CVE-2025-32728: Fix logic error in DisableForwarding option

Resolves: rhbz#2358778 Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>
Fixes for CVE-2025-26465, CVE-2025-26466
2025-05-19 10:25:55 +02:00 · 2025-02-18 15:21:47 +01:00 · 2025-01-27 14:05:53 +01:00 · 2025-01-17 12:49:45 +01:00 · 2024-10-16 15:43:14 +02:00 · 2024-10-15 16:40:22 +02:00
27 changed files with 3254 additions and 5454 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -62,3 +62,5 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc
 /openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc
 /openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
 	}
 	return;
 #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
 }
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -73,22 +73,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
 # endif
@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
 +	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
 +	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
 --- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 	kexgssc.o \
 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
 -	sshbuf-io.o
@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
 #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "version.h"
-@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+@@ -260,8 +261,44 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
 struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
@ -2064,6 +2064,42 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
 -void demote_sensitive_data(void);
 +void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
 +void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
 +
 +static int
 +sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
 +{
 +      switch (k->type) {
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
 +      case KEY_RSA: {
 +              const BIGNUM *d;
 +              const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey);
 +              RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
 +              return d != NULL;
 +          }
 +      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
 +      case KEY_DSA: {
 +              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
 +              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
 +              return priv_key != NULL;
 +          }
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 +      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
 +      case KEY_ECDSA: {
 +              const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(k->pkey);
 +              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdsa) != NULL;
 +              }
 +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 +      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
 +      case KEY_ED25519:
 +              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
 +      default:
 +              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
 +              return 0;
 +      }
 +}
 +
 static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
 /*
@ -2222,7 +2258,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
 	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
@@ -2525,7 +2593,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
-		_exit(EXIT_AUTH_ATTEMPTED);
+ 	}
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
 -	if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor())
@ -2231,57 +2267,4 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
 +	    mm_is_monitor())
 		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
 #endif
- 	_exit(i);
+ 	/* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
 }
 int
 +sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
 +{
 +      switch (k->type) {
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
 +      case KEY_RSA: {
 +              const BIGNUM *d;
 +              RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
 +              return d != NULL;
 +          }
 +      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
 +      case KEY_DSA: {
 +              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
 +              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
 +              return priv_key != NULL;
 +          }
 +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 +      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
 +      case KEY_ECDSA:
 +              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
 +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 +      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
 +      case KEY_ED25519:
 +              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
 +      default:
 +              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
 +              return 0;
 +      }
 +}
 +
 +int
 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
 {
 	if (k == NULL)
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int		 sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke
 int		 sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
 int	 sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
 +int	 sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
 int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
 int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
 int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -427,9 +427,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
@ -544,13 +544,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
 -		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
 +		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
 	else {
- 		switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
+ 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
 #ifdef WITH_DSA
@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 			first = 1;
 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
 +
 +		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
 +		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
 +
 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
 		fflush(stdout);
-		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
@ -572,31 +572,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
 -		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
 +		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
- 	type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
+ 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
 diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
 --- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
 		goto out;
-
+ 	}
-	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
 +		if (FIPS_mode())
 +			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
+--- openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx	2024-10-09 10:35:56.285946080 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c	2024-10-09 10:41:52.792597194 +0200
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "kex.h"
-@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@ -624,11 +624,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
 +		}
 		break;
 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
 -		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
 +		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
+@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@ -649,11 +658,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
 +		        &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
 -		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
 -		    &shared_secret);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
 +		        &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
+@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@ -676,6 +696,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
 +		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
 -		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
 -		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
 +		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	default:
@ -713,3 +744,23 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kex.c
 --- openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx	2024-10-11 12:44:08.087426597 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.9p1/kex.c	2024-10-11 14:00:10.404714521 +0200
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
 # include <openssl/kdf.h>
 # include <openssl/param_build.h>
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh
 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
 -		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 +	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 +.Pp
 Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
 their preference order.
