[s->cur_offset++] = value;
-         if (s->cur_offset == e->len) {
-             e->callback(e->callback_opaque, e->data);
-@@ -88,7 +92,8 @@
- static uint8_t fw_cfg_read(FWCfgState *s)
- {
-     int arch = !!(s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ARCH_LOCAL);
--    FWCfgEntry *e = &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
-+    FWCfgEntry *e = (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID) ? NULL :
-+                    &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
-     uint8_t ret;
- 
-     if (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID || !e->data || s->cur_offset >= e->len)

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1981.patch

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	Laszlo Ersek
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH] e1000: eliminate infinite loops on
-out-of-bounds transfer start
-*Date*: 	Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:17:20 +0100
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-The start_xmit() and e1000_receive_iov() functions implement DMA transfers
-iterating over a set of descriptors that the guest's e1000 driver
-prepares:
-
-- the TDLEN and RDLEN registers store the total size of the descriptor
-  area,
-
-- while the TDH and RDH registers store the offset (in whole tx / rx
-  descriptors) into the area where the transfer is supposed to start.
-
-Each time a descriptor is processed, the TDH and RDH register is bumped
-(as appropriate for the transfer direction).
-
-QEMU already contains logic to deal with bogus transfers submitted by the
-guest:
-
-- Normally, the transmit case wants to increase TDH from its initial value
-  to TDT. (TDT is allowed to be numerically smaller than the initial TDH
-  value; wrapping at or above TDLEN bytes to zero is normal.) The failsafe
-  that QEMU currently has here is a check against reaching the original
-  TDH value again -- a complete wraparound, which should never happen.
-
-- In the receive case RDH is increased from its initial value until
-  "total_size" bytes have been received; preferably in a single step, or
-  in "s->rxbuf_size" byte steps, if the latter is smaller. However, null
-  RX descriptors are skipped without receiving data, while RDH is
-  incremented just the same. QEMU tries to prevent an infinite loop
-  (processing only null RX descriptors) by detecting whether RDH assumes
-  its original value during the loop. (Again, wrapping from RDLEN to 0 is
-  normal.)
-
-What both directions miss is that the guest could program TDLEN and RDLEN
-so low, and the initial TDH and RDH so high, that these registers will
-immediately be truncated to zero, and then never reassume their initial
-values in the loop -- a full wraparound will never occur.
-
-The condition that expresses this is:
-
-  xdh_start >= s->mac_reg[XDLEN] / sizeof(desc)
-
-i.e., TDH or RDH start out after the last whole rx or tx descriptor that
-fits into the TDLEN or RDLEN sized area.
-
-This condition could be checked before we enter the loops, but
-pci_dma_read() / pci_dma_write() knows how to fill in buffers safely for
-bogus DMA addresses, so we just extend the existing failsafes with the
-above condition.
-
-Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <address@hidden>
-Cc: Petr Matousek <address@hidden>
-Cc: Stefano Stabellini <address@hidden>
-Cc: Prasad Pandit <address@hidden>
-Cc: Michael Roth <address@hidden>
-Cc: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
-RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1296044
-Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <address@hidden>
-Reviewed-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
----
-
-Notes:
-    Regarding the public posting: we made an honest effort to vet this
-    vulnerability, and the impact seems low -- no host side reads/writes,
-    "just" a DoS (infinite loop). We decided the patch could be posted
-    publicly, for the usual review process. Jason and Prasad checked the
-    patch in the internal discussion already, but comments, improvements
-    etc. are clearly welcome. The CVE request is underway. Thanks.
-
- hw/net/e1000.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
-index bec06e9..34d0823 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c
-@@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ start_xmit(E1000State *s)
-          * bogus values to TDT/TDLEN.
-          * there's nothing too intelligent we could do about this.
-          */
--        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start) {
-+        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start ||
-+            tdh_start >= s->mac_reg[TDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
-             DBGOUT(TXERR, "TDH wraparound @%x, TDT %x, TDLEN %x\n",
-                    tdh_start, s->mac_reg[TDT], s->mac_reg[TDLEN]);
-             break;
-@@ -1165,7 +1166,8 @@ e1000_receive_iov(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt)
-             s->mac_reg[RDH] = 0;
-         s->check_rxov = 1;
-         /* see comment in start_xmit; same here */
--        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start) {
-+        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start ||
-+            rdh_start >= s->mac_reg[RDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
-             DBGOUT(RXERR, "RDH wraparound @%x, RDT %x, RDLEN %x\n",
-                    rdh_start, s->mac_reg[RDT], s->mac_reg[RDLEN]);
-             set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO);
--- 
-1.8.3.1

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2538.patch

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When processing remote NDIS control message packets,
-the USB Net device emulator uses a fixed length(4096) data buffer.
-The incoming informationBufferOffset & Length combination could
-overflow and cross that range. Check control message buffer
-offsets and length to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/dev-network.c | 9 ++++++---
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per review
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg03475.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-network.c b/hw/usb/dev-network.c
-index 8a4ff49..180adce 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/usb-net.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/usb-net.c
-@@ -915,8 +915,9 @@ static int rndis_query_response(USBNetState *s,
- 
-     bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
-     buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
--    if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
-+    if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
-         return USB_RET_STALL;
-+    }
- 
-     infobuflen = ndis_query(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
-                             bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen, infobuf,
-@@ -961,8 +962,9 @@ static int rndis_set_response(USBNetState *s,
- 
-     bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
-     buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
--    if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
-+    if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
-         return USB_RET_STALL;
-+    }
- 
-     ret = ndis_set(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
-                     bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen);
-@@ -1212,8 +1214,9 @@ static void usb_net_handle_dataout(USBNetState *s, USBPacket *p)
-     if (le32_to_cpu(msg->MessageType) == RNDIS_PACKET_MSG) {
-         uint32_t offs = 8 + le32_to_cpu(msg->DataOffset);
-         uint32_t size = le32_to_cpu(msg->DataLength);
--        if (offs + size <= len)
-+        if (offs < len && size < len && offs + size <= len) {
-             qemu_send_packet(s->vc, s->out_buf + offs, size);
-+        }
-     }
-     s->out_ptr -= len;
-     memmove(s->out_buf, &s->out_buf[len], s->out_ptr);
--- 
-2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2841.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Ne2000 NIC uses ring buffer of NE2000_MEM_SIZE(49152)
-bytes to process network packets. Registers PSTART & PSTOP
-define ring buffer size & location. Setting these registers
-to invalid values could lead to infinite loop or OOB r/w
-access issues. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Yang Hongke <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-Update per review:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg05522.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c
-index b032212..ced4666 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,10 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
- {
-     int avail, index, boundary;
- 
-+    if (s->stop <= s->start) {
-+        return 1;
-+    }
-+
-     index = s->curpag << 8;
-     boundary = s->boundary << 8;
-     if (index < boundary)
--- 
-2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2857.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-While computing IP checksum, 'net_checksum_calculate' reads
-payload length from the packet. It could exceed the given 'data'
-buffer size. Add a check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Liu Ling <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- net/checksum.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per review:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg06121.html
-
-diff --git a/net/checksum.c b/net/checksum.c
-index 14c0855..0942437 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/net-checksum.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/net-checksum.c
-@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
-     int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
-     uint16_t csum;
- 
-+    /* Ensure data has complete L2 & L3 headers. */
-+    if (length < 14 + 20) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
- 	return; /* not IPv4 */
-     hlen  = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
-@@ -76,8 +81,9 @@ void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
- 	return;
-     }
- 
--    if (plen < csum_offset+2)
--	return;
-+    if (plen < csum_offset + 2 || 14 + hlen + plen > length) {
-+        return;
-+    }
- 
-     data[14+hlen+csum_offset]   = 0;
-     data[14+hlen+csum_offset+1] = 0;
--- 
-2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4001.patch

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From 3a15cc0e1ee7168db0782133d2607a6bfa422d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2016 11:33:48 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] net: stellaris_enet: check packet length against receive buffer
-
-When receiving packets over Stellaris ethernet controller, it
-uses receive buffer of size 2048 bytes. In case the controller
-accepts large(MTU) packets, it could lead to memory corruption.
-Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Oleksandr Bazhaniuk <oleksandr.bazhaniuk@intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-id: 1460095428-22698-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
-Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c |   12 +++++++++++-
- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
-index 84cf60b..6880894 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
-@@ -236,8 +236,18 @@ static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, si
-     n = s->next_packet + s->np;
-     if (n >= 31)
-         n -= 31;
--    s->np++;
- 
-+    if (size >= sizeof(s->rx[n].data) - 6) {
-+        /* If the packet won't fit into the
-+         * emulated 2K RAM, this is reported
-+         * as a FIFO overrun error.
-+         */
-+        s->ris |= SE_INT_FOV;
-+        stellaris_enet_update(s);
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    s->np++;
-     s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
-     p = s->rx[n].data;
-     *(p++) = (size + 6);
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4002.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When receiving packets over MIPSnet network device, it uses
- receive buffer of size 1514 bytes. In case the controller
-accepts large(MTU) packets, it could lead to memory corruption.
-Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported by: Oleksandr Bazhaniuk <address@hidden>
-
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
-index f261011..e134b31 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
-@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static ssize_t mipsnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t si
-     if (!mipsnet_can_receive(opaque))
-         return;
- 
-+    if (size >= sizeof(s->rx_buffer)) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-     s->busy = 1;
- 
-     /* Just accept everything. */
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4439.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	P J P
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/2] scsi: check command buffer length
-before write(CVE-2016-4439)
-*Date*: 	Thu, 19 May 2016 16:09:30 +0530
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte
-FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer. While
-writing to this command buffer 's->cmdbuf[TI_BUFSZ=16]', a check
-was missing to validate input length. Add check to avoid OOB write
-access.
-
-Fixes CVE-2016-4439
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/esp.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index 8961be2..01497e6 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -448,7 +448,11 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
-         break;
-     case ESP_FIFO:
-         if (s->do_cmd) {
--            s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
-+            if (s->cmdlen < TI_BUFSZ) {
-+                s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
-+            } else {
-+                ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-+            }
-         } else if (s->ti_size == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
-             ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-         } else {
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4441.patch

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	P J P
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH 2/2] scsi: check dma length before
-reading scsi command(CVE-2016-4441)
-*Date*: 	Thu, 19 May 2016 16:09:31 +0530
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte
-FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer.
-Routine get_cmd() uses DMA to read scsi commands into this buffer.
-Add check to validate DMA length against buffer size to avoid any
-overrun.
-
-Fixes CVE-2016-4441
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/esp.c | 11 +++++++----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index 01497e6..591c817 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ void esp_request_cancelled(SCSIRequest *req)
-     }
- }
- 
--static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf)
-+static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t buflen)
- {
-     uint32_t dmalen;
-     int target;
-@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf)
-     target = s->wregs[ESP_WBUSID] & BUSID_DID;
-     if (s->dma) {
-         dmalen = s->rregs[ESP_TCLO] | (s->rregs[ESP_TCMID] << 8);
-+        if (dmalen > buflen) {
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-         s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, buf, dmalen);
-     } else {
-         dmalen = s->ti_size;
-@@ -166,7 +169,7 @@ static void handle_satn(ESPState *s)
-     uint8_t buf[32];
-     int len;
- 
--    len = get_cmd(s, buf);
-+    len = get_cmd(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
-     if (len)
-         do_cmd(s, buf);
- }
-@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ static void handle_satn_stop(ESPState *s)
- 
- static void handle_satn_stop(ESPState *s)
- {
--    s->cmdlen = get_cmd(s, s->cmdbuf);
-+    s->cmdlen = get_cmd(s, s->cmdbuf, sizeof(s->cmdbuf));
-     if (s->cmdlen) {
-         DPRINTF("Set ATN & Stop: cmdlen %d\n", s->cmdlen);
-         s->do_cmd = 1;
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5238.patch

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	Paolo Bonzini
-*Subject*: 	Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] scsi: check buffer length before
-reading scsi command
-*Date*: 	Wed, 1 Jun 2016 15:10:16 +0200
-*User-agent*: 	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
-Thunderbird/45.1.0
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-On 31/05/2016 19:53, P J P wrote:
->/ From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>/
->/ /
->/ The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte/
->/ FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer./
->/ Routine get_cmd() in non-DMA mode, uses 'ti_size' to read scsi/
->/ command into a buffer. Add check to validate command length against/
->/ buffer size to avoid any overrun./
->/ /
->/ Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>/
->/ Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>/
->/ ---/
->/  hw/scsi/esp.c | 3 +++/
->/  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)/
->/ /
->/ diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
->/ index 60c1b28..953027a 100644/
->/ --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
->/ +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
->/ @@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t /
->/ buflen)/
->/          s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, buf, dmalen);/
->/      } else {/
->/          dmalen = s->ti_size;/
->/ +        if (dmalen > TI_BUFSZ) {/
->/ +            return 0;/
->/ +        }/
->/          memcpy(buf, s->ti_buf, dmalen);/
->/          buf[0] = buf[2] >> 5;/
->/      }/
->/ /
-
-In theory this shouldn't happen, but I agree that it is better to be
-defensive.  I'm queuing this patch.
-
-At least the following patch is needed to ensure that ti_size always
-matches ti_rptr/ti_wptr (Hervé, what do you think about it? should I
-resubmit it formally?).  Also, things are more complicated than
-necessary due to ti_size being used for both DMA and FIFO transfers.
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index c2f6f8f..6407844 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void write_response(ESPState *s)
-     } else {
-         s->ti_size = 2;
-         s->ti_rptr = 0;
--        s->ti_wptr = 0;
-+        s->ti_wptr = 2;
-         s->rregs[ESP_RFLAGS] = 2;
-     }
-     esp_raise_irq(s);
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5338.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-*From*: 	P J P
-*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3] scsi: esp: check TI buffer index
-before read/write
-*Date*: 	Mon, 6 Jun 2016 22:04:43 +0530
-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with internal 16-byte
-FIFO buffers. One is used to handle commands and other is for
-information transfer. Three control variables 'ti_rptr',
-'ti_wptr' and 'ti_size' are used to control r/w access to the
-information transfer buffer ti_buf[TI_BUFSZ=16]. In that,
-
-'ti_rptr' is used as read index, where read occurs.
-'ti_wptr' is a write index, where write would occur.
-'ti_size' indicates total bytes to be read from the buffer.
-
-While reading/writing to this buffer, index could exceed its
-size. Add check to avoid OOB r/w access.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/esp.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-06/msg01326.html
-
-diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-index c2f6f8f..4b94bbc 100644
---- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
-@@ -403,18 +403,17 @@ uint64_t esp_reg_read(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr)
-     DPRINTF("read reg[%d]: 0x%2.2x\n", saddr, s->rregs[saddr]);
-     switch (saddr) {
-     case ESP_FIFO:
--        if (s->ti_size > 0) {
-+        if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
-+            /* Data out.  */
-+            ESP_ERROR("PIO data read not implemented\n");
-+            s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
-+            esp_raise_irq(s);
-+        } else if (s->ti_rptr < s->ti_wptr) {
-             s->ti_size--;
--            if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
--                /* Data out.  */
--                ESP_ERROR("PIO data read not implemented\n");
--                s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
--            } else {
--                s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
--            }
-+            s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
-             esp_raise_irq(s);
-         }
--        if (s->ti_size == 0) {
-+        if (s->ti_rptr == s->ti_wptr) {
-             s->ti_rptr = 0;
-             s->ti_wptr = 0;
-         }
-@@ -459,7 +457,7 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
-             } else {
-                 ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-             }
--        } else if (s->ti_size == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
-+        } else if (s->ti_wptr == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
-             ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-         } else {
-             s->ti_size++;
--- 
-2.5.5
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-6351.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 926cde5f3e4d2504ed161ed0cb771ac7cad6fd11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 00:22:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] scsi: esp: make cmdbuf big enough for maximum CDB size
-
-While doing DMA read into ESP command buffer 's->cmdbuf', it could
-write past the 's->cmdbuf' area, if it was transferring more than 16
-bytes.  Increase the command buffer size to 32, which is maximum when
-'s->do_cmd' is set, and add a check on 'len' to avoid OOB access.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
----
- hw/esp.c         |    6 ++++--
- hw/esp.c |    3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/esp.c b/hw/esp.c
-index 64680b3..baa0a2c 100644
---- a/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/hw/esp.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
- #include "hw.h"
- #include "scsi-disk.h"
- #include "scsi.h"
-+#include <assert.h>
- 
- /* debug ESP card */
- //#define DEBUG_ESP
-@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ static void esp_do_dma(ESPState *s)
-     len = s->dma_left;
-     if (s->do_cmd) {
-         DPRINTF("command len %d + %d\n", s->cmdlen, len);
-+        assert (s->cmdlen <= sizeof(s->cmdbuf) &&
-+                len <= sizeof(s->cmdbuf) - s->cmdlen);
-         s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, &s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen], len);
-         s->ti_size = 0;
-         s->cmdlen = 0;
-@@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ static void handle_ti(ESPState *s)
-     s->dma_counter = dmalen;
- 
-     if (s->do_cmd)
--        minlen = (dmalen < 32) ? dmalen : 32;
-+        minlen = (dmalen < ESP_CMDBUF_SZ) ? dmalen : ESP_CMDBUF_SZ;
-     else if (s->ti_size < 0)
-         minlen = (dmalen < -s->ti_size) ? dmalen : -s->ti_size;
-     else
-@@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
-         break;
-     case ESP_FIFO:
-         if (s->do_cmd) {
--            if (s->cmdlen < TI_BUFSZ) {
-+            if (s->cmdlen < ESP_CMDBUF_SZ) {
-                 s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
-             } else {
-                 ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
-diff --git a/hw/esp.c b/hw/esp.c
-index 6c79527..d2c4886 100644
---- a/hw/esp.c
-+++ b/hw/esp.c
-@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ void esp_init(hwaddr espaddr, int it_shift,
- 
- #define ESP_REGS 16
- #define TI_BUFSZ 16
-+#define ESP_CMDBUF_SZ 32
- 
- typedef struct ESPState ESPState;
- 
-@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ struct ESPState {
-     uint32_t dma;
-     SCSIDevice *scsi_dev[ESP_MAX_DEVS];
-     SCSIDevice *current_dev;
--    uint8_t cmdbuf[TI_BUFSZ];
-+    uint8_t cmdbuf[ESP_CMDBUF_SZ];
-     uint32_t cmdlen;
-     uint32_t do_cmd;
- 
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8669.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 3592fe0c919cf27a81d8e9f9b4f269553418bb01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 11:28:08 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] char: serial: check divider value against baud base
-
-16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
-(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
-be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
-greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
-divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-Id: <1476251888-20238-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
----
- hw/char/serial.c |    3 ++-
- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/serial.c b/hw/serial.c
-index 3442f47..eec72b7 100644
---- a/hw/serial.c
-+++ b/hw/serial.c
-@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
-     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
-     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
- 
--    if (s->divider == 0)
-+    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     frame_size = 1;
-     if (s->lcr & 0x08) {
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8910.patch

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-RTL8139 ethernet controller in C+ mode supports multiple
-descriptor rings, each with maximum of 64 descriptors. While
-processing transmit descriptor ring in 'rtl8139_cplus_transmit',
-it does not limit the descriptor count and runs forever. Add
-check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Henderson <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/rtl8139.c b/hw/rtl8139.c
-index 3345bc6..f05e59c 100644
---- a/hw/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static void rtl8139_cplus_transmit(RTL8139State *s)
- {
-     int txcount = 0;
- 
--    while (rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-+    while (txcount < 64 && rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-     {
-         ++txcount;
-     }
--- 
-2.7.4

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-9776.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 77d54985b85a0cb760330ec2bd92505e0a2a97a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 00:38:39 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: check receive buffer size register value
-
-ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses a receive buffer size
-register(EMRBR) to hold maximum size of all receive buffers.
-It is set by a user before any operation. If it was set to be
-zero, ColdFire emulator would go into an infinite loop while
-receiving data in mcf_fec_receive. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/mcf_fec.c |    2 +-
- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/mcf_fec.c b/hw/mcf_fec.c
-index dc61bac..4025eb3 100644
---- a/hw/mcf_fec.c
-+++ b/hw/mcf_fec.c
-@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
-         s->tx_descriptor = s->etdsr;
-         break;
-     case 0x188:
--        s->emrbr = value & 0x7f0;
-+        s->emrbr = value > 0 ? value & 0x7F0 : 0x7F0;
-         break;
-     default:
-         cpu_abort(cpu_single_env, "mcf_fec_write Bad address 0x%x\n",
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-6505.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 02:23:33 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
-
-The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
-limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Message-id: 5899a02e.45ca240a.6c373.93c1@mx.google.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/usb-ohci.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb-ohci.c b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-index 2cba3e3..21c93e0 100644
---- a/hw/usb-ohci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
- 
- #define OHCI_MAX_PORTS 15
- 
-+#define ED_LINK_LIMIT 4
-+
- static int64_t usb_frame_time;
- static int64_t usb_bit_time;
- 
-@@ -1184,7 +1186,7 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
-     uint32_t next_ed;
-     uint32_t cur;
-     int active;
--
-+    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
-     active = 0;
- 
-     if (head == 0)
-@@ -1199,6 +1201,10 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
- 
-         next_ed = ed.next & OHCI_DPTR_MASK;
- 
-+        if (++link_cnt > ED_LINK_LIMIT) {
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-+
-         if ((ed.head & OHCI_ED_H) || (ed.flags & OHCI_ED_K)) {
-             uint32_t addr;
-             /* Cancel pending packets for ED that have been paused.  */
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-7718.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 215902d7b6fb50c6fc216fc74f770858278ed904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:39:19 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] fix :cirrus_vga fix OOB read case qemu Segmentation fault
-
-check the validity of parameters in cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_xxx
-and cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_xxx to avoid the OOB read which causes qemu Segmentation fault.
-
-After the fix, we will touch the assert in
-cirrus_invalidate_region:
-assert(off_cur_end >= off_cur);
-
-Signed-off-by: fangying <fangying1@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
-Message-id: 20170314063919.16200-1-hangaohuai@huawei.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h b/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
-index 0925a00..b7447f8 100644
---- a/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
-+++ b/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
-@@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
-     src = src_ - src_base;
-     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
-     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
-+
-+    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
-         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
- 	    p = *(dst_base + m(dst));
-@@ -143,6 +148,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
-     src = src_ - src_base;
-     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
-     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
-+
-+    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
-         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
- 	    p1 = *(dst_base + m(dst));
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-8309.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 3268a845f41253fb55852a8429c32b50f36f349a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 09:56:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] audio: release capture buffers
-
-AUD_add_capture() allocates two buffers which are never released.
-Add the missing calls to AUD_del_capture().
-
-Impact: Allows vnc clients to exhaust host memory by repeatedly
-starting and stopping audio capture.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2017-8309
-Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
-Reported-by: "Jiangxin (hunter, SCC)" <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-id: 20170428075612.9997-1-kraxel@redhat.com
----
- audio/audio.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/audio/audio.c b/audio/audio.c
-index c8898d8..beafed2 100644
---- a/audio/audio.c
-+++ b/audio/audio.c
-@@ -2028,6 +2028,8 @@ void AUD_del_capture (CaptureVoiceOut *cap, void *cb_opaque)
-                     sw = sw1;
-                 }
-                 LIST_REMOVE (cap, entries);
-+                qemu_free (cap->hw.mix_buf);
-+                qemu_free (cap->buf);
-                 qemu_free (cap);
-             }
-             return;
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-9330.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 03:15:03 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: fix error return code in servicing iso td
-
-It should return 1 if an error occurs when reading iso td.
-This will avoid an infinite loop issue in ohci_service_ed_list.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Message-id: 5899ac3e.1033240a.944d5.9a2d@mx.google.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/usb-ohci.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb-ohci.c b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-index c82a92f..2cba3e3 100644
---- a/hw/usb-ohci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb-ohci.c
-@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static int ohci_service_iso_td(OHCIState *ohci, struct ohci_ed *ed,
- 
-     if (!ohci_read_iso_td(addr, &iso_td)) {
-         printf("usb-ohci: ISO_TD read error at %x\n", addr);
--        return 0;
-+        return 1;
-     }
- 
-     starting_frame = OHCI_BM(iso_td.flags, TD_SF);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

qemu.trad.bug1399055.patch

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 4299b90e9ba9ce5ca9024572804ba751aa1a7e70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 13:15:17 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: check vga bits per pixel(bpp) value
-
-In Cirrus CLGD 54xx VGA Emulator, if cirrus graphics mode is VGA,
-'cirrus_get_bpp' returns zero(0), which could lead to a divide
-by zero error in while copying pixel data. The same could occur
-via blit pitch values. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-id: 1476776717-24807-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/cirrus_vga.c |   14 ++++++++++----
- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
-index 3d712d5..bdb092e 100644
---- a/hw/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
- static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
-                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
- {
-+    if (!pitch) {
-+        return true;
-+    }
-     if (pitch < 0) {
-         int64_t min = addr
-             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
-@@ -715,7 +718,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
-                                             s->cirrus_addr_mask));
- }
- 
--static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
-+static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
- {
-     int sx = 0, sy = 0;
-     int dx = 0, dy = 0;
-@@ -729,6 +732,9 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
-         int width, height;
- 
-         depth = s->get_bpp((VGAState *)s) / 8;
-+        if (!depth) {
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-         s->get_resolution((VGAState *)s, &width, &height);
- 
-         /* extra x, y */
-@@ -783,6 +789,8 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
-     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
- 				s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
- 				s->cirrus_blt_height);
-+
-+    return 1;
- }
- 
- static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
-@@ -790,11 +798,9 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
-     if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
-         return 0;
- 
--    cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
-+    return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
-             s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
-             s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
--
--    return 1;
- }
- 
- /***************************************
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-

sources

@@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ SHA512 (newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz) = 40eb96bbc6736a16b6399e0cdb73e853d0d90b685c967e77
 SHA512 (zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e
 SHA512 (polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz) = 88da614e4d3f4409c4fd3bb3e44c7587ba051e3fed4e33d526069a67e8180212e1ea22da984656f50e290049f60ddca65383e5983c0f8884f648d71f698303ad
 SHA512 (pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2) = 2b3d98d027e46d8c08037366dde6f0781ca03c610ef2b380984639e4ef39899ed8d8b8e4cd9c9dc54df101279b95879bd66bfd4d04ad07fef41e847ea7ae32b5
-SHA512 (xen-4.19.2.tar.gz) = 35147b0d755b5a603915fa5017bc021d4a238ab96ee1139dfee8e0f6ba76e64b89d5f331fbd60549682f45ee983d3d8f1cb95c53eed22373a7fa06074ca8da09
+SHA512 (mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz) = 7543774d15da84476d93d04154990923c82209cb3fa125574c0383652c5a310957200f54b63b34502161f9c3afce4907e0060d9036f3eaf3a7cb6b1b3119b546
+SHA512 (xen-4.21.1.tar.xz) = 8dfe65255e202b3dacf9d0d7265636bc1f97627c11b08babc13a5b8e74c7c65e7e2c6a1513e28b3c713fe512edb6702a73b2bf667e2a8f2ce825b196a2cd5aab

xen.drop.brctl.patch

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux.orig	2017-09-15 19:37:27.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux	2018-07-03 20:17:52.934780235 +0100
-@@ -34,4 +34,4 @@
- fi
- 
- ifconfig $1 0.0.0.0 up
--brctl addif $bridge $1 || true
-+ip link set $1 master $bridge || true

xen.efi.build.patch

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
---- xen-4.19.0-rc1/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk.orig	2024-07-01 18:31:39.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.19.0-rc1/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk	2024-07-02 21:10:00.796753718 +0100
-@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@
+--- xen-4.20.0-rc4/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk.orig	2025-02-07 11:56:01.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.20.0-rc4/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk	2025-02-09 22:56:05.579507311 +0000
+@@ -95,7 +95,9 @@
                                           -c $(srctree)/$(efi-check).c -o $(efi-check).o,y)
  
