x86: Native Branch History Injection [XSA-456, CVE-2024-2201]

update to xen 4.17.4, remove patches now included upstream
  rebase xen.gcc12.fixes.patch
x86 HVM hypercalls may trigger Xen bug check [XSA-454, CVE-2023-46842]
x86: Incorrect logic for BTC/SRSO mitigations [XSA-455, CVE-2024-31142]

.gitignore

@@ -6,5 +6,4 @@ lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
 pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2
 zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
 polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz
-/mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz
-/xen-4.21.1.tar.xz
+/xen-4.17.4.tar.gz

CVE-2014-0150.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- xen-4.4.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c.orig	2014-07-02 15:54:37.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.4.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c	2014-11-18 20:50:13.593122915 +0000
+@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@
+         return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
+ 
+     if (mac_data.entries) {
+-        if (n->mac_table.in_use + mac_data.entries <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
++        if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES - mac_data.entries) {
+             memcpy(n->mac_table.macs + (n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN),
+                    elem->out_sg[2].iov_base + sizeof(mac_data),
+                    mac_data.entries * ETH_ALEN);

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5278.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c.orig	2015-09-26 17:27:49.494334726 +0100
++++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c	2015-09-26 17:31:53.107474932 +0100
+@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
+         if (index <= s->stop)
+             avail = s->stop - index;
+         else
+-            avail = 0;
++            break;
+         len = size;
+         if (len > avail)
+             len = avail;

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5279.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+--- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c	2015-09-26 17:27:49.494334726 +0100
+@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@
+     }
+ 
+     index = s->curpag << 8;
++    if (index >= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
++        index = s->start;
++    }
+     /* 4 bytes for header */
+     total_len = size + 4;
+     /* address for next packet (4 bytes for CRC) */
+@@ -387,15 +390,21 @@
+         offset = addr | (page << 4);
+         switch(offset) {
+         case EN0_STARTPG:
+-            s->start = val << 8;
++            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
++                s->start = val << 8;
++            }
+             s->tainted = 1;
+             break;
+         case EN0_STOPPG:
+-            s->stop = val << 8;
++            if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
++                s->stop = val << 8;
++            }
+             s->tainted = 1;
+             break;
+         case EN0_BOUNDARY:
+-            s->boundary = val;
++            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
++                s->boundary = val;
++            }
+             break;
+         case EN0_IMR:
+             s->imr = val;
+@@ -436,7 +445,9 @@
+             s->phys[offset - EN1_PHYS] = val;
+             break;
+         case EN1_CURPAG:
+-            s->curpag = val;
++            if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
++                s->curpag = val;
++            }
+             s->tainted = 1;
+             break;
+         case EN1_MULT ... EN1_MULT + 7:

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-6815.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c	2015-09-26 17:16:36.406544380 +0100
+@@ -461,7 +461,8 @@
+                 memmove(tp->data, tp->header, hdr);
+                 tp->size = hdr;
+             }
+-        } while (split_size -= bytes);
++            split_size -= bytes;
++        } while (bytes && split_size);
+     } else if (!tp->tse && tp->cptse) {
+         // context descriptor TSE is not set, while data descriptor TSE is set
+         DBGOUT(TXERR, "TCP segmentaion Error\n");

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7295.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+--- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.c.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.c	2015-10-10 16:57:01.806370020 +0100
+@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@
+     return vring_avail_idx(vq) == vq->last_avail_idx;
+ }
+ 
+-void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
+-                    unsigned int len, unsigned int idx)
++static void virtqueue_unmap_sg(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
++			       unsigned int len)
+ {
+     unsigned int offset;
+     int i;
+@@ -302,7 +302,19 @@
+         
+         offset += size;
+     }
++}
+ 
++void virtqueue_discard(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
++                       unsigned int len)
++{
++    vq->last_avail_idx--;
++    virtqueue_unmap_sg(vq, elem, len);
++}
++
++void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
++                    unsigned int len, unsigned int idx)
++{
++    virtqueue_unmap_sg(vq, elem, len);
+     idx = (idx + vring_used_idx(vq)) % vq->vring.num;
+ 
+     /* Get a pointer to the next entry in the used ring. */
+--- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.h.orig	2015-06-09 16:32:24.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio.h	2015-10-10 16:57:53.146216039 +0100
+@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@
+ void virtqueue_push(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
+                     unsigned int len);
+ void virtqueue_flush(VirtQueue *vq, unsigned int count);
++void virtqueue_discard(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
++                       unsigned int len);
+ void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
+                     unsigned int len, unsigned int idx);
+ 
+--- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c.orig	2015-10-10 16:10:05.071786348 +0100
++++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/virtio-net.c	2015-10-10 19:05:34.510029916 +0100
+@@ -424,11 +424,15 @@
+         len = iov_fill(sg, elem.in_num,
+                        buf + offset, size - offset);
+         total += len;
++        offset += len;
++        if (!n->mergeable_rx_bufs && offset < size) {
++            virtqueue_discard(n->rx_vq, &elem, total);
++            return;
++        }
+ 
+         /* signal other side */
+         virtqueue_fill(n->rx_vq, &elem, total, i++);
+ 
+-        offset += len;
+     }
+ 
+     if (mhdr)

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7512.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 8b98a2f07175d46c3f7217639bd5e03f2ec56343 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 15:00:06 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] pcnet: fix rx buffer overflow(CVE-2015-7512)
+
+Backends could provide a packet whose length is greater than buffer
+size. Check for this and truncate the packet to avoid rx buffer
+overflow in this case.
+
+Cc: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+---
+ tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c |    6 ++++++
+ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
+index 309c40b..1f4a3db 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/pcnet.c
+@@ -1064,6 +1064,12 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
+             int pktcount = 0;
+ 
+             if (!s->looptest) {
++                if (size > 4092) {
++#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
++                    fprintf(stderr, "pcnet: truncates rx packet.\n");
++#endif
++                    size = 4092;
++                }
+                 memcpy(src, buf, size);
+                 /* no need to compute the CRC */
+                 src[size] = 0;
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8345.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 00837731d254908a841d69298a4f9f077babaf24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
+Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 08:42:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] eepro100: Prevent two endless loops
+
+http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2015-11/msg04592.html
+shows an example how an endless loop in function action_command can
+be achieved.
+
+During my code review, I noticed a 2nd case which can result in an
+endless loop.
+
+Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+---
+ tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
+index 60333b7..685a478 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/eepro100.c
+@@ -774,6 +774,11 @@ static void tx_command(EEPRO100State *s)
+                 uint32_t tx_buffer_address = ldl_phys(tbd_address);
+                 uint16_t tx_buffer_size = lduw_phys(tbd_address + 4);
+                 //~ uint16_t tx_buffer_el = lduw_phys(tbd_address + 6);
++                if (tx_buffer_size == 0) {
++                    /* Prevent an endless loop. */
++                    logout("loop in %s:%u\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
++                    break;
++                }
+                 tbd_address += 8;
+                 logout
+                     ("TBD (simplified mode): buffer address 0x%08x, size 0x%04x\n",
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8504.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 4c65fed8bdf96780735dbdb92a8bd0d6b6526cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2015 18:54:17 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] ui: vnc: avoid floating point exception
+
+While sending 'SetPixelFormat' messages to a VNC server,
+the client could set the 'red-max', 'green-max' and 'blue-max'
+values to be zero. This leads to a floating point exception in
+write_png_palette while doing frame buffer updates.
+
+Reported-by: Lian Yihan <lianyihan@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+---
+ tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c |    6 +++---
+ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
+index 7538405..cbe4d33 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c
+@@ -2198,15 +2198,15 @@ static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
+     }
+ 
+     vs->clientds = vs->serverds;
+-    vs->clientds.pf.rmax = red_max;
++    vs->clientds.pf.rmax = red_max ? red_max : 0xFF;
+     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.rbits, red_max);
+     vs->clientds.pf.rshift = red_shift;
+     vs->clientds.pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
+-    vs->clientds.pf.gmax = green_max;
++    vs->clientds.pf.gmax = green_max ? green_max : 0xFF;
+     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.gbits, green_max);
+     vs->clientds.pf.gshift = green_shift;
+     vs->clientds.pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
+-    vs->clientds.pf.bmax = blue_max;
++    vs->clientds.pf.bmax = blue_max ? blue_max : 0xFF;
+     count_bits(vs->clientds.pf.bbits, blue_max);
+     vs->clientds.pf.bshift = blue_shift;
+     vs->clientds.pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1714.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+--- xen-4.6.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/fw_cfg.c.orig	2016-01-04 15:35:42.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.6.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/fw_cfg.c	2016-03-06 16:42:33.464296362 +0000
+@@ -54,11 +54,15 @@
+ static void fw_cfg_write(FWCfgState *s, uint8_t value)
+ {
+     int arch = !!(s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ARCH_LOCAL);
+-    FWCfgEntry *e = &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
++    FWCfgEntry *e = (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID) ? NULL :
++                     &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
+ 
+     FW_CFG_DPRINTF("write %d\n", value);
+ 
+-    if (s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_WRITE_CHANNEL && s->cur_offset < e->len) {
++    if (s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_WRITE_CHANNEL
++        && e != NULL
++        && e->callback
++        && s->cur_offset < e->len) {
+         e->data[s->cur_offset++] = value;
+         if (s->cur_offset == e->len) {
+             e->callback(e->callback_opaque, e->data);
+@@ -88,7 +92,8 @@
+ static uint8_t fw_cfg_read(FWCfgState *s)
+ {
+     int arch = !!(s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ARCH_LOCAL);
+-    FWCfgEntry *e = &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
++    FWCfgEntry *e = (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID) ? NULL :
++                    &s->entries[arch][s->cur_entry & FW_CFG_ENTRY_MASK];
+     uint8_t ret;
+ 
+     if (s->cur_entry == FW_CFG_INVALID || !e->data || s->cur_offset >= e->len)

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1981.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+*From*: 	Laszlo Ersek
+*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH] e1000: eliminate infinite loops on
+out-of-bounds transfer start
+*Date*: 	Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:17:20 +0100
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The start_xmit() and e1000_receive_iov() functions implement DMA transfers
+iterating over a set of descriptors that the guest's e1000 driver
+prepares:
+
+- the TDLEN and RDLEN registers store the total size of the descriptor
+  area,
+
+- while the TDH and RDH registers store the offset (in whole tx / rx
+  descriptors) into the area where the transfer is supposed to start.
+
+Each time a descriptor is processed, the TDH and RDH register is bumped
+(as appropriate for the transfer direction).
+
+QEMU already contains logic to deal with bogus transfers submitted by the
+guest:
+
+- Normally, the transmit case wants to increase TDH from its initial value
+  to TDT. (TDT is allowed to be numerically smaller than the initial TDH
+  value; wrapping at or above TDLEN bytes to zero is normal.) The failsafe
+  that QEMU currently has here is a check against reaching the original
+  TDH value again -- a complete wraparound, which should never happen.
+
+- In the receive case RDH is increased from its initial value until
+  "total_size" bytes have been received; preferably in a single step, or
+  in "s->rxbuf_size" byte steps, if the latter is smaller. However, null
+  RX descriptors are skipped without receiving data, while RDH is
+  incremented just the same. QEMU tries to prevent an infinite loop
+  (processing only null RX descriptors) by detecting whether RDH assumes
+  its original value during the loop. (Again, wrapping from RDLEN to 0 is
+  normal.)
+
+What both directions miss is that the guest could program TDLEN and RDLEN
+so low, and the initial TDH and RDH so high, that these registers will
+immediately be truncated to zero, and then never reassume their initial
+values in the loop -- a full wraparound will never occur.
+
+The condition that expresses this is:
+
+  xdh_start >= s->mac_reg[XDLEN] / sizeof(desc)
+
+i.e., TDH or RDH start out after the last whole rx or tx descriptor that
+fits into the TDLEN or RDLEN sized area.
+
+This condition could be checked before we enter the loops, but
+pci_dma_read() / pci_dma_write() knows how to fill in buffers safely for
+bogus DMA addresses, so we just extend the existing failsafes with the
+above condition.
+
+Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <address@hidden>
+Cc: Petr Matousek <address@hidden>
+Cc: Stefano Stabellini <address@hidden>
+Cc: Prasad Pandit <address@hidden>
+Cc: Michael Roth <address@hidden>
+Cc: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
+RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1296044
+Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <address@hidden>
+Reviewed-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
+---
+
+Notes:
+    Regarding the public posting: we made an honest effort to vet this
+    vulnerability, and the impact seems low -- no host side reads/writes,
+    "just" a DoS (infinite loop). We decided the patch could be posted
+    publicly, for the usual review process. Jason and Prasad checked the
+    patch in the internal discussion already, but comments, improvements
+    etc. are clearly welcome. The CVE request is underway. Thanks.
+
+ hw/net/e1000.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
+index bec06e9..34d0823 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/e1000.c
+@@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ start_xmit(E1000State *s)
+          * bogus values to TDT/TDLEN.
+          * there's nothing too intelligent we could do about this.
+          */
+-        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start) {
++        if (s->mac_reg[TDH] == tdh_start ||
++            tdh_start >= s->mac_reg[TDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
+             DBGOUT(TXERR, "TDH wraparound @%x, TDT %x, TDLEN %x\n",
+                    tdh_start, s->mac_reg[TDT], s->mac_reg[TDLEN]);
+             break;
+@@ -1165,7 +1166,8 @@ e1000_receive_iov(NetClientState *nc, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt)
+             s->mac_reg[RDH] = 0;
+         s->check_rxov = 1;
+         /* see comment in start_xmit; same here */
+-        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start) {
++        if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == rdh_start ||
++            rdh_start >= s->mac_reg[RDLEN] / sizeof(desc)) {
+             DBGOUT(RXERR, "RDH wraparound @%x, RDT %x, RDLEN %x\n",
+                    rdh_start, s->mac_reg[RDT], s->mac_reg[RDLEN]);
+             set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2538.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+When processing remote NDIS control message packets,
+the USB Net device emulator uses a fixed length(4096) data buffer.
+The incoming informationBufferOffset & Length combination could
+overflow and cross that range. Check control message buffer
+offsets and length to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/usb/dev-network.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Update as per review
+  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg03475.html
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-network.c b/hw/usb/dev-network.c
+index 8a4ff49..180adce 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/usb-net.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/usb-net.c
+@@ -915,8 +915,9 @@ static int rndis_query_response(USBNetState *s,
+ 
+     bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
+     buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
+-    if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
++    if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
+         return USB_RET_STALL;
++    }
+ 
+     infobuflen = ndis_query(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
+                             bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen, infobuf,
+@@ -961,8 +962,9 @@ static int rndis_set_response(USBNetState *s,
+ 
+     bufoffs = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) + 8;
+     buflen = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength);
+-    if (bufoffs + buflen > length)
++    if (buflen > length || bufoffs >= length || bufoffs + buflen > length) {
+         return USB_RET_STALL;
++    }
+ 
+     ret = ndis_set(s, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID),
+                     bufoffs + (uint8_t *) buf, buflen);
+@@ -1212,8 +1214,9 @@ static void usb_net_handle_dataout(USBNetState *s, USBPacket *p)
+     if (le32_to_cpu(msg->MessageType) == RNDIS_PACKET_MSG) {
+         uint32_t offs = 8 + le32_to_cpu(msg->DataOffset);
+         uint32_t size = le32_to_cpu(msg->DataLength);
+-        if (offs + size <= len)
++        if (offs < len && size < len && offs + size <= len) {
+             qemu_send_packet(s->vc, s->out_buf + offs, size);
++        }
+     }
+     s->out_ptr -= len;
+     memmove(s->out_buf, &s->out_buf[len], s->out_ptr);
+-- 
+2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2841.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+Ne2000 NIC uses ring buffer of NE2000_MEM_SIZE(49152)
+bytes to process network packets. Registers PSTART & PSTOP
+define ring buffer size & location. Setting these registers
+to invalid values could lead to infinite loop or OOB r/w
+access issues. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Yang Hongke <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+Update per review:
+  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg05522.html
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c
+index b032212..ced4666 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/ne2000.c
+@@ -154,6 +154,10 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
+ {
+     int avail, index, boundary;
+ 
++    if (s->stop <= s->start) {
++        return 1;
++    }
++
+     index = s->curpag << 8;
+     boundary = s->boundary << 8;
+     if (index < boundary)
+-- 
+2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2857.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+While computing IP checksum, 'net_checksum_calculate' reads
+payload length from the packet. It could exceed the given 'data'
+buffer size. Add a check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Liu Ling <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ net/checksum.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+Update as per review:
+  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-02/msg06121.html
+
+diff --git a/net/checksum.c b/net/checksum.c
+index 14c0855..0942437 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/net-checksum.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/net-checksum.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
+     int hlen, plen, proto, csum_offset;
+     uint16_t csum;
+ 
++    /* Ensure data has complete L2 & L3 headers. */
++    if (length < 14 + 20) {
++        return;
++    }
++
+     if ((data[14] & 0xf0) != 0x40)
+ 	return; /* not IPv4 */
+     hlen  = (data[14] & 0x0f) * 4;
+@@ -76,8 +81,9 @@ void net_checksum_calculate(uint8_t *data, int length)
+ 	return;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (plen < csum_offset+2)
+-	return;
++    if (plen < csum_offset + 2 || 14 + hlen + plen > length) {
++        return;
++    }
+ 
+     data[14+hlen+csum_offset]   = 0;
+     data[14+hlen+csum_offset+1] = 0;
+-- 
+2.5.0

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4001.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 3a15cc0e1ee7168db0782133d2607a6bfa422d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2016 11:33:48 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: stellaris_enet: check packet length against receive buffer
+
+When receiving packets over Stellaris ethernet controller, it
+uses receive buffer of size 2048 bytes. In case the controller
+accepts large(MTU) packets, it could lead to memory corruption.
+Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Oleksandr Bazhaniuk <oleksandr.bazhaniuk@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 1460095428-22698-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+---
+ tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c |   12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
+index 84cf60b..6880894 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/stellaris_enet.c
+@@ -236,8 +236,18 @@ static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, si
+     n = s->next_packet + s->np;
+     if (n >= 31)
+         n -= 31;
+-    s->np++;
+ 
++    if (size >= sizeof(s->rx[n].data) - 6) {
++        /* If the packet won't fit into the
++         * emulated 2K RAM, this is reported
++         * as a FIFO overrun error.
++         */
++        s->ris |= SE_INT_FOV;
++        stellaris_enet_update(s);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    s->np++;
+     s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
+     p = s->rx[n].data;
+     *(p++) = (size + 6);
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4002.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+When receiving packets over MIPSnet network device, it uses
+ receive buffer of size 1514 bytes. In case the controller
+accepts large(MTU) packets, it could lead to memory corruption.
+Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported by: Oleksandr Bazhaniuk <address@hidden>
+
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
+index f261011..e134b31 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/mipsnet.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static ssize_t mipsnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t si
+     if (!mipsnet_can_receive(opaque))
+         return;
+ 
++    if (size >= sizeof(s->rx_buffer)) {
++        return;
++    }
+     s->busy = 1;
+ 
+     /* Just accept everything. */
+-- 
+2.5.5
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4439.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+*From*: 	P J P
+*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/2] scsi: check command buffer length
+before write(CVE-2016-4439)
+*Date*: 	Thu, 19 May 2016 16:09:30 +0530
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte
+FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer. While
+writing to this command buffer 's->cmdbuf[TI_BUFSZ=16]', a check
+was missing to validate input length. Add check to avoid OOB write
+access.
+
+Fixes CVE-2016-4439
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/scsi/esp.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+index 8961be2..01497e6 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+@@ -448,7 +448,11 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
+         break;
+     case ESP_FIFO:
+         if (s->do_cmd) {
+-            s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
++            if (s->cmdlen < TI_BUFSZ) {
++                s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
++            } else {
++                ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
++            }
+         } else if (s->ti_size == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
+             ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
+         } else {
+-- 
+2.5.5
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4441.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+*From*: 	P J P
+*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH 2/2] scsi: check dma length before
+reading scsi command(CVE-2016-4441)
+*Date*: 	Thu, 19 May 2016 16:09:31 +0530
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte
+FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer.
+Routine get_cmd() uses DMA to read scsi commands into this buffer.
+Add check to validate DMA length against buffer size to avoid any
+overrun.
+
+Fixes CVE-2016-4441
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/scsi/esp.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+index 01497e6..591c817 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ void esp_request_cancelled(SCSIRequest *req)
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf)
++static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t buflen)
+ {
+     uint32_t dmalen;
+     int target;
+@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf)
+     target = s->wregs[ESP_WBUSID] & BUSID_DID;
+     if (s->dma) {
+         dmalen = s->rregs[ESP_TCLO] | (s->rregs[ESP_TCMID] << 8);
++        if (dmalen > buflen) {
++            return 0;
++        }
+         s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, buf, dmalen);
+     } else {
+         dmalen = s->ti_size;
+@@ -166,7 +169,7 @@ static void handle_satn(ESPState *s)
+     uint8_t buf[32];
+     int len;
+ 
+-    len = get_cmd(s, buf);
++    len = get_cmd(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
+     if (len)
+         do_cmd(s, buf);
+ }
+@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ static void handle_satn_stop(ESPState *s)
+ 
+ static void handle_satn_stop(ESPState *s)
+ {
+-    s->cmdlen = get_cmd(s, s->cmdbuf);
++    s->cmdlen = get_cmd(s, s->cmdbuf, sizeof(s->cmdbuf));
+     if (s->cmdlen) {
+         DPRINTF("Set ATN & Stop: cmdlen %d\n", s->cmdlen);
+         s->do_cmd = 1;
+-- 
+2.5.5
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5238.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+*From*: 	Paolo Bonzini
+*Subject*: 	Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] scsi: check buffer length before
+reading scsi command
+*Date*: 	Wed, 1 Jun 2016 15:10:16 +0200
+*User-agent*: 	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
+Thunderbird/45.1.0
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+On 31/05/2016 19:53, P J P wrote:
+>/ From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>/
+>/ /
+>/ The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with an internal 16-byte/
+>/ FIFO buffer. It is used to handle command and data transfer./
+>/ Routine get_cmd() in non-DMA mode, uses 'ti_size' to read scsi/
+>/ command into a buffer. Add check to validate command length against/
+>/ buffer size to avoid any overrun./
+>/ /
+>/ Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>/
+>/ Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>/
+>/ ---/
+>/  hw/scsi/esp.c | 3 +++/
+>/  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)/
+>/ /
+>/ diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
+>/ index 60c1b28..953027a 100644/
+>/ --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
+>/ +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c/
+>/ @@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static uint32_t get_cmd(ESPState *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t /
+>/ buflen)/
+>/          s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, buf, dmalen);/
+>/      } else {/
+>/          dmalen = s->ti_size;/
+>/ +        if (dmalen > TI_BUFSZ) {/
+>/ +            return 0;/
+>/ +        }/
+>/          memcpy(buf, s->ti_buf, dmalen);/
+>/          buf[0] = buf[2] >> 5;/
+>/      }/
+>/ /
+
+In theory this shouldn't happen, but I agree that it is better to be
+defensive.  I'm queuing this patch.
+
+At least the following patch is needed to ensure that ti_size always
+matches ti_rptr/ti_wptr (Hervé, what do you think about it? should I
+resubmit it formally?).  Also, things are more complicated than
+necessary due to ti_size being used for both DMA and FIFO transfers.
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+index c2f6f8f..6407844 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void write_response(ESPState *s)
+     } else {
+         s->ti_size = 2;
+         s->ti_rptr = 0;
+-        s->ti_wptr = 0;
++        s->ti_wptr = 2;
+         s->rregs[ESP_RFLAGS] = 2;
+     }
+     esp_raise_irq(s);
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5338.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+*From*: 	P J P
+*Subject*: 	[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3] scsi: esp: check TI buffer index
+before read/write
+*Date*: 	Mon, 6 Jun 2016 22:04:43 +0530
+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+The 53C9X Fast SCSI Controller(FSC) comes with internal 16-byte
+FIFO buffers. One is used to handle commands and other is for
+information transfer. Three control variables 'ti_rptr',
+'ti_wptr' and 'ti_size' are used to control r/w access to the
+information transfer buffer ti_buf[TI_BUFSZ=16]. In that,
+
+'ti_rptr' is used as read index, where read occurs.
+'ti_wptr' is a write index, where write would occur.
+'ti_size' indicates total bytes to be read from the buffer.
+
+While reading/writing to this buffer, index could exceed its
+size. Add check to avoid OOB r/w access.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/scsi/esp.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+Update as per:
+  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-06/msg01326.html
+
+diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+index c2f6f8f..4b94bbc 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/esp.c
+@@ -403,18 +403,17 @@ uint64_t esp_reg_read(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr)
+     DPRINTF("read reg[%d]: 0x%2.2x\n", saddr, s->rregs[saddr]);
+     switch (saddr) {
+     case ESP_FIFO:
+-        if (s->ti_size > 0) {
++        if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
++            /* Data out.  */
++            ESP_ERROR("PIO data read not implemented\n");
++            s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
++            esp_raise_irq(s);
++        } else if (s->ti_rptr < s->ti_wptr) {
+             s->ti_size--;
+-            if ((s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] & STAT_PIO_MASK) == 0) {
+-                /* Data out.  */
+-                ESP_ERROR("PIO data read not implemented\n");
+-                s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = 0;
+-            } else {
+-                s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
+-            }
++            s->rregs[ESP_FIFO] = s->ti_buf[s->ti_rptr++];
+             esp_raise_irq(s);
+         }
+-        if (s->ti_size == 0) {
++        if (s->ti_rptr == s->ti_wptr) {
+             s->ti_rptr = 0;
+             s->ti_wptr = 0;
+         }
+@@ -459,7 +457,7 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
+             } else {
+                 ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
+             }
+-        } else if (s->ti_size == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
++        } else if (s->ti_wptr == TI_BUFSZ - 1) {
+             ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
+         } else {
+             s->ti_size++;
+-- 
+2.5.5
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-6351.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 926cde5f3e4d2504ed161ed0cb771ac7cad6fd11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 00:22:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] scsi: esp: make cmdbuf big enough for maximum CDB size
+
+While doing DMA read into ESP command buffer 's->cmdbuf', it could
+write past the 's->cmdbuf' area, if it was transferring more than 16
+bytes.  Increase the command buffer size to 32, which is maximum when
+'s->do_cmd' is set, and add a check on 'len' to avoid OOB access.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/esp.c         |    6 ++++--
+ hw/esp.c |    3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/esp.c b/hw/esp.c
+index 64680b3..baa0a2c 100644
+--- a/hw/esp.c
++++ b/hw/esp.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include "hw.h"
+ #include "scsi-disk.h"
+ #include "scsi.h"
++#include <assert.h>
+ 
+ /* debug ESP card */
+ //#define DEBUG_ESP
+@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ static void esp_do_dma(ESPState *s)
+     len = s->dma_left;
+     if (s->do_cmd) {
+         DPRINTF("command len %d + %d\n", s->cmdlen, len);
++        assert (s->cmdlen <= sizeof(s->cmdbuf) &&
++                len <= sizeof(s->cmdbuf) - s->cmdlen);
+         s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, &s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen], len);
+         s->ti_size = 0;
+         s->cmdlen = 0;
+@@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ static void handle_ti(ESPState *s)
+     s->dma_counter = dmalen;
+ 
+     if (s->do_cmd)
+-        minlen = (dmalen < 32) ? dmalen : 32;
++        minlen = (dmalen < ESP_CMDBUF_SZ) ? dmalen : ESP_CMDBUF_SZ;
+     else if (s->ti_size < 0)
+         minlen = (dmalen < -s->ti_size) ? dmalen : -s->ti_size;
+     else
+@@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ void esp_reg_write(ESPState *s, uint32_t saddr, uint64_t val)
+         break;
+     case ESP_FIFO:
+         if (s->do_cmd) {
+-            if (s->cmdlen < TI_BUFSZ) {
++            if (s->cmdlen < ESP_CMDBUF_SZ) {
+                 s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen++] = val & 0xff;
+             } else {
+                 ESP_ERROR("fifo overrun\n");
+diff --git a/hw/esp.c b/hw/esp.c
+index 6c79527..d2c4886 100644
+--- a/hw/esp.c
++++ b/hw/esp.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ void esp_init(hwaddr espaddr, int it_shift,
+ 
+ #define ESP_REGS 16
+ #define TI_BUFSZ 16
++#define ESP_CMDBUF_SZ 32
+ 
+ typedef struct ESPState ESPState;
+ 
+@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ struct ESPState {
+     uint32_t dma;
+     SCSIDevice *scsi_dev[ESP_MAX_DEVS];
+     SCSIDevice *current_dev;
+-    uint8_t cmdbuf[TI_BUFSZ];
++    uint8_t cmdbuf[ESP_CMDBUF_SZ];
+     uint32_t cmdlen;
+     uint32_t do_cmd;
+ 
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8669.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 3592fe0c919cf27a81d8e9f9b4f269553418bb01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 11:28:08 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] char: serial: check divider value against baud base
+
+16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
+(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
+be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
+greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
+divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <1476251888-20238-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/char/serial.c |    3 ++-
+ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/serial.c b/hw/serial.c
+index 3442f47..eec72b7 100644
+--- a/hw/serial.c
++++ b/hw/serial.c
+@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
+     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
+     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
+ 
+-    if (s->divider == 0)
++    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
+         return;
++    }
+ 
+     frame_size = 1;
+     if (s->lcr & 0x08) {
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8910.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+
+RTL8139 ethernet controller in C+ mode supports multiple
+descriptor rings, each with maximum of 64 descriptors. While
+processing transmit descriptor ring in 'rtl8139_cplus_transmit',
+it does not limit the descriptor count and runs forever. Add
+check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Andrew Henderson <address@hidden>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
+---
+ hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/rtl8139.c b/hw/rtl8139.c
+index 3345bc6..f05e59c 100644
+--- a/hw/rtl8139.c
++++ b/hw/rtl8139.c
+@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static void rtl8139_cplus_transmit(RTL8139State *s)
+ {
+     int txcount = 0;
+ 
+-    while (rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
++    while (txcount < 64 && rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
+     {
+         ++txcount;
+     }
+-- 
+2.7.4