- The selected algorithm will the the first algorithm in this list that
+ The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
-@@ -1338,28 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
+@@ -1338,29 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
 .Pp
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 -.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
-sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -mlkem768x25519-sha256,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@ -517,13 +518,14 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 .Pp
 The supported algorithms are:
 .Pp
-@@ -1075,16 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+@@ -1075,17 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
-sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -mlkem768x25519-sha256,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c
 diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100
-@@ -1549,10 +1549,72 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, cha
+@@ -1549,10 +1549,74 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, cha
 	idtab->nentries++;
 }
@ -978,6 +978,8 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c
 +	if (provider == NULL)
 +		return NULL;
 +
 +	memset(canonical_provider, 0, sizeof(canonical_provider));
 +
 +	if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
 +	    strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
 +	    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
@ -1351,9 +1353,17 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-c
 		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
 			/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
 			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.xxx	2024-10-09 11:56:35.890126144 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2024-01-12 14:28:09.170975480 +0100
+++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2024-10-09 11:56:48.528459585 +0200
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
 #include "pkcs11.h"
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
 	int			logged_in;
 };
@ -1554,7 +1564,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 }
 static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
-@@ -195,6 +286,56 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
+@@ -195,6 +286,60 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
 static int ec_key_idx = 0;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
@ -1571,13 +1581,17 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +
 +	/* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */
 +	switch (key->type) {
-+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_RSA: {
-+		k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(key->rsa, rsa_idx);
+               const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key->pkey);
 +		k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx);
 +		break;
 +		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
-+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+	case KEY_ECDSA: {
-+		k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, ec_key_idx);
+               const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key->pkey);
 +		k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx);
 +		break;
 +		}
 +#endif
 +	default:
 +		error("Unknown key type %d", key->type);
@ -1731,9 +1745,9 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
 +	}
 +
- 	RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
+ 	if (RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method) != 1)
- 	RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
+ 		fatal_f("RSA_set_method failed");
- 	return (0);
+ 	if (RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11) != 1)
@@ -532,8 +683,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,
 		return (NULL);
 	}
@ -1764,9 +1778,9 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
 +	}
 +
- 	EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
+ 	if (EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method) != 1)
- 	EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
+ 		fatal_f("EC_KEY_set_method failed");
- 
+ 	if (EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11) != 1)
@@ -622,7 +779,8 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
 }
 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
@ -1893,7 +1907,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
@@ -810,7 +970,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 	ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+ 	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
 fail:
 -	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
@ -1977,7 +1991,7 @@ diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
@@ -905,7 +1067,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 	rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+ 	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
 fail:
 -	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch
@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
 diff --color -ruNp a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
 --- a/audit-linux.c	2024-05-09 12:38:08.843017319 +0200
 +++ b/audit-linux.c	2024-05-09 12:47:05.162267634 +0200
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
 const char *audit_username(void);
 static void
 -linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
 +linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
 {
 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
 	}
 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
 -	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
 +	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
 	saved_errno = errno;
 	close(audit_fd);
@@ -181,9 +181,11 @@ audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const
 {
 	if (!user_login_count++)
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
 	return 0;
@@ -193,10 +195,12 @@ void
 audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
 {
 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 }
@@ -211,19 +215,27 @@ void
 audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 	if (!user_login_count++)
 -		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 -	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
 }
 void
 audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 -	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
 -		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 }
@@ -236,6 +248,7 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
 +			options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 		break;
 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
@@ -254,9 +267,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 		if (user_login_count) {
 			while (user_login_count--)
 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +				    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +			    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 		}
@@ -265,6 +280,7 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
 +			options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 		break;
 	default:
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@ -94,47 +94,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
 	sshbuf_reset(m);
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh	2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
 cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
 cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
 -PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
 +#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
 +PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
 EXTRA_TYPES=""
 rsa=""
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
 tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
 -REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
 +#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
 +REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
 # File based tests
 file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
 	fi
 }
 -SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
 -SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
 +#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
 +SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
 +SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
 for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
 	# generate user key
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
--- a/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
@ -52,9 +52,27 @@ diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.h
 void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
 void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
 void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
-diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
+--- openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c.xxx	2024-10-15 11:49:48.092151974 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c	2022-10-24 15:21:58.165303951 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/audit-linux.c	2024-10-15 12:08:17.179158343 +0200
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
 const char *audit_username(void);
 static void
 -linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
 +linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
 {
 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
 	}
 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
 -	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
 +	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
 	saved_errno = errno;
 	close(audit_fd);
@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
 }
@ -117,3 +135,112 @@ diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c
 out:
 	saved_errno = errno;
 	audit_close(audit_fd);
@@ -179,26 +211,34 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
 int
 audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
 {
 +	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
 	if (!user_login_count++)
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +		    audit_hostname,
 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +	    audit_hostname,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
 +	free(audit_hostname);
 	return 0;
 }
 void
 audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
 {
 +	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +	    audit_hostname,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +		    audit_hostname,
 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 +	free(audit_hostname);
 }
 void
@@ -211,31 +251,41 @@ void
 audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 	if (!user_login_count++)
 -		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 -	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
 }
 void
 audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 -	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
 -		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 }
 void
 audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
 {
 +	char * audit_hostname = options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL;
 +
 	switch(event) {
 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
 -		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
 +		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), audit_hostname,
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 		break;
 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
@@ -255,9 +305,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 		if (user_login_count) {
 			while (user_login_count--)
 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +				    audit_hostname,
 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +			    audit_hostname,
 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 		}
@@ -266,12 +318,14 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
 +			audit_hostname,
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 		break;
 	default:
 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
 		break;
 	}
 +	free(audit_hostname);
 }
 void
--- a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
 diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
 --- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
 +++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 +#include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/err.h>
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "digest.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 +#include "log.h"
 static int
 kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
 +static EC_KEY *
 +generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
 +{
 +	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +	const char *group_name;
 +
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
 +	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
 +		goto out;
 +	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
 +	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
 +	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
 +	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
 +		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
 +	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
 +		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +out:
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +	return client_key;
 +}
 +
 int
 kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
 {
@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
 	int r;
 -	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 -		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 -		goto out;
 -	}
 -	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
 +	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
 	*server_blobp = NULL;
 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
 -	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 -		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 -		goto out;
 -	}
 -	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
 +	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
 {
 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
 -	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
 -	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
 -	size_t klen = 0;
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
 +	size_t klen = 0, publen;
 +	const char *group_name;
 	int r;
 +	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
 +	if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
 +		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
 	}
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 -	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
 +
 +	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
 +	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
 +		goto out;
 +	sshbuf_reset(buf);
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
 +	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
 +	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
 +	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
 +	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
 +	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
 +	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
 +		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
 +	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
 +		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	sshbuf_reset(buf);
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
 -	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
 +	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
 #endif
 -	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
 -		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	ctx = NULL;
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
 +		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
 -	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
 -	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 +	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
 -	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
 +	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
 #endif
 +	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	*shared_secretp = buf;
 	buf = NULL;
  out:
 -	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
 +	freezero(pub, publen);
 	sshbuf_free(buf);
 	return r;
 }
--- a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c
 --- openssh-9.0p1/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.731868327 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
-@@ -1623,3 +1623,47 @@
+@@ -1623,3 +1623,142 @@
 	return r;
 }
@ -137,6 +137,101 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 + * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
 + * The private key can be omitted.
