Based on openssh-10.0p1-6.fc44

Signed-off-by: Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org>

0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -1,57 +1,83 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
---- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
-@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
- 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+From 95f4e30195382c3df7104c2ad3e5e9953f8ad554 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/50] openssh-7.8p1-role-mls
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c                       |   2 +-
+ auth-pam.h                       |   2 +-
+ auth.h                           |   3 +
+ auth2-gss.c                      |  11 +-
+ auth2-hostbased.c                |   9 +
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  11 +-
+ auth2.c                          |  14 ++
+ misc.c                           |   8 +
+ monitor.c                        |  37 ++-
+ monitor.h                        |   4 +
+ monitor_wrap.c                   |  21 ++
+ monitor_wrap.h                   |   3 +
+ openbsd-compat/Makefile.in       |   3 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  37 +--
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   3 +-
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |   3 +
+ 18 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index 13c0a792..b4100ea1 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ 	char *compound;
+diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
+index 8d801c68..9dd7ae07 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.h
++++ b/auth-pam.h
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 98bb23d4..83d07ae8 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role = NULL;
++	char		*role;
 +#endif
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
-@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
--		if (use_privsep)
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
-+		}
- 		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
-diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
-@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+ 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 75eb4e3a..f7898ab3 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
  	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
 +	char *micuser;
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
-@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	u_char *p;
+@@ -300,7 +301,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
@@ -66,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
  	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+@@ -313,6 +320,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
  	sshbuf_free(b);
@@ -74,11 +100,12 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
  	free(mic.value);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
-diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index eb21479a..a3be6e49 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -129,7 +129,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
@@ -93,12 +120,13 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
 +#endif
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
-@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index aa24fda0..267a27d2 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -206,9 +206,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
  			goto done;
  		}
  		/* reconstruct packet */
@@ -117,47 +145,51 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
  		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	char		*service;
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
- 	char		*style;
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 82f6e621..5ba45c12 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char		*role;
++	char *role = NULL;
 +#endif
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	double tstart = monotime_double();
  
- 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
- 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
---- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
-  * during the ssh authentication process.
-  */
- int
--do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- 	int ret = 1;
- 	char *compound;
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
---- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
- void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
--int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
+@@ -284,6 +287,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +321,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
+ 		userauth_banner(ssh);
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index dd0bd032..c932f9bb 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -806,6 +806,7 @@ char *
  colon(char *cp)
  {
  	int flag = 0;
@@ -165,7 +197,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  
  	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
  		return NULL;
-@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+@@ -821,6 +822,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
  			return (cp);
  		if (*cp == '/')
  			return NULL;
@@ -179,10 +211,11 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
-@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 2179553d..02b3eaaa 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -192,7 +225,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -194,6 +197,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -202,7 +235,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
+@@ -912,6 +918,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -212,7 +245,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
+@@ -986,6 +995,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -239,16 +272,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
- {
+@@ -1358,7 +1387,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
  	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
  	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
+@@ -1389,6 +1418,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -257,7 +290,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1439,7 +1470,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -266,7 +299,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
+@@ -1460,6 +1491,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
@@ -275,12 +308,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
---- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 3f8a9bea..9dcd9c29 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_STATE = 51, MONITOR_ANS_STATE = 52,
  
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
@@ -289,10 +323,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
-@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index bd900b2f..ef3ab1b1 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -442,6 +442,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
  
@@ -320,10 +355,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
  /* Do the password authentication */
  int
  mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 7134afee..38a280c8 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
      const char *, u_int compat);
  void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
@@ -333,10 +369,11 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
  struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
  char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
  int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index 1d549954..78e6fa5b 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
  	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
@@ -346,79 +383,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
  
  .c.o:
  	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- 	return sc;
- }
- 
--/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
--void
--ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
--{
--	char *user_ctx = NULL;
--
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
--		return;
--
--	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
--
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
--	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
--		switch (security_getenforce()) {
--		case -1:
--			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
--		case 0:
--			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
--			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
--			break;
--		default:
--			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
--			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
--		}
--	}
--	if (user_ctx != NULL)
--		freecon(user_ctx);
--
--	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
--}
--
- /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
- void
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- 
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 
- 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
--void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..b9fbe38b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -472,7 +442,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@@ -678,7 +647,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -752,7 +721,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@@ -840,10 +809,82 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index c1d54f38..7426f6f7 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -109,37 +109,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+@@ -152,7 +121,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 959430de..055c825e 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 4c4fe57e..1bfb4bea 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -852,10 +893,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index c64eb29f..74d2cbc7 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1328,6 +1328,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
@@ -864,4 +906,7 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 		do_pam_setcred();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 99d8e250514023d3b88a1c9eb724c4898aba9827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/50] openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
+ session.c                        | 16 +++++++++-------
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  4 ++++
+ sshd-session.c                   |  2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index b9fbe38b..dfafc622 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -415,6 +415,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 	debug3_f("done");
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
++		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 055c825e..498d242a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 6444c77f..e4657cef 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 
+ 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+ 
+-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+@@ -1382,6 +1382,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+ 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ 			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1417,6 +1420,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (in_chroot == 0)
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1434,9 +1442,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr,
+ 		    "You must change your password now and log in again!\n");
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		setexeccon(NULL);
+-#endif
+ #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ 		    (char *)NULL);
+@@ -1649,9 +1654,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index 30eecd8a..f957dc22 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
+ 	if ((box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (privsep_chroot) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 74d2cbc7..4a148db4 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
+ 	 * special privileges to begin with.
+ 	 */
+-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
++#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ 	skip_privdrop = 1;
+ #endif
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,23 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
- 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(127);
-+		}
-+#endif
- 		if (env != NULL)
- 			execve(av[0], av, env);
- 		else
-diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
---- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-+++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+From 5e35e18a419a5a66b6e1cb2b98beaaf4d9db0dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/50] openssh-6.6p1-keycat
+
+---
+ HOWTO.ssh-keycat                 |  12 ++
+ Makefile.in                      |   8 +-
+ configure.ac                     |   6 +
+ misc.c                           |   7 +
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c |  44 +++++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |   2 +
+ platform.c                       |   2 +-
+ ssh-keycat.c                     | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 8 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+ create mode 100644 ssh-keycat.c
+
+diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..630ec628
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@@ -31,45 +34,46 @@ diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
---- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
-+++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 4617cebc..438efc51 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
  ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
  SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
+ SSHD_AUTH=$(libexecdir)/sshd-auth
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
  SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
  LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
  LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
- AR=@AR@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ LIBWTMPDB=@LIBWTMPDB@
+@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
  
  .SUFFIXES: .lo
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) sshd-auth$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(SK_STANDALONE)
  
  XMSS_OBJS=\
  	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+@@ -260,6 +262,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
  ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
  ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
-@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
+@@ -447,6 +452,7 @@ install-files:
  	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -77,26 +81,69 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index ee77a048..d546788c 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3566,6 +3566,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
  
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
  
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
-@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+@@ -3576,6 +3577,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4801,6 +4803,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5812,6 +5815,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index c932f9bb..1e31acc9 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2897,6 +2897,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(1);
+ 		}
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(127);
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index dfafc622..8c5fc1fe 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
  
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@@ -115,7 +162,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  /* Send audit message */
  static int
  sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -317,7 +331,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -124,14 +171,14 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -328,16 +342,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
@@ -144,7 +191,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  
  	if (role != NULL)
  		free(role);
-@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -345,6 +359,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  	return rv;
  }
  
@@ -169,7 +216,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
  void
  sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+@@ -353,7 +385,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  	int r = 0;
  	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
  
@@ -178,7 +225,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  		return;
  
  	if (options.use_pam) {
-@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+@@ -420,7 +452,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
  {
  	security_context_t *ctx;
  
@@ -187,10 +234,26 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
  		return;
  
  	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 498d242a..1b745a76 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 1bfb4bea..0d12f311 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
  {
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
@@ -199,9 +262,11 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
---- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
-+++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
+diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..5678be07
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh-keycat.c
 @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -444,41 +509,6 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 			PAM_MSG="yes"
- 
- 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
- 
-@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
- 					;;
- 				*)
- 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- 					;;
- 				esac
- 			fi
-@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
- 
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
- 
- echo ""
- 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+From 28333f1dfe68b0ffc80c2a4799759587b4c32d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/50] openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 4a148db4..a365f26f 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -778,12 +778,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
  	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@@ -21,11 +31,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +				case 130:
 +				case 133:
 +				case 134:
-+					i += opts[i + 1];
-+					break;
++					if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
++						i += opts[i + 1];
++						break;
++					}
++					/* FALLTHROUGH */
 +				default:
 +				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
++			 	 * or incorrect source routing options. */
 +					text[0] = '\0';
 +					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
 +						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
@@ -35,5 +48,8 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
  	}
- 	return;
  #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
---- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
-@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+From 388be633842a9f3e4b0a76fe40cf7035912a913a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 05/50] openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man
+
+---
+ ssh.1  | 2 ++
+ sshd.8 | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 697f4e42..db92ac9a 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ manual page for more information.
  .Nm
  exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
  if an error occurred.
@@ -10,10 +21,11 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
---- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
-@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 08ebf53a..2aa73271 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -1018,6 +1018,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
  started last).
  The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
  .El
@@ -22,3 +34,6 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr scp 1 ,
  .Xr sftp 1 ,
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 80359feb76fd8061b5ce18f73451d7b9db0c2477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/50] openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe
+
+---
+ ssh-keyscan.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
+index 3436c0b5..9f76ad22 100644
+--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
++++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
+@@ -798,6 +798,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+ 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
++ 
++	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
++
+ 	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+ 	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+ 		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+From cf6d48305cf6601448ea7a0d96ae825cbbbf0a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/50] openssh-7.2p2-x11
+
+---
+ channels.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index bfe2e3b2..d46531ce 100644
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -5098,11 +5098,13 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  }
  
  static int
@@ -14,8 +24,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
  	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock == -1)
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -5110,11 +5112,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+ 	}
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@@ -30,7 +42,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  	return -1;
  }
  
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+@@ -5122,8 +5125,18 @@ static int
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
@@ -51,3 +63,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  }
  
  #ifdef __APPLE__
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+From 6b2a33044583e892badb9ac86cd2c6252b1a532f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/50] openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index a62f9815..cb7152dc 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
@@ -9,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+@@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -27,7 +37,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  static int
  passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  {
- 	const char *failed;
+@@ -153,7 +165,7 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
  	int buttons, default_response;
@@ -36,7 +46,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
  	GdkColor fg, bg;
  	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
-@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
  	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
@@ -45,12 +55,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 +		    FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
-		entry = gtk_entry_new();
-		if (fg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
-		if (bg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
-		gtk_box_pack_start(
+ 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ 		if (fg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+ 		if (bg_set)
+ 			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ 		gtk_box_pack_start(
 -		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
 -		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
 +		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
@@ -58,7 +68,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
  		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
  		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
-@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -225,6 +242,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
  			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
  		}
@@ -81,3 +91,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
  	}
  
  	/* Grab focus */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
-@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+From 710ce53fdf1d32a0629fce2e42fb49d407e2b06c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/50] openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info
+
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index cb7152dc..bbe93d83 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
++++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
  
  	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
  	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
@@ -16,3 +26,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/cont
  	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
  
  	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
---- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
+From 5f21983f6472b26693babea4d6ca6b95a7dc7b05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/50] openssh-8.7p1-redhat
+
+---
+ ssh_config            |  7 +++++++
+ ssh_config_redhat     | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config           |  8 ++++++++
+ sshd_config.0         |  6 +++---
+ sshd_config.5         |  2 +-
+ sshd_config_redhat    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config_redhat_cp |  7 +++++++
+ 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ssh_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat
+ create mode 100644 sshd_config_redhat_cp
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index cc566356..18169187 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
++++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -44,3 +44,10 @@
  #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
  #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
  #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
@@ -12,10 +31,12 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
 +# included below. For more information, see manual page for
 +#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
---- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff --git a/ssh_config_redhat b/ssh_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..8b1b5902
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ssh_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
 +Match final all
@@ -29,18 +50,35 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
 +# mode correctly we set this to yes.
 +	ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
++# rhbz#2352653 - export COLORTERM
++	SendEnv COLORTERM
 +
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
---- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 0f4a3a72..608203e4 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+ 
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
+index 2f77b4f4..49349bb3 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.0
++++ b/sshd_config.0
+@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
       SyslogFacility
               Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
@@ -53,10 +91,11 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
  