qemu.trad.CVE-2016-9776.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 77d54985b85a0cb760330ec2bd92505e0a2a97a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 00:38:39 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: check receive buffer size register value
+
+ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses a receive buffer size
+register(EMRBR) to hold maximum size of all receive buffers.
+It is set by a user before any operation. If it was set to be
+zero, ColdFire emulator would go into an infinite loop while
+receiving data in mcf_fec_receive. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/net/mcf_fec.c |    2 +-
+ 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/mcf_fec.c b/hw/mcf_fec.c
+index dc61bac..4025eb3 100644
+--- a/hw/mcf_fec.c
++++ b/hw/mcf_fec.c
+@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+         s->tx_descriptor = s->etdsr;
+         break;
+     case 0x188:
+-        s->emrbr = value & 0x7f0;
++        s->emrbr = value > 0 ? value & 0x7F0 : 0x7F0;
+         break;
+     default:
+         cpu_abort(cpu_single_env, "mcf_fec_write Bad address 0x%x\n",
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-6505.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 02:23:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
+
+The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
+limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5899a02e.45ca240a.6c373.93c1@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/usb-ohci.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb-ohci.c b/hw/usb-ohci.c
+index 2cba3e3..21c93e0 100644
+--- a/hw/usb-ohci.c
++++ b/hw/usb-ohci.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
+ 
+ #define OHCI_MAX_PORTS 15
+ 
++#define ED_LINK_LIMIT 4
++
+ static int64_t usb_frame_time;
+ static int64_t usb_bit_time;
+ 
+@@ -1184,7 +1186,7 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
+     uint32_t next_ed;
+     uint32_t cur;
+     int active;
+-
++    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
+     active = 0;
+ 
+     if (head == 0)
+@@ -1199,6 +1201,10 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
+ 
+         next_ed = ed.next & OHCI_DPTR_MASK;
+ 
++        if (++link_cnt > ED_LINK_LIMIT) {
++            return 0;
++        }
++
+         if ((ed.head & OHCI_ED_H) || (ed.flags & OHCI_ED_K)) {
+             uint32_t addr;
+             /* Cancel pending packets for ED that have been paused.  */
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-7718.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 215902d7b6fb50c6fc216fc74f770858278ed904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:39:19 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fix :cirrus_vga fix OOB read case qemu Segmentation fault
+
+check the validity of parameters in cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_xxx
+and cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_xxx to avoid the OOB read which causes qemu Segmentation fault.
+
+After the fix, we will touch the assert in
+cirrus_invalidate_region:
+assert(off_cur_end >= off_cur);
+
+Signed-off-by: fangying <fangying1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
+Message-id: 20170314063919.16200-1-hangaohuai@huawei.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h b/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+index 0925a00..b7447f8 100644
+--- a/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
++++ b/hw/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+@@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     src = src_ - src_base;
+     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
+     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
++
++    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
++        return;
++    }
++
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+ 	    p = *(dst_base + m(dst));
+@@ -143,6 +148,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     src = src_ - src_base;
+     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
+     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
++
++    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
++        return;
++    }
++
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
+ 	    p1 = *(dst_base + m(dst));
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-8309.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 3268a845f41253fb55852a8429c32b50f36f349a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 09:56:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: release capture buffers
+
+AUD_add_capture() allocates two buffers which are never released.
+Add the missing calls to AUD_del_capture().
+
+Impact: Allows vnc clients to exhaust host memory by repeatedly
+starting and stopping audio capture.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2017-8309
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
+Reported-by: "Jiangxin (hunter, SCC)" <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20170428075612.9997-1-kraxel@redhat.com
+---
+ audio/audio.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/audio/audio.c b/audio/audio.c
+index c8898d8..beafed2 100644
+--- a/audio/audio.c
++++ b/audio/audio.c
+@@ -2028,6 +2028,8 @@ void AUD_del_capture (CaptureVoiceOut *cap, void *cb_opaque)
+                     sw = sw1;
+                 }
+                 LIST_REMOVE (cap, entries);
++                qemu_free (cap->hw.mix_buf);
++                qemu_free (cap->buf);
+                 qemu_free (cap);
+             }
+             return;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

qemu.trad.CVE-2017-9330.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 03:15:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: fix error return code in servicing iso td
+
+It should return 1 if an error occurs when reading iso td.
+This will avoid an infinite loop issue in ohci_service_ed_list.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5899ac3e.1033240a.944d5.9a2d@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/usb-ohci.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb-ohci.c b/hw/usb-ohci.c
+index c82a92f..2cba3e3 100644
+--- a/hw/usb-ohci.c
++++ b/hw/usb-ohci.c
+@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static int ohci_service_iso_td(OHCIState *ohci, struct ohci_ed *ed,
+ 
+     if (!ohci_read_iso_td(addr, &iso_td)) {
+         printf("usb-ohci: ISO_TD read error at %x\n", addr);
+-        return 0;
++        return 1;
+     }
+ 
+     starting_frame = OHCI_BM(iso_td.flags, TD_SF);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

qemu.trad.bug1399055.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 4299b90e9ba9ce5ca9024572804ba751aa1a7e70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 13:15:17 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: check vga bits per pixel(bpp) value
+
+In Cirrus CLGD 54xx VGA Emulator, if cirrus graphics mode is VGA,
+'cirrus_get_bpp' returns zero(0), which could lead to a divide
+by zero error in while copying pixel data. The same could occur
+via blit pitch values. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 1476776717-24807-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/cirrus_vga.c |   14 ++++++++++----
+ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
+index 3d712d5..bdb092e 100644
+--- a/hw/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
+ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
+ {
++    if (!pitch) {
++        return true;
++    }
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
+@@ -715,7 +718,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+                                             s->cirrus_addr_mask));
+ }
+ 
+-static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
++static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ {
+     int sx = 0, sy = 0;
+     int dx = 0, dy = 0;
+@@ -729,6 +732,9 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+         int width, height;
+ 
+         depth = s->get_bpp((VGAState *)s) / 8;
++        if (!depth) {
++            return 0;
++        }
+         s->get_resolution((VGAState *)s, &width, &height);
+ 
+         /* extra x, y */
+@@ -783,6 +789,8 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+ 				s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
+ 				s->cirrus_blt_height);
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+@@ -790,11 +798,9 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+     if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
++    return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
+             s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
+             s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+-
+-    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /***************************************
+-- 
+1.7.0.4
+

sources

@@ -4,5 +4,4 @@ SHA512 (newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz) = 40eb96bbc6736a16b6399e0cdb73e853d0d90b685c967e77
 SHA512 (zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz) = 021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e
 SHA512 (polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz) = 88da614e4d3f4409c4fd3bb3e44c7587ba051e3fed4e33d526069a67e8180212e1ea22da984656f50e290049f60ddca65383e5983c0f8884f648d71f698303ad
 SHA512 (pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2) = 2b3d98d027e46d8c08037366dde6f0781ca03c610ef2b380984639e4ef39899ed8d8b8e4cd9c9dc54df101279b95879bd66bfd4d04ad07fef41e847ea7ae32b5
-SHA512 (mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz) = 7543774d15da84476d93d04154990923c82209cb3fa125574c0383652c5a310957200f54b63b34502161f9c3afce4907e0060d9036f3eaf3a7cb6b1b3119b546
-SHA512 (xen-4.21.1.tar.xz) = 8dfe65255e202b3dacf9d0d7265636bc1f97627c11b08babc13a5b8e74c7c65e7e2c6a1513e28b3c713fe512edb6702a73b2bf667e2a8f2ce825b196a2cd5aab
+SHA512 (xen-4.17.4.tar.gz) = 50dc2efd26e48131afdbc8efb1ca90154a84fe5fba5a6bc81d9801a3c13aebea91c8211872b5c69ce2773644f2c935c31cc56584a05b10b81e8728282d89eb84

xen.canonicalize.patch

@@ -1,54 +1,45 @@
---- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/watch.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/watch.c	2023-10-02 16:12:14.971264769 +0100
-@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
- 			    const char **path, bool *relative)
- {
- 	*relative = !strstarts(*path, "/") && !strstarts(*path, "@");
--	*path = canonicalize(conn, ctx, *path, true);
-+	*path = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, *path, true);
- 
- 	return *path ? 0 : errno;
- }
-@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@
+--- xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c.orig	2017-04-12 16:18:57.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c	2017-04-13 21:17:12.255231094 +0100
+@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
+ 			goto inval;
+ 	} else {
+ 		*relative = !strstarts(*path, "/");
+-		*path = canonicalize(conn, ctx, *path);
++		*path = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, *path);
+ 		if (!*path)
+ 			return errno;
+ 		if (!is_valid_nodename(*path))
+@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@
  	if (get_strings(in, vec, ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) != ARRAY_SIZE(vec))
  		return EINVAL;
  
--	node = canonicalize(conn, ctx, vec[0], true);
-+	node = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, vec[0], true);
+-	node = canonicalize(conn, ctx, vec[0]);
++	node = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, vec[0]);
  	if (!node)
- 		return errno;
+ 		return ENOMEM;
  	list_for_each_entry(watch, &conn->watches, list) {
---- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.c	2023-10-02 16:12:14.993264626 +0100
-@@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@
+--- xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c.orig	2017-04-12 16:18:57.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.9.0-rc1.2/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c	2017-04-13 21:19:35.668429881 +0100
+@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@
  	return strings;
  }
  
--const char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
-+const char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 			 const char *node, bool allow_special)
+-char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node)
++char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node)
  {
- 	const char *name;
-@@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@
- {
- 	struct node *node;
+ 	const char *prefix;
  
--	*canonical_name = canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
-+	*canonical_name = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
+@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!canonical_name)
+ 		canonical_name = &tmp_name;
+-	*canonical_name = canonicalize(conn, ctx, name);
++	*canonical_name = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, name);
  	if (!*canonical_name)
  		return NULL;
- 
-@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@
- 	const char *tmp_name;
- 	const struct node *node;
- 
--	tmp_name = canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
-+	tmp_name = xenstore_canonicalize(conn, ctx, name, allow_special);
- 	if (!tmp_name)
- 		return NULL;
- 
---- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c	2023-10-02 16:12:15.001264574 +0100
+ 	return get_node(conn, ctx, *canonical_name, perm);
+--- xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c.orig	2016-12-05 12:03:27.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-dom0.c	2017-02-26 21:52:24.554678631 +0000
 @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  	}
  }
@@ -85,8 +76,8 @@
  			fprintf(stderr, "%s", line);
  		} while (strcmp(line, "Okay.\n") != 0);
  
---- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c	2023-10-02 16:12:15.008264528 +0100
+--- xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c.orig	2016-12-05 12:03:27.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.8.0/tools/console/testsuite/console-domU.c	2017-02-26 21:52:50.320622804 +0000
 @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  #include <termios.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
@@ -105,14 +96,14 @@
  	seed = strtoul(line, 0, 0);
  
  	printf("Seed Okay.\n"); fflush(stdout);
---- xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.h.orig	2023-09-29 09:09:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ xen-4.18.0-rc1/tools/xenstored/core.h	2023-10-02 16:12:15.015264482 +0100
-@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
+--- xen-4.14.1/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h.orig	2020-12-17 16:47:25.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.14.1/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h	2020-12-17 20:13:10.806887309 +0000
+@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
  void send_ack(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type);
  
  /* Canonicalize this path if possible. */
--const char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
-+const char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 			 const char *node, bool allow_special);
+-char *canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node);
++char *xenstore_canonicalize(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *node);
  
  /* Get access permissions. */
+ unsigned int perm_for_conn(struct connection *conn,

xen.drop.brctl.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+--- xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux.orig	2017-09-15 19:37:27.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.11.0-rc7/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux	2018-07-03 20:17:52.934780235 +0100
+@@ -34,4 +34,4 @@
+ fi
+ 
+ ifconfig $1 0.0.0.0 up
+-brctl addif $bridge $1 || true
++ip link set $1 master $bridge || true

xen.efi.build.patch

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
---- xen-4.20.0-rc4/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk.orig	2025-02-07 11:56:01.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.20.0-rc4/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk	2025-02-09 22:56:05.579507311 +0000
-@@ -95,7 +95,9 @@
-                                          -c $(srctree)/$(efi-check).c -o $(efi-check).o,y)
+--- xen-4.17.0/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk.orig	2022-12-08 18:03:08.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.17.0/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk	2022-12-10 12:13:11.043182208 +0000
+@@ -94,7 +94,9 @@
+ XEN_BUILD_EFI := $(call if-success,$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $(srctree)/$(efi-check).c -o $(efi-check).o,y)
  
  # Check if the linker supports PE.
--EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
-+#EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
+-EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10
++#EFI_LDFLAGS := $(patsubst -m%,-mi386pep,$(LDFLAGS)) --subsystem=10
 +# use a reduced set of options from LDFLAGS
-+EFI_LDFLAGS = --as-needed --build-id=sha1 -mi386pep --subsystem=10 --enable-long-section-names
++EFI_LDFLAGS = --as-needed --build-id=sha1 -mi386pep --subsystem=10
  LD_PE_check_cmd = $(call ld-option,$(EFI_LDFLAGS) --image-base=0x100000000 -o $(efi-check).efi $(efi-check).o)
  XEN_BUILD_PE := $(LD_PE_check_cmd)
  

xen.fedora.crypt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c.orig	2015-07-12 21:55:32.875504811 +0100
++++ xen-4.5.1/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/vnc.c	2015-07-12 22:03:03.860005391 +0100
+@@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@
+     GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020200 /* 2.2.0 */
+ static int vnc_set_gnutls_priority(gnutls_session_t s, int x509)
+ {
+-    const char *priority = x509 ? "NORMAL" : "NORMAL:+ANON-DH";
++    const char *priority = x509 ? "@SYSTEM" : "@SYSTEM:+ANON-DH";
+     int rc;
+ 
+     rc = gnutls_priority_set_direct(s, priority, NULL);

xen.fedora.systemd.patch

@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ diff -uN xen-4.5.0/tools/hotplug/Linux/systemd.orig/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.s
 --- xen-4.17.0/tools/configure.orig	2022-12-08 18:03:08.000000000 +0000
 +++ xen-4.17.0/tools/configure	2022-12-09 19:51:43.278708226 +0000
 @@ -10081,7 +10081,7 @@
- if test "x$systemd" = "xy"
- then :
+ 
+ if test "x$systemd" = "xy"; then :
  
 -    ac_config_files="$ac_config_files hotplug/Linux/systemd/proc-xen.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-init-dom0.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-watchdog.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendomains.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendriverdomain.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenstored.service"
 +    ac_config_files="$ac_config_files hotplug/Linux/systemd/oxenstored.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/proc-xen.mount hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xen-watchdog.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenconsoled.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendomains.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xendriverdomain.service hotplug/Linux/systemd/xenstored.service"

xen.gcc13.fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+--- xen-4.17.0/xen/common/bunzip2.c.orig	2022-12-08 18:03:08.000000000 +0000
++++ xen-4.17.0/xen/common/bunzip2.c	2023-01-17 21:35:39.251292015 +0000
+@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@
+ 	for (j = 0; j < groupCount; j++) {
+ 		unsigned char length[MAX_SYMBOLS], temp[MAX_HUFCODE_BITS+1];
+ 		int	minLen,	maxLen, pp;
++		length[0]=0;
+ 		/* Read Huffman code lengths for each symbol.  They're
+ 		   stored in a way similar to mtf; record a starting
+ 		   value for the first symbol, and an offset from the

xen.gcc7.fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- xen-4.8.0/extras/mini-os/Makefile.orig	2016-09-28 12:09:38.000000000 +0100
++++ xen-4.8.0/extras/mini-os/Makefile	2017-02-15 21:15:19.340197960 +0000
+@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@
+ APP_LDLIBS += -lz
+ APP_LDLIBS += -lm
+ LDLIBS += -lc
++ifeq ($(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH),x86_32)
++LDLIBS += -L$(shell dirname `gcc -m32 -print-libgcc-file-name`) -lgcc
++endif
+ endif
+ 
+ ifneq ($(APP_OBJS)-$(lwip),-y)

xen.git-90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3.patch

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From 90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 21:55:46 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/amd: Mitigate AMD-SN-7053 / FP-DSS
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-This is XSA-488 / CVE-2025-54505
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 99912d346009fda1e7fb1510c9501fbab17e92a0)
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c               | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |  1 +
- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-index 8c55d233f3..1bb0766ebf 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -1048,6 +1048,42 @@ void amd_init_de_cfg(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-     wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, val | new);
- }
- 
-+static void amd_init_fp_cfg(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-+{
-+    uint64_t val, new = 0;
-+
-+    /* If virtualised, we won't have mutable access even if we can read it. */
-+    if ( cpu_has_hypervisor )
-+        return;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * On Zen1, mitigate SB-7053 / FP-DSS Floating Point Divider State
-+     * Sampling by setting bit 9 as instructed.
-+     */
-+    if ( c->family == 0x17 && is_zen1_uarch() )
-+        new |= 1 << 9;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Avoid reading FP_CFG if we don't intend to change anything.  The
-+     * register doesn't exist on all families.
-+     */
-+    if ( !new )
-+        return;
-+
-+    val = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG);
-+
-+    if ( (val & new) == new )
-+        return;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * FP_CFG is a Core-scoped MSR, and this write is racy.  However, both
-+     * threads calculate the new value from state which expected to be
-+     * consistent across CPUs and unrelated to the old value, so the result
-+     * should be consistent.
-+     */
-+    wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG, val | new);
-+}
-+
- void __init amd_init_lfence_dispatch(void)
- {
-     struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
-@@ -1120,6 +1156,7 @@ static void cf_check init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- 	uint64_t value;
- 
- 	amd_init_de_cfg(c);
-+	amd_init_fp_cfg(c);
- 
- 	if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
- 		amd_init_lfence_dispatch(); /* Needs amd_init_de_cfg() */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
-index df52587c85..6c5b2569e1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
-@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@
- #define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG		0xc0011020U
- #define MSR_AMD64_IC_CFG		0xc0011021U
- #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG		0xc0011022U
-+#define MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG		0xc0011028U
- #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029U
- #define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE	(_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
- #define MSR_AMD64_EX_CFG		0xc001102cU
--- 
-2.39.5
-

xen.hypervisor.config

@@ -1,50 +1,32 @@
 #
 # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Xen/x86 4.20 Configuration
+# Xen/x86 4.14.0-rc Configuration
 #
 CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
-CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=150001
+CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=100101
 CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION=0
-CONFIG_LD_IS_GNU=y
 CONFIG_CC_HAS_VISIBILITY_ATTRIBUTE=y
-CONFIG_CC_SPLIT_SECTIONS=y
-CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B=y
-CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT=16
 CONFIG_X86_64=y
 CONFIG_X86=y
 CONFIG_ARCH_DEFCONFIG="arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig"
-CONFIG_CC_HAS_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
+CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
 CONFIG_HAS_AS_CET_SS=y
-CONFIG_HAS_CC_CET_IBT=y
 
 #
 # Architecture Features
 #
-CONFIG_AMD=y
-CONFIG_INTEL=y
-CONFIG_64BIT=y
 CONFIG_NR_CPUS=256
-CONFIG_NR_NUMA_NODES=64
 CONFIG_PV=y
 CONFIG_PV32=y
 CONFIG_PV_LINEAR_PT=y
 CONFIG_HVM=y
-CONFIG_AMD_SVM=y
-CONFIG_INTEL_VMX=y
-CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK=y
-CONFIG_XEN_IBT=y
 CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING=y
 # CONFIG_BIGMEM is not set
-CONFIG_HVM_FEP=y
-CONFIG_X86_PSR=y
+CONFIG_TBOOT=y
 CONFIG_XEN_ALIGN_DEFAULT=y
 # CONFIG_XEN_ALIGN_2M is not set
-# CONFIG_X2APIC_PHYSICAL is not set
-CONFIG_X2APIC_MIXED=y
 # CONFIG_XEN_GUEST is not set
 # CONFIG_HYPERV_GUEST is not set
-# CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX is not set
-CONFIG_ALTP2M=y
 # end of Architecture Features
 