  # Check if the linker supports PE.
--EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10
-+#EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10
+-EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
++#EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
 +# use a reduced set of options from LDFLAGS
-+EFI_LDFLAGS = --as-needed --build-id=sha1 -mi386pep --subsystem=10
++EFI_LDFLAGS = --as-needed --build-id=sha1 -mi386pep --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
  LD_PE_check_cmd = $(call ld-option,$(EFI_LDFLAGS) --image-base=0x100000000 -o $(efi-check).efi $(efi-check).o)
  XEN_BUILD_PE := $(LD_PE_check_cmd)
  

xen.fedora.crypt.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c.orig	2015-07-12 21:55:32.875504811 +0100
-+++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c	2015-07-12 22:03:03.860005391 +0100
-@@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@
-     GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020200 /* 2.2.0 */
- static int vnc_set_gnutls_priority(gnutls_session_t s, int x509)
- {
--    const char *priority = x509 ? "NORMAL" : "NORMAL:+ANON-DH";
-+    const char *priority = x509 ? "@SYSTEM" : "@SYSTEM:+ANON-DH";
-     int rc;
- 
-     rc = gnutls_priority_set_direct(s, priority, NULL);

xen.gcc7.fix.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.8.0/extras/mini-os/Makefile.orig	2016-09-28 12:09:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.8.0/extras/mini-os/Makefile	2017-02-15 21:15:19.340197960 +0000
-@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@
- APP_LDLIBS += -lz
- APP_LDLIBS += -lm
- LDLIBS += -lc
-+ifeq ($(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH),x86_32)
-+LDLIBS += -L$(shell dirname `gcc -m32 -print-libgcc-file-name`) -lgcc
-+endif
- endif
- 
- ifneq ($(APP_OBJS)-$(lwip),-y)

xen.git-90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From 90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 21:55:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/amd: Mitigate AMD-SN-7053 / FP-DSS
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This is XSA-488 / CVE-2025-54505
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 99912d346009fda1e7fb1510c9501fbab17e92a0)
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c               | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+index 8c55d233f3..1bb0766ebf 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+@@ -1048,6 +1048,42 @@ void amd_init_de_cfg(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+     wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val | new);
+ }
+ 
++static void amd_init_fp_cfg(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
++{
++    uint64_t val, new = 0;
++
++    /* If virtualised, we won't have mutable access even if we can read it. */
++    if ( cpu_has_hypervisor )
++        return;
++
++    /*
++     * On Zen1, mitigate SB-7053 / FP-DSS Floating Point Divider State
++     * Sampling by setting bit 9 as instructed.
++     */
++    if ( c->family == 0x17 && is_zen1_uarch() )
++        new |= 1 << 9;
++
++    /*
++     * Avoid reading FP_CFG if we don't intend to change anything.  The
++     * register doesn't exist on all families.
++     */
++    if ( !new )
++        return;
++
++    val = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG);
++
++    if ( (val & new) == new )
++        return;
++
++    /*
++     * FP_CFG is a Core-scoped MSR, and this write is racy.  However, both
++     * threads calculate the new value from state which expected to be
++     * consistent across CPUs and unrelated to the old value, so the result
++     * should be consistent.
++     */
++    wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG, val | new);
++}
++
+ void __init amd_init_lfence_dispatch(void)
+ {
+     struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+@@ -1120,6 +1156,7 @@ static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ 	uint64_t value;
+ 
+ 	amd_init_de_cfg(c);
++	amd_init_fp_cfg(c);
+ 
+ 	if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
+ 		amd_init_lfence_dispatch(); /* Needs amd_init_de_cfg() */
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+index df52587c85..6c5b2569e1 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@
+ #define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG		0xc0011020U
+ #define MSR_AMD64_IC_CFG		0xc0011021U
+ #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG		0xc0011022U
++#define MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG		0xc0011028U
+ #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029U
+ #define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE	(_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
+ #define MSR_AMD64_EX_CFG		0xc001102cU
+-- 
+2.39.5
+

xen.hypervisor.config

@@ -1,32 +1,50 @@
 #
 # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Xen/x86 4.14.0-rc Configuration
+# Xen/x86 4.20 Configuration
 #
 CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
-CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=100101
+CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=150001
 CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION=0
+CONFIG_LD_IS_GNU=y
 CONFIG_CC_HAS_VISIBILITY_ATTRIBUTE=y
+CONFIG_CC_SPLIT_SECTIONS=y
+CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B=y
+CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT=16
 CONFIG_X86_64=y
 CONFIG_X86=y
 CONFIG_ARCH_DEFCONFIG="arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig"
-CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
+CONFIG_CC_HAS_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
 CONFIG_HAS_AS_CET_SS=y
+CONFIG_HAS_CC_CET_IBT=y
 
 #
 # Architecture Features
 #
+CONFIG_AMD=y
+CONFIG_INTEL=y
+CONFIG_64BIT=y
 CONFIG_NR_CPUS=256
+CONFIG_NR_NUMA_NODES=64
 CONFIG_PV=y
 CONFIG_PV32=y
 CONFIG_PV_LINEAR_PT=y
 CONFIG_HVM=y
+CONFIG_AMD_SVM=y
+CONFIG_INTEL_VMX=y
+CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK=y
+CONFIG_XEN_IBT=y
 CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING=y
 # CONFIG_BIGMEM is not set
-CONFIG_TBOOT=y
+CONFIG_HVM_FEP=y
+CONFIG_X86_PSR=y
 CONFIG_XEN_ALIGN_DEFAULT=y
 # CONFIG_XEN_ALIGN_2M is not set
+# CONFIG_X2APIC_PHYSICAL is not set
+CONFIG_X2APIC_MIXED=y
 # CONFIG_XEN_GUEST is not set
 # CONFIG_HYPERV_GUEST is not set
+# CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX is not set
+CONFIG_ALTP2M=y
 # end of Architecture Features
 
 #
@@ -35,42 +53,55 @@ CONFIG_XEN_ALIGN_DEFAULT=y
 CONFIG_COMPAT=y
 CONFIG_CORE_PARKING=y
 CONFIG_GRANT_TABLE=y
+CONFIG_ALTERNATIVE_CALL=y
+CONFIG_ARCH_MAP_DOMAIN_PAGE=y
+CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_FRAME=y
 CONFIG_HAS_ALTERNATIVE=y
+CONFIG_HAS_COMPAT=y
+CONFIG_HAS_DIT=y
 CONFIG_HAS_EX_TABLE=y
 CONFIG_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLY=y
+CONFIG_HAS_IOPORTS=y
+CONFIG_HAS_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ=y
+CONFIG_HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY=y
+CONFIG_HAS_UBSAN=y
+CONFIG_HAS_VMAP=y
 CONFIG_MEM_ACCESS_ALWAYS_ON=y
 CONFIG_MEM_ACCESS=y
-CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING=y
-CONFIG_HAS_PDX=y
-CONFIG_HAS_UBSAN=y
-CONFIG_HAS_KEXEC=y
-CONFIG_HAS_IOPORTS=y
-CONFIG_HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY=y
 CONFIG_NEEDS_LIBELF=y
+CONFIG_NUMA=y
 
 #
 # Speculative hardening
 #
+CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
+CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK=y
 CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_ARRAY=y
 CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_BRANCH=y
+CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS=y
+CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK=y
 # end of Speculative hardening
 
+# CONFIG_DIT_DEFAULT is not set
 CONFIG_HYPFS=y
 CONFIG_HYPFS_CONFIG=y
+CONFIG_IOREQ_SERVER=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC=y
-CONFIG_XENOPROF=y
 # CONFIG_XSM is not set
 CONFIG_SCHED_CREDIT=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_CREDIT2=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_RTDS=y
+CONFIG_SCHED_ARINC653=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_NULL=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_DEFAULT="credit2"
-CONFIG_CRYPTO=y
+# CONFIG_BOOT_TIME_CPUPOOLS is not set
 CONFIG_LIVEPATCH=y
 CONFIG_FAST_SYMBOL_LOOKUP=y
 CONFIG_ENFORCE_UNIQUE_SYMBOLS=y
 CONFIG_CMDLINE=""
 CONFIG_DOM0_MEM=""
+CONFIG_DTB_FILE=""
 CONFIG_TRACEBUFFER=y
 # end of Common Features
 
@@ -79,35 +110,63 @@ CONFIG_TRACEBUFFER=y
 #
 CONFIG_ACPI=y
 CONFIG_ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP=y
-CONFIG_NUMA=y
+CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA=y
 CONFIG_HAS_NS16550=y
 CONFIG_HAS_EHCI=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_TX_BUFSIZE=32768
+# CONFIG_XHCI is not set
 CONFIG_HAS_CPUFREQ=y
 CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH=y
+CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU=y
+CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU=y
+# CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_NONE is not set
+CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_BASIC=y
+# CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_SCRATCH_PAGE is not set
 CONFIG_HAS_PCI=y
+CONFIG_HAS_PCI_MSI=y
 CONFIG_VIDEO=y
 CONFIG_VGA=y
 CONFIG_HAS_VPCI=y
 # end of Device Drivers
 
 # CONFIG_EXPERT is not set
+# CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED is not set
 CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128=y
+CONFIG_ARCH_VCPU_IOREQ_COMPLETION=y
 
 #
 # Debugging Options
 #
 # CONFIG_DEBUG is not set
+CONFIG_GDBSX=y
+CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y
+CONFIG_SELF_TESTS=y
+# CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_PROFILE is not set
+CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKS=y
+# CONFIG_PERF_COUNTERS is not set
+CONFIG_VERBOSE_DEBUG=y
+CONFIG_SCRUB_DEBUG=y
+# CONFIG_UBSAN is not set
+# CONFIG_DEBUG_TRACE is not set
+CONFIG_XMEM_POOL_POISON=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y
 # end of Debugging Options
 
 # ARM64 settings
-CONFIG_64BIT=y
+CONFIG_MMU=y
 CONFIG_ARM_64=y
 CONFIG_ARM=y
+CONFIG_ARM_EFI=y
+CONFIG_GICV2=y
 CONFIG_GICV3=y
+CONFIG_VGICV2=y
 # CONFIG_NEW_VGIC is not set
 CONFIG_SBSA_VUART_CONSOLE=y
+CONFIG_HWDOM_VUART=y
 CONFIG_ARM_SSBD=y
 CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
+CONFIG_STATIC_EVTCHN=y
+CONFIG_PARTIAL_EMULATION=y
 
 #
 # ARM errata workaround via the alternative framework
@@ -115,8 +174,15 @@ CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_824069=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_819472=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_832075=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_834220=y
+CONFIG_ARM_ERRATUM_858921=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1508412=y
+
+# end of ARM errata workaround via the alternative framework
 CONFIG_ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
 CONFIG_ALL_PLAT=y
 # CONFIG_QEMU is not set
@@ -125,17 +191,18 @@ CONFIG_ALL_PLAT=y
 # CONFIG_NO_PLAT is not set
 CONFIG_ALL64_PLAT=y
 CONFIG_MPSOC_PLATFORM=y
+
+#
+# Common Features
+#
 CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE=y
 CONFIG_HAS_CADENCE_UART=y
+CONFIG_HAS_LINFLEX=y
+CONFIG_HAS_IMX_LPUART=y
 CONFIG_HAS_MVEBU=y
 CONFIG_HAS_MESON=y
 CONFIG_HAS_PL011=y
+CONFIG_HAS_OMAP=y
 CONFIG_HAS_SCIF=y
 CONFIG_ARM_SMMU=y
-
-# ARM32 settings
-CONFIG_ALL32_PLAT=y
-CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
-CONFIG_ARM_32=y
-CONFIG_HAS_EXYNOS4210=y
-CONFIG_HAS_OMAP=y
+# CONFIG_IPMMU_VMSA is not set

xen.json.nocpuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+--- xen-4.21.0/tools/libs/light/libxl_nocpuid.c.orig	2025-11-18 18:02:13.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.21.0/tools/libs/light/libxl_nocpuid.c	2025-11-20 09:03:56.517804514 +0000
+@@ -40,11 +40,24 @@
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_LIBJSONC
++#ifndef _hidden
++#define _hidden
++#endif
++_hidden int libxl_cpuid_policy_list_gen_jso(json_object **jso_r,
++                                libxl_cpuid_policy_list *pcpuid)
++{
++    return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(HAVE_LIBYAJL)
+ yajl_gen_status libxl_cpuid_policy_list_gen_json(yajl_gen hand,
+                                 libxl_cpuid_policy_list *pcpuid)
+ {
+     return 0;
+ }
++#endif
+ 
+ int libxl__cpuid_policy_list_parse_json(libxl__gc *gc,
+                                         const libxl__json_object *o,

xen.spec

@@ -6,13 +6,10 @@
 %define build_docs %{?_without_docs: 0} %{?!_without_docs: 1}
 # Build with stubdom unless rpmbuild was run with --without stubdom
 %define build_stubdom %{?_without_stubdom: 0} %{?!_without_stubdom: 1}
-# Only build with qemu-traditional if rpmbuild was run with --with qemutrad
-%define build_qemutrad %{?_with_qemutrad: 1} %{?!_with_qemutrad: 0}
 # build with ovmf from edk2-ovmf unless rpmbuild was run with --without ovmf
 %define build_ovmf %{?_without_ovmf: 0} %{?!_without_ovmf: 1}
-# set to 0 for archs that don't use qemu or ovmf (reduces build dependencies)
-%ifnarch x86_64 %{ix86}
-%define build_qemutrad 0
+# set to 0 for archs that don't use ovmf (reduces build dependencies)
+%ifnarch x86_64
 %define build_ovmf 0
 %endif
 # Build with xen hypervisor unless rpmbuild was run with --without hyp
@@ -39,8 +36,7 @@
 # --without efi
 %define build_efi %{?_without_efi: 0} %{?!_without_efi: 1}
 # xen only supports efi boot images on x86_64 or aarch64
-# i686 builds a x86_64 hypervisor so add that as well
-%ifnarch x86_64 aarch64 %{ix86}
+%ifnarch x86_64 aarch64
 %define build_efi 0
 %endif
 %if "%dist" >= ".fc20"
@@ -50,16 +46,16 @@
 %endif
 
 # Hypervisor ABI
-%define hv_abi  4.19
+%define hv_abi  4.21
 
 Summary: Xen is a virtual machine monitor
 Name:    xen
-Version: 4.19.2
-Release: 4%{?dist}
+Version: 4.21.1
+Release: 10%{?dist}
 # Automatically converted from old format: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+ and BSD - review is highly recommended.
 License: GPL-2.0-or-later AND LicenseRef-Callaway-LGPLv2+ AND LicenseRef-Callaway-BSD
 URL:     http://xen.org/
-Source0: https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/%{version}/xen-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source0: https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/%{version}/xen-%{version}.tar.xz
 Source2: %{name}.logrotate
 # used by stubdoms
 Source10: lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
@@ -70,60 +66,52 @@ Source14: grub-0.97.tar.gz
 Source15: polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz
 # .config file for xen hypervisor
 Source21: xen.hypervisor.config
+# mini-os xen-RELEASE-4.21.0 with .git and .gitignore stripped
+Source22: mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz
 
-Patch4: CVE-2014-0150.patch
-Patch5: xen.fedora.systemd.patch
-Patch6: xen.ocaml.selinux.fix.patch
-Patch7: xen.fedora.crypt.patch
-Patch8: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-6815.patch
-Patch9: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5279.patch
-Patch10: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5278.patch
-Patch11: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7295.patch
-Patch12: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8345.patch
-Patch13: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7512.patch
-Patch14: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8504.patch
-Patch15: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1714.patch
-Patch16: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1981.patch
-Patch17: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2841.patch
-Patch18: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2538.patch
-Patch19: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2857.patch
-Patch20: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4001.patch
-Patch21: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4002.patch
-Patch22: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4439.patch
-Patch23: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4441.patch
-Patch24: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5238.patch
-Patch25: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5338.patch
-Patch27: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-6351.patch
-Patch29: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8669.patch
-Patch30: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8910.patch
-Patch31: qemu.trad.bug1399055.patch
-Patch32: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-9776.patch
-Patch33: xen.gcc7.fix.patch
-Patch34: xen.canonicalize.patch
-Patch35: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-6505.patch
-Patch36: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-7718.patch
-Patch37: droplibvirtconflict.patch
-Patch38: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-8309.patch
-Patch39: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-9330.patch
-Patch40: xen.drop.brctl.patch
-Patch41: xen.gcc9.fixes.patch
-Patch43: xen.gcc11.fixes.patch
-Patch45: xen.gcc12.fixes.patch
-Patch46: xen.efi.build.patch
-Patch49: xen.python3.12.patch
-Patch50: xsa469-4.19-01.patch
-Patch51: xsa469-4.19-02.patch
-Patch52: xsa469-4.19-03.patch
-Patch53: xsa469-4.19-04.patch
-Patch54: xsa469-4.19-05.patch
-Patch55: xsa469-4.19-06.patch
-Patch56: xsa469-4.19-07.patch
+Patch1: xen.fedora.systemd.patch
+Patch2: xen.ocaml.selinux.fix.patch
+Patch3: xen.canonicalize.patch
+Patch4: droplibvirtconflict.patch
+Patch5: xen.gcc9.fixes.patch
+Patch6: xen.gcc11.fixes.patch
+Patch7: xen.gcc12.fixes.patch
+Patch8: xen.efi.build.patch
+Patch9: xen.python3.12.patch
+Patch11: xen.json.nocpuid.patch
+Patch12: xsa483.patch
+Patch13: xsa484.patch
+Patch14: xsa486.patch
+Patch15: xen.git-90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3.patch
+Patch16: xsa490-4.21.patch
+Patch17: xsa491-4.21.patch
+Patch18: xsa492-4.21-01.patch
+Patch19: xsa492-4.21-02.patch
+Patch20: xsa492-4.21-03.patch
+Patch21: xsa492-4.21-04.patch
+Patch22: xsa492-4.21-05.patch
+Patch23: xsa492-4.21-06.patch
+Patch24: xsa492-4.21-07.patch
+Patch25: xsa492-4.21-08.patch
+Patch26: xsa492-4.21-09.patch
+Patch27: xsa492-4.21-10.patch
+Patch28: xsa492-4.21-11.patch
+Patch29: xsa492-4.21-12.patch
+Patch30: xsa492-4.21-13.patch
+Patch31: xsa492-4.21-14.patch
+Patch32: xsa492-4.21-15.patch
+Patch33: xsa492-4.21-16.patch
+Patch34: xsa492-4.21-17.patch
+Patch35: xsa492-4.21-18.patch
+Patch36: xsa492-4.21-19.patch
+Patch37: xsa492-4.21-20.patch
+Patch38: xsa493-4.21-01.patch
+Patch39: xsa493-4.21-02.patch
+Patch40: xsa493-4.21-03.patch
+Patch41: xsa493-4.21-04.patch
+Patch42: xsa494-4.21.patch
 
 
-%if %build_qemutrad
-BuildRequires: libidn-devel zlib-devel SDL-devel curl-devel
-BuildRequires: libX11-devel gtk2-devel libaio-devel
-%endif
 # build using Fedora seabios and ipxe packages for roms
 BuildRequires: seabios-bin ipxe-roms-qemu
 %ifarch %{ix86} x86_64
@@ -145,8 +133,10 @@ BuildRequires: acpica-tools
 BuildRequires: bzip2-devel xz-devel libzstd-devel
 # libfsimage
 BuildRequires: e2fsprogs-devel
-# tools now require yajl and wget
-BuildRequires: yajl-devel wget
+# tools now require wget
+BuildRequires: wget
+# use json-c instead of yajl
+BuildRequires: json-c-devel
 # remus support now needs libnl3
 BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
 %if %with_xsm
@@ -166,7 +156,6 @@ Requires: xen-runtime = %{version}-%{release}
 # installs xen.
 Requires: kpartx
 ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
-#ExclusiveArch: %#{ix86} x86_64 ia64 noarch
 %if %with_ocaml
 BuildRequires: ocaml, ocaml-findlib
 BuildRequires: perl(Data::Dumper)
@@ -177,7 +166,7 @@ Requires(preun): systemd
 BuildRequires: systemd
 %endif
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
-%ifarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifarch aarch64
 BuildRequires: libfdt-devel
 %endif
 %if %build_hyp
@@ -209,11 +198,9 @@ Requires: /usr/bin/qemu-img
 Requires: xen-hypervisor-abi = %{hv_abi}
 # perl is used in /etc/xen/scripts/locking.sh
 Recommends: perl
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 # use /usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 in Fedora instead of qemu-xen
 Recommends: qemu-system-x86-core
-# rom file for qemu-xen-traditional
-Recommends: ipxe-roms-qemu
 %endif
 %if %build_ovmf
 Recommends: edk2-ovmf-xen
@@ -292,16 +279,22 @@ This package contains libraries for developing ocaml tools to
 manage Xen virtual machines.
 %endif
 
+%package test
+Summary: internal xen tests
+%description test
+This package contains files used in testing the xen builds
 
 %prep
 %setup -q
+%patch 1 -p1
+%patch 2 -p1
+%patch 3 -p1
 %patch 4 -p1
 %patch 5 -p1
 %patch 6 -p1
 %patch 7 -p1
 %patch 8 -p1
 %patch 9 -p1
-%patch 10 -p1
 %patch 11 -p1
 %patch 12 -p1
 %patch 13 -p1
@@ -317,45 +310,31 @@ manage Xen virtual machines.
 %patch 23 -p1
 %patch 24 -p1
 %patch 25 -p1
-%patch 33 -p1
-%patch 34 -p1
-%patch 37 -p1
-%patch 40 -p1
-%patch 41 -p1
-%patch 43 -p1
-%patch 45 -p1
-%patch 46 -p1
-%patch 49 -p1
-%patch 50 -p1
-%patch 51 -p1
-%patch 52 -p1
-%patch 53 -p1
-%patch 54 -p1
-%patch 55 -p1
-%patch 56 -p1
-
-# qemu-xen-traditional patches
-pushd tools/qemu-xen-traditional
+%patch 26 -p1
 %patch 27 -p1
+%patch 28 -p1
 %patch 29 -p1
 %patch 30 -p1
 %patch 31 -p1
 %patch 32 -p1
+%patch 33 -p1
+%patch 34 -p1
 %patch 35 -p1
 %patch 36 -p1
+%patch 37 -p1
 %patch 38 -p1
 %patch 39 -p1
-popd
-
-# qemu-xen patches
-pushd tools/qemu-xen
-popd
+%patch 40 -p1
+%patch 41 -p1
+%patch 42 -p1
 
 # stubdom sources
 cp -v %{SOURCE10} %{SOURCE11} %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} %{SOURCE14} %{SOURCE15} stubdom
 # copy xen hypervisor .config file to change settings
 cp -v %{SOURCE21} xen/.config
-
+# mini-os is now separate file
+mkdir extras
+tar -C extras -xf %{SOURCE22}
 
 %build
 # This package calls binutils components directly and would need to pass
@@ -373,20 +352,14 @@ mkdir -p dist/install/boot/efi/efi/fedora
 mkdir -p dist/install%{_libdir}/ocaml/stublibs
 %endif
 export EXTRA_CFLAGS_XEN_TOOLS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Wno-error=use-after-free $LDFLAGS"
-export EXTRA_CFLAGS_QEMU_TRADITIONAL="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
-export EXTRA_CFLAGS_QEMU_XEN="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
 export PYTHON="/usr/bin/python3"
 export LDFLAGS_SAVE=`echo $LDFLAGS | sed -e 's/-Wl,//g' -e 's/,/ /g' -e 's? -specs=[-a-z/0-9]*??g'`
 export CFLAGS_SAVE="$CFLAGS"
-%if %build_qemutrad
-CONFIG_EXTRA="--enable-qemu-traditional"
-%else
 CONFIG_EXTRA=""
-%endif
 %if %build_ovmf
 CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --with-system-ovmf=/usr/share/edk2/xen/OVMF.fd"
 %endif
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifarch aarch64
 CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --with-system-ipxe=/usr/share/ipxe/10ec8139.rom"
 %endif
 %if %(test -f /usr/share/seabios/bios-256k.bin && echo 1|| echo 0)
@@ -400,20 +373,11 @@ CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --enable-systemd"
 ./configure --prefix=%{_prefix} --libdir=%{_libdir} --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir} --with-system-qemu=/usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 --with-linux-backend-modules="xen-evtchn xen-gntdev xen-gntalloc xen-blkback xen-netback xen-pciback xen-scsiback xen-acpi-processor" $CONFIG_EXTRA
 unset CFLAGS CXXFLAGS FFLAGS LDFLAGS
 export LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS_SAVE"
-export CFLAGS="$CFLAGS_SAVE -Wno-error=address"
+export CFLAGS=`echo "$CFLAGS_SAVE -Wno-error=address" | sed -e 's/-specs=\/usr\/lib\/rpm\/redhat/redhat-annobin-cc1//g'`
 