       TCPKeepAlive
               Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
---- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c0771737..035a50c8 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
  .It Cm SyslogFacility
  Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
  .Xr sshd 8 .
@@ -65,38 +104,15 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
  LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
  The default is AUTH.
  .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
---- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
-@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
-
-+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
-+
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
---- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
-+# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
-+# write it before this block or include it before this file.
-+# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
-+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat b/sshd_config_redhat
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..993a28d5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sshd_config_redhat
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 +
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
++KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
 +
 +GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
@@ -105,13 +121,26 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
 +
 +X11Forwarding yes
 +
++# rhbz#2352653 - accept COLORTERM
++	AcceptEnv COLORTERM
++
 +# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
+diff --git a/sshd_config_redhat_cp b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..1d592d13
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/sshd_config_redhat_cp
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 56b8d082bc9e25a77b5227d576f27088446c6fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/50] openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning
+
+---
+ sshd-session.c | 4 ++++
+ sshd_config    | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a365f26f..a70b36c9 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1127,6 +1127,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			    "enabled authentication methods");
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
++	if (! options.use_pam)
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 608203e4..48af6321 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
++# problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
+From f5e5ee321def2a3674600714ad98fd1ca9b2cff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/50] openssh-6.6p1-force_krb
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ session.c       |  23 +++++++
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 ++
+ sshd.8          |   7 +++
+ 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 413b845..54dd383 100644
+index 8d2b677f..14502c5a 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
@@ -12,7 +24,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
+@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@
  
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
@@ -20,7 +32,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  extern ServerOptions options;
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+@@ -55,6 +58,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
  # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
  #endif
  
@@ -34,7 +46,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -87,6 +97,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	int retval;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -42,7 +54,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  
  	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
  		return 0;
-@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -98,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		return 0;
  	}
@@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  
-@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -109,6 +132,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	return retval;
  }
  
@@ -205,10 +217,10 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
 diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
+index cbfbcee8..89b3a9cf 100644
 --- a/session.c
 +++ b/session.c
-@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -680,6 +680,29 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		command = auth_opts->force_command;
  		forced = "(key-option)";
  	}
@@ -239,7 +251,7 @@ index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
  	if (forced != NULL) {
  		s->forced = 1;
 diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 0374c88..509109a 100644
+index 8ec45192..db34d77f 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
 @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
@@ -254,10 +266,10 @@ index 0374c88..509109a 100644
  
  /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
+index 2aa73271..049d0a94 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
  The client tries to authenticate itself using
  host-based authentication,
  public key authentication,
@@ -265,7 +277,7 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  challenge-response authentication,
  or password authentication.
  .Pp
-@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+@@ -874,6 +875,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
  but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
  rlogin/rsh.
  .Pp
@@ -278,3 +290,6 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
  and authentication information.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
+From 5fca5946aa97dce23c6824c52b070a92532752a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 14/50] openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 262 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ auth.h          |   3 +-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  42 +++-----
+ gss-serv.c      |  10 +-
+ servconf.c      |  12 ++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ session.c       |   5 +-
+ ssh-gss.h       |   4 +-
+ sshd-session.c  |   2 +-
+ sshd_config.5   |   8 ++
+ 10 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index c99e4e43..77714e3d 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  #endif
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	char *client, *platform_client;
  	const char *errmsg;
  
-@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  		goto out;
  	}
  
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
-@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  		goto out;
  #endif
  
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
  
-@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  void
  krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
@@ -126,12 +125,29 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
  		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
  		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,189 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	}
  }
  
 -#ifndef HEIMDAL
-+
+-krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
+-	mode_t old_umask;
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
 +#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
 +int
 +ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
@@ -149,7 +165,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +	old = *dsc;
 +
 +	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
++	if (i == -1) {
++		*dsc = old;
 +		free(src);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
@@ -196,8 +213,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
-+	}
-+
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
 +	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
 +		goto cleanup;
 +
@@ -232,29 +250,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
++krb5_error_code
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
- 	mode_t old_umask;
++	mode_t old_umask;
 +	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
- 
--	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
--	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
--		return ENOMEM;
--
--	old_umask = umask(0177);
--	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
--	oerrno = errno;
--	umask(old_umask);
--	if (tmpfd == -1) {
--		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
--		return oerrno;
--	}
++
 +	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
@@ -269,8 +271,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 +		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
 +		if (ret < 0)
 +			return ENOMEM;
- 
--	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++
 +		old_umask = umask(0177);
 +		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
  		oerrno = errno;
@@ -337,42 +338,32 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  }
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- }
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 83d07ae8..10e88e11 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
  
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
+@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
- 	char *envstr;
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
  #endif
  
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 14502c5a..df55512d 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
  
@@ -381,7 +372,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  {
  	krb5_ccache ccache;
-@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
  	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -399,7 +390,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
  # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
  # endif
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -418,7 +409,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
  
-@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
  		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
@@ -427,7 +418,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  
  	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
-@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -436,7 +427,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  
  	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  	    client->creds, ccache))) {
  		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
  		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
@@ -474,7 +465,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
  #endif
  
-@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
  
  	client->store.data = krb_context;
  
@@ -483,10 +474,44 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  }
  
  int
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index a5cca797..9d5435ed 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -414,13 +414,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -500,9 +502,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index d4f7fd66..55aa5bf0 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -494,7 +519,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -382,6 +383,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
  	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@@ -503,17 +528,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
-	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
-	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
+@@ -564,7 +567,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -655,11 +658,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -527,7 +551,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1668,6 +1673,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -538,7 +562,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3293,6 +3302,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # ifdef USE_AFS
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
@@ -546,10 +570,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c3f50140..a4a38d6d 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@@ -558,10 +583,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 89b3a9cf..2620dd11 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
  	 * the child's environment as they see fit
  	 */
@@ -571,7 +597,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  #endif
  
  	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+@@ -1101,7 +1102,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -580,10 +606,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index db34d77f..a894e23c 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index f8c8a797..478381db 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
  		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@@ -592,10 +641,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
-@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 8bc6586e..1251d4d5 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1033,6 +1033,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
  file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -608,26 +658,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@
+From 25540939422660b024b8832f67eab82267aa8df6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 15/50] openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ auth.h          |  2 ++
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.8          |  4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
+index 77714e3d..74f56d47 100644
 --- a/auth-krb5.c
 +++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
+@@ -465,5 +465,21 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
  		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
  	}
  }
@@ -25,10 +37,10 @@ index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
+index 10e88e11..39163035 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
  #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
  krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
@@ -38,10 +50,10 @@ index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
  
  #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
+index df55512d..820f794c 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+@@ -144,8 +144,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
  {
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
@@ -71,10 +83,10 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
+index 049d0a94..6784286d 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+@@ -880,6 +880,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
  These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
  Further details are described in
  .Xr ksu 1 .
@@ -85,3 +97,6 @@ index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
  .Pp
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,22 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
+From bac7a9d1a654c8c2e0c71f979195e300b25d6232 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/50] openssh-6.6p1-kuserok
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c     |  20 ++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ servconf.c      |  13 +++++-
+ servconf.h      |   1 +
+ sshd_config     |   1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |   5 +++
+ 6 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 74f56d47..bae153c9 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,21 @@
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
@@ -23,7 +38,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
  static int
  krb5_init(void *context)
  {
-@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+@@ -158,8 +173,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
@@ -35,10 +50,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
  		problem = -1;
  		goto out;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 820f794c..187faf92 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
      int);
  
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
@@ -46,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
  
-@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+@@ -91,6 +92,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
   * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
   */
  
@@ -150,17 +166,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  static int
  ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  {
-@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -115,7 +213,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
  	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
  	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
++	if (k5login_exists &&
++	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
  		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
  	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
@@ -172,18 +188,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	}
  	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
  		int saved_errno = errno;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
-@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 55aa5bf0..5dd5ca21 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -399,6 +400,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
  		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
  #endif
@@ -192,16 +209,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
-	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
-	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
-	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
+@@ -567,7 +570,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -659,12 +662,14 @@ static struct {
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
  	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -216,18 +233,18 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
-		}
-		break;
-
+@@ -2441,6 +2446,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
-	case sMatch:
-		if (cmdline)
-			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -2995,6 +3004,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
@@ -235,18 +252,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3303,6 +3313,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
 +	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index a4a38d6d..11de36a2 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
  						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
@@ -254,10 +272,23 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
-@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 8db9f0fb..ea5a878e 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 1251d4d5..0fcb409a 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,10 @@ The default value
  .Cm no
  can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
  user account.
@@ -266,9 +297,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+@@ -1355,6 +1359,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm IPQoS ,
  .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
  .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
@@ -276,14 +307,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
  .Cm LogLevel ,
  .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
  .Cm MaxSessions ,
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 20aabb2c445e29d211266ce7434bb0273edf88b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 17/50] openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote
+
+---
+ scp.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 57c242ff..716ae386 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1162,7 +1162,10 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
++			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
++				addargs(&alist, "-t");
++			else
++				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,20 @@
+From 6481ac7fbd0027a7038560e0f51dd0af056cc229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 18/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c      |  2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  1 +
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
+index 8c5fc1fe..646f0887 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
  #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
  #include "servconf.h"
  #include "port-linux.h"
@@ -10,7 +22,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  #include "sshkey.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
  #include "auth.h"
-@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -450,7 +451,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  void
  sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
  {
@@ -19,7 +31,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  
  	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
  		return;
-@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+@@ -469,6 +470,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
  	}
  }
  
@@ -93,24 +105,23 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  #endif
  
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
+index 7426f6f7..9a6b1d6e 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
--	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
- 	    oldctx, newctx);
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
+ 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
  	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
-		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+ 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+ 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
+index 1b745a76..7f8ba200 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
  void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
  void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
  int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
@@ -118,16 +129,19 @@ index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index d51e4636..e4a8edfd 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ privsep_child_demote(void)
+ 		fatal_f("ssh_sandbox_init failed");
+ #endif
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
 +	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
  #endif
  
  	/* Demote the child */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
+From 825018f5f2d892655f3d63167a0d1f3391cec678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 19/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot
+
+---
+ log.c              | 11 +++++++++--
+ log.h              |  1 +
+ monitor.c          | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h          |  2 +-
+ session.c          | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ sftp-server-main.c |  2 +-
+ sftp-server.c      |  6 +++---
+ sftp.h             |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c     |  7 ++++++-
+ 9 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index 6617f267..9782cfb0 100644
+--- a/log.c
++++ b/log.c
+@@ -196,6 +196,11 @@ void
  log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
      int on_stderr)
  {
@@ -13,7 +31,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
-@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
+@@ -208,8 +213,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
  		exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -26,9 +44,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
  
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
+diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
+index 8e8dfc23..70048a8a 100644
+--- a/log.h
++++ b/log.h
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
  typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
@@ -37,43 +56,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
-@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
- 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
-+
- 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
- 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
- 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
- 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
-+
- 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
- 	/* Log it */
- 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
--	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- 	free(msg);
-@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
- 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
- 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
- 
-+	mon->m_state = "";
-+
- 	return mon;
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 2ef16cc8..43c10a4e 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -2001,9 +2001,22 @@ monitor_init(void)
  }
  
  void
@@ -98,14 +85,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
- 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
- 	pid_t			 m_pid;
-+	char		*m_state;
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index dbc7e003..d4d631dd 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct monitor {
  };
  
  struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
@@ -114,10 +98,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
  
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 2620dd11..54da09d5 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
@@ -125,7 +110,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
  static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -670,6 +671,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	int ret;
  	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
  	char session_type[1024];
@@ -133,7 +118,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
  		original_command = command;
-@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+@@ -729,6 +731,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  			tty += 5;
  	}
  
@@ -144,7 +129,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    session_type,
  	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1512,14 +1518,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
@@ -159,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1652,8 +1650,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  			exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -168,7 +153,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
  
  	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+@@ -1678,9 +1674,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		argv[i] = NULL;
  		optind = optreset = 1;
  		__progname = argv[0];
@@ -187,29 +172,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	fflush(NULL);
  
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
+index 2c70f89b..bbb79f27 100644
+--- a/sftp-server-main.c
++++ b/sftp-server-main.c
+@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
  
- struct passwd;
- 
--int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index a4abb9f7..4985da38 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
  int
 -sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
  {
- 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
- 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+ 	ssize_t len, olen;
+@@ -1913,7 +1913,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
  	extern char *__progname;
  
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
@@ -218,7 +205,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
-@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -227,21 +214,23 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	/*
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
+diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
+index 2bde8bb7..ddf1a396 100644
+--- a/sftp.h
++++ b/sftp.h
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
--	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 	}
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 478381db..9342e416 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #endif
  
  	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
@@ -249,7 +238,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
  	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+@@ -456,6 +456,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
  