 #
@@ -53,55 +35,42 @@ CONFIG_ALTP2M=y
 CONFIG_COMPAT=y
 CONFIG_CORE_PARKING=y
 CONFIG_GRANT_TABLE=y
-CONFIG_ALTERNATIVE_CALL=y
-CONFIG_ARCH_MAP_DOMAIN_PAGE=y
-CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_FRAME=y
 CONFIG_HAS_ALTERNATIVE=y
-CONFIG_HAS_COMPAT=y
-CONFIG_HAS_DIT=y
 CONFIG_HAS_EX_TABLE=y
 CONFIG_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLY=y
-CONFIG_HAS_IOPORTS=y
-CONFIG_HAS_KEXEC=y
-CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ=y
-CONFIG_HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY=y
-CONFIG_HAS_UBSAN=y
-CONFIG_HAS_VMAP=y
 CONFIG_MEM_ACCESS_ALWAYS_ON=y
 CONFIG_MEM_ACCESS=y
+CONFIG_HAS_MEM_PAGING=y
+CONFIG_HAS_PDX=y
+CONFIG_HAS_UBSAN=y
+CONFIG_HAS_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_HAS_IOPORTS=y
+CONFIG_HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY=y
 CONFIG_NEEDS_LIBELF=y
-CONFIG_NUMA=y
 
 #
 # Speculative hardening
 #
-CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK=y
-CONFIG_RETURN_THUNK=y
 CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_ARRAY=y
 CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_BRANCH=y
-CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS=y
-CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK=y
 # end of Speculative hardening
 
-# CONFIG_DIT_DEFAULT is not set
 CONFIG_HYPFS=y
 CONFIG_HYPFS_CONFIG=y
-CONFIG_IOREQ_SERVER=y
 CONFIG_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_XENOPROF=y
 # CONFIG_XSM is not set
 CONFIG_SCHED_CREDIT=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_CREDIT2=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_RTDS=y
-CONFIG_SCHED_ARINC653=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_NULL=y
 CONFIG_SCHED_DEFAULT="credit2"
-# CONFIG_BOOT_TIME_CPUPOOLS is not set
+CONFIG_CRYPTO=y
 CONFIG_LIVEPATCH=y
 CONFIG_FAST_SYMBOL_LOOKUP=y
 CONFIG_ENFORCE_UNIQUE_SYMBOLS=y
 CONFIG_CMDLINE=""
 CONFIG_DOM0_MEM=""
-CONFIG_DTB_FILE=""
 CONFIG_TRACEBUFFER=y
 # end of Common Features
 
@@ -110,63 +79,35 @@ CONFIG_TRACEBUFFER=y
 #
 CONFIG_ACPI=y
 CONFIG_ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP=y
-CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA=y
+CONFIG_NUMA=y
 CONFIG_HAS_NS16550=y
 CONFIG_HAS_EHCI=y
-CONFIG_SERIAL_TX_BUFSIZE=32768
-# CONFIG_XHCI is not set
 CONFIG_HAS_CPUFREQ=y
 CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH=y
-CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU=y
-CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU=y
-# CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_NONE is not set
-CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_BASIC=y
-# CONFIG_IOMMU_QUARANTINE_SCRATCH_PAGE is not set
 CONFIG_HAS_PCI=y
-CONFIG_HAS_PCI_MSI=y
 CONFIG_VIDEO=y
 CONFIG_VGA=y
 CONFIG_HAS_VPCI=y
 # end of Device Drivers
 
 # CONFIG_EXPERT is not set
-# CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED is not set
 CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128=y
-CONFIG_ARCH_VCPU_IOREQ_COMPLETION=y
 
 #
 # Debugging Options
 #
 # CONFIG_DEBUG is not set
-CONFIG_GDBSX=y
-CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y
-CONFIG_SELF_TESTS=y
-# CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_PROFILE is not set
-CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKS=y
-# CONFIG_PERF_COUNTERS is not set
-CONFIG_VERBOSE_DEBUG=y
-CONFIG_SCRUB_DEBUG=y
-# CONFIG_UBSAN is not set
-# CONFIG_DEBUG_TRACE is not set
-CONFIG_XMEM_POOL_POISON=y
-CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y
 # end of Debugging Options
 
 # ARM64 settings
-CONFIG_MMU=y
+CONFIG_64BIT=y
 CONFIG_ARM_64=y
 CONFIG_ARM=y
-CONFIG_ARM_EFI=y
-CONFIG_GICV2=y
 CONFIG_GICV3=y
-CONFIG_VGICV2=y
 # CONFIG_NEW_VGIC is not set
 CONFIG_SBSA_VUART_CONSOLE=y
-CONFIG_HWDOM_VUART=y
 CONFIG_ARM_SSBD=y
 CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
-CONFIG_STATIC_EVTCHN=y
-CONFIG_PARTIAL_EMULATION=y
 
 #
 # ARM errata workaround via the alternative framework
@@ -174,15 +115,8 @@ CONFIG_PARTIAL_EMULATION=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_824069=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_819472=y
-CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_832075=y
 CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_834220=y
-CONFIG_ARM_ERRATUM_858921=y
-CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI=y
-CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807=y
-CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1508412=y
-
-# end of ARM errata workaround via the alternative framework
 CONFIG_ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
 CONFIG_ALL_PLAT=y
 # CONFIG_QEMU is not set
@@ -191,18 +125,17 @@ CONFIG_ALL_PLAT=y
 # CONFIG_NO_PLAT is not set
 CONFIG_ALL64_PLAT=y
 CONFIG_MPSOC_PLATFORM=y
-
-#
-# Common Features
-#
 CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE=y
 CONFIG_HAS_CADENCE_UART=y
-CONFIG_HAS_LINFLEX=y
-CONFIG_HAS_IMX_LPUART=y
 CONFIG_HAS_MVEBU=y
 CONFIG_HAS_MESON=y
 CONFIG_HAS_PL011=y
-CONFIG_HAS_OMAP=y
 CONFIG_HAS_SCIF=y
 CONFIG_ARM_SMMU=y
-# CONFIG_IPMMU_VMSA is not set
+
+# ARM32 settings
+CONFIG_ALL32_PLAT=y
+CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y
+CONFIG_ARM_32=y
+CONFIG_HAS_EXYNOS4210=y
+CONFIG_HAS_OMAP=y

xen.json.nocpuid.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
---- xen-4.21.0/tools/libs/light/libxl_nocpuid.c.orig	2025-11-18 18:02:13.000000000 +0000
-+++ xen-4.21.0/tools/libs/light/libxl_nocpuid.c	2025-11-20 09:03:56.517804514 +0000
-@@ -40,11 +40,24 @@
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_LIBJSONC
-+#ifndef _hidden
-+#define _hidden
-+#endif
-+_hidden int libxl_cpuid_policy_list_gen_jso(json_object **jso_r,
-+                                libxl_cpuid_policy_list *pcpuid)
-+{
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#if defined(HAVE_LIBYAJL)
- yajl_gen_status libxl_cpuid_policy_list_gen_json(yajl_gen hand,
-                                 libxl_cpuid_policy_list *pcpuid)
- {
-     return 0;
- }
-+#endif
- 
- int libxl__cpuid_policy_list_parse_json(libxl__gc *gc,
-                                         const libxl__json_object *o,

xen.ocaml5.fixes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+--- xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/common.make.orig	2023-04-27 06:53:19.000000000 -0600
++++ xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/common.make	2023-06-20 09:47:25.250969763 -0600
+@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ OCAMLFIND ?= ocamlfind
+ 
+ CFLAGS += -fPIC -I$(shell ocamlc -where)
+ 
+-OCAMLOPTFLAG_G := $(shell $(OCAMLOPT) -h 2>&1 | sed -n 's/^  *\(-g\) .*/\1/p')
+-OCAMLOPTFLAGS = $(OCAMLOPTFLAG_G) -ccopt "$(LDFLAGS)" -dtypes $(OCAMLINCLUDE) -cc $(CC) -w F -warn-error F
+-OCAMLCFLAGS += -g $(OCAMLINCLUDE) -w F -warn-error F
++OCAMLOPTFLAG_G := -g
++OCAMLOPTFLAGS = $(OCAMLOPTFLAG_G) -ccopt "$(LDFLAGS)" -dtypes $(OCAMLINCLUDE) -cc $(CC) -w F -warn-error F -I +unix
++OCAMLCFLAGS += -g $(OCAMLINCLUDE) -w F -warn-error F -I +unix
+ 
+ VERSION := 4.1
+ 
+--- xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/libs/xentoollog/xentoollog_stubs.c.orig	2023-04-27 06:53:19.000000000 -0600
++++ xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/libs/xentoollog/xentoollog_stubs.c	2023-06-20 09:04:30.375263358 -0600
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
+ 
+ /* The following is equal to the CAMLreturn macro, but without the return */
+ #define CAMLdone do{ \
+-caml_local_roots = caml__frame; \
++CAML_LOCAL_ROOTS = caml__frame; \
+ }while (0)
+ 
+ #define XTL ((xentoollog_logger *) Xtl_val(handle))
+--- xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/libs/xl/xenlight_stubs.c.orig	2023-04-27 06:53:19.000000000 -0600
++++ xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/libs/xl/xenlight_stubs.c	2023-06-20 09:34:09.550454354 -0600
+@@ -43,14 +43,14 @@
+ #ifndef CAMLreturnT
+ #define CAMLreturnT(type, result) do { \
+     type caml__temp_result = (result); \
+-    caml_local_roots = caml__frame; \
++    CAML_LOCAL_ROOTS = caml__frame; \
+     return (caml__temp_result); \
+ } while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* The following is equal to the CAMLreturn macro, but without the return */
+ #define CAMLdone do{ \
+-caml_local_roots = caml__frame; \
++CAML_LOCAL_ROOTS = caml__frame; \
+ }while (0)
+ 
+ #define Ctx_val(x)(*((libxl_ctx **) Data_custom_val(x)))
+--- xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/Makefile.rules.orig	2023-04-27 06:53:19.000000000 -0600
++++ xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/Makefile.rules	2023-06-20 10:00:58.769235173 -0600
+@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ quiet-command = $(if $(V),$1,@printf " %
+ mk-caml-lib-native = $(call quiet-command, $(OCAMLOPT) $(OCAMLOPTFLAGS) -a -o $1 $2 $3,MLA,$1)
+ mk-caml-lib-bytecode = $(call quiet-command, $(OCAMLC) $(OCAMLCFLAGS) -a -o $1 $2 $3,MLA,$1)
+ 
+-mk-caml-stubs = $(call quiet-command, $(OCAMLMKLIB) -o `basename $1 .a` $2,MKLIB,$1)
++mk-caml-stubs = $(call quiet-command, $(OCAMLMKLIB) -g -o `basename $1 .a` $2,MKLIB,$1)
+ mk-caml-lib-stubs = \
+-	$(call quiet-command, $(AR) rcs $1 $2 && $(OCAMLMKLIB) -o `basename $1 .a | sed -e 's/^lib//'` $2,MKLIB,$1)
++	$(call quiet-command, $(AR) rcs $1 $2 && $(OCAMLMKLIB) -g -o `basename $1 .a | sed -e 's/^lib//'` $2,MKLIB,$1)
+ 
+ # define a library target <name>.cmxa and <name>.cma
+ define OCAML_LIBRARY_template
+--- xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/xenstored/disk.ml.orig	2023-04-27 06:53:19.000000000 -0600
++++ xen-4.17.1/tools/ocaml/xenstored/disk.ml	2023-06-20 09:49:44.361963710 -0600
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ let undec c =
+ 	| _          -> raise (Failure "undecify")
+ 
+ let unhex c =
+-	let c = Char.lowercase c in
++	let c = Char.lowercase_ascii c in
+ 	match c with
+ 	| '0' .. '9' -> (Char.code c) - (Char.code '0')
+ 	| 'a' .. 'f' -> (Char.code c) - (Char.code 'a') + 10

xen.spec

@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@
 %define build_docs %{?_without_docs: 0} %{?!_without_docs: 1}
 # Build with stubdom unless rpmbuild was run with --without stubdom
 %define build_stubdom %{?_without_stubdom: 0} %{?!_without_stubdom: 1}
+# Only build with qemu-traditional if rpmbuild was run with --with qemutrad
+%define build_qemutrad %{?_with_qemutrad: 1} %{?!_with_qemutrad: 0}
 # build with ovmf from edk2-ovmf unless rpmbuild was run with --without ovmf
 %define build_ovmf %{?_without_ovmf: 0} %{?!_without_ovmf: 1}
-# set to 0 for archs that don't use ovmf (reduces build dependencies)
-%ifnarch x86_64
+# set to 0 for archs that don't use qemu or ovmf (reduces build dependencies)
+%ifnarch x86_64 %{ix86}
+%define build_qemutrad 0
 %define build_ovmf 0
 %endif
 # Build with xen hypervisor unless rpmbuild was run with --without hyp
@@ -36,7 +39,8 @@
 # --without efi
 %define build_efi %{?_without_efi: 0} %{?!_without_efi: 1}
 # xen only supports efi boot images on x86_64 or aarch64
-%ifnarch x86_64 aarch64
+# i686 builds a x86_64 hypervisor so add that as well
+%ifnarch x86_64 aarch64 %{ix86}
 %define build_efi 0
 %endif
 %if "%dist" >= ".fc20"
@@ -46,16 +50,15 @@
 %endif
 
 # Hypervisor ABI
-%define hv_abi  4.21
+%define hv_abi  4.17
 
 Summary: Xen is a virtual machine monitor
 Name:    xen
-Version: 4.21.1
-Release: 10%{?dist}
-# Automatically converted from old format: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+ and BSD - review is highly recommended.
-License: GPL-2.0-or-later AND LicenseRef-Callaway-LGPLv2+ AND LicenseRef-Callaway-BSD
+Version: 4.17.4
+Release: 1%{?dist}
+License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+ and BSD
 URL:     http://xen.org/
-Source0: https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/%{version}/xen-%{version}.tar.xz
+Source0: https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/%{version}/xen-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source2: %{name}.logrotate
 # used by stubdoms
 Source10: lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
@@ -66,52 +69,55 @@ Source14: grub-0.97.tar.gz
 Source15: polarssl-1.1.4-gpl.tgz
 # .config file for xen hypervisor
 Source21: xen.hypervisor.config
-# mini-os xen-RELEASE-4.21.0 with .git and .gitignore stripped
-Source22: mini-os-4.21.0.tar.xz
 
-Patch1: xen.fedora.systemd.patch
-Patch2: xen.ocaml.selinux.fix.patch
-Patch3: xen.canonicalize.patch
-Patch4: droplibvirtconflict.patch
-Patch5: xen.gcc9.fixes.patch
-Patch6: xen.gcc11.fixes.patch
-Patch7: xen.gcc12.fixes.patch
-Patch8: xen.efi.build.patch
-Patch9: xen.python3.12.patch
-Patch11: xen.json.nocpuid.patch
-Patch12: xsa483.patch
-Patch13: xsa484.patch
-Patch14: xsa486.patch
-Patch15: xen.git-90b20547b756a5cf9b0fec9fb0de5b361e8bf4c3.patch
-Patch16: xsa490-4.21.patch
-Patch17: xsa491-4.21.patch
-Patch18: xsa492-4.21-01.patch
-Patch19: xsa492-4.21-02.patch
-Patch20: xsa492-4.21-03.patch
-Patch21: xsa492-4.21-04.patch
-Patch22: xsa492-4.21-05.patch
-Patch23: xsa492-4.21-06.patch
-Patch24: xsa492-4.21-07.patch
-Patch25: xsa492-4.21-08.patch
-Patch26: xsa492-4.21-09.patch
-Patch27: xsa492-4.21-10.patch
-Patch28: xsa492-4.21-11.patch
-Patch29: xsa492-4.21-12.patch
-Patch30: xsa492-4.21-13.patch
-Patch31: xsa492-4.21-14.patch
-Patch32: xsa492-4.21-15.patch
-Patch33: xsa492-4.21-16.patch
-Patch34: xsa492-4.21-17.patch
-Patch35: xsa492-4.21-18.patch
-Patch36: xsa492-4.21-19.patch
-Patch37: xsa492-4.21-20.patch
-Patch38: xsa493-4.21-01.patch
-Patch39: xsa493-4.21-02.patch
-Patch40: xsa493-4.21-03.patch
-Patch41: xsa493-4.21-04.patch
-Patch42: xsa494-4.21.patch
+Patch4: CVE-2014-0150.patch
+Patch5: xen.fedora.systemd.patch
+Patch6: xen.ocaml.selinux.fix.patch
+Patch7: xen.fedora.crypt.patch
+Patch8: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-6815.patch
+Patch9: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5279.patch
+Patch10: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-5278.patch
+Patch11: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7295.patch
+Patch12: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8345.patch
+Patch13: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-7512.patch
+Patch14: qemu.trad.CVE-2015-8504.patch
+Patch15: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1714.patch
+Patch16: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-1981.patch
+Patch17: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2841.patch
+Patch18: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2538.patch
+Patch19: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-2857.patch
+Patch20: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4001.patch
+Patch21: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4002.patch
+Patch22: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4439.patch
+Patch23: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-4441.patch
+Patch24: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5238.patch
+Patch25: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-5338.patch
+Patch27: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-6351.patch
+Patch29: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8669.patch
+Patch30: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-8910.patch
+Patch31: qemu.trad.bug1399055.patch
+Patch32: qemu.trad.CVE-2016-9776.patch
+Patch33: xen.gcc7.fix.patch
+Patch34: xen.canonicalize.patch
+Patch35: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-6505.patch
+Patch36: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-7718.patch
+Patch37: droplibvirtconflict.patch
+Patch38: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-8309.patch
+Patch39: qemu.trad.CVE-2017-9330.patch
+Patch40: xen.drop.brctl.patch
+Patch41: xen.gcc9.fixes.patch
+Patch43: xen.gcc11.fixes.patch
+Patch45: xen.gcc12.fixes.patch
+Patch46: xen.efi.build.patch
+Patch47: xen.gcc13.fixes.patch
+Patch49: xen.python3.12.patch
+Patch50: xen.ocaml5.fixes.patch
 
 
+%if %build_qemutrad
+BuildRequires: libidn-devel zlib-devel SDL-devel curl-devel
+BuildRequires: libX11-devel gtk2-devel libaio-devel
+%endif
 # build using Fedora seabios and ipxe packages for roms
 BuildRequires: seabios-bin ipxe-roms-qemu
 %ifarch %{ix86} x86_64
@@ -120,6 +126,10 @@ BuildRequires: dev86
 %endif
 BuildRequires: python3-devel ncurses-devel python3-setuptools
 BuildRequires: perl-interpreter perl-generators
+%ifarch %{ix86} x86_64
+# so that x86_64 builds pick up glibc32 correctly
+BuildRequires: /usr/include/gnu/stubs-32.h
+%endif
 BuildRequires: gettext
 BuildRequires: gnutls-devel
 BuildRequires: openssl-devel
@@ -133,10 +143,8 @@ BuildRequires: acpica-tools
 BuildRequires: bzip2-devel xz-devel libzstd-devel
 # libfsimage
 BuildRequires: e2fsprogs-devel
-# tools now require wget
-BuildRequires: wget
-# use json-c instead of yajl
-BuildRequires: json-c-devel
+# tools now require yajl and wget
+BuildRequires: yajl-devel wget
 # remus support now needs libnl3
 BuildRequires: libnl3-devel
 %if %with_xsm
@@ -156,6 +164,7 @@ Requires: xen-runtime = %{version}-%{release}
 # installs xen.
 Requires: kpartx
 ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
+#ExclusiveArch: %#{ix86} x86_64 ia64 noarch
 %if %with_ocaml
 BuildRequires: ocaml, ocaml-findlib
 BuildRequires: perl(Data::Dumper)
@@ -166,7 +175,7 @@ Requires(preun): systemd
 BuildRequires: systemd
 %endif
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
-%ifarch aarch64
+%ifarch armv7hl aarch64
 BuildRequires: libfdt-devel
 %endif
 %if %build_hyp
@@ -198,9 +207,11 @@ Requires: /usr/bin/qemu-img
 Requires: xen-hypervisor-abi = %{hv_abi}
 # perl is used in /etc/xen/scripts/locking.sh
 Recommends: perl
-%ifnarch aarch64
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
 # use /usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 in Fedora instead of qemu-xen
 Recommends: qemu-system-x86-core
+# rom file for qemu-xen-traditional
+Recommends: ipxe-roms-qemu
 %endif
 %if %build_ovmf
 Recommends: edk2-ovmf-xen
@@ -279,22 +290,16 @@ This package contains libraries for developing ocaml tools to
 manage Xen virtual machines.
 %endif
 
-%package test
-Summary: internal xen tests
-%description test
-This package contains files used in testing the xen builds
 
 %prep
 %setup -q
-%patch 1 -p1
-%patch 2 -p1
-%patch 3 -p1
 %patch 4 -p1
 %patch 5 -p1
 %patch 6 -p1
 %patch 7 -p1
 %patch 8 -p1
 %patch 9 -p1
+%patch 10 -p1
 %patch 11 -p1
 %patch 12 -p1
 %patch 13 -p1
@@ -310,31 +315,42 @@ This package contains files used in testing the xen builds
 %patch 23 -p1
 %patch 24 -p1
 %patch 25 -p1
-%patch 26 -p1
+%patch 33 -p1
+%patch 34 -p1
+%patch 37 -p1
+%patch 40 -p1
+%patch 41 -p1
+%patch 43 -p1
+%patch 45 -p1
+%patch 46 -p1
+%patch 47 -p1
+%patch 49 -p1
+%if "%dist" != ".fc38"
+%patch 50 -p1
+%endif
+
+# qemu-xen-traditional patches
+pushd tools/qemu-xen-traditional
 %patch 27 -p1
-%patch 28 -p1
 %patch 29 -p1
 %patch 30 -p1
 %patch 31 -p1
 %patch 32 -p1
-%patch 33 -p1
-%patch 34 -p1
 %patch 35 -p1
 %patch 36 -p1
-%patch 37 -p1
 %patch 38 -p1
 %patch 39 -p1
-%patch 40 -p1
-%patch 41 -p1
-%patch 42 -p1
+popd
+
+# qemu-xen patches
+pushd tools/qemu-xen
+popd
 
 # stubdom sources
 cp -v %{SOURCE10} %{SOURCE11} %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} %{SOURCE14} %{SOURCE15} stubdom
 # copy xen hypervisor .config file to change settings
 cp -v %{SOURCE21} xen/.config
-# mini-os is now separate file
-mkdir extras
-tar -C extras -xf %{SOURCE22}
+
 
 %build
 # This package calls binutils components directly and would need to pass
@@ -352,14 +368,20 @@ mkdir -p dist/install/boot/efi/efi/fedora
 mkdir -p dist/install%{_libdir}/ocaml/stublibs
 %endif
 export EXTRA_CFLAGS_XEN_TOOLS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Wno-error=use-after-free $LDFLAGS"
+export EXTRA_CFLAGS_QEMU_TRADITIONAL="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
+export EXTRA_CFLAGS_QEMU_XEN="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS"
 export PYTHON="/usr/bin/python3"
 export LDFLAGS_SAVE=`echo $LDFLAGS | sed -e 's/-Wl,//g' -e 's/,/ /g' -e 's? -specs=[-a-z/0-9]*??g'`
 export CFLAGS_SAVE="$CFLAGS"
+%if %build_qemutrad
+CONFIG_EXTRA="--enable-qemu-traditional"
+%else
 CONFIG_EXTRA=""
+%endif
 %if %build_ovmf
 CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --with-system-ovmf=/usr/share/edk2/xen/OVMF.fd"
 %endif
-%ifarch aarch64
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
 CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --with-system-ipxe=/usr/share/ipxe/10ec8139.rom"
 %endif
 %if %(test -f /usr/share/seabios/bios-256k.bin && echo 1|| echo 0)
@@ -367,17 +389,23 @@ CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --with-system-seabios=/usr/share/seabios/bios-256k.b
 %else
 CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --disable-seabios"
 %endif
-%if %with_systemd_presets
-CONFIG_EXTRA="$CONFIG_EXTRA --enable-systemd"
-%endif
 ./configure --prefix=%{_prefix} --libdir=%{_libdir} --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir} --with-system-qemu=/usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 --with-linux-backend-modules="xen-evtchn xen-gntdev xen-gntalloc xen-blkback xen-netback xen-pciback xen-scsiback xen-acpi-processor" $CONFIG_EXTRA
 unset CFLAGS CXXFLAGS FFLAGS LDFLAGS
 export LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS_SAVE"
-export CFLAGS=`echo "$CFLAGS_SAVE -Wno-error=address" | sed -e 's/-specs=\/usr\/lib\/rpm\/redhat/redhat-annobin-cc1//g'`
+export CFLAGS="$CFLAGS_SAVE -Wno-error=address"
 