 + */
 +EVP_PKEY *
 +sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
 +{
 +  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
 +  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
 +  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
 +  		return NULL;
 +  	}
 +  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
 +  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
 +  		return NULL;
 +  	}
 +  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
 +  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
 +  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
 +  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +  		return NULL;
 +  	}
 +  	return ret;
 +}
 +
 +int
 +kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
 +{
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
 +  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
 +  	const char *group_name;
 +  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
 +  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
 +  	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	if (k == NULL)
 +    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
 +      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
 +      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
 +    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +    		goto out;
 +  	}
 +
 +	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
 +     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
 +                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
 +                group_name,
 +                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
 +    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +    		goto out;
 +	}
 +  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
 +    		const EC_GROUP *group;
 +    		size_t len;
 +
 +		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
 +		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
 +		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
 +		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
 +			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +			goto out;
 +		}
 +		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
 +		    pub,
 +		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
 +		    pub_ser,
 +		    len,
 +		    bn_ctx);
 +		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
 +		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
 +		    pub_ser,
 +		    len) != 1) {
 +			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +			goto out;
 +		}
 +	}
 +  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
 +	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
 +               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +  	}
 +  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
 +    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +    		goto out;
 +  	}
 +
 +out:
 +  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
 +  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 +  	free(pub_ser);
 +  	return ret;
 +}
 +
 +int
 +kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
 +    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
@ -281,12 +376,220 @@ diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 #  include <openssl/ec.h>
 # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-@@ -283,6 +286,8 @@
+@@ -283,6 +286,9@@
     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
 +int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
 +    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
 +int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
 #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
 void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
 diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
 --- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
 +++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 +#include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/err.h>
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "digest.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 +#include "log.h"
 static int
 kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
 +static EC_KEY *
 +generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
 +{
 +	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +	const char *group_name;
 +
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
 +	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
 +		goto out;
 +	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
 +	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
 +	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
 +	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
 +		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
 +	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
 +		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +out:
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +	return client_key;
 +}
 +
 int
 kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
 {
@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
 	int r;
 -	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 -		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 -		goto out;
 -	}
 -	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
 +	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
 	*server_blobp = NULL;
 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
 -	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 -		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 -		goto out;
 -	}
 -	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
 +	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
 {
 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
 -	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
 -	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
 -	size_t klen = 0;
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
 +	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
 +	size_t klen = 0, publen;
 +	const char *group_name;
 	int r;
 +	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
 +	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
 +		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
 	}
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 -	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
 +
 +	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
 +	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
 +		goto out;
 +	sshbuf_reset(buf);
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
 +	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
 +	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
 +	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
 +	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
 +	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
 +	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
 +		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
 +	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
 +		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	sshbuf_reset(buf);
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
 -	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
 +	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
 #endif
 -	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
 -		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	ctx = NULL;
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
 +		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
 -	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
 -	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 +	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
 -	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
 +	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
 #endif
 +	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	*shared_secretp = buf;
 	buf = NULL;
  out:
 -	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
 +	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
 +	freezero(pub, publen);
 	sshbuf_free(buf);
 	return r;
 }
--- a/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
--- a/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
 --- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
 +++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
 /*
  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
 - * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
 - * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
 - * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
 - * within a patch series.
 + * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
 + * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
 + * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
 + * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
  */
 int
@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
 	if (headerver == libver)
 		return 1;
 -	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
 -	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
 -		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
 +	/*
 +	 * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
 +	 */
 +	if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
 +		mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
 		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
 	}
 	/*
 -	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
 -	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
 +	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
 +	 * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
 	 */
 	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
--- a/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
 index 618bb198..8ea831f4 100644
 diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve	2023-07-21 15:38:13.237276580 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2023-07-21 15:41:30.269943569 +0200
@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
 /* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
 static char *allowed_providers;
 +/*
 + * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to
 + * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-bind@openssh.com).