  	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
@@ -261,3 +250,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
  	demote_sensitive_data();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 007ee98fa9100f7241985ac2a7eed71e17d89a9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 20/50] openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 716ae386..9554b188 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1876,6 +1876,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
++			errno = ENOTDIR;
++			goto bad;
++		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,21 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
-@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+From 9c75c175e3555377328fc5fc9b06e94f129b7cd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/50] openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users
+
+---
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  3 +--
+ servconf.c      | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ servconf.h      |  1 +
+ sshd_config     |  1 +
+ sshd_config.5   |  6 ++++++
+ 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 187faf92..03188d9b 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  	FILE *fp;
  	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
  	char *line = NULL;
@@ -9,7 +23,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser
  	struct stat st;
  	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
  	int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
  
  	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
  	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -18,18 +32,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-ser
                  return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
                                          k5login_exists);
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
-@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5dd5ca21..c0de7110 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
  	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
  	options->use_kuserok = -1;
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  #endif
  	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
  		options->use_kuserok = 1;
@@ -38,16 +53,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+@@ -585,7 +588,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
  	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+@@ -681,6 +684,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -55,8 +70,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #else
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -689,6 +693,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -64,7 +78,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -2450,6 +2455,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -72,10 +86,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
-	case sMatch:
-		if (cmdline)
-			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
-@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+@@ -3005,6 +3014,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
@@ -83,7 +97,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3314,6 +3324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
@@ -91,21 +105,35 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
-@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
-	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 11de36a2..c08cf6a7 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
  	int	use_kuserok;
 +	int		enable_k5users;
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
-@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index ea5a878e..33713c88 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 0fcb409a..fe246fc2 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -739,6 +739,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -118,14 +146,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_conf
  .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
  doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 05b09904f431333e19cd24528ef66d1fd15e9efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 22/50] openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output
+
+---
+ servconf.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index c0de7110..105e301d 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -3366,7 +3366,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+From 34b196198018059bed294fa7a08e70606b4cbc36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 23/50] openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission
+
+---
+ sftp-server.8 |  7 +++++++
+ sftp-server.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+index 5311bf92..5e6e3aa4 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.8
++++ b/sftp-server.8
 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
  .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
@@ -22,10 +33,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
  .El
  .Pp
  On some systems,
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 4985da38..6ed1c27f 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
  /* Version of client */
  static u_int version;
  
@@ -36,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
  static int init_done;
  
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -745,6 +749,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	Attrib a;
  	char *name;
  	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@@ -44,7 +56,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -754,6 +759,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
  	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
  	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@@ -55,7 +67,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
  	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
  	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -775,6 +784,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  			}
  		}
  	}
@@ -64,7 +76,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
  		send_status(id, status);
  	free(name);
-@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1894,7 +1905,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  	fprintf(stderr,
  	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
  	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
@@ -73,7 +85,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
  	    __progname, __progname);
  	exit(1);
-@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1918,7 +1929,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
  	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -82,7 +94,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'Q':
  			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1980,6 +1991,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handle
  				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
  			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
  			break;
@@ -98,3 +110,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  		case 'h':
  		default:
  			sftp_server_usage();
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -1,21 +1,17 @@
-Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
-
-All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
-sshd process to handle a new client connection is
-spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
-without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
-files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
-closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
-
-Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+From 9bb31b63142adaaf949e20c2d86c97f9b787217b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 24/50] openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom
 
 ---
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index 49a4f35f..f6112458 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+@@ -140,7 +140,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
  	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
  	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
  		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
@@ -49,4 +45,6 @@ Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
  	}
  	(void) closedir(dirp);
  	return;
+-- 
+2.49.0
 

0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
- 
- /* -- X11 forwarding */
--/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
--#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
-+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
-+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
- 
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
-@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+From 36e3430d1f81397d5f40600e075272a81f7effce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 25/50] openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays
+
+---
+ channels.c    |  9 ++++++---
+ channels.h    |  2 +-
+ servconf.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
+ servconf.h    |  2 ++
+ session.c     |  5 +++--
+ sshd_config.5 |  7 +++++++
+ 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index d46531ce..7438c1a5 100644
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -4996,7 +4996,7 @@ rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
   */
  int
  x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
@@ -21,8 +25,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
      u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
  {
  	Channel *nc = NULL;
-@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 	if (chanids == NULL)
+@@ -5009,8 +5009,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+ 	    x11_display_offset > UINT16_MAX - X11_BASE_PORT - MAX_DISPLAYS)
  		return -1;
  
 +	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
@@ -32,67 +36,35 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 -	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
 +	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
  	    display_number++) {
--		port = 6000 + display_number;
-+		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
-+		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
-+			break;
+ 		port = X11_BASE_PORT + display_number;
  		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -5065,7 +5068,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  		if (num_socks > 0)
  			break;
  	}
 -	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
-+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_BASE_PORT ) {
  		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
  		return -1;
  	}
-@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
-+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
- 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 			close(sock);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	}
- 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- 	if (!ai) {
--		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
-+		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	set_nodelay(sock);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
+index 134528d5..8a09a820 100644
+--- a/channels.h
++++ b/channels.h
+@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
  
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
  int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
 -int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
  void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
  	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
-@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ int      x11_channel_used_recently(struct ssh *ssh);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 105e301d..15c99b30 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  	options->print_lastlog = -1;
  	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
  	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
@@ -100,7 +72,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
  	options->permit_tty = -1;
  	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
-@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -353,6 +354,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
  		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
  	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
  		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
@@ -109,16 +81,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
  		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
  	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -576,7 +579,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ 	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
  	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 -	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 +	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
  	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
  	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
  	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -714,6 +717,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -126,7 +98,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -1750,6 +1754,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
  			*intptr = value;
  		break;
  
@@ -137,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	case sX11UseLocalhost:
  		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+@@ -3004,6 +3012,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
  	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
@@ -145,7 +117,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
-@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3299,6 +3308,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
  	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
@@ -153,10 +125,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
  	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
  	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index c08cf6a7..7c7e5d43 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  
  #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
  #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
@@ -164,7 +137,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  
  /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
  #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
-@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
  	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
  					 * searching at */
@@ -172,13 +145,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
  	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
  	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
  	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 54da09d5..28bbb8a7 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -2611,8 +2611,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
  		return 0;
  	}
-	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+ 	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
 -	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
 -	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
 +	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
@@ -187,18 +161,19 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
  		return 0;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index fe246fc2..26fcdc84 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1391,6 +1391,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
  .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
 +.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
  .Cm X11Forwarding
  and
  .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
-@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+@@ -2111,6 +2112,12 @@ Specifies the first display number available for
  X11 forwarding.
  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
  The default is 10.
@@ -211,3 +186,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
  .It Cm X11Forwarding
  Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
  The argument must be
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -1,40 +1,58 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+From 43320351b6f150167190aacc84f2f87030fef3d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 26/50] openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux
+
+---
+ auth2-pubkey.c                   |  8 ++++--
+ misc.c                           |  5 ++--
+ misc.h                           |  2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++---------------
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h      |  4 +--
+ platform.c                       |  6 ++++-
+ sshconnect.c                     |  2 +-
+ sshd-auth.c                      |  2 +-
+ sshd-session.c                   |  6 +++--
+ 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 267a27d2..0d5ae0df 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@
  
  /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
  
  static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
-@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
+@@ -485,7 +487,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
+@@ -755,7 +758,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 1e31acc9..09722962 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2764,7 +2764,8 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
  pid_t
  subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
      int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
@@ -44,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
-@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+@@ -2898,7 +2899,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
  			_exit(1);
  		}
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
@@ -53,10 +71,11 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
---- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index efecdf1a..9efa9cf4 100644
+--- a/misc.h
++++ b/misc.h
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
  #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
  pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
@@ -65,36 +84,22 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
  
  typedef struct arglist arglist;
  struct arglist {
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
- 
- int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
--void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
--int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
- void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 646f0887..291b569a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #endif
  
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
--extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  int
  sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
+@@ -222,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
  }
  
  static void
@@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	*role = NULL;
  	*level = NULL;
-@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
+@@ -240,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
  
  /* Return the default security context for the given username */
  static int
@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	char *sename, *lvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -249,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  	int r = 0;
  	context_t con = NULL;
  
@@ -124,16 +129,16 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
  	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  	if (r == 0) {
  		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
  			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
  
  			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -332,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
@@ -143,7 +148,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+@@ -341,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -152,12 +157,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
--	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
-@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+@@ -361,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  }
  
  static int
@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  }
  
  static int
-@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+@@ -373,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
  }
  
  int
@@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
  				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
-@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+@@ -407,7 +409,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
  
  	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
@@ -213,66 +218,50 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  	if (r >= 0) {
  		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
  		if (r < 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 7f8ba200..3cd7da6a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
+ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 0d12f311..f0800b1f 100644
+--- a/platform.c
++++ b/platform.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
  
- extern int use_privsep;
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
-@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+ int
+@@ -140,7 +142,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
--static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
--static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
-@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
-diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
---- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
-@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index c86182d1..04084810 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
  
  	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
@@ -281,3 +270,43 @@ diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
  		goto out;
  
  	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
+diff --git a/sshd-auth.c b/sshd-auth.c
+index e4a8edfd..897db9b4 100644
+--- a/sshd-auth.c
++++ b/sshd-auth.c
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Saved arguments to main(). */
+ static char **saved_argv;
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index 9342e416..81d30152 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1359,7 +1359,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 35205319dd71d8e61c1596b8f9479df91aff7756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 27/50] openssh-7.5p1-sandbox
+
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index b31062c2..1fabf99d 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -277,6 +277,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -295,6 +298,21 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_gettid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+@@ -304,6 +322,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
+From 507e6f245557ae7261806f7ecbd40697cb0dd389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 29/50] openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6
+
+---
+ scp.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
 diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
+index 9554b188..7f9795a5 100644
 --- a/scp.c
 +++ b/scp.c
-@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -1183,7 +1183,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
  			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
@@ -13,4 +22,6 @@ index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
  			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
  			    thost, targ);
  			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+-- 
+2.49.0
 

0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -1,13 +1,24 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-08-30 13:29:00.174292872 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2021-08-30 13:31:32.009548808 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@ or
- .Qq *.c.example.com
- domains.
+From b436140fe3abd9f97f01f9af9f5da5cf6c5d7725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 30/50] openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5  | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ sshd_config.5 | 179 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 8d5d0722..a43b2a27 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -438,17 +438,13 @@ A single argument of
+ causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
+ This is the default behaviour.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
@@ -24,13 +35,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@ If the option is set to
+@@ -587,20 +583,25 @@ If the option is set to
  (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
@@ -54,33 +65,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -616,13 +617,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+@@ -1022,6 +1016,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -1034,10 +1033,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -92,34 +103,103 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1219,29 +1216,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1056,36 +1053,25 @@ will not be converted automatically,
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
+-to the default set instead of replacing them.
++to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+-at the head of the default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+@@ -1138,6 +1124,17 @@ to prefer their algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++The proposed
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
++.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
++would break the order given by the
++.Pa known_hosts
++file.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+ real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+@@ -1376,6 +1373,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
+ their preference order.
+ The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
+@@ -1384,29 +1386,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
+-.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@@ -127,17 +207,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@ function, and all code in the
+ .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+@@ -1522,37 +1512,33 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
@@ -178,13 +259,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1553,37 +1542,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+@@ -1741,39 +1727,31 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
@@ -214,27 +295,44 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-08-30 13:29:00.157292731 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5	2021-08-30 13:32:16.263918533 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@ If the argument is
++.Pp
++This option affects also
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be
+@@ -2497,7 +2475,9 @@ for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+ This file must be world-readable.
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+-.Xr ssh 1
++.Xr ssh 1 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 26fcdc84..583a01cd 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@ If the argument is
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
@@ -251,13 +349,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
+@@ -533,20 +529,25 @@ The default is
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the ciphers allowed.
@@ -281,27 +379,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -573,13 +574,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -685,21 +679,22 @@ For this to work
+@@ -774,53 +768,43 @@ For this to work
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
@@ -327,18 +425,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
-@@ -799,26 +794,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
- .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the host key signature algorithms
- that the server offers.
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+-the default set instead of replacing them.
++the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
+-the head of the default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@@ -349,70 +456,102 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -887,25 +871,14 @@ is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+ The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+@@ -1052,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+ The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
+@@ -1060,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -1010,15 +997,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+@@ -1106,14 +1084,6 @@ sntrup761x25519-sha512
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
--diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@ function, and all code in the
+@@ -1200,21 +1170,26 @@ function, and all code in the
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
@@ -437,7 +576,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+@@ -1257,15 +1232,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -453,13 +592,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1548,37 +1522,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1753,36 +1719,25 @@ or equivalent.)
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
@@ -489,14 +628,27 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.7p1/sshd_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -2289,7 +2244,9 @@ This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+-.Xr sshd 8
++.Xr sshd 8 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From 430bd33963725beb8ec01a1e581529ae6bf6bec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 31/50] openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf
+
+---
+ configure.ac |   1 +
+ kex.c        | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d9bd2f51..d92a8580 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3137,6 +3137,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 19a56e8e..8b200ff4 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
++# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -1078,6 +1083,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
++static const char *
++digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return SN_sha1;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return SN_sha256;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return SN_sha384;
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return SN_sha512;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	u_char *key = NULL;
++	int r, key_len;
++
++	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
++       char keytype = (char)id;
++
++	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (md == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (param_bld == NULL) {
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
++	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
++		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
++				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
++				hash, hashlen) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
++				&keytype, 1);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
++	if (params == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
++	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
++	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
++#endif
++	*keyp = key;
++	key = NULL;
++	r = 0;
++
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	free (key);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (r < 0) {
++		return r;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1141,6 +1247,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
+From 6aa231d9acfeca870ee87e3bf9c4a1239518706d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 32/50] openssh-8.2p1-visibility
+
+---
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
 diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+index 347b2122..344f8a8a 100644
 --- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
 +++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
  #endif
  }
  