 %if %build_hyp
+%if %build_crosshyp
+export CFLAGS=`echo $CFLAGS | sed -e 's/-m32//g' -e 's/-march=i686//g' 's/-specs=\/usr\/lib\/rpm\/redhat\/redhat-annobin-cc1//g'`
+XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 %make_build prefix=/usr xen CC="/usr/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc"
+%else
+%ifarch armv7hl
+export CFLAGS=`echo $CFLAGS | sed -e 's/-mfloat-abi=hard//g' -e 's/-march=armv7-a//g'`
+%endif
+# armv7hl aarch64 or x86_64
 %make_build prefix=/usr xen
 %endif
+%endif
 unset CFLAGS CXXFLAGS FFLAGS LDFLAGS
 
 %make_build %{?ocaml_flags} prefix=/usr tools
@@ -385,6 +413,9 @@ unset CFLAGS CXXFLAGS FFLAGS LDFLAGS
 make                 prefix=/usr docs
 %endif
 export RPM_OPT_FLAGS_RED=`echo $RPM_OPT_FLAGS | sed -e 's/-m64//g' -e 's/--param=ssp-buffer-size=4//g' -e's/-fstack-protector-strong//'`
+%ifarch %{ix86}
+export EXTRA_CFLAGS_XEN_TOOLS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS_RED"
+%endif
 %if %build_stubdom
 %ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
 make mini-os-dir
@@ -438,7 +469,19 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/boot
 rm -fr %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/doc/xen
 
 # Pointless helper
-rm -f %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/xen-python-path
+rm -f %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/xen-python-path
+
+# qemu stuff (unused or available from upstream)
+rm -rf %{buildroot}/usr/share/xen/man
+rm -rf %{buildroot}/usr/bin/qemu-*-xen
+ln -s qemu-img %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/qemu-img-xen
+ln -s qemu-img %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/qemu-nbd-xen
+for file in bios.bin openbios-sparc32 openbios-sparc64 ppc_rom.bin \
+         pxe-e1000.bin pxe-ne2k_pci.bin pxe-pcnet.bin pxe-rtl8139.bin \
+         vgabios.bin vgabios-cirrus.bin video.x openbios-ppc bamboo.dtb
+do
+	rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/xen/qemu/$file
+done
 
 # README's not intended for end users
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_sysconfdir}/xen/README*
@@ -451,12 +494,20 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/*.a
 
 %if %build_efi
 # clean up extra efi files
+%ifarch %{ix86}
+rm -f %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-%{hv_abi}.efi
+rm -f %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-4.efi
+rm -f %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen.efi
+cp -p %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-%{version}{,.notstripped}.efi
+strip -s %{buildroot}/usr/lib64/efi/xen-%{version}.efi
+%else
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-%{hv_abi}.efi
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-4.efi
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen.efi
 cp -p %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-%{version}{,.notstripped}.efi
 strip -s %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/efi/xen-%{version}.efi
 %endif
+%endif
 
 %if ! %build_ocaml
 rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/oxenstored.service
@@ -488,7 +539,7 @@ ln -s %{_libexecdir}/%{name} %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/%{name}
 %endif
 
 ############ create symlink to qemu-system-i386 in /usr/bin ############
-ln -s ../../../bin/qemu-system-i386 %{buildroot}/%{_libexecdir}/%{name}/bin/qemu-system-i386
+ln -s /usr/bin/qemu-system-i386 %{buildroot}/%{_libexecdir}/%{name}/bin/qemu-system-i386
 
 ############ debug packaging: list files ############
 
@@ -506,17 +557,6 @@ find . -path licensedir -prune -o -path stubdom/ioemu -prune -o \
   install -m 644 $file licensedir/$file
 done
 
-############ move sbin files to bin
-
-mv %{buildroot}/usr/sbin/* %{buildroot}/usr/bin/
-
-############ remove xen*.efi.elf files to avoid debuginfo failure
-
-%ifarch x86_64
-rm dist/install/usr/lib/debug/xen-*.efi.elf
-rm %{buildroot}/usr/lib/debug/xen-*.efi.elf
-%endif
-
 ############ all done now ############
 
 %post
@@ -558,7 +598,7 @@ fi
 %endif
 
 %posttrans runtime
-if [ ! -L /usr/lib/xen -a -d /usr/lib/xen ] && [ -z "$(ls -A /usr/lib/xen)" ]; then
+if [ ! -L /usr/lib/xen -a -d /usr/lib/xen -a -z "$(ls -A /usr/lib/xen)" ]; then 
   rmdir /usr/lib/xen
 fi
 if [ ! -e /usr/lib/xen ]; then
@@ -576,7 +616,7 @@ do_it() {
       if [ ! -d $TARGET ]; then
         mkdir $TARGET
       fi
-      for m in relocator.mod multiboot2.mod elf.mod; do
+      for m in relocator.mod multiboot2.mod; do
         if [ -f $DIR/$m ]; then
           if [ ! -f $TARGET/$m ] || ! cmp -s $DIR/$m $TARGET/$m; then
             cp -p $DIR/$m $TARGET/$m
@@ -639,6 +679,7 @@ fi
 #files -f xen-xm.lang
 %files
 %doc COPYING README
+%{_bindir}/xencons
 %{python3_sitearch}/%{name}
 %{python3_sitearch}/xen-*.egg-info
 
@@ -666,7 +707,7 @@ fi
 %{_libdir}/libxenlight.so.4.*
 %{_libdir}/libxenstat.so.4.*
 %{_libdir}/libxenstore.so.4
-%{_libdir}/libxenstore.so.4.1
+%{_libdir}/libxenstore.so.4.0
 %{_libdir}/libxentoolcore.so.1
 %{_libdir}/libxentoolcore.so.1.0
 %{_libdir}/libxentoollog.so.1
@@ -676,8 +717,6 @@ fi
 %{_libdir}/xenfsimage
 %{_libdir}/libxenhypfs.so.1
 %{_libdir}/libxenhypfs.so.1.0
-%{_libdir}/libxenmanage.so.1
-%{_libdir}/libxenmanage.so.1.0
 
 # All runtime stuff except for XenD/xm python stuff
 %files runtime
@@ -695,8 +734,7 @@ fi
 %{_unitdir}/xen-watchdog.service
 %{_unitdir}/xen-qemu-dom0-disk-backend.service
 %{_unitdir}/xendriverdomain.service
-%{_modulesloaddir}/xen.conf
-%{_systemd_util_dir}/system-sleep/xen-watchdog-sleep.sh
+/usr/lib/modules-load.d/xen.conf
 
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/xencommons
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/xen/xl.conf
@@ -710,10 +748,19 @@ fi
 %dir %{_libexecdir}/%{name}
 %dir %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/bin
 %attr(0700,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/bin/*
+# QEMU runtime files
+%if %build_qemutrad
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/qemu
+%dir %{_datadir}/%{name}/qemu/keymaps
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/qemu/keymaps/*
+%endif
+%endif
 
 # man pages
 %if %build_docs
 %{_mandir}/man1/xentop.1*
+%{_mandir}/man1/xentrace_format.1*
 %{_mandir}/man8/xentrace.8*
 %{_mandir}/man1/xl.1*
 %{_mandir}/man5/xl.cfg.5*
@@ -731,7 +778,6 @@ fi
 %{_mandir}/man1/xenhypfs.1.gz
 %{_mandir}/man7/xen-vbd-interface.7.gz
 %{_mandir}/man5/xl-pci-configuration.5.gz
-%{_mandir}/man8/xenwatchdogd.8.gz
 %endif
 
 %{python3_sitearch}/xenfsimage*.so
@@ -739,12 +785,17 @@ fi
 %{python3_sitearch}/pygrub-*.egg-info
 
 # The firmware
-%ifarch x86_64
+%ifarch %{ix86} x86_64
 %dir %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/boot
 %{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/hvmloader
+%ifnarch %{ix86}
 %{_libexecdir}/%{name}/boot/xen-shim
 /usr/lib/debug%{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/xen-shim-syms
+%endif
 %if %build_stubdom
+%if %build_qemutrad
+%{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/ioemu-stubdom.gz
+%endif
 %{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz
 %{_libexecdir}/xen/boot/xenstorepvh-stubdom.gz
 %endif
@@ -761,61 +812,64 @@ fi
 %ghost %{_localstatedir}/run/xenstored
 
 # All xenstore CLI tools
+%{_bindir}/qemu-*-xen
 %{_bindir}/xenstore
 %{_bindir}/xenstore-*
+%{_bindir}/pygrub
+%{_bindir}/xentrace*
 #%#{_bindir}/remus
 # XSM
-%{_bindir}/flask-*
+%{_sbindir}/flask-*
 # Misc stuff
-%ifnarch aarch64
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
 %{_bindir}/xen-detect
 %endif
 %{_bindir}/xencov_split
-%ifnarch aarch64
-%{_bindir}/gdbsx
-%{_bindir}/xen-kdd
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%{_sbindir}/gdbsx
+%{_sbindir}/xen-kdd
 %endif
-%ifnarch aarch64
-%{_bindir}/xen-hptool
-%{_bindir}/xen-hvmcrash
-%{_bindir}/xen-hvmctx
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%{_sbindir}/xen-hptool
+%{_sbindir}/xen-hvmcrash
+%{_sbindir}/xen-hvmctx
 %endif
-%{_bindir}/xenconsoled
-%{_bindir}/xenlockprof
-%{_bindir}/xenmon
-%{_bindir}/xentop
-%{_bindir}/xentrace_setmask
-%{_bindir}/xenbaked
-%{_bindir}/xenstored
-%{_bindir}/xenpm
-%{_bindir}/xenpmd
-%{_bindir}/xenperf
-%{_bindir}/xenwatchdogd
-%{_bindir}/xl
-%ifnarch aarch64
-%{_bindir}/xen-lowmemd
+%{_sbindir}/xenconsoled
+%{_sbindir}/xenlockprof
+%{_sbindir}/xenmon
+%{_sbindir}/xentop
+%{_sbindir}/xentrace_setmask
+%{_sbindir}/xenbaked
+%{_sbindir}/xenstored
+%{_sbindir}/xenpm
+%{_sbindir}/xenpmd
+%{_sbindir}/xenperf
+%{_sbindir}/xenwatchdogd
+%{_sbindir}/xl
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%{_sbindir}/xen-lowmemd
 %endif
-%{_bindir}/xencov
-%ifnarch aarch64
-%{_bindir}/xen-mfndump
+%{_sbindir}/xencov
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
+%{_sbindir}/xen-mfndump
 %endif
 %{_bindir}/xenalyze
-%{_bindir}/xentrace
-%{_bindir}/xentrace_setsize
-%ifnarch aarch64
+%{_sbindir}/xentrace
+%{_sbindir}/xentrace_setsize
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
 %{_bindir}/xen-cpuid
 %endif
-%{_bindir}/xen-livepatch
-%{_bindir}/xen-diag
+%{_sbindir}/xen-livepatch
+%{_sbindir}/xen-diag
 %ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
-%{_bindir}/xen-ucode
-%{_bindir}/xen-memshare
-%{_bindir}/xen-mceinj
-%{_bindir}/xen-vmtrace
+%{_sbindir}/xen-ucode
+%{_sbindir}/xen-memshare
+%{_sbindir}/xen-mceinj
+%{_sbindir}/xen-vmtrace
 %endif
 %{_bindir}/vchan-socket-proxy
-%{_bindir}/xenhypfs
-%{_bindir}/xen-access
+%{_sbindir}/xenhypfs
+%{_sbindir}/xen-access
 
 # Xen logfiles
 %dir %attr(0700,root,root) %{_localstatedir}/log/xen
@@ -824,7 +878,7 @@ fi
 
 %files hypervisor
 %if %build_hyp
-%ifnarch aarch64
+%ifnarch armv7hl aarch64
 /boot/xen-*.gz
 /boot/xen*.config
 %else
@@ -837,8 +891,12 @@ fi
 /usr/lib/debug/xen*
 %endif
 %if %build_efi
+%ifarch %{ix86}
+/usr/lib64/efi/*.efi
+%else
 %{_libdir}/efi/*.efi
 %endif
+%endif
 
 %if %build_docs
 %files doc
@@ -866,7 +924,7 @@ fi
 %exclude %{_libdir}/ocaml/xen*/*.cmx
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/stublibs/*.so
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/stublibs/*.so.owner
-%{_bindir}/oxenstored
+%{_sbindir}/oxenstored
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/xen/oxenstored.conf
 %{_unitdir}/oxenstored.service
 
@@ -874,256 +932,32 @@ fi
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/xen*/*.a
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/xen*/*.cmxa
 %{_libdir}/ocaml/xen*/*.cmx
-%{_libdir}/ocaml/xsd_glue/*
-%{_libexecdir}/xen/ocaml/xsd_glue/xenctrl_plugin/domain_getinfo_v1.cmxs
 %endif
 
-%files test
-%{_libexecdir}/xen/tests/*
-
 %changelog
-* Wed Jul 22 2026 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-10
-- Rebuilt for Python 3.15.0b4 ABI change
-
-* Fri Jul 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.21.1-9
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_45_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Thu Jul 09 2026 Jerry James <loganjerry@gmail.com> - 4.21.1-8
-- OCaml 5.5.0 rebuild
-
-* Thu Jun 18 2026 Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-7
-- Rebuilt for openssl 4.0
-
-* Thu Jun 18 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-6
-- x86 HVM I/O port list traversal [XSA-491, CVE-2026-42487]
-- domctl lock open to abuse [XSA-492, CVE-2026-42489, CVE-2026-42490]
-- Arm: Completion of memory accesses not guaranteed by completion of a TLBI
-	 [XSA-493, CVE-2025-10263]
-- x86: mismatched mapcache metadata [XSA-494, CVE-2026-42488]
-
-* Sat Jun 13 2026 Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-5
-- Rebuilt for openssl 4.0
-
-* Wed Jun 03 2026 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.21.1-4
-- Rebuilt for Python 3.15
-
-* Tue May 12 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-3
-- x86: CPU Opcode Cache corruption [XSA-490,CVE-2025-54518]
-
-* Tue Apr 28 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-2
-- oxenstored keeps quota related use counts across domain destruction
-	[XSA-483, CVE-2026-23556]
-- Xenstored DoS via XS_RESET_WATCHES command [XSA-484, CVE-2026-23557]
-- grant table v2 race in status page mapping [XSA-486, CVE-2026-23558]
-- x86: Floating Point Divider State Sampling [XSA-488, CVE-2025-54505]
-
-* Thu Mar 26 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.1-1
-- update to xen 4.21.1
-  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
-
-* Tue Mar 17 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.0-5
-- Use after free of paging structures in EPT [XSA-480, CVE-2026-23554]
-- Xenstored DoS by unprivileged domain [XSA-481, CVE-2026-23555]
-
-* Fri Feb 20 2026 Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> - 4.21.0-4
-- OCaml 5.4.1 rebuild
-
-* Wed Jan 28 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.0-3
-  x86: buffer overrun with shadow paging + tracing [XSA-477, CVE-2025-58150]
-  x86: incomplete IBPB for vCPU isolation [XSA-479, CVE-2026-23553]
-
-* Sat Jan 17 2026 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.21.0-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_44_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Wed Jan 07 2026 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.21.0-1
-- update to xen 4.21.0
-  rebase mini-os
-  use .xz xen tarball instead of .gz
-  fix quotes around sed command
-  update libxenstore version
-  package libxenmanage and xen-watchdog-sleep.sh files
-  add a new package for test files
-  renumber patches
-  use json-c instead of yajl
-- fix bug in xen code when using json-c
-- fix code issues detected by gcc16
-
-* Thu Nov 13 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.2-2.fc44
-- update to xen 4.20.2
-  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
-
-* Sun Oct 26 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-9
-- teecr32_el1 and teehbr32_el1 support dropped in binutils 2.45.50-5.fc44
-
-* Fri Oct 24 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
-- Incorrect removal of permissions on PCI device unplug [XSA-476,
-	CVE-2025-58149]
-
-* Tue Oct 21 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
-- x86: Incorrect input sanitisation in Viridian hypercalls [XSA-475,
-	CVE-2025-58147, CVE-2025-58148]
-
-* Wed Oct 15 2025 Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> - 4.20.1-7
-- OCaml 5.4.0 rebuild
-
-* Fri Sep 19 2025 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.20.1-6
-- Rebuilt for Python 3.14.0rc3 bytecode
-
-* Wed Sep 10 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-5
-- Mutiple vulnerabilities in the Viridian interface [XSA-472,
-	CVE-2025-27466, CVE-2025-58142, CVE-2025-58143]
-- Arm issues with page refcounting [XSA-473, CVE-2025-58144,
-	CVE-2025-58145]
-
-* Tue Sep 02 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-4
-- tools/xl: don't crash on NULL command line
-
-* Fri Aug 15 2025 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.20.1-3
-- Rebuilt for Python 3.14.0rc2 bytecode
-
-* Fri Jul 25 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.20.1-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Sun Jul 13 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.20.1-1
-- update to xen 4.20.1
-  remove old qemu code for spac file
-  remove armv7hl and ix86 code from spec file
-  update configuration in xen.hypervisor.config 
-  minios is now a separate file
-  package extra ocaml files
-  unset -specs=/usr/lib/rpm/redhat/redhat-annobin-cc1 for hypervisor build
-  rebase xen.efi.build.patch
-  includes fixes for security vulnerabilites
-  x86: Incorrect stubs exception handling for flags recovery [XSA-470,
-	CVE-2025-27465]
-  x86: Transitive Scheduler Attacks [XSA-471, CVE-2024-36350,
-	CVE-2024-36357]
-
-* Fri Jul 11 2025 Jerry James <loganjerry@gmail.com> - 4.19.2-6
-- Rebuild to fix OCaml dependencies
-
-* Mon Jun 02 2025 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.19.2-5
-- Rebuilt for Python 3.14
-
-* Mon May 12 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.2-4
-- x86: Indirect Target Selection [XSA-469, CVE-2024-28956]
-
-* Mon Apr 07 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.2-2
-- update to xen-4.19.2
-  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
-  remove xen*.efi.elf files to avoid debuginfo failure
-
-* Thu Feb 27 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.1-7
-- deadlock potential with VT-d and legacy PCI device pass-through
-	[XSA-467, CVE-2025-1713]
-
-* Thu Jan 23 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.1-6
-- adjust file locations now /usr/sbin is a symlink to /usr/bin
-- remove debugedit fix as no longer needed
-
-* Sun Jan 19 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.19.1-5
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Fri Jan 10 2025 Jerry James <loganjerry@gmail.com> - 4.19.1-4
-- OCaml 5.3.0 rebuild for Fedora 42
-
-* Thu Jan 09 2025 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.1-3
-- work around debugedit bug to fix aarch64 builds
-
-* Sat Jan 04 2025 Andrea Perotti <aperotti@redhat.com> - 4.19.1-2
-- xen-hypervisor %post doesn't load all needed grub2 modules
-	(#2335558)
-
-* Thu Dec 05 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.1-1
-- update to xen-4.19.1
-  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
-
-* Tue Nov 12 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.0-5
-- Deadlock in x86 HVM standard VGA handling [XSA-463, CVE-2024-45818]
-- libxl leaks data to PVH guests via ACPI tables [XSA-464, CVE-2024-45819]
-- additional patches so above applies cleanly
-
-* Tue Sep 24 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.0-4
-- x86: Deadlock in vlapic_error() [XSA-462, CVE-2024-45817] (#2314782)
-
-* Wed Sep 04 2024 Miroslav Suchý <msuchy@redhat.com> - 4.19.0-3
-- convert license to SPDX
-
-* Wed Aug 14 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.0-2
-- error handling in x86 IOMMU identity mapping [XSA-460, CVE-2024-31145]
-	(#2314784)
-- PCI device pass-through with shared resources [XSA-461, CVE-2024-31146]
-	(#2314783)
-
-* Sat Aug 03 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.19.0-1
-- update to xen-4.19.0
-  rebase xen.fedora.systemd.patch, xen.efi.build.patch
-  xen.ocaml5.fixes.patch and xen.gcc14.fixes.patch
-  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
-  now need to enable systemd explicitly 
-  xentrace_format has gone, pygrub is now only in /usr/libexec/xen/bin/
-  package xenwatchdogd.8.gz
-  use relative links for /usr/bin/qemu-system-i386
-
-* Sat Jul 20 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.18.2-5
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jul 16 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.2-4
-- double unlock in x86 guest IRQ handling [XSA-458, CVE-2024-31143]
-	(#2298690)
-
-* Fri Jun 07 2024 Python Maint <python-maint@redhat.com> - 4.18.2-3
-- Rebuilt for Python 3.13
-
-* Mon Jun 03 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.2-2
-- x86: Native Branch History Injection [XSA-456 version 3, CVE-2024-2201]
-
-* Tue Apr 09 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.2-1
+* Tue Apr 09 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.17.4-1
 - x86: Native Branch History Injection [XSA-456, CVE-2024-2201]
-- update to xen 4.18.2, remove patches now included upstream
-
-* Tue Apr 09 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.1-2
+- update to xen 4.17.4, remove patches now included upstream
+  rebase xen.gcc12.fixes.patch
 - x86 HVM hypercalls may trigger Xen bug check [XSA-454, CVE-2023-46842]
 - x86: Incorrect logic for BTC/SRSO mitigations [XSA-455, CVE-2024-31142]
 
-* Wed Mar 20 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.1-1
-- update to xen-4.18.1
-  rebase xen.gcc12.fixes.patch
-  remove patches now included or superceded upstream
-
-* Wed Mar 13 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.0-7
+* Thu Mar 14 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.17.2-8
 - x86: Register File Data Sampling [XSA-452, CVE-2023-28746]
 - GhostRace: Speculative Race Conditions [XSA-453, CVE-2024-2193]
 - additional patches so above applies cleanly
 
-* Tue Feb 27 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.0-6
+* Tue Feb 27 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.17.2-7
 - x86: shadow stack vs exceptions from emulation stubs - [XSA-451,
-	CVE-2023-46841] (#2266326)
+        CVE-2023-46841] (#2266326)
 
-* Sun Feb 04 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.0-5
-- pci: phantom functions assigned to incorrect contexts [XSA-449,
-        CVE-2023-46839]
-- VT-d: Failure to quarantine devices in !HVM build [XSA-450,
-        CVE-2023-46840]
-- the glibc32 doesn't seem to add anything to the build so drop it
-
-* Sat Feb 03 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.0-4
-- build fixes for gcc14, replace stubs-32.h requirement with glibc32
-
-* Sat Jan 27 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.18.0-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Wed Dec 13 2023 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.0-2
+* Tue Jan 30 2024 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.17.2-6
 - arm32: The cache may not be properly cleaned/invalidated (take two)
 	[XSA-447, CVE-2023-46837]
-- rebuild for OCaml-5.1.1
-
-* Wed Nov 29 2023 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.18.0-1
-- update to xen-4.18.0
-  rebase xen.canonicalize.patch and xen.ocaml5.fixes.patch
-  remove or adjust patches now included or superceded upstream
-- xencons has been dropped
-
+- pci: phantom functions assigned to incorrect contexts [XSA-449,
+	CVE-2023-46839]
+- VT-d: Failure to quarantine devices in !HVM build [XSA-450,
+	CVE-2023-46840]
 