 %if %build_hyp
-%if %build_crosshyp
-export CFLAGS=`echo $CFLAGS | sed -e 's/-m32//g' -e 's/-march=i686//g' 's/-specs=\/usr\/lib\/rpm\/redhat\/redhat-annobin-cc1//g'`
-XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 %make_build prefix=/usr xen CC="/usr/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc"
-%else
-%ifarch armv7hl
-export CFLAGS=`echo $CFLAGS | sed -e 's/-mfloat-abi=hard//g' -e 's/-march=armv7-a//g'`
-%endif
-# armv7hl aarch64 or x86_64
 %make_build prefix=/usr xen
 %endif
-%endif
 unset CFLAGS CXXFLAGS FFLAGS LDFLAGS
 
 %make_build %{?ocaml_flags} prefix=/usr tools
@@ -421,9 +385,6 @@ unset CFLAGS CXXFLAGS FFLAGS LDFLAGS
 make                 prefix=/usr docs
 %endif
 export RPM_OPT_FLAGS_RED=`echo $RPM_OPT_FLAGS | sed -e 's/-m64//g' -e 's/--param=ssp-buffer-size=4//g' -e's/-fstack-protector-strong//'`
-%ifarch %{ix86}
-export EXTRA_CFLAGS_XEN_TOOLS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS_RED"
-%endif
 %if %build_stubdom
 %ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
 make mini-os-dir
@@ -479,18 +440,6 @@ rm -fr %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/doc/xen
 # Pointless helper
 rm -f %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/xen-python-path
 
-# qemu stuff (unused or available from upstream)
-rm -rf %{buildroot}/usr/share/xen/man
-rm -rf %{buildroot}/usr/bin/qemu-*-xen
-ln -s qemu-img %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/qemu-img-xen
-ln -s qemu-img %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/qemu-nbd-xen
-for file in bios.bin openbios-sparc32 openbios-sparc64 ppc_rom.bin \
-         pxe-e1000.bin pxe-ne2k_pci.bin pxe-pcnet.bin pxe-rtl8139.bin \
-         vgabios.bin vgabios-cirrus.bin video.x openbios-ppc bamboo.dtb
-do
-	rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/xen/qemu/$file
-done
-
 # README's not intended for end users
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfdir}/xen/README*
 
@@ -502,20 +451,12 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/*.a
 
 %if %build_efi
 # clean up extra efi files
-%ifarch %{ix86}
-rm -f %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-%{hv_abi}.efi
-rm -f %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-4.efi
-rm -f %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen.efi
-cp -p %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-%{version}{,.notstripped}.efi
-strip -s %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-%{version}.efi
-%else
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-%{hv_abi}.efi
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-4.efi
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen.efi
 cp -p %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-%{version}{,.notstripped}.efi
 strip -s %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-%{version}.efi
 %endif
-%endif
 
 %if ! %build_ocaml
 rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/oxenstored.service
@@ -725,7 +666,7 @@ fi
 %{_libdir}/libxenlight.so.4.*
 %{_libdir}/libxenstat.so.4.*
 %{_libdir}/libxenstore.so.4
-%{_libdir}/libxenstore.so.4.0
+%{_libdir}/libxenstore.so.4.1
 %{_libdir}/libxentoolcore.so.1
 %{_libdir}/libxentoolcore.so.1.0
 %{_libdir}/libxentoollog.so.1
@@ -735,6 +676,8 @@ fi
 %{_libdir}/xenfsimage
 %{_libdir}/libxenhypfs.so.1
 %{_libdir}/libxenhypfs.so.1.0
+%{_libdir}/libxenmanage.so.1
+%{_libdir}/libxenmanage.so.1.0
 
 # All runtime stuff except for XenD/xm python stuff
 %files runtime
@@ -752,7 +695,8 @@ fi
 %{_unitdir}/xen-watchdog.service
 %{_unitdir}/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service
 %{_unitdir}/xendriverdomain.service
-/usr/lib/modules-load.d/xen.conf
+%{_modulesloaddir}/xen.conf
+%{_systemd_util_dir}/system-sleep/xen-watchdog-sleep.sh
 
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/xencommons
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/xen/xl.conf
@@ -766,14 +710,6 @@ fi
 %dir %{_libexecdir}/%{name}
 %dir %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/bin
 %attr(0700,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/bin/*
-# QEMU runtime files
-%if %build_qemutrad
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
-%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/qemu
-%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/qemu/keymaps
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/qemu/keymaps/*
-%endif
-%endif
 
 # man pages
 %if %build_docs
@@ -803,17 +739,12 @@ fi
 %{python3_sitearch}/pygrub-*.egg-info
 
 # The firmware
-%ifarch %{ix86} x86_64
+%ifarch x86_64
 %dir %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/boot
 %{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/hvmloader
-%ifnarch %{ix86}
 %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/boot/xen-shim
 /usr/lib/debug%{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/xen-shim-syms
-%endif
 %if %build_stubdom
-%if %build_qemutrad
-%{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/ioemu-stubdom.gz
-%endif
 %{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz
 %{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/xenstorepvh-stubdom.gz
 %endif
@@ -830,22 +761,21 @@ fi
 %ghost %{_localstatedir}/run/xenstored
 
 # All xenstore CLI tools
-%{_bindir}/qemu-*-xen
 %{_bindir}/xenstore
 %{_bindir}/xenstore-*
 #%#{_bindir}/remus
 # XSM
 %{_bindir}/flask-*
 # Misc stuff
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 %{_bindir}/xen-detect
 %endif
 %{_bindir}/xencov_split
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 %{_bindir}/gdbsx
 %{_bindir}/xen-kdd
 %endif
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 %{_bindir}/xen-hptool
 %{_bindir}/xen-hvmcrash
 %{_bindir}/xen-hvmctx
@@ -862,17 +792,17 @@ fi
 %{_bindir}/xenperf
 %{_bindir}/xenwatchdogd
 %{_bindir}/xl
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 %{_bindir}/xen-lowmemd
 %endif
 %{_bindir}/xencov
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 %{_bindir}/xen-mfndump
 %endif
 %{_bindir}/xenalyze
 %{_bindir}/xentrace
 %{_bindir}/xentrace_setsize
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 %{_bindir}/xen-cpuid
 %endif
 %{_bindir}/xen-livepatch
@@ -894,7 +824,7 @@ fi
 
 %files hypervisor
 %if %build_hyp
-%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%ifnarch aarch64
 /boot/xen-*.gz
 /boot/xen*.config
 %else
@@ -907,12 +837,8 @@ fi
 /usr/lib/debug/xen*
 %endif
 %if %build_efi
-%ifarch %{ix86}
-/usr/lib64/efi/*.efi
-%else
 %{_libdir}/efi/*.efi
 %endif
-%endif
 
 %if %build_docs
 %files doc
@@ -948,9 +874,137 @@ fi
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/xen*/*.a
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/xen*/*.cmxa
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/xen*/*.cmx
+%{_libdir}/ocaml/xsd_glue/*
+%{_libexecdir}/xen/ocaml/xsd_glue/xenctrl_plugin/domain_getinfo_v1.cmxs
 %endif
 
+%files test
+%{_libexecdir}/xen/tests/*
+
 %changelog
+* Wed Jul 22 2026 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-10
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.15.0b4 ABI change
+
+* Fri Jul 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.21.1-9
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jul 09 2026 Jerry James <loganjerry@gmail.com> - 4.21.1-8
+- OCaml 5.5.0 rebuild
+
+* Thu Jun 18 2026 Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-7
+- Rebuilt for openssl 4.0
+
+* Thu Jun 18 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-6
+- x86 HVM I/O port list traversal [XSA-491, CVE-2026-42487]
+- domctl lock open to abuse [XSA-492, CVE-2026-42489, CVE-2026-42490]
+- Arm: Completion of memory accesses not guaranteed by completion of a TLBI
+	 [XSA-493, CVE-2025-10263]
+- x86: mismatched mapcache metadata [XSA-494, CVE-2026-42488]
+
+* Sat Jun 13 2026 Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-5
+- Rebuilt for openssl 4.0
+
+* Wed Jun 03 2026 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-4
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.15
+
+* Tue May 12 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-3
+- x86: CPU Opcode Cache corruption [XSA-490,CVE-2025-54518]
+
+* Tue Apr 28 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-2
+- oxenstored keeps quota related use counts across domain destruction
+	[XSA-483, CVE-2026-23556]
+- Xenstored DoS via XS_RESET_WATCHES command [XSA-484, CVE-2026-23557]
+- grant table v2 race in status page mapping [XSA-486, CVE-2026-23558]
+- x86: Floating Point Divider State Sampling [XSA-488, CVE-2025-54505]
+
+* Thu Mar 26 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-1
+- update to xen 4.21.1
+  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
+
+* Tue Mar 17 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.0-5
+- Use after free of paging structures in EPT [XSA-480, CVE-2026-23554]
+- Xenstored DoS by unprivileged domain [XSA-481, CVE-2026-23555]
+
+* Fri Feb 20 2026 Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> - 4.21.0-4
+- OCaml 5.4.1 rebuild
+
+* Wed Jan 28 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.0-3
+  x86: buffer overrun with shadow paging + tracing [XSA-477, CVE-2025-58150]
+  x86: incomplete IBPB for vCPU isolation [XSA-479, CVE-2026-23553]
+
+* Sat Jan 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.21.0-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_44_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jan 07 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.0-1
+- update to xen 4.21.0
+  rebase mini-os
+  use .xz xen tarball instead of .gz
+  fix quotes around sed command
+  update libxenstore version
+  package libxenmanage and xen-watchdog-sleep.sh files
+  add a new package for test files
+  renumber patches
+  use json-c instead of yajl
+- fix bug in xen code when using json-c
+- fix code issues detected by gcc16
+
+* Thu Nov 13 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.2-2.fc44
+- update to xen 4.20.2
+  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
+
+* Sun Oct 26 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-9
+- teecr32_el1 and teehbr32_el1 support dropped in binutils 2.45.50-5.fc44
+
+* Fri Oct 24 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
+- Incorrect removal of permissions on PCI device unplug [XSA-476,
+	CVE-2025-58149]
+
+* Tue Oct 21 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
+- x86: Incorrect input sanitisation in Viridian hypercalls [XSA-475,
+	CVE-2025-58147, CVE-2025-58148]
+
+* Wed Oct 15 2025 Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> - 4.20.1-7
+- OCaml 5.4.0 rebuild
+
+* Fri Sep 19 2025 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.20.1-6
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.14.0rc3 bytecode
+
+* Wed Sep 10 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-5
+- Mutiple vulnerabilities in the Viridian interface [XSA-472,
+	CVE-2025-27466, CVE-2025-58142, CVE-2025-58143]
+- Arm issues with page refcounting [XSA-473, CVE-2025-58144,
+	CVE-2025-58145]
+
+* Tue Sep 02 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-4
+- tools/xl: don't crash on NULL command line
+
+* Fri Aug 15 2025 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.20.1-3
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.14.0rc2 bytecode
+
+* Fri Jul 25 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.20.1-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sun Jul 13 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-1
+- update to xen 4.20.1
+  remove old qemu code for spac file
+  remove armv7hl and ix86 code from spec file
+  update configuration in xen.hypervisor.config 
+  minios is now a separate file
+  package extra ocaml files
+  unset -specs=/usr/lib/rpm/redhat/redhat-annobin-cc1 for hypervisor build
+  rebase xen.efi.build.patch
+  includes fixes for security vulnerabilites
+  x86: Incorrect stubs exception handling for flags recovery [XSA-470,
+	CVE-2025-27465]
+  x86: Transitive Scheduler Attacks [XSA-471, CVE-2024-36350,
+	CVE-2024-36357]
+
+* Fri Jul 11 2025 Jerry James <loganjerry@gmail.com> - 4.19.2-6
+- Rebuild to fix OCaml dependencies
+
+* Mon Jun 02 2025 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.19.2-5
+- Rebuilt for Python 3.14
+
 * Mon May 12 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.2-4
 - x86: Indirect Target Selection [XSA-469, CVE-2024-28956]
 

xsa469-4.19-01.patch

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/alternative: Support replacements when a feature is not present
-
-Use the top bit of a->cpuid to express inverted polarity.  This requires
-stripping the top bit back out when performing the sanity checks.
-
-Despite only being used once, create a replace boolean to express the decision
-more clearly in _apply_alternatives().
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-index 1ba35cb9ede9..88c90044c20d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ static int init_or_livepatch _apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
-         uint8_t *repl = ALT_REPL_PTR(a);
-         uint8_t buf[MAX_PATCH_LEN];
-         unsigned int total_len = a->orig_len + a->pad_len;
-+        unsigned int feat = a->cpuid & ~ALT_FLAG_NOT;
-+        bool inv = a->cpuid & ALT_FLAG_NOT, replace;
- 
-         if ( a->repl_len > total_len )
-         {
-@@ -214,11 +216,11 @@ static int init_or_livepatch _apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
-             return -ENOSPC;
-         }
- 
--        if ( a->cpuid >= NCAPINTS * 32 )
-+        if ( feat >= NCAPINTS * 32 )
-         {
-              printk(XENLOG_ERR
-                    "Alt for %ps, feature %#x outside of featureset range %#x\n",
--                   ALT_ORIG_PTR(a), a->cpuid, NCAPINTS * 32);
-+                   ALT_ORIG_PTR(a), feat, NCAPINTS * 32);
-             return -ERANGE;
-         }
- 
-@@ -243,8 +245,14 @@ static int init_or_livepatch _apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
-             continue;
-         }
- 
-+        /*
-+         * Should a replacement be performed?  Most replacements have positive
-+         * polarity, but we support negative polarity too.
-+         */
-+        replace = boot_cpu_has(feat) ^ inv;
-+
-         /* If there is no replacement to make, see about optimising the nops. */
--        if ( !boot_cpu_has(a->cpuid) )
-+        if ( !replace )
-         {
-             /* Origin site site already touched?  Don't nop anything. */
-             if ( base->priv )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
-index 69555d781ef9..89b7bdcb82e5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
- #ifndef __X86_ALTERNATIVE_H__
- #define __X86_ALTERNATIVE_H__
- 
-+/*
-+ * Common to both C and ASM.  Express a replacement when a feature is not
-+ * available.
-+ */
-+#define ALT_FLAG_NOT (1 << 15)
-+#define ALT_NOT(x) (ALT_FLAG_NOT | (x))
-+
- #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
- #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
- #else
-@@ -11,7 +18,7 @@
- struct __packed alt_instr {
-     int32_t  orig_offset;   /* original instruction */
-     int32_t  repl_offset;   /* offset to replacement instruction */
--    uint16_t cpuid;         /* cpuid bit set for replacement */
-+    uint16_t cpuid;         /* cpuid bit set for replacement (top bit is polarity) */
-     uint8_t  orig_len;      /* length of original instruction */
-     uint8_t  repl_len;      /* length of new instruction */
-     uint8_t  pad_len;       /* length of build-time padding */
-

xsa469-4.19-02.patch

@@ -1,314 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/guest: Remove use of the Xen hypercall_page
-
-In order to protect against ITS, Xen needs to start using return thunks.
-Therefore the advice in XSA-466 becomes relevant, and the hypercall_page needs
-to be removed.
-
-Implement early_hypercall(), with infrastructure to figure out the correct
-instruction on first use.  Use ALTERNATIVE()s to result in inline hypercalls,
-including the ALT_NOT() form so we only need a single synthetic feature bit.
-
-No overall change.
-
-This is part of XSA-469 / CVE-2024-28956
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/Makefile
-index 26fb4b1007c0..8b3250aa8886 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/Makefile
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--obj-y += hypercall_page.o
-+obj-bin-y += hypercall.init.o
- obj-y += xen.o
- 
- obj-bin-$(CONFIG_PVH_GUEST) += pvh-boot.init.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/hypercall.S b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/hypercall.S
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..05e429794cc4
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/hypercall.S
-@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
-+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
-+
-+#include <xen/linkage.h>
-+
-+        .section .init.text, "ax", @progbits
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Used during early boot, before alternatives have run and inlined
-+         * the appropriate instruction.  Called using the hypercall ABI.
-+         */
-+FUNC(early_hypercall)
-+        cmpb    $0, early_hypercall_insn(%rip)
-+        jl      .L_setup
-+        je      1f
-+
-+        vmmcall
-+        ret
-+
-+1:      vmcall
-+        ret
-+
-+.L_setup:
-+        /*
-+         * When setting up the first time around, all registers need
-+         * preserving.  Save the non-callee-saved ones.
-+         */
-+        push    %r11
-+        push    %r10
-+        push    %r9
-+        push    %r8
-+        push    %rdi
-+        push    %rsi
-+        push    %rdx
-+        push    %rcx
-+        push    %rax
-+
-+        call    early_hypercall_setup
-+
-+        pop     %rax
-+        pop     %rcx
-+        pop     %rdx
-+        pop     %rsi
-+        pop     %rdi
-+        pop     %r8
-+        pop     %r9
-+        pop     %r10
-+        pop     %r11
-+
-+        jmp     early_hypercall
-+END(early_hypercall)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/hypercall_page.S b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/hypercall_page.S
-deleted file mode 100644
-index 7ab55fc1f6e6..000000000000
---- a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/hypercall_page.S
-+++ /dev/null
-@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
--#include <asm/page.h>
--#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
--#include <public/xen.h>
--
--        .section ".text.page_aligned", "ax", @progbits
--
--DATA(hypercall_page, PAGE_SIZE)
--         /* Poisoned with `ret` for safety before hypercalls are set up. */
--        .fill PAGE_SIZE, 1, 0xc3
--END(hypercall_page)
--
--/*
-- * Identify a specific hypercall in the hypercall page
-- * @param name Hypercall name.
-- */
--#define DECLARE_HYPERCALL(name)                                                 \
--        .globl HYPERCALL_ ## name;                                              \
--        .type  HYPERCALL_ ## name, STT_FUNC;                                    \
--        .size  HYPERCALL_ ## name, 32;                                          \
--        .set   HYPERCALL_ ## name, hypercall_page + __HYPERVISOR_ ## name * 32
--
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(set_trap_table)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(mmu_update)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(set_gdt)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(stack_switch)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(set_callbacks)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(fpu_taskswitch)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(sched_op_compat)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(platform_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(set_debugreg)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(get_debugreg)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(update_descriptor)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(memory_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(multicall)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(update_va_mapping)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(set_timer_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(event_channel_op_compat)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(xen_version)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(console_io)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(physdev_op_compat)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(grant_table_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(vm_assist)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(update_va_mapping_otherdomain)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(iret)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(vcpu_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(set_segment_base)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(mmuext_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(xsm_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(nmi_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(sched_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(callback_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(xenoprof_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(event_channel_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(physdev_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(hvm_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(sysctl)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(domctl)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(kexec_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(argo_op)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(xenpmu_op)
--
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_0)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_1)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_2)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_3)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_4)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_5)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_6)
--DECLARE_HYPERCALL(arch_7)
--
--/*
-- * Local variables:
-- * tab-width: 8
-- * indent-tabs-mode: nil
-- * End:
-- */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/xen.c b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/xen.c
-index 7484b3f73ad3..2c30db05dfa7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/xen.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/guest/xen/xen.c
-@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
- bool __read_mostly xen_guest;
- 
- uint32_t __read_mostly xen_cpuid_base;
--extern char hypercall_page[];
- static struct rangeset *mem;
- 
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, vcpu_id);
-@@ -35,6 +34,50 @@ static struct vcpu_info *vcpu_info;
- static unsigned long vcpu_info_mapped[BITS_TO_LONGS(NR_CPUS)];
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu_info *, vcpu_info);
- 
-+/*
-+ * Which instruction to use for early hypercalls:
-+ *   < 0 setup
-+ *     0 vmcall
-+ *   > 0 vmmcall
-+ */
-+int8_t __initdata early_hypercall_insn = -1;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Called once during the first hypercall to figure out which instruction to
-+ * use.  Error handling options are limited.
-+ */
-+void asmlinkage __init early_hypercall_setup(void)
-+{
-+    BUG_ON(early_hypercall_insn != -1);
-+
-+    if ( !boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor )
-+    {
-+        unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
-+
-+        cpuid(0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-+
-+        boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor = x86_cpuid_lookup_vendor(ebx, ecx, edx);
-+    }
-+
-+    switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor )
-+    {
-+    case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
-+    case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR:
-+    case X86_VENDOR_SHANGHAI:
-+        early_hypercall_insn = 0;
-+        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL);
-+        break;
-+
-+    case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
-+    case X86_VENDOR_HYGON:
-+        early_hypercall_insn = 1;
-+        break;
-+
-+    default:
-+        BUG();
-+    }
-+}
-+
- static void __init find_xen_leaves(void)
- {
-     uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx, base;
-@@ -337,9 +380,6 @@ const struct hypervisor_ops *__init xg_probe(void)
-     if ( !xen_cpuid_base )
-         return NULL;
- 
--    /* Fill the hypercall page. */
--    wrmsrl(cpuid_ebx(xen_cpuid_base + 2), __pa(hypercall_page));
--
-     xen_guest = true;
- 
-     return &ops;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
-index ba3df174b76e..9e3ed21c026d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK,         X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks *
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT,           X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_PV,     X86_SYNTH(28)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for PV */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM,    X86_SYNTH(29)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for HVM */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(USE_VMCALL,        X86_SYNTH(30)) /* Use VMCALL instead of VMMCALL */
- 
- /* Bug words follow the synthetic words. */
- #define X86_NR_BUG 1
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest/xen-hcall.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest/xen-hcall.h
-index 665b472d05ac..96004dec9909 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest/xen-hcall.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest/xen-hcall.h
-@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@
-     ({                                                                  \
-         long res, tmp__;                                                \
-         asm volatile (                                                  \
--            "call hypercall_page + %c[offset]"                          \
-+            ALTERNATIVE_2("call early_hypercall",                       \
-+                          "vmmcall", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL),   \
-+                          "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL)             \
-             : "=a" (res), "=D" (tmp__) ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT              \
--            : [offset] "i" (hcall * 32),                                \
-+            : "0" (hcall),                                              \
-               "1" ((long)(a1))                                          \
-             : "memory" );                                               \
-         (type)res;                                                      \
-@@ -42,10 +44,12 @@
-     ({                                                                  \
-         long res, tmp__;                                                \
-         asm volatile (                                                  \
--            "call hypercall_page + %c[offset]"                          \
-+            ALTERNATIVE_2("call early_hypercall",                       \
-+                          "vmmcall", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL),   \
-+                          "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL)             \
-             : "=a" (res), "=D" (tmp__), "=S" (tmp__)                    \
-               ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT                                       \
--            : [offset] "i" (hcall * 32),                                \
-+            : "0" (hcall),                                              \
-               "1" ((long)(a1)), "2" ((long)(a2))                        \
-             : "memory" );                                               \
-         (type)res;                                                      \
-@@ -55,10 +59,12 @@
-     ({                                                                  \
-         long res, tmp__;                                                \
-         asm volatile (                                                  \
--            "call hypercall_page + %c[offset]"                          \
-+            ALTERNATIVE_2("call early_hypercall",                       \
-+                          "vmmcall", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL),   \
-+                          "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL)             \
-             : "=a" (res), "=D" (tmp__), "=S" (tmp__), "=d" (tmp__)      \
-               ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT                                       \
--            : [offset] "i" (hcall * 32),                                \
-+            : "0" (hcall),                                              \
-               "1" ((long)(a1)), "2" ((long)(a2)), "3" ((long)(a3))      \
-             : "memory" );                                               \
-         (type)res;                                                      \
-@@ -69,10 +75,12 @@
-         long res, tmp__;                                                \
-         register long _a4 asm ("r10") = ((long)(a4));                   \
-         asm volatile (                                                  \
--            "call hypercall_page + %c[offset]"                          \
-+            ALTERNATIVE_2("call early_hypercall",                       \
-+                          "vmmcall", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL),   \
-+                          "vmcall", X86_FEATURE_USE_VMCALL)             \
-             : "=a" (res), "=D" (tmp__), "=S" (tmp__), "=d" (tmp__),     \
-               "=&r" (tmp__) ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT                         \
--            : [offset] "i" (hcall * 32),                                \
-+            : "0" (hcall),                                              \
-               "1" ((long)(a1)), "2" ((long)(a2)), "3" ((long)(a3)),     \
-               "4" (_a4)                                                 \
-             : "memory" );                                               \