@@ -11,7 +20,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_api_version(void)
  {
  	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
-@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -20,7 +29,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
      const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
      struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
-@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -29,7 +38,7 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
      const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
      uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -38,3 +47,6 @@ index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
  sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
      struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
  {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
+From cfe5a99d335eb57b8c08b4eb6b4535dd042d96e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 33/50] openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6
+
+---
+ channels.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
 diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+index 7438c1a5..95836d50 100644
 --- a/channels.c
 +++ b/channels.c
-@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
- 			if (x11_use_localhost)
- 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+@@ -5055,6 +5055,16 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
  				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
  				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
@@ -23,8 +28,6 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
  				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
  					close(socks[n]);
  				num_socks = 0;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- 				break;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors	2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c	2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
-@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+From 8de0391e3b3eb75e23ee9f173f04a9c78f2b96c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 34/50] openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index b4100ea1..a042c3c8 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -523,7 +523,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  		goto auth_fail;
  
  	if (!do_pam_account()) {
@@ -14,7 +24,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  		goto auth_fail;
  	}
  	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+@@ -580,8 +584,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
  	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
  		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
  	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
@@ -27,18 +37,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
  		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
  	else
-@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 			plen++;
+@@ -890,9 +896,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
  			free(msg);
  			break;
-+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
-+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
 +			sshpam_account_status = 0;
 +			/* FALLTHROUGH */
  		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
 -			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -				sshpam_account_status = 0;
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
  				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
  			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,18 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h	2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
+From a68f3741fdc01bf6823a69d2442caba7de9835f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 35/50] openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch
+
+---
+ pathnames.h | 1 +
+ scp.1       | 7 +++++++
+ scp.c       | 8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
+index 1158bec9..43f0c570 100644
+--- a/pathnames.h
++++ b/pathnames.h
 @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
  #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
  #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
@@ -9,12 +21,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
  
  #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
  #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
-@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
- This is helpful in
- debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index aa2e2d8b..373d7237 100644
+--- a/scp.1
++++ b/scp.1
+@@ -331,6 +331,13 @@ during download or upload.
+ By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+ .El
  .El
 +.Pp
 +Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
@@ -26,10 +39,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
  .Sh EXIT STATUS
  .Ex -std scp
  .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
-@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 7f9795a5..7ed1a54c 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -649,6 +649,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  	if (iamremote)
  		mode = MODE_SCP;
  
@@ -44,3 +58,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
  	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
  		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
  
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+From 99e1e3af524376788e591ca73387f1ca37e6f5ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 36/50] openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp
+
+---
+ scp.c         |  2 +-
+ sftp-client.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ sftp-client.h |  4 ++--
+ sftp.c        |  6 +++---
+ 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 7ed1a54c..0c87dd0e 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
+ 			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 9f8ab4af..873dec04 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
++++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ 
+ /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+ static char *
+-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
++sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+-		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+-		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+-		free(errmsg);
+-		sshbuf_free(msg);
+-		return NULL;
++		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
++			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
++			if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
++			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
++					path, strlen(path));
++
++			get_msg(conn, msg);
++			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
++				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
++
++			if (id != expected_id)
++				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
++
++			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
++				free(errmsg);
++
++				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
++				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
++					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
++				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++				free(errmsg);
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++		} else {
++			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++			free(errmsg);
++			sshbuf_free(msg);
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@ sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
++sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
+ {
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@ sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+-		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
+ 	}
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@ sftp_download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
++	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2366,12 +2398,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ int
+ sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
++	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2826,7 +2858,7 @@ sftp_crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ 	char *from_path_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
++	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
+ 		    from_path);
+ 		return -1;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+index 74cdae7d..00ed6630 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.h
++++ b/sftp-client.h
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int sftp_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+ int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
++char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+ char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int sftp_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+ int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    int, int, int, int, int, int);
++    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index bdedd141..322e6d1f 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -809,7 +809,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ 		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+ 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+ 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
+ 		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+-		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
++		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 			err = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+ 	}
+ #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+ 
+-	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
++	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("Need cwd");
+ 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 286bc4a302b5130f732c857095ae665f7bea01dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 37/50] openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits
+
+---
+ readconf.c | 1 +
+ servconf.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 6c04ed43..f340bf50 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
++	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+ 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 15c99b30..84891544 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 26af04432f6404eb03780265a5cce948ecfec8dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 38/50] openssh-8.7p1-ibmca
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+index f6112458..417c2048 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
-@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+From c288d4a26ad44dc481c9d18d2920c9d70474833c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 40/50] openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition
+
+---
+ monitor_wrap.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor_wrap.h |  2 ++
+ session.c      | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 1a079c15..768a59f9 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1415,4 +1415,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
  	sshbuf_free(m);
  }
@@ -52,10 +64,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
 +}
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
-@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 661ed63b..e957ba6e 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
  void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
  void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
@@ -64,10 +77,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
  #endif
  
  struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
-@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 83fc9418..b4753d93 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
  login_cap_t *lc;
  #endif
  
@@ -78,7 +92,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  static int is_child = 0;
  static int in_chroot = 0;
  static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+@@ -390,6 +394,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
  	return 1;
  }
  
@@ -87,7 +101,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  #define USE_PIPES 1
  /*
   * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
-@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+@@ -513,6 +519,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		close(err[0]);
  #endif
  
@@ -96,7 +110,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
  		do_child(ssh, s, command);
  		/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+@@ -630,6 +638,9 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
  		close(ttyfd);
  
@@ -106,22 +120,22 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
  #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
  		do_login(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -766,6 +777,8 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	}
  	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -781,6 +794,20 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  	 */
  	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
  
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++	if (ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@@ -136,7 +150,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	return ret;
  }
  
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1532,6 +1559,33 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
  }
  
@@ -147,12 +161,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	/* FIXME beldmit destroy_sensitive_data(ssh); */
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@@ -171,12 +184,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  /*
   * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
   * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1549,13 +1603,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
  
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
--	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	/* remove keys from memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@@ -185,3 +198,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	/* Force a password change */
  	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
  		do_setusercontext(pw);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+From 80d967a18261156573e7385f8e534a89d2767d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 41/50] openssh-9.0p1-audit-log
+
+---
+ audit-bsm.c   |  2 +-
+ audit-linux.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ audit.c       | 18 +++++++++---
+ audit.h       |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+index a49abb92..c6f56553 100644
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
+index d484b82b..dcfde3a9 100644
+--- a/audit-linux.c
++++ b/audit-linux.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char *audit_username(void);
+ 
+ static void
+-linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+ 	}
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+-	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
++	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	close(audit_fd);
+ 
+@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++	const char *rip;
++	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
+ 		else
+ 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
++	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+-		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+ 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		goto out;
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
+-		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		rip, NULL, rv);
++	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		goto out;
++
++	if (cert) {
++		char *pbuf;
++
++		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
++		if (pbuf == NULL)
++			goto out;
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
++			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
++		free(pbuf);
++		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++			goto out;
++
++		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
++			if (pbuf == NULL)
++				goto out;
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
++			free(pbuf);
++			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
+ out:
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
+@@ -179,26 +211,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+ int
+ audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
+ 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++	    audit_hostname,
+ 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++		    audit_hostname,
+ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -211,31 +251,41 @@ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+ 	if (!user_login_count++)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
++		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
+ 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
++	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
++
+ 	switch(event) {
+ 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+ 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
+-		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+@@ -255,9 +305,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 		if (user_login_count) {
+ 			while (user_login_count--)
+ 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++				    audit_hostname,
+ 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++			    audit_hostname,
+ 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ 		}
+@@ -266,12 +318,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+ 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++			audit_hostname,
+ 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
++	free(audit_hostname);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
+index d0433c3a..28d51a14 100644
+--- a/audit.c
++++ b/audit.c
+@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ void
+ audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
+ {
+-	char *fp;
++	char *key_fp = NULL;
++	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
++	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
++		cert = key->cert;
++		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
++										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++	}
++	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
+ 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	free(fp);
++	if (key_fp)
++		free(key_fp);
++	if (issuer_fp)
++		free(issuer_fp);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
+index 45d66ccf..05ac132c 100644
+--- a/audit.h
++++ b/audit.h
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+ int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+-int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
+ void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+From 79f9b2763d85ec592cb7e54dcf1c695d8dd138b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 14:01:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 42/54] openssh-7.7p1-fips
+
+---
+ dh.c                     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ dh.h                     |  1 +
+ kex-names.c              |  6 +++-
+ kex.c                    |  3 +-
+ kexgen.c                 | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ kexgexc.c                |  5 +++
+ myproposal.h             | 33 ++++++++++++++++++
+ readconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  3 ++
+ servconf.c               | 16 ++++++---
+ ssh-ed25519.c            |  9 +++++
+ ssh-gss.h                |  5 +++
+ ssh-keygen.c             | 22 ++++++++++--
+ ssh-rsa.c                |  3 ++
+ ssh.c                    |  5 +++
+ sshconnect2.c            |  9 ++++-
+ sshd-session.c           |  1 +
+ sshd.c                   | 13 +++++++
+ sshkey.c                 | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 19 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 168dea1dd..8c9a29fa7 100644
+--- a/dh.c
++++ b/dh.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+ 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+ 	struct dhgroup dhg;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
++		    " Falling back to known groups.");
++		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
++	}
++
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
+@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 	return 8192;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
++ */
++int
++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
++{
++	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
++	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
++	DH *known = NULL;
++	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
++	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
++
++	if (bits <= 3072) {
++		known = dh_new_group14();
++	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
++		known = dh_new_group16();
++	} else {
++		known = dh_new_group18();
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
++
++	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
++	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
++		rv = 1;
++	}
++
++	DH_free(known);
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
+index c6326a39d..e51e292b8 100644
+--- a/dh.h
++++ b/dh.h
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+ 
+ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
++int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index 6c0b7c2b3..cd3902ad2 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -206,7 +207,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 62f607d6f..71fbe5cbe 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ # include <openssl/param_build.h>
+@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+ 
+ 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
+ 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
+-		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
+ 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
+ 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
+index 15df591ca..eecdceba2 100644
+--- a/kexgen.c
++++ b/kexgen.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
+index e99e0cf21..4c3feae09 100644
+--- a/kexgexc.c
++++ b/kexgexc.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+ 
+ 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
+index 8fe9276c2..3e0ec6826 100644
+--- a/myproposal.h
++++ b/myproposal.h
+@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256"
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256"
++
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," \
+@@ -79,6 +91,27 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
++	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++
+ /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+ #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index f340bf501..ea9d293c3 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+ # include <glob.h>
+ #else
+@@ -3043,11 +3044,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 1fabf99d0..ccb61586e 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 84891544b..8b708cbf4 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ #include <util.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -247,11 +248,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
+index 22d8db026..41942f4e5 100644
+--- a/ssh-ed25519.c
++++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -164,6 +165,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -221,6 +226,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..329dc9da0 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
+ 	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+ 
++#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
++	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
++
+ #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 16cff9473..792aafde0 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
+ #include "cipher.h"
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
++#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
+@@ -202,6 +204,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -259,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+ 	char *name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
++		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ 	else {
+ 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
+ #ifdef WITH_DSA
+@@ -1144,9 +1152,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+@@ -3849,7 +3865,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
++		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+ 
+ 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
+ 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 3ad1fddc4..6c2f771a3 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -142,6 +143,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 98b103c9e..abc8b8439 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -1642,6 +1643,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 0af15bcc1..3e02f485d 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
++			 match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++
+ 		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ 		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ 		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++		    options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
++		free(gss_kex_filtered);
++
+ 		if (gss) {
+ 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a808ac9a6..a67a78391 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 8a99f0b29..5ff0b5ff0 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1611,6 +1613,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
++		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
++				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
++		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++		    sshkey_free(key);
++		    key = NULL;
++		    continue;
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -1830,6 +1839,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 4e41a78c7..ca1cdb642 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -408,6 +410,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+ 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 			continue;
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			switch (impl->type) {
++			case KEY_ED25519:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++			     continue;
++			     break;
++			default:
++			     break;
++			}
++		}
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
+@@ -1441,6 +1455,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ 	}
+ 
++	switch (type) {
++	case KEY_ED25519:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    sshkey_free(k);
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		break;
++	}
+ 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+ 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+ 	*ret = *k;
+@@ -2275,6 +2303,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*lenp = 0;
+ 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++	/* Fallthrough */
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+@@ -2311,6 +2344,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*detailsp = NULL;
+ 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+-- 
+2.51.0
+