 * Tue Nov 14 2023 Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk> - 4.17.2-5
 - x86/AMD: mismatch in IOMMU quarantine page table levels [XSA-445,

xsa483.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
-Subject: tools/oxenstored: Reset quota when resetting permissions
-
-The quota object contains both limits and the current node usage counts.
-
-When a domain is torn down, the node data itself is cleaned up but the node
-usage counts are not.  A later domain reusing the same domid can create fewer
-nodes before being deemed to be over quota.
-
-Reset the count when the node permissions are cleaned up.
-
-This is XSA-483 / CVE-2026-23556.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-index 9b8dd2812df0..aa9204ead3ec 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-@@ -465,7 +465,8 @@ let reset_permissions store domid =
-         if perms <> node.perms then
-           Logging.debug "store|node" "Changed permissions for node %s" (Node.get_name node);
-         Some { node with Node.perms }
--    ) store.root
-+    ) store.root;
-+  store.quota <- Quota.del store.quota domid
- 
- type ops = {
-   store: t;

xsa484.patch

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-From 3d0d19ad17f29c64dde4a7baf392da4fd58f3654 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 15:06:11 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] tools/xenstored: make conn_delete_all_transactions()
- idempotent
-
-conn_delete_all_transactions() should be callable in any context,
-resetting ALL transaction related data.
-
-This includes number of active transactions and the transaction
-pointer in struct connection.
-
-So reset conn->trans to NULL in conn_delete_all_transactions() and
-do the cleanup for each transaction in destroy_transaction().
-
-This avoids triggering the assert() in conn_delete_all_transactions()
-in case e.g. ignore_connection() was called while an operation inside
-a transaction was performed, or XS_RESET_WATCHES was called in a
-transaction.
-
-This is XSA-484 / CVE-2026-23557.
-
-Reported-by: Andrii Sultanov <andriy.sultanov@vates.tech>
-Fixes: 1f9d04fb021c ("xenstored: allow guest to shutdown all its watches/transactions")
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
----
- tools/xenstored/transaction.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstored/transaction.c b/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
-index 167cd597fd..0825c48859 100644
---- a/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstored/transaction.c
-@@ -432,17 +432,23 @@ static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
- static int destroy_transaction(void *_transaction)
- {
- 	struct transaction *trans = _transaction;
-+	struct connection *conn = trans->conn;
- 	struct accessed_node *i;
- 
- 	wrl_ntransactions--;
- 	trace_destroy(trans, "transaction");
- 	while ((i = list_top(&trans->accessed, struct accessed_node, list))) {
- 		if (i->ta_node)
--			db_delete(trans->conn, i->trans_name, NULL);
-+			db_delete(conn, i->trans_name, NULL);
- 		list_del(&i->list);
- 		talloc_free(i);
- 	}
- 
-+	list_del(&trans->list);
-+	domain_transaction_dec(conn);
-+	if (list_empty(&conn->transaction_list))
-+		conn->ta_start_time = 0;
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -523,10 +529,6 @@ int do_transaction_end(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 		return ENOENT;
- 
- 	conn->transaction = NULL;
--	list_del(&trans->list);
--	domain_transaction_dec(conn);
--	if (list_empty(&conn->transaction_list))
--		conn->ta_start_time = 0;
- 
- 	chk_quota = trans->node_created && domain_is_unprivileged(conn);
- 
-@@ -572,14 +574,10 @@ void conn_delete_all_transactions(struct connection *conn)
- 	struct transaction *trans;
- 
- 	while ((trans = list_top(&conn->transaction_list,
--				 struct transaction, list))) {
--		list_del(&trans->list);
-+				 struct transaction, list)))
- 		talloc_free(trans);
--	}
--
--	assert(conn->transaction == NULL);
- 
--	conn->ta_start_time = 0;
-+	conn->transaction = NULL;
- }
- 
- int check_transactions(struct hashtable *hash)
--- 
-2.53.0
-

xsa486.patch

@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: gnttab: split gnttab_map_frame()
-
-If a domain tries to map status frames in parallel to switching grant
-table version from 2 to 1, the mapping operation may put in place P2M
-entries referencing MFNs which gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is in the
-process of freeing.
-
-Ideally we would refcount pages when entered into P2M tables, but that's a
-significant change. Extend the grant-table-locked region instead in
-xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() (being the sole caller of gnttab_map_frame()),
-such that a race with gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() is no longer
-possible.
-
-This is XSA-486 / CVE-2026-23558.
-
-Fixes: 5ce8fafa947c ("Dynamic grant-table sizing")
-Fixes: a98dc13703e0 ("Introduce a grant_entry_v2 structure")
-Reported-by: Rafal Wojtczuk <rafal.wojtczuk@7bulls.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
-@@ -174,12 +174,10 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-     switch ( space )
-     {
-     case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
--        rc = gnttab_map_frame(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
-+        rc = gnttab_map_frame_begin(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
-         if ( rc )
-             return rc;
- 
--        /* Need to take care of the reference obtained in gnttab_map_frame(). */
--        page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-         t = p2m_ram_rw;
- 
-         break;
-@@ -281,10 +279,23 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-      * to drop the reference we took earlier. In all other cases we need to
-      * drop any reference we took earlier (perhaps indirectly).
-      */
--    if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign ? rc : page != NULL )
-+    switch ( space )
-     {
-+    default:
-+        if ( page )
-+            put_page(page);
-+        break;
-+
-+    case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
-+        gnttab_map_frame_end(d, mfn);
-+        break;
-+
-+    case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign:
-+        if ( !rc )
-+            break;
-         ASSERT(page != NULL);
-         put_page(page);
-+        break;
-     }
- 
-     return rc;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-@@ -2009,11 +2009,9 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-         break;
- 
-     case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
--        rc = gnttab_map_frame(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
-+        rc = gnttab_map_frame_begin(d, idx, gfn, &mfn);
-         if ( rc )
-             return rc;
--        /* Need to take care of the reference obtained in gnttab_map_frame(). */
--        page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
-         break;
- 
-     case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn:
-@@ -2095,19 +2093,28 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
-     put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gfn));
- 
-  put_both:
--    /*
--     * In the XENMAPSPACE_gmfn case, we took a ref of the gfn at the top.
--     * We also may need to transfer ownership of the page reference to our
--     * caller.
--     */
--    if ( space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn )
-+    switch ( space )
-     {
-+    case XENMAPSPACE_gmfn:
-+        /*
-+         * We took a ref of the gfn at the top.  We also may need to transfer
-+         * ownership of the page reference to our caller.
-+         */
-         put_gfn(d, gmfn);
-         if ( !rc && extra.ppage )
-         {
-             *extra.ppage = page;
-             page = NULL;
-         }
-+        break;
-+
-+    case XENMAPSPACE_grant_table:
-+        /*
-+         * We (gnttab_map_frame_begin()) acquired a lock and took a ref of the
-+         * page underlying the MFN at the top.
-+         */
-+        gnttab_map_frame_end(d, mfn);
-+        break;
-     }
- 
-     if ( page )
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -4250,7 +4250,8 @@ int gnttab_acquire_resource(
-     return rc;
- }
- 
--int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
-+int gnttab_map_frame_begin(
-+    struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
- {
-     int rc = 0;
-     struct grant_table *gt = d->grant_table;
-@@ -4288,11 +4289,19 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
-             put_page(pg);
-     }
- 
--    grant_write_unlock(gt);
-+    if ( rc )
-+        grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
- 
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-+void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn)
-+{
-+    put_page(mfn_to_page(mfn));
-+
-+    grant_write_unlock(d->grant_table);
-+}
-+
- static void gnttab_usage_print(struct domain *rd)
- {
-     int first = 1;
---- a/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/grant_table.h
-@@ -60,8 +60,13 @@ int gnttab_release_mappings(struct domai
- int mem_sharing_gref_to_gfn(struct grant_table *gt, grant_ref_t ref,
-                             gfn_t *gfn, uint16_t *status);
- 
--int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn,
--                     mfn_t *mfn);
-+/*
-+ * These need to be used as a pair, as the first (in the success case) returns
-+ * with a lock and page reference held which the second needs to drop.
-+ */
-+int gnttab_map_frame_begin(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx, gfn_t gfn,
-+                           mfn_t *mfn);
-+void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn);
- 
- unsigned int gnttab_resource_max_frames(const struct domain *d, unsigned int id);
- 
-@@ -100,12 +105,14 @@ static inline int mem_sharing_gref_to_gf
-     return -EINVAL;
- }
- 
--static inline int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx,
--                                   gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
-+static inline int gnttab_map_frame_begin(struct domain *d, unsigned long idx,
-+                                         gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn)
- {
-     return -EINVAL;
- }
- 
-+static inline void gnttab_map_frame_end(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn) {}
-+
- static inline unsigned int gnttab_resource_max_frames(
-     const struct domain *d, unsigned int id)
- {

xsa490-4.21.patch

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Subject: x86/amd: Mitigate AMD-SN-7052
-
-This is XSA-490 / CVE-2025-54518.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-index 1bb0766ebf13..b5bf2b732e8f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -1116,11 +1116,25 @@ static void amd_check_bp_cfg(void)
- {
- 	uint64_t val, new = 0;
- 
--	/*
--	 * AMD Erratum #1485.  Set bit 5, as instructed.
--	 */
--	if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && is_zen4_uarch())
--		new |= (1 << 5);
-+	if (!cpu_has_hypervisor) {
-+		/*
-+		 * AMD Erratum #1485.  If SMT is enabled and STIBP disabled,
-+		 * the CPU may fetch incorrect instruction bytes.
-+		 *
-+		 * Set bit 5, as instructed.
-+		 */
-+		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 && is_zen4_uarch())
-+			new |= (1 << 5);
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * AMD SB-7052.  CPU OP Cache corruption, causing instructions
-+		 * to be executed at a higher privilege.
-+		 *
-+		 * Set bit 33, as instructed.
-+		 */
-+		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x17 && is_zen2_uarch())
-+			new |= (1UL << 33);
-+	}
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * On hardware supporting SRSO_MSR_FIX, activate BP_SPEC_REDUCE by

xsa491-4.21.patch

@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/HVM: add locking to I/O port translation list traversal
-
-XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping is usable by DM stubdoms, and hence we can't
-assume the list to be left unaltered while the guest (really: the
-hypervisor on behalf of the guest) is accessing it.
-
-This is XSA-491 / CVE-2026-42487.
-
-Fixes: 192c4dabc344 ("domctl and p2m changes for PCI passthru")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-                    "ioport_map:add: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
-                    d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
- 
-+            write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-             list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
-                 if (g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
-                 {
-@@ -684,11 +685,14 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-                 g2m_ioport->np = np;
-                 list_add_tail(&g2m_ioport->list, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list);
-             }
-+            write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-             if ( !ret )
-                 ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
-             if ( ret && !found && g2m_ioport )
-             {
-+                write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-                 list_del(&g2m_ioport->list);
-+                write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-                 xfree(g2m_ioport);
-             }
-         }
-@@ -697,6 +701,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
-                    "ioport_map:remove: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
-                    d->domain_id, fgp, fmp, np);
-+
-+            write_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-             list_for_each_entry(g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list)
-                 if ( g2m_ioport->mport == fmp )
-                 {
-@@ -704,6 +710,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-                     xfree(g2m_ioport);
-                     break;
-                 }
-+            write_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-+
-             ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
-             if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(currd) )
-                 printk(XENLOG_ERR
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
-@@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ void hvmemul_cancel(struct vcpu *v)
-     hvio->mmio_insn_bytes = 0;
-     hvio->mmio_access = (struct npfec){};
-     hvio->mmio_retry = false;
--    hvio->g2m_ioport = NULL;
- 
-     hvmemul_cache_disable(v);
- }
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -610,6 +610,7 @@ int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain
-     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.irq_lock);
-     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.uc_lock);
-     spin_lock_init(&d->arch.hvm.write_map.lock);
-+    rwlock_init(&d->arch.hvm.g2m_ioport_lock);
-     rwlock_init(&d->arch.hvm.mmcfg_lock);
-     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.hvm.write_map.list);
-     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.hvm.g2m_ioport_list);
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/io.c
-@@ -143,36 +143,56 @@ bool handle_pio(uint16_t port, unsigned
-     return true;
- }
- 
--static bool cf_check g2m_portio_accept(
--    const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, const ioreq_t *p)
-+/* NB: Returns with the lock held in the success case. */
-+static const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_portio_find_and_lock(struct hvm_domain *hvm,
-+                                                         uint64_t addr,
-+                                                         uint32_t size)
- {
--    struct vcpu *curr = current;
--    const struct hvm_domain *hvm = &curr->domain->arch.hvm;
--    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &curr->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
--    struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
--    unsigned int start, end;
-+    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
-+
-+    read_lock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
- 
-     list_for_each_entry( g2m_ioport, &hvm->g2m_ioport_list, list )
-     {
--        start = g2m_ioport->gport;
--        end = start + g2m_ioport->np;
--        if ( (p->addr >= start) && (p->addr + p->size <= end) )
--        {
--            hvio->g2m_ioport = g2m_ioport;
--            return 1;
--        }
-+        unsigned int start = g2m_ioport->gport;
-+
-+        if ( addr >= start && addr + size <= start + g2m_ioport->np )
-+            return g2m_ioport;
-     }
- 
--    return 0;
-+    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-+
-+    return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static bool cf_check g2m_portio_accept(
-+    const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, const ioreq_t *p)
-+{
-+    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
-+    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
-+        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, p->addr, p->size);
-+
-+    if ( !g2m_ioport )
-+        return false;
-+
-+    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-+
-+    return true;
- }
- 
- static int cf_check g2m_portio_read(
-     const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t addr, uint32_t size,
-     uint64_t *data)
- {
--    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &current->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
--    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport = hvio->g2m_ioport;
--    unsigned int mport = (addr - g2m_ioport->gport) + g2m_ioport->mport;
-+    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
-+    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
-+        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, addr, size);
-+    unsigned int mport;
-+
-+    if ( !g2m_ioport )
-+        return X86EMUL_RETRY;
-+
-+    mport = addr - g2m_ioport->gport + g2m_ioport->mport;
- 
-     switch ( size )
-     {
-@@ -189,6 +209,8 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_read(
-         BUG();
-     }
- 
-+    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-+
-     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
- 
-@@ -196,9 +218,15 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_write(
-     const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t addr, uint32_t size,
-     uint64_t data)
- {
--    struct hvm_vcpu_io *hvio = &current->arch.hvm.hvm_io;
--    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport = hvio->g2m_ioport;
--    unsigned int mport = (addr - g2m_ioport->gport) + g2m_ioport->mport;
-+    struct hvm_domain *hvm = &current->domain->arch.hvm;
-+    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport =
-+        g2m_portio_find_and_lock(hvm, addr, size);
-+    unsigned int mport;
-+
-+    if ( !g2m_ioport )
-+        return X86EMUL_RETRY;
-+
-+    mport = addr - g2m_ioport->gport + g2m_ioport->mport;
- 
-     switch ( size )
-     {
-@@ -215,6 +243,8 @@ static int cf_check g2m_portio_write(
-         BUG();
-     }
- 
-+    read_unlock(&hvm->g2m_ioport_lock);
-+
-     return X86EMUL_OKAY;
- }
- 
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/domain.h
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct hvm_domain {
- 
-     /* List of guest to machine IO ports mapping. */
-     struct list_head g2m_ioport_list;
-+    rwlock_t g2m_ioport_lock;
- 
-     /* List of MMCFG regions trapped by Xen. */
-     struct list_head mmcfg_regions;
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vcpu.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vcpu.h
-@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ struct hvm_vcpu_io {
-     unsigned long msix_unmask_address;
-     unsigned long msix_snoop_address;
-     unsigned long msix_snoop_gpa;
--
--    const struct g2m_ioport *g2m_ioport;
- };
- 
- struct nestedvcpu {

xsa492-4.21-01.patch

@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: sched: use sequence counter to enlighten vcpu_runstate_get()
-
-Subsequently XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo will want to invoke the function
-without holding a lock, thus allowing parallel execution of potentially
-many instances. As was learned from 228ab9992ffb ("domctl: improve
-locking during domain destruction"), reverted by d0887cc6b16e, such
-parallelism can result in severe lock contention on any (previously)
-inner lock. To avoid taking that risk replace the use of the scheduler
-lock in vcpu_runstate_get() by a newly introduced sequence counter.
-Convert the "no lock if current" property to "use a local counter
-instance", thus guaranteeing the loop to exit after the first iteration.
-
-Skeleton and commentary of the seqcount implementation based on /
-derived from Linux 6.11-rc.
-
-To have runstate_seq placed next to runstate in struct vcpu, without
-introducing a new obvious padding hole, yet while keeping the latter
-adjacent to runstate_guest{,_area} as well, move runstate down a little.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-@@ -281,13 +281,18 @@ static inline void vcpu_runstate_change(
-     }
- 
-     delta = new_entry_time - v->runstate.state_entry_time;
--    if ( delta > 0 )
-+
-+    /* Serialization: ->schedule_lock (see ASSERT() above). */
-+    with_seq_write(&v->runstate_seq)
-     {
--        v->runstate.time[v->runstate.state] += delta;
--        v->runstate.state_entry_time = new_entry_time;
--    }
-+        if ( delta > 0 )
-+        {
-+            v->runstate.time[v->runstate.state] += delta;
-+            v->runstate.state_entry_time = new_entry_time;
-+        }
- 
--    v->runstate.state = new_state;
-+        v->runstate.state = new_state;
-+    }
- }
- 
- void sched_guest_idle(void (*idle) (void), unsigned int cpu)
-@@ -307,30 +312,18 @@ void sched_guest_idle(void (*idle) (void
- void vcpu_runstate_get(const struct vcpu *v,
-                        struct vcpu_runstate_info *runstate)
- {
--    spinlock_t *lock;
--    s_time_t delta;
--    struct sched_unit *unit;
-+    struct seqcount seq = SEQCNT_ZERO();
-+    const struct seqcount *s = likely(v == current) ? &seq : &v->runstate_seq;
- 
--    rcu_read_lock(&sched_res_rculock);
--
--    /*
--     * Be careful in case of an idle vcpu: the assignment to a unit might
--     * change even with the scheduling lock held, so be sure to use the
--     * correct unit for locking in order to avoid triggering an ASSERT() in
--     * the unlock function.
--     */
--    unit = is_idle_vcpu(v) ? get_sched_res(v->processor)->sched_unit_idle
--                           : v->sched_unit;
--    lock = likely(v == current) ? NULL : unit_schedule_lock_irq(unit);
--    memcpy(runstate, &v->runstate, sizeof(*runstate));
--    delta = NOW() - runstate->state_entry_time;
--    if ( delta > 0 )
--        runstate->time[runstate->state] += delta;
--
--    if ( unlikely(lock != NULL) )
--        unit_schedule_unlock_irq(lock, unit);
-+    until_seq_read(s)
-+    {
-+        s_time_t delta;
- 
--    rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
-+        *runstate = v->runstate;
-+        delta = NOW() - runstate->state_entry_time;
-+        if ( delta > 0 )
-+            runstate->time[runstate->state] += delta;
-+    }
- }
- 
- uint64_t get_cpu_idle_time(unsigned int cpu)
---- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
- #include <xen/radix-tree.h>
- #include <xen/multicall.h>
- #include <xen/nospec.h>
-+#include <xen/seqcount.h>
- #include <xen/tasklet.h>
- #include <xen/mm.h>
- #include <xen/smp.h>
-@@ -198,7 +199,6 @@ struct vcpu
- 
-     struct sched_unit *sched_unit;
- 
--    struct vcpu_runstate_info runstate;
- #ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT
- # define runstate_guest(v) ((v)->runstate_guest)
-     XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_runstate_info_t) runstate_guest; /* guest address */
-@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ struct vcpu
-     } runstate_guest; /* guest address */
- #endif
-     struct guest_area runstate_guest_area;
-+    struct vcpu_runstate_info runstate;
-+    struct seqcount  runstate_seq;
-     unsigned int     new_state;
- 
-     /* Has the FPU been initialised? */
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/seqcount.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
-+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
-+#ifndef XEN_SEQCOUNT_H
-+#define XEN_SEQCOUNT_H
-+
-+#include <xen/lib.h>
-+#include <xen/nospec.h>
-+
-+#include <asm/atomic.h>
-+#include <asm/system.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * Sequence counters (seqcount_t)
-+ *
-+ * This is the raw counting mechanism, without any writer protection.
-+ *
-+ * Write side critical sections must be serialized (and non-preemptible).
-+ *
-+ * If readers can be invoked from interrupt contexts, interrupts must also
-+ * be respectively disabled before entering the write section.
-+ *
-+ * This mechanism can't be used if the protected data contains pointers,
-+ * as the writer can invalidate a pointer that a reader is following.
-+ */
-+struct seqcount {
-+    unsigned int sequence;
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * SEQCNT_ZERO() - initializer for seqcount_t
-+ * @name: Name of the struct seqcount instance
-+ */
-+#define SEQCNT_ZERO() { .sequence = 0 }
-+
-+static inline unsigned int seqprop_sequence(const struct seqcount *s)
-+{
-+    return ACCESS_ONCE(s->sequence);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * read_seqcount_begin() - begin a seqcount read critical section
-+ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
-+ *
-+ * Return: count to be passed to read_seqcount_retry()
-+ */
-+static inline unsigned int _read_seqcount_begin(const struct seqcount *s)
-+{
-+    unsigned int seq;
-+
-+    while ((seq = seqprop_sequence(s)) & 1)
-+        cpu_relax();
-+
-+    smp_rmb();
-+
-+    return seq;
-+}
-+
-+static always_inline unsigned int read_seqcount_begin(const struct seqcount *s)
-+{
-+    unsigned int seq = _read_seqcount_begin(s);
-+
-+    block_lock_speculation();
-+
-+    return seq;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * read_seqcount_retry() - end a seqcount read critical section
-+ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
-+ * @start: count, from read_seqcount_begin()
-+ *
-+ * read_seqcount_retry closes the read critical section of given struct
-+ * seqcount.  If the critical section was invalid, it must be ignored
-+ * (and typically retried).
-+ *
-+ * Return: true if a read section retry is required, else false
-+ */
-+static inline bool _read_seqcount_retry(const struct seqcount *s,
-+                                        unsigned int start)
-+{
-+    smp_rmb();
-+    return unlikely(seqprop_sequence(s) != start);
-+}
-+
-+static always_inline bool read_seqcount_retry(const struct seqcount *s,
-+                                              unsigned int start)
-+{
-+    return lock_evaluate_nospec(_read_seqcount_retry(s, start));
-+}
-+
-+/* Loops until a consistent count has been observed across the loop body. */
-+#define until_seq_read(seq)                                    \
-+    for ( unsigned int retry_ = 1, count_;                     \
-+          retry_ && (count_ = read_seqcount_begin(seq), true); \
-+          retry_ = read_seqcount_retry(seq, count_) )
-+
-+/*
-+ * write_seqcount_begin() - start a struct seqcount write side critical section
-+ * @s: Pointer to struct seqcount
-+ *
-+ * Context: sequence counter write side sections must be serialized.
-+ * If readers can be invoked from interrupt context, interrupts must be
-+ * respectively disabled.
-+ */
-+static inline void write_seqcount_begin(struct seqcount *s)
-+{
-+    add_sized(&s->sequence, 1);
-+    smp_wmb();
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * write_seqcount_end() - end a struct seqcount write side critical section
-+ * @s: Pointer to seqcount
-+ */
-+static inline void write_seqcount_end(struct seqcount *s)
-+{
-+    smp_wmb();
-+    add_sized(&s->sequence, 1);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Not really a loop, but we need write_seqcount_{begin,end}() in the correct
-+ * position.
-+ */
-+#define with_seq_write(seq)                           \
-+    for ( bool once_ = true;                          \
-+          once_ && (write_seqcount_begin(seq), true); \
-+          (write_seqcount_end(seq), once_ = false) )
-+
-+#endif /* XEN_SEQCOUNT_H */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Local variables:
-+ * mode: C
-+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
-+ * c-basic-offset: 4
-+ * tab-width: 4
-+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
-+ * End:
-+ */

xsa492-4.21-02.patch

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo without acquiring domctl lock
-
-getdomaininfo() is not called under consistently the same lock. Thus,
-with caller side locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the
-domctl lock not held. (Callers not pausing the domain they want to
-retrieve information for already need to be aware that not all of the
-data returned can be relied on as being consistent; most data will also
-be stale by the time the caller gets to look at it.)
-
-Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
-of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
-
-While moving, convert an assignment to an assertion: The domain in
-question was determined from the field which previously was "updated".
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Fixes: 5513bd0b4675 ("add xenstore domain flag to hypervisor")
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -318,6 +318,26 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         break;
-     }
- 
-+    /* Handle sub-ops not requiring the domctl lock. */
-+    switch ( op->cmd )
-+    {
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-+        ret = xsm_getdomaininfo(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
-+        if ( !ret )
-+        {
-+            getdomaininfo(d, &op->u.getdomaininfo);
-+
-+            ASSERT(op->domain == op->u.getdomaininfo.domain);
-+            copyback = true;
-+        }
-+
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+    default:
-+        /* Everything else handled further down. */
-+        break;
-+    }
-+
-     ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op->cmd,
-                      /* SSIDRef only applicable for cmd == createdomain */
-                      op->u.createdomain.ssidref);
-@@ -516,17 +536,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         copyback = 1;
-         break;
- 
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
--        ret = xsm_getdomaininfo(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
--
--        getdomaininfo(d, &op->u.getdomaininfo);
--
--        op->domain = op->u.getdomaininfo.domain;
--        copyback = 1;
--        break;
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpucontext:
-     {
-         vcpu_guest_context_u c = { .nat = NULL };
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -172,9 +172,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-         return xsm_default_action(XSM_XS_PRIV, current->domain, d);
-+
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return -EILSEQ;
-+
-     default:
-         return xsm_default_action(XSM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
-     }
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -682,8 +682,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-          */
-         return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
- 
--    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
-+    /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return -EILSEQ;
-+
-+    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:

xsa492-4.21-03.patch

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Subject: domctl: protect locking for get_domain_state
-
-When DOMID_INVALID is passed, the dom exec handler lock is being taken
-without any check that the domain is even allowed to take the lock. This
-allows for an unauthorized domain to DoS the get_domain_state domctl op.
-Move to consider the op effectively being called against the hypervisor.
-Thus it is the target of the call being invoked to identify the last
-domain with a state change. The subsequent check of whether the source
-domain is allowed the state of the last domain to change state is still
-relevant.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
-+++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
-@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ allow xenstore_t xen_t:xen writeconsole;
- # Xenstore queries domaininfo on all domains
- allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain getdomaininfo;
- allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain2 get_domain_state;
-+allow xenstore_t domxen_t:domain2 get_domain_state;
- 
- # As a shortcut, the following 3 rules are used instead of adding a domain_comms
- # rule between xenstore_t and every domain type that talks to xenstore
---- a/xen/common/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
-@@ -216,12 +216,8 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_g
-     if ( info->pad0 )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
--    if ( d )
-+    if ( d != dom_xen )
-     {
--        rc = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
--        if ( rc )
--            return rc;
--
-         set_domain_state_info(info, d);
- 
-         return 0;
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -304,13 +304,19 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         fallthrough;
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
-         {
-             d = NULL;
-             break;
-         }
-         fallthrough;
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+        if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
-+        {
-+            d = dom_xen;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+        fallthrough;
-     default:
-         d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
-         if ( !d )
-@@ -863,7 +869,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         break;
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
--        ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
-+        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
-+        if ( !ret )
-+            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
-         if ( !ret )
-             copyback = true;
-         break;
-@@ -876,7 +884,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-     domctl_lock_release();
- 
-  domctl_out_unlock_domonly:
--    if ( d && d != dom_io )
-+    if ( d && !is_system_domain(d) )
-         rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- 
-     if ( copyback && __copy_to_guest(u_domctl, op, 1) )

xsa492-4.21-04.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state without acquiring domctl lock
-
-get_domain_state() uses its own locking. Thus, with caller side locking
-irrelevant, it can as well be called with the domctl lock not held.
-
-Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
-of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Fixes: 3ad3df1bd0aa ("xen: add new domctl get_domain_state")
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -339,6 +339,14 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
- 
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
-+        if ( !ret )
-+            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
-+        if ( !ret )
-+            copyback = true;
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-     default:
-         /* Everything else handled further down. */
-         break;
-@@ -868,14 +876,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-         break;
- 
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
--        ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
--        if ( !ret )
--            ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
--        if ( !ret )
--            copyback = true;
--        break;
--
-     default:
-         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
-         break;
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -172,10 +172,9 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
--        return xsm_default_action(XSM_XS_PRIV, current->domain, d);
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
- 
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
-@@ -694,7 +695,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
- 
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/../domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:

xsa492-4.21-05.patch

@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domain: locking for iomem_caps accesses
-
-In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_mapping handling
-out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is needed to
-synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission.
-
-Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
-outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
-limited to non-__init code).
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
-@@ -518,10 +518,15 @@ static int late_hwdom_init(struct domain
-      * may be modified after this hypercall returns if a more complex
-      * device model is desired.
-      */
-+    write_lock(&dom0->caps_lock);
-     rangeset_swap(d->irq_caps, dom0->irq_caps);
-     rangeset_swap(d->iomem_caps, dom0->iomem_caps);
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     rangeset_swap(d->arch.ioport_caps, dom0->arch.ioport_caps);
-+#endif
-+    write_unlock(&dom0->caps_lock);
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     setup_io_bitmap(d);
-     setup_io_bitmap(dom0);
- #endif
-@@ -873,6 +878,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t dom
-     rspin_lock_init_prof(d, domain_lock);
-     rspin_lock_init_prof(d, page_alloc_lock);
-     spin_lock_init(&d->hypercall_deadlock_mutex);
-+    rwlock_init(&d->caps_lock);
-     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->page_list);
-     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->extra_page_list);
-     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->xenpage_list);
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -267,6 +267,35 @@ static struct vnuma_info *vnuma_init(con
-     return ERR_PTR(ret);
- }
- 
-+void iocaps_double_lock(struct domain *d, bool write)
-+{
-+    struct domain *currd = current->domain;
-+
-+    if ( d->domain_id > currd->domain_id )
-+        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
-+
-+    if ( write )
-+        write_lock(&d->caps_lock);
-+    else
-+        read_lock(&d->caps_lock);
-+
-+    if ( d->domain_id < currd->domain_id )
-+        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
-+}
-+
-+void iocaps_double_unlock(struct domain *d, bool write)
-+{
-+    struct domain *currd = current->domain;
-+
-+    if ( d != currd )
-+        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
-+
-+    if ( write )
-+        write_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
-+    else
-+        read_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
-+}
-+
- static bool is_stable_domctl(uint32_t cmd)
- {
-     return cmd == XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state;
-@@ -687,6 +716,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */
-             break;
- 
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-+
-         if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
-                                      mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ||
-              xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) )
-@@ -695,6 +726,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
-         else
-             ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-         break;
-     }
- 
-@@ -719,19 +752,15 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             break;
- #endif
- 
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
-+
-         ret = -EPERM;
-         if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
--             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
--            break;
--
--        ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
--
--        if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
--            break;
--
--        if ( add )
-+             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ||
-+             (ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add)) ||
-+             !paging_mode_translate(d) )
-+            /* Nothing. */;
-+        else if ( add )
-         {
-             printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
-                    "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
-@@ -755,6 +784,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-                        "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
-                        ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
-         }
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
-         break;
-     }
- 
---- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
-@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
- #include <asm/iocap.h>
- #include <asm/p2m.h>
- 
-+void iocaps_double_lock(struct domain *d, bool write);
-+void iocaps_double_unlock(struct domain *d, bool write);
-+
- static inline int iomem_permit_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long s,
-                                       unsigned long e)
- {
---- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ struct domain
- #endif
- 
-     /* I/O capabilities (access to IRQs and memory-mapped I/O). */
-+    rwlock_t         caps_lock;
-     struct rangeset *iomem_caps;
-     struct rangeset *irq_caps;
- 

xsa492-4.21-06.patch

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/domain: locking for ioport_caps accesses
-
-In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping
-handling out of the domctl-locked region, the new separate (per-domain)
-lock is used to synchronize in particular with
-XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission.
-
-Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
-outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
-limited to non-__init code).
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports;
-         int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access;
- 
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-+
-         if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
-             ret = -EINVAL;
-         else if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) ||
-@@ -242,6 +244,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
-         else
-             ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-         break;
-     }
- 
-@@ -648,16 +652,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             break;
-         }
- 
--        ret = -EPERM;
--        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
--            break;
--
--        ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
--
-         hvm = &d->arch.hvm;
--        if ( add )
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-+
-+        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ||
-+             (ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add)) )
-+            ret = ret ?: -EPERM;
-+        else if ( add )
-         {
-             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
-                    "ioport_map:add: dom%d gport=%x mport=%x nr=%x\n",
-@@ -718,6 +720,8 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-                        "ioport_map: error %ld denying dom%d access to [%x,%x]\n",
-                        ret, d->domain_id, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
-         }
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-         break;
-     }
- 
---- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
-@@ -2339,9 +2339,12 @@ void __hwdom_init setup_io_bitmap(struct
-         return;
- 
-     bitmap_fill(d->arch.hvm.io_bitmap, 0x10000);
-+
-+    read_lock(&d->caps_lock);
-     if ( rangeset_report_ranges(d->arch.ioport_caps, 0, 0x10000,
-                                 io_bitmap_cb, d) )
-         BUG();
-+    read_unlock(&d->caps_lock);
- 
-     /*
-      * We need to trap 4-byte accesses to 0xcf8 (see admin_io_okay(),

xsa492-4.21-07.patch

@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domain: locking for irq_caps accesses
-
-In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq
-handling out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is
-needed to synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,gsi}_permission.
-
-Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
-outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
-limited to non-__init code).
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     {
-         int rc;
-+        struct domain *currd = current->domain;
-         struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind = &domctl->u.bind_pt_irq;
-         uint32_t irq = bind->u.spi.spi;
-         uint32_t virq = bind->machine_irq;
-@@ -107,21 +108,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
-         if ( rc )
-             return rc;
- 
--        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
--            return -EPERM;
-+        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
- 
--        if ( !vgic_reserve_virq(d, virq) )
--            return -EBUSY;
--
--        rc = route_irq_to_guest(d, virq, irq, "routed IRQ");
--        if ( rc )
--            vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
-+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
-+            rc = -EPERM;
-+        else if ( !vgic_reserve_virq(d, virq) )
-+            rc = -EBUSY;
-+        else
-+        {
-+            rc = route_irq_to_guest(d, virq, irq, "routed IRQ");
-+            if ( rc )
-+                vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
-+        }
- 
-+        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
-         return rc;
-     }
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-     {
-         int rc;
-+        struct domain *currd = current->domain;
-         struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind = &domctl->u.bind_pt_irq;
-         uint32_t irq = bind->u.spi.spi;
-         uint32_t virq = bind->machine_irq;
-@@ -138,16 +144,15 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
-         if ( rc )
-             return rc;
- 
--        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
--            return -EPERM;
--
--        rc = release_guest_irq(d, virq);
--        if ( rc )
--            return rc;
-+        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
- 
--        vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
-+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
-+            rc = -EPERM;
-+        else if ( !(rc = release_guest_irq(d, virq)) )
-+            vgic_free_virq(d, virq);
- 
--        return 0;
-+        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
-+        return rc;
-     }
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vuart_op:
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -267,16 +267,17 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             break;
-         }
- 
--        ret = -EPERM;
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-+
-         if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) ||
-              xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, flags) )
--            break;
--
--        if ( flags )
-+            ret = -EPERM;
-+        else if ( flags )
-             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
-         else
-             ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
- 
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-         break;
-     }
- 
-@@ -579,20 +580,27 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             break;
- 
-         irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
--        ret = -EPERM;
--        if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
--            break;
-+        if ( irq <= 0 )
-+            ret = -EPERM;
- 
--        ret = -ESRCH;
--        if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
-+        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
-+
-+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
-+            ret = -EPERM;
-+        else if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
-         {
-             pcidevs_lock();
-             ret = pt_irq_create_bind(d, bind);
-             pcidevs_unlock();
-+
-+            if ( ret < 0 )
-+                printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_create_bind failed (%ld) for %pd\n",
-+                       ret, d);
-         }
--        if ( ret < 0 )
--            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_create_bind failed (%ld) for dom%d\n",
--                   ret, d->domain_id);
-+        else
-+            ret = -ESRCH;
-+
-+        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
-         break;
-     }
- 
-@@ -605,23 +613,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
-             break;
- 
--        ret = -EPERM;
--        if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
--            break;
--
-         ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
-         if ( ret )
-             break;
- 
--        if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
-+        read_lock(&currd->caps_lock);
-+
-+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
-+            ret = -EPERM;
-+        else if ( is_iommu_enabled(d) )
-         {
-             pcidevs_lock();
-             ret = pt_irq_destroy_bind(d, bind);
-             pcidevs_unlock();
-+
-+            if ( ret < 0 )
-+                printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_destroy_bind failed (%ld) for %pd\n",
-+                       ret, d);
-         }
--        if ( ret < 0 )
--            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "pt_irq_destroy_bind failed (%ld) for dom%d\n",
--                   ret, d->domain_id);
-+
-+        read_unlock(&currd->caps_lock);
-         break;
-     }
- 
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -695,6 +695,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             ret = -EINVAL;
-             break;
-         }
-+
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-+
-         irq = pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq);
-         if ( !irq || xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
-             ret = -EPERM;
-@@ -702,6 +705,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
-         else
-             ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-         break;
-     }
- #endif

xsa492-4.21-08.patch

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: XSM/Flask: split the .iomem_mapping() hook
-
-It's used twice in entirely different situations. The use in do_domctl()
-wants to become an ordinary XSM_DM_PRIV invocation, while the one in vPCI
-code need to remain XSM_HOOK (it may plausibly become XSM_TARGET). For
-Flask, the same backing function will continue to be used for the time
-being.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-
---- a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c
-@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int cf_check map_range(
-             return -EPERM;
-         }
- 
--        rc = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, map->d, map_mfn, m_end, map->map);
-+        rc = xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(XSM_HOOK, map->d, map_mfn, m_end, map->map);
-         if ( rc )
-         {
-             printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -580,6 +580,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
-+static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(
-+    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
-+{
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
-+}
-+
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_pci_config_permission(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start,
-     uint16_t end, uint8_t access)
---- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ struct xsm_ops {
-                             uint8_t allow);
-     int (*iomem_mapping)(struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e,
-                          uint8_t allow);
-+    int (*iomem_mapping_vpci)(struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e,
-+                              uint8_t allow);
-     int (*pci_config_permission)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf,
-                                  uint16_t start, uint16_t end, uint8_t access);
- 
-@@ -523,6 +525,12 @@ static inline int xsm_iomem_mapping(
-     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.iomem_mapping, d, s, e, allow);
- }
- 
-+static inline int xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci(
-+    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
-+{
-+    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.iomem_mapping_vpci, d, s, e, allow);
-+}
-+
- static inline int xsm_pci_config_permission(
-     xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start,
-     uint16_t end, uint8_t access)
---- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .irq_permission                = xsm_irq_permission,
-     .iomem_permission              = xsm_iomem_permission,
-     .iomem_mapping                 = xsm_iomem_mapping,
-+    .iomem_mapping_vpci            = xsm_iomem_mapping_vpci,
-     .pci_config_permission         = xsm_pci_config_permission,
-     .get_vnumainfo                 = xsm_get_vnumainfo,
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -1950,6 +1950,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .irq_permission = flask_irq_permission,
-     .iomem_permission = flask_iomem_permission,
-     .iomem_mapping = flask_iomem_mapping,
-+    .iomem_mapping_vpci = flask_iomem_mapping,
-     .pci_config_permission = flask_pci_config_permission,
- 
-     .resource_plug_core = flask_resource_plug_core,

xsa492-4.21-09.patch

@@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping without acquiring domctl lock
-
-With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
-Move the re-purposed dedicated XSM check as early as possible.
-
-Minimal "modernization": Switch "add" to bool and use %pd in log messages.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -376,6 +376,66 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             copyback = true;
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-+    {
-+        unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
-+        unsigned long mfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
-+        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
-+        unsigned long mfn_end = mfn + nr_mfns - 1;
-+        bool add = op->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
-+
-+        ret = -EINVAL;
-+        if ( mfn_end < mfn || /* Wrap? */
-+             ((mfn | mfn_end) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
-+             (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* Wrap? */
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+        ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
-+        if ( ret || !paging_mode_translate(d) )
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+#ifndef CONFIG_X86 /* XXX ARM!? */
-+        ret = -E2BIG;
-+        /* Must break hypercall up as this could take a while. */
-+        if ( nr_mfns > 64 )
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+#endif
-+
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
-+
-+        ret = -EPERM;
-+        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
-+             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
-+            /* Nothing. */;
-+        else if ( add )
-+        {
-+            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
-+                   "memory_map:add: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
-+                   d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
-+
-+            ret = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
-+            if ( ret < 0 )
-+                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
-+                       "memory_map:fail: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx ret:%ld\n",
-+                       d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
-+        }
-+        else
-+        {
-+            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
-+                   "memory_map:remove: %pd gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
-+                   d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
-+
-+            ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
-+            if ( ret < 0 && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
-+                printk(XENLOG_ERR
-+                       "memory_map: error %ld removing %pd access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
-+                       ret, d, mfn, mfn_end);
-+        }
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+    }
-+
-     default:
-         /* Everything else handled further down. */
-         break;
-@@ -736,64 +796,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         break;
-     }
- 
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
--    {
--        unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
--        unsigned long mfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
--        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
--        unsigned long mfn_end = mfn + nr_mfns - 1;
--        int add = op->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
--
--        ret = -EINVAL;
--        if ( mfn_end < mfn || /* wrap? */
--             ((mfn | mfn_end) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
--             (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* wrap? */
--            break;
--
--#ifndef CONFIG_X86 /* XXX ARM!? */
--        ret = -E2BIG;
--        /* Must break hypercall up as this could take a while. */
--        if ( nr_mfns > 64 )
--            break;
--#endif
--
--        iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
--
--        ret = -EPERM;
--        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
--             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ||
--             (ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add)) ||
--             !paging_mode_translate(d) )
--            /* Nothing. */;
--        else if ( add )
--        {
--            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
--                   "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
--                   d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
--
--            ret = map_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
--            if ( ret < 0 )
--                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
--                       "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx ret:%ld\n",
--                       d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
--        }
--        else
--        {
--            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG
--                   "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
--                   d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
--
--            ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, _gfn(gfn), nr_mfns, _mfn(mfn));
--            if ( ret < 0 && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
--                printk(XENLOG_ERR
--                       "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
--                       ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
--        }
--
--        iocaps_double_unlock(d, false);
--        break;
--    }
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
-         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
-         break;
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -168,13 +168,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     switch ( cmd )
-     {
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
-@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_mapping(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
-@@ -692,7 +693,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
- 

xsa492-4.21-10.patch

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping without acquiring domctl lock
-
-With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
-As the handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), almost no code is
-being moved, but a 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops) invocation of
-arch_do_domctl() is being added. Move just the re-purposed dedicated XSM
-check as early as possible.
-
-In flask_domctl() don't put #ifdef around the moved case label.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -663,12 +663,15 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             break;
-         }
- 
-+        ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add);
-+        if ( ret )
-+            break;
-+
-         hvm = &d->arch.hvm;
-         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
- 
--        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) ||
--             (ret = xsm_ioport_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, fmp, fmp + np - 1, add)) )
--            ret = ret ?: -EPERM;
-+        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fmp, fmp + np - 1) )
-+            ret = -EPERM;
-         else if ( add )
-         {
-             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -436,6 +436,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-     }
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-+        ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-     default:
-         /* Everything else handled further down. */
-         break;
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_OTHER);
-     switch ( cmd )
-     {
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
-@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iopor
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_ioport_mapping(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
-@@ -703,7 +704,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH

xsa492-4.21-11.patch

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq without acquiring domctl lock
-
-With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
-(It also already isn't used when pt_irq_{create,destroy}_bind() are
-invoked for PVH Dom0.) As the handling is in arch-specific code, no code
-is being moved, but the 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops like the ones
-here) invocation of arch_do_domctl() is being re-used.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Fixes: fda49f9b3fbb ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
-         if ( rc )
-             return rc;
- 
--        rc = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
-+        rc = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
-         if ( rc )
-             return rc;
- 
-@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *d
-         if ( irq != virq )
-             return -EINVAL;
- 
--        rc = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
-+        rc = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
-         if ( rc )
-             return rc;
- 
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
-             break;
- 
--        ret = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
-+        ret = xsm_bind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
-         if ( ret )
-             break;
- 
-@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
-             break;
- 
--        ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_HOOK, d, bind);
-+        ret = xsm_unbind_pt_irq(XSM_DM_PRIV, d, bind);
-         if ( ret )
-             break;
- 
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -437,6 +437,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-     }
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
- 
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -168,13 +168,11 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     switch ( cmd )
-     {
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
--        return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
-@@ -541,14 +539,14 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unmap
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_bind_pt_irq(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unbind_pt_irq(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -683,10 +683,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-         return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
- 
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
-@@ -697,9 +699,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
- 
--    /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/../domctl.c) */
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:

xsa492-4.21-12.patch

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_io{mem,port}_permission without acquiring domctl lock
-
-With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
-As the I/O port handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is
-being moved, but the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move
-the re-purposed dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -233,12 +233,17 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-         unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports;
-         int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access;
- 
-+        ret = -EINVAL;
-+        if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
-+            break;
-+
-+        ret = xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow);
-+        if ( ret )
-+            break;
-+
-         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
- 
--        if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS )
--            ret = -EINVAL;
--        else if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) ||
--                  xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow) )
-+        if ( !ioports_access_permitted(currd, fp, fp + np - 1) )
-             ret = -EPERM;
-         else if ( allow )
-             ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1);
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -376,6 +376,34 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             copyback = true;
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-+    {
-+        unsigned long mfn = op->u.iomem_permission.first_mfn;
-+        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.iomem_permission.nr_mfns;
-+        bool allow = op->u.iomem_permission.allow_access;
-+
-+        ret = -EINVAL;
-+        if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* Wrap? */
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+        ret = xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow);
-+        if ( ret )
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-+
-+        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
-+                                     mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) )
-+            ret = -EPERM;
-+        else if ( allow )
-+            ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
-+        else
-+            ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+    }
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     {
-         unsigned long gfn = op->u.memory_mapping.first_gfn;
-@@ -436,6 +464,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-     }
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-@@ -777,31 +806,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-     }
- #endif
- 
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
--    {
--        unsigned long mfn = op->u.iomem_permission.first_mfn;
--        unsigned long nr_mfns = op->u.iomem_permission.nr_mfns;
--        int allow = op->u.iomem_permission.allow_access;
--
--        ret = -EINVAL;
--        if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */
--            break;
--
--        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
--
--        if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain,
--                                     mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) ||
--             xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) )
--            ret = -EPERM;
--        else if ( allow )
--            ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
--        else
--            ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
--
--        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
--        break;
--    }
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
-         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
-         break;
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -170,7 +170,9 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-@@ -567,7 +569,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_irq_p
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_iomem_permission(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
-@@ -763,7 +765,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_priv_
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_ioport_permission(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t s, uint32_t e, uint8_t allow)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -686,7 +686,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-@@ -695,14 +697,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH

xsa492-4.21-13.patch

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,gsi}_permission without acquiring domctl lock
-
-With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
-As the GSI handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is being
-moved there; the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move the
-re-purposed (XSM_HOOK -> XSM_PRIV, as xsm_domctl() is now bypassed)
-dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -272,10 +272,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             break;
-         }
- 
-+        ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, flags);
-+        if ( ret )
-+            break;
-+
-         iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
- 
--        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) ||
--             xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, flags) )
-+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
-             ret = -EPERM;
-         else if ( flags )
-             ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -464,8 +464,41 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-     }
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-+    {
-+        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
-+        bool allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
-+
-+        ret = -EINVAL;
-+        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+        irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(current->domain, pirq);
-+
-+        ret = -EPERM;
-+        if ( irq )
-+            ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
-+        if ( ret )
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-+
-+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
-+            ret = -EPERM;
-+        else if ( allow )
-+            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
-+        else
-+            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
-+
-+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
-@@ -779,33 +812,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         }
-         break;
- 
--#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
--    {
--        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
--        int allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
--
--        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
--        {
--            ret = -EINVAL;
--            break;
--        }
--
--        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
--
--        irq = pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq);
--        if ( !irq || xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
--            ret = -EPERM;
--        else if ( allow )
--            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
--        else
--            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
--
--        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
--        break;
--    }
--#endif
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
-         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
-         break;
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -170,9 +170,11 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-@@ -562,7 +564,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_unmap
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_irq_permission(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int pirq, uint8_t allow)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -686,9 +686,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-@@ -696,14 +698,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
- 
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-     /*

xsa492-4.21-14.patch

@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl/XSM: drop vm_event_control hook
-
-Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). Care needs to be taken with the
-GET_VERSION sub-op, which may be invoked with DOMID_INVALID, and which has
-been (and continues to be) bypassing XSM checking.
-
-Since the latter two parameters were unused, monitor_domctl() invoking the
-hook was actually redundant with the earlier xsm_domctl() (as can be seen
-nicely from the hunks changing xsm/flask/hooks.c).
-
-As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at the same early
-point with and without Flask.
-
-While folding XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op and XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op in
-flask_domctl(), also fold in XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -496,6 +496,23 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-     }
- #endif
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
-+        if ( op->u.vm_event_op.op == XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION )
-+        {
-+            /* No XSM check (and potentially d == NULL) here. */
-+            ret = vm_event_domctl(d, &op->u.vm_event_op);
-+            if ( !ret )
-+                copyback = true;
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+        }
-+        if ( !d )
-+        {
-+            ret = -ESRCH;
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+        }
-+        /* Other sub-ops handled further down. */
-+        break;
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
---- a/xen/common/monitor.c
-+++ b/xen/common/monitor.c
-@@ -30,16 +30,11 @@
- 
- int monitor_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_monitor_op *mop)
- {
--    int rc;
-     bool requested_status = false;
- 
-     if ( unlikely(current->domain == d) ) /* no domain_pause() */
-         return -EPERM;
- 
--    rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, mop->op, mop->event);
--    if ( unlikely(rc) )
--        return rc;
--
-     switch ( mop->op )
-     {
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_ENABLE:
---- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
-+++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
-@@ -603,11 +603,10 @@ int vm_event_domctl(struct domain *d, st
- 
-     /* All other subops need to target a real domain. */
-     if ( unlikely(d == NULL) )
--        return -ESRCH;
--
--    rc = xsm_vm_event_control(XSM_PRIV, d, vec->mode, vec->op);
--    if ( rc )
--        return rc;
-+    {
-+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+        return -EILSEQ;
-+    }
- 
-     if ( unlikely(d == current->domain) ) /* no domain_pause() */
-     {
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -652,13 +652,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_hvm_a
-     }
- }
- 
--static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_vm_event_control(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
--{
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
--    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
--}
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_mem_access(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
- {
---- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-@@ -157,8 +157,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
-     int (*hvm_altp2mhvm_op)(struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op);
-     int (*get_vnumainfo)(struct domain *d);
- 
--    int (*vm_event_control)(struct domain *d, int mode, int op);
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
-     int (*mem_access)(struct domain *d);
- #endif
-@@ -657,12 +655,6 @@ static inline int xsm_get_vnumainfo(xsm_
-     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_vnumainfo, d);
- }
- 
--static inline int xsm_vm_event_control(
--    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
--{
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.vm_event_control, d, mode, op);
--}
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
- static inline int xsm_mem_access(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
- {
---- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-@@ -116,8 +116,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .remove_from_physmap           = xsm_remove_from_physmap,
-     .map_gmfn_foreign              = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign,
- 
--    .vm_event_control              = xsm_vm_event_control,
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
-     .mem_access                    = xsm_mem_access,
- #endif
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -699,7 +699,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
-@@ -793,9 +792,8 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__TRIGGER);
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required:
--        return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op:
-@@ -1368,11 +1366,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_hvm_altp2mhvm_
-     return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__ALTP2MHVM_OP);
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_vm_event_control(struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
--{
--    return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
--}
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
- static int cf_check flask_mem_access(struct domain *d)
- {
-@@ -1971,8 +1964,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .do_xsm_op = do_flask_op,
-     .get_vnumainfo = flask_get_vnumainfo,
- 
--    .vm_event_control = flask_vm_event_control,
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT
-     .mem_access = flask_mem_access,
- #endif