 + */
 +static int remote_add_provider;
 +
 /* locking */
 #define LOCK_SIZE	32
 #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
@@ -1228,6 +1234,12 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
 		if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
 			debug_f("internal provider");
 		} else {
 +			if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
 +				verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": "
 +				    "remote addition of providers is disabled",
 +				    sk_provider);
 +				goto out;
 +			}
 			if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
 				verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
 				    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
@@ -1368,7 +1380,7 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 static char *
 -sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
 +sanitize_pkcs11_provider(SocketEntry *e, const char *provider)
 {
 	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
 	char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */
@@ -1399,6 +1411,11 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
 		module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */
 	if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */
 +		if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
 +			verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of "
 +			    "providers is disabled", provider);
 +			return NULL;
 +		}
 		if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
 			verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
 			    module_path, strerror(errno));
@@ -1455,7 +1472,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
 		goto send;
 	}
 -	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
 +	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
 		goto send;
@@ -1516,7 +1533,7 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
 	}
 	free(pin);
 -	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
 +	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
 		goto send;
@@ -2108,7 +2125,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			break;
 		case 'O':
 			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
 -				restrict_websafe  = 0;
 +				restrict_websafe = 0;
 +			else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0)
 +				remote_add_provider = 1;
 			else
 				fatal("Unknown -O option");
 			break;
 diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
 index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
 --- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
 		goto fail;
 	}
 -	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
 -		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
 -		goto fail;
 -	}
 +	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
 +		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
 	p->module->handle = handle;
 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
 --- a/ssh-agent.1	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
 +++ b/ssh-agent.1	2023-07-19 21:39:17.981406432 +0200
@@ -107,9 +107,27 @@
 .It Fl O Ar option
 Specify an option when starting
 .Nm .
 -Currently only one option is supported:
 +Currently two options are supported:
 +.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
 +and
 .Cm no-restrict-websafe .
 -This instructs
 +.Pp
 +The
 +.Cm allow-remote-pkcs11
 +option allows clients of a forwarded
 +.Nm
 +to load PKCS#11 or FIDO provider libraries.
 +By default only local clients may perform this operation.
 +Note that signalling that a
 +.Nm
 +client remote is performed by
 +.Xr ssh 1 ,
 +and use of other tools to forward access to the agent socket may circumvent
 +this restriction.
 +.Pp
 +The
 +.Cm no-restrict-websafe ,
 +instructs
 .Nm
 to permit signatures using FIDO keys that might be web authentication
 requests.
--- a/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
--- a/openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch
--- a/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
 diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c
 --- a/session.c	2025-04-29 11:20:59.475107377 +0200
 +++ b/session.c	2025-04-29 11:23:16.638538968 +0200
@@ -2284,7 +2284,8 @@ session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh,
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
 	if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
 -	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
 +	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
 +	    options.disable_forwarding) {
 		debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2709,7 +2710,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Se
 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
 		return 0;
 	}
 -	if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
 +	if (!options.x11_forwarding || options.disable_forwarding) {
 		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
 		return 0;
 	}
--- a/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch
@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
 diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
 index afdf5142..1b4b55c5 100644
 --- a/misc.c
 +++ b/misc.c
@@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ rtrim(char *s)
 	}
 }
 +/*
 + * returns pointer to character after 'prefix' in 's' or otherwise NULL
 + * if the prefix is not present.
 + */
 +const char *
 +strprefix(const char *s, const char *prefix, int ignorecase)
 +{
 +	size_t prefixlen;
 +
 +	if ((prefixlen = strlen(prefix)) == 0)
 +		return s;
 +	if (ignorecase) {
 +		if (strncasecmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0)
 +			return NULL;
 +	} else {
 +		if (strncmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0)
 +			return NULL;
 +	}
 +	return s + prefixlen;
 +}
 +
 /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
 int
 set_nonblock(int fd)
 diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
 index 11340389..efecdf1a 100644
 --- a/misc.h
 +++ b/misc.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct ForwardOptions {
 char	*chop(char *);
 void	 rtrim(char *);
 void	skip_space(char **);
 +const char *strprefix(const char *, const char *, int);
 char	*strdelim(char **);
 char	*strdelimw(char **);
 int	 set_nonblock(int);
 diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
 index 3d9cc6db..9f559269 100644
 --- a/readconf.c
 +++ b/readconf.c
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
     struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host,
     int final_pass, int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum)
 {
 -	char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *host, *criteria;
 +	char *arg, *oattrib = NULL, *attrib = NULL, *cmd, *host, *criteria;
 	const char *ruser;
 	int r, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 	debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
 	    full_line, host, original_host);
 -	while ((oattrib = attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
 +	while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
 +		attrib = oattrib = xstrdup(attrib);
 		/* Terminate on comment */
 		if (*attrib == '#') {
 			argv_consume(acp);
@@ -777,9 +778,23 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 			    this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
 			continue;
 		}
 +
 +		/* Keep this list in sync with below */
 +		if (strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1)  != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "originalhost=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "localuser=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "localnetwork=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "tagged=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "exec=", 1) != NULL) {
 +			arg = strchr(attrib, '=');
 +			*(arg++) = '\0';
 +		} else {
 +			arg = argv_next(acp, avp);
 +		}
 +
 		/* All other criteria require an argument */
 -		if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL ||
 -		    *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
 +		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
 			result = -1;
 			goto out;
@@ -856,6 +871,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 		    criteria == NULL ? "" : criteria,