0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 299a602802d7c7d121306eb2aeae1502871a35cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 43/50] openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage
+
+---
+ ssh.1 | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 6a9fbdc5..755cdef2 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It BatchMode
+ .It BindAddress
+ .It BindInterface
+-.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CanonicalDomains
+ .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ .It CanonicalizeHostname
+ .It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
++.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+ .It CertificateFile
+ .It ChannelTimeout
+ .It CheckHostIP
+@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
+ .It DynamicForward
++.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
+ .It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EscapeChar
+@@ -588,6 +589,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RevokedHostKeys
++.It SecurityKeyProvider
+ .It RequiredRSASize
+ .It RevokedHostKeys
+ .It SecurityKeyProvider
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From 5c92430c08ac392b5b2ace899cc043247c923734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 44/50] openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs
+
+---
+ regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ sshconnect2.c            | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+index 28dcfe17..b9e716dc 100644
+--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
++++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
+ 
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
+ 
++PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
++    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
++echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r == 0 ]; then
++echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
++fi
++fi
++
+ trace "load hostkeys"
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
+ 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
+@@ -32,12 +45,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either
+ 
+ unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "key type $k"
++	hka=$k
++	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
++	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
++	fi
+ 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
++	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
++	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
+ 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+@@ -50,15 +67,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ done
+ 
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com' | maybe_filter_sk`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+ 
+ # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ HOSTKEYALGS=""
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
+ 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
+ done
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
+@@ -70,7 +88,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
+   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "cert type $k"
+ 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 14f7671a..ad3f560f 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
++	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -257,10 +257,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
+ 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ 
++	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
++		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
++				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
++		if (hkalgs)
++			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++		else
++			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	}
++
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+-	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++	    filtered_algs);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+@@ -304,6 +316,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
++	free(filtered_algs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+From be23afbab800c9b5ffea56b3f410a04156c08df2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 45/50] openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex
+
+---
+ dh.c      |  98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ kex.c     | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kex.h     |   6 +++
+ kexdh.c   |  52 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ kexecdh.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 5 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
+index 8c9a29fa..ea0a0b09 100644
+--- a/dh.c
++++ b/dh.c
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
++
++	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
++		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed key generation");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* reuse context for key generation */
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not create or init context");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not generate keys");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
++	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* transferred */
++	pub_key = NULL;
++	priv_key = NULL;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
++	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 71fbe5cb..ce6a7b81 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -1614,3 +1614,142 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++/* 
++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
++ * The private key can be omitted.
++ */
++EVP_PKEY *
++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
++{
++  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
++  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
++  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
++  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
++  	const char *group_name;
++  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (k == NULL)
++    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
++     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
++                group_name,
++                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++	}
++  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
++    		const EC_GROUP *group;
++    		size_t len;
++
++		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
++		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
++		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
++		    pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len,
++		    bn_ctx);
++		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len) != 1) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++  	free(pub_ser);
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
++    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++
++	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (priv != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return r;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 6a55aadf..48f3bb87 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -311,6 +314,9 @@ int	kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
++int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
++    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
++int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
+diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
+index 0faab21b..32e1de51 100644
+--- a/kexdh.c
++++ b/kexdh.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@ int
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
++	/* import key */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* import peer key 
++	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
++	 */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not get key size");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
++	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
+index efb2e55a..d92ba54f 100644
+--- a/kexecdh.c
++++ b/kexecdh.c
+@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++static EC_KEY *
++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
++{
++	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	const char *group_name;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
++	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
++		goto out;
++	}
++out:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	return client_key;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
++	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@ kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
++	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
++	size_t klen = 0, publen;
++	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
++	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
++
++	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
++	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
++	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
++	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+From e4ca3b9dba1cc832a9974493c91207d42e218a68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 46/50] openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof
+
+---
+ compat.c                               |  6 +++++
+ compat.h                               |  2 +-
+ monitor.c                              | 27 ++++++++++++++++------
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c       |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c   |  3 ++-
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------
+ serverloop.c                           |  6 ++++-
+ ssh-rsa.c                              |  3 ++-
+ sshconnect2.c                          |  8 +++++++
+ sshd-session.c                         | 21 +++++++++++++++++
+ 11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
+index b59f0bfc..4e611dc3 100644
+--- a/compat.c
++++ b/compat.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -125,16 +126,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
++	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
+index 1a19060f..2e6db5bf 100644
+--- a/compat.h
++++ b/compat.h
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index fbc35782..19cb058e 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -747,11 +747,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	struct sshkey *pubkey, *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
+-	size_t datlen, siglen;
+-	int r, is_proof = 0, keyid;
+-	u_int compat;
++	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
++	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
++	int r, is_proof = 0;
++	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
++	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -809,18 +810,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
++		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
++	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+index caf8f57f..09016aea 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
+ 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ 	if (kex != NULL)
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
++	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
++		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+index 3babe604..cc80fe97 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+index 0aff7c9b..951122e1 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+@@ -338,13 +338,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+index 5bf4b65c..6d0a35bb 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -102,8 +105,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
++	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0)
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -120,16 +124,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
++	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
++		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0) {
++		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
++		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
++		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -526,7 +536,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
++	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 40ddfb04..9c5b1567 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -699,7 +700,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
+-
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
++			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
++		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 6c2f771a..8dd4ab01 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -509,7 +509,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
++		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
++			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index ad3f560f..3941e089 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1434,6 +1434,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
++		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
++			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
++
++			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
++			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
++		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+index a808ac9a..c3349a8a 100644
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
+@@ -1316,6 +1316,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	{
++		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
++		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
++		if (rsakey == NULL)
++			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
++
++		if (rsakey != NULL) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++		    }
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 497de886faaddec60b7ad1013396c7d4f3145968 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 47/50] openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost
+
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index a042c3c8..a321e0d3 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+ 		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ 	}
+-	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
++	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
+ 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+ 		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
+ 		    sshpam_rhost);
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From b97b1040bc0918fe9be89cdb482d046270e92d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 48/50] openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign
+
+---
+ ssh_config.5 | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index a43b2a27..9d5da2a6 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ or
+ This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
+ See
+ .Xr ssh-keysign 8
+-for more information.
++for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly.
+ .It Cm EscapeChar
+ Sets the escape character (default:
+ .Ql ~ ) .
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+From 0a621a2ccb8444e4c6da906b0e112e0522658122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 49/50] openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem
+
+---
+ kex-names.c         |  20 +++
+ kexmlkem768x25519.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 311 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index cd3902ad..36a953ab 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -108,6 +108,19 @@ static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+ };
+ 
++static int is_mlkem768_available()
++{
++	static int is_fetched = -1;
++
++	if (is_fetched == -1) {
++		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
++		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
++	}
++
++	return is_fetched;
++}
++
+ static char *
+ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ {
+@@ -116,6 +129,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+ 	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++			continue;
+ 		if (ret != NULL)
+ 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
+@@ -147,6 +163,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
++	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++	return NULL;
++
+ 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+index 2b5d3960..670049dc 100644
+--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+@@ -48,10 +48,127 @@
+ #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 
+ #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++static int
++mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
++	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
++	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    ret = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
++	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
+ 	size_t need;
+@@ -86,6 +203,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	u_char *cp = NULL;
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++#endif
++	cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	kex->client_pub = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -93,6 +240,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	const u_char *client_pub;
+@@ -185,12 +333,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ 	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *client_pub;
++	u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
++
++	*server_blobp = NULL;
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
++	    client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
++	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++
++	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
++	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
++	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	/* append ECDH shared key */
++	client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:",
++	    enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
++	dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*server_blobp = server_blob;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	server_blob = NULL;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
++	explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
++	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+     const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ 	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+@@ -258,6 +491,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ 	explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
++	size_t need;
++	int r;
++
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
++	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
++	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
++	    buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
++	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+ int
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From fd32e753ae7f3b314712e6aa8b2bed3c1fca1ef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 14:53:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 50/51] openssh-9.9p2-error_processing
+
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 798bf9b6..dfb6ac72 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1377,6 +1377,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
+ 	    k == NULL ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
++		if (!r) /* k == NULL */
++			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 		error_fr(r, "parse");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 4965cdbc1ee1e6a0c665797bb8b944d96d3d411f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 15:11:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 51/53] Provide better error for non-supported private keys
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ sshkey.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ca1cdb642..aada474e0 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -3582,6 +3582,9 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
+ 			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		}
+ 	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
++#ifdef ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER
++	case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
++#endif
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 	}
+ 	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 9ed09ef158a113e21be7b3fefa7c5f932632749b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 May 2025 11:52:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 52/53] Ignore bad hostkeys in known_hosts file
+
+Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
+---
+ hostfile.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ hostfile.h |  1 +
+ ssh.c      |  2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
+index c5669c703..5c402f501 100644
+--- a/hostfile.c
++++ b/hostfile.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
+ #include "hmac.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ 
++static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
++
++void
++hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
++{
++	required_rsa_size = size;
++}
++
+ /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+ 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+ 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ 		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
++		    l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
+ 	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+ 	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
+index a24a4e329..0e9b1a19a 100644
+--- a/hostfile.h
++++ b/hostfile.h
+@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
+     const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+ 
+ void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
++void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index abc8b8439..33787a8d4 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
+ 	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+ 		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+ 
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
+
+RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
+associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
+name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
+to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
+may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
+issuance process.
+
+Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
+GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
+that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
+on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
+
+Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+---
+ configure.ac    |   1 +
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
+ sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
++		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
+ 
+ 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
+ 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
++ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
++ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
++ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
++ */
++
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
++{
++	int ret;
++	u_int i;
++
++	/* Check indicators */
++	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
++					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
++		/* negative or positive match */
++		if (ret != 0) {
++			*matched = i;
++			return ret;
++		}
++	}
++	/* No rule matched */
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+-	int retval;
++	int retval, matched;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	if (k5login_exists &&
+ 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
+ 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
+ 		name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
+-		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
+ 	} else
+ 		retval = 0;
+ 
++	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
++		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
++		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
++		retval = 0;
++		if (client->indicators) {
++			matched = -1;
++			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
++			if (retval != 0) {
++				retval = (retval == 1);
++				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
++					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
++					client->indicators[matched],
++					(char *)client->displayname.value,
++				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
++				goto cont;
++			}
++		}
++		if (retval == 0) {
++			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
++				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
++			(char *)client->displayname.value);
++		}
++	}
++cont:
++	if (retval == 1) {
++		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
++		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
++	}
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
++    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+ 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
++
++/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
++ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
++ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
++ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
++
++#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
++
++/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
++static OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
++	gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
++	size_t count, i;
++
++	ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++				      &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
++	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
++
++	if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
++		/* No indicators in the ticket */
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		count++;
++	}
++
++	if (count == 0) {
++		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
++		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		authenticated = 0;
++		complete = 0;
++		more = -1;
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		/* retrieve all indicators */
++		while (more != 0) {
++			value.value = NULL;
++			display_value.value = NULL;
++			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
++					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
++			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
++				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
++				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
++				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
++				count++;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++out:
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++	return (ctx->major);
++}
++
++
+ /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+  * be called once for a context */
+ 
+@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
++	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
++	    ctx->client, client))) {
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
++	size_t i;
+ 
+ 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
+ 
+@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
++
++			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
++				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
++				}
++				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
++			}
++
+ 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+ 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ 			return 0;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+-	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sGssIndicators:
++		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum, keyword);
++		if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
++			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
++	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   **allow_groups;
+ 	u_int num_deny_groups;
+ 	char   **deny_groups;
++	char   *gss_indicators;
+ 
+ 	u_int num_subsystems;
+ 	char   **subsystem_name;
+@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
++		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
++#include <gssapi_ext.h>
++#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
++#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ # ifndef HEIMDAL
+ #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
++	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
++mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
++authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
++.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
++When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
++will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
++indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
++.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
++policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
++access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
++rejected.
++.Pp
++By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
++indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
++to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
++preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
++authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
++(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
++indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
++inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
++.Pp
++Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
++particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
++FreeIPA environments:
++.Pp
++.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
++.It Cm hardened
++SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm pkinit
++smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm radius
++pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm otp
++TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
++.It Cm idp
++OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
++and device authorization grant flow
++.It Cm passkey
++FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
++.El
++.Pp
++The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ The default is handled system-wide by
+ .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