xsa469-4.19-03.patch

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/thunk: (Mis)align __x86_indirect_thunk_* to mitigate ITS
-
-The Indirect Target Selection speculative vulnerability means that indirect
-branches (including RETs) are unsafe when in the first half of a cacheline.
-
-Arrange for __x86_indirect_thunk_* to always be in the second half.
-
-This is part of XSA-469 / CVE-2024-28956
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S b/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S
-index fd5493c22b16..c4b978d67b8e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S
-@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
- 
- #include <asm/asm_defns.h>
- 
-+/* Alignment is dealt with explicitly here; override the respective macro. */
-+#undef SYM_ALIGN
-+#define SYM_ALIGN(align...)
-+
- .macro IND_THUNK_RETPOLINE reg:req
-         call 1f
-         int3
-@@ -35,6 +39,16 @@
- .macro GEN_INDIRECT_THUNK reg:req
-         .section .text.__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg, "ax", @progbits
- 
-+        /*
-+         * The Indirect Target Selection speculative vulnerability means that
-+         * indirect branches (including RETs) are unsafe when in the first
-+         * half of a cacheline.  Arrange for them to be in the second half.
-+         *
-+         * Align to 64, then skip 32.
-+         */
-+        .balign 64
-+        .fill 32, 1, 0xcc
-+
- FUNC(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
-         ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(IND_THUNK_RETPOLINE \reg),              \
-         __stringify(IND_THUNK_LFENCE \reg), X86_FEATURE_IND_THUNK_LFENCE, \

xsa469-4.19-04.patch

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/thunk: (Mis)align the RETs in clear_bhb_loops() to mitigate ITS
-
-The Indirect Target Selection speculative vulnerability means that indirect
-branches (including RETs) are unsafe when in the first half of a cacheline.
-
-clear_bhb_loops() has a precise layout of branches.  The alignment for
-performance cause the RETs to always be in an unsafe position, and converting
-those to return thunks changes the branching pattern.  While such a conversion
-is believed to be safe, clear_bhb_loops() is also a performance-relevant
-fastpath, so (mis)align the RETs to be in a safe position.
-
-No functional change.
-
-This is part of XSA-469 / CVE-2024-28956
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S b/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
-index 678c00c5d06f..52625f4e2c17 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
-@@ -50,7 +50,12 @@ END(clear_bhb_tsx)
-  *   ret
-  *
-  * The CALL/RETs are necessary to prevent the Loop Stream Detector from
-- * interfering.  The alignment is for performance and not safety.
-+ * interfering.
-+ *
-+ * The .balign's are for performance, but they cause the RETs to be in unsafe
-+ * positions with respect to Indirect Target Selection.  The .skips are to
-+ * move the RETs into ITS-safe positions, rather than using the slowpath
-+ * through __x86_return_thunk.
-  *
-  * The "short" sequence (5 and 5) is for CPUs prior to Alder Lake / Sapphire
-  * Rapids (i.e. Cores prior to Golden Cove and/or Gracemont).
-@@ -66,12 +71,14 @@ FUNC(clear_bhb_loops)
-         jmp     5f
-         int3
- 
--        .align 64
-+        .balign 64
-+        .skip   32 - (.Lr1 - 1f), 0xcc
- 1:      call    2f
--        ret
-+.Lr1:   ret
-         int3
- 
--        .align 64
-+        .balign 64
-+        .skip   32 - 18 /* (.Lr2 - 2f) but Clang IAS doesn't like this */, 0xcc
- 2:      ALTERNATIVE "mov $5, %eax", "mov $7, %eax", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS_LONG
- 
- 3:      jmp     4f
-@@ -83,7 +90,7 @@ FUNC(clear_bhb_loops)
-         sub     $1, %ecx
-         jnz     1b
- 
--        ret
-+.Lr2:   ret
- 5:
-         /*
-          * The Intel sequence has an LFENCE here.  The purpose is to ensure

xsa469-4.19-05.patch

@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/stubs: Introduce place_ret() to abstract away raw 0xc3's
-
-The Indirect Target Selection speculative vulnerability means that indirect
-branches (including RETs) are unsafe when in the first half of a cacheline.
-This means it's not safe for logic using the stubs to write raw 0xc3's.
-
-Introduce place_ret() which, for now, writes a raw 0xc3 but will contain
-additional logic when return thunks are in use.
-
-stub_selftest() doesn't strictly need to be converted as they only run on
-boot, but doing so gets us a partial test of place_ret() too.
-
-No functional change.
-
-This is part of XSA-469 / CVE-2024-28956
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.h b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.h
-index 8f8accfe3e70..946aaa9d660b 100644
---- a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.h
-+++ b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/x86-emulate.h
-@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@
- 
- #define is_canonical_address(x) (((int64_t)(x) >> 47) == ((int64_t)(x) >> 63))
- 
-+static inline void *place_ret(void *ptr)
-+{
-+    *(uint8_t *)ptr = 0xc3;
-+    return ptr + 1;
-+}
-+
- extern uint32_t mxcsr_mask;
- extern struct cpu_policy cp;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-index c1e64278ce85..a7e5a82689de 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PV) += pv/
- obj-y += x86_64/
- obj-y += x86_emulate/
- 
--alternative-y := alternative.init.o
--alternative-$(CONFIG_LIVEPATCH) :=
--obj-bin-y += $(alternative-y)
-+obj-y += alternative.o
- obj-y += apic.o
- obj-y += bhb-thunk.o
- obj-y += bitops.o
-@@ -41,7 +39,7 @@ obj-y += hypercall.o
- obj-y += i387.o
- obj-y += i8259.o
- obj-y += io_apic.o
--obj-$(CONFIG_LIVEPATCH) += alternative.o livepatch.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_LIVEPATCH) += livepatch.o
- obj-y += msi.o
- obj-y += msr.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) += indirect-thunk.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-index 88c90044c20d..ec451d962c10 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-@@ -137,6 +137,20 @@ void init_or_livepatch add_nops(void *insns, unsigned int len)
-     }
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Place a return at @ptr.  @ptr must be in the writable alias of a stub.
-+ *
-+ * Returns the next position to write into the stub.
-+ */
-+void *place_ret(void *ptr)
-+{
-+    uint8_t *p = ptr;
-+
-+    *p++ = 0xc3;
-+
-+    return p;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * text_poke - Update instructions on a live kernel or non-executed code.
-  * @addr: address to modify
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/extable.c b/xen/arch/x86/extable.c
-index 705cf9eb94ca..1572efa69a00 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/extable.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/extable.c
-@@ -151,20 +151,20 @@ search_exception_table(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned long *stub_ra)
- int __init cf_check stub_selftest(void)
- {
-     static const struct {
--        uint8_t opc[8];
-+        uint8_t opc[7];
-         uint64_t rax;
-         union stub_exception_token res;
-     } tests[] __initconst = {
- #define endbr64 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xfa
--        { .opc = { endbr64, 0x0f, 0xb9, 0xc3, 0xc3 }, /* ud1 */
-+        { .opc = { endbr64, 0x0f, 0xb9, 0x90 }, /* ud1 */
-           .res.fields.trapnr = X86_EXC_UD },
--        { .opc = { endbr64, 0x90, 0x02, 0x00, 0xc3 }, /* nop; add (%rax),%al */
-+        { .opc = { endbr64, 0x90, 0x02, 0x00 }, /* nop; add (%rax),%al */
-           .rax = 0x0123456789abcdef,
-           .res.fields.trapnr = X86_EXC_GP },
--        { .opc = { endbr64, 0x02, 0x04, 0x04, 0xc3 }, /* add (%rsp,%rax),%al */
-+        { .opc = { endbr64, 0x02, 0x04, 0x04 }, /* add (%rsp,%rax),%al */
-           .rax = 0xfedcba9876543210UL,
-           .res.fields.trapnr = X86_EXC_SS },
--        { .opc = { endbr64, 0xcc, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0xc3 }, /* int3 */
-+        { .opc = { endbr64, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x90 }, /* int3 */
-           .res.fields.trapnr = X86_EXC_BP },
- #undef endbr64
-     };
-@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ int __init cf_check stub_selftest(void)
- 
-         memset(ptr, 0xcc, STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2);
-         memcpy(ptr, tests[i].opc, ARRAY_SIZE(tests[i].opc));
-+        place_ret(ptr + ARRAY_SIZE(tests[i].opc));
-         unmap_domain_page(ptr);
- 
-         asm volatile ( "INDIRECT_CALL %[stb]\n"
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
-index 89b7bdcb82e5..841a63ebf1b6 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ struct __packed alt_instr {
- #define ALT_REPL_PTR(a)     __ALT_PTR(a, repl_offset)
- 
- extern void add_nops(void *insns, unsigned int len);
-+void *place_ret(void *ptr);
-+
- /* Similar to alternative_instructions except it can be run with IRQs enabled. */
- extern int apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start, struct alt_instr *end);
- extern void alternative_instructions(void);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-index 70150c272276..ff5d1c9f8634 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ static io_emul_stub_t *io_emul_stub_setup(struct priv_op_ctxt *ctxt, u8 opcode,
-         0x41, 0x5c, /* pop %r12  */
-         0x5d,       /* pop %rbp  */
-         0x5b,       /* pop %rbx  */
--        0xc3,       /* ret       */
-     };
- 
-     const struct stubs *this_stubs = &this_cpu(stubs);
-@@ -126,11 +125,13 @@ static io_emul_stub_t *io_emul_stub_setup(struct priv_op_ctxt *ctxt, u8 opcode,
- 
-     APPEND_CALL(save_guest_gprs);
-     APPEND_BUFF(epilogue);
-+    p = place_ret(p);
- 
-     /* Build-time best effort attempt to catch problems. */
-     BUILD_BUG_ON(STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2 <
-                  (sizeof(prologue) + sizeof(epilogue) + 10 /* 2x call */ +
--                  MAX(3 /* default stub */, IOEMUL_QUIRK_STUB_BYTES)));
-+                  MAX(3 /* default stub */, IOEMUL_QUIRK_STUB_BYTES) +
-+                  1 /* ret */));
-     /* Runtime confirmation that we haven't clobbered an adjacent stub. */
-     BUG_ON(STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2 < (p - ctxt->io_emul_stub));
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/fpu.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/fpu.c
-index 480d87965705..03612d00a2ce 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/fpu.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/fpu.c
-@@ -32,36 +32,42 @@ static inline bool fpu_check_write(void)
- 
- #define emulate_fpu_insn_memdst(opc, ext, arg)                          \
- do {                                                                    \
-+    void *_p = get_stub(stub);                                          \
-     /* ModRM: mod=0, reg=ext, rm=0, i.e. a (%rax) operand */            \
-     *insn_bytes = 2;                                                    \
--    memcpy(get_stub(stub),                                              \
--           ((uint8_t[]){ opc, ((ext) & 7) << 3, 0xc3 }), 3);            \
-+    memcpy(_p, ((uint8_t[]){ opc, ((ext) & 7) << 3 }), 2); _p += 2;     \
-+    place_ret(_p);                                                      \
-     invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (arg) : "a" (&(arg)));                     \
-     put_stub(stub);                                                     \
- } while (0)
- 
- #define emulate_fpu_insn_memsrc(opc, ext, arg)                          \
- do {                                                                    \
-+    void *_p = get_stub(stub);                                          \
-     /* ModRM: mod=0, reg=ext, rm=0, i.e. a (%rax) operand */            \
--    memcpy(get_stub(stub),                                              \
--           ((uint8_t[]){ opc, ((ext) & 7) << 3, 0xc3 }), 3);            \
-+    memcpy(_p, ((uint8_t[]){ opc, ((ext) & 7) << 3 }), 2); _p += 2;     \
-+    place_ret(_p);                                                      \
-     invoke_stub("", "", "=m" (dummy) : "m" (arg), "a" (&(arg)));        \
-     put_stub(stub);                                                     \
- } while (0)
- 
- #define emulate_fpu_insn_stub(bytes...)                                 \
- do {                                                                    \
-+    void *_p = get_stub(stub);                                          \
-     unsigned int nr_ = sizeof((uint8_t[]){ bytes });                    \
--    memcpy(get_stub(stub), ((uint8_t[]){ bytes, 0xc3 }), nr_ + 1);      \
-+    memcpy(_p, ((uint8_t[]){ bytes }), nr_); _p += nr_;                 \
-+    place_ret(_p);                                                      \
-     invoke_stub("", "", "=m" (dummy) : "i" (0));                        \
-     put_stub(stub);                                                     \
- } while (0)
- 
- #define emulate_fpu_insn_stub_eflags(bytes...)                          \
- do {                                                                    \
-+    void *_p = get_stub(stub);                                          \
-     unsigned int nr_ = sizeof((uint8_t[]){ bytes });                    \
-     unsigned long tmp_;                                                 \
--    memcpy(get_stub(stub), ((uint8_t[]){ bytes, 0xc3 }), nr_ + 1);      \
-+    memcpy(_p, ((uint8_t[]){ bytes }), nr_); _p += nr_;                 \
-+    place_ret(_p);                                                      \
-     invoke_stub(_PRE_EFLAGS("[eflags]", "[mask]", "[tmp]"),             \
-                 _POST_EFLAGS("[eflags]", "[mask]", "[tmp]"),            \
-                 [eflags] "+g" (regs->eflags), [tmp] "=&r" (tmp_)        \
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index b1d192cbbf1e..f40709682484 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -1396,7 +1396,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         stb[3] = 0x91;
-         stb[4] = evex.opmsk << 3;
-         insn_bytes = 5;
--        stb[5] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&stb[5]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (op_mask) : "a" (&op_mask));
- 
-@@ -3627,7 +3627,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         }
-         opc[1] = (modrm & 0x38) | 0xc0;
-         insn_bytes = EVEX_PFX_BYTES + 2;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_EVEX(opc, evex);
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=g" (dummy) : "a" (src.val));
-@@ -3694,7 +3694,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             insn_bytes = PFX_BYTES + 2;
-             copy_REX_VEX(opc, rex_prefix, vex);
-         }
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         ea.reg = decode_gpr(&_regs, modrm_reg);
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=a" (*ea.reg) : "c" (mmvalp), "m" (*mmvalp));
-@@ -3768,7 +3768,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             insn_bytes = PFX_BYTES + 2;
-             copy_REX_VEX(opc, rex_prefix, vex);
-         }
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         _regs.eflags &= ~EFLAGS_MASK;
-         invoke_stub("",
-@@ -4004,7 +4004,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0xc7;
-         insn_bytes = PFX_BYTES + 2;
-     simd_0f_to_gpr:
--        opc[insn_bytes - PFX_BYTES] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[insn_bytes - PFX_BYTES]);
- 
-         generate_exception_if(ea.type != OP_REG, X86_EXC_UD);
- 
-@@ -4401,7 +4401,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             vex.w = 0;
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0x38;
-         insn_bytes = PFX_BYTES + 2;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_REX_VEX(opc, rex_prefix, vex);
-         invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (src.val) : "a" (&src.val));
-@@ -4438,7 +4438,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             evex.w = 0;
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0x38;
-         insn_bytes = EVEX_PFX_BYTES + 2;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_EVEX(opc, evex);
-         invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (src.val) : "a" (&src.val));
-@@ -4633,7 +4633,7 @@ x86_emulate(
- #endif /* X86EMUL_NO_SIMD */
- 
-     simd_0f_reg_only:
--        opc[insn_bytes - PFX_BYTES] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[insn_bytes - PFX_BYTES]);
- 
-         copy_REX_VEX(opc, rex_prefix, vex);
-         invoke_stub("", "", [dummy_out] "=g" (dummy) : [dummy_in] "i" (0) );
-@@ -4967,7 +4967,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         if ( !mode_64bit() )
-             vex.w = 0;
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0xf8;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_VEX(opc, vex);
-         ea.reg = decode_gpr(&_regs, modrm_rm);
-@@ -5010,7 +5010,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         if ( !mode_64bit() )
-             vex.w = 0;
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0xc7;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_VEX(opc, vex);
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=a" (dst.val) : [dummy] "i" (0));
-@@ -5040,7 +5040,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         opc = init_prefixes(stub);
-         opc[0] = b;
-         opc[1] = modrm;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_VEX(opc, vex);
-         _regs.eflags &= ~EFLAGS_MASK;
-@@ -5608,7 +5608,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         if ( !mode_64bit() )
-             vex.w = 0;
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0xc7;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_REX_VEX(opc, rex_prefix, vex);
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=a" (ea.val) : [dummy] "i" (0));
-@@ -5726,7 +5726,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             opc[1] &= 0x38;
-         }
-         insn_bytes = PFX_BYTES + 2;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
-         if ( vex.opcx == vex_none )
-         {
-             /* Cover for extra prefix byte. */
-@@ -6006,7 +6006,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pvex->b = !mode_64bit() || (vex.reg >> 3);
-         opc[1] = 0xc0 | (~vex.reg & 7);
-         pvex->reg = 0xf;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=a" (ea.val) : [dummy] "i" (0));
-         put_stub(stub);
-@@ -6290,7 +6290,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             evex.w = 0;
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0xf8;
-         insn_bytes = EVEX_PFX_BYTES + 2;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         copy_EVEX(opc, evex);
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=g" (dummy) : "a" (src.val));
-@@ -6389,7 +6389,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pvex->b = 1;
-         opc[1] = (modrm_reg & 7) << 3;
-         pvex->reg = 0xf;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=m" (*mmvalp) : "a" (mmvalp));
- 
-@@ -6459,7 +6459,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pvex->b = 1;
-         opc[1] = (modrm_reg & 7) << 3;
-         pvex->reg = 0xf;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (*mmvalp) : "a" (mmvalp));
- 
-@@ -6515,7 +6515,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pevex->b = 1;
-         opc[1] = (modrm_reg & 7) << 3;
-         pevex->RX = 1;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=m" (*mmvalp) : "a" (mmvalp));
- 
-@@ -6580,7 +6580,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pevex->b = 1;
-         opc[1] = (modrm_reg & 7) << 3;
-         pevex->RX = 1;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (*mmvalp) : "a" (mmvalp));
- 
-@@ -6594,7 +6594,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         opc[2] = 0x90;
-         /* Use (%rax) as source. */
-         opc[3] = evex.opmsk << 3;
--        opc[4] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[4]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (op_mask) : "a" (&op_mask));
-         put_stub(stub);
-@@ -6688,7 +6688,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pevex->b = 1;
-         opc[1] = (modrm_reg & 7) << 3;
-         pevex->RX = 1;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=m" (*mmvalp) : "a" (mmvalp));
- 
-@@ -6766,7 +6766,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         opc[2] = 0x90;
-         /* Use (%rax) as source. */
-         opc[3] = evex.opmsk << 3;
--        opc[4] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[4]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "+m" (op_mask) : "a" (&op_mask));
-         put_stub(stub);
-@@ -6848,7 +6848,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pevex->r = !mode_64bit() || !(state->sib_index & 0x08);
-         pevex->R = !mode_64bit() || !(state->sib_index & 0x10);
-         pevex->RX = 1;
--        opc[2] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[2]);
- 
-         invoke_stub("", "", "=m" (index) : "a" (&index));
-         put_stub(stub);
-@@ -7058,7 +7058,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pvex->reg = 0xf; /* rAX */
-         buf[3] = b;
-         buf[4] = 0x09; /* reg=rCX r/m=(%rCX) */
--        buf[5] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&buf[5]);
- 
-         src.reg = decode_vex_gpr(vex.reg, &_regs, ctxt);
-         emulate_stub([dst] "=&c" (dst.val), "[dst]" (&src.val), "a" (*src.reg));
-@@ -7094,7 +7094,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pvex->reg = 0xf; /* rAX */
-         buf[3] = b;
-         buf[4] = (modrm & 0x38) | 0x01; /* r/m=(%rCX) */
--        buf[5] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&buf[5]);
- 
-         dst.reg = decode_vex_gpr(vex.reg, &_regs, ctxt);
-         emulate_stub("=&a" (dst.val), "c" (&src.val));
-@@ -7335,7 +7335,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             evex.w = vex.w = 0;
-         opc[1] = modrm & 0x38;
-         opc[2] = imm1;
--        opc[3] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[3]);
-         if ( vex.opcx == vex_none )
-         {
-             /* Cover for extra prefix byte. */
-@@ -7502,7 +7502,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             insn_bytes = PFX_BYTES + 3;
-             copy_VEX(opc, vex);
-         }
--        opc[3] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[3]);
- 
-         /* Latch MXCSR - we may need to restore it below. */
-         invoke_stub("stmxcsr %[mxcsr]", "",
-@@ -7748,7 +7748,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         }
-         opc[2] = imm1;
-         insn_bytes = PFX_BYTES + 3;
--        opc[3] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&opc[3]);
-         if ( vex.opcx == vex_none )
-         {
-             /* Cover for extra prefix byte. */
-@@ -8094,7 +8094,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         pxop->reg = 0xf; /* rAX */
-         buf[3] = b;
-         buf[4] = (modrm & 0x38) | 0x01; /* r/m=(%rCX) */
--        buf[5] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&buf[5]);
- 
-         dst.reg = decode_vex_gpr(vex.reg, &_regs, ctxt);
-         emulate_stub([dst] "=&a" (dst.val), "c" (&src.val));
-@@ -8203,7 +8203,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-         buf[3] = b;
-         buf[4] = 0x09; /* reg=rCX r/m=(%rCX) */
-         *(uint32_t *)(buf + 5) = imm1;
--        buf[9] = 0xc3;
-+        place_ret(&buf[9]);
- 
-         emulate_stub([dst] "=&c" (dst.val), "[dst]" (&src.val));
- 
-@@ -8293,12 +8293,12 @@ x86_emulate(
-             BUG();
-         if ( evex_encoded() )
-         {
--            opc[insn_bytes - EVEX_PFX_BYTES] = 0xc3;
-+            place_ret(&opc[insn_bytes - EVEX_PFX_BYTES]);
-             copy_EVEX(opc, evex);
-         }
-         else
-         {
--            opc[insn_bytes - PFX_BYTES] = 0xc3;
-+            place_ret(&opc[insn_bytes - PFX_BYTES]);
-             copy_REX_VEX(opc, rex_prefix, vex);
-         }
- 