 		    criteria == NULL ? "" : "\"");
 		free(criteria);
 +		free(oattrib);
 +		oattrib = attrib = NULL;
 	}
 	if (attributes == 0) {
 		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
@@ -865,6 +882,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
  out:
 	if (result != -1)
 		debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
 +	free(oattrib);
 	free(host);
 	return result;
 }
 diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
 index 89b8413e..dd774f46 100644
 --- a/servconf.c
 +++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.418 2024/09/15 03:09:44 djm Exp $ */
 +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.419 2024/09/25 01:24:04 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
     int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 {
 	int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
 -	char *arg, *attrib;
 +	char *arg, *attrib = NULL, *oattrib;
 	if (ci == NULL)
 		debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", full_line);
@@ -1047,7 +1047,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 		    ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
 	}
 -	while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
 +	while ((oattrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
 +		attrib = xstrdup(oattrib);
 		/* Terminate on comment */
 		if (*attrib == '#') {
 			argv_consume(acp); /* mark all arguments consumed */
@@ -1062,16 +1063,20 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 			    *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) {
 				error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
 				    "Match attributes");
 -				return -1;
 +				result = -1;
 +				goto out;
 			}
 			if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#')
 				argv_consume(acp); /* consume remaining args */
 -			return 1;
 +			result = 1;
 +			goto out;
 		}
 		/* Criterion "invalid-user" also has no argument */
 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "invalid-user") == 0) {
 -			if (ci == NULL)
 +			if (ci == NULL) {
 +				result = 0;
 				continue;
 +			}
 			if (ci->user_invalid == 0)
 				result = 0;
 			else
@@ -1078,11 +1081,26 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 				debug("matched invalid-user at line %d", line);
 			continue;
 		}
 +
 +		/* Keep this list in sync with below */
 +		if (strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "group=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "address=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "localaddress=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "localport=", 1) != NULL ||
 +		    strprefix(attrib, "rdomain=", 1) != NULL) {
 +			arg = strchr(attrib, '=');
 +			*(arg++) = '\0';
 +		} else {
 +			arg = argv_next(acp, avp);
 +		}
 +
 		/* All other criteria require an argument */
 -		if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL ||
 -		    *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
 +		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
 -			return -1;
 +			result = -1;
 +			goto out;
 		}
 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
 			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
@@ -1105,7 +1123,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 				match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user");
 			switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
 			case -1:
 -				return -1;
 +				result = -1;
 +				goto out;
 			case 0:
 				result = 0;
 			}
@@ -1141,7 +1160,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 				result = 0;
 				break;
 			case -2:
 -				return -1;
 +				result = -1;
 +				goto out;
 			}
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
 			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
@@ -1166,13 +1186,15 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 				result = 0;
 				break;
 			case -2:
 -				return -1;
 +				result = -1;
 +				goto out;
 			}
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
 			if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
 				error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
 				    arg);
 -				return -1;
 +				result = -1;
 +				goto out;
 			}
 			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
 				result = 0;
@@ -1200,16 +1222,21 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
 				debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at "
 				    "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line);
 		} else {
 -			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
 -			return -1;
 +			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", oattrib);
 +			result = -1;
 +			goto out;
 		}
 +		free(attrib);
 +		attrib = NULL;
 	}
 	if (attributes == 0) {
 		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
 		return -1;
 	}
 -	if (ci != NULL)
 + out:
 +	if (ci != NULL && result != -1)
 		debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
 +	free(attrib);
 	return result;
 }
 diff --git a/regress/cfginclude.sh b/regress/cfginclude.sh
 index d442cdd6..97fd816f 100644
 --- a/regress/cfginclude.sh
 +++ b/regress/cfginclude.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $
 +#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 tid="config include"
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
 Match host a
 	Hostname aa
 -Match host b # comment
 +Match host=b # comment
 	Hostname bb
 	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Match host c
 	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
 	Hostname cc
 -Match host m
 +Match host=m !user xxxyfake
 	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # comment
 Host d
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Match host xxxxxx
 _EOF
 cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
 -Match host a
 +Match host=a
 	Hostname aaa
 Match host b
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
 Match host a
 	Hostname aaaa
 -Match host b
 +Match host=b !user blahblahfake
 	Hostname bbbb
 -Match host c
 +Match host=c
 	Hostname cccc
 Host d
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ trial a aa
 # cleanup
 rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
 -#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $
 +#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 tid="config include"
 diff --git a/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
 index 05a66685..2737a5f9 100644
 --- a/regress/cfgmatch.sh
 +++ b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.13 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
 +#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.14 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 tid="sshd_config match"
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ start_client()
 			kill $client_pid
 			fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
 		fi
 -	done	
 +	done
 }
 stop_client()
@@ -119,40 +119,42 @@ stop_client
 # requires knowledge of actual group memberships user running the test).
 params="user:user:u1 host:host:h1 address:addr:1.2.3.4 \
     localaddress:laddr:5.6.7.8 rdomain:rdomain:rdom1"
 -cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
 -echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
 -for i in $params; do
 -	config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
 -	criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
 -	value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
 -	cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
 -	    Match $config $value
 -	      Banner /$value
 +for separator in " " "=" ; do
 +	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
 +	echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
 +	for i in $params; do
 +		config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
 +		criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
 +		value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
 +		cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
 +		    Match ${config}${separator}${value}
 +		      Banner /$value
 EOD
 -done
 +	done
 -${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
 -    fail "validate config for w/out spec"
 -
 -# Test matching each criteria.