1000-openssh-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+From 24c411970682dc67873c36bac05b4b460d68a628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 13:43:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 50/50] openssh-6.7p1-coverity
+
+---
+ auth-krb5.c                   | 2 ++
+ gss-genr.c                    | 3 ++-
+ krl.c                         | 3 +++
+ loginrec.c                    | 2 ++
+ misc.c                        | 3 +++
+ monitor.c                     | 4 ++--
+ openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 2 +-
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c  | 8 ++++----
+ readconf.c                    | 1 +
+ servconf.c                    | 5 +++--
+ serverloop.c                  | 2 +-
+ ssh-agent.c                   | 1 +
+ ssh-keygen.c                  | 3 +++
+ 13 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index bae153c9..209a3265 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -434,6 +435,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environm
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index 3034370c..c357e973 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
++++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -168,8 +168,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index 0d0f6953..d8517f12 100644
+--- a/krl.c
++++ b/krl.c
+@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1212,6 +1213,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1223,6 +1225,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
+index c4a9bd48..2583612c 100644
+--- a/loginrec.c
++++ b/loginrec.c
+@@ -683,9 +683,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index 09722962..cd71c1b2 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -1556,6 +1556,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2749,6 +2751,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 19cb058e..58fbac9d 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+index 346c7fe5..f42792fd 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+index 26bdc3e0..8e2939b9 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index ea9d293c..9680c38c 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -2164,6 +2164,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 8b708cbf..e7e4ad04 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2293,8 +2293,9 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 9c5b1567..768ee9fa 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 798bf9b6..0e39dff7 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1593,6 +1593,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 792aafde..96b3474d 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -2424,6 +2424,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
++			freezero(blob, blen);
++			blob = NULL;
++			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+

gsi-openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#Type Name ID  GECOS                     Home directory        Shell
+u     sshd 74  "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd -

gsi-openssh.spec

@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@
 
 %global _hardened_build 1
 
-# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
-%global sshd_uid    74
-%global sshd_gid    74
-
 # Build position-independent executables (requires toolchain support)?
 %global pie 1
 
@@ -27,13 +23,12 @@
 # Do we want libedit support
 %global libedit 1
 
-%global openssh_ver 8.7p1
-%global openssh_rel 2
+%global openssh_ver 10.0p1
 
 Summary: An implementation of the SSH protocol with GSI authentication
 Name: gsi-openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
+Release: 4%{?dist}
 Provides: gsissh = %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes: gsissh < 5.8p2-2
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
@@ -48,138 +43,155 @@ Source11: gsisshd.service
 Source12: gsisshd-keygen@.service
 Source13: gsisshd-keygen
 Source15: gsisshd-keygen.target
+Source19: %{name}-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
+Source20: gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh
+Source21: gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
 Source99: README.sshd-and-gsisshd
 
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
-Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
-
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
-# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
-Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
-# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
-Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
-
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX)
-Patch400: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+Patch0001: 0001-openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
 #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634
-Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
-#?
-Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
-
+Patch0002: 0002-openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+Patch0003: 0003-openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644
-Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1893 (WONTFIX)
-Patch604: openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+Patch0004: 0004-openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
 #(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925
-Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
-#?
-Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+Patch0005: 0005-openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+Patch0006: 0006-openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789
-Patch609: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
-
-#?
-Patch700: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
-#?
-Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+Patch0007: 0007-openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+Patch0008: 0008-openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
 #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332
-Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+Patch0009: 0009-openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX)
-Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+Patch0010: 0010-openssh-8.7p1-redhat.patch
 # warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
-Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
-# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
-Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
-
+Patch0011: 0011-openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
 # GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
 # from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
-Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+# and
+# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
+# upstream MR:
+# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
+Patch0012: 0012-openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
 #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
-Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
-# CVE-2014-9278
-Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+Patch0013: 0013-openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
 # Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494)
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775
-Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+Patch0014: 0014-openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
 # Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
-Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
-
+Patch0015: 0015-openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
-Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+Patch0016: 0016-openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
 # Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650)
-Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+Patch0017: 0017-openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
 # privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580)
-Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+Patch0018: 0018-openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
 # log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681)
-Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+Patch0019: 0019-openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
 # scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223)
-Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+Patch0020: 0020-openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
+# CVE-2014-9278
+Patch0021: 0021-openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
 # apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521)
-Patch922: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+Patch0022: 0022-openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
 # Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055)
-Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+Patch0023: 0023-openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
 # make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom
-Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+Patch0024: 0024-openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
 # Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
-Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-# Help systemd to track the running service
-Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+Patch0025: 0025-openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
 # Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
-Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+Patch0026: 0026-openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
 # Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
-Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+Patch0027: 0027-openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
 # PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration)
 # https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11
 # git show > ~/devel/fedora/openssh/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
-Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+Patch0028: 0028-openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
 # Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
-Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+Patch0029: 0029-openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
-Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
-# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
-Patch963: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
+# clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
+Patch0030: 0030-openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
 # Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
-Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+Patch0031: 0031-openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 # sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
-Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+Patch0032: 0032-openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
-Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
-Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+Patch0033: 0033-openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
 # sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
-Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
-# Use SFTP protocol by default for scp command
-Patch976: openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
+Patch0034: 0034-openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
 # Implement kill switch for SCP protocol
-Patch977: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
-# CVE-2021-41617
-Patch978: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
+Patch0035: 0035-openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+# Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299
+# downstream only
+Patch0036: 0036-openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+# Downstream alias for MinRSABits
+Patch0037: 0037-openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+# downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix
+# From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14
+Patch0038: 0038-openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
+# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
+Patch0039: 0039-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
+Patch0040: 0040-openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
+Patch0041: 0041-openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+Patch0042: 0042-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+# Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage
+# upstream bug:
+# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455
+Patch0043: 0043-openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+# Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation
+# upstream MR:
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
+Patch0044: 0044-openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+Patch0045: 0045-openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
+Patch0046: 0046-openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+Patch0047: 0047-openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
+Patch0048: 0048-openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
+Patch0049: 0049-openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
+# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/02/22/1
+Patch0050: 0050-openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/564
+Patch0051: 0051-Provide-better-error-for-non-supported-private-keys.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/567
+Patch0052: 0052-Ignore-bad-hostkeys-in-known_hosts-file.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500
+Patch0053: 0053-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
+Patch1000: 1000-openssh-coverity.patch
 
-# Fix issue with read-only ssh buffer during gssapi key exchange (#1938224)
-# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/19
-Patch97: openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch
 # This is the patch that adds GSI support
 # Based on hpn_isshd-gsi.7.5p1b.patch from Globus upstream
-Patch98: openssh-8.7p1-gsissh.patch
+Patch2000: 2000-openssh-10.0p1-gsissh.patch
 
 # This is the HPN patch
-# Based on https://sourceforge.net/projects/hpnssh/files/Patches/HPN-SSH%2015v2%208.5p1/
-Patch99: openssh-8.7p1-hpn-15.2-modified.patch
+# Based on https://github.com/rapier1/hpn-ssh/ tag: hpn-18.7.0
+Patch2001: 2001-openssh-10.0p1-hpn-18.7.0.patch
 
-License: BSD
+License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
+Requires: openssl-libs >= 3.5.0
 
 BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl-interpreter, perl-generators, zlib-devel
 BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5
 BuildRequires: util-linux, groff
 BuildRequires: pam-devel
-BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 3.5.0
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
 BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 BuildRequires: gcc make
 BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
 BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
+BuildRequires: libxcrypt-devel
 Recommends: p11-kit
 
 %if %{kerberos5}
@@ -212,7 +224,11 @@ Summary: SSH client applications with GSI authentication
 Provides: gsissh-clients = %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes: gsissh-clients < 5.8p2-2
 Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
-Requires: crypto-policies >= 20200610-1
+Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
+
+%package keysign
+Summary: A helper program used for host-based authentication
+Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 
 %package server
 Summary: SSH server daemon with GSI authentication
@@ -221,8 +237,10 @@ Obsoletes: gsissh-server < 5.8p2-2
 Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/useradd
 Requires: pam >= 1.0.1-3
-Requires: crypto-policies >= 20200610-1
+Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
 %{?systemd_requires}
+Requires(pre): policycoreutils-python-utils
+Requires(postun): policycoreutils-python-utils
 
 %description
 SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
@@ -247,6 +265,11 @@ the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
 
 This version of OpenSSH has been modified to support GSI authentication.
 
+%description keysign
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. ssh-keysign is a
+helper program used for host-based authentication disabled by default.
+
 %description server
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
@@ -257,70 +280,11 @@ This version of OpenSSH has been modified to support GSI authentication.
 
 %prep
 gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
-%setup -q -n openssh-%{version}
-
-%patch400 -p1 -b .role-mls
-%patch404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux
-
-%patch502 -p1 -b .keycat
-
-%patch601 -p1 -b .ip-opts
-%patch604 -p1 -b .keyperm
-%patch606 -p1 -b .ipv6man
-%patch607 -p1 -b .sigpipe
-%patch609 -p1 -b .x11
-
-%patch702 -p1 -b .progress
-%patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info
-%patch707 -p1 -b .redhat
-%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
-%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
-
-%patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex
-%patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb
-%patch804 -p1 -b .ccache_name
-%patch805 -p1 -b .k5login
-
-%patch901 -p1 -b .kuserok
-%patch906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
-%patch916 -p1 -b .contexts
-%patch918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot
-%patch919 -p1 -b .scp
-%patch802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users
-%patch922 -p1 -b .sshdt
-%patch926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
-%patch939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
-%patch944 -p1 -b .x11max
-%patch948 -p1 -b .systemd
-%patch949 -p1 -b .refactor
-%patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
-%patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
-%patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
-%patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
-%patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
-%patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
-%patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
-%patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
-%patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
-%patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
-%patch976 -p1 -b .sftp-by-default
-%patch977 -p1 -b .kill-scp
-%patch978 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
-
-%patch200 -p1 -b .audit
-%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
-%patch700 -p1 -b .fips
-
-%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity
-
-%patch97 -p1 -b .sshbuf-ro
-%patch98 -p1 -b .gsi
-%patch99 -p1 -b .hpn
+%autosetup -T -b 0 -p1 -n openssh-%{version}
 
 sed 's/sshd.pid/gsisshd.pid/' -i pathnames.h
 sed 's!$(piddir)/sshd.pid!$(piddir)/gsisshd.pid!' -i Makefile.in
-sed 's!/etc/sysconfig/sshd!/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config
-sed 's!/etc/pam.d/sshd!/etc/pam.d/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config
+sed 's!/etc/pam.d/sshd!/etc/pam.d/gsisshd!' -i sshd_config_redhat
 
 cp -p %{SOURCE99} .
 