xsa469-4.19-06.patch

@@ -1,375 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/thunk: Build Xen with Return Thunks
-
-The Indirect Target Selection speculative vulnerability means that indirect
-branches (including RETs) are unsafe when in the first half of a cacheline.
-
-In order to mitigate this, build with return thunks and arrange for
-__x86_return_thunk to be (mis)aligned in the same manner as
-__x86_indirect_thunk_* so the RET instruction is placed in a safe location.
-
-place_ret() needs to conditionally emit JMP __x86_return_thunk instead of RET.
-
-This is part of XSA-469 / CVE-2024-28956
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
-index 7e03e4bc5546..4542ea8408c7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
-@@ -37,9 +37,14 @@ config ARCH_DEFCONFIG
- 	default "arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig"
- 
- config CC_HAS_INDIRECT_THUNK
-+	# GCC >= 8 or Clang >= 6
- 	def_bool $(cc-option,-mindirect-branch-register) || \
- 	         $(cc-option,-mretpoline-external-thunk)
- 
-+config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
-+	# GCC >= 8 or Clang >= 15
-+	def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern)
-+
- config HAS_AS_CET_SS
- 	# binutils >= 2.29 or LLVM >= 6
- 	def_bool $(as-instr,wrssq %rax$(comma)0;setssbsy)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-index a7e5a82689de..27806a81aca8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_LIVEPATCH) += livepatch.o
- obj-y += msi.o
- obj-y += msr.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) += indirect-thunk.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK) += indirect-thunk.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_PV) += ioport_emulate.o
- obj-y += irq.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += machine_kexec.o
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
-index 66f799339913..97bd676aaee2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
-@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
-         pop     %r12
-         pop     %rbx
-         pop     %rbp
--        ret
-+        RET
- 
- .data
-         .align 16
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-index ec451d962c10..1b71ae959abe 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/alternative.c
-@@ -137,16 +137,45 @@ void init_or_livepatch add_nops(void *insns, unsigned int len)
-     }
- }
- 
-+void nocall __x86_return_thunk(void);
-+
- /*
-  * Place a return at @ptr.  @ptr must be in the writable alias of a stub.
-  *
-+ * When CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK is active, this may be a JMP __x86_return_thunk
-+ * instead, depending on the safety of @ptr with respect to Indirect Target
-+ * Selection.
-+ *
-  * Returns the next position to write into the stub.
-  */
- void *place_ret(void *ptr)
- {
-+    unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
-     uint8_t *p = ptr;
- 
--    *p++ = 0xc3;
-+    /*
-+     * When Return Thunks are used, if a RET would be unsafe at this location
-+     * with respect to Indirect Target Selection (i.e. if addr is in the first
-+     * half of a cacheline), insert a JMP __x86_return_thunk instead.
-+     *
-+     * The displacement needs to be relative to the executable alias of the
-+     * stub, not to @ptr which is the writeable alias.
-+     */
-+    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK) && !(addr & 0x20) )
-+    {
-+        long stub_va = (this_cpu(stubs.addr) & PAGE_MASK) + (addr & ~PAGE_MASK);
-+        long disp = (long)__x86_return_thunk - (stub_va + 5);
-+
-+        BUG_ON((int32_t)disp != disp);
-+
-+        *p++ = 0xe9;
-+        *(int32_t *)p = disp;
-+        p += 4;
-+    }
-+    else
-+    {
-+        *p++ = 0xc3;
-+    }
- 
-     return p;
- }
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk b/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-index b88d097a844b..85d3e7cbfeeb 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC) += -fno-jump-tables
- CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG) += -mretpoline-external-thunk
- endif
- 
-+# Compile with return thunk support if selected.
-+CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK) += -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
-+
- # Disable the addition of a .note.gnu.property section to object files when
- # livepatch support is enabled.  The contents of that section can change
- # depending on the instructions used, and livepatch-build-tools doesn't know
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S b/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
-index 52625f4e2c17..7f92201a3cbb 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
-@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ FUNC(clear_bhb_tsx)
- 0:      .byte 0xc6, 0xf8, 0             /* xabort $0 */
-         int3
- 1:
--        ret
-+        RET
- END(clear_bhb_tsx)
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/clear_page.S b/xen/arch/x86/clear_page.S
-index d6c076f1d8bc..dc3c3c26bfb7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/clear_page.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/clear_page.S
-@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
-         .file __FILE__
- 
- #include <xen/linkage.h>
-+
-+#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
- #include <asm/page.h>
- 
- FUNC(clear_page_sse2)
-@@ -16,5 +18,5 @@ FUNC(clear_page_sse2)
-         jnz     0b
- 
-         sfence
--        ret
-+        RET
- END(clear_page_sse2)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/copy_page.S b/xen/arch/x86/copy_page.S
-index c3c436545bac..e43e5370c815 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/copy_page.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/copy_page.S
-@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
-         .file __FILE__
- 
- #include <xen/linkage.h>
-+
-+#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
- #include <asm/page.h>
- 
- #define src_reg %rsi
-@@ -41,5 +43,5 @@ FUNC(copy_page_sse2)
-         movnti  tmp4_reg, 3*WORD_SIZE(dst_reg)
- 
-         sfence
--        ret
-+        RET
- END(copy_page_sse2)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/check.c b/xen/arch/x86/efi/check.c
-index 9e473faad3c9..23ba30abf330 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/check.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/check.c
-@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ int __attribute__((__ms_abi__)) test(int i)
-     return i;
- }
- 
-+/* In case -mfunction-return is in use. */
-+void __x86_return_thunk(void) {};
-+
- /*
-  * Populate an array with "addresses" of relocatable and absolute values.
-  * This is to probe ld for (a) emitting base relocations at all and (b) not
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-defns.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-defns.h
-index 32d6b4491063..97ebe21298a2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-defns.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-defns.h
-@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@
-     .endif
- .endm
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK
-+# define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
-+#else
-+# define RET ret
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IBT
- # define ENDBR64 endbr64
- #else
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S b/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S
-index c4b978d67b8e..26dad15f12c9 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S
-@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
- #undef SYM_ALIGN
- #define SYM_ALIGN(align...)
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK
-+
- .macro IND_THUNK_RETPOLINE reg:req
-         call 1f
-         int3
-@@ -62,3 +64,25 @@ END(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
- .irp reg, ax, cx, dx, bx, bp, si, di, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
-         GEN_INDIRECT_THUNK reg=r\reg
- .endr
-+
-+#endif /* CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK */
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK
-+        .section .text.entry.__x86_return_thunk, "ax", @progbits
-+
-+        /*
-+         * The Indirect Target Selection speculative vulnerability means that
-+         * indirect branches (including RETs) are unsafe when in the first
-+         * half of a cacheline.  Arrange for them to be in the second half.
-+         *
-+         * Align to 64, then skip 32.
-+         */
-+        .balign 64
-+        .fill 32, 1, 0xcc
-+
-+FUNC(__x86_return_thunk)
-+        ret
-+        int3 /* Halt straight-line speculation */
-+END(__x86_return_thunk)
-+
-+#endif /* CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-index ff5d1c9f8634..295d847ea24c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
-@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static io_emul_stub_t *io_emul_stub_setup(struct priv_op_ctxt *ctxt, u8 opcode,
-     BUILD_BUG_ON(STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2 <
-                  (sizeof(prologue) + sizeof(epilogue) + 10 /* 2x call */ +
-                   MAX(3 /* default stub */, IOEMUL_QUIRK_STUB_BYTES) +
--                  1 /* ret */));
-+                  (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK) ? 5 : 1) /* ret */));
-     /* Runtime confirmation that we haven't clobbered an adjacent stub. */
-     BUG_ON(STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2 < (p - ctxt->io_emul_stub));
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/gpr_switch.S b/xen/arch/x86/pv/gpr_switch.S
-index 5409ad3b1447..362b5d241623 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/gpr_switch.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/gpr_switch.S
-@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ FUNC(load_guest_gprs)
-         movq  UREGS_r15(%rdi), %r15
-         movq  UREGS_rcx(%rdi), %rcx
-         movq  UREGS_rdi(%rdi), %rdi
--        ret
-+        RET
- END(load_guest_gprs)
- 
- /* Save guest GPRs.  Parameter on the stack above the return address. */
-@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ FUNC(save_guest_gprs)
-         movq  %rbx, UREGS_rbx(%rdi)
-         movq  %rdx, UREGS_rdx(%rdi)
-         movq  %rcx, UREGS_rcx(%rdi)
--        ret
-+        RET
- END(save_guest_gprs)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 35351044f901..019a0a81f4a7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -569,6 +569,9 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
- #ifdef CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK
-                " INDIRECT_THUNK"
- #endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK
-+               " RETURN_THUNK"
-+#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING
-                " SHADOW_PAGING"
- #endif
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-index a99646c0cd4e..18f46c78cfbe 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ FUNC(cr4_pv32_restore)
-         or    cr4_pv32_mask(%rip), %rax
-         mov   %rax, %cr4
-         mov   %rax, (%rcx)
--        ret
-+        RET
- 0:
- #ifndef NDEBUG
-         /* Check that _all_ of the bits intended to be set actually are. */
-@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ FUNC(cr4_pv32_restore)
- 1:
- #endif
-         xor   %eax, %eax
--        ret
-+        RET
- END(cr4_pv32_restore)
- 
- FUNC(compat_syscall)
-@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(compat_bounce_null_selector)
-         xor   %eax, %eax
-         mov   %ax,  TRAPBOUNCE_cs(%rdx)
-         mov   %al,  TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
--        ret
-+        RET
- 
- .section .fixup,"ax"
- .Lfx13:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index 9b0cdb76408b..eb62e7c329bd 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(create_bounce_frame_bad_bounce_ip)
-         xor   %eax, %eax
-         mov   %rax, TRAPBOUNCE_eip(%rdx)
-         mov   %al,  TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx)
--        ret
-+        RET
- 
-         .pushsection .fixup, "ax", @progbits
-         # Numeric tags below represent the intended overall %rsi adjustment.
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-index 9a1dfe1b340a..506993867502 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ SECTIONS
-        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
-        _stextentry = .;
-        *(.text.entry)
-+       *(.text.entry.*)
-        . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
-        _etextentry = .;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/common/Kconfig b/xen/common/Kconfig
-index 565ceda741b9..da0fa7527643 100644
---- a/xen/common/Kconfig
-+++ b/xen/common/Kconfig
-@@ -130,6 +130,17 @@ config INDIRECT_THUNK
- 	  When enabled, indirect branches are implemented using a new construct
- 	  called "retpoline" that prevents speculation.
- 
-+config RETURN_THUNK
-+	bool "Out-of-line Returns"
-+	depends on CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
-+	default INDIRECT_THUNK
-+	help
-+	  Compile Xen with out-of-line returns.
-+
-+	  This allows Xen to mitigate a variety of speculative vulnerabilities
-+	  by choosing a hardware-dependent instruction sequence to implement
-+	  function returns safely.
-+
- config SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_ARRAY
- 	bool "Speculative Array Hardening"
- 	default y

xsa469-4.19-07.patch

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Synthesise ITS_NO to guests on unaffected hardware
-
-It is easier to express feature word 17 in terms of word 16 + [32, 64) as
-that's how the layout is given in documentation.
-
-This is part of XSA-469 / CVE-2024-28956
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
-index 9bc553681f4a..1729ba0c3097 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
-@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ static inline bool boot_cpu_has(unsigned int feat)
- #define cpu_has_gds_no          boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GDS_NO)
- #define cpu_has_rfds_no         boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RFDS_NO)
- #define cpu_has_rfds_clear      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RFDS_CLEAR)
-+#define cpu_has_its_no          boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ITS_NO)
- 
- /* Synthesized. */
- #define cpu_has_arch_perfmon    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 019a0a81f4a7..94cdbd521c4d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -1781,6 +1781,90 @@ static void __init bhi_calculations(void)
-     }
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/indirect-target-selection.html
-+ */
-+static void __init its_calculations(void)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * Indirect Target Selection is a Branch Prediction bug whereby certain
-+     * indirect branches (including RETs) get predicted using a direct branch
-+     * target, rather than a suitable indirect target, bypassing hardware
-+     * isolation protections.
-+     *
-+     * ITS affects Core (but not Atom) processors starting from the
-+     * introduction of eIBRS, up to but not including Golden Cove cores
-+     * (checked here with BHI_CTRL).
-+     *
-+     * The ITS_NO feature is not expected to be enumerated by hardware, and is
-+     * only for VMMs to synthesise for guests.
-+     *
-+     * ITS comes in 3 flavours:
-+     *
-+     *   1) Across-IBPB.  Indirect branches after the IBPB can be controlled
-+     *      by direct targets which existed prior to the IBPB.  This is
-+     *      addressed in the IPU 2025.1 microcode drop, and has no other
-+     *      software interaction.
-+     *
-+     *   2) Guest/Host.  Indirect branches in the VMM can be controlled by
-+     *      direct targets from the guest.  This applies equally to PV guests
-+     *      (Ring3) and HVM guests (VMX), and applies to all Skylake-uarch
-+     *      cores with eIBRS.
-+     *
-+     *   3) Intra-mode.  Indirect branches in the VMM can be controlled by
-+     *      other execution in the same mode.
-+     */
-+
-+    /*
-+     * If we can see ITS_NO, or we're virtualised, do nothing.  We are or may
-+     * migrate somewhere unsafe.
-+     */
-+    if ( cpu_has_its_no || cpu_has_hypervisor )
-+        return;
-+
-+    /* ITS is only known to affect Intel processors at this time. */
-+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL )
-+        return;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * ITS does not exist on:
-+     *  - non-Family 6 CPUs
-+     *  - those without eIBRS
-+     *  - those with BHI_CTRL
-+     * but we still need to synthesise ITS_NO.
-+     */
-+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 || !cpu_has_eibrs ||
-+         boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL) )
-+        goto synthesise;
-+
-+    switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
-+    {
-+        /* These Skylake-uarch cores suffer cases #2 and #3. */
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L:
-+        return;
-+
-+        /* These Sunny/Willow/Cypress Cove cores suffer case #3. */
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE:
-+    case INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE:
-+        return;
-+
-+    default:
-+        break;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Platforms remaining are not believed to be vulnerable to ITS. */
-+ synthesise:
-+    setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ITS_NO);
-+}
-+
- void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d)
- {
-     bool pv = is_pv_domain(d);
-@@ -2331,6 +2415,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
- 
-     bhi_calculations();
- 
-+    its_calculations();
-+
-     print_details(thunk);
- 
-     /*
-diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-index 9c98e4992861..4d9e468af653 100644
---- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-@@ -365,7 +365,8 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(GDS_NO,             16*32+26) /*A  No Gather Data Sampling */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(RFDS_NO,            16*32+27) /*A  No Register File Data Sampling */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(RFDS_CLEAR,         16*32+28) /*!A| Register File(s) cleared by VERW */
- 
--/* Intel-defined CPU features, MSR_ARCH_CAPS 0x10a.edx, word 17 */
-+/* Intel-defined CPU features, MSR_ARCH_CAPS 0x10a.edx, word 17 (express in terms of word 16) */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(ITS_NO,             16*32+62) /*!A No Indirect Target Selection */
- 
- #endif /* XEN_CPUFEATURE */
- 
-diff --git a/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py b/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py
-index 601eec608983..dc33ca3181b1 100755
---- a/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py
-+++ b/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py
-@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ def parse_definitions(state):
-         r"\s+/\*([\w!|]*) .*$")
- 
-     word_regex = re.compile(
--        r"^/\* .* word (\d*) \*/$")
-+        r"^/\* .* word (\d*) .*\*/$")
-     last_word = -1
- 
-     this = sys.modules[__name__]

xsa483.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
+Subject: tools/oxenstored: Reset quota when resetting permissions
+
+The quota object contains both limits and the current node usage counts.
+
+When a domain is torn down, the node data itself is cleaned up but the node
+usage counts are not.  A later domain reusing the same domid can create fewer
+nodes before being deemed to be over quota.
+
+Reset the count when the node permissions are cleaned up.
+
+This is XSA-483 / CVE-2026-23556.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
+index 9b8dd2812df0..aa9204ead3ec 100644
+--- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
++++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
+@@ -465,7 +465,8 @@ let reset_permissions store domid =
+         if perms <> node.perms then
+           Logging.debug "store|node" "Changed permissions for node %s" (Node.get_name node);
+         Some { node with Node.perms }
+-    ) store.root
++    ) store.root;
++  store.quota <- Quota.del store.quota domid
+ 
+ type ops = {
+   store: t;

xsa484.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From 3d0d19ad17f29c64dde4a7baf392da4fd58f3654 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 15:06:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tools/xenstored: make conn_delete_all_transactions()
+ idempotent
+
+conn_delete_all_transactions() should be callable in any context,
+resetting ALL transaction related data.
+
+This includes number of active transactions and the transaction
+pointer in struct connection.
+
+So reset conn->trans to NULL in conn_delete_all_transactions() and
+do the cleanup for each transaction in destroy_transaction().
+
+This avoids triggering the assert() in conn_delete_all_transactions()
+in case e.g. ignore_connection() was called while an operation inside
+a transaction was performed, or XS_RESET_WATCHES was called in a
+transaction.
+
+This is XSA-484 / CVE-2026-23557.
+
+Reported-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
+Fixes: 1f9d04fb021c ("xenstored: allow guest to shutdown all its watches/transactions")
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+---
+ tools/xenstored/transaction.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/xenstored/transaction.c b/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
+index 167cd597fd..0825c48859 100644
+--- a/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
++++ b/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
+@@ -432,17 +432,23 @@ static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
+ static int destroy_transaction(void *_transaction)
+ {
+ 	struct transaction *trans = _transaction;
++	struct connection *conn = trans->conn;
+ 	struct accessed_node *i;
+ 
+ 	wrl_ntransactions--;
+ 	trace_destroy(trans, "transaction");
+ 	while ((i = list_top(&trans->accessed, struct accessed_node, list))) {
+ 		if (i->ta_node)
+-			db_delete(trans->conn, i->trans_name, NULL);
++			db_delete(conn, i->trans_name, NULL);
+ 		list_del(&i->list);
+ 		talloc_free(i);
+ 	}
+ 
++	list_del(&trans->list);
++	domain_transaction_dec(conn);
++	if (list_empty(&conn->transaction_list))
++		conn->ta_start_time = 0;
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -523,10 +529,6 @@ int do_transaction_end(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
+ 		return ENOENT;
+ 
+ 	conn->transaction = NULL;
+-	list_del(&trans->list);
+-	domain_transaction_dec(conn);
+-	if (list_empty(&conn->transaction_list))
+-		conn->ta_start_time = 0;
+ 
+ 	chk_quota = trans->node_created && domain_is_unprivileged(conn);
+ 
+@@ -572,14 +574,10 @@ void conn_delete_all_transactions(struct connection *conn)
+ 	struct transaction *trans;
+ 
+ 	while ((trans = list_top(&conn->transaction_list,
+-				 struct transaction, list))) {
+-		list_del(&trans->list);
++				 struct transaction, list)))
+ 		talloc_free(trans);
+-	}
+-
+-	assert(conn->transaction == NULL);
+ 
+-	conn->ta_start_time = 0;
++	conn->transaction = NULL;
+ }
+ 
+ int check_transactions(struct hashtable *hash)
+-- 
+2.53.0
+

xsa486.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: gnttab: split gnttab_map_frame()
+
+If a domain tries to map status frames in parallel to switching grant
+table version from 2 to 1, the mapping operation may put in place P2M
+entries referencing MFNs which gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is in the
+process of freeing.
+
+Ideally we would refcount pages when entered into P2M tables, but that's a
+significant change. Extend the grant-table-locked region instead in
+xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() (being the sole caller of gnttab_map_frame()),
+such that a race with gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is no longer
+possible.
+
+This is XSA-486 / CVE-2026-23558.
+
+Fixes: 5ce8fafa947c ("Dynamic grant-table sizing")
+Fixes: a98dc13703e0 ("Introduce a grant_entry_v2 structure")
+Reported-by: Rafal Wojtczuk <rafal.wojtczuk@7bulls.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
+@@ -174,12 +174,10 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+     switch ( space )
+     {
+     case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
+-        rc = gnttab_map_frame(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
++        rc = gnttab_map_frame_begin(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        /* Need to take care of the reference obtained in gnttab_map_frame(). */
+-        page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+         t = p2m_ram_rw;
+ 
+         break;
+@@ -281,10 +279,23 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+      * to drop the reference we took earlier. In all other cases we need to
+      * drop any reference we took earlier (perhaps indirectly).
+      */
+-    if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign ? rc : page != NULL )
++    switch ( space )
+     {
++    default:
++        if ( page )
++            put_page(page);
++        break;
++
++    case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
++        gnttab_map_frame_end(d, mfn);
++        break;
++
++    case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign:
++        if ( !rc )
++            break;
+         ASSERT(page != NULL);
+         put_page(page);
++        break;
+     }
+ 
+     return rc;
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+@@ -2009,11 +2009,9 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+         break;
+ 
+     case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
+-        rc = gnttab_map_frame(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
++        rc = gnttab_map_frame_begin(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+-        /* Need to take care of the reference obtained in gnttab_map_frame(). */
+-        page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
+         break;
+ 
+     case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn:
+@@ -2095,19 +2093,28 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
+     put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gfn));
+ 
+  put_both:
+-    /*
+-     * In the XENMAPSPACE_gmfn case, we took a ref of the gfn at the top.
+-     * We also may need to transfer ownership of the page reference to our
+-     * caller.
+-     */
+-    if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn )
++    switch ( space )
+     {
++    case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn:
++        /*
++         * We took a ref of the gfn at the top.  We also may need to transfer
++         * ownership of the page reference to our caller.
++         */
+         put_gfn(d, gmfn);
+         if ( !rc && extra.ppage )
+         {
+             *extra.ppage = page;
+             page = NULL;
+         }
++        break;
++
++    case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
++        /*
++         * We (gnttab_map_frame_begin()) acquired a lock and took a ref of the
++         * page underlying the MFN at the top.
++         */
++        gnttab_map_frame_end(d, mfn);
++        break;
+     }
+ 
+     if ( page )
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -4250,7 +4250,8 @@ int gnttab_acquire_resource(
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
++int gnttab_map_frame_begin(
++    struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
+ {
+     int rc = 0;
+     struct grant_table *gt = d->grant_table;
+@@ -4288,11 +4289,19 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
+             put_page(pg);
+     }
+ 
+-    grant_write_unlock(gt);
++    if ( rc )
++        grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
+ 
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
++void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn)
++{
++    put_page(mfn_to_page(mfn));
++
++    grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
++}
++
+ static void gnttab_usage_print(struct domain *rd)
+ {
+     int first = 1;
+--- a/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
+@@ -60,8 +60,13 @@ int gnttab_release_mappings(struct domai
+ int mem_sharing_gref_to_gfn(struct grant_table *gt, grant_ref_t ref,
+                             gfn_t *gfn, uint16_t *status);
+ 
+-int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn,
+-                     mfn_t *mfn);
++/*
++ * These need to be used as a pair, as the first (in the success case) returns
++ * with a lock and page reference held which the second needs to drop.
++ */
++int gnttab_map_frame_begin(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn,
++                           mfn_t *mfn);
++void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn);
+ 
+ unsigned int gnttab_resource_max_frames(const struct domain *d, unsigned int id);
+ 
+@@ -100,12 +105,14 @@ static inline int mem_sharing_gref_to_gf
+     return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx,
+-                                   gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
++static inline int gnttab_map_frame_begin(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx,
++                                         gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
+ {
+     return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ 
++static inline void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn) {}
++
+ static inline unsigned int gnttab_resource_max_frames(
+     const struct domain *d, unsigned int id)
+ {

xsa490-4.21.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Subject: x86/amd: Mitigate AMD-SN-7052
+
+This is XSA-490 / CVE-2025-54518.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+index 1bb0766ebf13..b5bf2b732e8f 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+@@ -1116,11 +1116,25 @@ static void amd_check_bp_cfg(void)
+ {
+ 	uint64_t val, new = 0;
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * AMD Erratum #1485.  Set bit 5, as instructed.
+-	 */
+-	if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && is_zen4_uarch())
+-		new |= (1 << 5);
++	if (!cpu_has_hypervisor) {
++		/*
++		 * AMD Erratum #1485.  If SMT is enabled and STIBP disabled,
++		 * the CPU may fetch incorrect instruction bytes.
++		 *
++		 * Set bit 5, as instructed.
++		 */
++		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && is_zen4_uarch())
++			new |= (1 << 5);
++
++		/*
++		 * AMD SB-7052.  CPU OP Cache corruption, causing instructions
++		 * to be executed at a higher privilege.
++		 *
++		 * Set bit 33, as instructed.
++		 */
++		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x17 && is_zen2_uarch())
++			new |= (1UL << 33);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On hardware supporting SRSO_MSR_FIX, activate BP_SPEC_REDUCE by

xsa491-4.21.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/HVM: add locking to I/O port translation list traversal
+
+XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping is usable by DM stubdoms, and hence we can't
+assume the list to be left unaltered while the guest (really: the
+hypervisor on behalf of the guest) is accessing it.
+
+This is XSA-491 / CVE-2026-42487.
+
+Fixes: 192c4dabc344 ("domctl and p2m changes for PCI passthru")
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                    "ioport_map:add: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
+                    d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
+ 
++            write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+             list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
+                 if (g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
+                 {
+@@ -684,11 +685,14 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                 g2m_ioport->np = np;
+                 list_add_tail(&g2m_ioport->list, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list);
+             }
++            write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+             if ( !ret )
+                 ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+             if ( ret && !found && g2m_ioport )
+             {
++                write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+                 list_del(&g2m_ioport->list);
++                write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+                 xfree(g2m_ioport);
+             }
+         }
+@@ -697,6 +701,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
+                    "ioport_map:remove: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
+                    d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
++
++            write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+             list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
+                 if ( g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
+                 {
+@@ -704,6 +710,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                     xfree(g2m_ioport);
+                     break;
+                 }
++            write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
+             ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+             if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(currd) )
+                 printk(XENLOG_ERR
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+@@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ void hvmemul_cancel(struct vcpu *v)
+     hvio->mmio_insn_bytes = 0;
+     hvio->mmio_access = (struct npfec){};
+     hvio->mmio_retry = false;
+-    hvio->g2m_ioport = NULL;
+ 
+     hvmemul_cache_disable(v);
+ }
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+@@ -610,6 +610,7 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain
+     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.irq_lock);
+     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.uc_lock);
+     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.write_map.lock);
++    rwlock_init(&d->arch.hvm.g2m_ioport_lock);
+     rwlock_init(&d->arch.hvm.mmcfg_lock);
+     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.hvm.write_map.list);
+     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.hvm.g2m_ioport_list);
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
+@@ -143,36 +143,56 @@ bool handle_pio(uint16_t port, unsigned
+     return true;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool cf_check g2m_portio_accept(
+-    const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, const ioreq_t *p)
++/* NB: Returns with the lock held in the success case. */
++static const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_portio_find_and_lock(struct hvm_domain *hvm,
++                                                         uint64_t addr,
++                                                         uint32_t size)
+ {
+-    struct vcpu *curr = current;
+-    const struct hvm_domain *hvm = &curr->domain->arch.hvm;
+-    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &curr->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
+-    struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
+-    unsigned int start, end;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
++
++    read_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
+ 
+     list_for_each_entry( g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list )
+     {
+-        start = g2m_ioport->gport;
+-        end = start + g2m_ioport->np;
+-        if ( (p->addr >= start) && (p->addr + p->size <= end) )
+-        {
+-            hvio->g2m_ioport = g2m_ioport;
+-            return 1;
+-        }
++        unsigned int start = g2m_ioport->gport;
++
++        if ( addr >= start && addr + size <= start + g2m_ioport->np )
++            return g2m_ioport;
+     }
+ 
+-    return 0;
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
++    return NULL;
++}
++
++static bool cf_check g2m_portio_accept(
++    const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, const ioreq_t *p)
++{
++    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
++        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, p->addr, p->size);
++
++    if ( !g2m_ioport )
++        return false;
++
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
++    return true;
+ }
+ 
+ static int cf_check g2m_portio_read(
+     const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t addr, uint32_t size,
+     uint64_t *data)
+ {
+-    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &current->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
+-    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport = hvio->g2m_ioport;
+-    unsigned int mport = (addr - g2m_ioport->gport) + g2m_ioport->mport;
++    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
++        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, addr, size);
++    unsigned int mport;
++
++    if ( !g2m_ioport )
++        return X86EMUL_RETRY;
++
++    mport = addr - g2m_ioport->gport + g2m_ioport->mport;
+ 
+     switch ( size )
+     {
+@@ -189,6 +209,8 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_read(
+         BUG();
+     }
+ 
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
+     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -196,9 +218,15 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_write(
+     const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t addr, uint32_t size,
+     uint64_t data)
+ {
+-    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &current->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
+-    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport = hvio->g2m_ioport;
+-    unsigned int mport = (addr - g2m_ioport->gport) + g2m_ioport->mport;
++    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
++    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
++        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, addr, size);
++    unsigned int mport;
++
++    if ( !g2m_ioport )
++        return X86EMUL_RETRY;
++
++    mport = addr - g2m_ioport->gport + g2m_ioport->mport;
+ 
+     switch ( size )
+     {
+@@ -215,6 +243,8 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_write(
+         BUG();
+     }
+ 
++    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
++
+     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/domain.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/domain.h
+@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct hvm_domain {
+ 
+     /* List of guest to machine IO ports mapping. */
+     struct list_head g2m_ioport_list;
++    rwlock_t g2m_ioport_lock;
+ 
+     /* List of MMCFG regions trapped by Xen. */
+     struct list_head mmcfg_regions;
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vcpu.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vcpu.h
+@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ struct hvm_vcpu_io {
+     unsigned long msix_unmask_address;
+     unsigned long msix_snoop_address;
+     unsigned long msix_snoop_gpa;
+-
+-    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
+ };
+ 
+ struct nestedvcpu {