xsa492-4.21-15.patch

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl/XSM: pass full struct xen_domctl to xsm_domctl()
-
-Subsequently some sub-ops will want to inspect their sub-sub-ops. Plus
-this way we don't need to pass SSIDref separately anymore for
-domain_create.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ long do_paging_domctl_cont(
-     if ( d == NULL )
-         return -ESRCH;
- 
--    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op.cmd, 0 /* SSIDref not applicable */);
-+    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, &op);
-     if ( !ret )
-     {
-         if ( domctl_lock_acquire() )
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -526,9 +526,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         break;
-     }
- 
--    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op->cmd,
--                     /* SSIDRef only applicable for cmd == createdomain */
--                     op->u.createdomain.ssidref);
-+    ret = xsm_domctl(XSM_OTHER, d, op);
-     if ( ret )
-         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
- 
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_t
- }
- 
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref)
-+    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op)
- {
-     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_OTHER);
--    switch ( cmd )
-+    switch ( op->cmd )
-     {
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
---- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ struct xsm_ops {
-     int (*sysctl_scheduler_op)(int op);
- #endif
-     int (*set_target)(struct domain *d, struct domain *e);
--    int (*domctl)(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref);
-+    int (*domctl)(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op);
-     int (*sysctl)(int cmd);
-     int (*readconsole)(uint32_t clear);
- 
-@@ -260,9 +260,9 @@ static inline int xsm_set_target(
- }
- 
- static inline int xsm_domctl(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d,
--                             unsigned int cmd, uint32_t ssidref)
-+                             struct xen_domctl *op)
- {
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl, d, cmd, ssidref);
-+    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl, d, op);
- }
- 
- static inline int xsm_sysctl(xsm_default_t def, int cmd)
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -667,10 +667,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_set_target(str
-     return rc;
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd,
--                                 uint32_t ssidref)
-+static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op)
- {
--    switch ( cmd )
-+    switch ( op->cmd )
-     {
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain:
-         /*
-@@ -680,7 +679,8 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-          * Note that d is NULL because we haven't even allocated memory for it
-          * this early in XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain.
-          */
--        return avc_current_has_perm(ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
-+        return avc_current_has_perm(op->u.createdomain.ssidref, SECCLASS_DOMAIN,
-+                                    DOMAIN__CREATE, NULL);
- 
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__SET_LLC_COLORS);
- 
-     default:
--        return avc_unknown_permission("domctl", cmd);
-+        return avc_unknown_permission("domctl", op->cmd);
-     }
- }
- 

xsa492-4.21-16.patch

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl/XSM: drop scheduler_op hook
-
-Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
-struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
-the same early point with and without Flask.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-@@ -2074,10 +2074,6 @@ long sched_adjust(struct domain *d, stru
- {
-     long ret;
- 
--    ret = xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(XSM_HOOK, d, op->cmd);
--    if ( ret )
--        return ret;
--
-     if ( op->sched_id != dom_scheduler(d)->sched_id )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -141,13 +141,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_getdo
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
- }
- 
--static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int cmd)
--{
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
--    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
--}
--
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG int cmd)
- {
-     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
---- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
-                                 struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);
-     int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d, uint32_t ssidref);
-     int (*getdomaininfo)(struct domain *d);
--    int (*domctl_scheduler_op)(struct domain *d, int op);
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-     int (*sysctl_scheduler_op)(int op);
- #endif
-@@ -240,12 +239,6 @@ static inline int xsm_get_domain_state(x
-     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_domain_state, d);
- }
- 
--static inline int xsm_domctl_scheduler_op(
--    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int cmd)
--{
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.domctl_scheduler_op, d, cmd);
--}
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
- static inline int xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op(xsm_default_t def, int cmd)
- {
---- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .security_domaininfo           = xsm_security_domaininfo,
-     .domain_create                 = xsm_domain_create,
-     .getdomaininfo                 = xsm_getdomaininfo,
--    .domctl_scheduler_op           = xsm_domctl_scheduler_op,
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-     .sysctl_scheduler_op           = xsm_sysctl_scheduler_op,
- #endif
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_getdomaininfo(
-     return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__GETDOMAININFO);
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_domctl_scheduler_op(struct domain *d, int op)
-+static int flask_domctl_scheduler_op(struct domain *d, int op)
- {
-     switch ( op )
-     {
-@@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-@@ -745,6 +744,9 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_setdomainhandle:
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__SETDOMAINHANDLE);
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op:
-+        return flask_domctl_scheduler_op(d, op->u.scheduler_op.cmd);
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_ext_vcpucontext:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_vcpu_msrs:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_setvcpucontext:
-@@ -1884,7 +1886,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo,
-     .domain_create = flask_domain_create,
-     .getdomaininfo = flask_getdomaininfo,
--    .domctl_scheduler_op = flask_domctl_scheduler_op,
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-     .sysctl_scheduler_op = flask_sysctl_scheduler_op,
- #endif

xsa492-4.21-17.patch

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl/XSM: drop shadow_control_op hook
-
-Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
-struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
-the same early point with and without Flask.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
-@@ -677,10 +677,6 @@ int paging_domctl(struct domain *d, stru
-         return -EBUSY;
-     }
- 
--    rc = xsm_shadow_control(XSM_HOOK, d, sc->op);
--    if ( rc )
--        return rc;
--
-     /* Code to handle log-dirty. Note that some log dirty operations
-      * piggy-back on shadow operations. For example, when
-      * XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF is called, it first checks whether log dirty
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -682,13 +682,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_do_mc
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
- }
- 
--static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_shadow_control(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
--{
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
--    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
--}
--
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_mem_sharing_op(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
- {
---- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-@@ -172,7 +172,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     int (*do_mca)(void);
--    int (*shadow_control)(struct domain *d, uint32_t op);
-     int (*mem_sharing_op)(struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op);
-     int (*apic)(struct domain *d, int cmd);
-     int (*machine_memory_map)(void);
-@@ -680,12 +679,6 @@ static inline int xsm_do_mca(xsm_default
-     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.do_mca);
- }
- 
--static inline int xsm_shadow_control(
--    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
--{
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.shadow_control, d, op);
--}
--
- static inline int xsm_mem_sharing_op(
-     xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
- {
---- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-@@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .platform_op                   = xsm_platform_op,
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     .do_mca                        = xsm_do_mca,
--    .shadow_control                = xsm_shadow_control,
-     .mem_sharing_op                = xsm_mem_sharing_op,
-     .apic                          = xsm_apic,
-     .machine_memory_map            = xsm_machine_memory_map,
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
- #include <asm/pv/shim.h>
-+static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, unsigned int op);
- #else
- #define pv_shim false
- #endif
-@@ -699,10 +700,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
- 
--#ifdef CONFIG_X86
--    /* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
--#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-     /*
-      * These have individual XSM hooks
-@@ -787,6 +784,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_address_size:
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__GETADDRSIZE);
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
-+        return flask_shadow_control(d, op->u.shadow_op.op);
-+#endif
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op:
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING);
- 
-@@ -1603,7 +1605,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_do_mca(void)
-     return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN__MCA_OP);
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
-+static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, unsigned int op)
- {
-     uint32_t perm;
- 
-@@ -1999,7 +2001,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
-     .platform_op = flask_platform_op,
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-     .do_mca = flask_do_mca,
--    .shadow_control = flask_shadow_control,
-     .mem_sharing_op = flask_mem_sharing_op,
-     .apic = flask_apic,
-     .machine_memory_map = flask_machine_memory_map,

xsa492-4.21-18.patch

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group without acquiring domctl lock
-
-iommu_get_device_group() uses its own locking. Thus, with caller side
-locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the domctl lock not
-held.
-
-Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
-of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -513,6 +513,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         /* Other sub-ops handled further down. */
-         break;
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
-+        ret = iommu_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
-@@ -918,7 +922,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
-         ret = iommu_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
-         break;
- 
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ static int iommu_get_device_group(
-         if ( (pdev->seg != seg) || ((b == bus) && (df == devfn)) )
-             continue;
- 
--        if ( xsm_get_device_group(XSM_HOOK, (seg << 16) | (b << 8) | df) )
-+        if ( xsm_get_device_group(XSM_PRIV, (seg << 16) | (b << 8) | df) )
-             continue;
- 
-         sdev_id = iommu_call(ops, get_device_group_id, seg, b, df);
-@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
-         u32 max_sdevs;
-         XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(uint32) sdevs;
- 
--        ret = xsm_get_device_group(XSM_HOOK, domctl->u.get_device_group.machine_sbdf);
-+        ret = xsm_get_device_group(XSM_PRIV, domctl->u.get_device_group.machine_sbdf);
-         if ( ret )
-             break;
- 
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     {
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-@@ -401,7 +402,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_v
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_device_group(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t machine_bdf)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
- }
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks and don't make it here. */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
-@@ -705,7 +706,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-      * These have individual XSM hooks
-      * (drivers/passthrough/{pci,device_tree.c)
-      */
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:

xsa492-4.21-19.patch

@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl/XSM: drop {,de}assign_{,dt}device hooks
-
-Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). As a positive side effect,
-permissions are then checked at the same early point with and without
-Flask. As the DT device path needs fetching earlier (but must not be
-double fetched), cache it in a private field of the public interface
-struct.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -325,6 +325,10 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
-         if ( op->domain == DOMID_IO )
-         {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
-+            if ( op->u.assign_device.dev == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT )
-+                op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = NULL;
-+#endif
-             d = dom_io;
-             break;
-         }
-@@ -332,6 +336,11 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-             return -ESRCH;
-         fallthrough;
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
-+        if ( op->u.assign_device.dev == XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT )
-+            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = NULL;
-+        fallthrough;
-+#endif
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
-         if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
-         {
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/device_tree.c
-@@ -340,15 +340,15 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
-         if ( (d && d->is_dying) || domctl->u.assign_device.flags )
-             break;
- 
--        ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
--                                    domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
--                                    &dev);
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
--
--        ret = xsm_assign_dtdevice(XSM_HOOK, d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
-+        dev = domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev;
-+        if ( !dev )
-+        {
-+            ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
-+                                        domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
-+                                        &dev);
-+            if ( ret )
-+                break;
-+        }
- 
-         if ( domctl->cmd == XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device )
-         {
-@@ -396,15 +396,15 @@ int iommu_do_dt_domctl(struct xen_domctl
-         if ( domctl->u.assign_device.flags )
-             break;
- 
--        ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
--                                    domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
--                                    &dev);
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
--
--        ret = xsm_deassign_dtdevice(XSM_HOOK, d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
-+        dev = domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev;
-+        if ( !dev )
-+        {
-+            ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
-+                                        domctl->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
-+                                        &dev);
-+            if ( ret )
-+                break;
-+        }
- 
-         if ( d == dom_io )
-         {
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -1740,10 +1740,6 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
- 
-         machine_sbdf = domctl->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf;
- 
--        ret = xsm_assign_device(XSM_HOOK, d, machine_sbdf);
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
--
-         seg = machine_sbdf >> 16;
-         bus = PCI_BUS(machine_sbdf);
-         devfn = PCI_DEVFN(machine_sbdf);
-@@ -1785,10 +1781,6 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
- 
-         machine_sbdf = domctl->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf;
- 
--        ret = xsm_deassign_device(XSM_HOOK, d, machine_sbdf);
--        if ( ret )
--            break;
--
-         seg = machine_sbdf >> 16;
-         bus = PCI_BUS(machine_sbdf);
-         devfn = PCI_DEVFN(machine_sbdf);
---- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
-@@ -575,7 +575,10 @@ struct xen_domctl_assign_device {
-         } pci;
-         struct {
-             uint32_t size; /* Length of the path */
--            XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(char) path; /* path to the device tree node */
-+            XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(char) path; /* Path to the device tree node */
-+#ifdef __XEN__
-+            struct dt_device_node *dev; /* Resolved device node of the above */
-+#endif
-         } dt;
-     } u;
- };
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -405,40 +405,8 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_d
-     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
- }
--
--static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_assign_device(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
--{
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
--    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
--}
--
--static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_deassign_device(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
--{
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
--    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
--}
--
- #endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI */
- 
--#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
--static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_assign_dtdevice(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
--{
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
--    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
--}
--
--static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_deassign_dtdevice(
--    XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
--{
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
--    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
--}
--
--#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY */
--
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_resource_plug_core(XSM_DEFAULT_VOID)
- {
-     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
---- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
-@@ -124,13 +124,6 @@ struct xsm_ops {
- 
- #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
-     int (*get_device_group)(uint32_t machine_bdf);
--    int (*assign_device)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
--    int (*deassign_device)(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
--#endif
--
--#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
--    int (*assign_dtdevice)(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
--    int (*deassign_dtdevice)(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
- #endif
- 
-     int (*resource_plug_core)(void);
-@@ -533,35 +526,8 @@ static inline int xsm_get_device_group(x
- {
-     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_device_group, machine_bdf);
- }
--
--static inline int xsm_assign_device(
--    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
--{
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.assign_device, d, machine_bdf);
--}
--
--static inline int xsm_deassign_device(
--    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
--{
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.deassign_device, d, machine_bdf);
--}
- #endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI) */
- 
--#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
--static inline int xsm_assign_dtdevice(
--    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
--{
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.assign_dtdevice, d, dtpath);
--}
--
--static inline int xsm_deassign_dtdevice(
--    xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
--{
--    return alternative_call(xsm_ops.deassign_dtdevice, d, dtpath);
--}
--
--#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY */
--
- static inline int xsm_resource_plug_pci(xsm_default_t def, uint32_t machine_bdf)
- {
-     return alternative_call(xsm_ops.resource_plug_pci, machine_bdf);
---- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
-@@ -81,13 +81,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
- 
- #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
-     .get_device_group              = xsm_get_device_group,
--    .assign_device                 = xsm_assign_device,
--    .deassign_device               = xsm_deassign_device,
--#endif
--
--#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
--    .assign_dtdevice               = xsm_assign_dtdevice,
--    .deassign_dtdevice             = xsm_deassign_dtdevice,
- #endif
- 
-     .resource_plug_core            = xsm_resource_plug_core,
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,17 @@ static int flask_shadow_control(struct d
- #define pv_shim false
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
-+static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, unsigned int machine_bdf);
-+static int flask_deassign_device(struct domain *d, unsigned int machine_bdf);
-+#endif
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
-+static int flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
-+static int flask_deassign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath);
-+#endif
-+#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH */
-+
- static uint32_t domain_sid(const struct domain *dom)
- {
-     struct domain_security_struct *dsec = dom->ssid;
-@@ -700,16 +711,6 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
- 
-     /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
--
--#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
--    /*
--     * These have individual XSM hooks
--     * (drivers/passthrough/{pci,device_tree.c)
--     */
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
--#endif
-         return 0;
- 
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain:
-@@ -789,6 +790,49 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-         return flask_shadow_control(d, op->u.shadow_op.op);
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-+
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_assign_device:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device:
-+        switch ( op->u.assign_device.dev )
-+        {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PCI
-+        case XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_PCI:
-+            return op->cmd != XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device
-+                   ? flask_assign_device(
-+                         d, op->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf)
-+                   : flask_deassign_device(
-+                         d, op->u.assign_device.u.pci.machine_sbdf);
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY
-+        case XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_DT:
-+        {
-+            struct dt_device_node *dev;
-+            int ret = dt_find_node_by_gpath(op->u.assign_device.u.dt.path,
-+                                            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.size,
-+                                            &dev);
-+
-+            if ( ret )
-+                return ret;
-+
-+            op->u.assign_device.u.dt.dev = dev;
-+
-+            return op->cmd != XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device
-+                   ? flask_assign_dtdevice(d, dt_node_full_name(dev))
-+                   : flask_deassign_dtdevice(d, dt_node_full_name(dev));
-+        }
-+#endif
-+
-+        default:
-+            /* Unknown type. */
-+            break;
-+        }
-+        return avc_unknown_permission("assign_device", op->cmd);
-+
-+#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH */
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op:
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING);
- 
-@@ -1416,7 +1460,7 @@ static int flask_test_assign_device(uint
-     return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__STAT_DEVICE, NULL);
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
-+static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
- {
-     uint32_t dsid, rsid;
-     int rc = -EPERM;
-@@ -1446,7 +1490,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_assign_device(
-     return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, dperm, &ad);
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_deassign_device(
-+static int flask_deassign_device(
-     struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
- {
-     uint32_t rsid;
-@@ -1478,7 +1522,7 @@ static int flask_test_assign_dtdevice(co
-                                 NULL);
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
-+static int flask_assign_dtdevice(struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
- {
-     uint32_t dsid, rsid;
-     int rc = -EPERM;
-@@ -1508,7 +1552,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_assign_dtdevic
-     return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, dperm, &ad);
- }
- 
--static int cf_check flask_deassign_dtdevice(
-+static int flask_deassign_dtdevice(
-     struct domain *d, const char *dtpath)
- {
-     uint32_t rsid;
-@@ -1989,13 +2033,6 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_
- 
- #if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_PCI)
-     .get_device_group = flask_get_device_group,
--    .assign_device = flask_assign_device,
--    .deassign_device = flask_deassign_device,
--#endif
--
--#if defined(CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DEVICE_TREE_DISCOVERY)
--    .assign_dtdevice = flask_assign_dtdevice,
--    .deassign_dtdevice = flask_deassign_dtdevice,
- #endif
- 
-     .platform_op = flask_platform_op,

xsa492-4.21-20.patch

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_set_target without acquiring domctl lock
-
-The only locking required here is that between checking d->target and
-setting it. To avoid the need for an explicit lock, use cmpxchgptr() to
-update d->target.
-
-Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
-of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
-
-This is part of XSA-492.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/common/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
-@@ -505,6 +505,30 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-     }
- #endif
- 
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-+    {
-+        struct domain *e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
-+
-+        ret = -ESRCH;
-+        if ( !e )
-+            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+
-+        if ( d == e )
-+            ret = -EINVAL;
-+        else if ( !is_hvm_domain(e) )
-+            ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-+        else
-+            ret = xsm_set_target(XSM_PRIV, d, e);
-+
-+        /* Hold reference on @e until we destroy @d. */
-+        if ( !ret && cmpxchgptr(&d->target, NULL, e) )
-+            ret = -EINVAL;
-+
-+        if ( ret )
-+            put_domain(e);
-+        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-+    }
-+
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
-         if ( op->u.vm_event_op.op == XEN_VM_EVENT_GET_VERSION )
-         {
-@@ -844,36 +868,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
-         domain_set_time_offset(d, op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds);
-         break;
- 
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
--    {
--        struct domain *e;
--
--        ret = -ESRCH;
--        e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
--        if ( e == NULL )
--            break;
--
--        ret = -EINVAL;
--        if ( (d == e) || (d->target != NULL) )
--        {
--            put_domain(e);
--            break;
--        }
--
--        ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
--        if ( is_hvm_domain(e) )
--            ret = xsm_set_target(XSM_HOOK, d, e);
--        if ( ret )
--        {
--            put_domain(e);
--            break;
--        }
--
--        /* Hold reference on @e until we destroy @d. */
--        d->target = e;
--        break;
--    }
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe:
-         d->suspend_evtchn = op->u.subscribe.port;
-         break;
---- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
-@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_sysct
- static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_target(
-     XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *e)
- {
--    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
-+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
-     return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
- }
- 
-@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
-@@ -705,14 +705,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         return -EILSEQ;
- 
--    /* These have individual XSM hooks (common/domctl.c) */
--    case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
--        return 0;
--
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain:
-         return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__DESTROY);
- 