 -for i in $params; do
 -	testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
 -	expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
 -	spec=""
 -	for j in $params; do
 -		config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
 -		criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
 -		value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
 -		if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
 -			spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
 -		else
 -			spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
 +	${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
 +	    fail "validate config for w/out spec"
 +
 +	# Test matching each criteria.
 +	for i in $params; do
 +		testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
 +		expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
 +		spec=""
 +		for j in $params; do
 +			config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
 +			criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
 +			value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
 +			if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
 +				spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
 +			else
 +				spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
 +			fi
 +		done
 +		trace "test spec $spec"
 +		result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
 +		    awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
 +		if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
 +			fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
 		fi
 	done
 -	trace "test spec $spec"
 -	result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
 -	    awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
 -	if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
 -		fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
 -	fi
 done
 diff --git a/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
 index 518a703d..f67c3caa 100644
 --- a/regress/servcfginclude.sh
 +++ b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ tid="server config include"
 cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
 HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
 -Match host a
 +Match host=a
 	Banner /aa
 Match host b
 	Banner /bb
 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
 -Match host c
 +Match host=c
 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
 	Banner /cc
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Match Host e
 	Banner /ee
 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 -Match Host f
 +Match Host=f
 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 	Banner /ff
@@ -47,13 +47,13 @@ Match host b
 Match host c
 	Banner /ccc
 -Match Host d
 +Match Host=d
 	Banner /ddd
 Match Host e
 	Banner /eee
 -Match Host f
 +Match Host=f
 	Banner /fff
 _EOF
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
 Match host a
 	Banner /aaaa
 -Match host b
 +Match host=b
 	Banner /bbbb
 Match host c # comment
 	Banner /cccc
 -Match Host d
 +Match Host=d
 	Banner /dddd
 Match Host e
--- a/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch
@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
 diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
 index 679446e9..2b5d3960 100644
 --- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
 +++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
 +/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:59 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2023 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 +#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
 +# include <endian.h>
 +#endif
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 diff --git a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
 index a82d60e8..b8ac1436 100644
 --- a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
 +++ b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 -/*  $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
 +/*  $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $ */
 +
 /* Extracted from libcrux revision 84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35 */
 /*
@@ -160,18 +161,19 @@ static inline void Eurydice_slice_to_array3(uint8_t *dst_tag, char *dst_ok,
 // CORE STUFF (conversions, endianness, ...)
 static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes(uint64_t v, uint8_t buf[8]) {
 +  v = htole64(v);
   memcpy(buf, &v, sizeof(v));
 }
 static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[8]) {
   uint64_t v;
   memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v));
 -  return v;
 +  return le64toh(v);
 }
 static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[4]) {
   uint32_t v;
   memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v));
 -  return v;
 +  return le32toh(v);
 }
 static inline uint32_t core_num__u8_6__count_ones(uint8_t x0) {
 diff --git a/mlkem768.sh b/mlkem768.sh
 index 2fdc2831..3d12b2ed 100644
 --- a/mlkem768.sh
 +++ b/mlkem768.sh
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 -#       $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.2 2024/09/04 05:11:33 djm Exp $
 +#       $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.3 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $
 #       Placed in the Public Domain.
 #
 -WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main"
 +#WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main"
 +WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35"
 FILES="
 	libcrux/libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ echo '#define KRML_NOINLINE __attribute__((noinline, unused))'
 echo '#define KRML_HOST_EPRINTF(...)'
 echo '#define KRML_HOST_EXIT(x) fatal_f("internal error")'
 echo
 +
 for i in $FILES; do
 	echo "/* from $i */"
 	# Changes to all files:
@@ -56,11 +58,16 @@ for i in $FILES; do
 	    -e 's/[	 ]*$//' \
 	    $i | \
 	case "$i" in
 -	# XXX per-file handling goes here.
 +	*/libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h)
 +		# Replace endian functions with versions that work.
 +		perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes.*\n)([^}]*\n)/\1  v = htole64(v);\n\2/' |
 +		perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le64toh(v);/s' |
 +		perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le32toh(v);/s'
 +		;;
 	# Default: pass through.
 	*)
 -	    cat
 -	    ;;
 +		cat
 +		;;
 	esac
 	echo
 done
--- a/openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5
 --- openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5.xxx	2024-10-11 12:01:14.260566303 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh_config.5	2024-10-11 12:01:59.725654775 +0200
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ or
 This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
 See
 .Xr ssh-keysign 8
 -for more information.
 +for more information. ssh-keysign should be installed explicitly.
 .It Cm EscapeChar
 Sets the escape character (default:
 .Ql ~ ) .