xsa492-4.21-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: sched: use sequence counter to enlighten vcpu_runstate_get()
+
+Subsequently XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo will want to invoke the function
+without holding a lock, thus allowing parallel execution of potentially
+many instances. As was learned from 228ab9992ffb ("domctl: improve
+locking during domain destruction"), reverted by d0887cc6b16e, such
+parallelism can result in severe lock contention on any (previously)
+inner lock. To avoid taking that risk replace the use of the scheduler
+lock in vcpu_runstate_get() by a newly introduced sequence counter.
+Convert the "no lock if current" property to "use a local counter
+instance", thus guaranteeing the loop to exit after the first iteration.
+
+Skeleton and commentary of the seqcount implementation based on /
+derived from Linux 6.11-rc.
+
+To have runstate_seq placed next to runstate in struct vcpu, without
+introducing a new obvious padding hole, yet while keeping the latter
+adjacent to runstate_guest{,_area} as well, move runstate down a little.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
++++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
+@@ -281,13 +281,18 @@ static inline void vcpu_runstate_change(
+     }
+ 
+     delta = new_entry_time - v->runstate.state_entry_time;
+-    if ( delta > 0 )
++
++    /* Serialization: ->schedule_lock (see ASSERT() above). */
++    with_seq_write(&v->runstate_seq)
+     {
+-        v->runstate.time[v->runstate.state] += delta;
+-        v->runstate.state_entry_time = new_entry_time;
+-    }
++        if ( delta > 0 )
++        {
++            v->runstate.time[v->runstate.state] += delta;
++            v->runstate.state_entry_time = new_entry_time;
++        }
+ 
+-    v->runstate.state = new_state;
++        v->runstate.state = new_state;
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ void sched_guest_idle(void (*idle) (void), unsigned int cpu)
+@@ -307,30 +312,18 @@ void sched_guest_idle(void (*idle) (void
+ void vcpu_runstate_get(const struct vcpu *v,
+                        struct vcpu_runstate_info *runstate)
+ {
+-    spinlock_t *lock;
+-    s_time_t delta;
+-    struct sched_unit *unit;
++    struct seqcount seq = SEQCNT_ZERO();
++    const struct seqcount *s = likely(v == current) ? &seq : &v->runstate_seq;
+ 
+-    rcu_read_lock(&sched_res_rculock);
+-
+-    /*
+-     * Be careful in case of an idle vcpu: the assignment to a unit might
+-     * change even with the scheduling lock held, so be sure to use the
+-     * correct unit for locking in order to avoid triggering an ASSERT() in
+-     * the unlock function.
+-     */
+-    unit = is_idle_vcpu(v) ? get_sched_res(v->processor)->sched_unit_idle
+-                           : v->sched_unit;
+-    lock = likely(v == current) ? NULL : unit_schedule_lock_irq(unit);
+-    memcpy(runstate, &v->runstate, sizeof(*runstate));
+-    delta = NOW() - runstate->state_entry_time;
+-    if ( delta > 0 )
+-        runstate->time[runstate->state] += delta;
+-
+-    if ( unlikely(lock != NULL) )
+-        unit_schedule_unlock_irq(lock, unit);
++    until_seq_read(s)
++    {
++        s_time_t delta;
+ 
+-    rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
++        *runstate = v->runstate;
++        delta = NOW() - runstate->state_entry_time;
++        if ( delta > 0 )
++            runstate->time[runstate->state] += delta;
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ uint64_t get_cpu_idle_time(unsigned int cpu)
+--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
+ #include <xen/radix-tree.h>
+ #include <xen/multicall.h>
+ #include <xen/nospec.h>
++#include <xen/seqcount.h>
+ #include <xen/tasklet.h>
+ #include <xen/mm.h>
+ #include <xen/smp.h>
+@@ -198,7 +199,6 @@ struct vcpu
+ 
+     struct sched_unit *sched_unit;
+ 
+-    struct vcpu_runstate_info runstate;
+ #ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ # define runstate_guest(v) ((v)->runstate_guest)
+     XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_runstate_info_t) runstate_guest; /* guest address */
+@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ struct vcpu
+     } runstate_guest; /* guest address */
+ #endif
+     struct guest_area runstate_guest_area;
++    struct vcpu_runstate_info runstate;
++    struct seqcount  runstate_seq;
+     unsigned int     new_state;
+ 
+     /* Has the FPU been initialised? */
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/xen/include/xen/seqcount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
++#ifndef XEN_SEQCOUNT_H
++#define XEN_SEQCOUNT_H
++
++#include <xen/lib.h>
++#include <xen/nospec.h>
++
++#include <asm/atomic.h>
++#include <asm/system.h>
++
++/*
++ * Sequence counters (seqcount_t)
++ *
++ * This is the raw counting mechanism, without any writer protection.
++ *
++ * Write side critical sections must be serialized (and non-preemptible).
++ *
++ * If readers can be invoked from interrupt contexts, interrupts must also
++ * be respectively disabled before entering the write section.
++ *
++ * This mechanism can't be used if the protected data contains pointers,
++ * as the writer can invalidate a pointer that a reader is following.
++ */
++struct seqcount {
++    unsigned int sequence;
++};
++
++/*
++ * SEQCNT_ZERO() - initializer for seqcount_t
++ * @name: Name of the struct seqcount instance
++ */
++#define SEQCNT_ZERO() { .sequence = 0 }
++
++static inline unsigned int seqprop_sequence(const struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    return ACCESS_ONCE(s->sequence);
++}
++
++/*
++ * read_seqcount_begin() - begin a seqcount read critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
++ *
++ * Return: count to be passed to read_seqcount_retry()
++ */
++static inline unsigned int _read_seqcount_begin(const struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    unsigned int seq;
++
++    while ((seq = seqprop_sequence(s)) & 1)
++        cpu_relax();
++
++    smp_rmb();
++
++    return seq;
++}
++
++static always_inline unsigned int read_seqcount_begin(const struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    unsigned int seq = _read_seqcount_begin(s);
++
++    block_lock_speculation();
++
++    return seq;
++}
++
++/*
++ * read_seqcount_retry() - end a seqcount read critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
++ * @start: count, from read_seqcount_begin()
++ *
++ * read_seqcount_retry closes the read critical section of given struct
++ * seqcount.  If the critical section was invalid, it must be ignored
++ * (and typically retried).
++ *
++ * Return: true if a read section retry is required, else false
++ */
++static inline bool _read_seqcount_retry(const struct seqcount *s,
++                                        unsigned int start)
++{
++    smp_rmb();
++    return unlikely(seqprop_sequence(s) != start);
++}
++
++static always_inline bool read_seqcount_retry(const struct seqcount *s,
++                                              unsigned int start)
++{
++    return lock_evaluate_nospec(_read_seqcount_retry(s, start));
++}
++
++/* Loops until a consistent count has been observed across the loop body. */
++#define until_seq_read(seq)                                    \
++    for ( unsigned int retry_ = 1, count_;                     \
++          retry_ && (count_ = read_seqcount_begin(seq), true); \
++          retry_ = read_seqcount_retry(seq, count_) )
++
++/*
++ * write_seqcount_begin() - start a struct seqcount write side critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
++ *
++ * Context: sequence counter write side sections must be serialized.
++ * If readers can be invoked from interrupt context, interrupts must be
++ * respectively disabled.
++ */
++static inline void write_seqcount_begin(struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    add_sized(&s->sequence, 1);
++    smp_wmb();
++}
++
++/*
++ * write_seqcount_end() - end a struct seqcount write side critical section
++ * @s: Pointer to seqcount
++ */
++static inline void write_seqcount_end(struct seqcount *s)
++{
++    smp_wmb();
++    add_sized(&s->sequence, 1);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Not really a loop, but we need write_seqcount_{begin,end}() in the correct
++ * position.
++ */
++#define with_seq_write(seq)                           \
++    for ( bool once_ = true;                          \
++          once_ && (write_seqcount_begin(seq), true); \
++          (write_seqcount_end(seq), once_ = false) )
++
++#endif /* XEN_SEQCOUNT_H */
++
++/*
++ * Local variables:
++ * mode: C
++ * c-file-style: "BSD"
++ * c-basic-offset: 4
++ * tab-width: 4
++ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
++ * End:
++ */

xsa492-4.21-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo without acquiring domctl lock
+
+getdomaininfo() is not called under consistently the same lock. Thus,
+with caller side locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the
+domctl lock not held. (Callers not pausing the domain they want to
+retrieve information for already need to be aware that not all of the
+data returned can be relied on as being consistent; most data will also
+be stale by the time the caller gets to look at it.)
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+While moving, convert an assignment to an assertion: The domain in
+question was determined from the field which previously was "updated".
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: 5513bd0b4675 ("add xenstore domain flag to hypervisor")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -318,6 +318,26 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Handle sub-ops not requiring the domctl lock. */
++    switch ( op->cmd )
++    {
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++        ret = xsm_getdomaininfo(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
++        if ( !ret )
++        {
++            getdomaininfo(d, &op->u.getdomaininfo);
++
++            ASSERT(op->domain == op->u.getdomaininfo.domain);
++            copyback = true;
++        }
++
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++    default:
++        /* Everything else handled further down. */
++        break;
++    }
++
+     ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op->cmd,
+                      /* SSIDRef only applicable for cmd == createdomain */
+                      op->u.createdomain.ssidref);
+@@ -516,17 +536,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         copyback = 1;
+         break;
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+-        ret = xsm_getdomaininfo(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        getdomaininfo(d, &op->u.getdomaininfo);
+-
+-        op->domain = op->u.getdomaininfo.domain;
+-        copyback = 1;
+-        break;
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpucontext:
+     {
+         vcpu_guest_context_u c = { .nat = NULL };
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -172,9 +172,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_XS_PRIV, current->domain, d);
++
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
++        return -EILSEQ;
++
+     default:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+     }
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -682,8 +682,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+          */
+         return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
+ 
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
++    /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
++        return -EILSEQ;
++
++    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:

xsa492-4.21-03.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Subject: domctl: protect locking for get_domain_state
+
+When DOMID_INVALID is passed, the dom exec handler lock is being taken
+without any check that the domain is even allowed to take the lock. This
+allows for an unauthorized domain to DoS the get_domain_state domctl op.
+Move to consider the op effectively being called against the hypervisor.
+Thus it is the target of the call being invoked to identify the last
+domain with a state change. The subsequent check of whether the source
+domain is allowed the state of the last domain to change state is still
+relevant.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
++++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ allow xenstore_t xen_t:xen writeconsole;
+ # Xenstore queries domaininfo on all domains
+ allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain getdomaininfo;
+ allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain2 get_domain_state;
++allow xenstore_t domxen_t:domain2 get_domain_state;
+ 
+ # As a shortcut, the following 3 rules are used instead of adding a domain_comms
+ # rule between xenstore_t and every domain type that talks to xenstore
+--- a/xen/common/domain.c
++++ b/xen/common/domain.c
+@@ -216,12 +216,8 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_g
+     if ( info->pad0 )
+         return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-    if ( d )
++    if ( d != dom_xen )
+     {
+-        rc = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+-        if ( rc )
+-            return rc;
+-
+         set_domain_state_info(info, d);
+ 
+         return 0;
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -304,13 +304,19 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         fallthrough;
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
+         {
+             d = NULL;
+             break;
+         }
+         fallthrough;
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++        if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
++        {
++            d = dom_xen;
++            break;
++        }
++        fallthrough;
+     default:
+         d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
+         if ( !d )
+@@ -863,7 +869,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+-        ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
++        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
++        if ( !ret )
++            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
+         if ( !ret )
+             copyback = true;
+         break;
+@@ -876,7 +884,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     domctl_lock_release();
+ 
+  domctl_out_unlock_domonly:
+-    if ( d && d != dom_io )
++    if ( d && !is_system_domain(d) )
+         rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ 
+     if ( copyback && __copy_to_guest(u_domctl, op, 1) )

xsa492-4.21-04.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state without acquiring domctl lock
+
+get_domain_state() uses its own locking. Thus, with caller side locking
+irrelevant, it can as well be called with the domctl lock not held.
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: 3ad3df1bd0aa ("xen: add new domctl get_domain_state")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -339,6 +339,14 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+ 
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
++        if ( !ret )
++            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
++        if ( !ret )
++            copyback = true;
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
+     default:
+         /* Everything else handled further down. */
+         break;
+@@ -868,14 +876,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+         break;
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+-        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+-        if ( !ret )
+-            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
+-        if ( !ret )
+-            copyback = true;
+-        break;
+-
+     default:
+         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -172,10 +172,9 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+-        return xsm_default_action(XSM_XS_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -694,7 +695,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/../domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:

xsa492-4.21-05.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domain: locking for iomem_caps accesses
+
+In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_mapping handling
+out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is needed to
+synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission.
+
+Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
+outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
+limited to non-__init code).
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domain.c
++++ b/xen/common/domain.c
+@@ -518,10 +518,15 @@ static int late_hwdom_init(struct domain
+      * may be modified after this hypercall returns if a more complex
+      * device model is desired.
+      */
++    write_lock(&dom0->caps_lock);
+     rangeset_swap(d->irq_caps, dom0->irq_caps);
+     rangeset_swap(d->iomem_caps, dom0->iomem_caps);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     rangeset_swap(d->arch.ioport_caps, dom0->arch.ioport_caps);
++#endif
++    write_unlock(&dom0->caps_lock);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     setup_io_bitmap(d);
+     setup_io_bitmap(dom0);
+ #endif
+@@ -873,6 +878,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t dom
+     rspin_lock_init_prof(d, domain_lock);
+     rspin_lock_init_prof(d, page_alloc_lock);
+     spin_lock_init(&d->hypercall_deadlock_mutex);
++    rwlock_init(&d->caps_lock);
+     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->page_list);
+     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->extra_page_list);
+     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->xenpage_list);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -267,6 +267,35 @@ static struct vnuma_info *vnuma_init(con
+     return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+ 
++void iocaps_double_lock(struct domain *d, bool write)
++{
++    struct domain *currd = current->domain;
++
++    if ( d->domain_id > currd->domain_id )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++    if ( write )
++        write_lock(&d->caps_lock);
++    else
++        read_lock(&d->caps_lock);
++
++    if ( d->domain_id < currd->domain_id )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++}
++
++void iocaps_double_unlock(struct domain *d, bool write)
++{
++    struct domain *currd = current->domain;
++
++    if ( d != currd )
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++    if ( write )
++        write_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
++    else
++        read_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
++}
++
+ static bool is_stable_domctl(uint32_t cmd)
+ {
+     return cmd == XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state;
+@@ -687,6 +716,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */
+             break;
+ 
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
+                                      mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ||
+              xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) )
+@@ -695,6 +726,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+         else
+             ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -719,19 +752,15 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             break;
+ #endif
+ 
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
++
+         ret = -EPERM;
+         if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
+-             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        if ( add )
++             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ||
++             (ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add)) ||
++             !paging_mode_translate(d) )
++            /* Nothing. */;
++        else if ( add )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
+                    "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
+@@ -755,6 +784,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+                        "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
+                        ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
+         }
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
+@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
+ #include <asm/iocap.h>
+ #include <asm/p2m.h>
+ 
++void iocaps_double_lock(struct domain *d, bool write);
++void iocaps_double_unlock(struct domain *d, bool write);
++
+ static inline int iomem_permit_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long s,
+                                       unsigned long e)
+ {
+--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ struct domain
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* I/O capabilities (access to IRQs and memory-mapped I/O). */
++    rwlock_t         caps_lock;
+     struct rangeset *iomem_caps;
+     struct rangeset *irq_caps;
+ 

xsa492-4.21-06.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/domain: locking for ioport_caps accesses
+
+In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping
+handling out of the domctl-locked region, the new separate (per-domain)
+lock is used to synchronize in particular with
+XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission.
+
+Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
+outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
+limited to non-__init code).
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports;
+         int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access;
+ 
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
+             ret = -EINVAL;
+         else if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) ||
+@@ -242,6 +244,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
+         else
+             ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -648,16 +652,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+         hvm = &d->arch.hvm;
+-        if ( add )
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
++        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ||
++             (ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add)) )
++            ret = ret ?: -EPERM;
++        else if ( add )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
+                    "ioport_map:add: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
+@@ -718,6 +720,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+                        "ioport_map: error %ld denying dom%d access to [%x,%x]\n",
+                        ret, d->domain_id, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+         }
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+@@ -2339,9 +2339,12 @@ void __hwdom_init setup_io_bitmap(struct
+         return;
+ 
+     bitmap_fill(d->arch.hvm.io_bitmap, 0x10000);
++
++    read_lock(&d->caps_lock);
+     if ( rangeset_report_ranges(d->arch.ioport_caps, 0, 0x10000,
+                                 io_bitmap_cb, d) )
+         BUG();
++    read_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
+ 
+     /*
+      * We need to trap 4-byte accesses to 0xcf8 (see admin_io_okay(),

xsa492-4.21-07.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domain: locking for irq_caps accesses
+
+In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq
+handling out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is
+needed to synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,gsi}_permission.
+
+Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
+outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
+limited to non-__init code).
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     {
+         int rc;
++        struct domain *currd = current->domain;
+         struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind = &domctl->u.bind_pt_irq;
+         uint32_t irq = bind->u.spi.spi;
+         uint32_t virq = bind->machine_irq;
+@@ -107,21 +108,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+-            return -EPERM;
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
+ 
+-        if ( !vgic_reserve_virq(d, virq) )
+-            return -EBUSY;
+-
+-        rc = route_irq_to_guest(d, virq, irq, "routed IRQ");
+-        if ( rc )
+-            vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            rc = -EPERM;
++        else if ( !vgic_reserve_virq(d, virq) )
++            rc = -EBUSY;
++        else
++        {
++            rc = route_irq_to_guest(d, virq, irq, "routed IRQ");
++            if ( rc )
++                vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
++        }
+ 
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
+         return rc;
+     }
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+     {
+         int rc;
++        struct domain *currd = current->domain;
+         struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind = &domctl->u.bind_pt_irq;
+         uint32_t irq = bind->u.spi.spi;
+         uint32_t virq = bind->machine_irq;
+@@ -138,16 +144,15 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
+-            return -EPERM;
+-
+-        rc = release_guest_irq(d, virq);
+-        if ( rc )
+-            return rc;
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
+ 
+-        vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            rc = -EPERM;
++        else if ( !(rc = release_guest_irq(d, virq)) )
++            vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
+ 
+-        return 0;
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
++        return rc;
+     }
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vuart_op:
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -267,16 +267,17 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
+-        ret = -EPERM;
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) ||
+              xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, flags) )
+-            break;
+-
+-        if ( flags )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( flags )
+             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+         else
+             ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+ 
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -579,20 +580,27 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+ 
+         irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+-            break;
++        if ( irq <= 0 )
++            ret = -EPERM;
+ 
+-        ret = -ESRCH;
+-        if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
+         {
+             pcidevs_lock();
+             ret = pt_irq_create_bind(d, bind);
+             pcidevs_unlock();
++
++            if ( ret < 0 )
++                printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_create_bind failed (%ld) for %pd\n",
++                       ret, d);
+         }
+-        if ( ret < 0 )
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_create_bind failed (%ld) for dom%d\n",
+-                   ret, d->domain_id);
++        else
++            ret = -ESRCH;
++
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -605,23 +613,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+-            break;
+-
+         ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+-        if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
++        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
++
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
+         {
+             pcidevs_lock();
+             ret = pt_irq_destroy_bind(d, bind);
+             pcidevs_unlock();
++
++            if ( ret < 0 )
++                printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_destroy_bind failed (%ld) for %pd\n",
++                       ret, d);
+         }
+-        if ( ret < 0 )
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_destroy_bind failed (%ld) for dom%d\n",
+-                   ret, d->domain_id);
++
++        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -695,6 +695,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = -EINVAL;
+             break;
+         }
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
+         irq = pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq);
+         if ( !irq || xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
+             ret = -EPERM;
+@@ -702,6 +705,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+         else
+             ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+         break;
+     }
+ #endif

xsa492-4.21-08.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: XSM/Flask: split the .iomem_mapping() hook
+
+It's used twice in entirely different situations. The use in do_domctl()
+wants to become an ordinary XSM_DM_PRIV invocation, while the one in vPCI
+code need to remain XSM_HOOK (it may plausibly become XSM_TARGET). For
+Flask, the same backing function will continue to be used for the time
+being.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int cf_check map_range(
+             return -EPERM;
+         }
+ 
+-        rc = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, map->d, map_mfn, m_end, map->map);
++        rc = xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(XSM_HOOK, map->d, map_mfn, m_end, map->map);
+         if ( rc )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -580,6 +580,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
++static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(
++    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
++{
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
++}
++
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_pci_config_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start,
+     uint16_t end, uint8_t access)
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+                             uint8_t allow);
+     int (*iomem_mapping)(struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e,
+                          uint8_t allow);
++    int (*iomem_mapping_vpci)(struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e,
++                              uint8_t allow);
+     int (*pci_config_permission)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf,
+                                  uint16_t start, uint16_t end, uint8_t access);
+ 
+@@ -523,6 +525,12 @@ static inline int xsm_iomem_mapping(
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.iomem_mapping, d, s, e, allow);
+ }
+ 
++static inline int xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(
++    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
++{
++    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.iomem_mapping_vpci, d, s, e, allow);
++}
++
+ static inline int xsm_pci_config_permission(
+     xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start,
+     uint16_t end, uint8_t access)
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .irq_permission                = xsm_irq_permission,
+     .iomem_permission              = xsm_iomem_permission,
+     .iomem_mapping                 = xsm_iomem_mapping,
++    .iomem_mapping_vpci            = xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci,
+     .pci_config_permission         = xsm_pci_config_permission,
+     .get_vnumainfo                 = xsm_get_vnumainfo,
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -1950,6 +1950,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .irq_permission = flask_irq_permission,
+     .iomem_permission = flask_iomem_permission,
+     .iomem_mapping = flask_iomem_mapping,
++    .iomem_mapping_vpci = flask_iomem_mapping,
+     .pci_config_permission = flask_pci_config_permission,
+ 
+     .resource_plug_core = flask_resource_plug_core,

xsa492-4.21-09.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+Move the re-purposed dedicated XSM check as early as possible.
+
+Minimal "modernization": Switch "add" to bool and use %pd in log messages.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -376,6 +376,66 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             copyback = true;
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    {
++        unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
++        unsigned long mfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
++        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
++        unsigned long mfn_end = mfn + nr_mfns - 1;
++        bool add = op->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
++
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( mfn_end < mfn || /* Wrap? */
++             ((mfn | mfn_end) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
++             (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* Wrap? */
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
++        if ( ret || !paging_mode_translate(d) )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_X86 /* XXX ARM!? */
++        ret = -E2BIG;
++        /* Must break hypercall up as this could take a while. */
++        if ( nr_mfns > 64 )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++#endif
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
++
++        ret = -EPERM;
++        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
++             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
++            /* Nothing. */;
++        else if ( add )
++        {
++            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
++                   "memory_map:add: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
++                   d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
++
++            ret = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
++            if ( ret < 0 )
++                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
++                       "memory_map:fail: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx ret:%ld\n",
++                       d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
++        }
++        else
++        {
++            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
++                   "memory_map:remove: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
++                   d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
++
++            ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
++            if ( ret < 0 && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
++                printk(XENLOG_ERR
++                       "memory_map: error %ld removing %pd access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
++                       ret, d, mfn, mfn_end);
++        }
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++
+     default:
+         /* Everything else handled further down. */
+         break;
+@@ -736,64 +796,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+-    {
+-        unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
+-        unsigned long mfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
+-        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
+-        unsigned long mfn_end = mfn + nr_mfns - 1;
+-        int add = op->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
+-
+-        ret = -EINVAL;
+-        if ( mfn_end < mfn || /* wrap? */
+-             ((mfn | mfn_end) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
+-             (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* wrap? */
+-            break;
+-
+-#ifndef CONFIG_X86 /* XXX ARM!? */
+-        ret = -E2BIG;
+-        /* Must break hypercall up as this could take a while. */
+-        if ( nr_mfns > 64 )
+-            break;
+-#endif
+-
+-        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
+-
+-        ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
+-             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ||
+-             (ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add)) ||
+-             !paging_mode_translate(d) )
+-            /* Nothing. */;
+-        else if ( add )
+-        {
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
+-                   "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
+-                   d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
+-
+-            ret = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
+-            if ( ret < 0 )
+-                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+-                       "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx ret:%ld\n",
+-                       d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
+-        }
+-        else
+-        {
+-            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
+-                   "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
+-                   d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
+-
+-            ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
+-            if ( ret < 0 && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
+-                printk(XENLOG_ERR
+-                       "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
+-                       ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
+-        }
+-
+-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -168,13 +168,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     switch ( cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_mapping(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -692,7 +693,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 

xsa492-4.21-10.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+As the handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), almost no code is
+being moved, but a 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops) invocation of
+arch_do_domctl() is being added. Move just the re-purposed dedicated XSM
+check as early as possible.
+
+In flask_domctl() don't put #ifdef around the moved case label.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -663,12 +663,15 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
++        ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
++        if ( ret )
++            break;
++
+         hvm = &d->arch.hvm;
+         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+ 
+-        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ||
+-             (ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add)) )
+-            ret = ret ?: -EPERM;
++        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
+         else if ( add )
+         {
+             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -436,6 +436,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+     }
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++        ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
+     default:
+         /* Everything else handled further down. */
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_OTHER);
+     switch ( cmd )
+     {
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iopor
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_ioport_mapping(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+@@ -703,7 +704,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH

xsa492-4.21-11.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+(It also already isn't used when pt_irq_{create,destroy}_bind() are
+invoked for PVH Dom0.) As the handling is in arch-specific code, no code
+is being moved, but the 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops like the ones
+here) invocation of arch_do_domctl() is being re-used.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+-        rc = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        rc = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
+         if ( irq != virq )
+             return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-        rc = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        rc = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( rc )
+             return rc;
+ 
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        ret = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
++        ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -437,6 +437,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -168,13 +168,11 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     switch ( cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+-        return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -541,14 +539,14 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unmap
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_bind_pt_irq(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unbind_pt_irq(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -683,10 +683,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+@@ -697,9 +699,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/../domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:

xsa492-4.21-12.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_io{mem,port}_permission without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+As the I/O port handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is
+being moved, but the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move
+the re-purposed dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -233,12 +233,17 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports;
+         int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access;
+ 
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
++            break;
++
++        ret = xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow);
++        if ( ret )
++            break;
++
+         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+ 
+-        if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
+-            ret = -EINVAL;
+-        else if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) ||
+-                  xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow) )
++        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) )
+             ret = -EPERM;
+         else if ( allow )
+             ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -376,6 +376,34 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             copyback = true;
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
++    {
++        unsigned long mfn = op->u.iomem_permission.first_mfn;
++        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.iomem_permission.nr_mfns;
++        bool allow = op->u.iomem_permission.allow_access;
++
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* Wrap? */
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        ret = xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow);
++        if ( ret )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
++        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
++                                     mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( allow )
++            ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
++        else
++            ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     {
+         unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
+@@ -436,6 +464,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+     }
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+@@ -777,31 +806,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+-    {
+-        unsigned long mfn = op->u.iomem_permission.first_mfn;
+-        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.iomem_permission.nr_mfns;
+-        int allow = op->u.iomem_permission.allow_access;
+-
+-        ret = -EINVAL;
+-        if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */
+-            break;
+-
+-        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+-
+-        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
+-                                     mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ||
+-             xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) )
+-            ret = -EPERM;
+-        else if ( allow )
+-            ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+-        else
+-            ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+-
+-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -170,7 +170,9 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -567,7 +569,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_irq_p
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -763,7 +765,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_priv_
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_ioport_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -686,7 +686,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -695,14 +697,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH

xsa492-4.21-13.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,gsi}_permission without acquiring domctl lock
+
+With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
+As the GSI handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is being
+moved there; the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move the
+re-purposed (XSM_HOOK -> XSM_PRIV, as xsm_domctl() is now bypassed)
+dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -272,10 +272,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             break;
+         }
+ 
++        ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, flags);
++        if ( ret )
++            break;
++
+         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+ 
+-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) ||
+-             xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, flags) )
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+             ret = -EPERM;
+         else if ( flags )
+             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -464,8 +464,41 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
++    {
++        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
++        bool allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
++
++        ret = -EINVAL;
++        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(current->domain, pirq);
++
++        ret = -EPERM;
++        if ( irq )
++            ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
++        if ( ret )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
++
++        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
++            ret = -EPERM;
++        else if ( allow )
++            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
++        else
++            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
++
++        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+@@ -779,33 +812,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         }
+         break;
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+-    {
+-        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
+-        int allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
+-
+-        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
+-        {
+-            ret = -EINVAL;
+-            break;
+-        }
+-
+-        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+-
+-        irq = pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq);
+-        if ( !irq || xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
+-            ret = -EPERM;
+-        else if ( allow )
+-            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+-        else
+-            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+-
+-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+-        break;
+-    }
+-#endif
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -170,9 +170,11 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -562,7 +564,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unmap
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_irq_permission(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t allow)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -686,9 +686,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+@@ -696,14 +698,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+     /*

xsa492-4.21-14.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop vm_event_control hook
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). Care needs to be taken with the
+GET_VERSION sub-op, which may be invoked with DOMID_INVALID, and which has
+been (and continues to be) bypassing XSM checking.
+
+Since the latter two parameters were unused, monitor_domctl() invoking the
+hook was actually redundant with the earlier xsm_domctl() (as can be seen
+nicely from the hunks changing xsm/flask/hooks.c).
+
+As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at the same early
+point with and without Flask.
+
+While folding XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op and XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op in
+flask_domctl(), also fold in XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -496,6 +496,23 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
++        if ( op->u.vm_event_op.op == XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION )
++        {
++            /* No XSM check (and potentially d == NULL) here. */
++            ret = vm_event_domctl(d, &op->u.vm_event_op);
++            if ( !ret )
++                copyback = true;
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++        }
++        if ( !d )
++        {
++            ret = -ESRCH;
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++        }
++        /* Other sub-ops handled further down. */
++        break;
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+--- a/xen/common/monitor.c
++++ b/xen/common/monitor.c
+@@ -30,16 +30,11 @@
+ 
+ int monitor_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_monitor_op *mop)
+ {
+-    int rc;
+     bool requested_status = false;
+ 
+     if ( unlikely(current->domain == d) ) /* no domain_pause() */
+         return -EPERM;
+ 
+-    rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, mop->op, mop->event);
+-    if ( unlikely(rc) )
+-        return rc;
+-
+     switch ( mop->op )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_ENABLE:
+--- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
++++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
+@@ -603,11 +603,10 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, st
+ 
+     /* All other subops need to target a real domain. */
+     if ( unlikely(d == NULL) )
+-        return -ESRCH;
+-
+-    rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, vec->mode, vec->op);
+-    if ( rc )
+-        return rc;
++    {
++        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
++        return -EILSEQ;
++    }
+ 
+     if ( unlikely(d == current->domain) ) /* no domain_pause() */
+     {
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -652,13 +652,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_hvm_a
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_vm_event_control(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_mem_access(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
+ {
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -157,8 +157,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+     int (*hvm_altp2mhvm_op)(struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op);
+     int (*get_vnumainfo)(struct domain *d);
+ 
+-    int (*vm_event_control)(struct domain *d, int mode, int op);
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+     int (*mem_access)(struct domain *d);
+ #endif
+@@ -657,12 +655,6 @@ static inline int xsm_get_vnumainfo(xsm_
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_vnumainfo, d);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int xsm_vm_event_control(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.vm_event_control, d, mode, op);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+ static inline int xsm_mem_access(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
+ {
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -116,8 +116,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .remove_from_physmap           = xsm_remove_from_physmap,
+     .map_gmfn_foreign              = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign,
+ 
+-    .vm_event_control              = xsm_vm_event_control,
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+     .mem_access                    = xsm_mem_access,
+ #endif
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -699,7 +699,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+@@ -793,9 +792,8 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__TRIGGER);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required:
+-        return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op:
+@@ -1368,11 +1366,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_hvm_altp2mhvm_
+     return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__ALTP2MHVM_OP);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_vm_event_control(struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+-{
+-    return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+ static int cf_check flask_mem_access(struct domain *d)
+ {
+@@ -1971,8 +1964,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .do_xsm_op = do_flask_op,
+     .get_vnumainfo = flask_get_vnumainfo,
+ 
+-    .vm_event_control = flask_vm_event_control,
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
+     .mem_access = flask_mem_access,
+ #endif

xsa492-4.21-15.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: pass full struct xen_domctl to xsm_domctl()
+
+Subsequently some sub-ops will want to inspect their sub-sub-ops. Plus
+this way we don't need to pass SSIDref separately anymore for
+domain_create.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ long do_paging_domctl_cont(
+     if ( d == NULL )
+         return -ESRCH;
+ 
+-    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op.cmd, 0 /* SSIDref not applicable */);
++    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, &op);
+     if ( !ret )
+     {
+         if ( domctl_lock_acquire() )
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -526,9 +526,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op->cmd,
+-                     /* SSIDRef only applicable for cmd == createdomain */
+-                     op->u.createdomain.ssidref);
++    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op);
+     if ( ret )
+         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_t
+ }
+ 
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref)
++    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op)
+ {
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_OTHER);
+-    switch ( cmd )
++    switch ( op->cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+     int (*sysctl_scheduler_op)(int op);
+ #endif
+     int (*set_target)(struct domain *d, struct domain *e);
+-    int (*domctl)(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref);
++    int (*domctl)(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op);
+     int (*sysctl)(int cmd);
+     int (*readconsole)(uint32_t clear);
+ 
+@@ -260,9 +260,9 @@ static inline int xsm_set_target(
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int xsm_domctl(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d,
+-                             unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref)
++                             struct xen_domctl *op)
+ {
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl, d, cmd, ssidref);
++    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl, d, op);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int xsm_sysctl(xsm_default_t def, int cmd)
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -667,10 +667,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_set_target(str
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd,
+-                                 uint32_t ssidref)
++static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op)
+ {
+-    switch ( cmd )
++    switch ( op->cmd )
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain:
+         /*
+@@ -680,7 +679,8 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+          * Note that d is NULL because we haven't even allocated memory for it
+          * this early in XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain.
+          */
+-        return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
++        return avc_current_has_perm(op->u.createdomain.ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN,
++                                    DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__SET_LLC_COLORS);
+ 
+     default:
+-        return avc_unknown_permission("domctl", cmd);
++        return avc_unknown_permission("domctl", op->cmd);
+     }
+ }
+ 

xsa492-4.21-16.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop scheduler_op hook
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
+struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
+the same early point with and without Flask.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
++++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
+@@ -2074,10 +2074,6 @@ long sched_adjust(struct domain *d, stru
+ {
+     long ret;
+ 
+-    ret = xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(XSM_HOOK, d, op->cmd);
+-    if ( ret )
+-        return ret;
+-
+     if ( op->sched_id != dom_scheduler(d)->sched_id )
+         return -EINVAL;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -141,13 +141,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_getdo
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+ }
+ 
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int cmd)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG int cmd)
+ {
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+                                 struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);
+     int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d, uint32_t ssidref);
+     int (*getdomaininfo)(struct domain *d);
+-    int (*domctl_scheduler_op)(struct domain *d, int op);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+     int (*sysctl_scheduler_op)(int op);
+ #endif
+@@ -240,12 +239,6 @@ static inline int xsm_get_domain_state(x
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_domain_state, d);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int cmd)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl_scheduler_op, d, cmd);
+-}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ static inline int xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op(xsm_default_t def, int cmd)
+ {
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .security_domaininfo           = xsm_security_domaininfo,
+     .domain_create                 = xsm_domain_create,
+     .getdomaininfo                 = xsm_getdomaininfo,
+-    .domctl_scheduler_op           = xsm_domctl_scheduler_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+     .sysctl_scheduler_op           = xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op,
+ #endif
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_getdomaininfo(
+     return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__GETDOMAININFO);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_domctl_scheduler_op(struct domain *d, int op)
++static int flask_domctl_scheduler_op(struct domain *d, int op)
+ {
+     switch ( op )
+     {
+@@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+@@ -745,6 +744,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_setdomainhandle:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__SETDOMAINHANDLE);
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
++        return flask_domctl_scheduler_op(d, op->u.scheduler_op.cmd);
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_ext_vcpucontext:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_vcpu_msrs:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_setvcpucontext:
+@@ -1884,7 +1886,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo,
+     .domain_create = flask_domain_create,
+     .getdomaininfo = flask_getdomaininfo,
+-    .domctl_scheduler_op = flask_domctl_scheduler_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+     .sysctl_scheduler_op = flask_sysctl_scheduler_op,
+ #endif

xsa492-4.21-17.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop shadow_control_op hook
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
+struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
+the same early point with and without Flask.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+@@ -677,10 +677,6 @@ int paging_domctl(struct domain *d, stru
+         return -EBUSY;
+     }
+ 
+-    rc = xsm_shadow_control(XSM_HOOK, d, sc->op);
+-    if ( rc )
+-        return rc;
+-
+     /* Code to handle log-dirty. Note that some log dirty operations
+      * piggy-back on shadow operations. For example, when
+      * XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF is called, it first checks whether log dirty
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -682,13 +682,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_do_mc
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_shadow_control(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_mem_sharing_op(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
+ {
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -172,7 +172,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     int (*do_mca)(void);
+-    int (*shadow_control)(struct domain *d, uint32_t op);
+     int (*mem_sharing_op)(struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op);
+     int (*apic)(struct domain *d, int cmd);
+     int (*machine_memory_map)(void);
+@@ -680,12 +679,6 @@ static inline int xsm_do_mca(xsm_default
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.do_mca);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int xsm_shadow_control(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.shadow_control, d, op);
+-}
+-
+ static inline int xsm_mem_sharing_op(
+     xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
+ {
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .platform_op                   = xsm_platform_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     .do_mca                        = xsm_do_mca,
+-    .shadow_control                = xsm_shadow_control,
+     .mem_sharing_op                = xsm_mem_sharing_op,
+     .apic                          = xsm_apic,
+     .machine_memory_map            = xsm_machine_memory_map,
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ #include <asm/pv/shim.h>
++static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, unsigned int op);
+ #else
+ #define pv_shim false
+ #endif
+@@ -699,10 +700,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+-#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+     /*
+      * These have individual XSM hooks
+@@ -787,6 +784,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_address_size:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__GETADDRSIZE);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
++        return flask_shadow_control(d, op->u.shadow_op.op);
++#endif
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING);
+ 
+@@ -1603,7 +1605,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_do_mca(void)
+     return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN__MCA_OP);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
++static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, unsigned int op)
+ {
+     uint32_t perm;
+ 
+@@ -1999,7 +2001,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+     .platform_op = flask_platform_op,
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+     .do_mca = flask_do_mca,
+-    .shadow_control = flask_shadow_control,
+     .mem_sharing_op = flask_mem_sharing_op,
+     .apic = flask_apic,
+     .machine_memory_map = flask_machine_memory_map,

xsa492-4.21-18.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group without acquiring domctl lock
+
+iommu_get_device_group() uses its own locking. Thus, with caller side
+locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the domctl lock not
+held.
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -513,6 +513,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         /* Other sub-ops handled further down. */
+         break;
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
++        ret = iommu_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+@@ -918,7 +922,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+         ret = iommu_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
+         break;
+ 
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ static int iommu_get_device_group(
+         if ( (pdev->seg != seg) || ((b == bus) && (df == devfn)) )
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if ( xsm_get_device_group(XSM_HOOK, (seg << 16) | (b << 8) | df) )
++        if ( xsm_get_device_group(XSM_PRIV, (seg << 16) | (b << 8) | df) )
+             continue;
+ 
+         sdev_id = iommu_call(ops, get_device_group_id, seg, b, df);
+@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
+         u32 max_sdevs;
+         XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(uint32) sdevs;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_get_device_group(XSM_HOOK, domctl->u.get_device_group.machine_sbdf);
++        ret = xsm_get_device_group(XSM_PRIV, domctl->u.get_device_group.machine_sbdf);
+         if ( ret )
+             break;
+ 
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+@@ -401,7 +402,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_v
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_device_group(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
+@@ -705,7 +706,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+      * These have individual XSM hooks
+      * (drivers/passthrough/{pci,device_tree.c)
+      */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:

xsa492-4.21-19.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl/XSM: drop {,de}assign_{,dt}device hooks
+
+Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). As a positive side effect,
+permissions are then checked at the same early point with and without
+Flask. As the DT device path needs fetching earlier (but must not be
+double fetched), cache it in a private field of the public interface
+struct.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -325,6 +325,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
+         if ( op->domain == DOMID_IO )
+         {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++            if ( op->u.assign_device.dev == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT )
++                op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = NULL;
++#endif
+             d = dom_io;
+             break;
+         }
+@@ -332,6 +336,11 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+             return -ESRCH;
+         fallthrough;
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++        if ( op->u.assign_device.dev == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT )
++            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = NULL;
++        fallthrough;
++#endif
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
+         {
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
+@@ -340,15 +340,15 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
+         if ( (d && d->is_dying) || domctl->u.assign_device.flags )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
+-                                    domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
+-                                    &dev);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_assign_dtdevice(XSM_HOOK, d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
++        dev = domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev;
++        if ( !dev )
++        {
++            ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
++                                        domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
++                                        &dev);
++            if ( ret )
++                break;
++        }
+ 
+         if ( domctl->cmd == XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device )
+         {
+@@ -396,15 +396,15 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
+         if ( domctl->u.assign_device.flags )
+             break;
+ 
+-        ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
+-                                    domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
+-                                    &dev);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = xsm_deassign_dtdevice(XSM_HOOK, d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
++        dev = domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev;
++        if ( !dev )
++        {
++            ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
++                                        domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
++                                        &dev);
++            if ( ret )
++                break;
++        }
+ 
+         if ( d == dom_io )
+         {
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+@@ -1740,10 +1740,6 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
+ 
+         machine_sbdf = domctl->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_assign_device(XSM_HOOK, d, machine_sbdf);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+         seg = machine_sbdf >> 16;
+         bus = PCI_BUS(machine_sbdf);
+         devfn = PCI_DEVFN(machine_sbdf);
+@@ -1785,10 +1781,6 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
+ 
+         machine_sbdf = domctl->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf;
+ 
+-        ret = xsm_deassign_device(XSM_HOOK, d, machine_sbdf);
+-        if ( ret )
+-            break;
+-
+         seg = machine_sbdf >> 16;
+         bus = PCI_BUS(machine_sbdf);
+         devfn = PCI_DEVFN(machine_sbdf);
+--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
++++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+@@ -575,7 +575,10 @@ struct xen_domctl_assign_device {
+         } pci;
+         struct {
+             uint32_t size; /* Length of the path */
+-            XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(char) path; /* path to the device tree node */
++            XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(char) path; /* Path to the device tree node */
++#ifdef __XEN__
++            struct dt_device_node *dev; /* Resolved device node of the above */
++#endif
+         } dt;
+     } u;
+ };
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -405,40 +405,8 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_d
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+-
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_assign_device(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_deassign_device(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+ #endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI */
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_assign_dtdevice(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+-static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_deassign_dtdevice(
+-    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+-    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+-}
+-
+-#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY */
+-
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_resource_plug_core(XSM_DEFAULT_VOID)
+ {
+     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+@@ -124,13 +124,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
+     int (*get_device_group)(uint32_t machine_bdf);
+-    int (*assign_device)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
+-    int (*deassign_device)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-    int (*assign_dtdevice)(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
+-    int (*deassign_dtdevice)(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
+ #endif
+ 
+     int (*resource_plug_core)(void);
+@@ -533,35 +526,8 @@ static inline int xsm_get_device_group(x
+ {
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_device_group, machine_bdf);
+ }
+-
+-static inline int xsm_assign_device(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.assign_device, d, machine_bdf);
+-}
+-
+-static inline int xsm_deassign_device(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.deassign_device, d, machine_bdf);
+-}
+ #endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI) */
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-static inline int xsm_assign_dtdevice(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.assign_dtdevice, d, dtpath);
+-}
+-
+-static inline int xsm_deassign_dtdevice(
+-    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+-{
+-    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.deassign_dtdevice, d, dtpath);
+-}
+-
+-#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY */
+-
+ static inline int xsm_resource_plug_pci(xsm_default_t def, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.resource_plug_pci, machine_bdf);
+--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+@@ -81,13 +81,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
+     .get_device_group              = xsm_get_device_group,
+-    .assign_device                 = xsm_assign_device,
+-    .deassign_device               = xsm_deassign_device,
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-    .assign_dtdevice               = xsm_assign_dtdevice,
+-    .deassign_dtdevice             = xsm_deassign_dtdevice,
+ #endif
+ 
+     .resource_plug_core            = xsm_resource_plug_core,
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,17 @@ static int flask_shadow_control(struct d
+ #define pv_shim false
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
++static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, unsigned int machine_bdf);
++static int flask_deassign_device(struct domain *d, unsigned int machine_bdf);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++static int flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
++static int flask_deassign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
++#endif
++#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH */
++
+ static uint32_t domain_sid(const struct domain *dom)
+ {
+     struct domain_security_struct *dsec = dom->ssid;
+@@ -700,16 +711,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+ 
+     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
+-    /*
+-     * These have individual XSM hooks
+-     * (drivers/passthrough/{pci,device_tree.c)
+-     */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
+-#endif
+         return 0;
+ 
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain:
+@@ -789,6 +790,49 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+         return flask_shadow_control(d, op->u.shadow_op.op);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
++
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
++        switch ( op->u.assign_device.dev )
++        {
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
++        case XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_PCI:
++            return op->cmd != XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device
++                   ? flask_assign_device(
++                         d, op->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf)
++                   : flask_deassign_device(
++                         d, op->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
++        case XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT:
++        {
++            struct dt_device_node *dev;
++            int ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(op->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
++                                            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
++                                            &dev);
++
++            if ( ret )
++                return ret;
++
++            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = dev;
++
++            return op->cmd != XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device
++                   ? flask_assign_dtdevice(d, dt_node_full_name(dev))
++                   : flask_deassign_dtdevice(d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
++        }
++#endif
++
++        default:
++            /* Unknown type. */
++            break;
++        }
++        return avc_unknown_permission("assign_device", op->cmd);
++
++#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH */
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING);
+ 
+@@ -1416,7 +1460,7 @@ static int flask_test_assign_device(uint
+     return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__STAT_DEVICE, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
++static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+     uint32_t dsid, rsid;
+     int rc = -EPERM;
+@@ -1446,7 +1490,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_assign_device(
+     return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, dperm, &ad);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_deassign_device(
++static int flask_deassign_device(
+     struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+ {
+     uint32_t rsid;
+@@ -1478,7 +1522,7 @@ static int flask_test_assign_dtdevice(co
+                                 NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
++static int flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+ {
+     uint32_t dsid, rsid;
+     int rc = -EPERM;
+@@ -1508,7 +1552,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_assign_dtdevic
+     return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, dperm, &ad);
+ }
+ 
+-static int cf_check flask_deassign_dtdevice(
++static int flask_deassign_dtdevice(
+     struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
+ {
+     uint32_t rsid;
+@@ -1989,13 +2033,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
+     .get_device_group = flask_get_device_group,
+-    .assign_device = flask_assign_device,
+-    .deassign_device = flask_deassign_device,
+-#endif
+-
+-#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
+-    .assign_dtdevice = flask_assign_dtdevice,
+-    .deassign_dtdevice = flask_deassign_dtdevice,
+ #endif
+ 
+     .platform_op = flask_platform_op,

xsa492-4.21-20.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_set_target without acquiring domctl lock
+
+The only locking required here is that between checking d->target and
+setting it. To avoid the need for an explicit lock, use cmpxchgptr() to
+update d->target.
+
+Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
+of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
+
+This is part of XSA-492.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -505,6 +505,30 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
++    {
++        struct domain *e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
++
++        ret = -ESRCH;
++        if ( !e )
++            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++
++        if ( d == e )
++            ret = -EINVAL;
++        else if ( !is_hvm_domain(e) )
++            ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
++        else
++            ret = xsm_set_target(XSM_PRIV, d, e);
++
++        /* Hold reference on @e until we destroy @d. */
++        if ( !ret && cmpxchgptr(&d->target, NULL, e) )
++            ret = -EINVAL;
++
++        if ( ret )
++            put_domain(e);
++        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
++    }
++
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+         if ( op->u.vm_event_op.op == XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION )
+         {
+@@ -844,36 +868,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
+         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
+         break;
+ 
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-    {
+-        struct domain *e;
+-
+-        ret = -ESRCH;
+-        e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
+-        if ( e == NULL )
+-            break;
+-
+-        ret = -EINVAL;
+-        if ( (d == e) || (d->target != NULL) )
+-        {
+-            put_domain(e);
+-            break;
+-        }
+-
+-        ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+-        if ( is_hvm_domain(e) )
+-            ret = xsm_set_target(XSM_HOOK, d, e);
+-        if ( ret )
+-        {
+-            put_domain(e);
+-            break;
+-        }
+-
+-        /* Hold reference on @e until we destroy @d. */
+-        d->target = e;
+-        break;
+-    }
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe:
+         d->suspend_evtchn = op->u.subscribe.port;
+         break;
+--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
++++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_sysct
+ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_target(
+     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *e)
+ {
+-    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
++    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
++++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+@@ -705,14 +705,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
++    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
+         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+         return -EILSEQ;
+ 
+-    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
+-    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+-        return 0;
+-
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain:
+         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__DESTROY);
+ 