xsa493-4.21-01.patch

@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
-From 2e21b5301765de353c06081eee953255bf327176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 10:11:24 +0200
-Subject: xen/arm64: flushtlb: Optimize ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
-
-The ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI workaround is used to mitigate several
-errata where broadcast TLBI;DSB sequences don't provide all the
-architecturally required synchronization. The workaround performs more
-work than necessary, and can have significant overhead. This patch
-optimizes the workaround, as explained below.
-
-1. All relevant errata only affect the ordering and/or completion of
-   memory accesses which have been translated by an invalidated TLB
-   entry. The actual invalidation of TLB entries is unaffected.
-
-2. The existing workaround is applied to both broadcast and local TLB
-   invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
-   apply a workaround for broadcast invalidation.
-
-3. The existing workaround replaces every TLBI with a TLBI;DSB;TLBI
-   sequence, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
-   execute a single additional TLBI;DSB sequence after any number of
-   TLBIs are completed by a DSB.
-
-   For example, for a sequence of batched TLBIs:
-
-       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
-       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
-       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
-       DSB ISH
-
-   ... the existing workaround will expand this to:
-
-       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
-       DSB ISH                  // additional
-       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]     // additional
-       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
-       DSB ISH                  // additional
-       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]     // additional
-       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
-       DSB ISH                  // additional
-       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]     // additional
-       DSB ISH
-
-   ... whereas it is sufficient to have:
-
-       TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
-       TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
-       TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
-       DSB ISH
-       TLBI <opX>[, <argX>]     // additional
-       DSB ISH                  // additional
-
-   Using a single additional TLBI and DSB at the end of the sequence can
-   have significantly lower overhead as each DSB which completes a TLBI
-   must synchronize with other PEs in the system, with potential
-   performance effects both locally and system-wide.
-
-4. The existing workaround repeats each specific TLBI operation, whereas
-   for all relevant errata it is sufficient for the additional TLBI to
-   use *any* operation which will be broadcast, regardless of which
-   translation regime or stage of translation the operation applies to.
-
-   For example, for a single TLBI:
-
-       TLBI ALLE2IS
-       DSB ISH
-
-   ... the existing workaround will expand this to:
-
-       TLBI ALLE2IS
-       DSB ISH
-       TLBI ALLE2IS             // additional
-       DSB ISH                  // additional
-
-   ... whereas it is sufficient to have:
-
-       TLBI ALLE2IS
-       DSB ISH
-       TLBI VALE1IS, XZR        // additional
-       DSB ISH                  // additional
-
-   As the additional TLBI doesn't have to match a specific earlier TLBI,
-   the additional TLBI can be implemented in separate code, with no
-   memory of the earlier TLBIs. The additional TLBI can also use a
-   cheaper TLBI operation.
-
-5. The existing workaround is applied to both Stage-1 and Stage-2 TLB
-   invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to
-   apply a workaround for Stage-1 invalidation.
-
-   Architecturally, TLBI operations which invalidate only Stage-2
-   information (e.g. IPAS2E1IS) are not required to invalidate TLB
-   entries which combine information from Stage-1 and Stage-2
-   translation table entries, and consequently may not complete memory
-   accesses translated by those combined entries. In these cases,
-   completion of memory accesses is only guaranteed after subsequent
-   invalidation of Stage-1 information (e.g. VMALLE1IS).
-
-Rework the workaround logic as follows:
- - add TLB_HELPER_LOCAL() to be used for local TLB ops without a
-   workaround,
- - modify TLB_HELPER() workaround to use tlbi vale2is, xzr as a second
-   TLBI,
- - drop TLB_HELPER_VA(). It's used only by __flush_xen_tlb_one_local
-   which is local and does not need workaround and by
-   __flush_xen_tlb_one. In the latter case, since it's used in a loop,
-   we don't need a workaround in the middle. Add __tlb_repeat_sync with
-   a workaround to be used at the end after DSB and before final ISB,
- - TLBI VALE2IS passing XZR is used as an additional TLBI. While there is
-   an identity mapping there, it's used very rarely. The performance
-   impact is therefore negligible. If things change in the future, we
-   can revisit the decision.
-
-Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 7c502d7591519135765b8041cbd1c70e56e5a0b9)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
-index 61c25a318998..5483be08fbbe 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm32/flushtlb.h
-@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one(vaddr_t va)
-     asm volatile(STORE_CP32(0, TLBIMVAHIS) : : "r" (va) : "memory");
- }
- 
-+/* Only for ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI */
-+static inline void __tlb_repeat_sync(void) {}
-+
- #endif /* __ASM_ARM_ARM32_FLUSHTLB_H__ */
- /*
-  * Local variables:
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
-index 3b99c11b50d1..1606b26bf28a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/arm64/flushtlb.h
-@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@
-  * ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI:
-  * Modification of the translation table for a virtual address might lead to
-  * read-after-read ordering violation.
-- * The workaround repeats TLBI+DSB ISH operation for all the TLB flush
-- * operations. While this is strictly not necessary, we don't want to
-- * take any risk.
-+ * The workaround repeats TLBI+DSB ISH operation for broadcast TLB flush
-+ * operations. The workaround is not needed for local operations.
-+ *
-+ * It is sufficient for the additional TLBI to use *any* operation which will
-+ * be broadcast, regardless of which translation regime or stage of translation
-+ * the operation applies to. TLBI VALE2IS is used passing XZR. While there is
-+ * an identity mapping there, it's only used during suspend/resume, CPU on/off,
-+ * so the impact (performance if any) is negligible.
-  *
-  * For Xen page-tables the ISB will discard any instructions fetched
-  * from the old mappings.
-@@ -26,69 +31,90 @@
-  * Note that for local TLB flush, using non-shareable (nsh) is sufficient
-  * (see D5-4929 in ARM DDI 0487H.a). Although, the memory barrier in
-  * for the workaround is left as inner-shareable to match with Linux
-- * v6.1-rc8.
-+ * v6.19.
-  */
--#define TLB_HELPER(name, tlbop, sh)              \
-+#define TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(name, tlbop)            \
- static inline void name(void)                    \
- {                                                \
-     asm_inline volatile (                        \
--        "dsb  "  # sh  "st;"                     \
-+        "dsb  nshst;"                            \
-         "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";"                    \
--        ALTERNATIVE(                             \
--            "nop; nop;",                         \
--            "dsb  ish;"                          \
--            "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";",               \
--            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,        \
--            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \
--        "dsb  "  # sh  ";"                       \
-+        "dsb  nsh;"                              \
-         "isb;"                                   \
-         : : : "memory");                         \
- }
- 
--/*
-- * FLush TLB by VA. This will likely be used in a loop, so the caller
-- * is responsible to use the appropriate memory barriers before/after
-- * the sequence.
-- *
-- * See above about the ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI sequence.
-- */
--#define TLB_HELPER_VA(name, tlbop)               \
--static inline void name(vaddr_t va)              \
--{                                                \
--    asm_inline volatile (                        \
--        "tlbi "  # tlbop  ", %0;"                \
--        ALTERNATIVE(                             \
--            "nop; nop;",                         \
--            "dsb  ish;"                          \
--            "tlbi "  # tlbop  ", %0;",           \
--            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,        \
--            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \
--        : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");  \
-+#define TLB_HELPER(name, tlbop)                       \
-+static inline void name(void)                         \
-+{                                                     \
-+    asm_inline volatile (                             \
-+        "dsb  ishst;"                                 \
-+        "tlbi "  # tlbop  ";"                         \
-+        ALTERNATIVE(                                  \
-+            "nop; nop;",                              \
-+            "dsb  ish;"                               \
-+            "tlbi vale2is, xzr;",                     \
-+            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,             \
-+            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI)      \
-+        "dsb  ish;"                                   \
-+        "isb;"                                        \
-+        : : : "memory"); \
- }
- 
- /* Flush local TLBs, current VMID only. */
--TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb_local, vmalls12e1, nsh)
-+TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_guest_tlb_local, vmalls12e1)
- 
- /* Flush innershareable TLBs, current VMID only */
--TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb, vmalls12e1is, ish)
-+TLB_HELPER(flush_guest_tlb, vmalls12e1is)
- 
- /* Flush local TLBs, all VMIDs, non-hypervisor mode */
--TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb_local, alle1, nsh)
-+TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_all_guests_tlb_local, alle1)
- 
- /* Flush innershareable TLBs, all VMIDs, non-hypervisor mode */
--TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb, alle1is, ish)
-+TLB_HELPER(flush_all_guests_tlb, alle1is)
- 
- /* Flush all hypervisor mappings from the TLB of the local processor. */
--TLB_HELPER(flush_xen_tlb_local, alle2, nsh)
-+TLB_HELPER_LOCAL(flush_xen_tlb_local, alle2)
-+
-+#undef TLB_HELPER_LOCAL
-+#undef TLB_HELPER
-+
-+/*
-+ * FLush TLB by VA. This will likely be used in a loop, so the caller
-+ * is responsible to use the appropriate memory barriers before/after
-+ * the sequence.
-+ */
- 
- /* Flush TLB of local processor for address va. */
--TLB_HELPER_VA(__flush_xen_tlb_one_local, vae2)
-+static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one_local(vaddr_t va)
-+{
-+    asm_inline volatile (
-+        "tlbi vae2, %0" : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");
-+}
- 
- /* Flush TLB of all processors in the inner-shareable domain for address va. */
--TLB_HELPER_VA(__flush_xen_tlb_one, vae2is)
-+static inline void __flush_xen_tlb_one(vaddr_t va)
-+{
-+    asm_inline volatile (
-+        "tlbi vae2is, %0" : : "r" (va >> PAGE_SHIFT) : "memory");
-+}
- 
--#undef TLB_HELPER
--#undef TLB_HELPER_VA
-+/*
-+ * ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI:
-+ * For all relevant erratas it is only necessary to execute a single
-+ * additional TLBI;DSB sequence after any number of TLBIs are completed by DSB.
-+ */
-+static inline void __tlb_repeat_sync(void)
-+{
-+    asm_inline volatile (
-+        ALTERNATIVE(
-+            "nop; nop;",
-+            "tlbi vale2is, xzr;"
-+            "dsb  ish;",
-+            ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
-+            CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI)
-+        : : : "memory");
-+}
- 
- #endif /* __ASM_ARM_ARM64_FLUSHTLB_H__ */
- /*
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
-index e45fb6d97b02..c292c3c00d29 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/flushtlb.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static inline void flush_xen_tlb_range_va(vaddr_t va,
-         va += PAGE_SIZE;
-     }
-     dsb(ish); /* Ensure the TLB invalidation has completed */
-+    __tlb_repeat_sync();
-     isb();
- }
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
-index 19c0ec63a59a..feafc14ebfda 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/mmu/layout.h
-@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
-  *
-  *  Reserved to identity map Xen
-  *
-+ *  Note: As part of ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI, VA 0 is used for an extra
-+ *  TLBI operation given its rare use (only identity mapping) and thus
-+ *  negligible performance impact.
-+ *
-  * 0x00000a0000000000 - 0x00000a7fffffffff (512GB, L0 slot [20])
-  *  (Relative offsets)
-  *   0  -   2M   Unmapped

xsa493-4.21-02.patch

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From 7e70b87512c966248b1e8453d9ac54c643c06f44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 09:35:55 +0200
-Subject: xen/arm: Sync missing definitions for Arm CPUs with Linux
-
-Synchronize with Linux kernel 7.0 definitions for the following CPUs:
- - Cortex-A76AE,
- - Cortex-A78AE,
- - Cortex-X1C,
- - Cortex-X3,
- - Neoverse-V2,
- - Cortex-X4,
- - Neoverse-V3AE,
- - Neoverse-V3,
- - Cortex-X925.
-
-These will be used for errata detection in subsequent patches.
-
-Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-index ec23fd098b63..907778683b08 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-@@ -89,13 +89,22 @@
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76     0xD0B
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1    0xD0C
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77     0xD0D
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76AE   0xD0E
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1    0xD40
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78     0xD41
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78AE   0xD42
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1      0xD44
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710    0xD47
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2      0xD48
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2    0xD49
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C    0xD4B
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1C     0xD4C
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X3      0xD4E
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V2    0xD4F
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X4      0xD82
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE  0xD83
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3    0xD84
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925    0xD85
- 
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A12 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A17 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17)
-@@ -110,13 +119,22 @@
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76)
- #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)
-+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A76AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76AE)
- #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A78 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78)
-+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78AE)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_X1  MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_X2  MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2)
- #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A78C MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C)
-+#define MIDR_CORTEX_X1C MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1C)
-+#define MIDR_CORTEX_X3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X3)
-+#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V2)
-+#define MIDR_CORTEX_X4 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X4)
-+#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE)
-+#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3)
-+#define MIDR_CORTEX_X925 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925)
- 
- /* MPIDR Multiprocessor Affinity Register */
- #define _MPIDR_UP           (30)

xsa493-4.21-03.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From c0f7b40fdbb986b3cf470ed51f3878261e33f9cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 09:35:56 +0200
-Subject: xen/arm: Add C1-Ultra definitions
-
-Add processor definitions for C1-Ultra. These will be used for errata
-detection in subsequent patches.
-
-These values can be found in the C1-Ultra TRM:
-
-  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108014/0100/
-
-... in section A.5.1 ("MIDR_EL1, Main ID Register").
-
-Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-index 907778683b08..72745cca62bc 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE  0xD83
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3    0xD84
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925    0xD85
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA       0xD8C
- 
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A12 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A17 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17)
-@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@
- #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3AE)
- #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_X925 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925)
-+#define MIDR_C1_ULTRA MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA)
- 
- /* MPIDR Multiprocessor Affinity Register */
- #define _MPIDR_UP           (30)

xsa493-4.21-04.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 6af67aeca418bffb807424eb3415fab59e581733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 09:35:57 +0200
-Subject: xen/arm: Add C1-Premium definitions
-
-Add processor definitions for C1-Premium. These will be used for errata
-detection in subsequent patches.
-
-These values can be found in the C1-Premium TRM:
-
-  https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109416/0100/
-
-... in section A.5.1 ("MIDR_EL1, Main ID Register").
-
-Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-index 72745cca62bc..25c5762c6706 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/processor.h
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3    0xD84
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925    0xD85
- #define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA       0xD8C
-+#define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_PREMIUM     0xD90
- 
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A12 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_A17 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17)
-@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@
- #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3)
- #define MIDR_CORTEX_X925 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925)
- #define MIDR_C1_ULTRA MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA)
-+#define MIDR_C1_PREMIUM MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_PREMIUM)
- 
- /* MPIDR Multiprocessor Affinity Register */
- #define _MPIDR_UP           (30)

xsa494-4.21.patch

@@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
-From 579016a359741044c9076bf0884e1dbab00ab080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 11:03:22 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/mm: accurately track which vCPU page-tables are loaded
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Neither current nor curr_vcpu per-CPU fields accurately track which
-page-tables are loaded.  There are corner cases when dealing with shadow
-paging failures that switch to the idle vCPU page-tables without changing
-current or curr_vcpu per-CPU fields.
-
-Introduce a new per-CPU field that attempts to track which vCPU page-tables
-are loaded.  Update such tracking when cr3 is changed, and do so in a
-region with interrupts disabled, as to avoid handling interrupts with a
-mismatch between the vCPU tracking field and the loaded page-tables.
-
-As a result of this newly more accurate tracking the mapcache override
-functionality can be removed: the dom0 PV builder was the only user of it,
-and it's updated here to properly signal which vCPU page-tables are loaded
-in the calls to switch_cr3_cr4().
-
-Note the EFI page-tables have the Xen owned L4 slots copied from the idle
-page-tables, so for the effects of the mapcache the EFI page-tables could
-use the idle mapcache if it had one.  Pass the idle vCPU in the
-switch_cr3_cr4() call that switches to the runtime EFI page-tables.
-
-There are known issues with the use of mapcache in NMI context.  This patch
-does not alter the behaviour.
-
-This is CVE-2026-42488 / XSA-494.
-
-Fixes: fb0ff49fe9f7 ("x86/shadow: defer releasing of PV's top-level shadow reference")
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c           | 48 ++++++++++++----------------
- xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c              |  5 ++-
- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h    |  1 -
- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h  |  2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |  3 ++
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c                    |  4 +--
- xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c         | 12 +++----
- xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c             | 13 ++++++--
- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c               |  1 +
- xen/common/efi/common-stub.c         |  5 ---
- xen/common/efi/runtime.c             | 21 +++++-------
- xen/include/xen/efi.h                |  1 -
- 12 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c
-index eac5e3304fb8..72c00194f315 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c
-@@ -18,48 +18,40 @@
- #include <asm/hardirq.h>
- #include <asm/setup.h>
- 
--static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, override);
--
- static inline struct vcpu *mapcache_current_vcpu(void)
- {
--    /* In the common case we use the mapcache of the running VCPU. */
--    struct vcpu *v = this_cpu(override) ?: current;
--
--    /*
--     * When current isn't properly set up yet, this is equivalent to
--     * running in an idle vCPU (callers must check for NULL).
--     */
--    if ( !v )
--        return NULL;
-+    struct vcpu *v = this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu);
-+    struct vcpu *curr = current;
- 
-     /*
--     * When using efi runtime page tables, we have the equivalent of the idle
--     * domain's page tables but current may point at another domain's VCPU.
--     * Return NULL as though current is not properly set up yet.
-+     * During early boot pgtable_vcpu is not set, callers must handle NULL.
-+     * Non-PV domains don't have a mapcache, the directmap covers all physical
-+     * address space.
-      */
--    if ( efi_rs_using_pgtables() )
-+    if ( !v || !is_pv_vcpu(v) )
-         return NULL;
- 
-     /*
--     * If guest_table is NULL, and we are running a paravirtualised guest,
--     * then it means we are running on the idle domain's page table and must
--     * therefore use its mapcache.
-+     * If we are in a lazy context-switch state from a PV vCPU do a full switch
-+     * to the idle vCPU now, otherwise an incoming FLUSH_VCPU_STATE IPI would
-+     * change the page tables under our feet an invalidate any in-use mapcache
-+     * entries.
-      */
--    if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.guest_table)) && is_pv_vcpu(v) )
-+    if ( unlikely(this_cpu(curr_vcpu) != curr) )
-     {
--        /* If we really are idling, perform lazy context switch now. */
--        if ( (v = idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()]) == current )
--            sync_local_execstate();
-+        ASSERT(curr == idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()]);
-+        sync_local_execstate();
-         /* We must now be running on the idle page table. */
-         ASSERT(cr3_pa(read_cr3()) == __pa(idle_pg_table));
-     }
- 
--    return v;
--}
--
--void __init mapcache_override_current(struct vcpu *v)
--{
--    this_cpu(override) = v;
-+    /*
-+     * At this point we can guarantee Xen is not in lazy context switch: either
-+     * the code above will have synced the state, or an incoming
-+     * FLUSH_VCPU_STATE IPI has done so behind our back.  Use ACCESS_ONCE to
-+     * ensure the compiler never returns the locally cached pgtable_vcpu value.
-+     */
-+    return ACCESS_ONCE(this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu));
- }
- 
- #define mapcache_l2_entry(e) ((e) >> PAGETABLE_ORDER)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
-index 09e676c151fa..928bca66b433 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
-@@ -111,7 +111,9 @@ static void do_tlb_flush(void)
-     local_irq_restore(flags);
- }
- 
--void switch_cr3_cr4(unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4)
-+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, pgtable_vcpu);
-+
-+void switch_cr3_cr4(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4)
- {
-     unsigned long flags, old_cr4;
-     u32 t = 0;
-@@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ void switch_cr3_cr4(unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4)
-     if ( (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) > (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) )
-         cr3 |= X86_CR3_NOFLUSH;
-     write_cr3(cr3);
-+    this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu) = v;
- 
-     if ( old_cr4 != cr4 )
-         write_cr4(cr4);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h
-index 828f42c3e448..10d2b9fe2546 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/domain.h
-@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ struct mapcache_domain {
- 
- int mapcache_domain_init(struct domain *d);
- int mapcache_vcpu_init(struct vcpu *v);
--void mapcache_override_current(struct vcpu *v);
- 
- /* x86/64: toggle guest between kernel and user modes. */
- void toggle_guest_mode(struct vcpu *v);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h
-index 7bcbca2b7f31..345677eb72ae 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/flushtlb.h
-@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline void invlpg(const void *p)
- }
- 
- /* Write pagetable base and implicitly tick the tlbflush clock. */
--void switch_cr3_cr4(unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4);
-+void switch_cr3_cr4(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long cr3, unsigned long cr4);
- 
- /* flush_* flag fields: */
-  /*
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
-index 2e087c625770..d2cacdfedb74 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
-@@ -328,6 +328,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_page, tss_page);
- 
- DECLARE_PER_CPU(root_pgentry_t *, root_pgt);
- 
-+/* vCPU of the currently loaded page-tables. */
-+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, pgtable_vcpu);
-+
- extern void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v);
- 
- /* PAUSE (encoding: REP NOP) is a good thing to insert into busy-wait loops. */
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 2b23bf2e7a75..d02c9862d387 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v)
-         cpu_info->pv_cr3 = __pa(this_cpu(root_pgt));
-         if ( new_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE )
-             cpu_info->pv_cr3 |= get_pcid_bits(v, true);
--        switch_cr3_cr4(v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
-+        switch_cr3_cr4(v, v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
-     }
-     else
-     {
-@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ void write_ptbase(struct vcpu *v)
-         cpu_info->use_pv_cr3 = false;
-         cpu_info->xen_cr3 = 0;
-         /* switch_cr3_cr4() serializes. */
--        switch_cr3_cr4(v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
-+        switch_cr3_cr4(v, v->arch.cr3, new_cr4);
-         cpu_info->pv_cr3 = 0;
-     }
- }
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c
-index 37729091dfaa..42bc530c0f0d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/dom0_build.c
-@@ -828,8 +828,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
-     update_cr3(v);
- 
-     /* We run on dom0's page tables for the final part of the build process. */
--    switch_cr3_cr4(cr3_pa(v->arch.cr3), read_cr4());
--    mapcache_override_current(v);
-+    switch_cr3_cr4(v, cr3_pa(v->arch.cr3), read_cr4());
- 
-     /* Copy the OS image and free temporary buffer. */
-     elf.dest_base = (void*)vkern_start;
-@@ -838,8 +837,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
-     rc = elf_load_binary(&elf);
-     if ( rc < 0 )
-     {
--        mapcache_override_current(NULL);
--        switch_cr3_cr4(current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
-+        switch_cr3_cr4(current, current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
-         printk("Failed to load the kernel binary\n");
-         goto out;
-     }
-@@ -850,8 +848,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
-         if ( (parms.virt_hypercall < v_start) ||
-              (parms.virt_hypercall >= v_end) )
-         {
--            mapcache_override_current(NULL);
--            switch_cr3_cr4(current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
-+            switch_cr3_cr4(current, current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
-             printk("Invalid HYPERCALL_PAGE field in ELF notes.\n");
-             return -EINVAL;
-         }
-@@ -992,8 +989,7 @@ static int __init dom0_construct(const struct boot_domain *bd)
- #endif
- 
-     /* Return to idle domain's page tables. */
--    mapcache_override_current(NULL);
--    switch_cr3_cr4(current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
-+    switch_cr3_cr4(current, current->arch.cr3, read_cr4());
- 
-     update_domain_wallclock_time(d);
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-index ef4f442e7332..d9e52f5f88f3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c
-@@ -451,6 +451,8 @@ static void _toggle_guest_pt(struct vcpu *v)
-     pagetable_t old_shadow;
-     unsigned long cr3;
- 
-+    ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
-+
-     v->arch.flags ^= TF_kernel_mode;
-     guest_update = v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode;
-     old_shadow = update_cr3(v);
-@@ -473,15 +475,22 @@ static void _toggle_guest_pt(struct vcpu *v)
-     {
-         cr3 &= ~X86_CR3_NOFLUSH;
- 
-+        local_irq_disable();
-         if ( unlikely(mfn_eq(pagetable_get_mfn(old_shadow),
-                              maddr_to_mfn(cr3))) )
-         {
--            cr3 = idle_vcpu[v->processor]->arch.cr3;
-             /* Also suppress runstate/time area updates below. */
-             guest_update = false;
-+
-+            cr3 = idle_vcpu[v->processor]->arch.cr3;
-+            this_cpu(pgtable_vcpu) = idle_vcpu[v->processor];
-         }
-+
-+        write_cr3(cr3);
-+        local_irq_enable();
-     }
--    write_cr3(cr3);
-+    else
-+        write_cr3(cr3);
- 
-     if ( !pagetable_is_null(old_shadow) )
-         shadow_put_top_level(v->domain, old_shadow);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-index 27628800a821..b37feab3bef4 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
-@@ -1063,6 +1063,7 @@ static int cpu_smpboot_alloc(unsigned int cpu)
- 
-     info->current_vcpu = idle_vcpu[cpu]; /* set_current() */
-     per_cpu(curr_vcpu, cpu) = idle_vcpu[cpu];
-+    per_cpu(pgtable_vcpu, cpu) = idle_vcpu[cpu];
- 
-     gdt = per_cpu(gdt, cpu) ?: alloc_xenheap_pages(0, memflags);
-     if ( gdt == NULL )
-diff --git a/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c b/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c
-index 77f138a6c574..7b12005bea3f 100644
---- a/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c
-+++ b/xen/common/efi/common-stub.c
-@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ bool efi_enabled(unsigned int feature)
-     return false;
- }
- 
--bool efi_rs_using_pgtables(void)
--{
--    return false;
--}
--
- unsigned long efi_get_time(void)
- {
-     BUG();
-diff --git a/xen/common/efi/runtime.c b/xen/common/efi/runtime.c
-index 30d649ca5c1b..feb09acf754c 100644
---- a/xen/common/efi/runtime.c
-+++ b/xen/common/efi/runtime.c
-@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ const CHAR16 *__read_mostly efi_fw_vendor;
- const EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES *__read_mostly efi_rs;
- #ifndef CONFIG_ARM /* TODO - disabled until implemented on ARM */
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(efi_rs_lock);
--static unsigned int efi_rs_on_cpu = NR_CPUS;
- #endif
- 
- UINTN __read_mostly efi_memmap_size;
-@@ -92,6 +91,11 @@ struct efi_rs_state efi_rs_enter(void)
-     if ( mfn_eq(efi_l4_mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-         return state;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * If in lazy idle context switch state sync now to avoid an incoming
-+     * FLUSH_VCPU_STATE IPI changing the loaded page-tables.
-+     */
-+    sync_local_execstate();
-     state.cr3 = read_cr3();
-     save_fpu_enable();
-     asm volatile ( "fnclex; fldcw %0" :: "m" (fcw) );
-@@ -99,8 +103,6 @@ struct efi_rs_state efi_rs_enter(void)
- 
-     spin_lock(&efi_rs_lock);
- 
--    efi_rs_on_cpu = smp_processor_id();
--
-     /* prevent fixup_page_fault() from doing anything */
-     irq_enter();
- 
-@@ -115,7 +117,8 @@ struct efi_rs_state efi_rs_enter(void)
-         lgdt(&gdt_desc);
-     }
- 
--    switch_cr3_cr4(mfn_to_maddr(efi_l4_mfn), read_cr4());
-+    switch_cr3_cr4(idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()], mfn_to_maddr(efi_l4_mfn),
-+                   read_cr4());
- 
-     /*
-      * At the time of writing (2022), no UEFI firwmare is CET-IBT compatible.
-@@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ void efi_rs_leave(struct efi_rs_state *state)
-     if ( state->msr_s_cet )
-         wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, state->msr_s_cet);
- 
--    switch_cr3_cr4(state->cr3, read_cr4());
-+    switch_cr3_cr4(curr, state->cr3, read_cr4());
-     if ( is_pv_vcpu(curr) && !is_idle_vcpu(curr) )
-     {
-         struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {
-@@ -154,18 +157,10 @@ void efi_rs_leave(struct efi_rs_state *state)
-         lgdt(&gdt_desc);
-     }
-     irq_exit();
--    efi_rs_on_cpu = NR_CPUS;
-     spin_unlock(&efi_rs_lock);
-     vcpu_restore_fpu_nonlazy(curr, true);
- }
- 
--bool efi_rs_using_pgtables(void)
--{
--    return !mfn_eq(efi_l4_mfn, INVALID_MFN) &&
--           (smp_processor_id() == efi_rs_on_cpu) &&
--           (read_cr3() == mfn_to_maddr(efi_l4_mfn));
--}
--
- unsigned long efi_get_time(void)
- {
-     EFI_TIME time;
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/efi.h b/xen/include/xen/efi.h
-index 723cb8085270..9953197ee553 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/efi.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/efi.h
-@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ extern bool efi_secure_boot;
- 
- void efi_init_memory(void);
- bool efi_boot_mem_unused(unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end);
--bool efi_rs_using_pgtables(void);
- unsigned long efi_get_time(void);
- void efi_halt_system(void);
- void efi_reset_system(bool warm);
--- 
-2.53.0
-