@@ -328,7 +292,6 @@ autoreconf
 
 %build
 %set_build_flags
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"; export CFLAGS
 %if %{pie}
 %ifarch s390 s390x sparc sparcv9 sparc64
 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
@@ -361,12 +324,11 @@ fi
 	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh \
 	--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh \
 	--datadir=%{_datadir}/gsissh \
-	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin \
-	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-default-path=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-superuser-path=%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin \
 	--with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \
 	--disable-strip \
 	--without-zlib-version-check \
-	--with-ssl-engine \
 	--with-ipaddr-display \
 	--with-pie=no \
 	--without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \
@@ -374,6 +336,7 @@ fi
 	--with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \
 	--with-security-key-builtin=yes \
 	--with-pam \
+	--with-pam-service=gsisshd \
 %if %{WITH_SELINUX}
 	--with-selinux --with-audit=linux \
 	--with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
@@ -410,8 +373,9 @@ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/
 install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh
 install -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/gsisshd
 install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
-install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
-install -m644 sshd_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+install -m644 sshd_config_redhat_cp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf
+install -m644 sshd_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
 install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}
 install -m644 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd@.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd.socket
@@ -420,37 +384,55 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen@.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen.target
 install -m755 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-keygen
 install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd
+install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE19} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysusersdir}/%{name}-server.conf
+# Migration service/script for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+install -m744 %{SOURCE20} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+# Pulled-in via a `Wants=` in `gsisshd.service` & `gsisshd@.service`
+install -m644 %{SOURCE21} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib
+touch $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
 
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-add
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-agent
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keycat
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-sk-helper
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
 rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
 
 for f in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/* \
+%if "%{_sbindir}" != "%{_bindir}"
 	 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/* \
+%endif
 	 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* ; do
     mv $f `dirname $f`/gsi`basename $f`
 done
 
+# Add scp and hpnscp symlinks in gsisshd's path
+mkdir $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin
+ln -nrs $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/gsiscp \
+	$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/scp
+ln -nrs $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/gsiscp \
+	$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/hpnscp
+
 perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
 
-%pre
-getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || :
-
 %pre server
-getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || :
-getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
-  useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \
-  -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /usr/share/empty.sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE19}
+semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222 2>/dev/null || :
 
 %post server
+if [ $1 -gt 1 ]; then
+    # In the case of an upgrade (never true on OSTree systems) run the migration
+    # script for Fedora 38 to remove group ownership for host keys.
+    %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+    # Prevent the systemd unit that performs the same service (useful for
+    # OSTree systems) from running.
+    touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+fi
 %systemd_post gsisshd.service gsisshd.socket
 
 %preun server
@@ -458,6 +440,9 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 
 %postun server
 %systemd_postun_with_restart gsisshd.service
+if [ $1 -eq 0 ]; then
+    semanage port -d -t ssh_port_t -p tcp 2222 2>/dev/null || :
+fi
 
 %files
 %license LICENCE
@@ -467,8 +452,6 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsissh-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsissh-keygen.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/gsissh
-%attr(2755,root,ssh_keys) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keysign
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-keysign.8*
 
 %files clients
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsissh
@@ -480,11 +463,22 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/gsissh_config.5*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gsisftp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-sk-helper
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/gsisftp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-sk-helper.8*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin
+%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/scp
+%{_libexecdir}/gsissh/bin/hpnscp
+
+%files keysign
+%attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsissh-keysign.8*
 
 %files server
 %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/gsisshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-session
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-auth
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/sshd-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/gsisshd_config.5*
@@ -493,6 +487,7 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/gsisftp-server.8*
 %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config
 %dir %attr(0700,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf
 %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/gsissh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
 %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/gsisshd
 %attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
@@ -501,8 +496,135 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd.socket
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen@.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsisshd-keygen.target
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/%{name}-server.conf
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
+%attr(0744,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+%ghost %attr(0644,root,root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Sep 01 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 10.0p1-4
+- Based on openssh-10.0p1-6.fc44
+
+* Mon Sep 01 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 10.0p1-3
+- Based on openssh-10.0p1-4.fc43
+
+* Thu Jul 24 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 10.0p1-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_43_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jun 16 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 10.0p1-1
+- Based on openssh-10.0p1-3.fc43
+
+* Sun Apr 20 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-6
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-15.fc43
+
+* Wed Mar 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-5
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-11.fc43
+
+* Wed Mar 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-4
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-9.fc42
+
+* Wed Feb 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-3
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-8.fc42
+
+* Wed Feb 05 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-7.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-2.fc41
+
+* Sat Feb 01 2025 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 9.9p1-1.1
+- Add explicit BR: libxcrypt-devel
+
+* Mon Jan 20 2025 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.9p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.9p1-5.fc42 / openssh-9.9p1-1.fc41
+
+* Fri Jan 17 2025 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.8p1-2.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_42_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Oct 02 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.8p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.8p1-4.fc42
+
+* Fri Sep 27 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.8p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.8p1-3.fc41.1
+
+* Thu Jul 18 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.6p1-3.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_41_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jul 12 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.6p1-3
+- Add scp and hpnscp symlinks in gsisshd's path
+
+* Sat Jul 06 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.6p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc41.13
+
+* Sat Jul 06 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.6p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.6p1-1.fc40.4
+
+* Wed Jan 24 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.3p1-7.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Jan 20 2024 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-7
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40.1
+
+* Sat Jan 20 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.3p1-6.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Oct 24 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-6
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-13.fc40
+- Drop patch openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch (now included in
+  openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch)
+
+* Tue Oct 17 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-5
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-12.fc40
+
+* Tue Oct 17 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-4
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-9.fc39
+
+* Fri Aug 11 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-3
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-8.fc39
+
+* Sun Jul 23 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-5.fc39.1
+
+* Wed Jul 19 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.3p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.3p1-3.fc39
+- Fix keyex patch
+
+* Sun Apr 16 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-6
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-17.fc39
+
+* Wed Apr 12 2023 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 9.0p1-5.1
+- C99 compatiblity fixes
+
+* Sat Mar 11 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-5
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-12.fc38
+
+* Thu Jan 19 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 9.0p1-4.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jan 10 2023 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-4
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-9.fc38
+
+* Wed Nov 09 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-3
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-7.fc38
+
+* Tue Oct 04 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-2
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-5.fc38
+
+* Tue Aug 30 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 9.0p1-1
+- Based on openssh-9.0p1-3.fc38
+
+* Tue Aug 30 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.8p1-3
+- Based on openssh-8.8p1-6.fc37
+
+* Thu Jul 21 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 8.8p1-2.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sun May 08 2022 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.8p1-2
+- Based on openssh-8.8p1-2.fc37
+
+* Thu Jan 20 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 8.8p1-1.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Dec 01 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.8p1-1
+- Based on openssh-8.8p1-1.fc36
+
 * Sun Oct 24 2021 Mattias Ellert <mattias.ellert@physics.uu.se> - 8.7p1-2
 - Based on openssh-8.7p1-3.fc36
 

gsissh-host-keys-migration.service

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Update gsissh host key permissions
+Documentation=https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Before=gsisshd.service
+After=gsissh-keygen.target
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=-/usr/libexec/gsissh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+ExecStart=touch /var/lib/.gsissh-host-keys-migration
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=gsisshd.service

gsissh-host-keys-migration.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash
+set -eu -o pipefail
+# Detect existing non-conforming host keys and perform the permissions migration
+# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+#
+# Example output looks like:
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# gsisshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.
+#
+output="$(gsisshd -T 2>&1 || true)" # expected to fail
+while read line; do
+    if [[ $line =~ ^Permissions\ [0-9]+\ for\ \'(.*)\'\ are\ too\ open. ]]; then
+        keyfile=${BASH_REMATCH[1]}
+        echo $line
+        echo -e "\t-> changing permissions on $keyfile"
+        chmod --verbose g-r $keyfile
+        chown --verbose root:root $keyfile
+    fi
+done <<< "$output"

gsisshd-keygen

@@ -9,8 +9,14 @@ case $KEYTYPE in
 		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
 			exit 0
 		fi ;;
-	"rsa") ;; # always ok
-	"ecdsa") ;;
+	"rsa")
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_RSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_RSA_BITS"
+		fi ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa")
+		if [[ ! -z $SSH_ECDSA_BITS  ]]; then
+			SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS="-b $SSH_ECDSA_BITS"
+		fi ;;
 	*) # wrong argument
 		exit 12 ;;
 esac
@@ -25,13 +31,12 @@ fi
 rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
 
 # create new keys
-if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE $SSH_KEYGEN_OPTIONS -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
 	exit 1
 fi
 
 # sanitize permissions
-/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY
-/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 600 $KEY
 /usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
 if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
 	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}

gsisshd-keygen@.service

@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/gsissh/ssh_host_%i_key
 
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=/usr/libexec/gsissh/sshd-keygen %i
 

gsisshd.service

@@ -3,9 +3,15 @@ Description=gsissh server daemon
 Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
 After=network.target gsisshd-keygen.target
 Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=notify
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/gsisshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID

gsisshd.sysconfig

@@ -5,3 +5,7 @@
 # example using  systemctl enable gsisshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
 # of DSA key or  systemctl mask gsisshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
 # creation.
+
+#SSH_RSA_BITS=3072
+#SSH_ECDSA_BITS=256
+OPTIONS=""

gsisshd@.service

@@ -3,8 +3,16 @@ Description=gsissh per-connection server daemon
 Documentation=man:gsisshd(8) man:gsisshd_config(5)
 Wants=gsisshd-keygen.target
 After=gsisshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=gsissh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
+# Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
+# when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
+Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/gsisshd
 ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/gsisshd -i $OPTIONS -o "AuthorizedKeysFile ${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all .ssh/authorized_keys"
 StandardInput=socket
+ImportCredential=ssh.ephemeral-authorized_keys-all

openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
---- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
- 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-+
- 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- 

openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
- 
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
- {
--	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
- 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- };
- 
-@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
- {
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 	size_t n = 0;
--	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
-+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
- 
- 	if (len == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- 		return (0);
- 
--	while ((len--) > 0) {
-+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
-+		u_int r,a,b;
-+
- 		if (n == 0) {
--			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
--			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			int outl, i, buflen;
-+
-+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+
-+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+
-+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
-+				ctrbuf, buflen);
- 		}
--		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
--		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
-+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
-+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
-+		r = a ^ b;
-+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
-+		src += sizeof(a);
-+		dest += sizeof(r);
-+
-+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
- 	}
-+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
- 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- 	}
--	if (key != NULL)
--		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
--		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
-+			case 128:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 192:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 256:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
-+		}
-+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
-+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
-+	}
- 	if (iv != NULL)
- 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- 	return (1);
-@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
- 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
- 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
--			addargs(&alist, "-n");
-+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
-+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
-+			else
-+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
- 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
- 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);

openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
---- a/scp.c	
-+++ a/scp.c	
-@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- 			free(vect[0]);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
-+			errno = ENOTDIR;
-+			goto bad;
-+		}
- 		omode = mode;
- 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
--- 

openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
-+		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+			struct group *gr;
-+
-+			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
-+				/* The only additional bit is read
-+				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
-+				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
-+					return 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3_f("done");
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
-+		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
- 
--	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
- 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
-@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
-			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
-			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
-			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (in_chroot == 0)
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		fprintf(stderr,
- 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		setexeccon(NULL);
--#endif
- #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
- 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
- 		    (char *)NULL);
-@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
--#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
-@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Demote the child */
- 	if (privsep_chroot) {
- 		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
- #endif

openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,571 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
- 	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
-+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
-+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
- 	    n) == -1) {
-@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
- 	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
-+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
-+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (sa != NULL) {
--		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
-+		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
-+			freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 			return -1;
-+		}
- 		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
- 		umask(old_umask);
- 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
- 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 
-@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
- 			close(tmpfd);
-+			free(ccname);
- 			return oerrno;
- 		}
- 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
- 		return r;
- 	}
- 	/* success */
-+	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
-@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
- 		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
- 		    c->self, strerror(err));
- 		/* Try next address, if any */
--		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
-+		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
- 			close(c->sock);
- 			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
- 			channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
-@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ int
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
- {
- 	int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
--	char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
-+	char *host_to_connect = NULL, *listen_host = NULL, *listen_path = NULL;
- 	int port_to_connect, listen_port;
- 
- 	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
-@@ -3832,7 +3832,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
- 	success = 1;
- 	if (success) {
- 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
--		host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
- 		port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
- 		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
- 			host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
-@@ -3853,6 +3852,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
- 		    host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
- 		    listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
- 	}
-+	free(host_to_connect);
-+	free(listen_host);
-+	free(listen_path);
- 	return idx;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/compat.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.768968062 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/compat.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -191,10 +191,12 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, cha
- 		return p;
- 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
-		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
-			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
-			freerrset(fingerprints);
-+				free(dnskey_digest);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
-@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
- 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
- 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
--
-+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
- 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+#pragma pop
- 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.711967665 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -98,8 +98,10 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	default:
- 		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
- 	}
--	if (r != 0)
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
- 		return r;
-+	}
- 
- 	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
- 	sshkey_free(key);
- 	sshbuf_free(copy);
- 	sshbuf_free(sect);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
- 		return r;
- 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
- 	free(rb.blob);
-+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
- 	if (erb != NULL) {
- 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
-@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
- 	 */
- 
- 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
- # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
- 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
- # endif
-@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 
- 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
- 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
- 
-@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
- 
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
- 
- 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
-@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
- 	}
- 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(nullfd);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- }
- 
- char *
-@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
- 	}
- 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- 		close(devnull);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
-@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
- 	else
- 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
- 		    strerror(errno));
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- }
- 
- static unsigned long
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
-@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
- 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- 
- 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
--
-+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
- 	return (0);
- 
-  error:
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
-@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
- static void
- pselect_notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2_f("reading");
- 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
-@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
- 			} else if (r != 0) {
- 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
- 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
-+				free(arg2);
- 				goto out;
- 			}
- 			free(arg2);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
-@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
-@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		debug_f("invalid tun");
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
- 	/* Environment specified by admin */
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
- 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
- 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
- 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
- 		}
- 		*value++ = '\0';
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
-+		free(cp);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- 	pid = sshpid;
- 	if (pid > 1) {
- 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-@@ -762,6 +762,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
-+		free(abs_dst);
-+		abs_dst = NULL;
- 	}
- 
- out:
-@@ -985,6 +987,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
- 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
- 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
- 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
-+				free(fname);
- 				continue;
- 			}
- 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
- 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
- 	}
- 	free(rks);
-+	free(device);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
- 
- 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
- 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
-+			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
- 			return NULL;
- 		}
- 		/* validate also provider from URI */
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
- 		close(muxserver_sock);
- 		muxserver_sock = -1;
- 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
-+		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
- 		muxclient(options.control_path);
- 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
- 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
-@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
--		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -2474,7 +2479,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- 		    options.rekey_interval);
--
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE]*/
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
- 
-@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (newstr)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
--	else
-+	else {
- 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+		free(gss);
-+	     }
-+	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
- 	}
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
-@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
- 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
- 			if (r != 0)
- 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
-+			freezero(blob, blen);
-+			blob = NULL;
-+			blen = 0;
- 		} else {
- 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
- 				cp += 4;
-@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
- 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
-+			free(checkpoint);
- 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
- 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
-@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+	free(checkpoint);
-+	if (in != stdin)
-+		fclose(in);
- }
- 
- static char *
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
-@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
- 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
-+			ctx = NULL;
- 			errno = oerrno;
- 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- 			goto out;

openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
---- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
-+++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
-@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
--	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
- 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);

openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);

openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
-and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
-implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
-crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
-this is only need on s390 architecture.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
- #endif
-@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
--- 
-1.9.1
-
-getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
-crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
-Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
--- 1.9.1
-1.9.1
-diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
-@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_gettid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-

openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,454 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.994577324 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-04-19 16:58:47.750263410 +0200
-@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
- 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
- 	struct dhgroup dhg;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
-+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
-+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
- 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
- 	return 8192;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
-+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
-+ */
-+int
-+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
-+{
-+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
-+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
-+	DH *known = NULL;
-+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
-+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-+
-+	if (bits <= 3072) {
-+		known = dh_new_group14();
-+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
-+		known = dh_new_group16();
-+	} else {
-+		known = dh_new_group18();
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
-+
-+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
-+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
-+		rv = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_free(known);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-04-19 16:59:31.951616078 +0200
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
- 
- int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.058577815 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
--			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
- 
- 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,20 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
- 	"ssh-rsa"
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256," \
-+	"ssh-rsa"
-+
- #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
- 
- #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
-+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+
- /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
- #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.999577362 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.034577631 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_open
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socket
-+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.027577577 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
- 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
- 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.055577792 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
--		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
--		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
--		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
--		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
--		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
--			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
--			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
--			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
--			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				free(gss_host);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					free(gss_host);
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
- 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- 			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
- 
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.060577831 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:57:45.827769340 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #include <grp.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- 		orig = NULL;
- 
--	if (options.gss_keyex)
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
--	else
--		gss = NULL;
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.061577838 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.067577885 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
- #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- #include "ssh-sk.h"
- 
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	}
- 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
- 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.068577892 +0200
-@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));

openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
-@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
-+
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
-+# problems.
- #UsePAM no
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes

openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol	2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
-@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
- 		lnum++;
- 		cp = line;
--		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
-+		cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
- 		/* Trim leading space and comments */
- 		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
- 		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch

@@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
-From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
-
----
- digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
- digest.h         |   6 ++
- ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
- ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
- ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
- sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
- sshkey.h         |   4 +
- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
-index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
---- a/digest-openssl.c
-+++ b/digest-openssl.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-+const EVP_MD *
-+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static const struct ssh_digest *
- ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
- {
-diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
-index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
---- a/digest.h
-+++ b/digest.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
-index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
---- a/ssh-dss.c
-+++ b/ssh-dss.c
-@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
- ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
--	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-+	size_t rlen, slen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const u_char *psig = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
-+	    data, datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	free(sigb);
-+	sigb = NULL;
- 
- 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
- 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
--	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
-+	size_t len, slen;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
-@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	/* sha1 the data */
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
--
--	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-+	    sigb, slen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
---- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
- ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const unsigned char *psig;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- 	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t len, dlen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--
- 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t dlen;
-+	int hash_alg, len;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
-+		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
--static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
-+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
- 
- static const char *
- rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
-@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
--static int
--rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
--{
--	switch (type) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		return NID_sha1;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		return NID_sha256;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		return NID_sha512;
--	default:
--		return -1;
--	}
--}
--
- int
- ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
- {
-@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
- ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
--	size_t slen = 0;
--	u_int dlen, len;
--	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int len, slen = 0;
-+	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- 	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
-+
- 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
--		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
--	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--
--	/* hash the data */
--	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto out;
--	}
- 	if (len < slen) {
- 		size_t diff = slen - len;
- 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* encode signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- 	freezero(sig, slen);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	char *sigtype = NULL;
- 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
-+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
- 
-@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
--	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
--	    key->rsa);
-  out:
- 	freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * See:
-- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
-- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
-- */
--
--/*
-- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
--	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
--	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
--	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
--	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(1) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
--	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(3) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
--	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
--};
--
- static int
--rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
-+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
--	switch (hash_alg) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		*oidp = id_sha1;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		*oidp = id_sha256;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		*oidp = id_sha512;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
--		break;
--	default:
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	}
--	return 0;
--}
-+	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	const RSA *rsa;
-+	int ret;
- 
--static int
--openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
--    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
--{
--	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
--	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
--	const u_char *oid = NULL;
--	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
--
--	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
--		return ret;
--	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
--	if (hashlen != hlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--		goto done;
--	}
-+	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
--	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
--	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
--	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
-+	    sigbuf, siglen);
-+
- done:
--	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
- 	return ret;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
- }
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen, len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
-
-    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 		HMAC_CTX_init \
- 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
- 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
- 	])
- 
- 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+static const EVP_MD *
-+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-+{
-+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *key = NULL;
-+	int r, key_len;
-+
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
-+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
-+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
-+#endif
-+	*keyp = key;
-+	key = NULL;
-+	r = 0;
-+
-+out:
-+	free (key);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else
- static int
- derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- 	return r;
- }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
- 
- #define NKEYS	6
- int
-

openssh-8.0p1-sshbuf-readonly.patch

@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From 063e1a255b53abde1147522f9aceccfd2a7ceb9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 19:45:25 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Unbreak gsi-openssh by not holding the sshbuf structures
- originated from incoming packet buffer
-
-Keeping buffers from sshpkt_getb_froms() for breaks further packet
-processing because the "derived" buffer keeps a "link" to te parent
-buffer, which is then considered readonly.
-
-This addresses the visible issue in the kexgss_server(), which
-demonstrated with GSI (requiring more round trips than GSSAPI
-with kerberos).
-
-The additional two places in the client were never hit, because the host
-keys are never sent as part of the gssapi key exchange but in case we
-would have different server or we would start sending hostkeys as the
-code is ready for that, we would hit it anyway.
-
-Fixes #18
----
- kexgssc.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
- kexgsss.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
-index 1c62740e..29b8b031 100644
---- a/kexgssc.c
-+++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -162,11 +162,16 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			do {
- 				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
- 				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
- 					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
- 					if (server_host_key_blob)
- 						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
--					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
- 						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
- 				}
- 			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
- 
-@@ -453,11 +458,16 @@ kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			do {
- 				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
- 				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
- 					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
- 					if (server_host_key_blob)
- 						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
--					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
- 						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
- 				}
- 			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
- 
-diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
-index a2c02148..c8b7d652 100644
---- a/kexgsss.c
-+++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	 */
- 
- 	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
--	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
- 	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- 	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
- 	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
- 		switch(type) {
- 		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
--			if (client_pubkey != NULL)
-+			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
- 				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
- 			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
- 			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-@@ -135,6 +135,31 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 				goto out;
- 
- 			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+
-+			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
-+			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
-+			* buffer state->incoming_packet
-+			*/
-+			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+			    kex->hash_alg,
-+			    kex->client_version,
-+			    kex->server_version,
-+			    kex->peer,
-+			    kex->my,
-+			    empty,
-+			    client_pubkey,
-+			    server_pubkey,
-+			    shared_secret,
-+			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+				goto out;
-+
-+			gssbuf.value = hash;
-+			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+			client_pubkey = NULL;
-+
- 			break;
- 		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
- 			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-@@ -156,7 +181,7 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
- 			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
- 
--		if (client_pubkey == NULL)
-+		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
- 			fatal("No client public key");
- 
- 		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-@@ -185,23 +210,6 @@ kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
- 		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
- 
--	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
--	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
--	    kex->hash_alg,
--	    kex->client_version,
--	    kex->server_version,
--	    kex->peer,
--	    kex->my,
--	    empty,
--	    client_pubkey,
--	    server_pubkey,
--	    shared_secret,
--	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
--		goto out;
--
--	gssbuf.value = hash;
--	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
--
- 	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
- 		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
- 

openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index 68aac04b..a96e95ad 100644
---- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
- .\"
- .\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
- .\"
--.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $
-+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.101 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $
- .\"
--.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
-+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 8 2021 $
- .Dt SCP 1
- .Os
- .Sh NAME
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
- .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
- .Sh SYNOPSIS
- .Nm scp
--.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
-+.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrTv
- .Op Fl c Ar cipher
- .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
- .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
-@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ It uses
- .Xr ssh 1
- for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
- same security as a login session.
--The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
--.Xr glob 3
--pattern matching.
- .Pp
- .Nm
- will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
-@@ -79,7 +76,9 @@ The options are as follows:
- Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
- Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
- hosts.
--Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option
-+Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (via the
-+.Fl O
-+flag), this option
- selects batch mode for the second host as
- .Nm
- cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
-@@ -146,9 +145,10 @@ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
- .It Fl O
- Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
- Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
--not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
--wildcard patterns.
--This mode is the default.
-+not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
-+wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
-+.Sq ~
-+prefix for older SFTP servers.
- .It Fl o Ar ssh_option
- Can be used to pass options to
- .Nm ssh
-@@ -258,16 +258,6 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
- The program must understand
- .Xr ssh 1
- options.
--.It Fl s
--Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol.
--Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides
--more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol
--relied on the remote shell for expanding
--.Xr glob 3
--wildcards.
--.Pp
--A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default.
--This option will be deleted before the end of 2022.
- .It Fl T
- Disable strict filename checking.
- By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
-@@ -299,11 +289,23 @@ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
- .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
- .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
-+.Sh CAVEATS
-+The original scp protocol (selected by the
-+.Fl O
-+flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
-+.Xr glob 3
-+pattern matching.
-+This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
-+the remote shell, such as quote characters.
- .Sh HISTORY
- .Nm
- is based on the rcp program in
- .Bx
- source code from the Regents of the University of California.
-+.Pp
-+Since OpenSSH 8.8 (8.7 in Red Hat/Fedora builds),
-+.Nm
-+has use the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
- .Sh AUTHORS
- .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
- .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index e039350c..c7cf7529 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.233 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
-  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
-@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	const char *errstr;
- 	extern char *optarg;
- 	extern int optind;
--	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
-+	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
- 	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
- 
- 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
-@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ void
- usage(void)
- {
- 	(void) fprintf(stderr,
--	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
-+	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
- 	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
- 	    "           [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
- 	exit(1);

openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.169 2021/08/09 23:47:44 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.170 2021/09/26 14:01:03 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
-  * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
-@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
- # include <paths.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
- #include <net/if.h>
-@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
- 		}
- 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- 
-+		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
-+		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
-+			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
-+			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
- 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
- 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- 			    strerror(errno));

sources

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz) = 08c81024d9e1248abfda6cc874886ff5ae916669b93cd6aff640e0614ee8cbcbc3fe87a9ce47136b6443ddbb1168b114367c74e117551905994e1a7e3fa2c0c2
-SHA512 (openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc) = 08b4bda855ca3ef202c271f1c0e3486082b93d1009a794d020e7ba223978bc87bf34b1fbccaae3379a47639bd849935fdaaf63bdb781d0a44625066ccf00fbfc
+SHA512 (openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz) = 2daa1fcf95793b23810142077e68ddfabdf3732b207ef4f033a027f72d733d0e9bcdb6f757e7f3a5934b972de05bfaae3baae381cfc7a400cd8ab4d4e277a0ed
+SHA512 (openssh-10.0p1.tar.gz.asc) = 6ab9deb4233ff159e55a18c9fc07d5ff8a41723dad74aa3d803e1476b585f5662aba34f8a7a1f5fe1d248f3ff3cd663f2c2fb8e399c6a4723b6215b0eb423d13
 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21