xsa493-4.21-01.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+From 2e21b5301765de353c06081eee953255bf327176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 10:11:24 +0200
+Subject: xen/arm64: flushtlb: Optimize ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
+
+The ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI workaround is used to mitigate several
+errata where broadcast TLBI;DSB sequences don't provide all the
+architecturally required synchronization. The workaround performs more
+work than necessary, and can have significant overhead. This patch
+optimizes the workaround, as explained below.
+
+1. All relevant errata only affect the ordering and/or completion of
+   memory accesses which have been translated by an invalidated TLB
+   entry. The actual invalidation of TLB entries is unaffected.
+
+2. The existing workaround is applied to both broadcast and local TLB
+   invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
+   apply a workaround for broadcast invalidation.
+
+3. The existing workaround replaces every TLBI with a TLBI;DSB;TLBI
+   sequence, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
+   execute a single additional TLBI;DSB sequence after any number of
+   TLBIs are completed by a DSB.
+
+   For example, for a sequence of batched TLBIs:
+
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
+       DSB ISH
+
+   ... the existing workaround will expand this to:
+
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]     // additional
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]     // additional
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]     // additional
+       DSB ISH
+
+   ... whereas it is sufficient to have:
+
+       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
+       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
+       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
+       DSB ISH
+       TLBI <opX>[, <argX>]     // additional
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+
+   Using a single additional TLBI and DSB at the end of the sequence can
+   have significantly lower overhead as each DSB which completes a TLBI
+   must synchronize with other PEs in the system, with potential
+   performance effects both locally and system-wide.
+
+4. The existing workaround repeats each specific TLBI operation, whereas
+   for all relevant errata it is sufficient for the additional TLBI to
+   use *any* operation which will be broadcast, regardless of which
+   translation regime or stage of translation the operation applies to.
+
+   For example, for a single TLBI:
+
+       TLBI ALLE2IS
+       DSB ISH
+
+   ... the existing workaround will expand this to:
+
+       TLBI ALLE2IS
+       DSB ISH
+       TLBI ALLE2IS             // additional
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+
+   ... whereas it is sufficient to have:
+
+       TLBI ALLE2IS
+       DSB ISH
+       TLBI VALE1IS, XZR        // additional
+       DSB ISH                  // additional
+
+   As the additional TLBI doesn't have to match a specific earlier TLBI,
+   the additional TLBI can be implemented in separate code, with no
+   memory of the earlier TLBIs. The additional TLBI can also use a
+   cheaper TLBI operation.
+
+5. The existing workaround is applied to both Stage-1 and Stage-2 TLB
+   invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
+   apply a workaround for Stage-1 invalidation.
+
+   Architecturally, TLBI operations which invalidate only Stage-2
+   information (e.g. IPAS2E1IS) are not required to invalidate TLB
+   entries which combine information from Stage-1 and Stage-2
+   translation table entries, and consequently may not complete memory
+   accesses translated by those combined entries. In these cases,
+   completion of memory accesses is only guaranteed after subsequent
+   invalidation of Stage-1 information (e.g. VMALLE1IS).
+
+Rework the workaround logic as follows:
+ - add TLB_HELPER_LOCAL() to be used for local TLB ops without a
+   workaround,
+ - modify TLB_HELPER() workaround to use tlbi vale2is, xzr as a second
+   TLBI,
+ - drop TLB_HELPER_VA(). It's used only by __flush_xen_tlb_one_local
+   which is local and does not need workaround and by
+   __flush_xen_tlb_one. In the latter case, since it's used in a loop,
+   we don't need a workaround in the middle. Add __tlb_repeat_sync with
+   a workaround to be used at the end after DSB and before final ISB,
+ - TLBI VALE2IS passing XZR is used as an additional TLBI. While there is
+   an identity mapping there, it's used very rarely. The performance
+   impact is therefore negligible. If things change in the future, we
+   can revisit the decision.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7c502d7591519135765b8041cbd1c70e56e5a0b9)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
+index 61c25a318998..5483be08fbbe 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
+@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one(vaddr_t va)
+     asm volatile(STORE_CP32(0, TLBIMVAHIS) : : "r" (va) : "memory");
+ }
+ 
++/* Only for ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI */
++static inline void __tlb_repeat_sync(void) {}
++
+ #endif /* __ASM_ARM_ARM32_FLUSHTLB_H__ */
+ /*
+  * Local variables:
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
+index 3b99c11b50d1..1606b26bf28a 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
+@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@
+  * ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI:
+  * Modification of the translation table for a virtual address might lead to
+  * read-after-read ordering violation.
+- * The workaround repeats TLBI+DSB ISH operation for all the TLB flush
+- * operations. While this is strictly not necessary, we don't want to
+- * take any risk.
++ * The workaround repeats TLBI+DSB ISH operation for broadcast TLB flush
++ * operations. The workaround is not needed for local operations.
++ *
++ * It is sufficient for the additional TLBI to use *any* operation which will
++ * be broadcast, regardless of which translation regime or stage of translation
++ * the operation applies to. TLBI VALE2IS is used passing XZR. While there is
++ * an identity mapping there, it's only used during suspend/resume, CPU on/off,
++ * so the impact (performance if any) is negligible.
+  *
+  * For Xen page-tables the ISB will discard any instructions fetched
+  * from the old mappings.
+@@ -26,69 +31,90 @@
+  * Note that for local TLB flush, using non-shareable (nsh) is sufficient
+  * (see D5-4929 in ARM DDI 0487H.a). Although, the memory barrier in
+  * for the workaround is left as inner-shareable to match with Linux
+- * v6.1-rc8.
++ * v6.19.
+  */
+-#define TLB_HELPER(name, tlbop, sh)              \
++#define TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(name, tlbop)            \
+ static inline void name(void)                    \
+ {                                                \
+     asm_inline volatile (                        \
+-        "dsb  "  # sh  "st;"                     \
++        "dsb  nshst;"                            \
+         "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";"                    \
+-        ALTERNATIVE(                             \
+-            "nop; nop;",                         \
+-            "dsb  ish;"                          \
+-            "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";",               \
+-            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,        \
+-            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \
+-        "dsb  "  # sh  ";"                       \
++        "dsb  nsh;"                              \
+         "isb;"                                   \
+         : : : "memory");                         \
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * FLush TLB by VA. This will likely be used in a loop, so the caller
+- * is responsible to use the appropriate memory barriers before/after
+- * the sequence.
+- *
+- * See above about the ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI sequence.
+- */
+-#define TLB_HELPER_VA(name, tlbop)               \
+-static inline void name(vaddr_t va)              \
+-{                                                \
+-    asm_inline volatile (                        \
+-        "tlbi "  # tlbop  ", %0;"                \
+-        ALTERNATIVE(                             \
+-            "nop; nop;",                         \
+-            "dsb  ish;"                          \
+-            "tlbi "  # tlbop  ", %0;",           \
+-            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,        \
+-            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \
+-        : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");  \
++#define TLB_HELPER(name, tlbop)                       \
++static inline void name(void)                         \
++{                                                     \
++    asm_inline volatile (                             \
++        "dsb  ishst;"                                 \
++        "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";"                         \
++        ALTERNATIVE(                                  \
++            "nop; nop;",                              \
++            "dsb  ish;"                               \
++            "tlbi vale2is, xzr;",                     \
++            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,             \
++            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI)      \
++        "dsb  ish;"                                   \
++        "isb;"                                        \
++        : : : "memory"); \
+ }
+ 
+ /* Flush local TLBs, current VMID only. */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb_local, vmalls12e1, nsh)
++TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_guest_tlb_local, vmalls12e1)
+ 
+ /* Flush innershareable TLBs, current VMID only */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb, vmalls12e1is, ish)
++TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb, vmalls12e1is)
+ 
+ /* Flush local TLBs, all VMIDs, non-hypervisor mode */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb_local, alle1, nsh)
++TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_all_guests_tlb_local, alle1)
+ 
+ /* Flush innershareable TLBs, all VMIDs, non-hypervisor mode */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb, alle1is, ish)
++TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb, alle1is)
+ 
+ /* Flush all hypervisor mappings from the TLB of the local processor. */
+-TLB_HELPER(flush_xen_tlb_local, alle2, nsh)
++TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_xen_tlb_local, alle2)
++
++#undef TLB_HELPER_LOCAL
++#undef TLB_HELPER
++
++/*
++ * FLush TLB by VA. This will likely be used in a loop, so the caller
++ * is responsible to use the appropriate memory barriers before/after
++ * the sequence.
++ */
+ 
+ /* Flush TLB of local processor for address va. */
+-TLB_HELPER_VA(__flush_xen_tlb_one_local, vae2)
++static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one_local(vaddr_t va)
++{
++    asm_inline volatile (
++        "tlbi vae2, %0" : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");
++}
+ 
+ /* Flush TLB of all processors in the inner-shareable domain for address va. */
+-TLB_HELPER_VA(__flush_xen_tlb_one, vae2is)
++static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one(vaddr_t va)
++{
++    asm_inline volatile (
++        "tlbi vae2is, %0" : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");
++}
+ 
+-#undef TLB_HELPER
+-#undef TLB_HELPER_VA
++/*
++ * ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI:
++ * For all relevant erratas it is only necessary to execute a single
++ * additional TLBI;DSB sequence after any number of TLBIs are completed by DSB.
++ */
++static inline void __tlb_repeat_sync(void)
++{
++    asm_inline volatile (
++        ALTERNATIVE(
++            "nop; nop;",
++            "tlbi vale2is, xzr;"
++            "dsb  ish;",
++            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
++            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI)
++        : : : "memory");
++}
+ 
+ #endif /* __ASM_ARM_ARM64_FLUSHTLB_H__ */
+ /*
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
+index e45fb6d97b02..c292c3c00d29 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static inline void flush_xen_tlb_range_va(vaddr_t va,
+         va += PAGE_SIZE;
+     }
+     dsb(ish); /* Ensure the TLB invalidation has completed */
++    __tlb_repeat_sync();
+     isb();
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
+index 19c0ec63a59a..feafc14ebfda 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
+  *
+  *  Reserved to identity map Xen
+  *
++ *  Note: As part of ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI, VA 0 is used for an extra
++ *  TLBI operation given its rare use (only identity mapping) and thus
++ *  negligible performance impact.
++ *
+  * 0x00000a0000000000 - 0x00000a7fffffffff (512GB, L0 slot [20])
+  *  (Relative offsets)
+  *   0  -   2M   Unmapped

xsa493-4.21-02.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 7e70b87512c966248b1e8453d9ac54c643c06f44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 09:35:55 +0200
+Subject: xen/arm: Sync missing definitions for Arm CPUs with Linux
+
+Synchronize with Linux kernel 7.0 definitions for the following CPUs:
+ - Cortex-A76AE,
+ - Cortex-A78AE,
+ - Cortex-X1C,
+ - Cortex-X3,
+ - Neoverse-V2,
+ - Cortex-X4,
+ - Neoverse-V3AE,
+ - Neoverse-V3,
+ - Cortex-X925.
+
+These will be used for errata detection in subsequent patches.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
+index ec23fd098b63..907778683b08 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
+@@ -89,13 +89,22 @@
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76     0xD0B
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1    0xD0C
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77     0xD0D
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76AE   0xD0E
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1    0xD40
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78     0xD41
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78AE   0xD42
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1      0xD44
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710    0xD47
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2      0xD48
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2    0xD49
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C    0xD4B
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1C     0xD4C
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X3      0xD4E
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V2    0xD4F
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X4      0xD82
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE  0xD83
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3    0xD84
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925    0xD85
+ 
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A12 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A17 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17)
+@@ -110,13 +119,22 @@
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76)
+ #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)
++#define MIDR_CORTEX_A76AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76AE)
+ #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A78 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78)
++#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78AE)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_X1  MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_X2  MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2)
+ #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A78C MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C)
++#define MIDR_CORTEX_X1C MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1C)
++#define MIDR_CORTEX_X3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X3)
++#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V2)
++#define MIDR_CORTEX_X4 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X4)
++#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE)
++#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3)
++#define MIDR_CORTEX_X925 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925)
+ 
+ /* MPIDR Multiprocessor Affinity Register */
+ #define _MPIDR_UP           (30)

xsa493-4.21-03.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From c0f7b40fdbb986b3cf470ed51f3878261e33f9cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 09:35:56 +0200
+Subject: xen/arm: Add C1-Ultra definitions
+
+Add processor definitions for C1-Ultra. These will be used for errata
+detection in subsequent patches.
+
+These values can be found in the C1-Ultra TRM:
+
+  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108014/0100/
+
+... in section A.5.1 ("MIDR_EL1, Main ID Register").
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
+index 907778683b08..72745cca62bc 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
+@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE  0xD83
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3    0xD84
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925    0xD85
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA       0xD8C
+ 
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A12 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A17 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17)
+@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@
+ #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE)
+ #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_X925 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925)
++#define MIDR_C1_ULTRA MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA)
+ 
+ /* MPIDR Multiprocessor Affinity Register */
+ #define _MPIDR_UP           (30)

xsa493-4.21-04.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 6af67aeca418bffb807424eb3415fab59e581733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 09:35:57 +0200
+Subject: xen/arm: Add C1-Premium definitions
+
+Add processor definitions for C1-Premium. These will be used for errata
+detection in subsequent patches.
+
+These values can be found in the C1-Premium TRM:
+
+  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109416/0100/
+
+... in section A.5.1 ("MIDR_EL1, Main ID Register").
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
+index 72745cca62bc..25c5762c6706 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
++++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
+@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3    0xD84
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925    0xD85
+ #define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA       0xD8C
++#define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_PREMIUM     0xD90
+ 
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A12 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A17 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17)
+@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@
+ #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3)
+ #define MIDR_CORTEX_X925 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925)
+ #define MIDR_C1_ULTRA MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA)
++#define MIDR_C1_PREMIUM MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_PREMIUM)
+ 
+ /* MPIDR Multiprocessor Affinity Register */
+ #define _MPIDR_UP           (30)

xsa494-4.21.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+From 579016a359741044c9076bf0884e1dbab00ab080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 11:03:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/mm: accurately track which vCPU page-tables are loaded
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Neither current nor curr_vcpu per-CPU fields accurately track which
+page-tables are loaded.  There are corner cases when dealing with shadow
+paging failures that switch to the idle vCPU page-tables without changing
+current or curr_vcpu per-CPU fields.
+
+Introduce a new per-CPU field that attempts to track which vCPU page-tables
+are loaded.  Update such tracking when cr3 is changed, and do so in a
+region with interrupts disabled, as to avoid handling interrupts with a
+mismatch between the vCPU tracking field and the loaded page-tables.
+
+As a result of this newly more accurate tracking the mapcache override
+functionality can be removed: the dom0 PV builder was the only user of it,
+and it's updated here to properly signal which vCPU page-tables are loaded
+in the calls to switch_cr3_cr4().
+
+Note the EFI page-tables have the Xen owned L4 slots copied from the idle
+page-tables, so for the effects of the mapcache the EFI page-tables could
+use the idle mapcache if it had one.  Pass the idle vCPU in the
+switch_cr3_cr4() call that switches to the runtime EFI page-tables.
+
+There are known issues with the use of mapcache in NMI context.  This patch
+does not alter the behaviour.
+
+This is CVE-2026-42488 / XSA-494.
+
+Fixes: fb0ff49fe9f7 ("x86/shadow: defer releasing of PV's top-level shadow reference")
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c           | 48 ++++++++++++----------------
+ xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c              |  5 ++-
+ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h    |  1 -
+ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h  |  2 +-
+ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |  3 ++
+ xen/arch/x86/mm.c                    |  4 +--
+ xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c         | 12 +++----
+ xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c             | 13 ++++++--
+ xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c               |  1 +
+ xen/common/efi/common-stub.c         |  5 ---
+ xen/common/efi/runtime.c             | 21 +++++-------
+ xen/include/xen/efi.h                |  1 -
+ 12 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c
+index eac5e3304fb8..72c00194f315 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c
+@@ -18,48 +18,40 @@
+ #include <asm/hardirq.h>
+ #include <asm/setup.h>
+ 
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, override);
+-
+ static inline struct vcpu *mapcache_current_vcpu(void)
+ {
+-    /* In the common case we use the mapcache of the running VCPU. */
+-    struct vcpu *v = this_cpu(override) ?: current;
+-
+-    /*
+-     * When current isn't properly set up yet, this is equivalent to
+-     * running in an idle vCPU (callers must check for NULL).
+-     */
+-    if ( !v )
+-        return NULL;
++    struct vcpu *v = this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu);
++    struct vcpu *curr = current;
+ 
+     /*
+-     * When using efi runtime page tables, we have the equivalent of the idle
+-     * domain's page tables but current may point at another domain's VCPU.
+-     * Return NULL as though current is not properly set up yet.
++     * During early boot pgtable_vcpu is not set, callers must handle NULL.
++     * Non-PV domains don't have a mapcache, the directmap covers all physical
++     * address space.
+      */
+-    if ( efi_rs_using_pgtables() )
++    if ( !v || !is_pv_vcpu(v) )
+         return NULL;
+ 
+     /*
+-     * If guest_table is NULL, and we are running a paravirtualised guest,
+-     * then it means we are running on the idle domain's page table and must
+-     * therefore use its mapcache.
++     * If we are in a lazy context-switch state from a PV vCPU do a full switch
++     * to the idle vCPU now, otherwise an incoming FLUSH_VCPU_STATE IPI would
++     * change the page tables under our feet an invalidate any in-use mapcache
++     * entries.
+      */
+-    if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.guest_table)) && is_pv_vcpu(v) )
++    if ( unlikely(this_cpu(curr_vcpu) != curr) )
+     {
+-        /* If we really are idling, perform lazy context switch now. */
+-        if ( (v = idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()]) == current )
+-            sync_local_execstate();
++        ASSERT(curr == idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()]);
++        sync_local_execstate();
+         /* We must now be running on the idle page table. */
+         ASSERT(cr3_pa(read_cr3()) == __pa(idle_pg_table));
+     }
+ 
+-    return v;
+-}
+-
+-void __init mapcache_override_current(struct vcpu *v)
+-{
+-    this_cpu(override) = v;
++    /*
++     * At this point we can guarantee Xen is not in lazy context switch: either
++     * the code above will have synced the state, or an incoming
++     * FLUSH_VCPU_STATE IPI has done so behind our back.  Use ACCESS_ONCE to
++     * ensure the compiler never returns the locally cached pgtable_vcpu value.
++     */
++    return ACCESS_ONCE(this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu));
+ }
+ 
+ #define mapcache_l2_entry(e) ((e) >> PAGETABLE_ORDER)
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
+index 09e676c151fa..928bca66b433 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
+@@ -111,7 +111,9 @@ static void do_tlb_flush(void)
+     local_irq_restore(flags);
+ }
+ 
+-void switch_cr3_cr4(unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4)
++DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, pgtable_vcpu);
++
++void switch_cr3_cr4(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4)
+ {
+     unsigned long flags, old_cr4;
+     u32 t = 0;
+@@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ void switch_cr3_cr4(unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4)
+     if ( (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) > (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) )
+         cr3 |= X86_CR3_NOFLUSH;
+     write_cr3(cr3);
++    this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu) = v;
+ 
+     if ( old_cr4 != cr4 )
+         write_cr4(cr4);
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h
+index 828f42c3e448..10d2b9fe2546 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h
+@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ struct mapcache_domain {
+ 
+ int mapcache_domain_init(struct domain *d);
+ int mapcache_vcpu_init(struct vcpu *v);
+-void mapcache_override_current(struct vcpu *v);
+ 
+ /* x86/64: toggle guest between kernel and user modes. */
+ void toggle_guest_mode(struct vcpu *v);
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h
+index 7bcbca2b7f31..345677eb72ae 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline void invlpg(const void *p)
+ }
+ 
+ /* Write pagetable base and implicitly tick the tlbflush clock. */
+-void switch_cr3_cr4(unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4);
++void switch_cr3_cr4(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4);
+ 
+ /* flush_* flag fields: */
+  /*
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+index 2e087c625770..d2cacdfedb74 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+@@ -328,6 +328,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_page, tss_page);
+ 
+ DECLARE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
+ 
++/* vCPU of the currently loaded page-tables. */
++DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, pgtable_vcpu);
++
+ extern void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v);
+ 
+ /* PAUSE (encoding: REP NOP) is a good thing to insert into busy-wait loops. */
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+index 2b23bf2e7a75..d02c9862d387 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v)
+         cpu_info->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt));
+         if ( new_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE )
+             cpu_info->pv_cr3 |= get_pcid_bits(v, true);
+-        switch_cr3_cr4(v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
++        switch_cr3_cr4(v, v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
+     }
+     else
+     {
+@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v)
+         cpu_info->use_pv_cr3 = false;
+         cpu_info->xen_cr3 = 0;
+         /* switch_cr3_cr4() serializes. */
+-        switch_cr3_cr4(v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
++        switch_cr3_cr4(v, v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
+         cpu_info->pv_cr3 = 0;
+     }
+ }
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c
+index 37729091dfaa..42bc530c0f0d 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c
+@@ -828,8 +828,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
+     update_cr3(v);
+ 
+     /* We run on dom0's page tables for the final part of the build process. */
+-    switch_cr3_cr4(cr3_pa(v->arch.cr3), read_cr4());
+-    mapcache_override_current(v);
++    switch_cr3_cr4(v, cr3_pa(v->arch.cr3), read_cr4());
+ 
+     /* Copy the OS image and free temporary buffer. */
+     elf.dest_base = (void*)vkern_start;
+@@ -838,8 +837,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
+     rc = elf_load_binary(&elf);
+     if ( rc < 0 )
+     {
+-        mapcache_override_current(NULL);
+-        switch_cr3_cr4(current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
++        switch_cr3_cr4(current, current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
+         printk("Failed to load the kernel binary\n");
+         goto out;
+     }
+@@ -850,8 +848,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
+         if ( (parms.virt_hypercall < v_start) ||
+              (parms.virt_hypercall >= v_end) )
+         {
+-            mapcache_override_current(NULL);
+-            switch_cr3_cr4(current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
++            switch_cr3_cr4(current, current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
+             printk("Invalid HYPERCALL_PAGE field in ELF notes.\n");
+             return -EINVAL;
+         }
+@@ -992,8 +989,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* Return to idle domain's page tables. */
+-    mapcache_override_current(NULL);
+-    switch_cr3_cr4(current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
++    switch_cr3_cr4(current, current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
+ 
+     update_domain_wallclock_time(d);
+ 
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
+index ef4f442e7332..d9e52f5f88f3 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
+@@ -451,6 +451,8 @@ static void _toggle_guest_pt(struct vcpu *v)
+     pagetable_t old_shadow;
+     unsigned long cr3;
+ 
++    ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
++
+     v->arch.flags ^= TF_kernel_mode;
+     guest_update = v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode;
+     old_shadow = update_cr3(v);
+@@ -473,15 +475,22 @@ static void _toggle_guest_pt(struct vcpu *v)
+     {
+         cr3 &= ~X86_CR3_NOFLUSH;
+ 
++        local_irq_disable();
+         if ( unlikely(mfn_eq(pagetable_get_mfn(old_shadow),
+                              maddr_to_mfn(cr3))) )
+         {
+-            cr3 = idle_vcpu[v->processor]->arch.cr3;
+             /* Also suppress runstate/time area updates below. */
+             guest_update = false;
++
++            cr3 = idle_vcpu[v->processor]->arch.cr3;
++            this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu) = idle_vcpu[v->processor];
+         }
++
++        write_cr3(cr3);
++        local_irq_enable();
+     }
+-    write_cr3(cr3);
++    else
++        write_cr3(cr3);
+ 
+     if ( !pagetable_is_null(old_shadow) )
+         shadow_put_top_level(v->domain, old_shadow);
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+index 27628800a821..b37feab3bef4 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+@@ -1063,6 +1063,7 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
+ 
+     info->current_vcpu = idle_vcpu[cpu]; /* set_current() */
+     per_cpu(curr_vcpu, cpu) = idle_vcpu[cpu];
++    per_cpu(pgtable_vcpu, cpu) = idle_vcpu[cpu];
+ 
+     gdt = per_cpu(gdt, cpu) ?: alloc_xenheap_pages(0, memflags);
+     if ( gdt == NULL )
+diff --git a/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c b/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c
+index 77f138a6c574..7b12005bea3f 100644
+--- a/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c
++++ b/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c
+@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ bool efi_enabled(unsigned int feature)
+     return false;
+ }
+ 
+-bool efi_rs_using_pgtables(void)
+-{
+-    return false;
+-}
+-
+ unsigned long efi_get_time(void)
+ {
+     BUG();
+diff --git a/xen/common/efi/runtime.c b/xen/common/efi/runtime.c
+index 30d649ca5c1b..feb09acf754c 100644
+--- a/xen/common/efi/runtime.c
++++ b/xen/common/efi/runtime.c
+@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ const CHAR16 *__read_mostly efi_fw_vendor;
+ const EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES *__read_mostly efi_rs;
+ #ifndef CONFIG_ARM /* TODO - disabled until implemented on ARM */
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(efi_rs_lock);
+-static unsigned int efi_rs_on_cpu = NR_CPUS;
+ #endif
+ 
+ UINTN __read_mostly efi_memmap_size;
+@@ -92,6 +91,11 @@ struct efi_rs_state efi_rs_enter(void)
+     if ( mfn_eq(efi_l4_mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
+         return state;
+ 
++    /*
++     * If in lazy idle context switch state sync now to avoid an incoming
++     * FLUSH_VCPU_STATE IPI changing the loaded page-tables.
++     */
++    sync_local_execstate();
+     state.cr3 = read_cr3();
+     save_fpu_enable();
+     asm volatile ( "fnclex; fldcw %0" :: "m" (fcw) );
+@@ -99,8 +103,6 @@ struct efi_rs_state efi_rs_enter(void)
+ 
+     spin_lock(&efi_rs_lock);
+ 
+-    efi_rs_on_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+-
+     /* prevent fixup_page_fault() from doing anything */
+     irq_enter();
+ 
+@@ -115,7 +117,8 @@ struct efi_rs_state efi_rs_enter(void)
+         lgdt(&gdt_desc);
+     }
+ 
+-    switch_cr3_cr4(mfn_to_maddr(efi_l4_mfn), read_cr4());
++    switch_cr3_cr4(idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()], mfn_to_maddr(efi_l4_mfn),
++                   read_cr4());
+ 
+     /*
+      * At the time of writing (2022), no UEFI firwmare is CET-IBT compatible.
+@@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ void efi_rs_leave(struct efi_rs_state *state)
+     if ( state->msr_s_cet )
+         wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, state->msr_s_cet);
+ 
+-    switch_cr3_cr4(state->cr3, read_cr4());
++    switch_cr3_cr4(curr, state->cr3, read_cr4());
+     if ( is_pv_vcpu(curr) && !is_idle_vcpu(curr) )
+     {
+         struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {
+@@ -154,18 +157,10 @@ void efi_rs_leave(struct efi_rs_state *state)
+         lgdt(&gdt_desc);
+     }
+     irq_exit();
+-    efi_rs_on_cpu = NR_CPUS;
+     spin_unlock(&efi_rs_lock);
+     vcpu_restore_fpu_nonlazy(curr, true);
+ }
+ 
+-bool efi_rs_using_pgtables(void)
+-{
+-    return !mfn_eq(efi_l4_mfn, INVALID_MFN) &&
+-           (smp_processor_id() == efi_rs_on_cpu) &&
+-           (read_cr3() == mfn_to_maddr(efi_l4_mfn));
+-}
+-
+ unsigned long efi_get_time(void)
+ {
+     EFI_TIME time;
+diff --git a/xen/include/xen/efi.h b/xen/include/xen/efi.h
+index 723cb8085270..9953197ee553 100644
+--- a/xen/include/xen/efi.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/efi.h
+@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ extern bool efi_secure_boot;
+ 
+ void efi_init_memory(void);
+ bool efi_boot_mem_unused(unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end);
+-bool efi_rs_using_pgtables(void);
+ unsigned long efi_get_time(void);
+ void efi_halt_system(void);
+ void efi_reset_system(bool warm);
+-- 
+2.53.0
+