--- a/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
 diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
 index e2efdf06..0d0f6953 100644
 --- a/krl.c
 +++ b/krl.c
@@ -674,6 +674,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
 			break;
 		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
 			if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
 +				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 				error_f("insane bitmap gap");
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -1059,6 +1060,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
 	}
 	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		error_f("alloc failed");
 		goto out;
 	}
 diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
 index 486f8515..9dea2cfc 100644
 --- a/packet.c
 +++ b/packet.c
@@ -1864,6 +1864,14 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &d, &len)) != 0)
 				return r;
 			DBG(debug("Received SSH2_MSG_PING len %zu", len));
 +			if (!ssh->state->after_authentication) {
 +				DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING in preauth"));
 +				break;
 +			}
 +			if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
 +				DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING during KEX"));
 +				break;
 +			}
 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_PONG)) != 0 ||
 			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, d, len)) != 0 ||
 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
 index 48973b2c..c27c5a95 100644
 --- a/ssh-agent.c
 +++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1220,6 +1220,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
 	    "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
 		if (*dcsp != NULL) {
 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
 +			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
@@ -1229,6 +1230,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
 			if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
 +				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 				goto out;
 			}
 			*dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
@@ -1246,6 +1248,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
 		}
 		if (*certs != NULL) {
 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
 +			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &v)) != 0 ||
@@ -1257,6 +1260,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
 			if (*ncerts >= AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS) {
 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
 +				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 				goto out;
 			}
 			*certs = xrecallocarray(*certs, *ncerts, *ncerts + 1,
@@ -1757,6 +1761,7 @@ process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
 	/* record new key/sid */
 	if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
 		error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
 +		r = -1;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
 diff --git a/ssh-sk-client.c b/ssh-sk-client.c
 index 321fe53a..06fad221 100644
 --- a/ssh-sk-client.c
 +++ b/ssh-sk-client.c
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
 		}
 		if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
 			error_f("calloc failed");
 +			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		srk->key = key;
@@ -450,6 +451,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
 		if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
 		    sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) {
 			error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
 +			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 			goto out;
 		}
 		debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks,
 diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
 index a69c4da1..1ee6000a 100644
 --- a/sshconnect2.c
 +++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
 	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
 		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
 -	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
 +	    xxx_conn_info) != 0)
 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -699,6 +699,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 	if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
 		debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
 +		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 		goto done;
 	}
 	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
 		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
 		    key->type, pktype);
 +		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 		goto done;
 	}
@@ -728,6 +730,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
 		error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s",
 		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
 +		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 		goto done;
 	}
 	ident = format_identity(id);
 diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
 index 6e03c0b0..3da005d6 100644
 --- a/sshsig.c
 +++ b/sshsig.c
@@ -879,6 +879,7 @@ cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum,
 	}
 	if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
 		error_f("buffer error");
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	/* success */
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@ -46,10 +46,10 @@
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
-%global openssh_ver 9.8p1
+%global openssh_ver 9.9p1
-%global openssh_rel 3
+%global openssh_rel 4
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
-%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 10
+%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 13
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
 Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
 Patch202: openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
 # Correctly audit hostname and IP address
 Patch203: openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch
 # --- pam_ssh-agent ---
 # make it build reusing the openssh sources
@ -145,7 +143,7 @@ Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
 # Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
 # upstream MR:
 # https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
-Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+Patch800: openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
 #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
 Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
 # add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
@ -156,8 +154,6 @@ Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
 Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
 # Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
 Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
 # Rewriting OpenSSH GSS KEX to use new packet API
 Patch806: openssh-9.6p1-gsskex-new-api.patch
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
 Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@ -190,9 +186,6 @@ Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
 # clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
 Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
 # Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
 # TODO fix the comment above ^
 Patch963: openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
 # Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
 Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 # sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
@ -228,11 +221,22 @@ Patch1002: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
 # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
 Patch1006: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
-Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
+Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
 Patch1013: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
 Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
 Patch1015: openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
 Patch1016: openssh-9.9p1-separate-keysign.patch
 # upstream cf3e48ee8ba1beeccddd2f203b558fa102be67a2
 # upstream 0c3927c45f8a57b511c874c4d51a8c89414f74ef
 Patch1017: openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch
 # upstream 3f02368e8e9121847727c46b280efc280e5eb615
 # upstream 67a115e7a56dbdc3f5a58c64b29231151f3670f5
 Patch1020: openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch
 # upstream 6ce00f0c2ecbb9f75023dbe627ee6460bcec78c2
 # upstream 0832aac79517611dd4de93ad0a83577994d9c907
 Patch1021: openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
 # upstream fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367
 Patch1022: openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch
 License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@ -285,6 +289,10 @@ Summary: An open source SSH client applications
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
 %package keysign
 Summary: A helper program used for host-based authentication
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 %package server
 Summary: An open source SSH server daemon
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
@ -330,6 +338,11 @@ OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
 the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
 %description keysign
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. ssh-keysign is a
 helper program used for host-based authentication disabled by default.
 %description server
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
@ -393,7 +406,6 @@ popd
 %patch -P 801 -p1 -b .force_krb
 %patch -P 804 -p1 -b .ccache_name
 %patch -P 805 -p1 -b .k5login
 %patch -P 806 -p1 -b .gsskex-new-api
 # 
 %patch -P 901 -p1 -b .kuserok
 %patch -P 906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
@ -410,7 +422,6 @@ popd
 %patch -P 951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
 %patch -P 953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
 %patch -P 962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
 %patch -P 963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
 %patch -P 964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
 %patch -P 965 -p1 -b .visibility
 %patch -P 966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
@ -426,7 +437,6 @@ popd
 %patch -P 200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch -P 201 -p1 -b .audit-race
 %patch -P 202 -p1 -b .audit-log
 %patch -P 203 -p1 -b .audit-hostname
 %patch -P 700 -p1 -b .fips
 %patch -P 1002 -p1 -b .ssh-manpage
@ -434,9 +444,13 @@ popd
 %patch -P 1006 -p1 -b .negotiate-supported-algs
 %patch -P 1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-dh
 %patch -P 1013 -p1 -b .evp-fips-ecdh
 %patch -P 1014 -p1 -b .nosha1hostproof
 %patch -P 1015 -p1 -b .pam-rhost
 %patch -P 1016 -p1 -b .sep-keysign
 %patch -P 1017 -p1 -b .mlkembe
 %patch -P 1020 -p1 -b .match
 %patch -P 1021 -p1 -b .errcode_set
 %patch -P 1022 -p1 -b .disable-forwarding
 %patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity
@ -552,7 +566,7 @@ popd
 %endif
 %check
-%{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23}  # ./parallel_tests.sh parallel_tests.Makefile
+OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null %{SOURCE22} %{SOURCE23}  # ./parallel_tests.sh parallel_tests.Makefile
 %install
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
@ -666,8 +680,6 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
 %attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
 %files clients
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
@ -695,6 +707,10 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket
 %files keysign
 %attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
 %files server
 %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
@ -744,6 +760,28 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %endif
 %changelog
 * Mon May 19 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-4
 - CVE-2025-32728: Fix logic error in DisableForwarding option
  Resolves: rhbz#2358778
 * Tue Feb 18 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-3
 - Fix regression of Match directive processing
 - Fix missing error codes set and invalid error code checks in OpenSSH. It
  prevents memory exhaustion attack and a MITM attack when VerifyHostKeyDNS
  is on (CVE-2025-26465, CVE-2025-26466).
 * Mon Jan 27 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-2
 - Fix regression of Match directive processing
  Resolves: rhbz#2341769
 * Fri Jan 17 2025 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-1
 - Backport rebase to OpenSSH 9.9p1 from rawhide
 - Fix MLKEM for BE platforms
 - Separate ssh-keysign to a dedicated package
 * Tue Sep 03 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-3.1
 - Synchronize patches from Red Hat
 * Mon Aug 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.8p1-3
 - Sshd now proposes to enter password again when a non-existing user is specified
--- a/4
+++ b/4
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz) = 95dec2f18e58eb47994f3de4430253e0665e185564b65088ca5f4108870e05feddef8cda8d3c0a4b75f18b98cc2c024df0e27de53b48c1a16da8da483cb8292a
+SHA512 (openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz) = 3cc0ed97f3e29ecbd882eca79239f02eb5a1606fce4f3119ddc3c5e86128aa3ff12dc85000879fccc87b60e7d651cfe37376607ac66075fede2118deaa685d6d
-SHA512 (openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc) = 4df1f1be2c6ab7f3aebaedd0a773b0e8c8929abb30cd3415873ad55d012cfa113f792e888e5e772dd468c394aeb7e35d62893a514dbc0ab1a03acd79918657f7
+SHA512 (openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc) = 916e975c54eb68c0b2f0b0006522b241cbe54c4caa88d31537a6278490c93d9d732c2ab3a080ac084bf75cbdd5402901ec68583cbe7c7cde4a8e40e7a8b78c28
 SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
 SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21
--- a/sshd-keygen@.service
+++ b/sshd-keygen@.service
@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
 # Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
 # when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
 Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i
--- a/sshd.service
+++ b/sshd.service
@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 [Service]
 Type=notify
 # Set option as empty variable to suppress warnings upon expanding the command line
 # when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
 Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
--- a/sshd@.service
+++ b/sshd@.service
@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ After=sshd-keygen.target
 Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 [Service]
 # Set option as empty variable to avoid warnings upon expanding the command line
 # when the config file under /etc does not exist or is empty.
 Environment=OPTIONS=
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS
 StandardInput=socket
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Zoltan Fridrich	d40c8a38aa	CVE-2025-32728: Fix logic error in DisableForwarding option Resolves: rhbz#2358778 Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>	2025-05-19 10:25:55 +02:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	2608e2de3a	Fixes for CVE-2025-26465, CVE-2025-26466 and also some minor regressions	2025-02-18 15:21:47 +01:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	064da31af6	Fix regression of Match directive processing Resolves: rhbz#2341769	2025-01-27 14:05:53 +01:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	25272c68ef	Rebasing to OpenSSH 9.9p1 - Backport rebase to OpenSSH 9.9p1 from rawhide - Fix MLKEM for BE platforms - Separate ssh-keysign to a dedicated package	2025-01-17 12:49:45 +01:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	82b86d60c5	Eliminate memory leaks	2024-10-16 15:43:14 +02:00
Zoltan Fridrich	ceb1e2f209	Merge gssapi patches Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com>	2024-10-15 16:40:22 +02:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	23b9423768	Synchronize patches from Red Hat	2024-09-03 18:17:40 +02:00